Equities
Dear Client, In addition to an abridged Weekly Report, we are also including a Special Report written by our Global ETF Strategy team. BCA's Global ETF Strategy, launched in September joins comprehensive ETF analysis with BCA's global macroeconomic thematic research: its aim is to help clients connect the dots from BCA themes to individual ETF ticker symbols with real-time market expressions of our views. The team is currently producing a series of reports on smart-beta ETF selection, whereby they examine the key factors recognized by academia and investment practitioners as persistent drivers of market performance. In this second installment, the team focuses on dividend-focused funds. Although the team finds that dividends do not qualify as a true standalone factor consistently explaining equity returns, dividend policy can add to multi-factor models' explanatory power at the margin. Given the popularity of dividend investing, we think dividend policy could be a fruitful subject for further research. Best regards, Lenka Martinek Feature U.S. financial markets breathed a collective sigh of relief last week when the FOMC followed through on a fully discounted 25 bps rate hike, but did not increase the number of expected rate hikes for the year. In other words, the Fed successfully delivered a "dovish hike", thus reassuring investors that the policy sweet spot - the period when interest rates are rising but have not become restrictive - will last a while longer (Chart 1). Chart 1A "Dovish Hike" Chart 2Low Structural Unemployment Rate The Fed's assessment of the economy is not very different from our own, though there were a few details in the economic projections worth highlighting. First, the estimate for the structural rate of unemployment was scaled down further by a tenth of a percentage point to 4.7%. This may seem minor, but it suggests that policymakers believe the labor market has more running room before wage inflation moves higher. Granted, any forecast for structural unemployment should be taken with a dose of salt, but our bias throughout this cycle - and as outlined in our November Special Report - has been to expect wage inflation to lag relative to past cycles due to structural factors (Chart 2). And as can be seen in Chart 3, Japan provides a roadmap: in that country, demographic factors helped push the unemployment rate to below 3% without creating inflationary pressures. Of course, the U.S. economy is very different from Japan and we do not expect unemployment to drop as low. However, as occurred in Japan, we would not be surprised to see the FOMC trim its forecast for the structural unemployment rate further in the coming quarters. A related point is that the Fed also adjusted the wording of the FOMC statement regarding its inflation targets. The statement said that the Fed was looking for a "sustained" return to 2% inflation, while also referring to its inflation target as a "symmetric" one. Our interpretation is that the Fed is trying to clarify that it will not react too aggressively if core inflation were to drift somewhat above 2%. Clearly, the Fed is beginning to see the balance of risks toward higher inflation. That makes sense, given that the economy is operating close to full employment. However, we maintain that a sustained rise in inflation above the Fed's 2% core PCE target is not imminent. Indeed, the message from last week' CPI report reinforces our view that with the exception of a few components, inflation is very well contained (Chart 4). Our diffusion index of the major inflation components is in negative territory. Importantly, price surveys continue to show that businesses are not able to easily raise prices. For example, despite the continued optimism in the headline components of the NFIB small businesses survey, small businesses have not been able to - and do not yet anticipate being able to - raise prices. This reinforces our long-held view that after a long period of disinflation - and outright deflation in the retail sector - inflation expectations are extremely well-anchored and savvy consumers know how to extract a better deal. Core PCE inflation may converge on the Fed's target of 2% in the second half of 2017, but an inflation overshoot should not be a major driver of investment decision-making over the next 6-12 months. Chart 3Japan: A Low Unemployment Rate ##br##And Little Wage Inflation Chart 4Inflation ##br##Still Low In the end, it is Fed Chair Yellen's least sophisticated remarks that provide the best summation. During the FOMC press conference, she stated that "the simple message is the economy is doing well". Indeed, the moderate pace of growth that has prevailed since the beginning of the recovery means that the typical imbalances and pressure points that accumulate in the advanced stages of a business cycle are so far still absent. The backdrop overwhelmingly favors stocks relative to government bonds on a cyclical horizon. To be sure, equities are expensive, but as we wrote last week, relative to competing assets, valuations are not extreme. The greater near-term risk continues to be a phase of economic and earnings disappointments that could develop later this year, since there remains a tremendous amount of optimism in the business community regarding regime change in Washington. Note that the policy uncertainty index remains very elevated (Chart 5) and Trump's "skinny budget", which aims to slash spending across all discretionary items save military and veterans affairs, will be contested. Our geopolitical team notes that Democrats could threaten a government shutdown later this year to try to force Republicans' hand at removing the most controversial elements of the budget. Democrats can filibuster parts of the appropriations process which makes the concrete budget allocations. Chart 5Political Uncertainty Still Elevated On this basis, we remain skeptical that fiscal policy will be clean fuel for the equity bull market. However, we adhere to Yellen's "simple message" that the economy is on a stable footing. That implies that Washington disappointments will most likely lead to equity setbacks rather than a painful breakdown. Lenka Martinek, Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com Appendix Monthly Asset Allocation Model Update Our Asset Allocation (AA) model provides an objective assessment of the outlook for relative returns across equities, Treasuries and cash. It combines valuation, cyclical, monetary and technical indicators. The model was constructed as a capital preservation tool, and has historically outperformed the benchmark in large part by avoiding major equity bear markets. Please note that our official cyclical asset allocation recommendations deviate at times from the model's recommendation. The model is just one input to our decision process. The model's recommendation weightings for the major asset classes are unchanged: neutral equity exposure at 60% (benchmark 60%), neutral Treasury allocation at 30% (benchmark 30%) and cash at 10% (benchmark 10%). The diffusion index of the three components for The Equity Model remained neutral. The technical component "buy" signal strengthened, with sturdy advances for both the breadth & trend and momentum indicators. The monetary component, which measures overall liquidity conditions within the financial and economic system and designed to lead equity prices, is slightly more bullish and still favorable for equities. The earnings-driven component continues to give a cautious signal. Real operating earnings remain at a significant distance from positive economic expectations which have moved higher yet again. Moreover, earnings momentum is still sluggish, based on our earnings diffusion index, which compares nominal earnings growth relative to four key macro proxies for business costs. The model's recommendation for bonds remains at benchmark which still fits with our neutral qualitative stance for Treasuries in balanced portfolios since November 7, 2016. Although the cyclical component of the bond model is more constructive than the valuation component, the further deterioration in the technical component maintains the "sell" signal for Treasuries firmly in place. Chart 6Portfolio Total Returns Chart 7Current Model Recommendations Note: The asset allocation model is not necessarily consistent with the weighting recommendations of the Cyclical Investment Stance. For further information, please see our Special Report "Presenting Our U.S. Asset Allocation Model", February 6, 2009. Highlights Factor attribution began a half-century ago with the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM"). Although the CAPM itself has been superseded, selected factors have exerted a consistent influence on equity performance. The empirical evidence does not support including dividends among the proven factors, yet dividend-focused funds are the most numerous in the smart-beta universe. The ambiguity surrounding dividends' effect on equity performance leaves plenty of room for smart-beta purveyors to build a better mousetrap, but our own research suggests that they will have to do so with something other than purely dividend-related metrics. Reflecting the fact that many of the dividend funds already incorporate multi-factor inputs, we evaluate them based on their exposure to all of the metrics within our Equity Trading Strategy service's multi-factor model. Feature Welcome to the second installment of our series on smart-beta ETF selection. Over the course of the series, we intend to examine the factors widely recognized by academia and investment practitioners as persistent drivers of equity performance. Each Special Report will weigh the evidence for the factor's efficacy, consider the metrics that best reveal its presence and compare our ideal metrics with the metrics utilized by our proprietary Equity Trading Strategy ("ETS") multi-factor model. It will then evaluate the menu of smart-beta ETFs using either our ETS model's metrics or an augmented version of them. The series began last month with a review of the Value factor, enshrined by Fama and French's research, and the current subset of Value smart-beta ETFs.1 This month we examine Dividend smart-beta ETFs. Subsequent installments will examine Quality, Momentum and Volatility,2 and we will likely wrap up the series with a review of Multi-Factor smart-beta ETFs. This installment provides some background on factor investing and the smart-beta process before subjecting Yield (Dividends) to scrutiny to determine whether or not it really constitutes a standalone equity factor. Back To The Beginning The ubiquity of beta in discussions of investing performance originates from the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM"), as advanced by William Sharpe and other researchers in the early 1960's. The CAPM posits that the expected return of stock XYZ is solely a function of XYZ's riskiness relative to the overall equity market. XYZ's riskiness is a function of its covariance with the market, and is represented in the CAPM's simple linear model as the coefficient "beta.3" The elegantly simple CAPM holds that any stock's expected return (E(rs)) is the sum of the risk-free rate (rf) and the product of its beta (ßs) and the difference between the expected market return (E(rm)) and the risk-free rate (rf): E(rs) = rf + ßs x (E(rm) - rf) As noted by several researchers, including Eugene Fama and Kenneth French,4 CAPM's return predictions are woefully errant when applied to stocks. As Chart 1 indicates, the returns projected by the CAPM bear little relationship to empirical results. It turns out that low-beta stocks have systematically outperformed high-beta stocks on a risk-adjusted basis (Chart 2), just as low-book-multiple stocks have crushed high-book-multiple stocks without regard for beta (Chart 3). This is powerful evidence for value, and for the low-volatility factor that we will examine in a subsequent report, but it is damning for the simple application of the CAPM to stocks. Chart 1CAPM Sounded Great In Theory ... Chart 2... But It Flopped In Practice Chart 3Low-Book-Multiple Stocks Systematically ##br##Flout CAPM Predictions A New Vocabulary Despite its empirical shortcomings, the CAPM provides an intuitive way of conceptualizing the risk-return tradeoff, and it paved the way for the asset-pricing research that followed it. The notion that individual securities' risks come in two flavors, market and idiosyncratic, is a critical element of portfolio theory and its thou-shalt-diversify commandment. It is also the basis, as we shall see, for beta, alpha and the factor-investing approach enabled by smart-beta ETFs. For that application, let us add an alpha term to the CAPM to account for the component of realized returns that cannot be explained by market exposures: rs = rf + ßs x (E(rm) - rf) + a Rearranging terms to solve for alpha shows it to be the difference between the realized return and the return expected by CAPM: a = rs - (rf + ßs x (E(rm) - rf)) From CAPM To Factors To Smart Beta In today's accepted usage, alpha is the ex-post difference between portfolio and benchmark return, adjusted for risk. It is the component of return attributed to portfolio manager skill, whereas beta is the return accruing to simple market exposure. As return-attribution research has uncovered the systematic factors underpinning performance, beta has claimed an increasing share of the pie from alpha. The salubrious effect for investors, especially those who employ third-party managers, has been to demystify the sources of portfolio returns. Beta's expanding share has also opened the door to a middle course between purely active and purely passive portfolio management strategies. Factor research has made it possible to join the main advantages of passive strategies - transparency, predictability and low cost - with active strategies' aim of delivering a risk-adjusted return profile distinct from those offered by cap-weighted benchmarks. Investors have embraced the factor approach and traditional asset managers have obliged them with a torrent of smart-beta ETF choices. Both should put investors on alert: according to the late Barton Biggs, there is no investment idea so good that it can't be destroyed by too much money, and fund company enthusiasm may correlate more closely with its own profits than its clients'. Biggs' admonition is always on our mind, but we don't think the established factors are in imminent danger of losing their zest. Factor excess returns are not new news. 25 years after Fama and French's paper, low-book-multiple stocks continue to outperform high-book-multiple stocks and smaller stocks continue to outperform larger stocks. We do not see the comparatively modest aggregate smart-beta ETF AUM as a catalyst for bidding away the returns that have durably accrued to factors. Are Dividends Really An Equity Factor? For the purposes of this report, our first objective is to determine whether or not Dividends can properly be considered a factor alongside the big five (Value, Quality, Momentum, Volatility and Size). Unable to find compelling evidence for their inclusion, we do not think they should. Yield may be a promising factor in fixed income, but extending the concept to equities is problematic. Across all capitalization buckets for the last 20 years, it cannot even be said that dividend payers outperform non-dividend payers (Chart 4). The empirical record for more sophisticated slicing and dicing is mixed, depending on the level of granularity. Breaking the universe of U.S. equities into non-dividend payers and dividend payers, and then segmenting the latter by yield into the lowest three deciles, the median four deciles and the highest three deciles, Fama and French's 90-year dataset supports the idea that higher-yielding stocks generate higher total returns (Chart 5). The breakout is neatly consistent, with dividend payers outperforming non-dividend payers, and each yield cohort of the dividend payers outperforming the lower-yielding cohorts beneath it (Chart 6, top panel). Zoom into the dividend payers at the quintile and decile levels, however, and the consistency disappears as the tidy staircase pattern begins instead to resemble a jagged picket fence (Chart 6, lower panels). Chart 4Dividends Have Been Hazardous To Investors' ##br##Wealth Over The Last 20 Years ... Chart 5... Though They've Rewarded Investors ##br##Over Nine Decades Chart 6Not Ready For A Close-Up Adjusting for risk makes the picture even murkier. While the non-payers and the lowest-yielding cohorts always post the smallest risk-adjusted returns, they are the only cohorts the highest-yielders manage to beat. The median 40 is the winner among our 30-40-30 cohorts, while the fourth and the second quintiles bracketing the median 40 easily outpace the top quintile, and the eighth, fourth and seventh deciles break away from the rest of the decile pack (Chart 7). It should come as no surprise that our long top 30%/short bottom 30% litmus test failed to reveal any viable excess return strategies based on dividend yields. Our attempts to develop simple portfolio construction rules based on markers of dividend quality and sustainability failed to conclusively advance the dividend cause. Long/short strategies founded on dividend growth added no value to a simple portfolio built from dividend yield and change in share count (Chart 8). Payout ratio metrics, which might shed some light on both quality and sustainability, provided pretty solid results, but they weren't enormous winners (Chart 9). Our analysis left us unable to conclude that Yield merits inclusion among the established equity factors. Chart 7No Theme To Risk-Adjusted Return Profiles Chart 8No Viable Long/Short Dividend-Growth Strategy ... Chart 9... But Payout Ratios Work Pretty Well An Ideal Dividend Index The fact that the way forward for dividend strategies is not obvious is good news for smart-beta sponsors. The ambiguity leaves plenty of room for developing better index-construction methods. Some sources of improvement might include: A means of identifying and sidestepping "yield traps," high and/or growing yields that are actually a distress signal. A way to review historical metrics to gain a sense of ongoing dividend growth. An evaluation of a dividend's source, valuing dividends supported by operating cash flows more highly than those supported by financing activities or asset dispositions. A process for limiting sector exposures, and an awareness of the most auspicious backdrops for taking on exposure to specialized yield plays like mortgage REITs, MLPs and BDCs. Ticking off every item on this wish list, however, would necessarily involve infringing on other factors' turf. Quality, Value, Size and Volatility could all spill into the process of assessing dividend quality and sustainability. Given that our attempts at creating our own tests to measure up to the wish list came up empty, it seems that a cross-disciplinary approach might be the only option. Even if the indexes are not based completely on dividend-derived metrics, it may be possible for a few dividend accents to add some incremental value to the overall stew. Smart-Beta Fund Evaluation These issues were on our mind when we set out to define the metrics that we would use to evaluate the indexes created by our Dividend smart-beta ETF subset. The two payout metrics in the ETS model, dividend yield and change in shares outstanding, are pretty thin gruel for evaluating the dividend ETFs. The ETS payout metrics were selected based on their interaction with the Value, Safety, Quality, Momentum and Sentiment metrics, 23 in all, that comprise the rest of the stock-level inputs into our model. They were not intended to be stand-alone measures. Many of the ETFs in our subset explicitly screen for Quality, Value and/or Low Volatility. They could just as accurately be described as multi-factor funds in a dividend-first wrapper, and we have therefore deployed the entire ETS model to evaluate them. To assess whether or not their constituent selection process consistently improves upon a simple dividend strategy, we compare their ETS scores to those of VIG, the Vanguard Dividend Appreciation ETF, which tracks the NASDAQ US Dividend Achievers Select Index of stocks (ex-REITs and LPs) with at least 10 consecutive years of dividend increases. First Trust Rising Dividend Achievers ETF (RDVY) RDVY's ETS scores have stood out from its smart-beta peers' since the fund's inception at the beginning of 2014. Its concentrated 50-stock portfolio allows it to focus on exposure to its preferred growth and sustainability metrics. Only stocks that have grown their dividends over 3- and 5-year periods, and their non-zero earnings per share over a 3-year period, make it through the growth filters. The sustainability filters admit only stocks with cash-to-debt ratios of at least 50% and dividend payout ratios of 65% or less. Chart 10Good Things Come To Those Who Wait Although the fund has outperformed VIG since inception, its relative performance has not been nearly as consistent as its relative ETS scores (Chart 10). It has taken a 40% surge over the 12 months ended February 28th to put RDVY over the top. We recognize that performance can be capricious, however, and place more weight on RDVY's consistently stellar relative ETS scores, which are 20% more, on average, than its smart-beta peers'.5 RDVY's 50-basis-point ("bps") expense ratio exceeds the 36-bps group average, but we think its screens and concentration are worth the incremental 14 bps. The fund is on the smaller side with $127 million of AUM, and daily turnover of just over $2 million, but larger investors can make use of the creation/redemption unit process to transact in larger volumes without concern. We recommend RDVY for investors seeking large- and mid-cap dividend exposure. FlexShares Quality Dividend Index Fund (QDF) QDF stands second to RDVY on an ETS score basis. Its relative scores have been remarkably stable, rarely falling below 110% en route to averaging 113% of the aggregate Dividend smart-beta score. QDF's selection process is proprietary, and it incorporates measures of cash flow, profitability, and management's skill at deploying capital and financing its activities. The mix has enabled QDF to outperform VIG from the get-go, and steadily pad its lead ever since (Chart 11). Its 37-bps expense ratio is right in line with the group's and its $1.7 billion AUM and $5 million average daily turnover provide a nice sense of ballast. We recommend QDF, along with RDVY, as the best Dividend smart-beta options. Chart 11Wire-To-Wire Outperformance WisdomTree MidCap Dividend Fund (DON) O'Shares FTSE US Quality Dividend ETF (OUSA) WisdomTree has been a pioneer in creating dividend-weighted indexes, but the formula it's applied to selecting constituents for DON, its mid-cap dividend ETF, has not found favor with the ETS model. The fund's constituents have repeatedly earned an aggregate ETS score below 40, holding its relative score below 80% for extended periods. OUSA is a newer fund, with less than a year of history, but its ETS scores have been noticeably weak. We would avoid OUSA until it compiles enough of a track record to permit more conclusions about its process and we would advise investors seeking targeted mid-cap exposure to gain it via funds other than DON. Dividends' Curious Attraction Our work in researching this Special Report has brought dividends' many contradictions to light. In countries like the U.S., where ordinary income is taxed at a higher rate than capital gains, dividends represent an especially tax-inefficient way of redeeming a portion of one's investment. Either share buybacks or sales to third parties would yield more after-tax cash. Humans feel a strong pull to book gains, and steadily redeeming portions of a successful investment has an intuitive emotional appeal: "Let's quit while we're ahead, let's go while the getting is good." It's exactly the wrong thing to do with investments, however. If the quarterly dividend flow assuages the remorse over a mistaken investment, encouraging an investor to stick with a losing position, it's even worse. It is possible that dividends, even though they're small, help reinforce our innate resistance to selling losers and letting winners run. From management's perspective, legacy dividend payments can act as handcuffs. Fearful of issuing a signal that is sure to be interpreted negatively by the market, firms take pains to refrain from cutting dividends. Dividend declarations, then, are a part of the capital budgeting process that is not rooted in economics. A rigorously utility-maximizing visitor from outer space may have found the oil majors' borrowing to fund their dividends in the midst of the severe downturn in crude prices to be very odd indeed. All of these shortcomings may help explain why we were unable to find clear evidence that dividends exert a clear and consistent influence on stock prices. And yet, dividends are enormously popular, with dividend funds by far outnumbering every other flavor of smart-beta ETF. We, too, like to think of positions in balanced portfolios on a total-return basis, as does our U.S. Investment Strategy service, which has successfully recommended the Dividend Aristocrats much longer than we have. Total return is important, but we are increasingly leaning toward the view that specialty dividend plays, purchased at the right point of the cycle, are the best way for an investor to capture income from equity holdings. Such an all-or-nothing approach may well be superior to the one-foot-in, one-foot-out stance that is embodied by the average 2% large-cap dividend yield. Our U.S. Investment Strategy service has successfully surfed the cyclical wave in mortgage REITs, and we are attempting to do so now with the inclusion of BIZD, the business development company ETF, in our U.S. portfolios. Adding cycle analysis would make our smart-beta studies too long, but we are conducting research into the interaction between factor performance and cycle phases, and we will share our findings with our clients in standalone Special Reports if they are insightful enough to merit their attention. Doug Peta, Vice President Global ETF Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com Jennifer Lacombe, Research Analyst Global ETF Strategy Jenniferl@bcaresearch.com Philippe Morissette, Associate Vice President Equity Trading Strategy philippem@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global ETF Strategy/Equity Trading Strategy Special Report, "Smart-Beta ETF Selection, Part I - Value Funds," published February 15, 2017, at etf.bcaresearch.com. 2 Size may be too straightforward to allow for an index-construction edge. 3 Stock XYZ's beta is equal to the covariance of its returns with the market's returns, divided by the variance of the market's returns, where its covariance with the market equals its returns' correlation with the market's times the product of XYZ's volatility and the market's volatility. 4 Fama, Eugene F. and French, Kenneth R., "The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 18, Number 3 (Summer 2004), pp. 25-46. 5Befitting its benchmark status, VIG’s ETS scores have averaged 99.8% of the entire subset’s since inception.
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Contrary to popular perception, non-cyclical sectors have led the market so far this year, while deep cyclical sectors are breaking down, in relative performance terms. Our models point to more of the same ahead. The oversold rebound in the pharmaceutical group may soon run into resistance so we recommend trimming positions to neutral. Put the proceeds into restaurants, a quasi-defensive group that enjoys a brightening sales outlook without pharma's political and regulatory risk. Recent Changes S&P Pharmaceuticals - Downgrade to neutral. S&P Restaurants - Upgrade to overweight. Table 1 Feature Equities are exhibiting signs of mild fatigue. Breadth has begun to narrow, and new highs have sagged compared with new lows (Chart 1). Both of these technical developments have warned of previous tactical pullbacks. The recent reset in oil prices may also test investor nerves. Oil prices have been a critical macro variable, because they influence inflation expectations and the corporate bond market (high yield bond spreads shown inverted, Chart 1). Crude oil price corrections have accurately timed equity retreats (Chart 1), and general risk aversion phases. To be sure, the global economy is no longer on a deflationary precipice, suggesting that weaker oil prices may not foreshadow a soft patch, but they may be a good enough excuse for profit taking in the equity market after a good run. Contrary to popular perception, cyclical sectors have not led the broad market so far in 2017. In fact, energy, materials and industrials have all broken down in relative performance terms (Chart 2), after peaking in mid-December. Only the technology sector has stayed resilient. Chart 1Short-Term Fatigue Chart 2Cyclicals Have Broken Down Chart 3Overshoot Renormalization Insipid cyclical sector performance has occurred within the context of a synchronized lift in global economic growth and recovering corporate sector pricing power. So why are cyclical sectors lagging? It may simply be a digestion phase. However, a different interpretation is that a number of key macro factors fail to confirm the durability of last year's outperformance, suggesting that defensive outperformance could last. Concerns that the current global inventory cycle may not morph into a broad-based upturn in global final demand continue to linger: the global credit impulse remains anemic, the Fed and China are tightening monetary policy and commodity markets are cracking (Chart 3). The lack of any meaningful improvement in Chinese loan demand signals that the economy may be quick to cool as the authorities tap the breaks on credit growth. It would take a decisive depreciation in the U.S. dollar to boost the relative profit fortunes of capital spending-dependent cyclical sectors on a sustainable basis. On a more positive note, the Fed's benign forward guidance last week bears close attention. If the U.S. dollar loses upside support, particularly with the ECB contemplating a retreat from full throttle easing, it could change the investment landscape. By reminding markets that their inflation target is symmetric, the Fed signaled it will be willing to tolerate a modest inflation overshoot, which is positive for risk assets in the short run. A softer U.S. dollar would take the pressure off of developing countries, support commodity prices, and bolster our cyclical sector sales models and Cyclical Macro Indicators. However, Chart 4 shows that the objective message from our models remains consistent with continued defensive sector outperformance. With a more protectionist U.S. Administration, we remain reluctant to position exclusively for a much weaker dollar. The ongoing underperformance of emerging market equities relative to U.S. and global benchmarks reinforces that foreign-sourced profit growth continues to lag (Chart 5). Positioning for cyclical sector earnings outperformance requires healthier profits abroad, to spur a new capital investment cycle. Chart 4Heeding The Message From Our Models... Chart 5... And The Markets We will look to selectively add cyclical exposure when the objective message from our Indicators provides confirmation that earnings-driven outperformance lies ahead. At the moment, there is no such confirmation. In fact, the elevated reading in the SKEW index continues to signal that a defensive posture will optimize portfolio performance (Chart 5). In sum, we continue to characterize the broad market's current momentum as an overshoot phase, with additional technical upside potential, but the rally is starting to fray around the edges. In this environment, holding a mostly defensive basket with selective beta exposure is still recommended. Importantly, within the defensive universe, there are tweaks to be made, especially if the U.S. dollar stops rising. Fade The Pharmaceuticals Rebound Health care has been the second strongest of the eleven broad sectors year-to-date, contrary to popular perception. That is in line with the flattening yield curve, cresting in inflation expectations and a modest correction in oil prices (Chart 6), all of which have revived the allure of non-cyclical sectors. Moreover, our Cyclical Macro Indicator (CMI) for the health care sector remains firm, supported by the ongoing large pricing power advantage. Relative value is the most attractive it has been in five years. While the latter provides little timing help, it indicates low risk, especially with technical conditions still deeply oversold (Chart 7). Chart 6Health Care Is Storming Back Chart 7Still Cheap And Oversold The heavyweight pharmaceutical group has led the sector's tactical charge, recouping the ground lost, in relative performance terms, leading up to the U.S. election. While we were caught off guard by the severity of the pullback last September/October, we refrained from selling into an oversold market and noted our intention to lighten positions whenever the inevitable relief rally occurred. The time has come to execute on this thesis. Pharmaceutical stocks are very cheap and have discounted a hostile regulatory environment. The relative forward P/E is well below its historic mean, even though both 12-month and 5-year relative forward earnings growth expectations are depressed (Chart 8). Typically, the latter would serve to artificially inflate valuations. These conditions exist even though free cash flow growth remains strong; merger activity has been solid, albeit ebbing in recent months; and companies have used excess capital to reduce total shares outstanding (Chart 8). In other words, relative forward earnings would have to decline substantially to validate these expectations. Is this plausible? Much depends on the regulatory environment. While details of the U.S. Administration's proposal to replace the Affordable Care Act have started to leak out, final details are still elusive and legislative action is not imminent. So far, it appears as if a worst case scenario would see an increase in the number of uninsured Americans, with a rising cost of insurance (to the benefit of managed care companies). According to the Department of Health & Human Services, the uninsured rate of the U.S. population nearly halved from 16% in 2010 to 9% in 2015. That led to a lift in the number of procedures performed and bolstered hospital bottom lines. Hospitals are a major pharmaceutical buying group. Higher utilization rates fed increased pharmaceutical demand for a number of years. However, drug spending growth has dropped off, and if the legion of uninsured patients rises anew in the coming years, then hospital utilization rates will decline, taking drug consumption growth down with it. Moreover, Trump wants to streamline the FDA's approval process, which would ultimately boost the number of high margin new drugs coming to market. Drug stocks boomed back in the mid-1990s, the last time FDA approval rates accelerated meaningfully (Chart 9). Chart 8Full Capitulation Chart 9Full Capitulation But at the same time, if government is given leeway to negotiate drug prices directly with drug companies, then pricing power will continue to converge down toward overall corporate sector pricing power, especially if drug consumption rates ease (Chart 9). At the moment, drug consumption growth remains above the rate of overall consumption growth, but that is much slower than during the boom following the introduction of the Affordable Care Act. Retail sales at pharmacies are growing robustly, and hospitals are still adding staff, signaling that they continue to position for expansion, i.e. rising procedure volumes (Chart 10). On the downside, the strong U.S. dollar is a big drag on top-line growth. Drug imports exceed exports by a wide margin, resulting in a negative trade balance and a drag on U.S. drug company profits, all else equal. The combination of a sales growth deceleration and adequate channel inventories has capped drug output growth (Chart 10). That is a productivity and profit margin headwind. Against this background, the industry will need an external assist to deliver profit outperformance. Relative profit estimates rise when disinflationary forces reign supreme, as measured by the NFIB planned price hikes series (shown inverted, Chart 11). This measure of future corporate pricing power intentions has rolled over, but broader measures of inflation are creeping higher. Ergo, drug earnings forecasts may be challenged to keep pace with the overall corporate sector. Chart 10... But Growth Rates Are Slowing Chart 11Mixed Signals The good news is that even though U.S. dollar strength is an export drag, the negative drug trade balance suggests that it will hurt other industries more. Indeed, a rising currency often coincides with profit outperformance (Chart 11). There is not enough evidence that exogenous factors will offset slowing domestic drug consumption growth. In all, the case for a further and sustained relative performance recovery has weakened, and we are taking advantage of this year's oversold bounce to move to the sidelines. Bottom Line: Trim the S&P pharmaceuticals index to neutral. This position was deep in the money initially, but last year's downdraft pushed it into a loss position of 10%. BLBG: S5PHARX-JNJ, PFE, MRK, BMY, LLY, AGN, ZTS, MYL, PRGO, MNK. Restaurants: Increasing Appetite The broad consumer discretionary sector has been treading water, largely owing to fears that a border adjustment tax (BAT) will undermine the retailing sub-component. This consolidation has restored value and created an attractive technical entry point (Chart 12, bottom panel). Importantly, industry earnings fundamentals are on the upswing. Our consumer discretionary sector Cyclical Macro Indicator has perked up (Chart 12), supported by an increase in wages, and more recently, the decline in oil prices. The latter is freeing up disposable income, which consumers have an incentive to spend given that household net worth (HNW) has climbed to all-time highs as a percent of disposable income (Chart 13). Chart 12A Good Place To Shop Chart 13Piggyback The Wealth Effect While we remain overweight housing related equities (homebuilders and home improvement retailers) in addition to our upbeat view on the media and advertising complex, a buying opportunity has surfaced in the neglected S&P restaurants index. We booked gains on an underweight position and lifted exposure to neutral back in late-October. Since then, value has improved further, while leading sales indicators continue to firm. Stronger consumer finances should flow into the casual dining industry. Sales have already started to reaccelerate, and should climb further based on the leading message from HNW (Chart 14). The lower income, $15K-$35K, cohort is also feeling increasingly confident, according to the latest Conference Board survey data (Chart 14). Meanwhile, the National Association of Restaurants Performance Index has regained momentum (Chart 15), signaling increased activity and rising confidence among restaurateurs. While the gap between the cost of dining out and dining in remains wide, it has begun to narrow, which is a plus for store traffic, all else equal. Chart 14Buy Into Weakness Chart 15At A Turning Point Domestically... Chart 16... And Globally? Our restaurants profit margin proxy (comprising restaurants CPI versus a blend of the industry's wage bill and food commodity costs) is trending higher. That is notable because it has a good track record in leading relative earnings growth estimates (Chart 15). Nevertheless, it is not all good news. International exposure remains a headache. Typically, soft EM currencies warn of translation drags on foreign sourced revenue (Chart 16). This cycle, there is an offset, as EM interest rates have come down, which is a plus for domestic demand (Chart 16). Thus, the headwind from outside the U.S. should abate as the year progresses. Adding it all up, factors are falling into place for a playable rally in the under-owned and unloved S&P restaurants index. This group offers attractive quasi-cyclical defensive exposure to replace the S&P pharmaceuticals index, without the political and regulatory risks. Bottom Line: Redeploy funds from the pharma downgrade and boost the S&P restaurants index to overweight. BLBG: S5REST-MCD, YUM, CMG, SBUX, DRI. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps. Favor growth over value (downgrade alert).
Highlights Once the Brexit starting gun is fired, the EU27's high-level guidelines and red lines will create more vulnerabilities and uncertainties for the U.K. than for the euro area. The BoE will be more boxed in than the ECB. Brexit trades have more legs. We describe four structural disruptors to economies and financial markets (on page 6). Our favourite structural investment themes are Personal Product equities, euro/yuan, and real estate in Spain, Ireland and Germany. Feature "Many in Great Britain expected a major calamity... but what happened was near enough nothing ." The citation above perfectly describes the 9 months that have elapsed since the U.K.'s June 23 2016 vote to exit the EU. In fact, it refers to the 9 months that elapsed after Britain declared war on Germany on September 3 1939 - a period of calm, militarily speaking, which became known as the 'Phoney War'.1 But outside the military sphere a lot did happen in the Phoney War. Most notably, a propaganda war ensued. On the night of September 3 1939 alone, the Royal Air Force dropped 6 million leaflets over Germany titled 'Note to the German People'. Chart of the WeekOne Big Correlated Trade: Pound/Euro And Eurostoxx600 Vs. FTSE100 Brexit Phoney War And The Markets Fast forward 77 years. The 9 months since the Brexit vote has also been a period of calm, economically speaking. Indeed, the U.K. economy has sailed along remarkably smoothly. And this has fuelled a propaganda war for those who believe that Brexit's economic impact will be near enough nothing. But outside the economic sphere, a lot has happened in the Brexit Phoney War: The pound has slumped 12% versus the euro and 17% versus the dollar. The FTSE100 has surged 16%, substantially outperforming the 8% gain in the Eurostoxx600 The U.K. 10-year gilt yield is down 40 bps when the equivalent German bund yield is up 40 bps and the equivalent U.S. Treasury yield is up 90 bps. These relative moves appear to reflect different asset class stories, but it is crucial to realise that: All of these relative moves are just one big correlated trade. The relative moves in bond yields have just tracked the expected differences in central bank policy rates two years ahead (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). This is exactly in line with the theory that a bond yield just equals the expected average interest rate over the bond's lifetime. Chart I-2Difficult Brexit = Gilt Yields Fall Vs. Bund Yields Chart I-3Difficult Brexit = Gilt Yields Fall Vs. T-Bond Yields Likewise, the moves in pound/dollar and pound/euro have also closely tracked the same expected differences in central bank policy rates (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Again, this is exactly in line with theory. Over short horizons, the biggest driver of exchange rates is fixed income cross-border portfolio flows - which always seek out the highest yield adjusted for hedging costs. Chart I-4Difficult Brexit = Pound/Euro Falls Chart I-5Difficult Brexit = Pound/Dollar Falls In turn, FTSE100 performance versus the Eurostoxx600 has near-perfectly tracked the inverse direction of pound/euro. Once more, this is exactly as theory would suggest. The FTSE100 and Eurostoxx600 are just a collection of multinational dollar-earning companies quoted in pounds and euros respectively. So when pound/euro weakens, the dollar earnings increase more in FTSE100 index terms than in Eurostoxx600 index terms, resulting in Eurostoxx600 underperformance (Chart of the Week). Now that the Brexit battle is about to begin in earnest, what will happen to these Brexit trades? Brexit Battle Begins It is not our intention here to forecast all the twists and turns of the Brexit battle. We will leave that to a later report. Instead, we just want to list the likely opening salvos. With Parliamentary approval now sealed, Theresa May is due to trigger Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty in the week commencing March 27 and thereby formally begin the Brexit battle. Expect the first EU27 response within 48 hours, probably through the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk. In this response, Tusk may also give the date for the first European Council 'Brexit' summit. This EU27 Brexit summit will take place within 8 weeks of the Article 50 trigger, and likely after the two-round French Presidential Election in April/May. At the Brexit summit, the EU27 will establish its strategy, high-level guidelines and red lines for the Brexit negotiations. The European Council will present these negotiating guidelines to the European Commission. Drawing upon its own legal and policy expertise, the Commission will then draft a mandate which sets out more technical details of each area of negotiation. Next, the Council of the EU2 must approve this draft mandate by qualified majority vote (obviously excluding the U.K.) Once approved, the European Commission can begin the detailed negotiations with the U.K., keeping within the final mandate's guidelines. But what does all this mean for investors? The preceding analysis showed that the dominant driver for all Brexit trades is the expected difference in central bank policy interest rates two years ahead. Recall that not long ago the BoE was vying with the Fed to be the first to hike rates in this cycle, while the ECB was likely to ease further. But after the Brexit vote and the resulting uncertainty about the U.K.'s position in the world, the tables have turned. The EU27's high-level negotiating guidelines and red lines are likely to create more vulnerabilities and uncertainties for the U.K. than for the euro area. And now, these vulnerabilities and uncertainties are amplified by Scotland First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, calling for a second referendum on Scottish Independence. For central bank policy, this means that the BoE will be hamstrung; whereas, absent any tail-events, the ECB can continue to back away from its extreme dovishness - a process that Draghi verbally started at the ECB Press Conference last week. Therefore, at least into the early summer, stay: Overweight U.K. gilts versus German bunds. Long euro/pound. Long FTSE100 versus Eurostoxx600 (or Eurostoxx50). Long U.K. Clothes and Apparel equities versus the market (Chart I-6). Short U.K. Real Estate equities versus the market (Chart I-7). But a word of warning for risk control. Remember that all five positions are in effect just one big correlated trade. So they will all work together, or they will all not work together! Chart I-6Difficult Brexit = U.K. Clothes And Apparel Outperforms Chart I-7Difficult Brexit = U.K. Real Estate Equities Underperform Four Disruptors The final section this week takes a wider-angle view of the world, and briefly highlights four structural disruptors to economies and financial markets in the coming years. Disruptor 1: Protectionism. Since the Great Recession, an extremely polarised distribution of economic growth has left most people's standard of living stagnant - despite seemingly decent headline economic growth and job creation (Chart I-8). Looking to find a scapegoat, economic nationalism and protectionism have resonated very strongly with voters in the U.K. and U.S. - resulting in Brexit and President Donald Trump. Other voters could follow in the same vein. But history teaches us that protectionism ends up hurting many more people than it helps. Disruptor 2: Technology. The bigger danger is that people are misdiagnosing the illness. The vast majority of middle-income job losses are not due to globalization, but due to technology. Specifically, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is replacing secure middle-income jobs and displacing workers into insecure low-income manual jobs - like bartending and waitressing - which AI cannot (yet) replace (Table I-1). And AI's impact on middle-income jobs is only in its infancy.3 The worry is that by misdiagnosing the illness as globalization and wrongly taking a protectionist medicine, the illness will intensify, rather than improve. Chart I-8Disruptor 1: Protectionism Table I-1Disruptor 2: Technology Disruptor 3: Debt super-cycles have reached exhaustion. The protectionist medicine carries a further danger. Major emerging market economies are coming to the end of structural credit booms and need to wean themselves off their credit addictions (Chart I-9). At this point of vulnerability, aggressive protectionism risks tipping these emerging economies into a sharp slowdown. Chart I-9Disruptor 3: Debt Super-Cycles Have Reached Exhaustion Disruptor 4: Equities are overvalued. Disruptors one, two and three come at a time when equities are valued to generate feeble total nominal returns over the next decade (Chart I-10). Risk premiums are extremely compressed. And if investors suddenly demand that risk premiums rise to average historical levels, it necessarily requires equity prices to adjust downwards. Chart I-10Disruptor 4: Equities Are Overvalued The long-term investment message is crystal clear. With the four disruptors in play, we strongly advise long-term investors not to follow passive (equity) index-tracking strategies. Instead, we advise long-term investors to stick to bespoke structural investment themes. Our favourite structural investment themes are Personal Product equities, euro/yuan, and real estate in Spain, Ireland and Germany. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 C N Trueman 'The Phoney War'. 2 The Council of the EU should not be confused with the European Council. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Superstar Economy: Part 2," dated January 19, 2017, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model This week's trade is to short Netherlands equities, but wait until after the election result. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
The latest NFIB small business survey revealed that broad based small business optimism is holding up after an incredible post-election surge. This resilience provides confidence that small businesses are experiencing a sustainable increase in business activity. Complaints regarding government regulation and red tape have deflated back to 2011 levels, resulting in some much needed breathing room for small enterprises. Similarly, margins are set to expand according to our proxy, as price hikes are materializing and planned labor compensation increases are coming off the boil (bottom panel). Importantly, in terms of small/large cap relative performance, the latest global manufacturing PMI releases signaled that the U.S. is firing on all cylinders with the U.S. survey coming in 9% higher (or about 5 PMI points) than the rest of the world. Historically, a lopsided relative manufacturing backdrop has been an excellent leading indicator of the small/large share price ratio, given that small companies garner most of the revenue at home (top panel). Bottom Line: Continue to overweight small caps versus large caps.
Highlights U.S. equity valuations are historically high, based on a variety of metrics. However, relative to competing assets and global equity peers, U.S. stock valuations are not an extreme. For U.S.-based investors, our upbeat view on the U.S. dollar implies that efforts to diversify globally may come up short. The Fed will allow its Agency bond and MBS portfolios to run off starting in 2018, but it is much more uncertain whether it will ever cease the reinvestment of its Treasury holdings. Feature The S&P 500 remains near record highs, despite a modest setback last week. And the only period when stocks were more expensive was during the halcyon days of the dot-com bubble. Have stock prices outpaced fundamentals, and if so, how much of a risk does this present over the cyclical horizon? And should U.S. investors look further afield than domestic markets for a relative deal? On a historical basis, it is hard to argue that U.S. equities are anything other than expensive. A preferred valuation metric is the cyclically adjusted P/E ratio (CAPE), see Chart 1. Based on this metric, stocks are expensive, trading at their highest valuation outside of the dot-com bubble. However, valuing equities is a complicated issue, and the CAPE is not without its weaknesses. Examining a broad array of valuation indicators provides a slightly different message; U.S. stocks are expensive in absolute terms based on historic relationships, but are less stretched relative to both other asset classes and other equity indexes. Expensive, But... Our BCA valuation index captures the message from a broad range of metrics in one gauge (Chart 2). The valuation index was constructed using 11 different measures in an attempt to approach valuation from multiple angles. Decomposing the index into its three major components - earnings, balance sheet metrics and yield - show that stocks prices are well into expensive territory in absolute terms based on traditional fundamentals: Chart 1(Part I) U.S. Stocks Are Expensive ##br##Relative To History Chart 2(Part II) U.S. Stocks Are Expensive Relative ##br##To History Earnings Group: There are five inputs to the earnings component of our valuation indicator, including trailing price/earnings ratio, price/sales, market cap as a share of GDP. The second panel of Chart 2 shows that the aggregate of the Earnings Group indicators sits at historical highs, excluding the tech bubble. Balance Sheet Metrics: This component includes measure of the market value of equities relative to corporate net worth, both using market value (replacement cost) and historical cost. This measure of valuation has the same profile as the Earnings Group. Yield Group: The yield group compares the price of stocks to interest rates, nominal and real, government and corporate. Of the three groups, it is this Yield Group that gives a less expensive reading on equities (bottom panel of Chart 2). Overall, the Valuation Indicator is already well into "overvalued territory". There is only one episode since 1970 when the indicator has reached a significantly more extreme reading (the dot-com bubble). ...Not So On A Relative Basis Stocks are expensive on an absolute basis, but are far more appealing in relative terms. The current earnings yield on stocks is well above the real corporate bond yield and corporate bond spreads are historically very tight, despite the erosion in balance sheet health (our corporate health monitor has been deteriorating for several months). And compared to housing returns, stocks look downright cheap (Chart 3). Within the U.S., we expect stocks to be the biggest beneficiary of investment flows in the next year or two, in part because equity market value is the most appealing. Meanwhile, relative to global peers, U.S. equities valuations have been climbing since 2009 (Charts 4 and Chart 5). This eight-year rise in valuations now leaves U.S. P/Es at the higher end of the historical range relative to G10 ex-U.S. equities. U.S. stocks are especially expensive relative to Japanese equities. In any case, standard valuation measures have always been lower in Japan, with the exception of price-forward earnings. As our Bank Credit Analyst monthly publication points out, Japanese companies generally have a much higher interest coverage ratio compared to Corporate America. Nonetheless, they tend to come up short in terms of profitability. Operating margins in the U.S. have typically been double that of Japan. Japan's return-on-equity (RoE) has been dismal because of low levels of corporate leverage and loads of low-yielding cash sitting on balance sheets. Nonetheless, the valuation gap is at an extreme, with Japanese equities appearing to be a screaming value relative to U.S. stocks. Chart 3Stocks Look Less Expensive Relative To Competing Assets Chart 4(Part I) U.S. Outperformance Phase Can Continue Chart 5(Part II) U.S. Outperformance Phase Can Continue A similar, albeit less extreme, valuation case can be made for European stocks relative to the U.S. Eurozone stocks have also almost always traded at a discount to U.S. equities and this continues to be the case. Stocks have gotten even more expensive, more quickly, in the U.S. over the past year. But relative valuations are not near historic extremes. Tack on the fact that BCA's view is that the dollar will continue to appreciate over the next six-twelve months. For U.S.-based investors, the coming rise in the domestic currency implies that efforts to diversify globally may come up short, despite better value in major foreign markets. It is important to note that BCA does not view valuation measures as market timing tools. They are only useful at extremes. The bottom line is that U.S. equities are certainly far from cheap, but are not so expensive in relative terms to warrant an allocation change on this basis. We believe that equity returns should outperform Treasuries, cash and high-quality corporate bonds over the next 1-2 years as the bond bear market plays out. The Fed's Balance Sheet: What's Next? Recently we have received a number of client questions about the Fed's balance sheet and how it will evolve during the next few years. In response, we reprint below work from our U.S. Bond Strategy team, who recently addressed the topic in detail. The Fed's Stated Plan The most up-to-date guidance we have received about the Fed's balance sheet plans comes from Janet Yellen's recent Congressional testimony: "The FOMC has annunciated that its longer run goal is to shrink our balance sheet to levels consistent with the efficient and effective implementation of monetary policy. And while our system evolves and I can't put a number on that, I would anticipate a balance sheet that's substantially smaller than at the current time. In addition, we would like our balance sheet to again be primarily Treasury securities, whereas as you pointed out, we have substantial holdings of mortgage-backed securities." From this, and similar statements from other Fed officials, we conclude that the Fed will allow its balance sheet to shrink once the fed funds rate is somewhere in the range of 1% to 1.5%. Surveys also show that the median primary dealer expects the Fed will change its balance sheet policy when the target fed funds rate is 1.38%. As such, and under reasonable assumptions for the pace of rate hikes, we think it is very likely that the Fed will start to let its balance sheet shrink sometime in 2018. MBS First, Treasuries Maybe Later Yellen's statement to Congress also makes clear that the Fed would be more comfortable with a balance sheet that consists entirely of Treasury securities. For this reason, the central bank will start by simply ceasing the reinvestment of its Agency bond and MBS portfolios. At least initially, the Fed will continue to reinvest the proceeds from its maturing Treasury portfolio. Yellen also left open the possibility that reinvestment could be "tapered" rather than just halted altogether. While this is possible, and in fact 70% of primary dealers think that reinvestments will be phased out over time while only 14% think they will be ceased all at once, it seems to us like a needless complication. We expect that reinvestments of Agency bonds and MBS will end all at once sometime in 2018. As for the Fed's holdings of Treasury securities, it is much less clear whether the Fed will allow these balances to run down. In a Report in 2014,1 we describe in detail the differences between the Fed's pre-crisis mode of operation, when bank reserves were scarce, and the Fed's current mode of operation with large bank reserve balances. As of now, the Fed has stated that it intends to eventually drain bank reserves from the system and return to its pre-crisis mode of operation, but there are several possible advantages to running a system with an outsized Fed balance sheet and large bank reserve balances. None other than Ben Bernanke pointed out a few of those reasons in a blog post last fall.2 In our view, the most compelling is that regulatory changes have increased private sector demand for safe, short-maturity, liquid assets in recent years. If the Treasury department is unwilling to supply T-bills in sufficient numbers, then the Fed can supply safe, short-maturity, liquid assets to the market by purchasing long-maturity Treasury securities and replacing them with bank reserves. Chart 6Reserves Can Be Drained Fairly Quickly Of course, we take the Fed at its word when it says that it would like to eventually drain excess bank reserves from the system. But even in that case, the steady growth of currency in circulation means that bank reserves will decline over time even if the Fed keeps the asset side of its balance sheet flat. For example, Chart 6 shows what would happen to bank reserves if the amount of currency in circulation grows at a conservative 5% per year pace, and if the Fed decides to allow its Agency bond and MBS portfolios to run off at the beginning of next year while keeping its Treasury portfolio flat. We assume that MBS runs off the Fed's balance sheet at a pace of $15 billion per month, slightly below the recent pace of MBS reinvestment. During the past three years, the Fed has reinvested between $20bn and $40bn MBS each month with an average monthly reinvestment of $32bn. In this scenario, outstanding bank reserves would decline to zero by the end of 2025. At that point the Fed would have to start adding to its Treasury holdings just to keep pace with the amount of currency in circulation. Bottom Line: While it is very likely that the Fed will allow its Agency bond and MBS portfolios to run off starting in 2018, it is much more uncertain whether it will ever cease the reinvestment of its Treasury holdings. If the Fed does allow its Treasury holdings to run down as well, it will have to start buying Treasuries again before 2025. Lenka Martinek, Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report "Cleaning Up After The 100-Year Flood", dated June 10, 2014, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 2 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2016/09/02/should-the-fed-keep-its-balance-sheet-large/
Highlights We discuss three "battles" that will shape the investment landscape in the euro area over the remainder of the decade. Battle #1: Reflation Versus Deleveraging - Reflation will triumph over the next 12 months. For the time being, this justifies an overweight position in euro area equities. Beyond then, the outlook is likely to darken. Battle #2: Hawks Versus Doves - The doves will win. Germany will reluctantly accept an overheated economy and higher inflation. Stay short the euro. Battle #3: Globalists Versus Populists - Marine Le Pen will lose this year's election, but Europe's populist parties will finally gain the upper hand by the end of the decade. Buy gold as a long-term hedge. Feature Market Update Global equities are technically overbought in the short term, but the longer-term cyclical (12-month) trend remains to the upside. Chart 1 illustrates the "reflation trade" in a nutshell. The Citigroup global economic and inflation surprise indices have surged and now stand at their highest combined level in the 14-year history of the series. While tracking estimates for Q1 U.S. GDP growth have fallen, this is mainly because of negative contributions from government spending, net exports, and inventories. Taken together, these three factors have shaved about 1.4 percentage points off of Q1 growth according to the Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model (Chart 2). Private final domestic demand is still growing at a reasonably robust 2.6% pace, and forward-looking indicators such as the ISM indices suggest that this number could rise over the next few quarters. Chart 1The Reflation Trade In One Chart Chart 2Underlying U.S. Growth Is Still Healthy As such, it is not too surprising that U.S. equities have had little trouble digesting the prospect of a March Fed rate hike. The market is still pricing in less than three rate increases this calendar year. Four hikes would not be out of the question. Investors should remain positioned for a stronger dollar and higher Treasury yields. We continue to favor higher beta developed markets such as the euro area and Japan over the U.S. on a currency-hedged basis. The Battle For Europe History is often shaped by great battles. Sometimes these are of the military variety. But often they transcend physical conflict, pitting competing ideas, interests, and trends against one another. In the remainder of this week's report, we discuss three economic and political battles that will determine Europe's fortunes over the next 12 months and beyond. Battle #1: Reflation Versus Deleveraging The euro area grew faster than the U.S. in 2016, the first time this has happened since 2008. While the U.S. is likely to resume pole position in 2017, we still expect the euro area economy to expand at an above-trend pace. That should be enough to keep unemployment on a downward trajectory. The euro area economic surprise index remains in positive territory. The composite PMI rose to 56 in February - the highest level since April 2011 - with the forward-looking "new orders" component hitting new cyclical highs. Capital goods orders continue to trend higher, which bodes well for investment spending over the coming months (Chart 3). In addition, private-sector credit growth has sped up to the fastest pace since the 2008-09 financial crisis (Chart 4). All this is good news for the region. Investors should overweight euro area equities on a currency-hedged basis over the next 12 months. Chart 3Euro Area Growth Holding Up Well Chart 4Euro Area: Accelerating Private-Sector ##br##Credit Growth Beyond then, things look murkier. The ECB's Bank Lending Standards survey showed a modest tightening in lending standards for business loans in Q4 of 2016 (Chart 5). Private-sector debt levels also remain elevated across the region, which is likely to dampen credit demand (Chart 6). Both of these factors suggest that loan growth could begin to moderate later this year. Chart 5Slight Tightening In Lending Standards ##br##For Business Loans And Mortgages In Q4 Of 2016 Chart 6Still A Lot Of Debt If the positive impulse from rising credit growth does begin to fade, GDP growth will fall off. Whether that proves to be just another run-of-the-mill "mid-cycle slowdown" or something more nefarious will depend on the policy response. On the fiscal side, the period of extended austerity has ended. The fiscal thrust in the euro area turned positive last year, the first time this has happened since 2010. The European Commission is advising member states to loosen fiscal policy further this year, but the governments themselves are targeting a modest tightening (Chart 7). With a slew of elections slated for this year, budget overruns will be hard to avoid. Nevertheless, barring a significant economic slowdown, no major European economy is likely to launch a large fiscal stimulus program anytime soon. Thus, while fiscal policy will not be a drag on growth, it will not provide much of a tailwind either. Chart 7European Commission Recommending Greater Fiscal Expansion This puts the ball back in the ECB's court. As we discuss next, monetary policy is likely to stay highly accommodative. That should help extend the cyclical recovery into 2018. Battle #2: Hawks Versus Doves Jean Claude Trichet's decision to raise rates in 2011 would have gone down as the most disastrous blunder the ECB ever made, were it not for his even more disastrous decision to raise rates in 2008. Mario Draghi has gone out of his way to avoid repeating the mistakes of his predecessor. Nevertheless, the risk is that the improving growth backdrop instills a false sense of complacency. There is no doubt that Draghi has become more confident about the economic outlook. The ECB revised up its growth and inflation projections for 2017-18 at this week's meeting and signaled that it was unlikely to extend its targeted longer-term refinancing operations, or TLTROs. The ECB is also likely to further reduce the value of its monthly asset purchases in 2018 with a view towards phasing them out completely by the end of that year. It is possible that these steps could trigger a "taper tantrum" in European government debt markets of the sort the U.S. experienced in 2013. If that were to happen, we would see it as a buying opportunity. As Draghi stressed during his press conference, wage growth is anemic. Without faster wage growth, inflationary pressures will remain muted. Granted, euro area headline inflation reached 2.0% in February. However, this was mainly the result of base effects stemming from higher food and energy prices. Our expectation is that headline inflation will fall back close to 1% by the end of the year. This is where core inflation currently stands. One should also keep in mind that the trade-weighted euro has depreciated by 8% since mid-2014 (Chart 8). To the extent that a weaker euro has put upward pressure on import prices, this has caused core inflation to be higher than it would otherwise have been. In contrast, the trade-weighted U.S. dollar has appreciated by 24% over this period. Yet, despite the diverging path between the two currencies, core inflation in the euro area remains noticeably lower than in the U.S. This is true even if one excludes housing costs from the U.S. CPI in order to make it more comparable to the European estimate of inflation. Excluding shelter, U.S. core inflation is currently 43 basis points higher than in the euro area (Chart 9). The point is that the Fed is much further along the path to monetary policy normalization than the ECB. Chart 8A Stronger Dollar Has Restrained U.S. Inflation... Chart 9...Yet Core Inflation In The U.S. ##br##Is Still Higher, Even Excluding Housing If that were all to the story, it would be enough to justify the ECB's wait-and-see approach. But there is so much more. Start with the fact that the euro area's poor demographics, high debt levels, and dysfunctional institutions all imply that the neutral rate - the interest rate consistent with full employment - is lower there than in the U.S. How does one ensure that real rates can fall to a low enough level in the event of an economic slowdown? One solution is to target a higher inflation rate. If inflation is running at 1% going into a recession, it might be impossible to bring real rates down much below -1%. But if inflation is running at 3%, real rates can fall to as low as -3%. This implies that the ECB should actually target a higher inflation rate than the Fed. Then there are the internal constraints imposed by the common currency. Countries with flexible exchange rates can adjust to adverse economic shocks by letting their currencies depreciate. That is not possible within the euro area. If one or a few countries in the region are suffering while others are not, the unlucky ones have to engineer an "internal devaluation." This requires that wages and prices in the ill-fated countries decline in relation to those in the better-performing ones. However, if inflation is already low in the latter, outright deflation may be necessary in the former, something that only a deep recession can achieve. The travails experienced by the peripheral countries over the past eight years brought home this lesson in stark and painful terms. Will Germany accept higher inflation? There is little in its recent history to suggest that it won't. Mario Draghi was not the odds-on favorite to become ECB president. That job was supposed to go to Axel Weber, the former president of the Bundesbank. Weber met with Angela Merkel on February 10, 2011. During this meeting with the chancellor, he made it clear that he did not support the ECB's emergency bond buying. Merkel balked and so the next day Weber tendered his resignation. Six months after that, ECB board member and uber-hawk Jürgen Stark quit, leaving the ECB more firmly in the control of the doves.1 Chart 10Germans Turning Radically Europhile Merkel's preference for a less hawkish ECB leadership wasn't solely based on altruistic feelings towards her European compatriots. Politically, Merkel knew full well that Germany would be blamed for the breakup of the euro area. Economically, German taxpayers also stood to lose a lot from a breakup. It is easy to forget now, but Germany spent 8% of GDP during the global financial crisis on bailing out its own banks. All that effort would have been for naught if German banks had been forced to write off billions of euros in loans that they had extended to peripheral Europe. Critically, the demise of the euro would have also saddled German exporters with a much more expensive Deutsche Mark, thus blowing a hole through the country's gargantuan current account surplus. The calculus has not changed much over the last six years. Germany may not welcome higher inflation, but the alternative is much worse. If anything, the polls suggest that German voters have become even more Europhile since the euro crisis ended (Chart 10). This gives Draghi even more free rein. For investors, this implies that the ECB is unlikely to raise rates for the next two years, and perhaps not until the end of the decade. As inflation expectations across the euro area drift higher, real rates will fall. This will push down the value of the euro. We expect EUR/USD to approach parity over the course of this year. Battle #3: Globalists Versus Populists First Brexit, then Trump, and now Le Pen? The spread between French and German 10-year government bond yields briefly touched 68 basis points in February, the highest level since the euro crisis (Chart 11). While the spread has edged down since then, investors remain on edge. Betting markets are currently assigning a one-in-three chance that Le Pen will become president, close to the odds that they were giving Donald Trump before his surprise victory (Chart 12). Chart 11Investors Worried About The Coming ##br##French Election Chart 12Will Le Pen Rule? Wanna Bet? There is little doubt that populism is in a secular "bull market." However, that doesn't mean that every populist politician is going to win every single election. For all their faults, U.S. nationwide presidential election polls were not that far off the mark. The RealClearPolitics average had Clinton up by 3.2% going into the election. She won by 2.1 points. Where the polls fell flat was at the state level. They completely underestimated Trump support in the Rust Belt states of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin. That's not an issue in France, where the presidential vote is tallied at the national level. Le Pen currently trails Macron by 26 percentage points in a head-to-head contest (Chart 13). It is highly unlikely that she will be able to close this gap between now and May 7th, the date of the second round of the Presidential contest. The only way that Le Pen could win is if one of the two leftist candidates drops out.2 However, given the animosity between Benoit Hamon and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, that is almost inconceivable. And even if that did occur, the odds would still favor Macron slipping into the final round. As such, investors should downplay risks of a populist uprising this year. Beyond then, things are likely to get messier. At some point, Europe will face another downturn, either of its own doing or the result of an external shock. Many voters have been reluctant to vote for populist leaders out of fear that the ensuing economic turmoil could leave them out of a job. But if they have already lost their jobs, that reason goes away. Chart 14 shows the strong correlation between unemployment in various French départements, and support for Marine Le Pen's National Front. If French unemployment rises, her support is likely to increase as well. The same goes for other European countries. Chart 13Macron Leads Le Pen By A Mile Chart 14Higher Unemployment Would Benefit Le Pen In addition, worries about large-scale immigration from outside Europe will continue to work to the advantage of populist leaders. Recent immigrants and their children have sometimes struggled to integrate into European society. This has manifested itself in the form of low labor participation rates, poor educational achievement, elevated involvement in criminal activity, and high welfare usage. The problem has been especially acute in European countries with very generous welfare states (Chart 15). Chart 15Many Immigrants To Europe Are Lagging Behind The reaction of establishment parties to mounting concerns about immigration has been completely counterproductive. Rather than acknowledging the problems, they have sought to censor uncomfortable "hatefacts" and stage show trials of populist leaders - such as the one Marine Le Pen will likely be subjected to for her alleged crime of tweeting graphic photos of terrorist atrocities. This strategy will backfire and the result will be a wave of populist victories towards the end of the decade. With that in mind, investors should consider buying some gold as a long-term hedge. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, “Europe: Game Was Changed A Long Time Ago,” in a Monthly Report, “Fortuna And Policymakers,” dated October 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, “Europe – Election Update, France,” in a Weekly Report, “Donald Trump Is Who We Thought He Was,” dated March 8, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights Eurostoxx50 versus S&P500 boils down to a simple choice: Banco Santander, BNP Paribas and ING; or Apple, Microsoft and Google? Right now, we would rather own the three tech stocks than the three banks - which necessarily means underweighting the Eurostoxx50 versus the S&P500. Eurostoxx50 performance relative to the FTSE100 boils down to the inverse direction of euro/pound. Right now, we expect euro/pound to strengthen - which necessarily means underweighting the Eurostoxx50 versus the FTSE100. Stay overweight Spanish Bonos versus French OATs as a structural position. Feature Which would you rather own: Banco Santander, BNP Paribas and ING; or Apple, Microsoft and Google?1 Surprising as it may seem, the all-important allocation decision between the Eurostoxx50 and the S&P500 boils down to this simple choice. The Chart of the Week should leave no doubt that everything else is largely irrelevant. Chart of the WeekEurostoxx50 Vs. S&P500 = Santander, BNP & ING Vs. Apple, Microsoft & Google Right now, we would rather own the top three U.S. tech stocks rather than the top three euro area banks - which necessarily means underweighting the Eurostoxx50 versus the S&P500. The Fallacy Of Division For Equities The fallacy of division is a logical fallacy. It occurs when somebody falsely infers that what is true for the whole is also true for the parts that make up the whole. As a simple example, somebody might infer that because their computer screen appears purple, the pixels that make up the screen are also purple. In fact, the pixels are not purple. They are either red or blue. The fallacy of division is that the property of the whole - purpleness - does not translate to the property of the constituent parts - redness or blueness. As investment strategists, we hear a common fallacy of division. Since global equities are a play on the global economy, it might seem that national equity markets - like Ireland's ISEQ or Denmark's OMX - are plays on their national economies. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. The property of the equity market as a global aggregate does not translate to the property of equity markets as national parts. The equity markets in Ireland and Denmark are each dominated by one stock which accounts for almost a quarter of national market capitalization - in Ireland, Ryanair, the pan-European budget airline, and in Denmark, Novo Nordisk, the global pharmaceutical company. Therefore, the relative performance of Ireland's ISEQ has almost no connection with Ireland's economy; rather, it is a just a play on airlines. And given budget airlines' sensitivity to fuel costs, Ireland's ISEQ is counterintuitively an inverse play on the oil price (Chart I-2). Likewise, the relative performance of Denmark's OMX has no connection with Denmark's economy; it is just a strong play on global pharma (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Ireland = Short Oil Chart I-3Denmark = Long Pharma In a similar vein, the relative performance of Switzerland's SME is also a play on global pharma - via Novartis and Roche (Chart I-4); Norway's OBX is a play on global energy - via Statoil (Chart I-5); and Italy's MIB and Spain's IBEX are plays on banks (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). We could continue, but you get our drift... Chart I-4Switzerland = Long Pharma / Short Oil Chart I-5Norway = Long Oil Chart I-6Italy = Long Banks Chart I-7Spain = Long Banks But what about a regional index like the Eurostoxx50 or Eurostoxx600: surely, with the broader exposure, there must be a strong connection with the euro area economy? Unfortunately not - at least, not when it comes to relative performance. Consider that for the past few years, the euro area economy has actually outperformed the U.S. economy2 (Chart I-8). Yet the Eurostoxx50 has substantially underperformed the S&P500 (Chart I-9). What's going on? The answer is that the Eurostoxx50 has a major 15% weighting to banks and a minor 7% weighting to tech. The S&P500 is the mirror image; a minor 7% weighting to banks and a major 22% weighting to tech. Chart I-8The Euro Area Economy ##br##Has Outperformed... Chart I-9...But The Eurostoxx50##br## Has Underperformed For the Eurostoxx50 the distinguishing property is 'bank'; for the S&P500 it is 'tech'. And as we saw earlier, these distinguishing properties are captured by just three large euro area banks and three large U.S tech stocks. So index relative performance simply boils down to whether the three euro area banks outperform the three U.S. tech stocks, or vice-versa. Everything else is largely irrelevant. Equities' Connection With Economies Is Often Counterintuitive When it comes to the FTSE100, it turns out that it is not more bank or tech than the Eurostoxx50. Major sector weightings across the two indexes are broadly similar. Hence, relative performance is more connected to relative economic performance. But there is a catch - the connection is not as intuitive as you might first think. You see, both major indexes are made up of dollar-earning multinational companies. Yet the index value and earnings are quoted in pounds and euros respectively. If the home currency appreciates, index earnings - translated from dollars into home currency - go down, depressing index relative performance with it. And the opposite happens if the home currency depreciates. So the counterintuitive thing is that a relatively strengthening home economy does not result in index outperformance. Quite the opposite, it normally means a relatively more hawkish central bank, and an appreciating currency (Chart I-10). Thereby it causes index underperformance. Hence, Eurostoxx50 performance relative to the FTSE100 boils down to the inverse direction of euro/pound. Once again, Chart I-11 should leave readers in no doubt. Chart I-10A Relatively More Hawkish Central Bank =##br## A Stronger Currency Chart I-11A Stronger Currency = ##br##Equity Index Underperformance Which neatly brings us to today's ECB meeting. The ECB is a tunnel-vision 2% inflation-targeting central bank. Any upgrade to its inflation forecast, as seems likely, would imply less need for its extreme and experimental monetary easing. Once digested by the market, this would support the euro. Meanwhile, on the other side of the Channel, the U.K. Government is preparing to trigger Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty and start its formal divorce from the EU within a couple of weeks. Expect the EU's immediate response to cast long shadows across Theresa May's vision of a future in sunlit uplands. Once digested by the market, this would further weigh down the pound. A stronger euro/pound necessarily means underweighting the Eurostoxx50 versus the FTSE100. The Fallacy Of Division For Bonds The fallacy of division also applies to euro area sovereign bonds. The aggregate euro area sovereign yield just equals the average ECB policy rate anticipated over the lifetime of the bond (Chart I-12). This is directly analogous to the relationship between the U.K. gilt yield and the anticipated path of the BoE base rate, and the relationship between the U.S. T-bond yield and the anticipated path of the Fed funds rate (Chart I-13). Chart I-12The Aggregate Euro Area Bond Yield = ##br##The Average ECB Policy Rate Expected Chart I-13The U.S. T-Bond Yield = ##br##The Average Fed Funds Rate Expected But what is true for the whole is not necessarily true for the parts that make up the whole. Individual euro area sovereign bond yields carry a second component which can override everything else. This second component is a redenomination premium as compensation for the expected loss if the bond redenominates out of euros. For example, the redenomination premium on a Spanish Bono versus a French OAT equals: The annual probability of euro breakup Multiplied by The expected undervaluation of a new peseta versus a new franc. However, the ECB's own analysis shows that Spain is now as competitive as France (Chart I-14), meaning that a new peseta ultimately should not lose value versus a new franc. So irrespective of the probability of euro breakup, the second item of the multiplication should be zero. Meaning that the redenomination premium should also be zero, rather than today's 75 bps (on 10-year Bonos over OATs). Bear in mind that Spain's housing bust and subsequent recapitalisation of its banks has followed Ireland's template - just with a two year lag. And observe that the redenomination premium on Irish 10-year bonds over OATs, which once stood at a remarkable 1100 bps, has now completely vanished. We expect Spain to continue following in the footsteps of Ireland (Chart I-15). As a structural position, stay long Spanish Bonos versus French OATs. Chart I-14Spain Has Dramatically Improved##br## Its Competitiveness Chart I-15Spain Is Following In The##br## Footsteps Of Ireland Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Listed as Alphabet. 2 On a per capita basis. Fractal Trading Model* Long tin / short copper hit its 5% profit target, while short MSCI AC World hit its 2.5% stop-loss. This week's recommendation is to short ruble / dollar. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-16 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Feature Strong global economic data have continued to bolster equity markets across the globe. While there is no imminent risk to growth within advanced economies, the risk-reward for EM risk assets is not favorable. Importantly, there are several variables and indicators that are foretelling of a potential rollover in EM share prices and currencies. In particular: The commodities currency index - the average of Canadian, Australian and New Zealand exchange rates - has rolled over. The indicator has historically been correlated with EM share prices (Chart I-1). The narrow trade-weighted U.S. dollar has firmed up, but EM share prices have so far remained resilient (Chart I-2). The dollar index is shown inverted in this chart. Such a decoupling is puzzling and unsustainable. The economic surprise indexes for both the developed and developing economies have spiked to their highs of the past 15 years (Chart I-3). These can serve as proxies for global growth sentiment and in turn reflect what is already baked into their equity valuations. In brief, share prices are discounting a lot of good news worldwide. Chart I-1A Red Flag For EM Stocks? Chart I-2Unsustainable Divergence Chart I-3As Good As It Gets? BCA's Emerging Market Strategy service's bearish stance on EM financial markets has not been due to expectations of weaker U.S./DM growth. In fact, since the middle of July 20161 we have been highlighting the upside risks to U.S. economic growth and have argued for higher bond yields in advanced economies. Our bearish view on EM risk assets has been due to poor EM domestic fundamentals (domestic demand and profitability) as well as a stronger U.S. dollar and lower commodities prices, not DM growth. There has been no broad-based recovery in EM domestic demand, as we illustrated in our February 15 Weekly Bulletin,2 but the rally in commodities prices has run much further than we thought. Looking ahead, we have the following considerations and observations: First, if and as U.S. and euro area domestic demand growth remains robust, their bond yields should rise, which will weigh on EM risk assets. In particular, the U.S. dollar will likely firm up, as discussed in last week's report.3 Second, the staying power of growth improvements in the U.S. and euro area is better than in EM/China. As such, we expect EM/China growth to begin disappointing again sooner than later. The main reason is unsustainability of still-strong credit growth in EM/China. In particular, China's infrastructure spending is already slowing, and we doubt private sector investment expenditures will accelerate much to offset it (Chart I-4). More importantly, Chinese policymakers are now switching their focus from boosting growth to containing asset bubbles and managing financial risks. This entails that they will likely tighten policy settings, albeit gradually and timidly. On a related note, China's interest rates/bond yields continue to move higher, which could be a precursor of a rollover in the credit impulse (Chart I-5). Chart I-4China: Infrastructure##br## Capex Slowing? Chart I-5China: Rising Interest Rates ##br##Warrant Weaker Credit Impulse In our opinion, regulatory tightening for banks and shadow banks in China is as important as rate hikes. The basis is that regulatory tightening is aimed at forcing banks and non-banks to abandon their speculative activities. This in turn will slow down the pace of their credit expansion. Finally, EM share prices have failed to outperform DM stocks, despite a sizable rally in commodities prices. This is a very rare occurrence and could be due to a combination of the following factors: (i) The growth improvement has largely stemmed from DM, not EM -- except the upturn in China's capital spending from the last year's major stimulus push; (ii) EM banking systems/credit cycles remain a potential drag on the outlook domestic demand; (iii) U.S. trade protectionism is expected potentially to hurt EM. Furthermore, the failure of EM to outperform DM has been broad-based, i.e., due to the dismal performance of all non-commodities sectors, as shown in Chart I-6. In brief, only EM materials and energy sectors have outpaced their DM counterparts in the past 12 months. Chart I-6AEM Versus DM: ##br##Relative Sector Performance Chart I-6BEM Versus DM: ##br##Relative Sector Performance Such broad-based underperformance for non-commodities sectors gives us confidence to maintain our negative bias toward EM. Bottom Line: The risk-reward of EM risk assets is extremely unattractive. Stay put and underweight. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Risks To Our Negative EM View", dated July 13, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled, "A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies", dated February 15, 2017, available ems.bcaresearch.com 3 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Some Common Questions From Asia", dated March 1, 2017, available ems.bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations