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Since early March, when we first turned tactically cautious on the prospects of the broad equity market, we started applying risk metrics to our portfolio in order to protect profits. In recent weeks as our cautiousness morphed from a tactical into a cyclical time horizon, we have both added more stops and also tightened existing trailing stops to our portfolio. As a result, our long S&P homebuilding/short S&P home improvement retail market- and sector-neutral trade got stopped out last week at the 10% return mark since the January 22nd, 2019 inception. Bottom Line: We have been increasingly using risk management metrics to protect gains in our U.S. equity portfolio and we are obeying the trailing stop on the long S&P homebuilders/short S&P home improvement retailers pair trade for a gain of 10% since inception. 
Special Report Highlights The odds of a cyclical upturn in the global semiconductor sector over the next three to six months are low. Global semiconductor demand will continue to decline due to contracting demand for smartphones, automobiles, personal computers (PCs), and servers. Global semiconductor stocks are still facing considerable downside in absolute terms. We recommend going long Asian semiconductor stocks versus the U.S. S&P 500 semiconductor index. Dedicated EM equity portfolios should stay neutral on the Taiwanese bourse and Korean technology sector relative to the overall EM benchmark. Feature Chart 1 shows share prices of the global semiconductor sector and global semiconductor sales in the past two decades. Chart 1Global Semiconductor Market: Sales & Share Prices Was last December’s trough in global semiconductor equity prices the ultimate bottom in this cycle? The odds are in favor of a continued contraction in global semiconductor sales and further downside in semiconductor share prices over the next three to six months. Cycle-On-Cycle Analysis Semiconductor sales experienced five recessions over the past 20 years. Table 1 illustrates the peak-to-bottom percentage decline in nominal global semiconductor sales and the magnitude of the drop in global semiconductor share prices in U.S. dollar terms during these five cyclical downturns in this industry. It also indicates the duration of each downturn and the number of months that semiconductor stocks led the bottom in global semiconductor sales. Table 1Key Statistics Of Five Cyclical Downturns In Global Semiconductor Market The current shrinkage of semiconductor sales is worse than the 2011-12 and 2015 downturns. Yet, it is still smaller than the magnitude during the 2008 Great Financial Crisis and the 2001 tech bubble bust. The revenue of semiconductor companies has so far contracted by 24%, which is disproportionally more than the decline in share prices of these companies. The global semiconductor equity index is only 14% below its March 2018 high. It appears as though the market is expecting a quick recovery in semiconductor sales. As per Table 1, in the downturns of 2008, 2011 and 2015, global semiconductor stocks all bottomed before the bottom of global semiconductor sales. Only in the 2001 episode, stock prices bottomed eight months after the bottom in sales. In the current cyclical downturn, global semiconductor sales have so far had only four months of growth contraction,1 far less than the 13-16 months experienced in all the past four cycles. All in all, we would lean against the market’s expectation of an imminent recovery in the semiconductor cycle. The demand downturn will last another three to six months and share prices are facing major headwinds. Global Semiconductor Demand Semiconductor sales are in contraction across countries and regions (Chart 2). In April – before President Trump’s tweet on imposing new import tariff on China, global semiconductor sales growth sank to a negative 15% year-on-year. The short-term (three-to-six month) outlook for global semiconductor demand remains dismal. Chart 3 shows global semiconductor revenue breakdown in terms of end usage. Mobile phones account for the largest share (29%) of the market, followed by PCs (12%), miscellaneous consumer products (12%), and servers (11%). All of these major demand sources are under downward pressure: Smartphone Sales Global smartphone sales are shrinking (Chart 4). According to the International Data Corporation (IDC), global smartphone shipments declined 6.6% year-on-year in volume terms in the first quarter of this year, worse than last year’s 4.4% drop. Chart 2Semiconductor Sales Are In Contraction Across Countries  In the current cyclical downturn, global semiconductor sales have so far had only four months of growth contraction, far less than the 13-16 months experienced in all the past four cycles. Chart 4Global Smartphone Sales: Contracting We expect smartphone shipments to continue contracting in the second half of this year. Major markets such as mainland China and advanced economies have entered the saturation phase of mobile-phone demand. For example, U.S. shipments were down 15% year-on-year in the first quarter due to near-full market penetration. In China, smartphone sales have shown signs of stabilization (Chart 5). However, this is probably temporary and has been driven by the boom in Huawei smartphone sales in China since early this year. The incredible 50% year-on-year growth of Huawei smartphone sales in the first quarter is not sustainable. While global sales of Huawei smartphones increased by 20 million units, total global smartphone sales of all brands fell by 22 million units (Chart 6). The U.S. punitive actions towards China and Huawei have also instigated nationalism in China. This has triggered a Chinese buying-spree of the Huawei smartphone. Chart 5Chinese Smartphone Sales: Temporary Stabilization Yet, this has probably reduced the number of potential Chinese smartphones buyers in the near future. After all, many buyers likely made the purchase earlier than otherwise planned in the absence of a trade war. Although Samsung, Huawei, OnePlus, Xiaomi, Motorola, LG, and ZTE have either released or will release their 5G phones this year, the sales growth from 5G phones will not be able to offset the loss in 2G, 3G and 4G phone sales, at least not in 2019. The IDC estimated that 5G phones would only account for about 0.5% of the market share this year. 5G will likely only begin affecting overall semiconductor demand next year, when they account for a larger share of smartphone sales.   Huawei is the market leader in 5G technology. The U.S. boycott of Huawei will likely continue. This will only slow the pace of 5G phone adoption and the development of 5G networks worldwide. On balance, global smartphone demand may only recover next year. Server Demand Global server shipments also experienced a 5% contraction in volume terms in the first quarter of this year, according to IDC (Chart 7). The outlook for the rest of 2019 does not look promising. Global server demand will likely remain in contraction in the second half of this year. Many hyperscale data centers have already purchased considerable amounts of servers in advance of the trade war to avoid tariffs.2 Meanwhile, the escalation in the U.S.-China confrontation has increased economic uncertainties. This may delay potential datacenter investments. Decelerating 5G network development worldwide due to the U.S. ban on Huawei will also tend to discourage new datacenter and cloud services projects. This is because the 5G technology enables datacenter and cloud services to experience a huge improvement in terms of data transfer speeds, latency, connectivity, capacity, reliability and mobility. Chart 7Global Server Shipment: Are In Contraction Personal Computers (PC) PCs sales are also in contraction (Chart 8). PC demand has entered into the deep-maturation phase while facing strong competition from tablets and laptops. Auto Sales Global auto sales also sank by 5% in April from a year ago, registering the worst contraction since 2009 (Chart 9). Chart 8Global PCs Sales: Deeply Saturated Chart 9Global Auto Sales Are In Contraction As Well Regarding auto demand, the Chinese government may continue to implement more supportive policies to stimulate car sales in China. However, we believe the recovery will be delayed. The government has already implemented a number of policies to lift domestic car sales since late January, including providing subsidies to encourage new energy vehicle sales, to promote auto sales in rural areas, and to increase auto replacement. The central government recently loosened auto sales restrictions in the first tier cities of Guangzhou and Shenzhen that have restrictive auto sales policies. However, all of these policies have failed to lift Chinese domestic car sales out of deep contraction. The key reason has been a diminishing willingness to spend among Chinese consumers, as suggested by falling households’ marginal propensity to consume (Chart 10). Bottom Line: Global semiconductor demand growth will likely remain weak and will fail to recover in the second half of this year. The basis is that its major upstream markets (smartphone, servers, PCs and automobiles) are all facing cyclically declining demand. Chart 10Chinese Consumers: Diminishing Willingness To Consume Inventories And Prices Chart 11 shows the semiconductor supply chain illustrating the process of manufacturing semiconductors starting with silicon wafers and up to final electronic products. Box 1 explains the role of key segments and players along the supply chain. Box 1 A Brief Explanation Of The Key Segments/Players Of The Supply Chain Both integrated device manufacturers (IDM) and foundries are at the center of the supply chain, responsible for chip manufacturing. In terms of semiconductor sales revenue, Samsung, Intel and SK Hynix are the world’s top three IDM companies and TSMC, Global Foundries and United Microelectronics Corp (UMC) are the world’s top three foundries. While IDMs cover most of the process from IC design, chip fabrication, assembly, testing and packaging, IDM companies still have to purchase raw materials and equipment for the chip-making process. Foundry companies receive orders from IC designing companies like Qualcomm, Nvidia, and Huawei HiSilicon, then purchase needed raw materials and equipment to proceed in the chip-manufacturing process. Both IDMs and foundries can either outsource the tasks of semiconductor assembly and testing or perform them on their own. The final semiconductor products will be used in electronics products, such as smartphones, computers, home appliances, automobiles, etc. Global semiconductor demand growth will likely remain weak and will fail to recover in the second half of this year. The basis is that its major upstream markets (smartphone, servers, PCs and automobiles) are all facing cyclically declining demand. In a typical business cycle, a cyclical downturn begins with a slump in demand for final electronic products (upstream demand). This leads to falling semiconductor sales. As a result, inventory buildup will occur across most of the segments along the semiconductor supply chain. Chipmakers: Producers’ semiconductor inventory in both Taiwan and Korea have reached either a record high or a near-record high (Chart 12). The installed wafer capacities at these two countries are the world’s largest, together accounting for 43% of total global wafer capacity. In addition, the inventory of some major electronic parts and components have also increased considerably in Taiwan (Chart 13). This also implies weaker demand for semiconductor raw materials. Chart 12Chipmakers: A Rapid Buildup In Inventory Chart 13Rising Inventory Of Some Major Electronic Parts And Components Raw material suppliers: Silicon wafer is the indispensable raw material required in the chip manufacturing process. Japanese companies account for over half of global silicon wafer supply.Chart 14 shows that silicon wafer inventory in Japan has had a significant buildup in volume terms since late last year. Importantly, it is not declining yet. Chart 14Silicon Wafer Inventory: A Significant Buildup As Well Outsourced semiconductor assembly and test (OSAT) providers: Both Singapore and Thailand are OSAT providers while they also manufacture, assemble and export electronic products. Both countries are closer to the downstream side of the semiconductor supply chain. Semiconductor inventory at these two countries has also jumped to a record high (Chart 15).   Chart 15Singapore and Thailand: Record High Semiconductor inventory   Importantly, a marginal improvement in demand will tend to support spot prices. For example, in the memory chip market, falling prices denote weak demand relative to excess supply. When prices of DRAM and NAND start to form a bottom or decisively move up, this may indicate the arrival of a cyclical upturn. So far, both DRAM and NAND prices are continuing to fall (Chart 16). In addition, the prices of silicon wafer – the most important raw material used in the chip-making process – have declined in the first half of this year.3  Chart 16Still Falling Memory Chip Prices Chart 17Deflating DRAM Prices Suggest Downside Risks To Korean Tech StocksIn short, prices are the most important variable to monitor. Chart 17 exhibits the high correlation between DRAM prices and the Korean technology sector stock prices. Falling DRAM prices suggest downside risks to technology stocks in Korea. Samsung accounts for about 65% of Korea’s tech index and 27% of the overall Korean equity index. Memory chips accounted for 68% of Samsung’s operating profits in the first quarter of this year.   Bottom Line: There has been involuntary inventory accumulation along the entire supply chain of semiconductors. This and ongoing price deflation among various types of semiconductors foreshadow a downbeat near-term outlook. The Interpretation Of Some Positive Developments There have been some positive developments in the past several months. Taiwanese PMI new orders diffusion index in the electronics sector jumped out of deep contraction to reach zero, and Chinese semiconductor imports halted their decline in both volume and value terms (Chart 18). The improvement in the aforementioned data was probably mainly due to large semiconductor purchases by China to hedge the rising risk of U.S. blocking China’s technological development (Chart 19). Chart 18Some Positive Development Chart 19China: More Semiconductors Purchases Before The Tariff And U.S. Huawei Ban? Besides, Huawei smartphone sales have been booming, which we deliberated on page 5, could have been responsible for the improvement in these data. This one-off surge will likely dwindle going forward. Investment Conclusions We remain negative on Asian semiconductor share prices in absolute terms. A continued contraction in global semiconductor sales will further squeeze their profits. In relative terms, we are neutral on the Asian semiconductor sector: we continue recommending market-weight allocation to Taiwan’s overall market and the Korean technology sector within the EM equity benchmark. As a new trade, we recommend going long Asian semiconductor stocks and short the S&P 500 semiconductor index over the next three to six months (Chart 20). The Bloomberg Asia Pacific semiconductor index has nine stocks. Samsung and TSMC account for 42% and 38% of the index, respectively. There has been involuntary inventory accumulation along the entire supply chain of semiconductors. This and ongoing price deflation among various types of semiconductors foreshadow the downbeat near-term outlook. Samsung will likely benefit from the U.S. ban on Huawei in the smartphone sector outside of China. In addition, Samsung will win some market share from Apple as the latter does not have a 5G phone to release this year. These positive factors may partially offset the negative impact from falling memory prices and demand on Samsung. The S&P 500 semiconductor index has 13 stocks. Intel, Broadcom, Texas Instruments and Qualcomm are the top five constituents, together accounting for nearly 70% of the index. Most of these companies are IC designing companies, which will likely suffer as Chinese demand for their products shrink due to the U.S. administration's ban on Huawei. This position will also benefit from U.S. dollar appreciation. A firm dollar will hurt profits of U.S. semiconductor stocks. In turn, currency depreciation in Korea and Taiwan will on the margin benefit Asian semiconductor stocks. Chart 20Recommend Long Asia Pacific Semiconductor Stock Vs. S&P 500 Semiconductor Index Chart 21The 2015 Experience Chart 21 shows that global foundry companies outperformed global IC designing companies during the final phase of the 2015 cyclical downturn. Odds are that these dynamics will play out in this downturn as well. Finally, the relative performance of Asian semiconductor stocks versus U.S. ones is oversold and might stage some sort of mean reversion (Chart 20). Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please note that here the calculation for “the number of months of the growth contraction” is different from the one for the “peak-to-bottom duration” in Table 1. “The number of months of the growth contraction” equals the number of months when semiconductor sales year-on-year growth is negative. 2      https://marketrealist.com/2019/05/nvidias-data-center-revenue-inference-rendering-and-edge/ 3      http://www.sohu.com/a/300386061_132567, http://news.moore.ren/industry/104958.htm
Highlights A resurfacing of trade tensions could weigh on risk sentiment in the near term. A somewhat less dovish tone from the FOMC this month could further rattle risk assets. While we would not exclude the possibility of an “insurance cut,” the Fed is probably uncomfortable with the amount of easing that markets now expect. That being said, a trade truce is still more likely than not, and while the Fed will resist cutting rates this year, it will not raise them either. The neutral rate of interest in the U.S. is higher than widely believed, which means that monetary policy will remain accommodative. That’s good news for global equities. Investors should maintain a somewhat cautious stance over the next month or so. However, they should overweight stocks, while underweighting bonds, over a 12-month horizon. The equity bull market will only end when U.S. inflation rises to a level that forces the Fed to pick up the pace of rate hikes. That is unlikely to occur until late-2020 at the earliest. Feature Stocks Bounce Back We turned positive on global equities in late December after a six-month period on the sidelines. While we have remained structurally bullish over the course of this year, we initiated a tactical hedge to short the S&P 500 on May 10th following what we regarded as an overly complacent reaction by investors to President Trump’s decision to increase tariffs on Chinese imports. Our reasoning at the time was that a period of market pressure would likely be necessary to forge an agreement between the two sides. Our thesis was looking prescient for a while. However, the rebound in stocks since last week has brought the S&P 500 close to the level where we initiated the trade. Is it time to drop the hedge? Not yet. First, market internals do not inspire much confidence. Even though the S&P 500 is just below its year-to-date (and all-time) high, the Russell 2000 is 5.1% below its May highs, and 11.8% below where it was last August (Chart 1). The S&P mid cap and small cap indexes are 6.8% and 16.2%, respectively, below their highs reached last August. Such weak breadth is disconcerting. Chart 1U.S. Stocks: Not As Strong As They Appear Second, President Trump’s decision to suspend raising the tariffs on Mexican imports may have had less to do with his desire to seek a more conciliatory tone, and more to do with pressure from Congressional Republicans. Various news reports suggested that Mitch McConnell and other Republican leaders opposed the action, and threatened to revoke the President’s authority to unilaterally impose tariffs.1 In the end, the deal with Mexico contained many of the same measures that the Mexicans had already agreed to implement months earlier. Our geopolitical team remains skeptical of a grand bargain in trade talks with China.2 In the United States, protectionist sentiment is politically more popular towards China than it is towards other countries (Chart 2). A breakthrough is still probable, but again, it may take a stock market selloff to produce a trade truce.   Third, we have become increasingly concerned that the market has gotten ahead of itself in pricing in Fed easing. While we would not rule out the possibility that the Fed takes out an “insurance cut” to guard against downside risks to the economy, the 80 basis points of easing that the market has priced in over the next 12 months seems excessive to us. Chart 3Financial Conditions Have Not Tightened Much Unlike late last year, U.S. financial conditions have tightened only modestly over the past nine weeks (Chart 3). The economy is also performing reasonably well. According to the Atlanta Fed GDPNow model, real final sales to domestic purchasers3 are set to grow by 2.5% in the second quarter, up from 1.5% in Q1 (Chart 4). Real personal consumption expenditures are on track to rise by 3.2%. Gasoline futures have tumbled, which will support discretionary spending over the next few quarters (Chart 5).   Chart 5Lower Gasoline Prices Should Bode Well For Discretionary Spending Granted, the labor market has cooled down. Payrolls increased by only 75K in May. However, the Council of Economic Advisers estimated that flooding in the Midwest shaved 40K from payrolls. And even with this adverse impact, the three-month average for payroll growth still stands at 151K, well above the 90K-to-100K or so that is needed to keep up with labor force growth. Meanwhile, initial unemployment claims remain muted and the employment component of the nonmanufacturing ISM hit a seven-month high in May. Chart 6Trimmed Mean PCE Inflation Back To 2% Inflation expectations are on the low side, but actual inflation is proving to be reasonably sturdy. The core PCE index rose by 0.25% month-over-month in April. Trimmed mean PCE inflation increased above 2% on a year-over-year basis for the first time in seven years (Chart 6). According to a recent Fed study, the trimmed mean calculation is superior to the core PCE index as a summary measure of underlying inflationary trends.4 Ultimately, the fact that the U.S. economy is holding up well is a positive sign for equity returns over the next 12 months. In the short term, however, it does create the risk that the Fed will sound less dovish than investors are anticipating, leading to a temporary selloff in stocks. Hence our view: near-term cautious, longer-term bullish. Who Determines Interest Rates? Central banks decide where rates will go in the short run, but it is the economy that determines where interest rates will go in the long run. The neutral rate of interest is the rate that corresponds to full employment and stable inflation. One can also think of it as the rate that aligns the level of aggregate demand with the maximum potential output the economy is capable of achieving without overheating. Both the Fed dots and the widely-used Laubach Williams model suggest that rates are close to neutral. But are they really? If a central bank keeps rates below their neutral level for too long, inflation will eventually break out, forcing the central bank to raise rates. Conversely, if a central bank raises rates above their neutral level, growth will slow, inflation will decline, and the central bank will be forced to cut rates. The problem is that changes in monetary policy typically affect the economy with a lag of 12-to-18 months. Inflation is also a highly lagging indicator. It usually peaks well after a recession has begun and troughs long after the recovery is under way (Chart 7). Thus, central banks have to make an educated guess as to where the neutral rate lies and try to steer the economy towards that rate in a way that achieves a soft landing. Needless to say, this is easier said than done. Today, both the Fed dots and the widely-used Laubach Williams model suggest that rates are close to neutral (Chart 8). Chart 8The Fed Thinks Rates Are Close To Neutral But are they really? That’s the million dollar question. Not only will the answer determine the medium-term path of interest rates, it will also determine how long the current U.S. economic expansion will last. Recessions rarely occur when monetary policy is accommodative, and equity bear markets almost never happen outside of recessionary periods (Chart 9). Thus, if rates are currently well below neutral, investors should maintain a bullish equity tilt. Chart 9Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Chart 10U.S.: Federal Fiscal Policy Has Been Expansionary Where Is Neutral? The neutral rate of interest is a function of many variables, most of which are not in the Laubach Williams model. Let us consider a few: Fiscal Policy A larger budget deficit boosts aggregate demand, while higher interest rates lower demand. Thus, once an economy has achieved full employment, an easing of fiscal policy must be counterbalanced by an increase in interest rates, which is another way of saying that looser fiscal policy raises the neutral rate of interest. The U.S. cyclically-adjusted budget deficit has risen by about 3% of GDP since 2015. Both tax cuts and increased federal discretionary spending have contributed to the deterioration in the fiscal balance (Chart 10). Standard “Taylor Rule” equations suggest that a 1% of GDP increase in aggregate demand will raise the appropriate level of the fed funds rate by 0.5-to-1 percentage points.5 This implies that easier fiscal policy has lifted the neutral rate of interest by 1.5-to-3 percentage points over the past five years. Labor Market Developments A tight labor market tends to increase the share of national income accruing to workers (Chart 11). Workers generally spend more of every dollar of income than businesses. Thus, a shift of income from businesses to workers raises the neutral rate of interest. The fact that a tight labor market usually generates the biggest gains for workers at the bottom of the income distribution – who have the highest marginal propensity to spend – further amplifies the positive effect on aggregate spending. Chart 11Workers Garner A Larger Piece Of The Income Pie When The Labor Market Is Tight The labor share of income has rebounded since reaching a record low in 2014. The lowest-paid workers have also seen the largest wage increases during the past 12 months (Chart 12). Neither of these nascent developments have come close to unwinding the beating that labor has suffered in relation to capital over the past four decades, but if the unemployment rate keeps falling, workers are going to start gaining the upper hand. Thus, one would expect the neutral rate of interest to rise further as the labor market continues to tighten. Credit Growth The Great Recession ushered in a painful deleveraging cycle. Household debt fell from 86% of GDP in 2009 to 70% of GDP in 2012. The household debt-to-GDP ratio has edged slightly lower since then due to continued declines in mortgage debt and home equity lines of credit. A return to the rapid pace of credit growth seen before the financial crisis is unlikely. Nevertheless, a modest releveraging of household balance sheets would not be surprising. Some categories such as student and auto loans have seen fairly robust debt growth (Chart 13). Housing-related debt could also stage a modest comeback due to rising home prices and buoyant consumer confidence. Conceptually, the rate of credit growth determines the level of aggregate demand.6 Thus, if household credit growth picks up at the margin, this would push up the neutral rate of interest. Corporate debt levels also have scope to rise further. Net corporate debt is only modestly higher than it was in the late 1980s, a period when the fed funds rate averaged nearly 10% (Chart 14). Chart 13U.S. Housing Deleveraging Has Slowed Chart 14U.S. Corporate Debt (I): No Cause For Alarm   Thanks to low interest rates and rapid asset accumulation, the economy-wide interest coverage ratio is above, while the ratio of debt-to-assets is below, their respective long-term averages (Chart 15). The corporate sector financial balance – the difference between what businesses earn and spend – is still in surplus. Almost every recession in the post-war era has begun when the corporate sector financial balance was in deficit (Chart 16). Chart 15U.S. Corporate Debt (II): No Cause For Alarm Chart 16U.S. Corporate Debt (III): No Cause For Alarm     The Value Of The U.S. Dollar A stronger dollar reduces net exports. This drains demand from the economy, which lowers the neutral rate of interest. The real broad trade-weighted dollar index has risen 10% since 2014. According to the New York Fed’s econometric model, this would be expected to reduce the level of real GDP by 0.5% in the first year and by a further 0.2% in the second year, for a cumulative decline of 0.7%, equivalent to a decrease in the neutral rate of 0.35%-to-0.7%. The New York Fed model assumes an “all things equal” environment. All things have not been quite equal, however. The U.S. has benefited from a modest improvement in its terms of trade7 over the past five years (Chart 17). The shale boom has also significantly cut into oil imports. As a result, the trade deficit has fallen from 5.9% of GDP in 2005 to 2.9% of GDP at present. Chart 17The Dollar Has Appreciated Since 2014 Chart 18The Savings Rate Has (A Lot Of) Room To Drop, Judging From The Historical Relationship With Wealth Asset Prices An increase in asset values – whether they be equities, bonds, or homes – makes people and businesses feel wealthier, which leads to more consumption and investment spending. As such, higher asset prices raise the neutral rate of interest. Today, U.S. household net worth stands near a record high as a percent of disposable income (Chart 18). The personal savings rate, in contrast, still stands at an elevated 6.4%. If the savings rate falls over the coming months, this would further boost aggregate demand. Demographics Slower labor force growth has led to a decline in trend GDP growth in the U.S. and most other economies. Slower economic growth tends to reduce the neutral rate of interest. The Bureau of Labor Statistics expects labor force growth to be broadly stable over the next 5-to-10 years, with immigration compensating for the withdrawal of baby boomers from employment (Chart 19). Chart 20Savings Over The Life Cycle In the current political climate, there is quite a bit of uncertainty over how many immigrants will settle in the United States. On the one hand, less immigration would reduce labor force growth, thus lowering the neutral rate. On the other hand, a decline in immigration would lead to an even tighter labor market, thus potentially raising the neutral rate. An additional question is how population aging, which will continue even if immigration remains elevated, will affect the neutral rate. Older people work less, but consume more than younger people, once health care spending is accounted for (Chart 20). If overall national output falls in relation to consumption, national savings will go down. This will raise the neutral rate of interest. The Shift To A Capital-Lite Economy Firms increasingly need less physical capital to carry out their activities. Larry Summers has labeled this the “demassification” of the economy. Lower investment spending would translate into a lower neutral rate. While plausible, it is not clear how important this phenomenon is. Companies may need less physical capital, but they need more human capital. Instead of more lending to businesses to finance purchases of machinery, we get additional lending to students. If our thesis that the neutral rate of interest is higher than widely believed turns out to be correct, this means that the Fed will eventually need to start hiking rates again. The question is when. The share of R&D and other intangibles in business investment has risen from around 14% in the 1960s to 33% today (Chart 21). Importantly, the depreciation rate for intangible investment is much higher than for other forms of capital spending. As intangible investment has increased, the overall depreciation rate for the economy has risen (Chart 22). Conceptually, an increase in the depreciation rate should lead to a higher neutral rate of interest.8 Chart 21A Larger Share Of Business Investment Is Intangible... Chart 22...And That Puts Upward Pressure On The Depreciation Rate   Watch Housing And Business Capex The discussion above suggests that the neutral rate of interest is probably higher than widely believed. That said, there is significant uncertainty around any estimate of the neutral rate. As such, we recommend that investors track the more interest-rate sensitive sectors of the economy to gauge whether monetary policy is becoming restrictive. Housing, and to a lesser extent, business capital expenditures are the key indicators to watch. As a long-lived asset, housing is very sensitive to mortgage rates. Chart 23 shows that changes in mortgage rates tend to lead residential investment and home sales by about six months. Chart 23Housing Is Interest-Rate Sensitive If the decline in mortgage rates since last fall fails to spur housing, this would support the claim that monetary policy turned restrictive last year. Fortunately, the jump in homebuilder confidence, the outperformance of homebuilder stocks, and the surge in mortgage applications for purchases all suggest that the housing sector remains on firm ground (Chart 24). Despite the broad-based weakness in the global manufacturing sector, U.S. capex intentions remain reasonably buoyant (Chart 25). This week’s release of the May NFIB small business survey, which showed that the share of firms citing “now is a good time to expand” jumped five points to a seven-month high, provides further evidence in support of this view. Chart 24Some Positives For U.S. Housing Chart 25U.S. Capex Intentions Remain Solid   A Two-Stage Fed Cycle Chart 26Inflation Expectations Are Not Where The Fed Wants Them To Be If our thesis that the neutral rate of interest is higher than widely believed turns out to be correct, this means that the Fed will eventually need to start hiking rates again. The question is when. Right now, the Fed has the luxury of time on its side. Even though some measures of core inflation such as the trimmed mean calculation discussed above have reached the Fed’s 2% target, this follows a prolonged period of below-target inflation. A few years of above-trend inflation would hardly be the worst thing in the world. The Fed’s failure to reach its inflation target has pushed long-term inflation expectations below the central bank’s comfort zone (Chart 26). Given the asymmetric risks created by the zero lower bound on interest rates - if inflation rises too fast, the Fed can always hike rates; but if inflation falls too much, it may be impossible to ease monetary policy by enough to avert a recession - the Fed can afford to remain patient. Thus, while the Fed is unlikely to cut rates as much as investors currently expect, it is also unlikely to raise them this year. Thanks to a cyclical revival in productivity growth, unit labor cost inflation has actually declined over the past 12 months (Chart 27). However, as we get into late next year and 2021, circumstances may change. If an increasingly tight jobs market continues to push up wage growth, unit labor costs will start to reaccelerate. Cost-push inflation will kick in. At that point, the Fed may have no choice but to pick up the pace of monetary tightening. All this suggests that Fed policy will evolve in two stages: an initial stage lasting for the next 12-to-18 months where the Fed is doing little-to-no tightening (and could even cut rates if the trade war heats up), followed by a second stage where the central bank is scrambling to raise rates to cool an overheated economy. U.S. Treasury yields are likely to rise modestly during the first stage in response to stronger-than-expected economic growth. We see the 10-year yield clawing its way back to the high-2% range by early next year. Yields could rise more precipitously, to around 4%, in the second stage once inflation begins to move decisively higher. The dollar is unlikely to strengthen during the first stage. Indeed, our baseline forecast calls for a period of modest dollar weakness stretching into late next year driven by a reacceleration in European and Chinese/EM growth. The sharp rebound in Chinese real estate equipment purchases from -18% on a six-month basis late last year to +30% in April suggests that the government’s stimulus efforts are working (Chart 28). Chart 27No Imminent Threat Of A Wage-Price Inflationary Spiral Chart 28China: A Sign That Stimulus Is Finding Its Way Into The Economy   The greenback will likely appreciate, perhaps significantly so, once the Fed picks up the pace of rate hikes in late 2020. The accompanying tightening in global financial conditions is likely to sow the seeds for a worldwide downturn in 2021. The combination of faster global growth and a weaker dollar will support global equities over the next 12 months. European and EM bourses will benefit the most. Investors should begin derisking in the second half of next year. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Patricia Zengerle, “U.S. Lawmakers Seek To Block Trump On Tariffs,” Reuters, June 5, 2019. 2      Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “Is Trump Ready For The New Long March?” dated May 24, 2019. 3      Final sales to domestic purchasers is equal to gross domestic product (GDP) excluding net exports of goods and services, less the change in private inventories. 4      Jim Dolmas and Evan F. Koenig, “Two Measures Of Core Inflation: A Comparison,” Federal Reserve Bank Of Dallas, Working Paper 1903, February 25, 2019. 5      Depending on which specification of the Taylor Rule one uses, a one percent of GDP increase in aggregate demand will increase the neutral rate of interest by half a point (John Taylor’s original specification) or by a full point (Janet Yellen’s preferred specification). John B. Taylor's 1993 specification is based on the following equation: rt = 2 + pt + 0.5(pt - 2) + 0.5yt. Janet Yellen's preferred specification is based on the following equation: rt = 2 + pt+ 0.5(pt - 2) + 1.0yt. Please note: For both specifications above, rt is the federal funds rate; pt is core PCE expressed as a year-over-year percent change; and yt is the output gap (as approximated using the unemployment gap and Okun's law). For further discussion, please see Janet L. Yellen, "The Economic Outlook And Monetary Policy," April 11, 2012. 6      Recall that GDP is a flow variable (how much production takes place every period), whereas credit is a stock variable (how much debt there is outstanding). By definition, a flow is a change in a stock. Thus, credit growth affects GDP and the change in credit growth affects GDP growth. 7      Ratio (multiplied by 100) of the price index for exports of goods and services to the price index for imports of goods and services. 8      The higher the depreciation rate, the more investment is necessary to maintain the existing capital stock. More investment demand for any given level of savings implies a higher interest rate. One can see this in the Solow growth model, which posits that the neutral rate of interest (r*) should be equal to: Where a is the output elasticity of capital, s is the savings rate, n is labor force growth, g is the growth in total factor productivity, and d is the depreciation rate. The equation implies that the neutral rate of interest will increase if capital intensity increases, the savings rate declines, the rate of labor force growth picks up, technological progress accelerates, or the depreciation rate increases.     Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Neutral In the context of further de-risking the portfolio, we downgraded the S&P tech hardware storage & peripherals index (THS&P) to neutral in our most recent Weekly Report. Four reasons underpin our downgrade of this index that comprises almost 1/5 of the S&P tech market cap. First, index heavyweight Apple has 20% foreign sales exposure to the Greater China region. While we doubt the Chinese will directly retaliate to the U.S. restriction on Huawei by directly targeting Apple, it is still a risk. Moreover, recent news of the FTC and the DOJ targeting GOOGL and FB pose a risk to Apple, especially given its App Store dominance. Any negative news on either front would take a bite out of the sector’s profits. Second, the S&P THS&P index’s internationally sourced revenues are near the 60% mark, and computer exports are also flirting with the zero line. Worryingly, deflating EM Asian currencies are sapping consumer purchasing power and are weighing on industry exports (bottom panel). For the other two reasons that compelled us to downgrade the S&P THS&P index, please refer to our most recent Weekly Report. Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P THS&P index to neutral for a modest relative loss of 1.0% since inception. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5CMPE – AAPL, HPQ, HPE, NTAP, STX, WDC, XRX.  
Special Report Highlights The odds of a cyclical upturn in the global semiconductor sector over the next three to six months are low. Global semiconductor demand will continue to decline due to contracting demand for smartphones, automobiles, personal computers (PCs), and servers. Global semiconductor stocks are still facing considerable downside in absolute terms. We recommend going long Asian semiconductor stocks versus the U.S. S&P 500 semiconductor index. Dedicated EM equity portfolios should stay neutral on the Taiwanese bourse and Korean technology sector relative to the overall EM benchmark. Feature Chart 1 shows share prices of the global semiconductor sector and global semiconductor sales in the past two decades. Chart 1Global Semiconductor Market: Sales & Share Prices Was last December’s trough in global semiconductor equity prices the ultimate bottom in this cycle? The odds are in favor of a continued contraction in global semiconductor sales and further downside in semiconductor share prices over the next three to six months. Cycle-On-Cycle Analysis Semiconductor sales experienced five recessions over the past 20 years. Table 1 illustrates the peak-to-bottom percentage decline in nominal global semiconductor sales and the magnitude of the drop in global semiconductor share prices in U.S. dollar terms during these five cyclical downturns in this industry. It also indicates the duration of each downturn and the number of months that semiconductor stocks led the bottom in global semiconductor sales. Table 1Key Statistics Of Five Cyclical Downturns In Global Semiconductor Market The current shrinkage of semiconductor sales is worse than the 2011-12 and 2015 downturns. Yet, it is still smaller than the magnitude during the 2008 Great Financial Crisis and the 2001 tech bubble bust. The revenue of semiconductor companies has so far contracted by 24%, which is disproportionally more than the decline in share prices of these companies. The global semiconductor equity index is only 14% below its March 2018 high. It appears as though the market is expecting a quick recovery in semiconductor sales. As per Table 1, in the downturns of 2008, 2011 and 2015, global semiconductor stocks all bottomed before the bottom of global semiconductor sales. Only in the 2001 episode, stock prices bottomed eight months after the bottom in sales. In the current cyclical downturn, global semiconductor sales have so far had only four months of growth contraction,1 far less than the 13-16 months experienced in all the past four cycles. All in all, we would lean against the market’s expectation of an imminent recovery in the semiconductor cycle. The demand downturn will last another three to six months and share prices are facing major headwinds. Global Semiconductor Demand Semiconductor sales are in contraction across countries and regions (Chart 2). In April – before President Trump’s tweet on imposing new import tariff on China, global semiconductor sales growth sank to a negative 15% year-on-year. The short-term (three-to-six month) outlook for global semiconductor demand remains dismal. Chart 3 shows global semiconductor revenue breakdown in terms of end usage. Mobile phones account for the largest share (29%) of the market, followed by PCs (12%), miscellaneous consumer products (12%), and servers (11%). All of these major demand sources are under downward pressure: Smartphone Sales Global smartphone sales are shrinking (Chart 4). According to the International Data Corporation (IDC), global smartphone shipments declined 6.6% year-on-year in volume terms in the first quarter of this year, worse than last year’s 4.4% drop. Chart 2Semiconductor Sales Are In Contraction Across Countries  In the current cyclical downturn, global semiconductor sales have so far had only four months of growth contraction, far less than the 13-16 months experienced in all the past four cycles. Chart 4Global Smartphone Sales: Contracting We expect smartphone shipments to continue contracting in the second half of this year. Major markets such as mainland China and advanced economies have entered the saturation phase of mobile-phone demand. For example, U.S. shipments were down 15% year-on-year in the first quarter due to near-full market penetration. In China, smartphone sales have shown signs of stabilization (Chart 5). However, this is probably temporary and has been driven by the boom in Huawei smartphone sales in China since early this year. The incredible 50% year-on-year growth of Huawei smartphone sales in the first quarter is not sustainable. While global sales of Huawei smartphones increased by 20 million units, total global smartphone sales of all brands fell by 22 million units (Chart 6). The U.S. punitive actions towards China and Huawei have also instigated nationalism in China. This has triggered a Chinese buying-spree of the Huawei smartphone. Chart 5Chinese Smartphone Sales: Temporary Stabilization Yet, this has probably reduced the number of potential Chinese smartphones buyers in the near future. After all, many buyers likely made the purchase earlier than otherwise planned in the absence of a trade war. Although Samsung, Huawei, OnePlus, Xiaomi, Motorola, LG, and ZTE have either released or will release their 5G phones this year, the sales growth from 5G phones will not be able to offset the loss in 2G, 3G and 4G phone sales, at least not in 2019. The IDC estimated that 5G phones would only account for about 0.5% of the market share this year. 5G will likely only begin affecting overall semiconductor demand next year, when they account for a larger share of smartphone sales.   Huawei is the market leader in 5G technology. The U.S. boycott of Huawei will likely continue. This will only slow the pace of 5G phone adoption and the development of 5G networks worldwide. On balance, global smartphone demand may only recover next year. Server Demand Global server shipments also experienced a 5% contraction in volume terms in the first quarter of this year, according to IDC (Chart 7). The outlook for the rest of 2019 does not look promising. Global server demand will likely remain in contraction in the second half of this year. Many hyperscale data centers have already purchased considerable amounts of severs in advance of the trade war to avoid tariffs.2 Meanwhile, the escalation in the U.S.-China confrontation has increased economic uncertainties. This may delay potential datacenter investments. Decelerating 5G network development worldwide due to the U.S. ban on Huawei will also tend to discourage new datacenter and cloud services projects. This is because the 5G technology enables datacenter and cloud services to experience a huge improvement in terms of data transfer speeds, latency, connectivity, capacity, reliability and mobility. Chart 7Global Server Shipment: Are In Contraction Personal Computers (PC) PCs sales are also in contraction (Chart 8). PC demand has entered into the deep-maturation phase while facing strong competition from tablets and laptops. Auto Sales Global auto sales also sank by 5% in April from a year ago, registering the worst contraction since 2009 (Chart 9). Chart 8Global PCs Sales: Deeply Saturated Chart 9Global Auto Sales Are In Contraction As Well Regarding auto demand, the Chinese government may continue to implement more supportive policies to stimulate car sales in China. However, we believe the recovery will be delayed. The government has already implemented a number of policies to lift domestic car sales since late January, including providing subsidies to encourage new energy vehicle sales, to promote auto sales in rural areas, and to increase auto replacement. The central government recently loosened auto sales restrictions in the first tier cities of Guangzhou and Shenzhen that have restrictive auto sales policies. However, all of these policies have failed to lift Chinese domestic car sales out of deep contraction. The key reason has been a diminishing willingness to spend among Chinese consumers, as suggested by falling households’ marginal propensity to consume (Chart 10). Bottom Line: Global semiconductor demand growth will likely remain weak and will fail to recover in the second half of this year. The basis is that its major upstream markets (smartphone, servers, PCs and automobiles) are all facing cyclically declining demand. Chart 10Chinese Consumers: Diminishing Willingness To Consume Inventories And Prices Chart 11 shows the semiconductor supply chain illustrating the process of manufacturing semiconductors starting with silicon wafers and up to final electronic products. Box 1 explains the role of key segments and players along the supply chain. Box 1 A Brief Explanation Of The Key Segments/Players Of The Supply Chain Both integrated device manufacturers (IDM) and foundries are at the center of the supply chain, responsible for chip manufacturing. In terms of semiconductor sales revenue, Samsung, Intel and SK Hynix are the world’s top three IDM companies and TSMC, Global Foundries and United Microelectronics Corp (UMC) are the world’s top three foundries. While IDMs cover most of the process from IC design, chip fabrication, assembly, testing and packaging, IDM companies still have to purchase raw materials and equipment for the chip-making process. Foundry companies receive orders from IC designing companies like Qualcomm, Nvidia, and Huawei HiSilicon, then purchase needed raw materials and equipment to proceed in the chip-manufacturing process. Both IDMs and foundries can either outsource the tasks of semiconductor assembly and testing or perform them on their own. The final semiconductor products will be used in electronics products, such as smartphones, computers, home appliances, automobiles, etc. Global semiconductor demand growth will likely remain weak and will fail to recover in the second half of this year. The basis is that its major upstream markets (smartphone, servers, PCs and automobiles) are all facing cyclically declining demand. In a typical business cycle, a cyclical downturn begins with a slump in demand for final electronic products (upstream demand). This leads to falling semiconductor sales. As a result, inventory buildup will occur across most of the segments along the semiconductor supply chain. Chipmakers: Producers’ semiconductor inventory in both Taiwan and Korea have reached either a record high or a near-record high (Chart 12). The installed wafer capacities at these two countries are the world’s largest, together accounting for 43% of total global wafer capacity. In addition, the inventory of some major electronic parts and components have also increased considerably in Taiwan (Chart 13). This also implies weaker demand for semiconductor raw materials. Chart 12Chipmakers: A Rapid Buildup In Inventory Chart 13Rising Inventory Of Some Major Electronic Parts And Components Raw material suppliers: Silicon wafer is the indispensable raw material required in the chip manufacturing process. Japanese companies account for over half of global silicon wafer supply.Chart 14 shows that silicon wafer inventory in Japan has had a significant buildup in volume terms since late last year. Importantly, it is not declining yet. Chart 14Silicon Wafer Inventory: A Significant Buildup As Well Outsourced semiconductor assembly and test (OSAT) providers: Both Singapore and Thailand are OSAT providers while they also manufacture, assemble and export electronic products. Both countries are closer to the downstream side of the semiconductor supply chain. Semiconductor inventory at these two countries has also jumped to a record high (Chart 15).   Chart 15Singapore and Thailand: Record High Semiconductor inventory   Importantly, a marginal improvement in demand will tend to support spot prices. For example, in the memory chip market, falling prices denote weak demand relative to excess supply. When prices of DRAM and NAND start to form a bottom or decisively move up, this may indicate the arrival of a cyclical upturn. So far, both DRAM and NAND prices are continuing to fall (Chart 16). In addition, the prices of silicon wafer – the most important raw material used in the chip-making process – have declined in the first half of this year.3  Chart 16Still Falling Memory Chip Prices Chart 17Deflating DRAM Prices Suggest Downside Risks To Korean Tech StocksIn short, prices are the most important variable to monitor. Chart 17 exhibits the high correlation between DRAM prices and the Korean technology sector stock prices. Falling DRAM prices suggest downside risks to technology stocks in Korea. Samsung accounts for about 65% of Korea’s tech index and 27% of the overall Korean equity index. Memory chips accounted for 68% of Samsung’s operating profits in the first quarter of this year.   Bottom Line: There has been involuntary inventory accumulation along the entire supply chain of semiconductors. This and ongoing price deflation among various types of semiconductors foreshadow a downbeat near-term outlook. The Interpretation Of Some Positive Developments There have been some positive developments in the past several months. Taiwanese PMI new orders diffusion index in the electronics sector jumped out of deep contraction to reach zero, and Chinese semiconductor imports halted their decline in both volume and value terms (Chart 18). The improvement in the aforementioned data was probably mainly due to large semiconductor purchases by China to hedge the rising risk of U.S. blocking China’s technological development (Chart 19). Chart 18Some Positive Development Chart 19China: More Semiconductors Purchases Before The Tariff And U.S. Huawei Ban? Besides, Huawei smartphone sales have been booming, which we deliberated on page 5, could have been responsible for the improvement in these data. This one-off surge will likely dwindle going forward. Investment Conclusions We remain negative on Asian semiconductor share prices in absolute terms. A continued contraction in global semiconductor sales will further squeeze their profits. In relative terms, we are neutral on the Asian semiconductor sector: we continue recommending market-weight allocation to Taiwan’s overall market and the Korean technology sector within the EM equity benchmark. As a new trade, we recommend going long Asian semiconductor stocks and short the S&P 500 semiconductor index over the next three to six months (Chart 20). The Bloomberg Asia Pacific semiconductor index has nine stocks. Samsung and TSMC account for 42% and 38% of the index, respectively. There has been involuntary inventory accumulation along the entire supply chain of semiconductors. This and ongoing price deflation among various types of semiconductors foreshadow the downbeat near-term outlook. Samsung will likely benefit from the U.S. ban on Huawei in the smartphone sector outside of China. In addition, Samsung will win some market share from Apple as the latter does not have a 5G phone to release this year. These positive factors may partially offset the negative impact from falling memory prices and demand on Samsung. The S&P 500 semiconductor index has 13 stocks. Intel, Broadcom, Texas Instruments and Qualcomm are the top five constituents, together accounting for nearly 70% of the index. Most of these companies are IC designing companies, which will likely suffer as Chinese demand for their products shrink due to the U.S. administration's ban on Huawei. This position will also benefit from U.S. dollar appreciation. A firm dollar will hurt profits of U.S. semiconductor stocks. In turn, currency depreciation in Korea and Taiwan will on the margin benefit Asian semiconductor stocks. Chart 20Recommend Long Asia Pacific Semiconductor Stock Vs. S&P 500 Semiconductor Index Chart 21The 2015 Experience Chart 21 shows that global foundry companies outperformed global IC designing companies during the final phase of the 2015 cyclical downturn. Odds are that these dynamics will play out in this downturn as well. Finally, the relative performance of Asian semiconductor stocks versus U.S. ones is oversold and might stage some sort of mean reversion (Chart 20). Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please note that here the calculation for “the number of months of the growth contraction” is different from the one for the “peak-to-bottom duration” in Table 1. “The number of months of the growth contraction” equals the number of months when semiconductor sales year-on-year growth is negative. 2      https://marketrealist.com/2019/05/nvidias-data-center-revenue-inference-rendering-and-edge/ 3      http://www.sohu.com/a/300386061_132567, http://news.moore.ren/industry/104958.htm   Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights The European barometer that best gauges global growth is euro area growth excluding inventory adjustments. Euro area growth excluding inventory adjustments is now running at a blistering 4.2 percent nominal pace – close to its 10-year upper bound – and is unlikely to accelerate much further. All the evidence shows that we are at the tail-end of a global growth up-oscillation. Irrespective of the evolution of the trade war, our high conviction view is that our global growth barometer will show weaker readings in the second half of the year. We present the correct investment strategy for this environment within the report. Feature Chart of the WeekGrowth Isn’t Going To Get Much Better Europe is an excellent barometer of the world economy. Not only is Europe a big chunk of the global economy in its own right, Europe also has a very open economy with a huge external sector. Gross exports amount to almost a half of GDP in the euro area, compared to little more than a tenth in the United States (Chart I-2). But here’s the key point: the European barometer that best gauges global growth is not euro area growth per se; it is euro area growth excluding inventory adjustments (Chart of the Week and Chart I-3). Chart I-2Europe Has A Very Open Economy Chart I-3Euro Area Growth Ex Inventory Adjustments Has Rebounded Sharply If euro area firms were building inventories, it would clearly boost economic output; and vice versa. However, this inventory building would not represent genuine end demand from abroad. It follows that we must strip out inventory adjustments to yield a truer gauge of external demand.1 The Reading From Our European Barometer What does euro area growth excluding inventory adjustments show? The long-term analysis confirms that global activity suffered its sharpest setbacks this millennium in 2002, 2008, 2012, and again briefly last year. But in the first quarter of this year, euro area real growth excluding inventory adjustments bounced back to a very robust 2.5 percent clip or, in nominal terms, a blistering 4.2 percent clip.2 Indeed, in nominal terms, our barometer was close to its strongest reading since 2010! These impressive numbers leave us with not a shred of doubt: after a sharp setback, global growth commenced a strong rebound at the end of last year. Global growth commenced a strong rebound at the end of last year. For those still in doubt, further compelling evidence comes from the very clear recent outperformance of the economically sensitive global sectors: industrials and financials. Through the past decade, the relative performance of these global cyclicals has closely tracked our European barometer – albeit a brief decoupling did occur in 2012 after Draghi’s “whatever it takes” speech gave all financial assets a big shot in the arm (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Global Cyclicals Are Tracking Our Growth Barometer One problem is that our barometer gives a reading just once a quarter and these readings come out after a long delay. From the mid-point of the quarter to which the GDP data refers to their release date around one month after the quarter end, there is a two and a half month delay. Begging the question, is there a more frequent and timely current activity indicator (CAI) for the euro area? The answer is yes. We have found that the ZEW economic sentiment indicator (not to be confused with the current situation indicator) does the job well in real-time (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). Chart I-5The ZEW Economic Sentiment Indicator... Chart I-6...Is A Good Current Activity Indicator   How Should Investors Use Our Barometer? However, investors face an even more fundamental problem. The equity market is itself a real-time current activity indicator. To be more precise, the best current activity is not the equity market taken as a whole – because the aggregate equity market can move as a result of drivers other than current economic activity, most notably central bank policy. Rather, as we have just shown, the very best current activity indicator is the performance of economically sensitive sectors – such as industrials and financials – relative to the total market (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-7The Best Current Activity Indicator... Chart I-8...Is The Relative Performance Of Global Cyclicals This means that even if we could measure GDP growth excluding inventory adjustments in real time, it would not help investors. After all, it would be ludicrous to expect one current activity indicator consistently to lead another current activity indicator! What we really need is a future activity indicator (FAI). If we could reliably predict where our barometer’s reading would be three or six months from now we could also reliably allocate our investments ‘ahead of the move’. Still, sometimes the current reading does inform us about the future. If a barometer already reads ‘very dry’ then we know that the weather is not going to get any better in the next few months! To be clear, euro area nominal growth excluding inventories, running at a blistering 4.2 percent pace, is near a 10-year high not just on a quarter-on-quarter basis but also on a six month on six month basis. The chances that it moves significantly higher are close to nil.   We are at the tail-end of a global growth up-oscillation. We should also look at the short-term impulses that drive growth. Crucially, these emanate from the short-term changes – and not the levels – of bond yields, the oil price (inverted), and bank credit flows. These impulses are now losing momentum (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Short-Term Impulses Are Losing Momentum The Correct Investment Strategy   To sum up, all the evidence shows that we are at the tail-end of a global growth up-oscillation. Irrespective of the evolution of the trade war, our high conviction view is that our global growth barometer – euro area growth excluding inventory adjustments – is highly unlikely to accelerate much further from its blistering 4.2 percent nominal clip. Much more likely, it will show weaker readings in the second half of the year. The yen is still an excellent defensive currency. Nevertheless, in the near term, asset allocation is a tough call. This is because, very unusually, all asset classes have performed well in unison, making it hard to rotate into one that offers value (Chart I-10). Hence, from a tactical perspective, we are shorting a 30:60:10 portfolio of equities, long-dated bonds, and crude oil. So far, the position is slightly down but we recommend holding it until it either achieves a 3 percent profit or it hits a 3 percent stop-loss. Chart I-10All Asset-Classes Have Performed Well In Unison For equities versus bonds, our long DAX versus the 30-year bund is now broadly flat since inception in January. But we will hold it for a while longer until we see clearer signs that global growth has flipped into a down-oscillation.   Within bonds, our underweight German 10-year bunds versus U.S 10-year T-bonds is still appropriate given the closer proximity of the bund yield, at -0.2 percent, to the mathematical lower bound. Moreover, this relative position has been working well recently.  Within equities, overweight European equities versus China and the U.S. has also been working well. However, we will be looking for opportunities to switch to underweight Europe versus the less economically sensitive U.S. equity market within the next couple of months. Finally, our stance to the euro – long versus the dollar, short versus the yen – has also been working well. The stance remains appropriate as the yen is still an excellent defensive currency, with the big additional advantage of possessing minimal political risk. Fractal Trading System* Given the synchronized rally of all asset classes this year, the financial services sector has strongly outperformed the market. But according to its 130-day fractal dimension, this strong outperformance is approaching technical exhaustion. Accordingly, this week’s trade recommendation is to short the financial services sector versus the market. The profit target is 2 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. (One way of executing this is to short the IYG ETF versus the MSCI All Country World Index). In other trades, we are pleased to report that short NZX 50 versus FTSE100 achieved its 2 percent profit target and is now closed, leaving three open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions.   * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 To be precise, it is the change in the change in inventories that contributes to GDP growth. For example, if the change in inventories added 0.5 percent to GDP this quarter, but 1 percent last quarter, then it will have subtracted 0.5% from growth this quarter. 2 Quarter-on-quarter growth at annualised rates. Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  
We are compelled to put the S&P tech sector on our downgrade watch list as President Trump’s hawkish trade talk and actions since May 5 warn that tech revenues (60% export exposure) and profits will likely remain under intense downward pressure. Our tech EPS model is also flashing red on the back of sinking capex and an appreciating U.S. dollar (bottom panel). We will be downgrading the tech sector to underweight via the S&P software index, the tech sector’s largest industry group on a market cap basis. A downgrade to neutral in the S&P software index would push our S&P tech sector weight to a below benchmark allocation. Thus, we are initiating a stop near the 10% relative return mark on the S&P software high-conviction overweight call since the December 3, 2018 inception. We also lift the stop to 27% from 17% relative return on the cyclical overweight we have on the S&P software index since the November 27, 2017 inception. Bottom Line: We are compelled to put the tech sector on our downgrade watch list. We will execute the S&P tech sector downgrade to underweight when the S&P software index’s stops are triggered. This would push the S&P software index to neutral from currently overweight.
As we highlighted in our most recent Weekly Report, the risk/reward tradeoff remains squarely to the downside and we are turning cyclically (3-12 month horizon) cautious on the prospects of the broad equity market. The Presidential cycle, UBER’s IPO, the S&P 500 hitting all-time highs following the initial December 2018 yield curve inversion, and two additional yield curve inversions signal that this time is no different and a recession is likely upon us in the coming 18 months. Using the NY Fed’s yield curve-derived recession probability forecast is revealing. This recession gauge has been an excellent leading indicator of S&P 500 momentum since the S&L crisis induced recession and its current message corroborates U.S. Equity Strategy’s cautious cyclical equity market view (recession gauge shown inverted, see chart). For additional details, please refer to the most recent Weekly Report.
Yesterday we were stopped out on our long S&P managed health care/short S&P semis market neutral pair trade initiated on May 13, 2019 for a gain of 10%. Our thesis remains intact that a lot of negative news has been priced into HMOs on the back of the threat of the “Medicare For All” bill passage, while a lot of euphoria has been baked in the cake for semis despite their current down cycle. However, portfolio risk management is forcing our hand and given our ongoing de-risking, we are obeying our trailing stop loss for a gain of 10% in a very short time span. Bottom Line: Book gains of 10% in the long S&P managed health care/short S&P semis pair trade since inception and move to the sidelines for now.  
Highlights Portfolio Strategy The risk/reward tradeoff remains squarely to the downside and we are turning cyclically (3-12 month horizon) cautious on the prospects of the broad equity market. The Presidential cycle, UBER’s IPO, the SPX hitting all-time highs following the initial December 2018 yield curve inversion, and two additional yield curve inversions signal that this time is no different and a recession is likely upon us in the coming 18 months. The re-escalation of the U.S./China trade tussle along with the risk of an antitrust investigation into Apple, waning capital outlays, softening exports and deteriorating operating conditions warn that it does not pay to be overweight the S&P tech hardware storage & peripherals (THS&P) index. Our tech EPS model is flashing red on the back of sinking capex and an appreciating U.S. dollar, deteriorating operating metrics signal that tech margins are under attack and exports are also in a freefall, suggesting that the time is ripe to put the tech sector on downgrade alert. Recent Changes Downgrade the S&P THS&P index to neutral, today. Put the S&P tech sector on downgrade alert. Table 1 Feature The SPX appeared to crack early in the week, but dovish Fed President statements saved the day and stocks recovered smartly to end the week on a high note. Our tactically (0-3 month) cautious equity market stance has served us well and has run its course. We are currently leaning toward a cyclically (3-12 month) cautious stance as a slew of our cyclical indicators have rolled over decisively. At the current juncture the big call to make is on the longevity of the business cycle. Crudely put, can the Fed engineer a soft landing or is the looming easing cycle a precursor of recession (Chart 1)? We side with the latter. Chart 1What’s The Opposite Of Bond Vigilantes? This is U.S. Equity Strategy service’s view. BCA’s house view remains constructive on a cyclical 3-12 month time horizon. As a reminder, the ongoing expansion is officially the longest on record and BCA’s house view also calls for recession in late-2020/early-2021. Stan Druckenmiller once famously said “…you have to visualize the situation 18 months from now, and whatever that is, that's where the price will be, not where it is today." Thus, if BCA’s recession view is accurate then we need to start preparing the portfolio for a recessionary outcome. This week we conduct a simple thought experiment on where and why the SPX will be headed as the economy flirts with recession. But first, we rely on the message from our indicators to guide us in determining if the cycle is nearing an end. Last December parts of the yield curve slope inverted (Chart 2) and our simple insight was that the market almost always peaks following the yield curve inversion and we remained bullish on the prospects of the broad equity market and called for fresh all-time highs based on the results of our research.1 On May 1, 2019 we got confirmation as the SPX vaulted to new all-time highs, so that box is now checked. Chart 2The Yield Curve... Beyond the traditional yield curve inversion that forecasts that the Fed’s next move will be a cut and eventually the cycle ends, other yield curve type indicators have inverted and also foreshadow the end of the business cycle. Charts 3A & 3B show that the unemployment gap and another labor market yield curve type indicator have both inverted signaling that the business cycle is long in the tooth. Chart 3A...Is Always Right...Chart 3B...In Predicting Fed Cuts This time is no different and the business cycle will end. Why? Because the Fed has likely raised interest rates (as we first posited on November 19, 2018 and again on December 3, 2018) by enough to trigger a default cycle in the most indebted segment of the U.S. economy where the excesses are most prominent in the current expansion: the non-financial business sector (Chart 4A). Chart 4AMind The Corporate Debt Excesses Chart 4BDefault Cycle Looming Already, junk bond market spreads are widening and the yield curve is predicting that a default cycle is around the corner (yield curve shown on inverted scale, bottom panel, Chart 4B).  Another interesting indicator is the Presidential cycle. Chart 5 updates our work from last year showing years 2 & 3 of 17 Presidential cycles dating back to 1950. In the summer of year 3 the SPX typically peaks. Finally, the anecdote of the biggest unicorn, UBER, ipoing on May 10, 2019 also likely marks the ending of the cycle. Therefore if recession looms in the coming 18 months what is the typical magnitude of the SPX EPS drawdown and what multiple do investors pay for trough earnings? Chart 5Presidential Cycle Says Sell While the two most recent recessionary earnings contractions have been severe, we are conservative in estimating a garden variety recession causing a 20% EPS fall. S&P 500 2018 EPS ended near $162/share. This year $167/share is likely and we are now revising down our forecast for next year to $175/share from $181/share previously. A conservative 20% drawdown sets us back to $140/share in 2021. Dating back to the late 1970s when our IBES dataset on the forward P/E multiple commences, the trough forward P/E multiple during recessions averages out to 10x (Chart 6). Remaining on a conservative path we will use 13.5x, or the recent December 2018 trough multiple as our worst case multiple and a sideways move to 16.5x as the most optimistic case. This implies an SPX ending value of between 1890 and 2310 will be reached some time in 2020, with the former resetting the equity market back near the 2016 BREXIT lows. Chart 6Trough Recession Multiple Averages 10x As a result, we are not willing to play a 100-200 point advance for a potential 1000 point drawdown, the risk/reward tradeoff is to the downside. Can and has the Fed previously engineered soft landings that have caused big relief rallies in the equity market? Six times since the 1960s: once in each of the mid-1960s, early-1970s, mid-1970s, mid-1980s and mid-1990s and once in 1998 (top panel, Chart 7). Chart 7Six Mid-cycle Easing Attempts Three easing cycles were not forecast by a yield curve inversion, but the mid-1960s, the mid-1990s and in 1998 the yield curve cautioned investors that an easing cycle was looming (bottom panel, Chart 7). Specifically in 1998 the Fed only acted after the equity market fell by 20%. Another interesting observation is that ex-post five of these six iterations were truly mid cycle, one was very late cycle, but none took place in year 11 of an expansion as is currently the case. We are in uncharted territory. Chart 8 shows the mean profile of the S&P 500 six months prior to and one year post the initial Fed cut. Our assumption is that a cut in July may materialize, thus the vertical line in Chart 8 denotes t=0, which is in sync with the bond market that is pricing a greater than 75% chance of this occurrence. The subsequent market rallies were significant. Our insight from this research is that we already had the explosive rally as Chart 8 depicts, owing to the Fed’s completed pivot, with the stock market rallying from the 2018 Christmas Eve lows to the May 1, 2019 all-time highs by 26%. But, the jury is still out. The biggest risk to our call is indeed a continued rally in the S&P 500 on easy money. A way to mitigate this risk of missing out on a rally is by going long SPX LEAPS Calls once a greater than 10% correction takes root. Chart 8Is The Rally Already Behind Us? Keep in mind, that for the Fed to act and cut rates, stocks will likely have to breach the 2650 level, a point where a reflexive fall will further shake investor’s confidence in profit growth. In other words, the bond market is screaming that Fed cuts are looming, but it also means that stocks have ample room to fall before the Fed cuts rates, i.e. a riot point will force the Fed’s hand. Another big risk to this call is a swift positive resolution on the U.S./China trade dispute, and/or an unprecedented easing from the Chinese authorities which will put us offside as a euphoric rise will definitely ensue. Again SPX LEAPS Calls are an excellent way to position for such an outcome. Netting it all out, the risk/reward tradeoff remains squarely to the downside and we are turning cyclically (3-12 month horizon) cautious on the prospects of the broad equity market. The Presidential cycle, UBER’s IPO, the SPX hitting all-time highs following the initial December 2018 yield curve inversion, and two additional yield curve inversions signal that this time is no different and a recession is likely upon us in the coming 18 months. Thus, this week we are further de-risking the portfolio by downgrading a tech subindex to neutral, setting a tighter stop on a different long term tech subsector holding that has been the cornerstone of the equity bull market, and putting the overall tech sector on downgrade watch. Downgrade Tech Hardware Storage & Peripherals To Neutral In the context of further de-risking the portfolio we are downgrading the S&P tech hardware storage & peripherals index to a benchmark allocation and booking a small loss of 1.0% in relative terms since inception. Four reasons underpin our downgrade of this index that comprises almost 1/5 of the S&P tech market cap. First, index heavyweight Apple has 20% foreign sales exposure to the Greater China region. While we doubt the Chinese will directly retaliate to the U.S. restriction on Huawei by directly targeting Apple, it is still a risk. Moreover, recent news of the FTC and the DOJ targeting GOOGL and FB pose a risk to Apple, especially given its App Store dominance. Any negative news on either front would take a bite out of the sector’s profits. Second, capex has taken a bit hit. Chart 9 shows industry investment is almost nil and capex intentions from regional Fed surveys and from CEO confidence surveys signal more pain down the line. Third, the S&P THS&P index’s internationally sourced revenues are near the 60% mark, and computer exports are also flirting with the zero line. Worryingly, deflating EM Asian currencies are sapping consumer purchasing power and are weighing on industry exports (third panel, Chart 10). Chart 9Capex Blues Chart 10Exports... Similarly, global trade volumes have sunk into contractionary territory and to a level last seen during the Great Recession (not shown). With regard to export expectations the recently updated IFO World Economic Survey still points toward sustained global export ails (second panel, Chart 10). More specifically, tech laden Korean and Taiwanese exports are outright contracting at an accelerating pace and so are Chinese exports. Tack on the negative signal from the respective EM Asian stock market indices and the implication is that more profit pain looms for the S&P THS&P index (Chart 11). Finally, on the domestic front, new orders-to-inventories (NOI) have not only ground to a halt from the overall manufacturing sector, but also computer and electronic product NOI are not contracting on a short-term rate of change basis (bottom panel, Chart 10). Tracking domestic consumer outlays on computer and peripheral equipment reveals that they too have steeply decelerated from the cyclical peak reached in early 2018, painting a softening picture for industry sales growth prospects (Chart 12). Chart 11...Under Pressure Chart 12Soft Sales Backdrop  The re-escalation of the U.S./China trade tussle along with the risk of an antitrust investigation into Apple, waning capital outlays, softening exports and deteriorating operating conditions warn that it does not pay to be overweight the S&P THS&P index. Nevertheless, before getting too bearish there is a silver lining. This index has a net debt/EBITDA of 0.5x versus the non-financial broad market of 2x. On the valuation front this tech subindex trades at 28% discount to the non-financial broad market on an EV/EBITDA basis suggesting that most of bad news is already reflected in bombed out valuations (Chart 13). The re-escalation of the U.S./China trade tussle along with the risk of an antitrust investigation into Apple, waning capital outlays, softening exports and deteriorating operating conditions warn that it does not pay to be overweight the S&P THS&P index. Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P THS&P index to neutral for a modest relative loss of 1.0% since inception. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5CMPE – AAPL, HPQ, HPE, NTAP, STX, WDC, XRX. Chart 13But B/S Remains Pristine Put Tech On Downgrade Alert We are compelled to put the S&P tech sector on our downgrade watch list as President Trump’s hawkish trade talk and actions since May 5 warn that tech revenues (60% export exposure) and profits will likely remain under intense downward pressure. The way we will execute this tech sector downgrade to underweight will be via the S&P software index, the sector’s largest market cap weight. A downgrade to neutral in the S&P software index would push our S&P tech sector weight to a below benchmark allocation. Thus, we are initiating a stop near the 10% relative return mark on the S&P software high-conviction overweight call since the December 3, 2018 inception and also lift the stop to 27% from 17% relative return on the cyclical overweight we have on the S&P software index since the November 27, 2017 inception. Any near term stock market pullback will likely trigger these stops and push the tech sector to an underweight position. Stay tuned. With regard to the overall tech sector, our EPS model is on the verge of contraction on the back of sinking capex and a firming U.S. dollar (middle panel, Chart 14). In more detail, tech capex has recaptured market share swinging from below 6% to above 13% in the past decade and now has likely hit a wall similar to the late 1990s peak (second panel, Chart 15). On a rate of change basis tech capital outlays have all peaked and national data corroborate the message from stock market reported data (bottom panel, Chart 15). Chart 14Grim EPS Model Signal Chart 15Exhausted Capex? The San Francisco Fed’s Tech Pulse Index (comprising coincident indicators of activity in the U.S. information technology sector) is also closing in on the expansion/contraction line warning that tech stocks are in for a rough ride (bottom panel, Chart 14). Delving deeper into operating metrics, we encounter some profit margin trouble for tech stocks. Not only do industry selling prices continue to deflate, but also our tech sector wage bill gauge is picking up steam. Taken together, all-time high profit margins – double the broad market – appear unsustainable and something has to give (Chart 16). On the export relief valve front, the sector faces twin headwinds. First the trade war re-escalation suggests that an interruption/disruption of tech supply chains is a rising risk, and the firming greenback will continue to weigh on P&Ls as negative translation effects will hit Q2, Q3 and likely Q4 profits (Chart 17). Chart 16Margin Trouble Chart 17Rising Dollar Will Weigh On Revenues & Profits Netting it all out, our tech EPS model is flashing red on the back of sinking capex and an appreciating U.S. dollar, deteriorating operating metrics signal that tech margins are under attack and exports are also in a freefall, suggesting that the time is ripe to put the tech sector on downgrade alert. Nevertheless, there are two sizable offsets contrasting all the grim news. Tech stocks are effectively debt free with the net debt/EBITDA sitting on the zero line and valuations a far cry from the tech bubble era. Finally, the drop in interest rates via the 10-year yield and looming Fed cuts will underpin these growth stocks that thrive in a disinflationary backdrop (Chart 18). Netting it all out, our tech EPS model is flashing red on the back of sinking capex and an appreciating U.S. dollar, deteriorating operating metrics signal that tech margins are under attack and exports are also in a freefall, suggesting that the time is ripe to put the tech sector on downgrade alert. Bottom Line: We are compelled to put the tech sector on our downgrade watch list. We will execute the S&P tech sector downgrade to underweight when the S&P software index’s stops are triggered. This would push the S&P software index to neutral from currently overweight. Stay tuned. Chart 18But There Is An Offset: Melting Yields Help Growth Stocks   Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Signal Vs. Noise” dated December 17, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.   Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps