Policy

Highlights The Phillips curve, which encouraged economic policymakers of the sixties and early seventies to believe in a mechanical tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, fell into disrepute once stagflation strangled the U.S. economy. We do not view the idea that there is an inverse relationship between the unemployment rate and wage gains as controversial. This weak form of the Phillips curve simply formalizes the interplay between supply and demand in the labor market. We have found, however, that any reference to the Phillips curve has the potential to provoke strong reactions from investors. The criticism that the link between compensation gains and consumer prices is questionable has merit. Over the last 30 years, changes in compensation have exhibited a sporadic correlation with changes in consumer prices. Even if the empirical evidence between labor market tightness and inflation is somewhat wobbly, the Fed remains squarely in the Phillips curve camp, and its take on the relationship is the only one that matters for monetary policy. The investment implication is that labor market strength will prove self-limiting. An unemployment rate bound for 3.5% or lower will pull the Fed back off the sidelines, ultimately bringing down the curtain on the expansion and the equity bull market. Feature The stagflation of the seventies was a near-death experience for the Phillips curve and its proposition that unemployment and inflation are inversely related. As both Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps had predicted, the trade-off could not survive beyond the short term because workers would adjust their expectations as they caught on to the pattern, demanding wages that kept pace with inflation even when unemployment was high. Duly modified, the Phillips curve’s appeal was rekindled, and the Phelps-Phillips expectations-augmented version has gone mostly unchallenged within the economics profession ever since. The Fed and other policymakers may have given up on the notion that they could manage their economies via a mechanical tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, but the inverse relationship remains a pillar of their macroeconomic models. We don’t find the idea that the unemployment rate and wage inflation are inversely related the least bit controversial, as it fully accords with the laws of supply and demand. Unemployment’s link to consumer price inflation is uncertain, however, and even the narrow unemployment/wages form of the Phillips curve relationship we favor often invites controversy. Discussing upward wage pressures within the context of consumer price inflation and the Fed’s reaction function can elicit spirited resistance. As one client put it in a January meeting, “it is unbecoming for BCA to subscribe to these sorts of cost-plus notions of inflation.” This Special Report examines the record in an effort to determine the influence the Phillips curve thesis will have on policy and markets going forward. It asks the following questions along the way: What is the Phillips curve? Where does inflation come from? Is there a relationship between wage inflation and price inflation? Where does the Fed stand? What impact will a falling unemployment rate have on the economy and financial markets? A Brief History Of The Phillips Curve The Phillips curve arose from a study of the unemployment rate and wages in the U.K. from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. William Phillips discovered a consistent inverse relationship between the unemployment rate and changes in wages: high unemployment was associated with muted wage gains, and low unemployment was associated with robust wage gains. He posited that the unemployment rate revealed the level of tightness in the labor market, and the extent to which employers had to compete to attract workers. Other researchers extended the relationship from wage inflation to price-level inflation and suggested that policy makers could use the tradeoff between unemployment and inflation to fine-tune the course of the economy. The stagflation of the seventies blew up the notion of a mechanical tradeoff, but a modified form of the inverse relationship between unemployment and wage gains resides at the heart of mainstream macroeconomic forecasting models. Those models have become more sophisticated, and now include the concept of a natural rate of unemployment, but the inverse relationship between unemployment and inflation remains at their core. Investor skepticism aside, the Phillips curve is deeply embedded in orthodox economic narratives relating inflation and unemployment. As New York Fed President Williams put it last Friday in the first line of a speech discussing the issues raised in a new Phillips curve paper, “The Phillips curve is the connective tissue between the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate goals of maximum employment and price stability.1” Where Does Inflation Come From? Thousands of dissertations have grappled with this subject without providing a definitive solution, but there are two broad explanations we find most compelling. The first is that inflation responds to the level of slack in the economy. That’s to say that inflation is a by-product of the relative balance between aggregate supply and aggregate demand. When the output gap is wide (demand falls well short of the economy’s capacity), inflation is unlikely to find a footing. When the output gap is closed (demand and capacity are in balance) or negative (demand exceeds capacity), inflation will gain traction unless imported capacity bridges the gap. For the second, we combine the idea that inflation expectations play a central role with Milton Friedman’s always-and-everywhere admonition. The stable inflation of the last couple of decades has coincided with stable inflation expectations. The causation mostly appears to run from (trailing) inflation to expectations (Chart 1), but expectations surely influence economic actors’ price negotiations and open the door to a monetary influence. Inflation expectations are likely to be well anchored under a central bank that convinces households and businesses of its commitment to price stability. When the monetary authority lacks inflation credibility, inflation expectations may become unmoored and impel economic actors to insist upon higher wages and selling prices to keep pace with a rising price level. Chart 1Seeing The Future In The Recent Past Seeing The Future In The Recent Past Seeing The Future In The Recent Past The expectations-augmented Phillips curve makes it clear that inflation is a function of inflation expectations just as surely as it is a function of the unemployment rate. The more firmly expectations are anchored, the more unemployment has to drift from its natural rate (NAIRU, or u-star (u*)) to move the inflation needle. In other words, when expectations are as well-anchored as they have been since the crisis, wages will be so unresponsive to changes in the unemployment rate that the Phillips curve will appear to be broken. Believing that inflation will permanently remain at 2% or lower, workers feel no urgency to press for larger wage/salary increases. The Empirical Record – Unemployment And Wages The seventies played havoc with the Phillips curve, but over the last twenty-five years, the inverse relationship between changes in the unemployment rate and wage gains has held up very well once the unemployment rate has reached threshold levels at or near u-star. When there is ample slack in the labor market, wages are nearly insensitive to changes in the unemployment rate. When the unemployment rate moves from 10% to 9%, 9% to 8%, or 8% to 7%, there are multiple qualified candidates for every job opening and employers have no reason to bid wages higher (Chart 2, top panel). Below 5%, roughly around u*, employers have to compete for workers and wage gains are very sensitive to moves in the unemployment rate (Chart 2, bottom panel). Chart 2 Chart 3 illustrates the threshold concept, segmenting the last 30 years of observations by their relationship to the unemployment gap. Observations for which the unemployment gap is greater than or equal to 2% are shown in gray; their best-fit line with wage gains is nearly flat. Positive, but small, unemployment-gap observations are shown in orange; their best-fit line is steeper and indicates a more robust correlation with moves in wages. Negative unemployment-gap observations are colored blue; they have the steepest best-fit line and exhibit the tightest correlation with changes in wages. Chart 3 A skeptic might seek more convincing evidence, but period-to-period noise in the data limits the amount of variation in wages explained by the unemployment rate (just under 40% over the last 30 years). Noting that the unemployment gap tends to persist in negative and positive territory for extended periods, we measured the annualized rate of wage gains for negative-gap and positive-gap phases. The results were robust, with wage gains in negative-gap phases consistently topping gains in positive-gap phases (Chart 4). Both groups exhibited remarkably consistent growth rates – the three complete negative-gap phases featured wage gains of 3.8%, 3.8% and 3.9%, while the three positive-gap phases had wage growth of 2.7%, 2.5% and 2.4%. At 3%, the current negative-gap phase has already separated itself from the last three decades’ positive-gap phases, though the 3.8% level is still a ways away. Chart 4Mind The Gap Mind The Gap Mind The Gap The Empirical Record – Wage Inflation And Price Inflation If businesses were omniscient, omnipotent and able to adjust selling prices in real time – something like Amazon, in another words – they might seek to preserve their profit margins by instantaneously raising prices to offset wage gains. Wage inflation and price inflation would then move together in lockstep without any lags. Businesses do not have unlimited power or unlimited knowledge, however, and neither do workers. There are information and expectation lags, and price-making/price-taking status is fluid. The empirical record over the 50-plus years covered by the average hourly earnings series shows that the wage-price relationship is constantly shifting. Under a cost-push inflation framework, tightness in the labor market shows up in consumer prices after employees negotiate raises, and employers subsequently raise prices to recoup lost profits. In a demand-pull model, businesses perceiving signs of excess demand take the opportunity to raise prices, spurring employees to demand raises to preserve their purchasing power. There is room for both models, as BCA’s analysis of wage/price dynamics over the years has shown that leadership between prices and wages regularly shifts. For the purposes of this report, it is sufficient to note that the wage/price skeptics have a point. A decade-by-decade review of year-on-year gains in average hourly earnings (“AHE”) and core CPI shows that correlations between AHE and consumer prices regularly make big swings. The ‘60s, ‘80s and ‘00s were pretty good to Phillips curve adherents (Chart 5), but the ‘70s, ‘90s and the current decade mocked them, featuring repeated instances of outright decoupling (Chart 6). The bottom line is that the direction of causation between wages and consumer price inflation, as well as the sensitivity of the relationship, is fluid. The empirical record does not support the idea that wage inflation translates to overall inflation in a consistent and timely fashion. Chart 5Moving In Lockstep One Decade... Moving In Lockstep One Decade... Moving In Lockstep One Decade... Chart 6... Decoupling The Next ... Decoupling The Next ... Decoupling The Next The Fed’s Reaction Function Wage gains exhibit little sensitivity to changes in the unemployment rate when there is a lot of slack in the labor market. Even at lower levels of unemployment, inflation expectations can temper wages’ sensitivity to the unemployment rate. There is assuredly an inverse relationship between wages and unemployment, nonetheless, and wage gains are especially sensitive when the unemployment gap is negative. The jury is out on the relationship between unemployment and inflation, however. The direction of causation is not constant and the response lags between the series can be quite long. Inflation expectations play a sizable role, and are capable of smothering wage gains in times of low unemployment if they’re well-anchored, or goosing them even in times of high unemployment if they’re spiraling upward. Believing in the Phillips curve relationship requires a lot of assumptions, and if the theory were brand-new today, it might have a hard time surviving peer review. Markets don’t take their cues from peer-reviewed journals, however. When it comes to interest rates and the entire gamut of financial assets impacted by monetary policy, the Fed has the last word. What it believes about the Phillips curve is much more important than whether or not its conclusions have iron-clad empirical support. It has long been BCA’s view, informed by our contacts within the Fed, the former central bankers who sat on our Research Advisory Board, the Bank of Canada veterans who have worked at BCA, and careful observation of the Fed’s own comments and research, that the Fed maintains a Phillips curve view of the world. The Fed has plenty of company in this regard. Nearly all central banks are Phillips curve believers; in the absence of a mainstream alternative model of inflation, they all have to fall back on the expectations-augmented hypothesis. Investors and economics enthusiasts can rail against the Phillips curve’s empirical shortcomings, and posit that globalization, robotics/AI, Amazon and the gig economy have rendered it null and void. Those theories have not been confirmed by the data,2 however, and until the profession unites behind an alternative narrative, the Phillips curve will continue to heavily influence monetary policy. New York Fed President Williams clearly subscribes to the tell-‘em-what-you’re-gonna-tell-‘em/tell-‘em/tell-‘em-what-you-just-told-‘em method of constructing speeches. One need look no further than his remarks last Friday, when discussing a paper co-authored by former Fed governor Frederic Mishkin, for his view. “[T]he Phillips curve is very much alive in very tight labor markets,” he said near the beginning of his remarks. “[T]he Phillips curve is alive and kicking,” he said more than halfway through. “In summary, the Phillips curve is alive and well,” he said in conclusion, in case anyone in the audience had been napping. The bottom line for an investor today is that the Fed’s reaction function ensures that labor market strength will ultimately prove to be self-limiting. Assuming that Baby Boomer retirements will stifle further gains in the labor force participation rate, the unemployment rate is likely to ratchet lower across 2019.3 As it dips further and further below NAIRU, the Fed can be counted upon to remove accommodation, ultimately triggering a recession (Chart 7). Chart 7Expansions End When Unemployment Rises Expansions End When Unemployment Rises Expansions End When Unemployment Rises Investment Implications As the Fed’s pause allows the economy to regather momentum, hiring and wage growth should be well supported. The accompanying decline in the unemployment rate will drive the Fed to revive its tightening campaign. The irony is the longer the Fed grants the economy, and investors, a respite by holding its fire, the more accommodation it will have to remove to stamp out inflation pressures. It will take until 2020 for the Fed to complete its tightening campaign, but we expect the terminal fed funds rate in this cycle will be at least 3.25 to 3.5%, far above the OIS curves’ projection that fed funds will end 2020 at 2.25%. Such a wide disparity between our expectations and market expectations leaves considerable room for the Treasury curve to shift out along all maturities. We expect the curve will ultimately invert, but the process will follow a bear-flattening course, and long maturities will suffer the worst capital losses. We therefore advocate underweighting Treasuries in all fixed-income portfolios, while maintaining below-benchmark duration in all bond sleeves. We expect that Fed tightening will bring the curtain down on the equity bull market before the recession officially begins (Chart 8). Until it does, however, we expect the Fed’s forbearance to help the economy generate evident momentum, pushing risk-asset values higher. We continue to recommend that investors overweight equities and spread product for now, but the clock is ticking. Watch the unemployment gap for the cue to position portfolios more defensively. Chart 8Inducing A Recession Is Tantamount To Inducing A Bear Market Inducing A Recession Is Tantamount To Inducing A Bear Market Inducing A Recession Is Tantamount To Inducing A Bear Market Doug Peta, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1      Williams, John C., “Discussion of ‘Prospects for Inflation in a High Pressure Economy: Is the Phillips Curve Dead or Is It Just Hibernating?’” Remarks at the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, New York City, February 22, 2019. https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2019/wil190222 2      Please see the September 2017 Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, “Did Amazon Kill the Phillips Curve?” available at bcaresearch.com. 3      Holding the participation rate constant, the U.S. economy has to create 110,000 jobs a month to keep the unemployment rate at a steady state. Please see the Atlanta Fed’s online jobs calculator at https://www.frbatlanta.org/chcs/calculator.aspx.

Highlights It may seem self-evident that most governments are overly indebted, but both theory and evidence suggest otherwise. Higher debt today does not require higher taxes tomorrow if the growth rate of the economy exceeds the interest rate on government bonds. Not only is that currently the case, but it has been the norm for most of history. Unlike private firms or households, governments can choose the interest rate at which they borrow, provided that they issue debt in their own currencies. Ultimately, inflation is the only constraint to how large fiscal deficits can get. Today, most governments would welcome higher inflation. There are increasing signs China is abandoning its deleveraging campaign. Fiscal policy will remain highly accommodative in the U.S. and will turn somewhat more stimulative in Europe. Remain overweight global equities/underweight bonds. We do not have a strong regional equity preference at the moment, but expect to turn more bullish on EM versus DM by the middle of this year. Feature A Fiscal Non-Problem? Debt levels in advanced economies are higher today than they were on the eve of the Global Financial Crisis. Rising private debt accounts for some of this increase, but the lion’s share has occurred in government debt (Chart 1). Chart 1Global Debt Levels Have Risen, Especially In The Public Sector Global Debt Levels Have Risen, Especially In The Public Sector Global Debt Levels Have Risen, Especially In The Public Sector Not surprisingly, rising public debt levels have elicited plenty of consternation. While there has been a lively debate about how fast governments should tighten their belts, few have disputed the seemingly self-evident opinion that some degree of “fiscal consolidation” is warranted. Given this consensus view, one would think that the economic case for public debt levels being too high is airtight. It’s not. Far from it. Debt Sustainability, Quantified Start with the classic condition for debt sustainability, which specifies the primary fiscal balance (i.e., the overall balance excluding interest payments) necessary to maintain a constant debt-to-GDP ratio (See Box 1 for a derivation of this equation).   Image An increase in the economy’s growth rate (g), or a decrease in real interest rates (r), would allow the government to loosen the primary fiscal balance without causing the debt-to-GDP ratio to increase (Chart 2).1 If the government were to ease fiscal policy beyond that point, debt would rise in relation to GDP. But by how much? It is tempting to assume that the debt-to-GDP ratio would then begin to increase exponentially. However, that is only true if the interest rate is higher than the growth rate of the economy. If the opposite were true, the debt-to-GDP ratio would rise initially but then flatten out at a higher level.2 Chart 2 A Fiscal Free Lunch The last point is worth emphasizing. As long as the interest rate is below the economic growth rate, then any primary fiscal balance – even a permanent deficit of 20%, or even 30% of GDP – would be consistent with a stable long-term debt-to-GDP ratio. In such a setting, the government could just indefinitely rollover the existing stock of debt, while issuing enough new debt to cover interest payments. No additional taxes would be necessary. In fact, stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio becomes easier the higher it rises. Chart 3 shows this point analytically.  Chart 3   Ah, one might say: If the government issues a lot of debt, then interest rates would rise, and before we know it, we are back in a world where the borrowing rate is above the economy’s growth rate, at which point the debt dynamics go haywire. Now, that sounds like a sensible statement, but it is actually quite misleading. As long as a government is able to issue its own currency, it can always create money to pay for whatever it purchases. If people want to turn around and use that money to buy bonds, they are welcome to do so, but the government is under no obligation to pay them the interest rate that they want. If they do not wish to hold cash, they can always use the cash to buy goods and services or exchange it for foreign currency. As long as a government is able to issue its own currency, it can always create money to pay for whatever it purchases. Wouldn’t that cause inflation and currency devaluation? Yes, it might, and that’s the real constraint: What limits the ability of governments with printing presses to run large deficits is not the inability to finance them. Rather, it is the risk that their citizens will treat their currencies as hot potatoes, rushing to exchange them for goods and services out of fear that rising prices will erode the purchasing power of their cash holdings. When Is Saving Desirable? The reason governments pay interest on bonds is because they want people to save more. However, more savings is not necessarily a good thing. This is obviously the case when an economy is depressed, but it may even be true when an economy is at full employment. Just like someone can work so much that they have no time left over for leisure, or buy a house so big that they spend all their time maintaining it, it is possible for an economy to save too much, leading to an excess of capital accumulation. Under such circumstances, steady-state consumption will be permanently depressed because so much of the economy’s resources are going towards replenishing the depreciation of the economy’s capital stock.  Economists have a name for this condition: “dynamic inefficiency.” What determines whether an economy is dynamically inefficient? As it turns out, the answer is the same as the one that determines whether debt ratios are on an explosive path or not: The difference between the interest rate and the economy’s growth rate. Economies where interest rates are below the growth rate will tend to suffer from excess savings. In that case, government deficits, to the extent that they soak up national savings, may increase national welfare.   r < g Has Been The Norm Today, the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield stands at 2.69%, compared to the OECD’s projection of nominal GDP growth of 3.8% over the next decade. The gap between projected growth and bond yields is even greater in other major economies (Chart 4). Chart 4 Granted, equilibrium real rates are likely to rise over the next few years as spare capacity is absorbed. Structural factors might also push up real rates over time. Most notably, the retirement of baby boomers could significantly curb income growth, leading to a decline in national savings. Chart 5 shows that the ratio of workers-to-consumers globally is in the process of peaking after a three-decade long ascent. Economic growth could also fall if cognitive abilities continue to deteriorate, a worrying trend we discussed in a recent Special Report.3 Chart 5The Global Worker-To-Consumer Ratio Has Peaked The Global Worker-To-Consumer Ratio Has Peaked The Global Worker-To-Consumer Ratio Has Peaked It may take a while before real rates rise above GDP growth. Still, it may take a while before real rates rise above GDP growth. As Olivier Blanchard, the former chief economist at the IMF, noted in his Presidential Address to the American Economics Association earlier this year, periods in U.S. history where GDP growth exceeds interest rates have been the rule rather than the exception (Chart 6).4 The same has been true for most other economies.5 Chart 6GDP Growth Above Interest Rates: Historically, The Rule, Not The Exception GDP Growth Above Interest Rates: Historically, The Rule, Not The Exception GDP Growth Above Interest Rates: Historically, The Rule, Not The Exception What’s Next For Fiscal Policy? Austerity fatigue has set in. In the U.S., fiscally conservative Republicans, if they ever really existed, are a dying breed. Trump’s big budget deficits and his “I love debt” mantra are the waves of the future. For their part, the Democrats are shifting to the left, with the “Green New Deal” proposal being the latest manifestation. The case for fiscal stimulus is stronger in the euro area than for the United States. The European Commission expects the euro area to see a positive fiscal thrust of 0.40% of GDP this year, up from a thrust of 0.05% of GDP last year (Chart 7). This should help support growth. Chart 7The Euro Area Will Benefit From A Modest Amount Of Fiscal Easing This Year The Euro Area Will Benefit From A Modest Amount Of Fiscal Easing This Year The Euro Area Will Benefit From A Modest Amount Of Fiscal Easing This Year Additional fiscal easing would be feasible. This is clearly true in Germany, but even in Italy, the cyclically-adjusted government primary surplus is larger than what is necessary to stabilize the debt ratio.6 Unfortunately, the situation in southern Europe is greatly complicated by the ECB’s inability to act as an unconditional lender of last resort to individual sovereign borrowers. When a government cannot print its own currency, its debt markets can be subject to multiple equilibria. Under such circumstances, a vicious spiral can develop where rising bond yields lead investors to assign a higher default risk, thus leading to even higher yields (Chart 8). Chart 8   Mario Draghi’s now-famous “whatever it takes” pledge has gone a long way towards reassuring bond investors. Nevertheless, given the political constraints the ECB faces, it is doubtful that Italy or other indebted economies in the euro area will be able to pursue large-scale stimulus. Instead, the ECB will keep interest rates at exceptionally low levels. A new round of TLTROs is also looking increasingly likely, which should protect against a rise in bank funding costs and a potential credit crunch. Our European team believes that a TLTRO extension would be particularly helpful to Italian banks.  Even in Italy, the cyclically-adjusted government primary surplus is larger than what is necessary to stabilize the debt ratio. Despite having one of the highest sovereign debt ratios in the world, Japan faces no pressing need to tighten fiscal policy. Instead of raising the sales tax this October, the government should be cutting it. A loosening of fiscal policy would actually improve debt sustainability if, as is likely, a larger budget deficit leads to somewhat higher inflation (and thus, lower real borrowing rates) and, at least temporarily, faster GDP growth. We expect the Abe government to counteract at least part of the sales tax increase with new fiscal measures, and ultimately to abandon plans for further fiscal tightening over the next few years. In the EM space, Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa are among a handful of economies with vulnerable fiscal positions. They all have borrowing rates that exceed the growth rate of the economy, cyclically-adjusted primary budget deficits, and above-average levels of sovereign debt (Chart 9). Chart 9   In contrast, China stands out as having the biggest positive gap between projected GDP growth and sovereign borrowing rates of any major economy. The problem is that the main borrowers have been state-owned companies and local governments, neither of which are backstopped by the state. Not officially, anyway. Unofficially, the government has been extremely reluctant to allow large-scale defaults anywhere in the economy. Despite all the rhetoric about market-based reforms, they are unlikely to start now. Historically, the Chinese government has allowed credit growth to reaccelerate whenever it has fallen towards nominal GDP growth. As we recently argued in a report entitled “China’s Savings Problem,” China needs more debt to sustain aggregate demand.7 Historically, the government has allowed credit growth to reaccelerate whenever it has fallen towards nominal GDP growth (Chart 10). The stronger-than-expected jump in credit origination in January suggests that we are approaching such an inflection point. Chart 10Historically, China Has Scaled Back On Deleveraging When Credit Growth Has Fallen Close To Nominal GDP Growth Historically, China Has Scaled Back On Deleveraging When Credit Growth Has Fallen Close To Nominal GDP Growth Historically, China Has Scaled Back On Deleveraging When Credit Growth Has Fallen Close To Nominal GDP Growth Investment Conclusions The consensus economic view is that deflation is a much harder problem to overcome than inflation. When dealing with inflation, all you have to do is raise interest rates and eventually the economy will cool down. With deflation, however, a central bank could very quickly find itself up against the zero lower bound constraint on interest rates, unable to ease policy any further via conventional means. While this standard argument is correct, it takes a very monetary policy-centric view of macroeconomic policy. When interest rates are low, fiscal policy becomes very potent. Indeed, the whole notion that deflation is a bigger problem than inflation is rather peculiar. Just as it is easier to consume resources than to produce them, it should be easier to get people to spend than to save. People like to spend. And even if they didn’t, governments could go out and buy goods and services directly. Looking out, our bet is that policymakers will increasingly lean towards the ever-more fiscal stimulus. If structural trends end up causing the so-called neutral rate of interest to rise – the rate of interest that is necessary to avoid overheating – policymakers will have no choice but to eventually raise rates and tighten fiscal policy (Box 2). However, they will only do so begrudgingly. The result, at least temporarily, will be higher inflation. Fixed-income investors should maintain below benchmark duration exposure over both a cyclical and structural horizon. Reflationary policies that increase nominal GDP growth will help support equities, at least over the next 12 months. Chart 11 shows that corporate earnings tend to accelerate whenever nominal GDP growth rises. We upgraded global equities to overweight following the December FOMC meeting selloff. While our enthusiasm for stocks has waned with the year-to-date rally, we are sticking with our bullish bias. Chart 11Earnings And Nominal GDP Growth Tend To Move In Lock-Step Earnings And Nominal GDP Growth Tend To Move In Lock-Step Earnings And Nominal GDP Growth Tend To Move In Lock-Step A reacceleration in Chinese credit growth will put a bottom under both Chinese and global growth by the middle of this year. As a countercyclical currency, the dollar will likely come under pressure in the second half of this year. Until then, we expect the greenback to be flat-to-modestly stronger. The combination of faster global growth and a weaker dollar later this year will be manna from heaven for emerging markets. We closed our put on the EEM ETF for a gain of 104% on Jan 3rd, and are now outright long EM equities. I do not have a strong view on the relative performance of EM versus DM at the moment, but expect to shift EM equities to overweight by this summer.8 Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com   Box 1 The Arithmetic Of Debt Sustainability Image   Box 2 Debt Sustainability And Full Employment: The Role Of Fiscal And Monetary Policy Image Policymakers should strive to stabilize the ratio of debt-to-GDP over the long haul, while also ensuring that the economy stays near full employment. The accompanying chart shows the tradeoffs involved. The DD schedule depicts the combination of the primary fiscal balance and the gap between the borrowing rate and GDP growth (r minus g) that is consistent with a stable debt-to-GDP ratio. In line with the debt sustainability equation derived in Box 1, the slope of the DD schedule is simply equal to the debt/GDP ratio. Any point below the DD schedule is one where the debt-to-GDP ratio is rising, while any point above is one where the ratio is falling. The EE schedule depicts the combination of the primary fiscal balance and r - g that keeps the economy at full employment. The schedule is downward-sloping because an increase in the primary fiscal balance implies a tightening of fiscal policy, and hence requires an offsetting decline in interest rates. Any point above the EE schedule is one where the economy is operating at less than full employment. Any point below the EE schedule is one where the economy is operating beyond full employment and hence overheating. Suppose there is a structural shift in the economy that causes the neutral rate of interest – the rate of interest consistent with full employment and stable inflation – to increase. In that case, the EE schedule would shift to the right: For any level of the fiscal primary balance, the economy would need a higher interest rate to avoid overheating. The arrows show three possible “transition paths” to a new equilibrium. Scenario #1 is one where policymakers raise rates quickly but are slow to tighten fiscal policy. This results in a higher debt-to-GDP ratio. Scenario #2 is one where policymakers tighten fiscal policy quickly but are slow to raise rates. This results in a lower debt-to-GDP ratio. Scenario #3 is one where the government drags its feet in both raising rates and tightening fiscal policy. As the economy overheats, real rates actually decline, sending the arrow initially to the left. This effectively allows policymakers to inflate away the debt, leading to a lower debt-to-GDP ratio. Note: In Scenario #2, and especially in Scenario #3, the DD line will become flatter (not shown on the chart to avoid clutter). Consequently, the final equilibrium will be one where real rates are somewhat higher, but the primary fiscal balance is somewhat lower, than in Scenario #1.   Footnotes 1          One can equally define the interest rate and GDP growth rate in nominal terms (see Box 1 for details).  2       Japan is a good example of this point. The primary budget deficit averaged 5% of GDP between 1993 and 2010, a period when government net debt rose from 20% of GDP to 142% of GDP. Since then, Japan’s primary deficit has averaged 5.1% of GDP, but net debt has risen to only 156% of GDP (and has been largely stable for the past two years). 3      Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “The Most Important Trend In The World Has Reversed And Nobody Knows Why,” dated February 1, 2019. 4      Olivier Blanchard, “Public Debt And Low Interest Rates,” Peterson Institute for International Economics and MIT American Economic Association (AEA) Presidential Address, (January 2019). 5      Paolo Mauro, Rafael Romeu, Ariel Binder, and Asad Zaman, “A Modern History Of Fiscal Prudence And Profligacy,” IMF Working Paper, (January 2013). 6      The Italian 10-year bond yield is 2.83% while nominal GDP growth is 2.64%. Multiplying the difference by net debt of 118% of GDP results in a required primary surplus of .22% of GDP that is necessary to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio. This is lower than the IMF’s 2018 estimate of cyclically-adjusted government primary surplus of 2.14%. 7      Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “China’s Savings Problem,” dated January 25, 2019. 8      Please note that my colleague, Arthur Budaghyan, BCA’s Chief EM strategist, remains bearish on both EM and DM equities and expects EM to underperform DM over the coming months. Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Chart 12 Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades        

Highlights A sooner-than-anticipated end to the Federal Reserve’s balance-sheet runoff should give a welcome boost to international liquidity conditions. Moreover, reflationary efforts in China, cautious global central banks, and easing global financial conditions all point to a rebound in economic surprises. This will support pro-cyclical versus defensive currencies and argues against a strong USD. At this point, it is too early to tell how long a pro-cyclical FX stance will be warranted. Sell NZD/CAD. Feature Since the turn of the year, this publication has argued that a correction in the dollar was increasingly likely, and that the main beneficiaries of this move should be the more pro-cyclical currencies. Because U.S. domestic fundamentals remain much stronger than the rest of the G10’s, our preference has been to favor commodity currencies versus the yen instead of playing dollar weakness outright. This theme remains in place for now. However, we are increasingly concerned about the dollar and think the outperformance of commodity currencies could last longer than originally expected. Essentially, an end to the Federal Reserve’s balance-sheet runoff, more cautious central banks, and easier global financial conditions could set the stage for a significant rebound in commodity currencies. U.S. Excess Reserves Vs. Commodity Currencies Whether it is from Governor Lael Brainard, Cleveland Fed President Loretta Mester, or the FOMC minutes, the message is clear: The days of the Fed’s balance sheet runoff are numbered. Ryan Swift, BCA’s Chief U.S. Bond Strategist, has written at length that the Fed’s balance sheet attrition has had a limited direct impact on U.S. growth. However, Ryan and the FOMC members both agree that a smaller balance sheet impacts the ability of the Fed to control the level of the fed funds rate.1 With less excess reserves in the banking system, the New York Fed has to intervene more often to keep the policy rate below its ceiling. This might seem like a very technical point, but it is an important one for many FX markets. Prior to the financial crisis, expanding excess reserves on U.S. commercial banks would coincide with improving dollar-based liquidity. Moreover, since 2011, reserves even lead our financial liquidity index (Chart I-1). Since there is 14 trillion of USD-denominated foreign-currency debt around the world, these fluctuations in U.S. excess reserves, and thus global liquidity, can have an impact on the price of assets most levered to global growth conditions. Chart I-1U.S. Excess Reserves Contribute To The Global Liquidity Backdrop U.S. Excess Reserves Contribute To The Global Liquidity Backdrop U.S. Excess Reserves Contribute To The Global Liquidity Backdrop Chart I-2 illustrates that commodity currencies are indeed very responsive to changes in U.S. excess reserves, particularly when these pro-cyclical currencies are compared to counter-cyclical ones like the JPY. Meanwhile, the trade-weighted dollar tends to move in the opposite direction of excess reserves, reflecting the dollar’s countercyclical nature (Chart I-3). This relationship, however, is not as tight as the one between commodity currencies and the reserves. Chart I-2Improving Growth In Excess Reserves Leads To Stronger Commodity Currencies... Improving Growth In Excess Reserves Leads To Stronger Commodity Currencies... Improving Growth In Excess Reserves Leads To Stronger Commodity Currencies... Chart I-3...And To A Weaker Greenback ...And To A Weaker Greenback ...And To A Weaker Greenback A corollary to the growing consensus within the FOMC to end the balance-sheet runoff sooner than later is that the contraction in excess reserves will end. A bottoming in the rate of change of the reserves is consistent with a rebound in commodity currencies, especially against the yen, and with a correction in the dollar. Gold prices are very sensitive to global liquidity conditions. Today, not only is the yellow metal moving closer to the US$1350-US$1370 zone that marked its previous highs in 2016, 2017, and 2018, but also, the gold rally is broadening, as exemplified by the advance / decline line of gold prices versus nine currencies, which is making new highs (Chart I-4, top panel). This indicates that the precious metal could punch above this resistance level. Gold is probably sniffing out an improvement in global liquidity conditions. Since rising gold prices tend to lead EM high-yield bond prices higher (Chart I-4, bottom panel), investors need to monitor this move closely. Chart I-4A Broadening Gold Rally Is Consistent With Easing Liquidity Conditions A Broadening Gold Rally Is Consistent With Easing Liquidity Conditions A Broadening Gold Rally Is Consistent With Easing Liquidity Conditions Bottom Line: The growing chorus among FOMC members singing the praises of the end of the Fed’s balance-sheet runoff points toward a significant slowdown in U.S. excess reserves attrition. While this may not be a significant development for U.S. domestic economic variables, it should help liquidity conditions outside the U.S. While this could weigh on the greenback, the probability is higher that it will help commodity currencies in the short run, especially against the yen. Global Policy And Commodity Currencies In China, new total social financing hit CNY 4.6 trillion in January, well above the normal seasonal strength. Accordingly, the Chinese fiscal and credit impulse is starting to improve (Chart I-5). While this rebound is currently embryonic, our Geopolitical Strategy team has argued that a massive increase in Chinese credit this January would indicate a change in Beijing’s economic priorities.2 The Chinese government may be trying to limit the downside to growth, and reflation may expand. This would result in a further pick-up in the credit impulse. Chart I-5The Chinese Credit Impulse May Be Bottoming The Chinese Credit Impulse May Be Bottoming The Chinese Credit Impulse May Be Bottoming Easing EM financial conditions – courtesy of rebounding EM high-yield bond prices – and rising Chinese credit flows should ultimately lead to improving growth conditions across EM. As a result, our diffusion index of EM economic activity – which tallies improvements across 23 EM economic variables – should bounce from currently very depressed levels. Such a recovery is normally associated with a weaker trade-weighted dollar, a stronger euro, rising commodity prices and rising commodity currencies – both against the USD and the JPY (Chart I-6). Chart I-6IF EM Growth Conditions Improve, This Will Have A Profound Impact On the FX Market IF EM Growth Conditions Improve, This Will Have A Profound Impact On the FX Market IF EM Growth Conditions Improve, This Will Have A Profound Impact On the FX Market We can expand this line of thinking to the global economy. Our Leading Economic Indicator Diffusion Index, which compares the number of countries with a rising LEI versus those with a falling LEI, already rebounded five months ago. Historically, this signals an upcoming rebound in the BCA global LEI. Additionally, other major central banks are also sounding an increasingly cautious tone. This should accentuate the easing in global financial conditions that began in late December, creating another support for global growth. However, global investors remain very pessimistic on global growth, as exemplified by this week’s very poor global growth expectations computed from the German ZEW survey (Chart I-7). This dichotomy between depressed growth expectations and burgeoning green shoots suggests that risk asset prices have room to rally further in the coming quarter or two. Chart I-7Investors Remain Pessimistic About Growth, Yet Green Shoots Are Popping Up Investors Remain Pessimistic About Growth, Yet Green Shoots Are Popping Up Investors Remain Pessimistic About Growth, Yet Green Shoots Are Popping Up These dynamics are positive for commodity currencies and negative for the dollar. This cycle, the pattern has been for the trade-weighted dollar to correct and hypersensitive pro-cyclical currencies like the AUD and the NZD to perk up only after our Global LEI diffusion index has trough, and around the same time as risk asset prices rebound (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Thinking About Growth, Asset Prices, The Dollar, And Commodity Currencies Thinking About Growth, Asset Prices, The Dollar, And Commodity Currencies Thinking About Growth, Asset Prices, The Dollar, And Commodity Currencies Treasury yields will most likely also be forced higher by improving risk asset prices and economic activity, especially as bond market flows suggest T-notes currently are a coiled spring. The U.S. Treasury International Capital System data released at the end of last week was very revealing. The press emphasized the large-scale selling of Treasurys from the Cayman Islands – interpreted as selling by hedge funds. Missing from the picture was the enormous buying from these same players over the past 12 months, which corresponded with falling yields and a rallying trade-weighted dollar (Chart I-9). It was a sign of growing fear that pushed up the price of bonds. Chart I-9Hedge Funds Have Room To Liquidate Their Treasury Holdings Hedge Funds Have Room To Liquidate Their Treasury Holdings Hedge Funds Have Room To Liquidate Their Treasury Holdings If, as we expect, global growth beats dismal expectations and risk assets rebound further, the countercyclical dollar should correct. This will further ease global financial conditions and justifying even more a wholesale liquidation of stale bond holdings by hedge funds and further pushing the Fed toward resuming its hiking campaign faster than the market is currently anticipating. This combination is highly bond bearish. Unsurprisingly, this means that the yen, which normally trades closely in line with U.S. Treasury yields, is likely to weaken. Hence, USD/JPY and EUR/JPY could experience significant upside over the coming months (Chart I-10). Chart I-10A Bond Bearish Backdrop Is Also Bad For The Yen A Bond Bearish Backdrop Is Also Bad For The Yen A Bond Bearish Backdrop Is Also Bad For The Yen Bottom Line: Global growth conditions are evolving away from a dollar-bullish, commodity currency-bearish backdrop. Not only is the dollar-based liquidity set to improve, but China is also releasing the proverbial brake. Additionally, a generally more cautious tone among global central banks will contribute to easing global financial conditions. These developments are likely to result in a period of positive global economic surprises – and an environment where the greenback weakens and where pro-cyclical currencies outperform. But For How Long? It remains a question mark as to how long this pro-growth cycle will last. Parts of the dynamics described above are very self-defeating. If global growth conditions and asset prices rebound strongly, the Fed will be in a better position to increase rates once again. This could quickly curtail the improvement in global financial conditions and favor a strong dollar. Additionally, it is not clear how far Beijing will go in terms of pushing reflation through the Chinese economy. Chinese policymakers are worried about too-pronounced a slowdown but are equally worried about too much debt in their economy, and do not want to repeat the debt binge witnessed in 2010 and 2016. Therefore, they may be much quicker to lift their foot off the gas pedal. This conflicting attitude is best illustrated by recent opposing remarks made by Chinese policymakers. On the one hand, Premier Li-Keqiang expressed concerns regarding the January credit surge, suggesting that some Chinese policymakers are already trying to dampen expectations that stimulus will be substantial. On the other hand, the PBoC sounded utterly unconcerned.  Moreover, as our Emerging Markets Strategy service highlights, EM earnings are likely to continue to suffer from the lagged effect of China’s previous tightening. This creates the risk that even if global growth rebounds, EM stock prices, EM FX and all related plays do not follow. This would maintain the dollar-bullish environment and hurt pro-cyclical commodity currencies while supporting the yen. Despite these risks, it is nonetheless too early to tell how short-lived this period of dollar softness and commodity currency strength will be.  After all, the dollar is a momentum currency. If the dollar weakness gathers steam, a virtuous cycle could emerge: improving global growth begets a weaker dollar, a weaker dollar begets easier global financial conditions, easier global financial conditions beget stronger growth, and so on.          Gold prices may hold the key to cut this Gordian knot. If gold cannot maintain its recent gains, then the pro-cyclical positioning will not be valid for more than three months. However, if gold prices can remain at elevated levels or even rally further, then this pro-cyclical positioning will stay appropriate for at least six to nine months. What is clear is that for now, buying risk in the FX space makes sense. Bottom Line: At this point, too many crosscurrents are at play to evaluate confidently the length of any rally in pro-cyclical currencies relative to defensive ones. Since easier financial conditions ultimately force the Fed to resume hiking and since it is far from clear how committed to reflation Chinese policymakers are, our base case remains that this move will last a quarter or so. However, the fact that a falling dollar further eases global financial conditions, fomenting greater global growth in the process, suggests that a virtuous circle that create additional dollar downside can also emerge. Gold may provide early signals as to when investors should once again adopt a defensive posture. Sell NZD/CAD Something exceptional happened three months ago. For the second time in 25 years, Canadian policy rates fell in line with New Zealand’s. As Chart I-11 shows, this last happened from 1998 to 1999, when NZD/CAD subsequently depreciated 26%. However, today Canada’s and New Zealand’s current accounts are roughly in line while back then New Zealand had a substantially larger deficit, such a decline is unlikely to repeat itself. Nonetheless, we posit that NZD/CAD possesses ample downside. Chart I-11Bad News For NZD/CAD Bad News For NZD/CAD Bad News For NZD/CAD First, like in 1998-‘99, the real trade-weighted NZD exhibits a larger premium to its fair value than the real trade-weighted CAD (Chart I-12). In fact, the relative premium of the NZD to the CAD is roughly comparable as it was back then. Moreover, our Intermediate-Term Timing Model for NZD/CAD reinforces this message as it suggests that short-term valuations are also stretched (Chart I-13). Chart I-12NZD/CAD Is Pricey... NZD/CAD Is Pricey... NZD/CAD Is Pricey... Chart I-13...And Our Short-Term Valuation Metric Agrees ...And Our Short-Term Valuation Metric Agrees ...And Our Short-Term Valuation Metric Agrees Second, the New Zealand economy is currently weaker than that of Canada. Relative consumer confidence and business confidence have been in a downward trend for three years. Historically, while NZD/CAD can deviate from such dynamics, ultimately this cross tends to revert toward relative growth trends. The recent collapse in New Zealand’s economic surprises relative to Canada’s suggests that the timing for such a reversion is increasingly ripe, as there is currently scope for investors to discount a more hawkish Bank of Canada than Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Indeed, 1-year/1-year forward yields in Canada have fallen much more relative to the BoC overnight rate than similar forwards have fallen relative to the RBNZ policy rate. Third, New Zealand real bond yields have collapsed relative to Canada’s. As Chart I-14 illustrates, NZD/CAD tends to follow real yield differentials. So far, NZD/CAD has been less-weak than the real-yield gap would imply, but from late 2003 to early 2005 this cross also managed to defy gravity for an extended time, only to ultimately succumb to the inevitable. Chart I-14Falling Real Yield Spreads Will Weigh On NZD/CAD Falling Real Yield Spreads Will Weigh On NZD/CAD Falling Real Yield Spreads Will Weigh On NZD/CAD Fourth, as the top panel of Chart I-15 illustrates, the performance of kiwi stocks relative to Canadian equities tend to lead NZD/CAD, especially at tops. While tentative, the ratio of New Zealand to Canadian stocks seems to have peaked in early 2016. Supporting this judgment, kiwi profits have fallen relative to their Canadian counterparts and relative net earnings revisions are following a similar path – a move normally associated with a weaker NZD/CAD (Chart I-15, bottom panel). Chart I-15Relative Stock Market Dynamics Look Poor Relative Stock Market Dynamics Look Poor Relative Stock Market Dynamics Look Poor Fifth, terms of trades are becoming a growing headwind for NZD/CAD (Chart I-16). The price of agricultural commodities relative to energy products drives this pair, reflecting the comparative advantages of the two countries. BCA’s Commodity & Energy service is currently much more positive on the outlook for the energy complex than the agricultural complex. NZD/CAD is a perfect instrument to implement this view, especially now that the NZD suffers from a very rare negative carry against the CAD. Chart I-16A Negative Tems-Of-Trade Shock For NZD/CAD A Negative Tems-Of-Trade Shock For NZD/CAD A Negative Tems-Of-Trade Shock For NZD/CAD Bottom Line: NZD/CAD is set to experience an important fall. The NZD currently suffers from a very rare negative carry against the CAD. The last time this happened, a large depreciation ensued. Moreover, valuations and economic trends argue in favor of shorting this pair. Finally, relative bond yields, equity dynamics and term-of-trade outlooks also point to a lower NZD/CAD. Sell at 0.900, with a stop at 0.927 for a target of 0.800.     Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, titled “Caught Offside”, dated February 12, 2019, and the U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, titled “The Great Unwind”, dated September 19, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report titled “China: Stimulating Amid The Trade Talks,” dated February 20, 2019 available at gps.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.S. has been mixed: Capacity Utilization underperformed expectations, coming in at 78.2%. However, Michigan Consumer Sentiment outperformed expectations, coming in at 95.5. Finally, the NAHB Housing Market Index also surprised to the upside, coming in at 62. The DXY has fallen by 0.2% this week. We remain bullish on the U.S. dollar on a cyclical basis, given that the Fed will end up hiking rates more than expected. However, the current easing of monetary conditions by Chinese authorities should tactically hurt the dollar and help commodity currencies. Moreover, the fact that the Fed announced that it might bring about an end to the balance sheet runoff sooner than expected will further help global liquidity conditions. The real question now is how long the coming dollar correction will last? Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Global Liquidity Trends Support The Dollar, But... - January 25, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area has been mixed: The annual growth in construction output underperformed expectations, coming in at 0.7%. The current account balance also surprised to the downside, coming in at 33 billion euros. However, the Zew Survey – Economic sentiment, though negative, surprised to the upside, coming in at -16.6. EUR/USD has risen by 0.4% this week. We remain bearish on EUR/USD on a cyclical basis; given that, we expect real rates to rise much faster in the U.S. than in the euro area. This is because we think that the U.S. economy  will remain stronger than Europe’s, a consequence of the fact that the former has experienced a significant private sector deleveraging since 2008 while the latter has not. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 2019 Key Views: The Xs And The Currency Market - December 7, 2018 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been mixed: Machinery orders yearly growth outperformed to the upside, coming in at 0.9%. Hurt by a very sharp contraction in shipments to China, the yearly growth of Japanese exports also surprised to the downside, coming in at -8.4%. However, imports yearly growth outperformed to the upside, coming in at -0.6%. USD/JPY has risen by 0.2% this week. We are bearish towards the yen on a tactical basis as the current upturn in liquidity conditions should hurt safe haven currencies. Moreover, reflationary efforts by Chinese Authorities should provide a boon to risk assets and make low yield currencies like the yen even less attractive. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Yen Fireworks - January 4, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been strong: Retail sales and retail sales ex-fuel yearly growth both outperformed expectations, coming in at 4.2% and 4.1%. Moreover, the yearly growth of average hourly earnings excluding bonus also surprised positively, coming in at 3.4%. GBP/USD has risen by 0.9% this week. We expect that a soft Brexit deal remains the most probable outcome out of Westminster. Thus, this factor, along with how cheap the pound is, make us bullish on the pound on a long-term basis. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Deadlock In Westminster - January 18, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia has been mixed: The wage price index yearly growth underperformed expectations, coming in at 0.5%. However, the employment change surprised to the upside, coming in at 39.1 thousand in January. The participation rate also surprised positively, coming in at 65.7%. AUD/USD has fallen 0.7% this week. We are positive on the AUD on a tactical basis. Global monetary conditions have eased thanks to the rising Chinese credit and more cautious global central banks. Moreover, the announcement that the Fed is looking to halt its balance sheet reduction sooner than expected has provided further relief. However, the fundamentals of Australia remain poor, and thus long-term investors should continue to avoid this currency, Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 CAD And AUD: Jumping Higher To Plunge Deeper - February 1, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 The recent data in New Zealand has been mixed: The business PMI in January fell to 53.1. However, the input of the producer price index on a quarter-over-quarter basis surprised to the upside, coming in at 1.6%. NZD/USD depreciated by 0.7% this week. While NZD/USD might have some upside in the short term, we remain bearish on the NZD/USD on a cyclical basis. Both the short-term and long-term interest rates in New Zealand are lower than in the U.S., while the real trade-weighted NZD is trading at 7% premium to its fair value. Thus, the kiwi is relatively overvalued which means that any tactical upside of NZD won’t have legs.  Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - November 2, 2018 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 The recent data in Canada has been neutral: The December new housing price index stays unchanged at 0%, on both month-over-month and year-over-year basis. The CAD has risen by 0.2% against USD this week. As BCA anticipates oil prices to strengthen more, we also expect the CAD to outperform the AUD and the NZD over the next few months. However, we remain bearish on CAD/USD on a structural basis. The unhealthy housing market in Canada could be a potential risk to the Canadian financial industry and the economy as a whole. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 CAD And AUD: Jumping Higher To Plunge Deeper - February 1, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 The recent data in Switzerland has been positive: The December exports increased to 19,682 million, while the imports increased to 16,639 million. The trade balance in December thus increased to 3,043 million, surprised to the upside. EUR/CHF has been flat this week. We are bullish on EUR/CHF on a cyclical basis. Easy global financial conditions should hurt safe haven currencies like the franc. Moreover, we believe that the SNB will continue to play a heavily dovish bias in order to counteract the fall in inflation caused by the surge in the franc last year. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Waiting For A Real Deal - December 7, 2018 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway has been positive: January trade balance increased to 28.8 million, from previous 25 billion. USD/NOK was flat this week. In general, we are overweight the krone, since we believe the pickup in oil prices will help the Norwegian economy, ultimately boosting the performance of NOK against the EUR,  the SEK, the AUD and the NZD. Moreover, the NOK is undervalued and currently trading at a large discount to its fair value, which could further lift the performance of the NOK on a cyclical basis. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Global Liquidity Trends Support The Dollar, But... - January 25, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden has been negative: January unemployment rate has increased to 6.5%. Moreover, the monthly inflation rate comes in at -1%, surprising to the downside. USD/SEK rallied by more than 1% this week. We remain bearish on EUR/SEK since the SEK is currently trading at a discount to its long-term fair value. Moreover, there are many signs pointing to a Swedish economy rebound. The negative rate in the country and easy financial conditions could stimulate the domestic demand and if global growth perks up, the weak inflation readings will prove transitory. The Riksbank has already abandoned it pledge to suppress the krona and it will move this year to lift rates again. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Global Liquidity Trends Support The Dollar, But... - January 25, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Highlights So What? China’s January credit data suggest that stimulus is here. Why? January credit growth was a blowout number. Trade uncertainty is likely to be prolonged with an extension of talks. Equity bourses in South Korea and Russia are the most likely to benefit from Chinese stimulus. Industrial metals such as copper will also benefit – with a delay. Feature New credit data for China in January improves the chances that Beijing’s stimulus measures will overshoot this year, causing China’s economy to bottom in 2019 and jumpstart global growth. In our annual outlook for this year we argued that while China was stimulating the economy, the magnitude of stimulus would be the decisive factor for the global macro environment in 2019. We argued that the type of stimulus would remain primarily fiscal – tax cuts for households and small and medium-sized enterprises – and hence that it would be modest as fiscal easing would merely offset relatively weak credit growth. This view stemmed from our assessment of the Xi Jinping administration, highlighted in April 2017, as an “elitist” (not populist) administration. Its policy priorities are to discipline the Chinese economy, and in particular to contain systemic financial risk, which President Xi has cited as a national security threat. This view is not wrong, but the latest data clearly show that Xi has decided to pause these painful efforts at limiting leverage and rebalancing China’s economy. Witness January’s decisive uptick in both total social financing (total private credit) and local government bond issuance (Chart 1). Chart 1Higher Risk Of An Overshoot Higher Risk Of An Overshoot Higher Risk Of An Overshoot A massive spike in new credit is the single most important criterion in our “Checklist For A Stimulus Overshoot.” Thus, from a policy perspective, we are now at higher risk of an overshoot (Table 1). Not only credit as a whole but also informal lending saw a surge in January, implying that the government is relenting in its crackdown on the shadow banks. The approval of local government bond issuance for early in the year – and the People’s Bank of China’s announcement of a “Central Bank Bills Swap” program – reinforce this policy shift.1 Table 1Checklist For A Chinese Stimulus Overshoot In 2019 China: Stimulating Amid The Trade Talks China: Stimulating Amid The Trade Talks   A stimulus overshoot is positive for Chinese demand in the short run but negative for potential GDP in the long run. A “traditional” credit surge of this nature cannot be surgically targeted at SMEs or households. It will go to state-owned enterprises, privileged corporations, property developers, and the like, which have always had the advantage in China’s financial system. SOEs have taken a much larger share of new loans than private companies in recent years,2 and the only silver lining of this trend was the possibility that tighter credit controls would discipline the SOEs. That silver lining is now fading, barring some new and surprising development on the reform front. China needs to create 26 trillion renminbi in new credit over the course of the year to avoid a corporate earnings contraction. These January numbers put China on track to do just that (Chart 2), assuming that President Xi and U.S. President Donald Trump agree to a short-term, framework trade deal this year. Chart 2On Track To Avoid An Earnings Contraction On Track To Avoid An Earnings Contraction On Track To Avoid An Earnings Contraction Of course, a few caveats are in order. First, January’s credit number is only one data point and credit growth is always abnormally strong in the first month of the year. Early in the year, banks seek to expand their assets rapidly in a bid to get as much market share as possible before administrative credit quotas kick in. Because of Chinese New Year, it is best to combine January and February data to get a sense of the rate of credit expansion in the first part of the year. To do that, investors will have to wait for mid-March when the February data is out. This year’s January numbers are very strong relative to previous Januaries (Chart 3) and the context is more accommodative than the 2017 January credit surge, when authorities were beginning to tighten rather than ease macroprudential policy. Still a rapid rate of credit expansion will have to be sustained in the coming months in order to meet the 26 trillion RMB requirement highlighted above. Chart 3 Second, there is some risk that China’s households and private businesses will not respond as positively today as in the past. The intensification of Communist Party control over the society and economy, President Xi’s cancellation of term limits, and the strategic confrontation with the United States have created a bearish sentiment in the private sector. Our Emerging Markets Strategy would point out that if the propensity to consume, and money velocity,3 do not accelerate, then a surge in new credit may fail to ignite a reacceleration in China (Chart 4). Chart 4Chinese Are Holding On To Their Money Chinese Are Holding On To Their Money Chinese Are Holding On To Their Money Still, what we now know is that Xi Jinping and his top economic adviser, Vice Premier Liu He, are not initiating the “assault phase of reform” that their predecessors initiated in the late 1990s in order to cleanse China’s economy of bad loans and zombie companies. Instead, they are likely reestablishing the “Socialist Put” in order to reverse the current deceleration, demonstrate China’s continued economic might and face down the United States’ threat of tariffs. Bottom Line: China’s stimulus measures are increasingly likely to overshoot, with positive implications for both Chinese and global growth. China is still facing a corporate earnings recession, but the odds of averting it are increasing.    Trade Deadline More Likely To Be Extended What of the trade war? First, we would warn clients that China’s annual credit origination is a much bigger factor for the global economy than China’s exports to the United States (Chart 5). The trade war can escalate from here and yet, if China’s stimulus works as it has in the past, the results will be manageable for China’s economy save for Chinese companies expressly exposed to the U.S. economy through exports. In reality, both the U.S. and China are now effectively stimulating their economies and in this sense global trade as a whole will benefit regardless of bilateral tariffs. Chart 5Watch China Credit, Not So Much The Trade War Watch China Credit, Not So Much The Trade War Watch China Credit, Not So Much The Trade War But it is possible that just as global equity markets ignored China’s economic slowdown and only sold off when the tariffs were levied (Chart 6), they may not continue to rally much on China’s credit data. Given the already considerable rally in global risk assets since October, markets may not be satisfied merely with one or two months of solid credit data out of China without a clear resolution to the trade conflict. After all, if a collapse in U.S.-China trade talks portends a new Cold War, then institutional investors may be justified in taking a wait-and-see approach despite China’s credit cycle upswing. Chart 6Will Equities Ignore China Data (Again)? Will Equities Ignore China Data (Again)? Will Equities Ignore China Data (Again)? In the past, we have highlighted that the U.S. and China are not economically prohibited from engaging in a trade war – the export exposure is too small – and China’s new stimulus reinforces this point. However, President Trump is concerned about causing a sell-off in the tech sector and hence the broad equity market which could translate into a bear market and raise the probability of a recession occurring prior to November 2020. Meanwhile, in China, given Beijing’s reported trade concessions, there is apparently a desire to pacify the relationship and discourage U.S. unilateral tariffs and sanctions that could become seriously destabilizing for the Chinese economy and society. The need to have a happy 2021 centenary celebration for the Communist Party may factor into policymakers’ thinking. The latest news flow is mildly positive for the odds of getting a framework deal sometime this year. President Trump visited the Chinese negotiators in Washington, D.C. while President Xi reciprocated with the American negotiators in Beijing. Trump has signaled that an extension of the March 1 deadline is possible, and a two-month extension is being bandied about in the press. China’s National People’s Congress is likely to pass a new Foreign Investment Law that ostensibly guarantees many of the American demands on forced tech transfer, intellectual property theft, and discriminatory treatment of U.S. companies (Table 2). Even the second Trump summit with Kim Jong Un, this time in Vietnam, should be seen as a mild positive for U.S.-China negotiations. Table 2New Foreign Investment Law Would Be A Positive For U.S.-China Negotiations China: Stimulating Amid The Trade Talks China: Stimulating Amid The Trade Talks However, Presidents Trump and Xi have yet to schedule a new summit, which is probably necessary for a final deal. And there are murmurs from the press suggesting that China’s new law and other concessions are not going to satisfy the U.S. negotiators on the critical point of “structural changes” and a verification process. This leaves us inclined to change our trade war probabilities to increase the odds of an extension (Table 3). The improvement in U.S. financial conditions and China’s stimulus, if anything, make it more likely that negotiations will be extended, as both sides feel their economic and financial constraints less acutely. Table 3Updated Trade War Probabilities China: Stimulating Amid The Trade Talks China: Stimulating Amid The Trade Talks Bottom Line: Global and Chinese risk assets should rally on China’s credit uptick, but the lack of resolution of the trade war could continue to inhibit animal spirits – and the odds of a March 1 resolution are declining. Who Are The Equity Winners Of China’s Stimulus? China’s strong January credit number is supportive of global equity markets. That much is obvious. But which equity markets will benefit the most? In what follows we examine the relationship between Chinese credit and MSCI equity returns of various countries. We find that Malaysian, Australian, South Korean, and Indonesian equities are the most highly correlated with Chinese credit growth and are thus most likely to benefit from the recent upturn (Chart 7). On the other hand, France and Italy stand out as countries whose bourses are more insulated. Chart 7 Out of the markets that are positively correlated, South Korea and Russia stand out as relatively cheap (Chart 8). Thus we expect these equities to do especially well. By contrast, while Indonesia and the Philippines are highly leveraged to China, these markets are currently relatively expensive. BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy is currently overweight Korean and Russian equities within the EM space, neutral Turkey (although recently upgraded from underweight), and underweight Indonesia and the Philippines. Chart 8 In addition to credit stimulus, we expect Chinese household consumption to also gain support going forward. This will likely be driven by policy stimulus targeting the consumer specifically and is best exemplified by the recently announced tax cuts (Chart 9), which we expect to trickle down to greater consumer demand and growth in retail sales. Our base case calls for 8%-10% growth in household consumption over the coming 12 months, up from the current 3.5%. Chart 9 However, consumer sentiment in China is weak. BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy’s proxy for household marginal propensity to spend ticked up recently, after falling since early last year (see Chart 4 above). A resumption in the decline would highlight that households are increasingly unwilling to spend, which would translate into weaker retail sales despite policy efforts to boost consumption. Such a scenario – in which credit growth accelerates without a substantial uptick in consumer spending – is plausible, given that it occurred between mid-2015 and mid-2016 (Chart 10). In any case, whether Chinese stimulus comes in the form of the traditional credit channel, or instead in the form of fiscal stimulus to household consumption, the same equity markets will generally benefit the most (Chart 11). Chart 10...But Flattish Retail Sales Are Also A Possibility ...But Flattish Retail Sales Are Also A Possibility ...But Flattish Retail Sales Are Also A Possibility Chart 11 Indeed, global equity markets react the same way regardless of the type of stimulus implemented. For instance, MSCI returns for the Philippines, Sweden, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Turkey are more closely correlated to both Chinese credit growth and retail sales growth compared to Italy, Japan, and France.  The same conclusion is reached when we look at the correlations between Chinese credit growth or consumption growth and individual MSCI sectors such as industrials and consumer discretionary (Chart 12). Chart 12 The relatively stronger correlation between Chinese credit growth and equity returns – as opposed to Chinese retail sales and equity returns – can be put down to the nature of Chinese imports. While industrial goods account for the bulk of China’s purchases of foreign goods, consumer goods excluding autos make up only 15% of China’s imports (Table 4). However, as Chart 12 illustrates, the relationship between China’s retail sales growth and global equities is much tighter in the case of the consumer discretionary sector, whether the latter is compared to global industrials sectors or the overall MSCI index. Table 4Import Composition Of Chinese Imports China: Stimulating Amid The Trade Talks China: Stimulating Amid The Trade Talks Equity market exposure to China is not always in line with the extent of each country’s trade exposure to China (Chart 13). Chart 13 There are some clear exceptions – most notably Mexico, which has the highest correlation coefficient with Chinese credit and consumption variables since 2010. However, this is likely due to idiosyncratic factors.4 Correlation does not imply causation, and we cannot conclude with certainty that Mexican equities will outperform amid China’s new round of stimulus. Nevertheless, given that Mexico is a very deeply liquid market that benefits amid EM bull markets, this may not be entirely coincidental. The correlations between global equity markets and Chinese credit peak two months after the stimulus measures are first implemented (Chart 14). This is more or less in line with adjusted total social financing’s correlation versus industrial metals. However BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy has shown that copper’s correlations versus other measures of Chinese money and credit peak after roughly three quarters (Chart 15).5 This is evident in both the 2012 and 2015-16 stimulus episodes in which the bottom in copper prices lagged the bottom in China’s credit growth. Thus we may witness a rebound in equity markets on the back of China’s credit splurge before we see an improvement in annual returns on copper prices.  Chart 14 Chart 15Copper Rallies Lag China Credit Stimulus Copper Rallies Lag China Credit Stimulus Copper Rallies Lag China Credit Stimulus Bottom Line: South Korean and Russian equities are best positioned to benefit from the positive surprise in China’s credit data. France and Italy are the worst positioned. Copper prices will rebound with a delay.  Investment Implications BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy recommends that investors stay long Chinese equities ex-tech relative to the emerging market benchmark. This is a tactical call initiated in August 2018 that is now becoming a cyclical call on the basis of the credit upswing. We also remain long the “China Play Index,” a basket of China-sensitive assets, and long China’s “Big Five” banks relative to other banks. A rebound in China’s credit data and stronger global growth will support copper demand. Prices are still 15% below the mid-2018 peak and are poised to benefit in this environment, especially given that global inventories are already falling. BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy recommends that investors go long copper. Meanwhile, BCA’s China Investment Strategy recommends (for now) staying only tactically overweight Chinese equities relative to the global benchmark, pending higher conviction that the pace of credit growth will be strong enough to overwhelm the negative ramifications of a continued deceleration in actual activity over the coming few months on sentiment and 12-month forward earnings expectations. Over the long run, Geopolitical Strategy would look to underweight Chinese equities, as we are not optimistic about China’s productivity and potential GDP. This is because of the negative structural consequences of continuing the Socialist Put (i.e., bad loans, zombie companies, trade protectionism).  We would expect CNY/USD to remain relatively buoyant in the context of both trade negotiations with the U.S. and fiscal-and-credit stimulus. The trade talks can hardly succeed if CNY/USD is falling. Depending on whether and how soon China’s stimulus results in a durable economic bottom, global growth could stabilize and the USD could see a substantial countertrend selloff.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist roukayai@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1          Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled “China: Prepping A Bazooka?” dated February 14, 2019 available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2      Please see Nicholas Lardy, “The State Strikes Back: The End Of Economic Reform In China?” Peterson Institute For International Economics, January 29, 2019, available at piie.com. 3          Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled “Dissecting China’s Stimulus,” dated January 17, 2019 available at ems.bcaresearch.com 4       The 2012 election of President Enrique Peña Nieto caused Mexican equities to outperform their EM counterparts. Similarly in 2015-16, U.S. outperformance relative to EM also supported Mexico relative to EM because Mexico’s economy is highly leveraged to its northern neighbor. In both periods Mexico’s outperformance was not caused by – but instead coincided with – Chinese credit stimulus. These idiosyncratic events biased the correlation between Mexico’s equity markets and Chinese credit growth to the upside. 5      Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled “Trade Wars, China Credit Policy Will Roil Global Copper Markets,” dated June 21, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com.