Russia

Prefer government bonds over stocks, defensive sectors over cyclicals, and large caps over small caps. Favor North America over other markets. Favor emerging markets like Southeast Asia and Latin America over Greater China, Turkey, and emerging Europe. Stick with aerospace/defense stocks.

Special Report

Prefer government bonds over stocks, defensive sectors over cyclicals, and large caps over small caps. Favor North America over other markets. Favor emerging markets like Southeast Asia and Latin America over Greater China, Turkey, and emerging Europe. Stick with aerospace/defense stocks.

Special Report

Investors should maintain a conservative and defensive strategy until recession risks are clearly reduced.

The Chinese government will repress social unrest, then relax Covid-19 social restrictions to try to stabilize the economy. Russia will be aggressive in the short term but will pursue a ceasefire before March 2024. European and Italian risk will stay high on energy constraints.

OPEC 2.0’s decision to cut 2mm b/d of output beginning in December telescopes the loss of Russian volumes we expect over the course of the coming year. OPEC 2.0 clearly is not playing by the G7’s or the US’s rules. This will keep prices volatile.

Russia’s conflict with the West will escalate and trigger more bad news for risky assets this fall. Beyond that, stalemate looms. Latin American equities present a potential opportunity once the macro and geopolitical backdrop improve.

Investors should go long US treasuries and stay overweight defensive versus cyclical sectors, large caps versus small caps, and aerospace/defense stocks. Regionally we favor the US, India, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, while disfavoring China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, eastern Europe, and the Middle East.

Executive Summary EU Metal Industry Under Threat Russia’s threat to cut off all remaining exports of natural gas to the EU via Ukraine will further imperil the bloc’s struggling metals industry, particularly aluminum smelting – where half of its capacity already has been shut – and zinc refining. The EU will have to prioritize energy security over its renewable-energy goals, given the challenges its manufacturing industries will confront for the next 3-5 years. Surging imports of raw copper concentrates and unwrought metal will consolidate the global dominance of China’s copper refiners, which sharply increased their treatment and refining charges this week. The US likely will see more investment in metals mining and refining on the back of the EU distress, which realistically cannot be addressed until gas and power prices fall to levels that allow them to sustain their operations. Bottom Line: Ongoing supply shocks to the EU’s base-metals industry will force the bloc to prioritize energy security over its renewable-energy goals. This will drive the bloc’s demand for liquified natural gas (LNG) and oil higher, even after short-term measures to increase LNG intake and distribution capacity are completed over the next 2-3 years. We expect the equities of oil and gas producers to outperform metals miners over this period. After being stopped out, we will be re-instating our long XOP ETF position at tonight’s close. Feature Earlier this month, Eurometaux, the EU metals lobbying group, published a memo to the European Commission drawing attention to “Europe’s worsening energy crisis and its existential threat to our future.”1 This is not hyperbole. At the heart of the industry’s woes is a chronic shortage of energy – in any form – for industrial use. Utilities are signing long-term LNG supply contracts to address this shortage, but they can expect to wait 3-4 years or more before gas arrives on Europe’s shores.2 Spot and one-off cargoes will become available over that time, but most of the existing LNG production is under long-term contract. Oil, coal, and nuclear energy are available for power generation, industrial applications and space-heating, and they increasingly are being used in the bloc, but these too are constrained.3 Measures to address the chronic energy shortage hammering the EU base-metals industry will take years to effect, and could come too late to meaningfully preserve existing refining capacity, which has been contracting for years (Chart 1).4 Most of the EU’s metals production is accounted for by aluminum, copper and zinc, which are extremely energy intensive, copper only less so (Chart 2). The surge in LNG prices following Russia's invasion of Ukraine propelled electricity prices higher, given gas is the marginal fuel for EU power generation (Chart 3). This crushed zinc and aluminum refining. Half of the EU’s aluminum smelter capacity – ~ 1mm MT – will be curtailed or shuttered this year, according to European Aluminum.5 Chart 1EU Metal Industry Under Threat Chart 2EU Metals Are Extremely Energy Intensive Chart 3EU Power Price Surge Crushes Metals Refining The surge in European electricity prices and the resulting curtailment or shuttering of zinc refining paced the 2.6% y/y decline in global output in 1H22, which took global production down to 6.77mm MT, according to the International Lead and Zinc Study group. Europe accounts for ~ 15% of global zinc refining.6 Refined zinc consumption fell 3% y/y in 1H22 to 6.74mm MT. China Bingeing On Copper Global refined copper output in the January – July 2022 period slightly outpaced usage – with 3% growth in the former and 2.6% growth in the latter, according to the International Copper Study Group (ICSG). On the back of this report, we lowered our expected supply growth estimate to 3% this year, (Chart 4). This brings our estimate for total supply down by ~400k MT vs. our previous iteration to 25.3mm MT. We are keeping our estimate of 2023 supply growth rate at ~ 4.5%. Our copper demand estimate is a function of real GDP estimated by the World Bank, and remains at just under 26mm MT and 27.2 mm MT for 2022 and 2023 respectively. As a result of the lower 2022 production growth rate, our forecasted copper deficit has widened to ~ 605k tons in 2022 and 480k tons in 2023. The mismatch in supply and demand levels will keep inventories in China and the West under pressure (Charts 5A and 5B). Chart 4Copper Supply Estimate Lowered   Chart 5AChinese Copper Inventories Continue To Draw Chart 5BAs Do Stocks In The West China’s imports of copper condensates – the raw material used to make refined copper – surged to 16.65mm tons over January – August 2022, up 9% y/y. Imports of unwrought and semi-fabricated copper were up 8% over the same period at 3.9mm MT, according to Mysteel.com. As is to be expected, treatment and refining charges at Chinese smelters also moved higher: for 3Q22, refiners were charging $93/MT, up $13 from 2Q22 levels and $23/MT from 4Q21, according to Reuters. These charges increase when raw-material supplies increase, and vice versa. This is meant to be a floor charged for refining concentrates to produce refined copper. Real USD Matches US PPI After Re-Opening In an unusual turn of events, the USD Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) has been moving higher along with the US Producer Price Index for all commodities. This trend started as the global economy accelerated its re-opening in 2021 (Chart 6). The USD has a profound affect on commodity prices: Most globally traded commodities are denominated in USD, funded in USD and invoiced in USD. This is the channel through which the Fed’s monetary policy impacts commodity buyers ex-US. A stronger dollar means commodities in local-currency terms are more expensive, and vice versa. It also means production costs in states that do not peg their currencies to the USD go down, and vice versa. Chart 6Real USD Gains With US PPI During Reopening Given the USD’s elevated level, copper prices in local-currency terms will continue to face a massive headwind on the demand side, and a massive tailwind on the production side. For households and firms buying commodities, or durable goods with a lot of metals in them (copper, stainless steel, etc.), Fed policy has a direct effect on how their budgets get allocated.7 In the short and long run macroeconomic variables such as the USD influence copper prices by increasing the cost of copper ex-US when the dollar rallies, and vice versa. Fundamental variables like tight inventories, which arise when demand is consistently above supply, impart an upward price bias to the copper forward curve (backwardation increases as inventories decrease). Domestic economic factors matter, too.  Copper prices have been pummeled by the meltdown of China’s property sector, which has been the growth engine for the country’s economy, accounting for ~ 30% of its copper demand. The USD has remained well bid following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, presenting a powerful headwind to commodity prices in general. This is particularly true for refined copper, given China accounts for more than 50% of total global consumption. China’s RMB dropped 11.4% vs. the USD from the start of the year to now. This has not stood in the way of a sharp increase in imports of the copper ore and refined metal this year, despite the country’s weak economic performance. Given China’s property-market slowdown and its zero-tolerance COVID-19 policy and its attendant lockdowns, it is difficult to pinpoint a cause for its increased copper demand. It may be opportunistic purchasing – buying the metal when prices are far lower than their peak earlier this year – or it could signal a post-Communist Party Congress increase in economic activity (e.g., more fiscal stimulus hitting the system) officials are preparing for. Investment Implications The EU’s metals-refining sector faces existential challenges as a result of the bloc’s energy crisis. Significant employers – not just the metal refiners – will be confronting limited energy supply and higher costs for years, given the tightness in conventional energy markets – oil, gas and coal. The renewable-energy sector also faces daunting challenges, as a result of difficulties faced by metals refiners and the energy crisis they presently confront. It is worthwhile noting that none of the renewables technology is possible without metals. Given the abundant lessons re reliance on a single supply source Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has provided, we expect investment in US metals mining and refining to increase, as consumers of copper, aluminum and zinc seek to diversify away from Chinese dominance of this sector. This will take time to build out, just as the increase in LNG supplies will take time. This likely will keep a bid under the USD, as manufacturing, mining and refining capex investment shifts to the US. We expect the EU’s drive to secure conventional energy will drive the bloc’s demand for liquified natural gas (LNG) and oil higher, even after currently planned short-term measures to increase LNG intake and distribution capacity are completed over the next 2-3 years. After being stopped out this past week, we will be re-instating our long XOP ETF position on tonight’s close, consistent with our view.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed additional economic sanctions against Russia yesterday including extending price caps on oil to third countries, following the call-up of reserves in Russia last week, and a veiled threat to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine. In a related matter, Gazprom, the state-owned gas producer and trading company, threatened to cut off the remaining gas sales to Europe via Ukraine – close to half the ~ 80mm cm /d still being sold via pipeline to the continent (Chart 7). It is apparent the EU has been anticipating a full shut-off of Russian pipeline gas shipments, which likely motivates von der Leyen’s proposal. Any proposal to increase sanctions on Russia would have to be unanimously approved. Base Metals: Bullish. In a boost to prospective Chile copper production, a BHP executive indicated he expects regulatory uncertainties in the largest copper producing state to ease. BHP mentioned earlier this year that legal certainty in Chile would be key to investing over USD 10 billion in the state. Earlier this month, Chilean voters rejected a constitution, which, among other things, could have curtailed mining operation by including new taxes and environmental regulations. Precious Metals: Neutral. In their Q2 platinum balances report, the World Platinum Investment Council (WPIC) expects FY 2022 surplus to rise more than 50% vs. its Q1 estimates to 974k oz. Weak platinum ETF demand resulting from a strong USD and rising interest rates is expected to outweigh operational constraints in South African and North American mining operations. Bolstering supply is the fact that Russian platinum – which constitutes ~11% of global supply – has been reaching buyers. However, this security of supply may not last. Once buyers’ long-term contracts for Russian platinum end, as in the case with aluminum, companies may self-sanction, turning to the spot market and other producing states instead. For palladium, SFA Oxford sees the metal's surplus dropping to ~92% y/y, as demand is expected to increase and production is forecast to fall (Chart 8). Chart 7 Chart 8     Footnotes 1     Please see Europe’s non-ferrous metals producers call for emergency EU action to prevent permanent deindustrialisation from spiralling electricity and gas prices, posted by Eurometaux 6 September 2022. 2     See, e.g., Exclusive: German utilities close to long-term LNG deals with Qatar, sources say published by reuters.com 20 September 2022. 3    For additional discussion, please see Energy Security Rolls Over EU's ESG Agenda, which we published 28 July 2022.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4    Please see Agenda for a resilient European metals supply for the green and digital transitions, posted by Eurometaux in mid-2020.   5    Please see Reconciling growth and decarbonisation amidst the energy crisis, posted by European Aluminium May 2022. 6    Please see Column: European smelter hits mean another year of zinc shortfall published by reuters.com 17 May 2022.  7    Please see "Global Dimensions of U.S. Monetary Policy" by Maurice Obstfeld, which appeared in the February 2020 issue of International Journal of Central Banking for an in-depth discussion and analysis. Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2022

Executive Summary The US inflation surprise increases the odds of both congressional gridlock and recession, which increases uncertainty over US leadership past 2024 and reduces the US’s ability to lower tensions with China and Iran.   Despite the mainstream media narrative, the Xi-Putin summit reinforces our view that China cannot reject Russia’s strategic partnership. The potential for conflict in Taiwan forces China to accept Russia’s overture. For the same reason the US and China cannot re-engage their economies sustainably, even if Biden and Xi somehow manage to reduce tensions after the midterm elections and twentieth national party congress. Russia could reduce oil exports as well as natural gas, intensifying the global energy shock. Ukraine’s counter-offensive and Europe’s energy diversification increase the risk of Russian military and economic failure. The Middle East will destabilize anew and create a new source of global energy supply disruptions. US-Iran talks are faltering as expected. Russian Oil Embargo Could Deliver Global Shock Asset Initiation Date Return LONG GLOBAL DEFENSIVES / CYCLICALS EQUITIES 2022-01-20 19.1% Bottom Line: Stay long US stocks, defensive sectors, and large caps. Avoid China, Taiwan, eastern Europe, and the Middle East. Feature Several notable geopolitical developments occurred over the past week while we met with clients at the annual BCA Research Investment Conference in New York. In this report we analyze these developments using our geopolitical method, which emphasizes constraints over preferences, capabilities over intentions, reality over narrative. We also draw freely from the many valuable insights gleaned from our guest speakers at the conference.  China Cannot Reject Russia: The Xi-Putin Summit In Uzbekistan Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are meeting in Uzbekistan as we go to press and Putin has acknowledged China’s “questions and concern” about the war in Ukraine.1 They last met on February 4 when Xi gave Putin his blessing for the Ukraine invasion, promising to buy more Russian natural gas and to pursue a “no limits” strategic partnership (meaning one that includes extensive military cooperation). The meeting’s importance is clear from both leaders’ efforts to make it happen. Putin is leaving Russia despite rising domestic criticism over his handling of the Ukraine war and European energy war. Ukraine is making surprising gains in the battlefield, particularly around Kharkiv, threatening Russia’s ability to complete the conquest of Donetsk and the Donbas region. Meanwhile Xi is leaving China for the first time since the Covid-19 outbreak, despite the fact that he is only one month away from the most important political event of his life: the October 16 twentieth national party congress, where he hopes to clinch another five, ten, or fifteen years in power, expand his faction’s grip over the political system, and take over Mao Zedong’s unique title as chairman of the Communist Party. We do not yet know the full outcome of the Uzbek summit but we do not see it as a turning point in which China turns on Russia. Instead the summit reinforces our key point to investors all year: China cannot reject Russia. Russia broke energy ties with Europe and is fighting a proxy war with NATO. The Putin regime has lashed Russia to China’s side for the foreseeable future. China may not have wanted to move so quickly toward an exclusive relationship but it is not in a position to reject Russia’s diplomatic overture and leave Putin out to dry. The reason is that China is constrained by the US-led world order and like Russia is attempting to change that order and carve a sphere of influence to improve its national security. Beijing’s immediate goal is to consolidate power across the critical buffer territories susceptible to foreign interests. It has already consolidated Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and to some extent the South China Sea, the critical approach to Taiwan. Taiwan is the outstanding buffer space that needs to be subjugated. Xi Jinping has taken it upon himself to unify China and Taiwan within his extended rule. But Taiwanese public opinion has decisively shifted in favor of either an indefinite status quo or independence. Hence China and Taiwan are on a collision course. Regardless of one’s view on the likelihood of war, it is a high enough chance that China, Taiwan, the US, and others will be preparing for it in the coming years. Chart 1US Arms Sales To Taiwan The US is attempting to increase its ability to deter China from attacking Taiwan. It believes it failed to deter Russia from invading Ukraine – and Taiwan is far more important to US economy and security than Ukraine. The US is already entering discussions with Taiwan and other allies about a package of severe economic sanctions in the event that China attacks – sanctions comparable to those imposed on Russia. The US Congress is also moving forward with the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022, which will solidify US support for the island as well as increase arms sales (Chart 1).2  Aside from China's military preparation – which needs to be carefully reviewed in light of Russia’s troubles in Ukraine and the much greater difficulty of invading Taiwan – China must prepare to deal with the following three factors in the event of war: 1. Energy: China is overly exposed to sea lines of communication that can be disrupted by the United States Navy. Beijing will have to partner with Russia to import Russian and Central Asian resources and attempt to forge an overland path to the Middle East (Chart 2). Unlike Russia, China cannot supply its own energy during a war and its warfighting capacity will suffer if shortages occur or prices spike. 2. Computer Chips: China has committed at least $200 billion on a crash course to build its own semiconductors since 2013 due to the need to modernize its military and economy and compete with the US on the global stage. But China is still dependent on imports, especially for the most advanced chips, and its dependency is rising not falling despite domestic investments (Chart 3). The US is imposing export controls on advanced microchips and starting to enforce these controls on third parties. The US and its allies have cut off Russia’s access to computer chips, leading to Russian shortages that are impeding their war effort.  Chart 2China’s Commodity Import Vulnerability Chart 3China's Imports Of Semiconductors     3. US Dollar Reserves: China is still heavily exposed to US dollar assets but its access will be cut off in the event of war, just as the US has frozen Russian, Iranian, Venezuelan, and Cuban assets over the years. China is already diversifying away from the dollar but will have to move more quickly given that Russia had dramatically reduced its exposure and still suffered severely when its access to dollar reserves was frozen this year (Chart 4). Where will China reallocate its reserves? To developing and importing natural resources from Russia, Central Asia, and other overland routes. Chart 4China's US Dollar Exposure Russia may be the junior partner in a new Russo-Chinese alliance but it will not be a vassal. Russia has resources, military power, and regional control in Central Asia that China needs. Of course, China will maintain a certain diplomatic distance from Russia because it needs to maintain economic relations with Europe and other democracies as it breaks up with the United States. Europe is far more important to Chinese exports than Russia. China will play both sides and its companies will develop parallel supply chains. China will also make gestures to countries that feel threatened by Russia, including the Central Asian members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). But the crucial point is that China cannot reject Russia. If the Putin regime fails, China will be diplomatically isolated, it will lose an ally in any Taiwan war, and the US will have a much greater advantage in attempting to contain China in the coming years and decades. Russo-Chinese Alliance And The US Dollar Many investors speculate that China’s diversification away from the US dollar will mark a severe downturn for the currency. This is of course possible, given that Russia and China will form a substantial anti-dollar bloc. Certainly there can be a cyclical downturn in the greenback, especially after the looming recession troughs. But it is harder to see a structural collapse of the dollar as the leading global reserve currency. The past 14 years have shown how global investors react to US dysfunction, Russian aggression, and Chinese slowdown: they buy the dollar! The implication is that a US wage-price spiral, a Russian détente with Europe, and a Chinese economic recovery would be negative for the dollar – but those stars have not yet aligned. Related Report  Geopolitical StrategyThe Geopolitical Consequences Of The Ukraine War The reason China needs to diversify is because it fears US sanctions when it invades Taiwan. Hence reducing its holdings of US treasuries and the dollar signals that it expects war in future. But will other countries rush into the yuan and yuan-denominated bonds if Xi is following in Putin’s footsteps and launching a war of choice, with damaging consequences for the economy? A war over Taiwan would be a global catastrophe and would send other countries plunging into the safe-haven assets, including US assets.   Nevertheless China will diversify and other countries will probably increase their yuan trade over time, just as Russia has done. This will be a cyclical headwind for the dollar at some point. But it will not knock the US off the premier position. That would require a historic downgrade in the US’s economic and strategic capability, as was the case with the United Kingdom after the world wars. China will continue to stimulate the economy after the party congress. A successful Chinese and global economic rebound next year – and a decision to pursue “jaw jaw” with the US and Taiwan rather than “war war” – would be negative for the dollar. Hence we may downgrade our bullish dollar view to neutral on a cyclical basis before long … but not yet and not on a structural basis.  Bottom Line: Favor the US dollar and the euro over the Chinese renminbi and Taiwanese dollar. Underweight Chinese and Taiwanese assets on a structural basis. Ukraine’s Counter-Offensive And A Russian Oil Embargo Ukraine launched a counter-offensive against Russia in September and achieved significant early victories. Russians fell back away from Kharkiv, putting Izyum in Ukrainian hands and jeopardizing Russia’s ability to achieve its war aim of conquering the remaining half of Donetsk province and thus controlling the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. Russian positions also crumbled west of the Dnieper river, which was always an important limit on Russian capabilities (Map 1). Map 1Status Of Russia-Ukraine War: The Ukrainian Counter-Offensive (September 15, 2022) Some commentators, such as Francis Fukuyama in the Washington Post, have taken the Ukrainian counter-offensive as a sign that the Ukrainians will reconquer lost territory and Russia will suffer an outright defeat in this war.3 If Russia cannot conquer the Donbas, its control of the “land bridge” to Crimea will be unsustainable, and it may have to admit defeat. But we are very skeptical. It will be extremely difficult for Ukrainians to drive the Russians out of all of their entrenched positions. US military officials applauded Ukraine’s counter-offensive but sounded a cautious note. The chief problem is that neither President Putin nor the Russian military can afford such a defeat. They will have to double down on the Donbas and land bridge. The war will be prolonged. Ultimately we expect stalemate, which will be a prelude to ceasefire negotiations. But first the fighting will intensify and the repercussions for global economy and markets will get worse. Russia’s war effort is also flagging because Europe is making headway in finding alternatives for Russian natural gas. Russia has cut off flows through the Nord Stream pipeline to Germany, the Yamal pipeline to Poland, and partially to the Ukraine pipeline system, leaving only Turkstream operating normally. Yet EU gas storage is in the middle of its normal range and trending higher (Chart 5).   Chart 5Europe Handling Natural Gas Crisis Well … So Far Of course, Europe’s energy supply is still not secure. Cold weather could require more heating than expected. Russia has an incentive to tighten the gas flow further. Flows from Algeria or Azerbaijan could be sabotaged or disrupted (Chart 6). Chart 6Europe’s NatGas Supply Still Not Secure Chart 7Europe Tipping Into Recession Anyway Russia’s intention is to inflict a recession on Europe so that it begins to rethink its willingness to maintain a long-term proxy war. Recession will force European households to pay the full cost of the energy breakup with Russia all at once. Popular support for war will moderate and politicians will adopt more pragmatic diplomacy. After all they do not have an interest in prolonging the war to the point that it spirals out of control. Clearly the economic pain is being felt, as manufacturing expectations and consumer confidence weaken (Chart 7). Europe’s resolve will not collapse overnight. But the energy crisis can get worse from here. The deeper the recession, the more likely European capitals will try to convince Ukraine to negotiate a ceasefire.   However, given Ukraine’s successes in the field and Europe’s successes in diversification, it is entirely possible that Russia faces further humiliating setbacks. While this outcome may be good for liberal democracies, it is not good for global financial markets, at least not in the short run. If Russia is backed into a corner on both the military and economic fronts, then Putin’s personal security and regime security will be threatened. Russia could attempt to turn the tables or lash out even more aggressively. Already Moscow has declared a new “red line” if the US provides longer-range missiles to Ukraine. A US-Russia showdown, complete with nuclear threats, is not out of the realm of possibility. Russia could also start halting oil exports, as it has threatened to do, to inflict a major oil shock on the European economy. Investors will need to be prepared for that outcome.  Bottom Line: Petro-states have geopolitical leverage as long as global commodity supplies remain tight. Investors should be prepared for the European embargo of Russian oil to provoke a Russian reaction. A larger than expected oil shock is possible given the risk of defeat that Russia faces (Chart 8). Chart 8Russian Oil Embargo Could Deliver Global Shock US-Iran Talks Falter Again This trend of petro-state geopolitical leverage was one of our three key views for 2022 and it also extends to the US-Iran nuclear negotiations, which are faltering as expected. Tit-for-tat military action between Iran and its enemies in the Persian Gulf will pick up immediately – i.e. a new source of oil disruption will emerge. If global demand is collapsing then this trend may only create additional volatility for oil markets at first, but it further constrains the supply side for the foreseeable future. It is not yet certain that the talks are dead but a deal before the US midterm looks unlikely. Biden could continue working on a deal in 2023-24. The Democratic Party is likely to lose at least the House of Representatives, leaving him unable to pass legislation and more likely to pursue foreign policy objectives. The Biden administration wants the Iran deal to tamp down inflation and avoid a third foreign policy crisis at a time when it is already juggling Russia and China. The overriding constraints in this situation are that Iran needs a nuclear weapon for regime survival, while Israel will attack Iran as a last resort before it obtains a nuclear weapon. Yes, the US is reluctant to initiate another war in the Middle East. But public war-weariness is probably overrated today (unlike in 2008 or even 2016) and the US has drawn a hard red line against nuclear weaponization. Iran will retaliate to any US-Israeli aggression ferociously. But conflict and oil disruptions will emerge even before the US or Israel decide to launch air strikes, as Iran will face sabotage and cyber-attacks and will need to deter the US and Israel by signaling that it can trigger a region-wide war. Chart 9If US-Iran Talks Fail, Iraq Will Destabilize Further Recent social unrest in Iraq, where the nationalist coalition of Muqtada al-Sadr is pushing back against Iranian influence, is only an inkling of what can occur if the US-Iran talks are truly dead, Iran pushes forward with its nuclear program, and Israel and the US begin openly entertaining military options. The potential oil disruption from Iraq presents a much larger supply constraint than the failure to remove sanctions on Iran (Chart 9). A new wave of Middle Eastern instability would push up oil prices and strengthen Russia’s hand, distracting the US and imposing further pain on Europe. It would not strengthen China’s hand, but the risk itself would reinforce China’s Eurasian strategy, as Beijing would need to prepare for oil cutoffs in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s attempts to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization should be seen in this context. Ultimately the only factor that could still possibly convince Iran not to make a dash for the bomb – the military might of the US and its allies – is the same factor that forces China and Russia to strengthen their strategic bond. The emerging Russo-Chinese behemoth, in turn, acts as a hard constraint on any substantial reengagement of the US and Chinese economies. The US cannot afford to feed another decade of Chinese economic growth and modernization if China is allied with Russia and Central Asia. Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Xi and Biden administrations will try to prevent a total collapse of US-China relations in 2023. If China is not yet ready to invade Taiwan then there is a brief space for diplomacy to try to work. But there is no room for long-lasting reengagement – because the US cannot simply cede Taiwan to China, and hence China cannot reject Russia, and Russia no longer has any options. Bottom Line: Expect further oil volatility and price shocks. Sell Middle Eastern equities. Favor North American, Latin American, and Australian energy producers. Investment Takeaways Recession Risks Rising: The inflation surprise in the US in August necessitates more aggressive Fed rate hikes in the near term, which increases the odds of rising unemployment and recession. US Policy Uncertainty Rising: A recession will greatly increase the odds of US political instability over the 2022-24 cycle and reduce the incentive for foreign powers like Iran or China to make concessions or agreements with the US. European Policy Uncertainty Rising: We already expected a European recession. Russia’s setbacks make it more likely that it will adopt more aggressive military tactics and economic warfare. Chinese Policy Uncertainty Rising: China will continue stimulating next year but its economy will suffer from energy shocks and its stimulus is less effective than in the past. It will likely increase economic and military pressure on Taiwan, while the US will increase punitive measures against China. It is not clear that it will launch a full scale invasion of Taiwan – that is not our base case – but it is possible so investors need to be prepared. Long US and Defensives: Stay long US stocks over global stocks, defensive sectors over cyclicals, and large caps over small caps. Buy safe-havens like the oversold Japanese yen. Long Arms Manufacturers: Buy defense stocks and cyber-security firms. Short China and Taiwan: Favor the USD and EUR over the CNY. Favor US semiconductor stocks over Taiwanese equities. Favor Korean over Taiwanese equities. Favor Indian tech over Chinese tech. Favor Singaporean over Hong Kong stocks. Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Tessa Wong and Simon Fraser, “Putin-Xi talks: Russian leader reveals China's 'concern' over Ukraine,” BBC, September 15, 2022, bbc.com. 2     US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “The Taiwan Policy Act of 2022,” foreign.senate.gov. 3    Greg Sargent, “Is Putin facing defeat? The ‘End of History’ author remains confident,” Washington Post, September 12, 2022, washingtonpost.com.                                                                                         Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix