Policy

Highlights President Biden’s $2.4 trillion “American Jobs Plan” is a major US public investment that will dispel any endogenous deflationary tail risk from the US economy this cycle, increase inflation expectations yet boost productivity, and hike corporate taxes. The proposal has an 80% chance of passage before the end of the year given that infrastructure is popular and Democrats can pass the bill via reconciliation with zero Republican votes.   The $2.4 trillion infrastructure proposal will take effect over eight years and will be offset by corporate tax hikes that will take effect over 15 years. The increase in the budget deficit will be around $400 billion if all tax hikes pass and $1.4 trillion if only half the tax hikes pass. The American Families Plan will follow with another roughly $700 billion to $1.3 trillion increase to the budget deficit, depending on how much individual/household taxes go up. But this bill only has a 50/50 chance of passing before the 2022 midterm elections. Investors should maintain a bullish cyclical (12-month) bias and keep favoring value stocks, industrials, and materials over tech and health care. We also recommend going long consumer discretionary stocks and energy large caps versus small caps. Feature President Joe Biden spoke in Pittsburgh on Wednesday to unveil his economic vision and policy proposals going forward. Biden proposed a $2.4 trillion “American Jobs Plan” infrastructure and green energy package to be implemented over eight years, which will be part of a $4 trillion-plus “Build Back Better” legislative agenda that will be partially offset by an estimated $3 trillion in tax hikes to take effect over 15 years. The result will be a pro-cyclical boost to fiscal thrust, GDP growth, and inflation expectations; some potential for a productivity boom; a possible expansion of the social safety net; and tax reform that reduces US corporate profits. Pennsylvania is a Rust Belt state, Biden’s home state, and a critical swing state in the 2016 and 2020 elections, so the location makes sense. Biden aims to solidify the economic recovery and restore the Democratic Party’s leadership on infrastructure and manufacturing after Republican President Trump nearly stole their thunder. If he succeeds then his administration and party will improve their support substantially. The US economy is opening rapidly while the COVID-19 vaccination campaign continues apace. Chart 1 shows that household disposable income and net worth surged as a result of giant fiscal relief while consumer spending lags behind due to social distancing. The $1.7 trillion treasure chest of personal savings creates the basis for an increase in spending as consumers get vaccinated and regain their freedom. Economic policy uncertainty has collapsed, even relative to global uncertainty (Chart 2). There are no longer doubts about whether government will spend the country out of a slump. Even state and local governments have been bailed out despite having much stronger finances than predicted. However, there are doubts about how much more deficit spending the Biden administration will be able to push through, and that is what will now be debated in Congress following Biden’s Pittsburgh proposals. Chart 1Lower Spending And Higher Income Led To Mounting Excess Savings Lower Spending And Higher Income Led To Mounting Excess Savings Lower Spending And Higher Income Led To Mounting Excess Savings Chart 2US Policy Uncertainty Soon To Revive US Policy Uncertainty Soon To Revive US Policy Uncertainty Soon To Revive There will not be much of a deflationary tail risk to the new business cycle in the context of this expansive fiscal policy, as bullish investors are well aware. However, policy uncertainty will revive going forward as more spending will raise the risk of economic overheating, tax hikes will affect different sectors disproportionately, deficits and debt will balloon, and Biden’s challenges with immigration and foreign policy will intensify. There is an upside risk for the stock market that Congress delays tax hikes but this is not our base case. In this week’s report we revise and update our estimates for the impact of Biden administration’s legislative proposals – including his projected $4 trillion-plus in spending on infrastructure, health, and education – taking into consideration Biden’s Pittsburgh speech, his first press conference on March 25, and all the rumors and leaks that have come to light over the past two weeks. Back-Of-The-Envelope Estimates Of US Growth And Output Gap After ARPA First we need to revise our back-of-the-envelope estimates of the impact of the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA). Chart 3 shows two scenarios for US GDP growth. The first is the “maximum” scenario, in which US real GDP grows by 10.7% because all of the money authorized under the new law is spent. The second scenario puts real growth at 6% by using only the Congressional Budget Office’s expected federal outlays (as opposed to budget authority) to estimate the government spending component of GDP. In both cases we assume that 33% of the fiscal relief is spent in FY2021 and the remainder in FY2022. These scenarios do not include Biden’s American Jobs and Families Plans because those bills have yet to be drafted, let alone pass Congress. Chart 3Revised US GDP Estimates With ARPA Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Consensus estimates put real GDP growth at 5.7% and the Federal Reserve estimates that 2021 growth will clock in at 6.5%, as shown in Chart 4. Not all of the government spending will translate directly into aggregate demand because 37% of the ARPA consists of direct checks and unemployment benefits to households that may only spend one-third of the amount they receive (while paying down debt with a third of it and saving a third of it). Yet more government deficit spending is coming down the pike and consumers are sitting on a huge pile of savings, which implies that growth could surprise to the upside of consensus estimates. Chart 4Consensus Estimates Of US GDP PosT-ARPA Consensus Estimates Of US GDP PosT-ARPA Consensus Estimates Of US GDP PosT-ARPA Chart 5 uses our same back-of-the-envelope calculation to estimate the impact of current law (including ARPA) on the US output gap. The output gap is the difference between actual GDP growth and potential GDP growth – during busts the country’s growth falls well beneath potential while during booms it rises above potential. The chart shows that if all of the government relief funds are spent then the output gap will be more than closed by the end of the year. By contrast, the CBO’s January projection shows the output gap persisting through 2025. While our estimates in Chart 5 may be too generous regarding federal cash handouts translating directly to consumer spending and higher demand, nevertheless the consensus estimate is entirely understated and out of date as a result of ARPA and the Biden administration’s additional fiscal spending that is coming. Chart 5Revised US Output Gap Estimates With ARPA Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Chart 6Revised US Budget Deficit Projection Post-ARPA Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Chart 6 updates our US budget deficit outlook using the CBO’s February budget baseline. The ARPA’s increase in government spending is added to create the new Democratic Party status quo scenario over the next ten years, with the budget normalizing by 2025. The Democratic low spending scenario assumes that Biden passes the $2.4tn infrastructure-plus plan announced in Pittsburgh (Table 1) using all the revenue from all the corporate tax hikes. Biden’s agenda will be broken into separate bills with varying probabilities of success. So in our budget deficit outlook we only include the infrastructure-and-corporate-tax-hikes component that is apparently being prioritized. Table 1Biden's 'American Jobs Plan' Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Bottom Line: US growth will surprise to the upside of consensus estimates while the US output gap will be closed much sooner than expected. Financial markets are largely prepared for this outcome, although it reinforces that investors should maintain a cyclically bullish view and tactically should buy on the dips. Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And ‘American Jobs Plan’ Budget Impacts Our view is that the Biden administration has a subjective 80% chance of passing a second major budget reconciliation bill (FY2022) and a 50% chance of passing a third budget reconciliation bill (FY2023). The question appears to be resolved that Democrats will prioritize infrastructure over social welfare. Whichever one they prioritize can be linked to tax hikes and yet will still be highly likely to pass given that no Republican votes are needed under budget reconciliation rules. Moderate Democrats may water down the tax provisions but they would be suicidal to oppose their entire party on the administration’s signature piece of legislation. The social spending bill, assuming it follows infrastructure, would have to be pursued via a third reconciliation bill for FY2023 but it is less likely to pass. By next year Biden will have spent a lot of his political capital, fiscal spending fatigue will be a real phenomenon, and the 2022 midterm elections will loom. What matters for investors is the impact on the budget deficit since that will determine how big of an impact will hit GDP and how long US fiscal policy remains accommodative. Table 2 shows the impact on the budget balance if Biden gets all of his spending and all revenue proposals (Baseline), if he gets all the spending but only half the tax hikes (Scenario 1), and if he gets half the spending and half the tax hikes (Scenario 2). Scenarios 3 and 4 treat the social spending plan with varying degrees of tax revenue from the proposed individual tax hikes, while Scenarios 5 and 6 treat the infrastructure plan with varying tax revenue from corporate tax hikes. Table 2Biden’s Forthcoming ‘American Jobs Plan’ Legislative Proposals Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Table 3 shows the Biden campaign’s proposed tax hikes by line item along with the spending proposals. The range of net deficit spending runs from about $400 billion to about $3 trillion over ten years, which is a broad range and not very telling but which seems, subjectively, likely to settle in the $2 trillion range. Chart 7 shows the budget deficit’s deviation from the status quo trajectory in each of these scenarios, i.e. additional fiscal thrust. Table 3Biden’s Tax-And-Spend Proposals In Detail Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Chart 7US Budget Deficit Projections With ‘American Jobs Plan’ Agenda Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda The infrastructure package consists of a range of proposals having to do with traditional roads and bridges, renewable energy, rural broadband Internet, domestic manufacturing incentives, supply chain security initiatives, affordable housing, and research and development (see Table 1 above). The social safety net expansion consists of making permanent the child tax credit that was extended in the ARPA; lowering the Medicare eligibility requirement to age 60 from 65; lengthening paid family/medical leave for workers; funding universal pre-school; and funding tuition-free community college. Some Democrats will oppose delaying social spending and tax hikes because they may not pass before the midterms and Republicans could easily take back control of the House of Representatives in 2022. Hence there is still a chance that Biden will pursue infrastructure on a bipartisan and piecemeal basis while using the FY2022 budget reconciliation for his social spending and tax hikes. The reasoning goes as follows: Historically the House has a high probability of shifting against a new president’s party in his first midterm election. The only exception to this rule were George W. Bush and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Republicans will definitely oppose social welfare and tax hikes, whereas they could be convinced to support an infrastructure plan. Republicans will not vote for infrastructure if it includes tax hikes and many Democrats believe that long-term infrastructure spending will enhance productivity and hence need not require revenue offsets. Hence there is still a chance of a bipartisan infrastructure bill. This would jeopardize its overall passage but it would ensure that Democrats could pass their social agenda via FY2022 reconciliation. What are the odds of bipartisanship? Throughout this year we have reserved some space for bipartisan lawmaking to take place under the radar. A recent example is the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) Extension Act of 2021, which Biden signed into law on March 30. This is a bipartisan extension of the small business emergency loan program that began under President Trump. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell quashed objections from within his party to extending the program, which has substantial support from the National Federation of Independent Business.1 The result was a 92-7 vote majority in the Senate, showing that Republican cooperation is possible. The fact that Republicans also cleared the way for the use of earmarks, or pork barrel spending directed at a critical lawmaker’s constituency in exchange for his or her vote, also suggests that bipartisanship is possible, particularly on infrastructure. Republicans can also be brought to support efforts to secure supply chains and energize the US technological race with China, such as the $50 billion funding for semiconductor manufacturing, which could be part of a major infrastructure package or regular budget appropriations. The catch is that Republicans will not support tax hikes, unionization, IRS strengthening, workplace enforcement, or climate change policies pursued under the guise of infrastructure. As a result the Democrats are highly incentivized to bypass Republicans from the beginning and pursue their agenda through two separate reconciliation bills. Finally, Democrats still have the option of removing the Senate filibuster, enabling regular bills to pass with merely 51 votes. Investors should plan on this occurring despite the news media narrative suggesting that moderate Democrats do not want it to happen – the point is that it is not an invincible check on the ruling party’s power. Biden signaled in his first press conference on March 25 that he is willing to see the filibuster removed. Bottom Line: Democrats can pass most of their infrastructure and social safety net proposals via budget reconciliation bills for FY2022 and FY2023, without a single Republican vote. If they do so they can only spare three votes in the House and zero votes in the Senate – meaning that the devil is in the details. Their odds of passing the first are high at a subjective 80% but then their odds of passing the second are 50/50 at best. Thus it is not wise to bet against Democratic tax hikes or new spending. The net impact on the deficit will be negative and hence stimulating for the economy. Growth and inflation will surprise to the upside. Biden’s Political Capital Still Moderate-To-Strong Our argument above is based in great part on Biden’s political capital, which is moderate but likely to strengthen as consumer sentiment rises. Table 4 updates our US Political Capital Index. Political polarization is subsiding from extreme peaks, and business sentiment and economic conditions are improving (with a surge in capex intentions albeit rising concerns over regulation). Table 4Biden’s Political Capital Sufficient For Another Major Bill Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda The weak spot is household sentiment as Biden’s approval rating is falling (normal for presidents as their honeymoon ends). However, consumer confidence is already picking up and will surely accelerate with vaccinations gaining ground, the dole being delivered, and the service sector reviving. Chart 8 shows that Biden’s approval rating is settling in the mid-50% range, which is substantially better than Trump’s at this time although worse than President Obama’s. Biden can be understood as a synthesis of these two predecessors given that he is coopting Trump’s agenda on fiscal spending, infrastructure, trade, and manufacturing while continuing Obama’s legacy on regulation, immigration, civil rights, and foreign policy. We expect Biden’s approval rating not to fall too far, unless he suffers a foreign policy disaster with China, Iran, or Russia, given that over 50% of voters will tend to support him as long as President Trump is the obvious alternative. Chart 9 suggests that Biden’s economic approval rating is weak but this score is going to rise once the new relief funds are distributed and the economic recovery gets going full steam. The early business cycle will probably be a constant source of support for the president over his four-year term. Chart 8Biden’s Approval Rating Fairly Stout Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Chart 9Biden’s Approval On Economy Will Rise Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Remarkably even the US Congress is gaining greater popular approval (Chart 10). This is very rare in modern times and could suggest that a major change is taking shape as Congress pursues populist fiscal policy under both Trump and Biden. Congress is handing out free money so people suddenly don’t hate it as much. There is a limit to how popular Congress will become and it will certainly not shake off its hard-earned reputation for gridlock and partisan rancor by suddenly exemplifying enlightenment and bipartisanship. But any rise in congressional approval is notable and would imply greater political capital for the current government and hence greater policy certainty for investors in the short run. Biden’s political capital is not yet suffering due to economic overheating as the latter has not yet happened – but it is a risk to monitor over the medium term. Inflationary pressures continue to build across the supply chain. Small businesses are increasingly flagging cost of labor as a rising concern while consumer price inflation is likely to pick up. Chart 10Congress Is Becoming More Popular Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Inflation expectations are critical and will take time to change. Americans think about inflation through prices at the pump. Chart 11 shows the US and global crude oil price and average gasoline prices at the gas station for US consumers. Gasoline prices have surged although they are not yet at the $4 per gallon level that causes popular concern to escalate sharply. Chart 11Inflation Is Coming But Geopolitics Brings Oil Price Volatility Inflation Is Coming But Geopolitics Brings Oil Price Volatility Inflation Is Coming But Geopolitics Brings Oil Price Volatility Oil prices are expected to go higher in the coming two years, according to our Commodity & Energy Strategy, but over a five-year period global supply-demand trends and balances suggest that the price will fluctuate within the $60-$80 dollar range. Biden’s regulations and foreign policy will introduce some volatility by hampering domestic US production, triggering sparks in the Middle East over Iran, and yet ultimately increasing global supply via any diplomatic deal with Iran. The BCA Research House View holds that today’s inflation is a temporary phenomenon whereas a more substantial bout of inflation is waiting in the medium-to-long term. The reason our strategists are not overly concerned in the near term is that there is still substantial slack in the economy: the labor force participation rate has fallen from 63.3% to 61.4% since the pandemic, the U6 unemployment rate stands at 11.1% (up from 7% prior to the pandemic), and the all-important employment-to-population ratio for prime-age workers stands at 57.6%, down from 61.1% prior to the pandemic. However, this slack is on pace to be tightened quickly as long as the pandemic subsides and Biden’s American Jobs Plan passes. Bottom Line: Our US Political Capital Index suggests Biden’s political capital is moderate-to-strong, which supports our view that he can pass at least one more major piece of legislation and possibly two. Inflation expectations will rise further and the selloff in US treasuries will continue. Investment Takeaways The market rally since January has priced a lot of the good news from Biden’s proposals, which are broadly similar to his campaign proposals. There is not a clear legislative strategy and passing two major bills before the midterm elections is a stretch. The priority bill, however, looks to pass by the end of this year after a roller-coaster ride of congressional negotiations and horse-trading. Deep cyclical sectors will benefit the most. We remain long value over growth stocks, specifically industrials and materials. We are also maintaining our long BCA infrastructure basket at least until passage of the bill is secured. Our infrastructure basket consists of a range of materials and machinery producers, construction services, and environmental services, and does not focus on headline “infrastructure” companies in the utilities and telecoms sectors. We recommend going long large cap energy stocks relative to small caps, which will have a harder time adjusting to Biden’s regulatory, tax, and green agenda. A long-term infrastructure plan that includes green energy, manufacturing, digital infrastructure, and R&D could create a productivity boost. Hiking the corporate tax rate to 28% is negative for corporate earnings but it will take place over a longer time frame and is being introduced in the context of a cyclical upswing. Hence we remain bullish over the course of this year. Biden’s Pittsburgh speech ostensibly confirmed the news flow over the past month suggesting that the Democrats will not propose a government-provided health insurance option in their upcoming legislative proposals. Instead they are prioritizing lowering the Medicare eligibility requirement and enabling Medicare to negotiate pharmaceutical prices. Our short of the managed health care sub-sector suffered from this shift in policy focus although we will maintain the trade as we expect the public option to reemerge at a later date. Meanwhile our pair trade of long health equipment and facilities relative to pharmaceuticals and bio-tech continues to perform well (Chart 12). A clear beneficiary of the US’s newfound proactive fiscal policy is the consumer. Consumer spending has not fully recovered from the pandemic and recession. Household disposable income ticked down in February from January, after the distribution of the government’s $900 billion COVID-19 relief funds in the Consolidated Appropriations Act passed in December. However, disposable income is up 8% over the 12 months since COVID broke out, due to fiscal relief. The result of lower spending and higher income is an increase in the personal saving rate to 13.6% in February, well above normal, as our US Bond Strategy highlights in its latest report. Recent research from our US Investment Strategy highlights that consumer growth should track relatively well with increases in household net worth, implying that nominal personal consumption expenditures could grow at a rate of 8.8% by the end of the year and 6.9% by the end of next year. Chart 12Stay Long Industrials Over Health Care Stay Long Industrials Over Health Care Stay Long Industrials Over Health Care Chart 13Go Long Consumer Discretionary Stocks Go Long Consumer Discretionary Stocks Go Long Consumer Discretionary Stocks In this context we take a positive view of consumer stocks in general. Cyclically we would favor consumer discretionary stocks and recommend investors go long. While discretionary spending should outperform as the economic upswing gains pace, we are holding consumer staples as a hedge against bad news (Chart 13). Not only will Biden’s tax hikes, inflation, and the rise in bond yields cause ongoing risks to cyclical sectors, but Biden also faces a series of imminent foreign policy tests with China/Taiwan, Iran, Russia, and North Korea, as highlighted in our sister Geopolitical Strategy.     Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Appendix Table A1Political Risk Matrix Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Table A2APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Table A2BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Table A2CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Table A3Biden’s Cabinet Position Appointments Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda   Footnotes 1     Bill Scher, “The Bipartisan Senate Bill You Haven’t Heard About,” Real Clear Politics, realclearpolitics.com.          

Highlights Extremely accommodative fiscal policy and a rapid pace of vaccination puts the US on track to close its output gap by the end of the year. The situation is different in Europe, and the euro area economy will likely continue to underperform the US until at least the summer. Investors are now unusually more hawkish than the Fed, whose caution is driven by the expectation of some lingering and persistent slack in the labor market even once the pandemic is over. The Fed’s rate projections, coupled with the extraordinary size of the American Rescue Plan, have stoked investor concerns about a significant rise in inflation. For inflation to rise dangerously above the Fed’s target, the US would likely need to see a persistently strong and positive output gap, and/or a major upward shift in expectations among consumers and firms. We expect a meaningful recovery in inflation this year, perhaps to above-target levels even without factoring in transitory supply-chain effects, but probably not to levels that investors deem to be “out of control.” Over the coming 6 to 12 months, a comparatively sanguine perspective on inflation supports a bullish view on stocks and an overweight stance towards equities within a multi-asset portfolio. We recommend that investors maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration, and overweight US speculative over investment-grade corporate bonds. The fact that Europe may lag growth-wise for a few months could continue to impact regional equity performance as well as the trend in the dollar over the coming 0-3 months. But over a 6-12 month time horizon, we continue to favor global ex-US vs. US stocks, and expect the dollar to be lower than it is today. A Brighter Light At The End Of The Tunnel Chart I-1Even Better Than Some Optimists Would Have Predicted Even Better Than Some Optimists Would Have Predicted Even Better Than Some Optimists Would Have Predicted Over the past 4-6 weeks, the US has continued to make incredible progress in vaccinating its population against COVID-19. Chart I-1 highlights that the pace of vaccination is now well within the range required for herd immunity to be in place by the end of the third quarter. If this pace continues at an average of 2.5 million doses per day, the US will have vaccinated 90% of its population by the end of September (if it is determined that the vaccine is safe to give to children). And these calculations assume the continuation of a two-dose regime, meaning that the eventual rollout of Johnson & Johnson's Janssen vaccine – which requires only one dose and has shown to be extremely effective at preventing severe illness and death – could shorten the time to herd immunity rates of vaccination among adults even further. The situation is clearly different in Europe. The vaccination progress in several European countries is woefully behind that of the US and the UK (Chart I-2), and per capita cases in the euro area have again risen significantly above that of the US (Chart I-3). This reality motivated last week’s news that the European Union is reportedly planning on banning exports of the AstraZeneca vaccine for a period of time, as European policymakers grow increasingly concerned about the potential economic consequences of lengthened or additional pandemic control measures over the coming few months. Chart I-2Europe Is Badly Lagging The Vaccine Race… April 2021 April 2021 There was at least some positive economic news from Europe this month, as reflected by the flash manufacturing and services PMIs (Chart I-4). The euro area manufacturing PMI surpassed that of the US this month, reflecting that the prospects for goods-producing companies in Europe remain solidly linked to the strong global manufacturing cycle. Services, on the other hand, have been the weak spot in Europe, having remained below the boom/bust line since last summer (in contrast to the US). The March services PMI highlighted that this gap is now starting to narrow, although the euro area economy will likely continue to underperform the US until at least the summer. Chart I-3...And It Is Starting To Show ...And It Is Starting To Show ...And It Is Starting To Show Chart I-4Some Closure Of The Services Gap, But Still A Ways To Go Some Closure Of The Services Gap, But Still A Ways To Go Some Closure Of The Services Gap, But Still A Ways To Go   The underperformance of the European services sector over the past nine months has been due in part to more severe pandemic control measures, but also a comparatively timid fiscal policy. The IMF’s October Fiscal Monitor highlighted that the US had provided roughly eight percentage points more of GDP in above-the-line fiscal measures versus the European Union as a whole, and that was before the US December 2020 relief bill and this month’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan (ARP) act were passed. The CBO estimates that the ARP will result in about US$1 trillion in outlays in 2021, which is roughly 5% of nominal GDP. Consequently, Chart I-5 highlights that consensus expectations now suggest that the output gap will be marginally positive by the end of the year, with the Fed’s most recent forecast implying that real GDP will be more than 1% above the CBO’s estimate of potential output. Chart I-5The US Output Gap Will Likely Be Closed By The End Of This Year The US Output Gap Will Likely Be Closed By The End Of This Year The US Output Gap Will Likely Be Closed By The End Of This Year The Fed Versus The Market Despite this, the Fed held pat during this month’s FOMC meeting and did not validate market expectations of rate hikes beginning in early 2023. Chart I-6 highlights the Fed funds rate path over the coming years as implied by the OIS curve, alongside the Fed’s median projection of the Fed funds rate. This means that investors are now more hawkish than the Fed, which is the opposite of what has typically prevailed since the global financial crisis. Chart I-6The Market Is Now, Unusually, More Hawkish Than The Fed The Market Is Now, Unusually, More Hawkish Than The Fed The Market Is Now, Unusually, More Hawkish Than The Fed Fed Chair Jerome Powell implied during the March 17 press conference that some FOMC participants were unwilling to change their projections for the path of interest rates based purely on a forecast, which argues that the median dot in the Fed’s “dot plot” will shift higher in the second half of the year if participants’ growth and inflation forecasts come to fruition. But Charts I-7A and I-7B suggest that the Fed’s caution is also driven by the expectation of some lingering and persistent slack in the labor market even once the pandemic is over. Chart I-7AA Positive Output Gap Implies… April 2021 April 2021 Chart I-7B…An Unemployment Rate Below NAIRU April 2021 April 2021   The charts highlight the historical relationship between the output gap and the deviation of NAIRU from the unemployment rate, from 2000 and 2010. In both cases, the charts show that the unemployment rate would be below the CBO’s estimate of NAIRU at the end of this year (roughly 4.5%) given the CBO’s estimate for potential (i.e. full employment) GDP and the Fed's forecast for growth. However, the Fed is forecasting that the unemployment rate will essentially be at NAIRU, which is itself above the Fed’s longer-run unemployment rate projection of 4%. As such, the Fed does not see the unemployment rate falling to “full employment” levels this year, a precondition for the onset of rate normalization. Investors should note that the relationships shown in Charts I-7A and I-7B suggest that the unemployment rate will be closer to 3-3.5% at the end of this year if the Fed’s growth forecast is correct, which would constitute full employment based on the Fed’s 4% unemployment rate target. The difference between a 3-3.5% unemployment rate and the Fed’s estimate of 4.5% translates to a gap of roughly 1.5-2.5 million jobs at the end of this year, which underscores that the Fed expects either a significant shift in temporary to permanent unemployment or an influx of unemployed workers back into the labor force who don’t quickly find jobs once social distancing ends and pandemic restrictions are no longer required. Chart I-8The Full Employment Level Of GDP Has Not Been Significantly Revised The Full Employment Level Of GDP Has Not Been Significantly Revised The Full Employment Level Of GDP Has Not Been Significantly Revised There are three possible circumstances that would resolve this seeming contradiction. The first is that the Fed’s estimate for growth this year is simply too high, and that the output gap will be close to zero at the end of the year (i.e., more in line with consensus market expectations). The second is that the CBO is understating the level of GDP that is consistent with full employment, namely that potential GDP is higher than what they currently project. But Chart I-8 shows that the CBO’s current estimate for potential output at the end of this year is only 0.4% below what it had estimated prior to the pandemic, which is smaller than the positive gap implied by the Fed’s growth estimate for this year (roughly 1.2%). The third possibility is that the Fed is overestimating the extent to which the pandemic will cause permanent damage to the labor market. As we noted in our February report, even once social distancing is no longer required, it does seem likely that some portion of the spending on services that has been “missing” over the past year will never return. While it seems reasonable to expect that the gap in spending on hospitality and travel will close quickly once the health situation allows, it also seems reasonable to expect that some service areas, particularly retail, will experience a permanent loss in demand owing to durable shifts in consumer behavior that occurred during the pandemic (greater familiarity and use of online shopping, a permanent reduction of some magnitude in commuting, etc). A gap of 1.5-2.5 million jobs accounts for roughly 10-15% of pre-pandemic employment in retail trade, or 4-7% of the sum of retail trade, leisure & hospitality, and other services. It is possible that permanent job losses or significantly deferred job recovery of this size will occur, but it is far from clear that it will. Were job losses / deferred jobs recovery of this magnitude to not materialize, it would suggest that the US will reach full employment earlier than the Fed is currently projecting, and would significantly increase the odds that the Fed will begin to taper its asset purchases and/or raise interest rates at some point next year – which is earlier than investors currently expect. For Now, Dangerously Above-Target Inflation Is Unlikely Fed projections of a 0% Fed funds rate for the next 2 1/2 years, coupled with the extraordinary size of the American Rescue Plan, have understandably stoked investor concerns about a significant rise in inflation. Larry Summers’ recent interview with Bloomberg was emblematic of the concern, during which he criticized the Biden administration’s fiscal policy as the “least responsible” that the US has experienced in four decades and warned of the potential inflationary consequences of overheating the economy.1 It is true that the Federal Reserve is explicitly aiming to generate a temporary overshoot of inflation relative to its target, the Biden administration’s fiscal plan is legitimately large, and there is a tremendous pool of excess savings that could be deployed later this year once the pandemic is essentially over. Clearly, the risks of overheating must be higher than they have been in the past. But from our perspective, out-of-control inflation over the coming 12-24 months would very likely necessitate one of two things to occur, and possibly both: US consumers decide to spend an overwhelmingly large amount of the excess savings that have been accumulated. Main street expectations for consumer prices rise sharply, prompted by a public discussion about the likelihood of a shifting inflation regime. Our view is rooted in the examination of the modern-day Phillips Curve that we presented in our January report, which considers both the impact of economic/labor market slack and inflation expectations as a driver of actual inflation. The modern-day Phillips Curve posits that expectations act as the trend for inflation, and slack in the economy determines whether actual inflation is above or below that baseline. Chart I-9 highlights that the output gap worked well prior to the global financial crisis at explaining the difference between actual and exponentially-smoothed inflation, the latter acting as a long-history proxy for expectations. Pre-GFC, the chart highlights that there have been only two exceptions to the relationship that concerned the magnitude rather than the direction of inflation. Post-GFC, the relationship deviated substantially, but in a way that implied that actual inflation was too strong during the last expansion, not too weak – particularly during the early phase of the economic recovery. This likely occurred because expectations initially stayed very well anchored due to the Fed’s strong record of maintaining low and stable inflation, but ultimately declined due to a persistently negative output gap as well as in response to the 2014 collapse in oil prices (Chart I-10). Chart I-9Pre-GFC, The Output Gap Generally Explained Inflation Surprises Pre-GFC, The Output Gap Generally Explained Inflation Surprises Pre-GFC, The Output Gap Generally Explained Inflation Surprises Chart I-10Inflation Expectations Eventually Succumbed Post-GFC To Collapsing Energy Prices Inflation Expectations Eventually Succumbed Post-GFC To Collapsing Energy Prices Inflation Expectations Eventually Succumbed Post-GFC To Collapsing Energy Prices Thus, for inflation to rise dangerously above the Fed’s target, the US would likely need to see a persistently strong and positive output gap, and/or a major upward shift in expectations among consumers and firms. Chart I-11 highlights that the amount of excess savings that have accumulated as a percentage of GDP does indeed significantly exceed the magnitude of the output gap, but some of those savings have been and will be invested in financial markets (boosting valuation), some will be used to pay down debt, some will eventually be spent on international travel (boosting services imports), and some will likely be permanently held as deposits in anticipation of future tax increases. And while long-term household expectations for prices have risen since the passing of the CARES act last year, the rise has merely unwound the decline that took place following the 2014 oil price collapse (Chart I-12). Chart I-11A Huge Pool Of Savings Exists, But Not All Of It Will Be Spent A Huge Pool Of Savings Exists, But Not All Of It Will Be Spent A Huge Pool Of Savings Exists, But Not All Of It Will Be Spent Chart I-12Long-Term Consumer Inflation Expectations Have Risen From A Very Low Base Long-Term Consumer Inflation Expectations Have Risen From A Very Low Base Long-Term Consumer Inflation Expectations Have Risen From A Very Low Base   For now, this framework points to a meaningful recovery in inflation this year, perhaps to above-target levels even without factoring in transitory supply-chain effects, but probably not to levels that investors deem to be “out of control.” Investment Conclusions Over the coming 6 to 12 months, a comparatively sanguine perspective on inflation supports a bullish view on stocks and an overweight stance towards equities within a multi-asset portfolio. While the Fed is likely to shift in a hawkish direction compared with its current projections, it is highly unlikely to become meaningfully more hawkish than current market expectations unless economic growth and the recovery in the labor market is much stronger than the Fed or the market is projecting. In fact, even if the market’s expectations for the first Fed rate hike shift to mid-2022 over the coming several months, Chart I-13 highlights that the impact on the equity market is likely to be minimal unless investors shift up their expectations for the terminal Fed funds rate. The chart presents a fair value estimate for the 10-year Treasury yield based on the OIS-implied path of the Fed funds rate out to December 2024, and assumes that short rates ultimately rise to the Fed’s long-term Fed funds rate projection of 2.5%. The second fair value series assumes that the shape of the OIS curve stays the same, but shifts closer by 6 months. Chart I-13The Market’s Assumed Rate Hike Path And Terminal Rate Are Not Threatening For Stocks April 2021 April 2021 The chart underscores that the 10-year yield will rise to at most between 2-2.2% by the end of the year based on these scenarios. A shift forward in the timing of Fed rate hikes will impact the short end of the curve, but the long end will remain relatively unchanged if terminal rate expectations stay constant and the term premium on long-term bonds remains near zero. These levels would in no way be economically damaging nor threatening to stock market valuation. It is possible, however, that investor expectations for the neutral rate of interest (“r-star”) will shift higher once the pandemic is over, and we explore this risk to stocks in Section 2 of our report. For now, this remains a risk to our view rather than our expectation, but it is likely to remain an important possibility to monitor as the decisive end to social distancing and other pandemic control measures draws nearer. Within fixed income, we recommend that investors maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration even though investors are already pricing in a more hawkish path for the Fed funds rate. First, Chart I-13 highlighted that yields at the long end of the curve are likely to continue to move modestly higher this year even if the projected path for the Fed funds rate remains relatively unchanged. But more importantly, barring a substantially negative development on the health or vaccine front that prolongs the pandemic, the risk appears to be clearly to the upside in terms of the timing of the first Fed rate hike and the terminal Fed funds rate. As such, from a risk-reward perspective, a long duration stance remains unattractive. We would also recommend overweighting US speculative over investment-grade corporate bonds, as spreads are not as historically depressed for the former than the latter (Chart I-14). Finally, in terms of the dimensions of equity market performance and the dollar, we recommend that investors overweight global ex-US equities vs. the US, overweight value vs. growth, overweight cyclicals vs. defensives, and overweight small vs. large caps. We are also bearish on the dollar on a 12-month time horizon. However, there are two caveats that investors should bear in mind. First, global cyclicals versus defensives (especially in equally-weighted terms) as well as small versus large caps have already mostly normalized not just the impact of the pandemic but as well that of the 2018-2019 Trump trade war (Chart I-15). We would expect, at best, modest further gains from both positions this year. Chart I-14Speculative-Grade Corporate Bonds Are Less Expensive Than Investment-Grade Speculative-Grade Corporate Bonds Are Less Expensive Than Investment-Grade Speculative-Grade Corporate Bonds Are Less Expensive Than Investment-Grade Chart I-15Going Forward, Expect More Modest Gains From Cyclicals And Small Caps Going Forward, Expect More Modest Gains From Cyclicals And Small Caps Going Forward, Expect More Modest Gains From Cyclicals And Small Caps   Second, the fact that Europe may lag growth-wise for a few months could continue to impact regional equity performance as well as the trend in the dollar on a 0-3 month time horizon. The US dollar is typically a counter-cyclical currency, but there have been exceptions to that rule. And historically, exceptions have tended to revolve around periods when US growth has been quite strong, as is currently the case (Chart I-16). A continued counter-trend rally in the dollar is thus possible over the course of the next few months, but we would expect USD-EUR to be lower than current levels 12 months from now. Chart I-16A Short-Term Counter-Trend Dollar Move Is Possible A Short-Term Counter-Trend Dollar Move Is Possible A Short-Term Counter-Trend Dollar Move Is Possible A counter-trend dollar move could also correspond with a period of US outperformance versus global ex-US, or at a minimum, a period of flat performance when global ex-US stocks would normally outperform. Our China strategists expect that the Chinese credit impulse will decelerate later this year (Chart I-17), which would weigh on EM stocks and heighten the importance of European equities in driving global ex-US outperformance. European equity outperformance, in turn, will likely necessitate the outperformance of euro area financials. Chart I-18 highlights that euro area equity underperformance versus the US last year was mostly a tech story, but today there is little difference between the relative performance of euro area stocks overall versus indexes that exclude the broadly-defined technology sector. In both cases, the euro area index is roughly 10% below its US counterpart relative to pre-pandemic levels, which exactly matches the extent to which euro area financials have underperformed. Chart I-17A Slowing Chinese Credit Impulse Means EM Equities Will Struggle To Outperform A Slowing Chinese Credit Impulse Means EM Equities Will Struggle To Outperform A Slowing Chinese Credit Impulse Means EM Equities Will Struggle To Outperform Chart I-18Euro Area Financials Need To Outperform For Europe To Outperform Euro Area Financials Need To Outperform For Europe To Outperform Euro Area Financials Need To Outperform For Europe To Outperform   Euro area financials have demonstrated very poor fundamental performance over the past decade, but they are likely to outperform for some period once the European vaccination campaign gains enough traction to alter the disease’s transmission and hospitalization dynamics. Chart I-19 highlights that euro area bank 12-month forward earnings have further room to recover to pre-pandemic levels than for banks in the US, and Chart I-20 highlights that euro area banks trade at their deepest price-to-book discount versus their US peers since the euro area financial crisis. Chart I-19Euro Area Bank Earnings Have Catch-Up Potential Euro Area Bank Earnings Have Catch-Up Potential Euro Area Bank Earnings Have Catch-Up Potential Chart I-20Euro Area Banks Are Extremely Cheap Versus The US Euro Area Banks Are Extremely Cheap Versus The US Euro Area Banks Are Extremely Cheap Versus The US   Thus, while euro area and global ex-US equities may not outperform on the back of rising global stock prices over the coming few months, investors focused on a 6-12 month time horizon should respond by increasing their allocation to European stocks and to further reduce dollar exposure. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst March 31, 2021 Next Report: April 29, 2021 II. R-star, And The Structural Risk To Stocks In the decade following the global financial crisis, investor concerns that the Fed’s monetary policies have artificially boosted equity market valuation have been mostly overblown. But today, it is now true that US equities are increasingly dependent on persistently low bond yields, as stocks can only avoid near bubble-like relative pricing if yields remain below trend rates of economic growth. Macroeconomic theory and the historical record both support the notion that nominal interest rates are normally in equilibrium when they are roughly equal to the trend rate of nominal income growth. A gap between interest rates and trend rates of growth was indeed justified for a few years following the global financial crisis, but in the few years prior to the pandemic, it is altogether possible that the neutral rate of interest (or “r-star”) was in fact meaningfully higher than academic estimates suggested. In a scenario where the US output gap closes quickly, inflation rises above target, and where permanent damage to the labor market from the pandemic is relatively limited, we expect the narrative of secular stagnation to be challenged and for investor expectations for the neutral rate to move closer to trend rates of economic growth. That would imply that the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield could hypothetically rise above 3%, and possibly as high as 4% or more. Such a shift would push the US equity risk premium back to 2002 levels based on current stock market pricing. This is not necessarily negative for equities, but it is also not clear what equity risk premium investors will require to contend with the myriad risks to the economic outlook that did not exist in the early 2000s. A low ERP that is technically not as low as that of the tech bubble era could thus still threaten stock prices, as T.I.N.A., “There Is No Alternative,” may not prevail. Many investors have questioned what asset allocation strategy should be pursued in a scenario where stock prices and bond yields are no longer positively correlated. While they are not likely to be without cost, options exist for investors to potentially earn positive absolute returns in a scenario where a significant shift in the interest rate outlook threatens both stock and bond prices. Chart II-1Equity Valuation Concerns Have Persisted For The Past Decade... Equity Valuation Concerns Have Persisted For The Past Decade... Equity Valuation Concerns Have Persisted For The Past Decade... For the better part of the last decade, many investors have argued that the Fed’s monetary policies have artificially boosted equity market valuation. Based on the cyclically-adjusted P/E ratio metric originated by Robert Shiller, stocks reached pre-global financial crisis (GFC) multiples in late 2014 and early 2015 (Chart II-1). Based on metrics such as the price-to-sales ratio, stocks rose to pre-GFC valuation in late 2013, and are now even more richly valued than they were at the height of the dotcom bubble. These concerns have mostly occurred in response to absolute changes in stock multiples, but equity valuation cannot be divorced from the prevailing level of interest rates. Relative to bond yields, stocks were extraordinarily cheap for many years following the GFC. Measured by one simple approach to calculating the equity risk premium, the spread between the 12-month forward earnings yield (the inverse of the forward P/E ratio) and the real 10-year Treasury yield, stocks were the cheapest following the GFC that they had been since the mid 1980s, and remain reasonably priced today (Chart II-2). Chart II-2...But Stocks Have Actually Been Cheap Versus Bonds ...But Stocks Have Actually Been Cheap Versus Bonds ...But Stocks Have Actually Been Cheap Versus Bonds The fact that stocks have appeared to be expensive for several years but quite cheap (or reasonably priced) relative to bonds underscores the fact that longer-term bond yields have been extraordinarily low following the global financial crisis. Still, equities were not dependent on low bond yields prior to the pandemic, as illustrated in Chart II-3. The chart highlights the range of 10-year Treasury yields that would be consistent with the pre-GFC equity risk premium range (measured from 2002-2007), alongside the actual 10-year yield and trend nominal GDP growth. The chart shows that for years following the financial crisis, bond yields could have risen to levels well above trend rates of economic growth and stocks would still have been priced in line with pre-crisis norms. This “normal pricing” range for the 10-year declined as the expansion continued, but remained consistent with trend growth rates and above the actual 10-year yield up until the beginning of the pandemic. Chart II-3 also highlights, however, that the circumstances changed last year. The equity risk premium briefly rose at the onset of the pandemic as stocks initially sold off sharply, but then quickly fell as stock prices recovered in response to aggressive fiscal and monetary easing. Today, it is true that US equities are increasingly dependent on persistently low bond yields, as stocks can only avoid bubble-like relative pricing if yields remain below trend rates of economic growth. Chart II-3Now, Stocks Are Increasingly Dependent On Low Bond Yields Now, Stocks Are Increasingly Dependent On Low Bond Yields Now, Stocks Are Increasingly Dependent On Low Bond Yields Prior to the pandemic, most fixed-income investors would have viewed the risk of bond yields rising to trend nominal GDP growth, let alone above it, as minimal. Global investors have come to accept the secular stagnation narrative as described by Larry Summers in November 2013, and have gravitated to academic estimates of the neutral rate of interest (“R-star”) that show a substantial gap between the natural rate and trend real growth (Chart II-4). This view has manifested itself in a decline in surveyed estimates of the long-run Fed funds rate, but at present the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield has pushed well above this survey-derived fair value range (Chart II-5). It is possible that the fiscal response to the pandemic will cause investor views about r-star to evolve even further over the coming 12-24 months, and in this report we explore the potential headwind that such an evolution could present to stock prices at some point – potentially as early as next year. Chart II-4Investors Have Accepted Secular Stagnation, And The View That R-star Is Well Below Trend Rates Of Growth Investors Have Accepted Secular Stagnation, And The View That R-star Is Well Below Trend Rates Of Growth Investors Have Accepted Secular Stagnation, And The View That R-star Is Well Below Trend Rates Of Growth Chart II-5The Market's Views About R-star May Be Shifting The Market's Views About R-star May Be Shifting The Market's Views About R-star May Be Shifting   R-star: A Brief Primer Macroeconomic theory and the historical record both support the notion that nominal interest rates are normally in equilibrium when they are roughly equal to the trend rate of nominal income growth. From the perspective of macro theory, the neutral rate of interest is determined by the supply of and demand for savings. But in practical terms, this implies that the neutral rate should normally be closely linked to the trend rate of economic growth. For example, if interest rates – and thus the cost of capital – were persistently below aggregate income growth, then demand for capital (and thus credit and likely labor demand) should increase as firms seek to profit from the gap between the interest rate and the expected rate of return from real investment. As such, the trend rate of growth acts as a good proxy for the interest rate that will balance the supply and demand for credit during normal economic circumstances. Empirically, academic estimates of r-star closely followed estimates of trend real GDP growth prior to the global financial crisis, as shown in Chart II-4 above. In addition, we noted in our January report that the stance of monetary policy, as defined by the difference between nominal GDP growth and the 10-year Treasury yield, has generally done a good job of explaining the US output gap prior to 2000. This supports the notion that monetary policy is stimulative (restrictive) when bond yields are below (above) trend growth rates. However, in the years following the GFC, investors’ estimates of r-star collapsed, as evidenced by the sharp decline in 5-year / 5-year forward Treasury yields (Chart II-6). This was followed by a decline in primary dealer and FOMC expectations for the long-term Fed funds rate, which investors took as validating their view that the neutral rate of interest has permanently declined. Chart II-6Investors Led The Fed And Others In Expecting A Lower Nominal Neutral Rate Investors Led The Fed And Others In Expecting A Lower Nominal Neutral Rate Investors Led The Fed And Others In Expecting A Lower Nominal Neutral Rate R-star And Trend Growth: Is A Gap Between The Two Really Justified? Chart II-7R-star Likely Did Decline Following The GFC (For A Time) R-star Likely Did Decline Following The GFC (For A Time) R-star Likely Did Decline Following The GFC (For A Time) It seems clear that r-star did indeed decline for a time after the GFC. The US and select European economies suffered a balance sheet recession in 2008/2009 that impacted credit demand for an extended period of time (Chart II-7), and extraordinarily low interest rates for several years did not fuel major credit excesses (at least in the household sector). But as we detailed in a Special Report last year,2 we doubt that the decline in r-star was permanent, for several reasons. The first, and most important, is that there have been at least four deeply impactful non-monetary shocks to both the US and global economies since 2008 that magnified the impact of prolonged household deleveraging and help explain the disconnect between growth and interest rates during the last economic cycle: The euro area sovereign debt crisis Premature fiscal austerity in the US, the UK, and euro area from 2010 – 2012/2014 The US dollar / oil price shock of 2014 The Trump administration’s aggressive use of tariffs beginning in 2018, impacting China but also other developed market economies. Chart II-8Recent Trends In US Private Sector Leverage Do Not Suggest R-star Is Very Low Recent Trends In US Private Sector Leverage Do Not Suggest R-star Is Very Low Recent Trends In US Private Sector Leverage Do Not Suggest R-star Is Very Low Except for the oil price shock of 2014 (which was driven by technological developments and a price war among producers), all of these non-monetary shocks were caused or exacerbated by policymakers – often for political reasons or due to regulatory failures. Second, the trend in US private sector credit growth last cycle does not suggest that r-star fell permanently. Chart II-8 underscores two points: the first is that while US household sector credit contracted for several years following the global financial crisis, it started growing again in 2013 and had largely closed the gap with income growth prior to the pandemic. The second point is that the nonfinancial corporate sector clearly leveraged itself over the course of the last expansion, arguing that interest rates have not in any way been restrictive for businesses. Third, we disagree with a common view in the marketplace that the 2018-2019 period supported the validity of low academic estimates of the neutral rate. Chart II-9 highlights that monetary policy ceased to be stimulative in 2019 according to the Laubach & Williams r-star estimate, which some investors have argued explains the late 2018 equity market selloff, the 2019 slowdown in the US housing market, the inversion of the yield curve, and the global manufacturing recession. Chart II-9Monetary Policy Ceased To Be Stimulative In 2019, According To The LW R-star Estimate Monetary Policy Ceased To Be Stimulative In 2019, According To The LW R-star Estimate Monetary Policy Ceased To Be Stimulative In 2019, According To The LW R-star Estimate But this narrative ignores other important factors that contributed to the slowdown. For example, Chart II-10 highlights that this period of economic weakness exactly coincided with the most intense phase of the Sino-US trade war, as well as a significant slowdown in Chinese credit growth. The chart highlights that the selloff in the US equity market began almost immediately after a surge in the effective tariff rates levied by the two countries against each other, and after the Chinese credit impulse fell three percentage points (from 30% to 27% of GDP). Chart II-10The 2018 Stock Market Selloff Occurred Once Sino-US Tariffs Exploded The 2018 Stock Market Selloff Occurred Once Sino-US Tariffs Exploded The 2018 Stock Market Selloff Occurred Once Sino-US Tariffs Exploded Chart II-11 highlights that interest rates did likely impact the housing market, but that it was the speed at which rates rose that was damaging rather than their level. The chart shows that the rise in mortgage rates from late 2016 to late 2018 was among the largest 2-year increases that has occurred since the early 1980s, so it is unsurprising that the growth in home sales and real residential investment slowed for a time. Additionally, Chart II-12 highlights that the rise in mortgage rates during this period did not cause a downtrend in mortgage credit growth, which only occurred in Q4 2018 in response to the impact of the sharp selloff in the equity market on household net worth. Chart II-11Mortgage Rates Rose Very Significantly From Late 2016 To Late 2018 Mortgage Rates Rose Very Significantly From Late 2016 To Late 2018 Mortgage Rates Rose Very Significantly From Late 2016 To Late 2018 Chart II-12A Record Rise In Mortgage Rates Did Not Crack The Housing Market A Record Rise In Mortgage Rates Did Not Crack The Housing Market A Record Rise In Mortgage Rates Did Not Crack The Housing Market   In short, the late 2018 / 2019 period saw a major global aggregate demand shock occur following an already-established slowdown in Chinese credit growth and a rapid rise in interest rates in the DM world. It is these factors that were likely responsible for the 2019 slowdown in economic growth, not the fact that interest rates reached levels that restricted economic activity on their own. R-star In A Post-Pandemic World Charts II-7 – II-12 above suggest that a gap between interest rates and trend rates of growth was indeed justified for a few years following the global financial crisis, but that a decline in r-star only appeared to be permanent due to persistent, non-monetary policy shocks to aggregate demand. In the few years prior to the pandemic, it is altogether possible that r-star was in fact meaningfully higher than academic estimates suggested. But that is now a counterfactual assertion, as the pandemic has transformed the outlook for interest rates and bond yields in conflicting ways. A 10% decline in the level of real output was the most intensely negative non-monetary shock to aggregate demand since the 1930s (Chart II-13), and we agree that another depression would have occurred without extraordinary government assistance. The economic damage caused by the pandemic certainly does not work in favor of a higher neutral rate, and we highlighted in Section 1 of our report that the Fed expects there to be some lingering and persistent slack in the labor market even once the pandemic is over. Chart II-13Without Major Monetary And Fiscal Policy Support, The Pandemic Would Probably Have Caused A Depression Without Major Monetary And Fiscal Policy Support, The Pandemic Would Probably Have Caused A Depression Without Major Monetary And Fiscal Policy Support, The Pandemic Would Probably Have Caused A Depression Chart II-14A Huge Increase In Government Transfers And Spending Is Underway April 2021 April 2021 On the other hand, Larry Summers, the chief proponent of the theory of secular stagnation, has argued for several years that increased fiscal spending was warranted in order to address an imbalance between private sector savings and investment. Summers himself now characterizes US fiscal policy as the “least responsible” that he has seen over the past 40 years, because of too-large government spending that risks overheating the economy (Chart II-14). Summers’ critique rests in large part on the fact that new government spending has not occurred in the form of investment (to balance out the existence of excess savings), but is instead providing transfers to households that in many cases have already accumulated significant excess savings. But the key point for investors is that the pandemic has completely shifted the narrative about fiscal spending, from “arguably insufficient for several years following the global financial crisis” to now “risking a dramatic overheating of the economy.” Some elements of Summers’ criticism of the Biden administration’s fiscal policy are justified, particularly the policy of large direct transfer payments to workers who have suffered no loss in employment or income as a result of the pandemic. Despite this, as detailed in Section 1 of our report, we are more sanguine about the risks of aggressive overheating for three reasons: it does seem likely that some portion of the spending on services that has been “missing” over the past year will never return or will be slow to return, some of the excess savings that have accumulated will not be immediately (or ever) spent, and the rise in consumer inflation expectations that has occurred over the past year has happened from an extremely low starting point and has yet to even rise above its post-GFC range. The low odds that we assign to dangerously above-target inflation over the coming 12-24 months does not, however, mean that investors’ expectations for r-star will stay low. For right or for wrong, the US government has aggressively dis-saved over the past year, in an environment where low expectations for the neutral rate were anchored by a view of excessive private sector savings and insufficient demand from governments. In a scenario where the US output gap closes quickly, inflation rises modestly above target, and where permanent damage to the labor market from the pandemic is relatively limited, it seems reasonable to conclude that the narrative of secular stagnation will be challenged and that investor expectations for the neutral rate will converge towards trend rates of economic growth. That would imply that the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield could hypothetically rise above 3%, possibly as high as 4% or more. This is not our base case view, but it will be an important possibility to monitor as the decisive end to social distancing and other pandemic control measures draws nearer. Investment Conclusions A rise in the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield does not, in and of itself, suggest that 10-year Treasury yields will rise to levels that would threaten a significant decline in stock prices. The Fed does not control the long-end of the Treasury curve, but it does exert a very strong influence on the short-end. For example, were the Fed to follow the median current projection of FOMC participants and refrain from raising interest rates until sometime after 2023, it would limit how high current 10-year Treasury yields could rise. But it is not difficult to envision plausible scenarios where the 10-year Treasury yield rises above the range consistent with the pre-GFC US equity risk premium. Chart II-15 presents three hypothetical fair value paths for the 10-year yield assuming a mid-2022 liftoff date and a 4% terminal Fed funds rate for the following three scenarios: Chart II-1510-Year Yields Could Rise Meaningfully Further If Investors Shift Their Expectations For R-star 10-Year Yields Could Rise Meaningfully Further If Investors Shift Their Expectations For R-star 10-Year Yields Could Rise Meaningfully Further If Investors Shift Their Expectations For R-star The Fed raises rates at a pace of 1% (4 hikes) per year, with a term premium of 10 basis points The Fed raises rates at a pace of 1% (4 hikes) per year, with a term premium of 50 basis points The Fed raises rates at a pace of 1.5% (6 hikes) per year, with a term premium of 50 basis points In the first scenario, based on the current US 12-month forward P/E ratio, the fair value of the 10-year Treasury yield would rise above the range consistent with a reasonable ERP in the middle of 2022, the liftoff point assumed in all three scenarios. In the second and third scenarios, the US equity ERP would already be quite low. When using the late 1999 / early 2000 bubble period as a reference point, even the scenarios shown in Chart II-15 are not very threatening to stock prices. Given current equity market pricing, the third scenario would take the US equity risk premium back to mid 2002 levels, which were still meaningfully higher than during the peak of the bubble. And that is assuming an earlier liftoff than the market currently expects, a faster pace of rate hikes than experienced during the last economic cycle, and a very meaningful increase in the market’s expectations for the neutral rate. But it is not clear what equity risk premium investors will require to contend with the myriad risks to the economic outlook that did not exist in the early 2000s. For example, equity investors are today faced with a riskier policy environment than existed 20 years ago in the US and in other developed economies that is at least partially driven by populist sentiment, potentially impacting earnings via lower operating margins or higher taxes. These or other risks existed at several points over the past decade and T.I.N.A. (“There Is No Alternative”) prevailed, but that occurred precisely because the equity risk premium was very elevated. A low ERP that is technically not as low as what prevailed during the tech bubble era could thus still threaten stock prices, raising the specter of negative absolute returns from stocks and nominal government bonds for a period of time, beginning potentially at or in the lead-up to the first Fed rate hike. Chart II-16There Are Alternatives To A Traditional 60/40 Portfolio In A Rising Rate Environment There Are Alternatives To A Traditional 60/40 Portfolio In A Rising Rate Environment There Are Alternatives To A Traditional 60/40 Portfolio In A Rising Rate Environment Many investors have questioned what asset allocation strategy should be pursued in a scenario where stock prices and bond yields are no longer positively correlated. Chart II-16 provides some perspective on the question, by comparing the total return of a 60/40 stock/bond portfolio to a strategy involving the opportunistic redeployment of cash into stocks. The strategy rule maintains a 50/50 stock/cash allocation during normal market conditions, but it then shifts the entire cash allocation into equities following a 15% selloff in the stock market. The portfolio is shifted back to a 50/50 allocation once stocks rise to a new rolling 1-year high. The chart highlights that 60/40 balanced portfolio-style returns may be achievable with cash as the diversifier without a significant reduction in the Sharpe ratio. In fact, the strategy has the effect of lowering average volatility due to prolonged periods of comparatively lower equity exposure, although this occurs at the cost of higher volatility during periods of high market stress (precisely when investors most want protection from volatility). But the bottom line for investors is that while they are not likely to be without cost, options exist for investors to potentially earn positive absolute returns in a scenario where a significant shift in the interest rate outlook threatens both stock and bond prices. As noted above, this remains a risk to our view rather than our expectation, but we will continue to monitor the potential threat posed to stock prices as the pandemic draws to a decisive close later this year. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst III. Indicators And Reference Charts BCA’s equity indicators highlight that the “easy” money from expectations of an eventual end to the pandemic have already been made. Our technical, valuation, and sentiment indicators are very extended, highlighting that investors should expect positive but more modest returns from stocks over the coming 6-12 months. Our monetary indicator has aggressively retreated from its high last year, reflecting a meaningful recovery in government bond yields. The indicator remains above the boom/bust line, however, highlighting that monetary policy remains supportive for risky asset prices. Forward equity earnings already price in a complete earnings recovery, but for now there is no meaningful sign of waning forward earnings momentum. Net revisions remain very strong, and positive earnings surprises have ticked slightly lower from their strongest levels on record. Within a global equity portfolio, US stocks have recently risen versus global ex-US, reflecting a countertrend rise in the US dollar and a lagging vaccination campaign in Europe. We expect a deceleration in the Chinese credit impulse later this year, which will weigh on EM stocks and heighten the importance of European equities in driving global ex-US outperformance. European equity outperformance, in turn, will likely necessitate the outperformance of euro area financials. The US 10-Year Treasury yield has risen well above its 200-day moving average. Long-dated yields are technically stretched to the upside, but our valuation index highlights that bonds are still extremely expensive and that yields could move higher over the cyclical investment horizon. The recent bounce in the US dollar has reflected improved relative US growth expectations, but also previously oversold levels. The dollar may continue to strengthen on a 0-3 month time horizon, but we expect it to be lower in 12 months’ time than it is today. Commodity prices have recovered not just back to pre-pandemic levels, but also back to 2014 levels. This underscores that many commodity prices are extended, and may be due for a breather once the Chinese credit impulse begins to decline. US and global LEIs remain in a solid uptrend, and global manufacturing PMIs are strong. This underscores that the global demand for goods is robust, and that output is below pre-pandemic levels in most economies because of very weak services spending. The latter will recover significantly later this year, as social distancing and other pandemic control measures disappear. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings US Earnings US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations US Treasurys And Valuations US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market US Labor Market US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption US Consumption US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing US Housing US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1  “Summers Sees ‘Least Responsible’ Fiscal Policy in 40 Years,” Bloomberg News, March 20, 2021. 2  2020-03-20 GIS SR “Revisiting The Neutral Rate Of Interest: A Contrarian View In A Time Of Crisis.”

Highlights Central Bank Expectations: Market expectations of short-term interest rate moves over the next few years are inching higher. The potential for markets to offer a greater bond-bearish challenge to the current highly dovish forward guidance of the major central banks should not be dismissed given the growth-positive mix of expanding global vaccinations and US fiscal stimulus. Global Golden Rule: The gap between market expectations of global central bank policy rates and realized interest rate outcomes is a reliable predictor of government bond returns – a dynamic we have dubbed the “Global Golden Rule of Bond Investing”. Given our expectation that no major developed market central bank will hike rates within the next twelve months, the Global Golden Rule is calling for the recent government bond market laggards to outperform over the next year. Tapering & The Golden Rule: Government bonds in countries where central banks are most likely to begin tapering in 2022 well before considering rate hikes – most notably, the US and Canada – are likely to suffer returns worse than implied by the Global Golden Rule. It is too soon to raise allocations to those higher-beta bond markets. Feature As the first quarter of 2021 draws to a close, fixed income investors are licking their wounds from a rough start to the year. Government bonds across the developed world have absorbed heavy losses as yields have climbed higher, led by US Treasuries which are down -4.0% year-to-date in total return terms. Other markets have also been hit hard, like Canada (-3.9%), Australia (-3.5%) and the UK (-6.3%). The trend in rising yields has been concentrated at longer maturities, with shorter ends of yield curves seeing much smaller moves (Chart 1). Two-year government bond yields are still being pinned down by the dovish forward guidance of the major central banks. The Fed is signaling no rate hikes through at least the end of 2023, while other central banks are sending similar messages on the timing of any potential future rate moves. However, global growth expectations continue to gain upward momentum, fueled by the optimistic combination of expanding COVID-19 vaccinations and aggressive US fiscal stimulus. Real GDP growth is expected to soar to a mid-single digit pace in the US, UK, Canada and even the euro zone - moves heralded by the steady climb of the OECD leading economic indicators and composite purchasing manager indices (Chart 2). Chart 1Rising Yields Reflect Reflation Rising Yields Reflect Reflation Rising Yields Reflect Reflation Chart 2A Bond-Bearish Surge In Global Growth Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Markets will continue to pull forward the timing and pace of the next monetary tightening cycle if those faster above-trend growth forecasts are realized. This will represent a change of “leadership” in the global bond bear market from faster inflation breakevens to increased policy rate expectations helping drive real yields higher. That shift may already be underway according to the ZEW survey of global investor expectations which now shows that the net number of respondents expecting higher short-term interest rates in the US and UK has turned positive (Chart 3). Already, our Central Bank Monitors for the US, Canada and Australia (Chart 4) have climbed back to neutral levels suggesting that easier monetary policy is no longer required. Similar trends can be seen to a lesser extent in the UK, euro area and even Japan (Chart 5). These moves are already coinciding with increased cyclical upward pressure on global bond yields, even without any change in dovish central bank guidance alongside ongoing buying of government bonds via quantitative easing programs. Chart 3Shifting Expectations For Policy Rates? Shifting Expectations For Policy Rates? Shifting Expectations For Policy Rates? Chart 4Diminishing Need For Easy Monetary Policy Here Diminishing Need For Easy Monetary Policy Here Diminishing Need For Easy Monetary Policy Here   Chart 5Easy Policy Still Required Here Easy Policy Still Required Here Easy Policy Still Required Here How will a trend of rising short-term interest rate expectations translate into future expected returns on government bonds? For that, we revisit a framework temporarily set aside during the pandemic era of crisis monetary policies – the Global Golden Rule (GGR) of bond investing. An Update Of The Global Golden Rule, By Country In September 2018, we published a Special Report introducing a government bond return forecasting methodology called the “Global Golden Rule.” This was an extension of a framework introduced by our sister service, US Bond Strategy, that links US Treasury returns (versus cash) to changes in the fed funds rate that were not already discounted in the US Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve.1 The historical results convincingly showed that investors who "get the Fed right" by making correct bets on changes in the funds rate versus expectations were very likely to make the right call on the direction of Treasury yields. We discovered that relationship also held in other developed market countries. Thus, we now had a framework to help project expected bond returns simply based on a view for future central bank interest rate moves versus market expectations.2 Specific details on the calculation of the Global Golden Rule can be found in those original 2018 papers. In the following pages, we present the latest results of the Global Golden Rule for the US, Canada, Australia, the UK, the euro area and Japan. The set-up for the chart shown for each country is the same. We show the 12-month policy rate “surprise”, defined as the actual change in the central bank policy rate over the preceding 12-months versus the expected 12-month change in the policy rate from a year earlier extracted from OIS curves (aka our 12-month discounters). We then compare the 12-month policy rate surprise to the annual excess return over cash (treasury bills) of the Bloomberg Barclays government bond index for each country. We also show the 12-month policy rate surprise versus the 12-month change in the government bond index yield. The very strong historical correlation between those latter two series is the backbone of the Global Golden Rule framework. After that, we present tables showing expected yield changes and excess returns for various maturity points, as well as the overall government bond index, derived from the Global Golden Rule regressions. The expected change in yield is derived from regressions on the policy rate surprises, with different estimations done for each maturity point. In the tables, we show the results for different scenarios for changes in policy rates. For example, the row in the return tables called “1 rate hike” would show the expected yield changes and excess returns if the central bank for that particular country lifts the policy interest rate by +25bps over the next 12 months. This allows us to pick the scenario(s) that most closely correlate to our own expectation for central bank actions, translating that into government bond return expectations. Global Golden Rule: US Chart 6UST Selloff Akin To A Hawkish Surprise UST Selloff Akin To A Hawkish Surprise UST Selloff Akin To A Hawkish Surprise The Golden Rule would have underestimated the losses realized by US Treasuries over the past year (-4.5%), as negative excess returns over cash typically occur when the Fed is more hawkish than expectations – an outcome that did not occur (Chart 6). The trailing 12-month policy rate surprise for the US is currently zero, as last year’s massively dovish rate cuts have rolled off. The US OIS curve now discounts only 5bps of interest rate increases over the next 12 months, a period that runs to the end of first quarter of 2022. This is in line with the Fed’s guidance that no rate hikes will take place before the end of 2023. Our base case is the “Flat” scenario shown in Table 1 and Table 2, with the Fed keeping the funds rate unchanged near 0% for the next twelve months – a very modest “dovish” surprise. This produces a Golden Rule forecast of the overall US Treasury index yield falling -2bps that generates a total return of +1.1%. This is essentially a coupon-clipping return equivalent to the current index yield. Table 1US: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Table 2US: Expected Changes In Treasury Yields Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Global Golden Rule: Canada Chart 7Canadian Bond Selloff Worse Than Implied By Golden Rule Canadian Bond Selloff Worse Than Implied By Golden Rule Canadian Bond Selloff Worse Than Implied By Golden Rule Canadian government bonds have sold off smartly over the past 12 months, delivering an excess return over cash of -2.8%. That is a smaller loss, however, compared to other developed economy government bond markets. The Canadian OIS curve did not move as aggressively to price in rate cuts last year, so the rapid pace of Bank of Canada (BoC) easing that was actually delivered constituted a modest “dovish surprise” that helped mute Canadian bond losses to some degree (Chart 7). The trailing 12-month policy rate surprise for Canada is +37bps (a dovish surprise), but rate expectations are more aggressive on forward basis. The Canadian OIS curve now discounts +28bps of interest rate increases over the next 12-months, a period that runs to the end of first quarter of 2022. This stands out as the highest such figure among the countries discussed in this report. This is likely due to the relatively less dovish messaging from BoC officials who have hinted that QE could be tapered sooner than expected if the economy outperforms the BoC’s forecasts for 2021. Our base case is the “Flat” scenario shown in Table 3 and Table 4, with the BoC keeping the policy interest rate at 0.25% for the next twelve months. This produces a Golden Rule forecast of a decline in the overall Canadian government bond index yield of -12bps, delivering a projected total return of +1.69%. That return may turn out to be overly optimistic if the BoC does indeed begin tapering QE later this year. Table 3Canada: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Table 4Canada: Expected Changes In Government Bond Yields Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Global Golden Rule: Australia Chart 8Australian Bonds Acting Like The RBA Was Hawkish Australian Bonds Acting Like The RBA Was Hawkish Australian Bonds Acting Like The RBA Was Hawkish Australian government bonds have delivered a negative excess return over cash of -3.6% over the past year (Chart 8). This underperformed the projection from the Golden Rule, as the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) was not more hawkish than market expectations. The central bank actually delivered a dovish surprise in 2020, not only cutting policy rates dramatically but starting up a bond-buying QE program and instituting yield curve control to cap 3-year bond yields. The trailing 12-month policy rate surprise for Australia is zero, as last year’s massively dovish surprise rate cuts have rolled off. The Australia OIS curve now discounts only 7bps of interest rate increases over the next 12-months, a period that runs to the end of first quarter of 2022. This is in line with the RBA’s highly dovish guidance suggesting that there will be no change to current policy settings until Australian wage growth picks up to the 3% level consistent with the RBA’s 2-3% CPI inflation target. The central bank does not expect that to occur before 2023. We agree with dovish guidance from the RBA, thus our base case is the “Flat” scenario shown in Table 5 and Table 6, with the RBA keeping the Cash Rate unchanged at 0.1% for the next twelve months. This generates a Golden Rule forecast of an -5bps decline in the overall Australian government bond index yield, producing a total return projection of +1.4%. Table 5Australia: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Table 6Australia: Expected Changes In Government Bond Yields Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Global Golden Rule: UK Chart 9A UK Gilt Selloff Without A Hawkish BoE A UK Gilt Selloff Without A Hawkish BoE A UK Gilt Selloff Without A Hawkish BoE UK Gilts underperformed the Golden Rule forecast over the past 12 months, delivering a negative excess return over cash of –5.1% even with the Bank of England (BoE) not delivering any hawkish surprise versus market expectations (Chart 9). The trailing 12-month policy rate surprise for the UK is currently zero. The UK OIS curve now discounts only 5bps of interest rate increases over the next 12-months, a period that runs to the end of first quarter of 2022. This is in line with the BoE’s guidance that no monetary tightening will take place until there is clear evidence that the excess capacity created by the pandemic shock is clearly being absorbed. Yet while the BoE has still left the door open to moving to a negative policy rate if needed, markets are not discounting any such move. Our base case is the “Flat” scenario shown in Table 7 and Table 8, with the BoE keeping the Bank Rate unchanged at 0.1% for the next twelve months. This produces a Golden Rule forecast of the overall UK Gilt index yield falling -2bps that generates a total return of +1.0%. This is a return only slightly above the current index yield. Table 7UK: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Table 8UK: Expected Changes In Gilt Yields Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Global Golden Rule: Germany Chart 10Even Bunds Acting Like ECB Is "Hawkish" Even Bunds Acting Like ECB Is "Hawkish" Even Bunds Acting Like ECB Is "Hawkish" German government bonds have produced an excess return over cash of -1.6% over the past year. There was no surprise from the European Central Bank (ECB) during that time relative to market expectations (Chart 10), so that negative return reflected the modest rise in German bond yields on the back of improving global growth. The trailing 12-month policy rate surprise for Germany (and the overall euro area) remains stuck near zero, as has been the case since the ECB cut its deposit rate below zero and instituted QE back in 2016. The euro area OIS curve now discounts only -4bps of interest rate cuts over the next 12 months, a period that runs to the end of first quarter of 2022. This is in line with the ECB’s guidance that rates will be kept unchanged until at least 2023, as the central bank’s projections call for euro area inflation to not climb above 1.5% - below the ECB’s 2% target – through 2023. The OIS curve is discounting a small probability that the ECB could be forced to deliver a small rate cut given the degree of the euro area inflation undershoot. Our base case, however, is that the ECB will keep rates steady over the next 12 months (and likely for a few more years after that). Thus, the “Flat” scenarios shown in Table 9 and Table 10 are most relevant, with the German government bond index yield rising +2bps according to the Golden Rule. This produces a total return projection of -0.6%. Table 9Germany: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Table 10Germany: Expected Changes In Bund Yields Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Global Golden Rule: Japan Chart 11JGBs Bucking The Global "Hawkish" Selloff JGBs Bucking The Global "Hawkish" Selloff JGBs Bucking The Global "Hawkish" Selloff Japanese government bonds (JGBs) have delivered an excess return versus cash of -0.8% over the past twelve months (Chart 11). Although it may sound unusual for Japan, there was actually a tiny “hawkish” surprise as the Bank of Japan (BoJ) kept policy rates steady over the past year even as markets had priced in a possibility of a small rate cut in response to the COVID-19 growth shock. Admittedly, the Golden Rule framework is poorly suited to project Japanese bond returns. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) has been unable to lift policy rates for many years, while they have instituted yield curve control on 10-year JGBs since 2016, anchoring yields near zero. With no variability on policy rates or bond yields, a methodology that links bond returns to unexpected policy interest rate changes will have poor predictive power. The Japan OIS curve now discounts -5bps of interest rate cuts over the next 12 months, a period that runs to the end of first quarter of 2022. The BoJ has not ruled out the possibility of a small rate cut sometime in the next few months, as Japanese inflation remains far below the 2% BoJ target. Our base case is the “Flat” scenarios shown in Table 11 and Table 12, with the BoJ keeping policy rates unchanged near 0% for the next twelve months. That generates a Golden Rule forecast of a +5bp increase in the Japanese government bond index yield, with a total return projection of -0.4%. This would be consistent with the BoJ producing a small hawkish “surprise” by not cutting rates deeper into negative territory. Table 11Japan: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Table 12Japan: Expected Changes In JGB Yields Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Investment Implications Of The Global Golden Rule Projections Among all the scenarios laid out above, our base case has been that no change in policy rates should be expected over the next 12 months in any of the countries. This fits with our view that central banks will be reluctant to consider any changes to the current dovish forward guidance on future rate hikes until there is clear evidence that the global economy has moved beyond the pandemic. That means taking some near-term inflation risks given the very robust pace of growth expected over the rest of 2021. In Table 13, we rank all the return projections generated by the Global Golden Rule for the “Flat” scenarios on policy rates over the next year. Returns are shown both in local currency terms and in USD-hedged terms. Table 13Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Assuming Policy Rates Remain Unchanged Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The return rankings are a mirror image of the performance seen year-to-date, with the “higher beta” bond markets (Canada, Australia and the US) outperforming the more defensive low-yielding markets (the UK, Germany and Japan). Returns are projected to be moderate, however, with Canada leading the way both unhedged (+1.69%) and currency hedged (+1.73%). The return rankings excluding the +10-year maturity buckets of the government bond indices are shown in Table 14. We present these to allow a more “apples to apples” comparison of the six regions shown, as the UK index has a huge weighting in the +10-year bucket while there is no +10-year benchmark for Australia. On this basis, Australia stands out as having the best Global Golden Rule generated return projections, both unhedged (+1.44%) and USD-hedged (+1.66%).3 Table 14 Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing These return rankings run counter to our current recommended country allocation: underweight the US, overweight Germany and Japan and neutral the UK, Canada and Australia. We still believe there is more near-term upside for global bond yields, led by US Treasuries, thus it is too soon to begin to position for the results projected by the Global Golden Rule. There is one other factor that leads us to interpret the results cautiously – the likelihood that some central banks will begin tapering their bond purchases within the next 12 months. Our expectation is that the Fed will begin to signal a need to slow the pace of its QE bond buying in the fourth quarter of this year, with actual tapering beginning in Q1 of 2022. The BoC is likely to follow suit shortly thereafter. Thus, the Fed and BoC will begin tapering within the 12-month forecasting window of the Global Golden Rule. The RBA and BoE will debate a need to taper later in 2022 – beyond that 12-month window – while the ECB and BoJ will maintain their current pace of bond buying until at least the end of 2022. From the point of view of bond markets, tapering by the Fed and BoC will likely feel as if those central banks were actually delivering rate hikes. Bond yields will likely rise by more than projected by the Global Golden Rule in the “Flat” scenarios highlighted earlier. Quantitative models that attempt to translate QE into interest rate changes, so-called “shadow rates”, show that the Fed’s QE bond buying over the past year has been equivalent to nearly 250bp of additional Fed rate cuts after the funds rate was slashed to 0% (Chart 12). Thus, when the Fed begins to taper QE, it will conceptually be as if the Fed started a rate hike cycle with the starting point of a fed funds rate at minus -2.5%. When looking at the historical correlation of changes in the US shadow rate and US Treasury yields, the +40bps rise in the Treasury index yield over the past 12 months is equivalent to roughly a 100bp increase in the shadow fed funds rate (Chart 13, top panel). That would line up with a fairly aggressive pace of Fed tapering when looking at the correlation of changes in the shadow rate to changes in the size of the Fed balance sheet (middle panel). Chart 12"Shadow Policy Rates" Are Below 0% "Shadow Policy Rates" Are Below 0% "Shadow Policy Rates" Are Below 0% Chart 13UST Yields Discount A Lot Of Fed Tapering UST Yields Discount A Lot Of Fed Tapering UST Yields Discount A Lot Of Fed Tapering US Treasury yields have been rising for more fundamental reasons like improving growth expectations alongside rising inflation expectations. If the Fed is forced to signal a tapering of QE later this year because that robust growth outlook comes to fruition, it is a stretch to think that Treasury yields will not see additional upward pressure. Thus, we are sticking with our current country allocations, despite the message from our Global Golden Rule. US Treasury returns may look more like the “1 rate hike” or “2 rate hikes” scenarios shown in Table 1 when the Fed begins tapering early in 2022. The same goes for Canadian bond yields once the BoC moves to taper soon after the Fed, as we expect, which is why we are keeping Canada on “downgrade watch.” Bottom Line: The Global Golden Rule is calling for the recent government bond market laggards to outperform over the next year if central banks keep rates on hold. Government bonds in countries where central banks are most likely to begin tapering in 2022 well before considering rate hikes – most notably, the US and Canada – are likely to suffer returns worse than implied by the Global Golden Rule. It is too soon to raise allocations to those higher-beta bond markets.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research US Bond Strategy Special Report, "The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing", dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcarearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing", dated September 25, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Note that in Table 14, we rescale the other maturity buckets after removing the +10-year bucket. The index returns are presented as a market-capitalization weighted combination of the expected returns of the remaining maturity buckets. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Duration: The Treasury market has moved quickly to price-in expectations of a strong economic recovery, while the Fed has been more cautious about moving its own rate forecasts. We think that the market’s expectations are well founded and that the Fed will eventually move its dots higher. Stick with below-benchmark portfolio duration. Corporate Bonds: Junk spreads already embed a significant decline in the default rate during the next 12 months, but reasonable assumptions for corporate debt growth and profit growth suggest that this outcome will be achieved. Investors should continue to favor spread product over Treasuries and continue to hold a down-in-quality bias within corporate credit. Economy: Disposable personal income fell in February compared to January, but it has risen massively since last year’s passage of the CARES act. The large pool of accumulated household savings will help drive economic growth as the pandemic recedes. Feature There is widespread anticipation that the economic recovery is about to kick into high gear. To us, this anticipation seems rather well founded. The United States’ vaccination roll-out is proceeding quickly and the federal government is pitching in with a tsunami of fiscal support. But it’s important to acknowledge that this positive outlook is still a forecast, one that has not yet been validated by hard economic data. The risk for investors is obvious. Market prices have already moved to price-in a significant amount of economic optimism and they are vulnerable in a situation where that optimism doesn’t pan out. In this week’s report we look at how much economic optimism is already discounted in both the Treasury and corporate bond markets. We conclude that the most likely scenario is one where the economic data are strong enough to validate current pricing in both markets. Investors should keep portfolio duration below-benchmark and continue to favor spread product over Treasuries, with a down-in-quality bias. Optimism In The Treasury Market The most obvious way to illustrate the economic optimism currently embedded in Treasury securities is to look at the rate hike expectations priced into the yield curve relative to the Fed’s own projections (Chart 1). The market is currently looking for four 25 basis point rate hikes by the end of 2023 while only seven out of 18 FOMC participants expect any hikes at all by then. Chart 1Market More Hawkish Than Fed Market More Hawkish Than Fed Market More Hawkish Than Fed We addressed the wide divergence between market and FOMC expectations in last week’s report.1 We noted that the main reason for the divergence is that while the market is focused on expectations for rapid economic growth the Fed is making a concerted effort to rely only on hard economic data. This sentiment was echoed by Fed Governor Lael Brainard in a speech last week:2 The focus on achieved outcomes rather than the anticipated outlook is central to the Committee’s guidance regarding both asset purchases and the policy rate. The emphasis on outcomes rather than the outlook corresponds to the shift in our monetary policy approach that suggests policy should be patient rather than preemptive at this stage in the recovery. The upshot of the Fed’s excessively cautious approach is that its interest rate projections will move toward the market’s as the hard economic data strengthen during the next 6-12 months, keeping the bond bear market intact. As evidence for this view, consider that the US Economic Surprise Index remains at an extremely high level, consistent with a rising 10-year Treasury yield (Chart 2). Further, 12-month core inflation rates are poised to jump significantly during the next two months as the weak monthly prints from March and April 2020 fall out of the 12-month sample (Chart 3). Then, pipeline pressures in both the goods and service sectors will ensure that inflation remains relatively high for the balance of the year (Chart 3, bottom panel).3   Chart 2Data Surprises Remain Positive Data Surprises Remain Positive Data Surprises Remain Positive Chart 3Inflation About To Jump Inflation About To Jump Inflation About To Jump Finally, the hard economic data still do not reflect the truly massive amount of fiscal stimulus that is about to hit the US economy. Chart 4 illustrates how large last year’s fiscal stimulus was compared to what was seen during recent recessions, and this chart does not yet incorporate the recently passed $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan (~8.7% of GDP) or the second infrastructure focused reconciliation bill that is likely to pass this fall. Our political strategists expect 2021’s second budget bill to be similar in size to the American Rescue Plan though tax hikes will also be included and, due to the infrastructure-focused nature of the bill, the spending will be more spread out over a number of years.4  Chart 4The Era Of Big Government Is Back That Uneasy Feeling That Uneasy Feeling Bottom Line: The Treasury market has moved quickly to price-in expectations of a strong economic recovery, while the Fed has been more cautious about moving its own rate forecasts. We think that the market’s expectations are well founded and that the Fed will eventually move its dots higher. Stick with below-benchmark portfolio duration.  Optimism In The Corporate Bond Market Chart 5What's Priced In Junk Spreads? What's Priced In Junk Spreads? What's Priced In Junk Spreads? The way we assess the amount of economic optimism baked into the corporate bond market is to calculate the 12-month default rate that is implied by the current High-Yield Index spread (Chart 5). We need to make a few assumptions to do this. First, we assume that investors require an excess spread of at least 100 bps from the index after subtracting 12-month default losses. In past research, we’ve noted that High-Yield has a strong track record of outperforming duration-matched Treasuries when the realized excess spread is above 100 bps. High-Yield underperforms Treasuries more often than it outperforms when the realized excess spread is below 100 bps.5 Second, we must assume a recovery rate for defaulted bonds. The 12-month recovery rate tends to fluctuate between 20% and 60%, with higher levels seen when the default rate is low and lower levels when the default rate is high (Chart 5, bottom panel). For this week’s analysis, we assume a range of recovery rates, from 20% to 50%, though we expect the recovery rate to be closer to the top-end of that range during the next 12 months, given our expectations for a rapid economic recovery. With these assumptions in mind, we calculate that the High-Yield Index is fairly priced for a default rate between 2.8% and 4.5% for the next 12 months (Chart 5, panel 2). If the default rate falls into that range, or below, then we would expect High-Yield bonds (and corporate credit more generally) to outperform a duration-matched position in Treasuries. If the default rate comes in above 4.5%, then we would expect Treasuries to beat High-Yield. To figure out whether the default rate will meet the market’s expectations, we turn to a simple model of the 12-month speculative grade default rate that is based on nonfinancial corporate sector gross leverage (aka total debt over pre-tax profits) and C&I lending standards (Chart 6). If we make forecasts for nonfinancial corporate 12-month debt growth and pre-tax profit growth, we can let the model tell us what default rate to anticipate. Chart 6Default Rate Model Default Rate Model Default Rate Model Debt Growth Expectations We expect corporate debt growth to be quite weak during the next 12 months (Chart 7). This is mainly because firms raised a huge amount of debt last spring when the Fed and federal government made it very attractive to do so. Now, we are emerging from a recession and the nonfinancial corporate sector already holds an elevated cash balance (Chart 7, bottom panel). Debt growth was also essentially zero during the past six months, and very low (or even negative) debt growth is a common occurrence right after a peak in the default rate (Chart 7, top 2 panels). It is true that the nonfinancial corporate sector’s Financing Gap – the difference between capital expenditures and retained earnings – is no longer negative (Chart 7, panel 3). But it is also not high enough to suggest that firms need to significantly add debt. Chart 7Debt Growth Will Be Slow Debt Growth Will Be Slow Debt Growth Will Be Slow For our default rate calculations, we assume that corporate debt growth will be between 0% and 8% during the next 12 months. However, our sense is that it will be closer to 0% than to 8%. Profit Growth Expectations Chart 8Profit Growth Will Surge Profit Growth Will Surge Profit Growth Will Surge Our expectation is that profit growth will surge during the next 12 months, as is the typical pattern when the economy emerges from recession. Year-over-year profit growth peaked at 62% in 2002 following the 2001 recession, and it peaked at 51% in 2010 coming out of the Global Financial Crisis (Chart 8). More specifically, if we model nonfinancial corporate sector pre-tax profit growth on real GDP and then assume 6.5% real GDP growth in 2021, in line with the Fed’s median forecast, then we get a forecast for 31% profit growth in 2021. If we use a higher real GDP growth forecast of 10%, in line with our US Political Strategy service's "maximum impact" scenario, then our model forecasts pre-tax profit growth of 40% for 2021.6 Default Rate Expectations Table 1 puts together different estimates for profit growth and debt growth and maps them to a range of 12-month default rate outcomes, as implied by our Default Rate Model. For example, profit growth of 30% and debt growth between 0% and 8% in 2021 maps to a 12-month default rate of between 3.2% and 3.8%. This falls comfortably within the range of 2.8% to 4.5% that is consistent with current market pricing. Table 1Default Rate Scenarios That Uneasy Feeling That Uneasy Feeling In fact, for our model to output a default rate range that is higher than what is priced into junk spreads, we need to assume 2021 profit growth of 20% or less. This is quite far below the estimates we made above based on reasonable forecasts for real GDP. Bottom Line: Junk spreads already embed a significant decline in the default rate during the next 12 months, but reasonable assumptions for corporate debt growth and profit growth suggest that this outcome will be achieved. Investors should continue to favor spread product over Treasuries and continue to hold a down-in-quality bias within corporate credit. Economy: Household Income Update Last week’s personal income and spending report showed that disposable household income was lower in February than in January, a decline that is entirely attributable to the fact that the $600 checks to individuals that were part of the December stimulus bill were mostly delivered in January. These “Economic Impact Payments” totaled $138 billion in January and only $8 billion in February. This drop-off of $130 billion almost exactly matches the $128 billion monthly decline seen in disposable personal income. Consumer spending also fell in February compared to January, a result that likely owes a lot to February’s bad weather conditions, particularly the winter storm that caused much of Texas to lose power. Though spending has recovered a lot from last year’s lows, it remains significantly below its pre-COVID trend (Chart 9). In contrast to spending, disposable income has skyrocketed since the pandemic started last March. Chart 10 shows that disposable personal income has increased 8% in the 12 months since COVID struck compared to the 12 months prior. Moreover, it shows that the increase is entirely attributable to fiscal relief. Chart 9Households Have Excess ##br##Savings Households Have Excess Savings Households Have Excess Savings Chart 10Disposable Personal Income Growth And Its Drivers That Uneasy Feeling That Uneasy Feeling The result of below-trend spending and a surge in income is a big jump in the savings rate. The personal savings rate was 13.6% in February, well above its average pre-COVID level (Chart 9, panel 3), as it has been since the pandemic began. This consistently elevated savings rate has led to US households building up a $1.9 trillion buffer of excess savings compared to a pre-pandemic baseline (Chart 9, bottom panel). Perhaps the biggest question for economic growth is whether households will deploy this large pool of savings as the economy re-opens or whether they will continue to hoard it. In this regard, the individual checks that were part of last year’s CARES act are the most likely to be hoarded, as these checks were distributed to all Americans making less than $99,000. The income support provisions in this month’s American Rescue Plan are much more targeted. Only individuals making below $75,000 will receive a $1,400 check and the bill also includes expanded unemployment benefits and a large amount of aid for state & local governments. All in all, we anticipate that a substantial amount of household excess savings will be spent once the vaccination effort has made enough progress that people feel safe venturing out. This will lead to strong economic growth and higher inflation in the second half of 2021.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Fed Looks Backward While Markets Look Forward”, dated March 23, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20210323b.htm 3 For more details on our outlook for core inflation in 2021 please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Limit Rate Risk, Load Up On Credit”, dated March 16, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Political Strategy Second Quarter Outlook 2021, “From Stimulus To Structural Reform”, dated March 24, 2021, available at usps.bcaresearch.com 5 For more details on this excess spread analysis please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “Trading The US Corporate Bond Market In A Time Of Crisis”, dated March 31, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 The "maximum impact" scenario assumes that the full amount of authorized outlays from the American Rescue Plan will be spent, with 60% of the outlays spent in FY2021. For more details see US Political Strategy Second Quarter Outlook 2021, “From Stimulus To Structural Reform”, dated March 24, 2021, available at usps.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

The inflation/deflation debate has been dominating the news flow and we are compelled to offer our thoughts in two-part series of Special Reports on this widely discussed, but also widely misunderstood topic. Over the past year, we have been inundated with countless questions about our outlook on inflation given the dual monetary and fiscal stimuli that have been ongoing since Covid-19 hit (Chart 1). We take this opportunity to provide detailed answers on everything inflation in this series of Special Reports. Specifically, in this first report we focus on the long-term and structural forces behind US core CPI inflation. We go in depth into the drivers behind the current deflationary trend and also examine what other variables might break that trend in the future. We also try to ignore the medium-term outlook because the inflation story is well-known as the financial media is littered with charts that slice and dice the ISM manufacturing release in every possible way showing that inflation will rebound. Hence, there is no disagreement about the medium-term path for the core CPI inflation. Chart 12020 Stimuli 2020 Stimuli 2020 Stimuli The important question that we look to answer in this Special Report is whether this rebound is a paradigm shift that will push the US into a new era of consistently high (i.e. above 3%/annum) core CPI inflation, or is it a merely counter trend inflationary spike within the broader deflationary megatrend? Laying The Groundwork Before we wrestle with the structural forces behind inflation, first we must get the question of quantitative easing (QE) and its effects on the real economy and inflation out of the way. Undoubtedly, QE is an integral part of any discussion about the real-word and/or financial asset price inflation, and while it tickles the public’s imagination with hyperinflationary fears, the reality is that those fears are largely misplaced (Chart 2). In fact, pundits have established a consensus: “QE only affects the financial economy as it increases bank reserves that can never escape in the real economy. On the other hand, fiscal stimulus affects the real economy and can cause genuine inflation.” There clearly hasn’t been any material inflation since the GFC, so the argument of “QE only affecting the financial economy” appears to be correct, but at closer look there is room for a different interpretation. What is important to understand is that QE is nothing but a tool, sometimes a signaling tool, in the Fed’s arsenal, and like any tool, it can be used in different ways. Chart 2Boogeyman? (Part I) Tinkering With Inflation: Outlook (Part I) Tinkering With Inflation: Outlook  The fact that there has not been any material real-world inflation since the housing bubble is neither because QE is structurally deflationary nor because it “cannot touch” the real economy, but because policy makers chose to use the QE tool to rescue creditors (the financial sector) rather than debtors (the real economy) during the GFC. Delving deeper in the Great Recession, the banks were largely undercapitalized with cash accounting for a tiny portion of overall assets and Treasury holdings being at historic lows (Chart 3). The rest of the assets were tied to loans and other risky securities. Once NINJA loans and other subprime loans along with the derivative CLOs/CDOs house of cards began imploding, the banking sector could not stomach the losses owing to the nonexistent cash buffer, and the entire system went into insolvency mode. This is when the Fed stepped in with QE (and the Treasury with TARP in order to recapitalize the banks) to bail out the nervous system of the US economy by boosting reserves and giving freshly printed money to the banks in exchange for their Treasurys, MBS and other risky securities. By providing support to the banking system, the Fed was counterbalancing a deflationary financial industry shutdown (the Richard Koo balance sheet type recession) rather than injecting an inflationary real economic stimulus. As a result, nearly all of the newly created money was stuck in the financial system in the form of new reserves, and as far as the real economy was concerned, no new money entered directly into the real world. This is how the consensus of “QE only affecting the financial economy” was formed, and why we did not observe a long-lasting rise in CPI despite all of the GFC-brought about stimuli. Chart 3Banks Were Well-capitalized Banks Were Well-capitalized Banks Were Well-capitalized Fast-forward to today, and the backdrop could not be more different. The banking sector was well capitalized, so doing an aggressive QE to boost reserves and to stimulate the financial sector would have only provided marginal benefits. The deflationary shock came through the real economy, not the financial economy, meaning that a real (i.e. fiscal) stimulus was needed. Once again, the QE tool comes to the rescue. This time however, QE was also used to finance Main Street stimulus programs as the Fed bought long dated Treasury (and other) securities that pushed interest rates to rock bottom levels and helped facilitate government stimulus spending. Consequently, a more meaningful fraction of QE money reached Main Street and had an effect on the real economy and was not just locked in new reserves. As a reminder, when rates fall to zero and the Fed embarks on QE, the lines between monetary and fiscal policies get blurred. When QE (instead of the foreign or private sectors) is used to facilitate government expenditures, which later on gets distributed into the real economy, QE can provide inflationary support and can reach the real economy. Chart 42008 Versus Today 2008 Versus Today 2008 Versus Today Perhaps the best way to illustrate the difference between 2008 and 2020 is by showing M2 money supply data. The spike in M2 data in 2020 dwarfs the one in 2008; in 2020 QE money reached the real economy and ended up in private sector’s bank accounts (thus contributing to M2 growth), whereas in 2008 QE money was mainly locked in bank reserves. True the money multiplier and M2 money stock velocity are still in hibernation, and were we to see a sustainable inflationary impulses both of these indicators would have to show signs of life (Chart 4). So does this mean that there are grounds for longer-term inflationary concerns since in 2020 QE actually reached the real economy? To answer this question, we now dig deeper into the secular inflation forces and split them in two camps: pro-inflationary and anti-inflationary. Pro-Inflationary Driver #1: The Buenos Aires Consensus Our view since last June has been that fiscal deficits are here to stay as far as the eye can see and the shift from the Washington to the Buenos Aires Consensus1 is a paradigm shift with staying power. The most important long-term consequence of the Buenos Aires Consensus will be higher inflation. And we are not talking just the asset price kind – which investors have enjoyed over the past decade – but of the more traditional flavor: consumer price inflation. Crudely put, as long as fiscal support remains in place (proverbial helicopter drop, Chart 5) after the pandemic is long forgotten it can serve as a meaningful catalyst for structural inflation, instead of being a one-off counterbalancing short-term boost. To reiterate just how much more powerful fiscal spending is outside of a recession, we conduct a labor market analysis and show that a large percentage of the present-day stimulus is being used to counterbalance the deflationary pandemic shock, rather than contributing to driving inflation higher. Table 1 shows our proxy for total payroll losses incurred by America households as a direct result of the pandemic. Our estimate is $501 billion from March 2020 until today. Chart 5Helicopter Checks Helicopter Checks Helicopter Checks The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget also publishes detailed statistics on the dollar flow of every pandemic stimulus program to a specific economic sector. As of today, US households received $1,400 billion, but some of the stimulus categories simply defer a payment that households still have to make in the future, instead of injecting brand-new money. After stripping those categories out, we arrive to a cleaner number of roughly $1,000 billion – that is how much new money US households received. Next, we subtract our total payroll loss proxy resulting into a net inflow of approximately $500 billion or 2.3% of 2020 US GDP. This is a respectable sum and 2.3% is significant. However, it has one major drawback. The 2.3% GDP stimulus number assumes that every single dollar was actually spent into the real economy, which we know is not true. Table 1The Counterbalancing Effect (Part I) Tinkering With Inflation: Outlook (Part I) Tinkering With Inflation: Outlook A recent New York Fed study on how American households used their stimulus money concluded that: “36.4% of the stimulus money was used to boost savings, 34.5% to paydown debt, 25.9% was spent on essentials and non-essentials, and finally the rest of the money (3.2%) was donated”. It is worth noting that this study also looked at the expected spending patterns for the new round of stimulus checks, and the results were generally the same. To obtain a more realistic number of how much of the net $500 billion inflow actually entered the economy, we multiply it by 25.9% (how much money was used on spending according to the NY Fed) and arrive at a better estimate of $130 billion or 0.6% of 2020 US GDP, which is by no means an astronomical number that will shatter into pieces the current deflationary megatrend. This empirical exercise demonstrated how a large percentage of the present-day stimulus is being used to counterbalance the deflationary pandemic shock. However, if our thesis of a Buenos Aires Consensus in which governments spend even outside of recessions pans out, then there will not be the aforementioned counterbalancing effect, and all the fiscal dollars will go straight to contributing to rising inflation until the deflationary megatrend is broken. Pro-Inflationary Driver #2: Demographics In the long run, inflation tends to oscillate alongside a country’s demographics. More specifically, it is the relative size of the three age cohorts (young, working-age, and old) that plays a key role in driving inflation. People who are in the working-age cohort are at their peak productivity, which implies that their contribution to the production of goods and services is greater than the demand for new credit they generate, meaning that they produce a deflationary pull. The opposite is true for the other two age cohorts (the young and the old). Neither one is contributing to the production of goods & services, while both still generate new credit in the economy (for example student loans), and the end result is an inflationary pull. Hence, it is the interplay between these three age cohorts that serves as a structural force behind inflation. To put some numbers behind this conceptual framework, we turn our attention to a paper “The enduring link between demography and inflation” written by Mikael Juselius and Előd Takáts. In the paper, the authors conduct rigorous cross-country analysis and find that indeed, people 30-60 years of age (the working-age cohort) exert deflationary pressure, while the other two cohorts contribute to rising inflation. Chart 6 plots the age-structure effect for the US against inflation. The authors also quantified that over the 40-year period (1970-2010) the increase in the working-age population (due to baby-boomers) has lowered inflationary pressures by almost five percentage points in the US (Chart 7). Meanwhile, by extrapolating the likely path of demographic data by 40 years (2010-2050), the authors observed a shift from deflationary to inflationary age pressure mainly due to the incoming increase in the proportion of the old cohort. Their estimate of the expected pull on inflation in the US will be approximately two and a half percent (Chart 8). Chart 6Demographics Are A Mighty Force Demographics Are A Mighty Force Demographics Are A Mighty Force Chart 7From Deflationary... (Part I) Tinkering With Inflation: Outlook (Part I) Tinkering With Inflation: Outlook Chart 8...To Inflationary (Part I) Tinkering With Inflation: Outlook (Part I) Tinkering With Inflation: Outlook Going forward, US demographics will be more inflationary than deflationary. Pro-Inflationary Driver #3: De-Globalization The “apex of globalization” or “de-globalization” is our third pro-inflationary driver. We have written about this theme extensively at BCA Research and it is the mega-theme of our sister Geopolitical Strategy (GPS) service. Odds are high that countries will continue looking inward as the US sustains its aggressive trade policy, China’s trend growth slows, and US-China strategic tensions intensify. Chart 9 shows that we are at the conclusion of a period of tranquility. Pax Americana underpinned globalization as much as Pax Britannica before it. The US is in a relative decline after decades of geopolitical stability allowed countries like China to rise to “great power” status and rivals like Russia to recover from the chaos of the 1990s. Chart 9The Tide Is Turning The Tide Is Turning The Tide Is Turning De-globalization has become the consensus since the election of Donald Trump. But Trump is not the prophet of de-globalization; he is its acolyte. And now, President Biden is continuing in Trump’s footsteps. Globalization is ending because of structural factors, not cyclical ones. And its decline was pre-written into its “source code.” Three factors stand at the center of this assessment, first outlined in a 2014 GPS Special Report, “The Apex Of Globalization – All Downhill From Here”: multipolarity, populism and protectionism. Events have since confirmed this view. The three pillars of globalization are the free movement of goods, capital, and people across national borders. We expect to see marginally less of each in the future and this should prove inflationary. Pro-Inflationary Driver #4: US Dollar Bear Market The path of least resistance is lower for the US dollar and it represents our final pro-inflationary driver. Chart 10 highlights the ebbs and flows of the trade-weighted US dollar since it floated in the early-1970s. The DXY index has moved in six-to-ten year bull and bear markets. The most recent trough was during the depths of the Great Recession, while the peak was in early-2020. If history repeats, eventually the dollar will mean revert lower in the 2020s, especially given the fiscal profligacy (Buenos Aires Consensus) of the current administration that may continue into 2024. Chart 10Time For A Downcycle? Time For A Downcycle? Time For A Downcycle? True, the US dollar remains the global reserve currency, but that exorbitant privilege is clearly fraying on the edges as the balance-of-payments dynamics are heading in the wrong direction. While the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) expects some normalization in the US budget deficit over the next 4 years since the pandemic shock will be over, looking further into the future the CBO forecasts a further reacceleration in deficit spending. Assuming a stable to grinding lower current account deficit in the next several years, the path of least resistance is lower for the currency. BCA’s US dollar model also corroborates the twin deficit message and suggests ample structural downside for the USD (Chart 11).  The apex of globalization will also hurt the greenback in a reflexive manner. In a world where all the markets are integrated, borrowers in EM nations often use the reserve currency to issue liabilities at a lower cost. This boosts the demand by EM central banks for US dollar reserves to protect domestic banking systems funded in USD. Moreover, some countries like China implement pegs (both official and unofficial) to the US dollar in order to maintain their competitiveness and export their production surpluses to the US. To do so they buy US assets. If the global economy becomes more fragmented and the Sino-US relationship continues to deteriorate structurally as we expect, then these sources of demand for the dollar will recede. Overlay the widening US current account deficit, and you have the perfect recipe for a depreciating trade-weighted US dollar. Importantly, the 1970s is an interesting period to examine in more detail. As the Nixon administration floated the greenback this aggravated the inflationary pressures (Chart 12) that were building all along the 1960s when the US adopted the Mutually Assured Destruction Doctrine along with the Cold War space race that eventually saw the US landing on the moon in 1969. Chart 11A Bearish Outlook A Bearish Outlook A Bearish Outlook Chart 12The Greenback In The 1970s The Greenback In The 1970s The Greenback In The 1970s A lower greenback is synonymous with rising commodity and import prices and given that the US is the consumer of last resort (70% PCE), the commodity/import price pendulum will swing from a deflationary to an inflationary force. Anti-Inflationary Driver #1: Technology’s Creative Destruction Schumpeter’s “creative destruction” forces dominate technology companies in general and Silicon Valley in particular, and represent our fist anti-inflationary driver. These creative destruction forces in the tech industry are inherently deflationary. As a result, tech business models have evolved to thrive during disinflationary periods. Chart 13 shows the software sector deflator derived from national accounts, and since the mid-1980s more often than not it has been mired in deflation. US semiconductor prices, computer hardware prices, and almost any tech related category from the PCE, PPI and CPI releases looks more or less the same as software, underscoring that this is a technology sector wide modus operandi. More recently, Uber Technologies and Airbnb, to name a few, continually bring existing capacity online and that adds another layer of deflation forces at work in select industries they operate in. Tack on technology infiltrating finance and soon the extremely opaque health care services industry that comprises almost 20% of US GDP or $4tn and a deflationary impulse will likely reverberate across these large segments of the US economy that have managed to sustain high pricing power over the decades. Chart 13Technological Progress Is Deflationary Technological Progress Is Deflationary Technological Progress Is Deflationary Thus, these creative destruction processes remain alive and well in tech land and will continue to exert deflationary/disinflationary pressure (of the good kind) on the US economy. Anti-Inflationary Driver #2: Income & Wealth Inequality The growing trend in income and wealth inequality is our second anti-inflationary force. We first want to focus on the issue of income inequality as it leads to wealth inequality. Income inequality refers to the distribution of wages and profits generated by the economy. It is the proverbial “share of the pie” that households from different socioeconomic brackets receive. The link with inflation comes through the marginal propensity to save statistic of those different brackets. Lower income households have nearly nonexistent propensity to save as they live paycheck to paycheck. Therefore, any additional income inflow they receive gets immediately syphoned into the real economy. In contrast, the top 10% have a high propensity to save as all of their living expenses are well covered, so any additional income they receive is stashed away into savings and does not enter the real economy. This is why following the Trump’s tax cut that benefitted the top 10% there has not been a durable spike in CPI inflation. The fact that in the US the income share of the top 10% is growing at stratospheric rates at the same as time as the bottom 90% are struggling to cover even a $400 unexpected expense needs no introduction. The exact reasons as to why that happened would require a separate Special Report, but one of the main reasons is the multi-decade suppression of unions, which does not allow employees to bargain effectively for a larger slice of corporate profits. Given that profits are an exact mirror image of labor expenses, it is not surprising that the union movement is being marginalized (Charts 14 & 15). Staying on the topic of inflation, as we already outlined, when the lower and medium socioeconomic brackets receive more income, it does not disappear in the savings accounts, but instead it is redirected into the real economy causing a healthy inflationary uptick. Chart 14No Power = No Money No Power = No Money No Power = No Money Chart 15The Tug Of War The Tug Of War The Tug Of War ​​​​​​​ Chart 16 shows the wealth share of the top 10% of American households on inverted scale. Since the 1920s, inflation and the wealth share of the top 10% has moved in opposite directions. There were two distinct periods when the wealth share of the bottom 90% rose: from the early 1930s until the early 1950s, and from the mid-1960s until the mid-1980s. Both of these periods were accompanied by rising CPI inflation. Chart 16Wealth Equality Is Inflationary Wealth Equality Is Inflationary Wealth Equality Is Inflationary At the same time, when looking at any other period outside of those golden days for the bottom 90%, US inflation was anemic. This empirical evidence further underscores the importance of income and wealth distribution in the economy, and given the current US political and economic realities, we do not expect any material changes in labor dynamics to take root. The top 10% will continue benefitting at the expense of the bottom 90%, which will keep US CPI inflation suppressed. Concluding Thoughts In this Special Report our goal was to look beyond the already known medium term inflation outlook, and present both sides of the argument about the long-term inflation trend. We took a deep dive into six structural forces behind inflation that we identified. Four of those forces were pro-inflationary, while the remaining two were anti-inflationary (Table 2). We also assigned a value on our subjective strength scale for each force. Each value incorporates how quickly a particular force will come to fruition, and how strong it will be over the next 5-to-10 year period. Based on our analysis, we conclude that there are rising odds that the deflationary megatrend has run its course and has reached an inflection point of turning inflationary. Table 2Inflation Dots (Part I) Tinkering With Inflation: Outlook (Part I) Tinkering With Inflation: Outlook In the next Special Report from our Tinkering With Inflation series, we will conduct a thought experiment and explore a world in which our forecasts prove to be accurate, and a new inflationary paradigm engulfs the US economy. Under such a backdrop what will the US equity sector winners and losers, especially given the related shift in the stock-to-bond correlation? Stay tuned.   Arseniy Urazov Research Associate ArseniyU@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Buenos Aires Consensus is our catchall term for everything that is opposite of the Washington Consensus: less globalization, fiscal stimulus as far as the eyes can see, erosion of central bank independence, and a dirigiste (as opposed to laissez-faire) approach to economics that seeks to protect “state champions,” stifles innovation, and ultimately curbs productivity growth.

Highlights Global manufacturing activity will soon peak due to growing costs and China’s policy tightening. This process will allow the dollar’s rebound to continue. EUR/USD’s correction will run further. This pullback in the euro is creating an attractive buying opportunity for investors with a 12- to 24-month investment horizon. Eurozone banks will continue to trade in unison with the euro. Feature The correction in the euro has further to run. The dollar currently benefits from widening real interest differentials, but a growing list of headwinds will cause a temporary setback for the global manufacturing sector, which will fuel the greenback rally further. Nonetheless, EUR/USD will stabilize between 1.15 and 1.12, after which it will begin a new major up-leg. Consequently, investors with a 12- to 24-month investment horizon should use the current softness to allocate more funds to the common currency. A Hiccup In Global Industrial Activity Global manufacturing activity is set to decelerate on a sequential basis and the Global Manufacturing PMI will soon peak. The first problem for the global manufacturing sector is the emergence of financial headwinds. The sharp rebound in growth in the second half of 2020 and the optimism created by last year’s vaccine breakthrough as well as the rising tide of US fiscal stimulus have pushed US bond yields and oil prices up sharply. These financial market moves are creating a “growth tax” that will bite soon. Mounting US interest rates have lifted global borrowing costs while the doubling in Brent prices has increased the costs of production and created a small squeeze on oil consumers. Thus, even if the dollar remains well below its March 2020 peak, our Growth Tax Indicator (which incorporates yields, oil prices and the US dollar) warns of an imminent top in the US ISM Manufacturing and the Global Manufacturing PMI (Chart 1). Already, the BCA Global Leading Economic Indicator diffusion index has dipped below the 50% line, which usually ushers in downshifts in global growth. A deceleration in China’s economy constitutes another problem for the global manufacturing cycle. Last year’s reflation-fueled rebound in Chinese economic activity was an important catalyst to the global trade and manufacturing recovery. However, according to BCA Research’s Emerging Market Strategy service, Beijing is now tightening policy, concerned by a build-up in debt and excesses in the real estate sector. Already, the PBoC’s liquidity withdrawals are resulting in a decline of commercial bank excess reserves, which foreshadows a slowing of China’s credit impulse (Chart 2). Chart 1The Global Growth Tax Will Bite The Global Growth Tax Will Bite The Global Growth Tax Will Bite Chart 2Chinese Credit Will Slow Chinese Credit Will Slow Chinese Credit Will Slow In addition to liquidity withdrawals, Chinese policymakers are also tightening the regulatory environment to tackle excessive debt buildups and real estate speculation. The crackdown on property developers and house purchases will cause construction activity to shrink in the second half of 2021. Meanwhile, tougher rules for both non-bank lenders and the asset management divisions of banks will further harm credit creation. BCA’s Chief EM strategist, Arthur Budaghyan, notes that consumer credit is already slowing. Chinese fiscal policy is unlikely to create a counterweight to the deteriorating credit impulse. China’s fiscal impulse will be slightly negative next year. Chinese financial markets are factoring in these headwinds, and on-shore small cap equities are trying to break down while Chinese equities are significantly underperforming global benchmarks. Chart 3Deteriorating Surprises Deteriorating Surprises Deteriorating Surprises Bottom Line: The combined assault from the rising “growth tax” and China’s policy tightening is leaving its mark. Economic surprises in the US, the Eurozone, EM and China have all decelerated markedly (Chart 3), which the currency market echoes. Some of the most pro-cyclical currencies in the G-10 are suffering, with the SEK falling relative to the EUR and the NZD and AUD both experiencing varying degrees of weakness. The Euro Correction Will Run Further… Until now, the euro’s decline mostly reflects the rise in US interest rate differentials; however, the coming hiccup in the global manufacturing cycle is causing a second down leg for the euro. First, the global economic environment remains consistent with more near-term dollar upside, due to: Chart 4Commodities Are Vulnerable Commodities Are Vulnerable Commodities Are Vulnerable A commodity correction that will feed the dollar’s rebound. Aggregate speculator positioning and our Composite Technical Indicator show that commodity prices are technically overextended (Chart 4). With this backdrop, the coming deceleration in Chinese economic activity is likely to catalyze a significant pullback in natural resources, which will hurt rates of returns outside the US and therefore, flatter the dollar. The dollar’s counter-cyclicality. The expected pullback in the Global Manufacturing PMI is consistent with a stronger greenback (Chart 5). The dollar’s momentum behavior. Among G-10 FX, the dollar responds most strongly to the momentum factor (Chart 6). Thus, the likelihood is high that the dollar’s recent rebound will persist, especially because our FX team’s Dollar Capitulation Index has only recovered to neutral from oversold levels and normally peaks in overbought territory.  Chart 5The Greenback's Counter-Cyclicality The Greenback's Counter-Cyclicality The Greenback's Counter-Cyclicality Chart 6The Dollar Is A High Momentum Currency The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward Second, the euro’s specific dynamics remain negative for now. Based on our short-term valuation model, the fair value of EUR/USD has downshifted back to 1.1, which leaves the euro 7% overvalued (Chart 7). Until now, real interest rate differentials and the steepening of the US yield curve relative to Germany’s have driven the decline in the fair value estimate. However, the deceleration in global growth also hurts the euro’s fair value because the US is less exposed than the Eurozone to the global manufacturing cycle. Chart 7The Euro's Short-Term Fair Value Is At 1.1 The Euro's Short-Term Fair Value Is At 1.1 The Euro's Short-Term Fair Value Is At 1.1 Chart 8Speculators Have Not Capitulated Speculators Have Not Capitulated Speculators Have Not Capitulated The euro is also technically vulnerable, similar to commodities. Speculators are still massively net long EUR/USD and the large pool of long bets in the euro suggests that a capitulation has yet to take place (Chart 8). The euro responds very negatively to a weak Chinese economy. The Eurozone has deeper economic ties with China than the US. Exports to China account for 1.7% of the euro area’s GDP, and 2.8% of Germany’s compared to US exports to China at 0.5% of GDP. Indirect financial links are also larger. Credit to EM accounts for 45% of the Eurozone’s GDP compared to 5% for the US. Thus, the negative impact of a Chinese slowdown on EM growth has greater spillovers on European than on US ones rates of returns. A weak CNY and sagging Chinese capital markets harm the euro. The euro’s rebound from 1.064 on March 23 2020 to 1.178 did not reflect sudden inflows into European fixed-income markets. Instead, the money that previously sought higher interest rates in the US left that country for EM bonds and China’s on-shore fixed-income markets, the last major economies with attractive yields. These outflows from the US to China and EM pushed the dollar down, which arithmetically helped the euro. Thus, the recent EUR/USD correlates closely with Sino/US interest rate and with the yuan because the euro’s strength reflects the dollar demise (Chart 9). Consequently, a decelerating Chinese economy will also hurt EUR/USD via fixed-income market linkages. Finally, the euro will depreciate further if global cyclical stocks correct relative to defensive equities. Deep cyclicals (financials, consumer discretionary, energy, materials and industrials) represent 59% of the Eurozone MSCI benchmark versus 36% of the US index. Cyclical equities are exceptionally overbought and expensive relative to defensive names. They are also very levered to the global business cycle and Chinese imports. In this context, the expected deterioration in both China’s economic activity and the Global Manufacturing PMI could cause a temporary but meaningful pullback in the cyclicals-to-defensives ratio and precipitate equity outflows from Europe into the US (Chart 10). Chart 9EUR/USD And Chinese Rates EUR/USD And Chinese Rates EUR/USD And Chinese Rates Chart 10EUR/USD Will Follow Cyclicals/Defensives EUR/USD Will Follow Cyclicals/Defensives EUR/USD Will Follow Cyclicals/Defensives Bottom Line: A peak in the global manufacturing PMI will hurt the euro, especially because China will meaningfully contribute to this deceleration in global industrial activity. Thus, the euro’s pullback has further to run. An important resistance stands at 1.15. A failure to hold will invite a rapid decline to EUR/USD 1.12. Nonetheless, the euro’s depreciation constitutes nothing more than a temporary pullback. … But The Long-Term Bull Market Is Intact We recommend buying EUR/USD on its current dip because the underpinnings of its cyclical bull market are intact. Chart 11Investors Structurally Underweight Europe Investors Structurally Underweight Europe Investors Structurally Underweight Europe First, investors are positioned for a long-term economic underperformance of the euro area relative to the US. The depressed level of portfolio inflows into Europe relative to the US indicates that investors already underweight European assets (Chart 11). This pre-existing positioning limits the negative impact on the euro of the current decrease in European growth expectations (Chart 11, bottom panel). Second, as we wrote last week, European growth is set to accelerate significantly this summer. Considering the absence of ebullient investor expectations toward the euro, this process can easily create upside economic surprises later this year, especially when compared to the US. Moreover, the deceleration in Chinese and global growth will most likely be temporary, which will limit the duration of their negative impact on Europe. Third, the US stimulus measure will create negative distortions for the US dollar. The addition of another long-term stimulus package of $2 trillion to $4 trillion to the $7 trillion already spent by Washington during the crisis implies that the US government deficit will not narrow as quickly as US private savings will decline. Therefore, the US current account deficit will widen from its current level of 3.5% of GDP. As a corollary, the US twin deficit will remain large. Meanwhile, the Fed is unlikely to increase real interest rates meaningfully in the coming two years because it believes any surge in inflation this year will be temporary. Furthermore, the FOMC aims to achieve inclusive growth (i.e. an overheated labor market). This policy combination forcefully points toward greater dollar weakness. The US policy mix looks particularly dollar bearish when compared to that of the Eurozone. To begin with, the balance of payment dynamics make the euro more resilient. The euro area benefits from the underpinning of a current account surplus of 1.9% of GDP. Moreover, the European basic balance of payments stands at 1.5% of GDP compared to a 3.6% deficit for the US. Additionally, FDI into Europe are rising relative to the US. The divergence in the FDI trends will continue due to the high probability that the Biden administration will soon increase corporate taxes. Chart 12The DEM In The 70s The DEM In The 70s The DEM In The 70s The combination of faster vaccine penetration and much larger fiscal stimulus means that the US economy will overheat faster than Europe’s. Because the Fed seems willing to tolerate higher inflation readings, US CPI will rise relative to the Eurozone. In the 1970s, too-easy policy in Washington meant that the gap between US and German inflation rose. Despite the widening of interest rate and growth differentials in favor of the USD or the rise in German relative unemployment, the higher US inflation dominated currency fluctuations and the deutschemark appreciated (Chart 12). A similar scenario is afoot in the coming years, especially in light of the euro bullish relative balance of payments. Fourth, valuations constitute an additional buttress behind the long-term performance of the euro. Our FX strategy team Purchasing Power Parity model adjusts for the different composition of price indices in the US and the euro area. Based on this metric, the euro is trading at a significant 13% discount from its long-term fair value, with the latter being on an upward trend (Chart 13).  Furthermore, BCA’s Behavioral Exchange Rate Model for the trade-weighted euro is also pointing up, which historically augurs well for the common currency. Lastly, even if the ECB’s broad trade-weighted index stands near an all-time high, European financial conditions remain very easy. This bifurcation suggests that the euro is not yet a major hurdle for the continent and can enjoy more upside (Chart 14). Chart 13EUR/USD Trades Well Below Long-Term Fair Value EUR/USD Trades Well Below Long-Term Fair Value EUR/USD Trades Well Below Long-Term Fair Value Chart 14Easy European Financial Conditions Easy European Financial Conditions Easy European Financial Conditions Chart 15Make Room For the Euro! Make Room For the Euro! Make Room For the Euro! Finally, the euro will remain a beneficiary from reserve diversification away from the USD. The dollar’s status as the premier reserve currency is unchallenged. However, its share of global reserves has scope to decline while the euro’s proportion could move back to the levels enjoyed by legacy European currencies in the early 1990s (Chart 15). Large reserve holders will continue to move away from the dollar. BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy team argues that US tensions with China transcend the Trump presidency.  Meanwhile, the current administration’s relationship with Russia and Saudi Arabia will be cold. For now, their main alternative to the dollar is the euro because of its liquidity. Moreover, the NGEU stimulus program creates an embryonic mechanism to share fiscal risk within the euro area. The Eurozone is therefore finally trying to evolve away from a monetary union bereft of a fiscal union. This process points toward a lower probability of a break up, which makes the euro more attractive to reserve managers. Bottom Line: Despite potent near-term headwinds, the euro’s long-term outlook remains bright. Global investors already underweight European assets, yet balance of payment and policy dynamics point toward a higher euro. Moreover, valuations and geopolitical developments reinforce the cyclical tailwinds behind EUR/USD. Thus, investors with a 12- to 24-month investment horizon should use the current euro correction to gain exposure to the European currencies. Any move in EUR/USD below 1.15 will generate a strong buy signal. Sector Focus: European Banks And The Istanbul Shake The recent decline in euro area bank stocks coincides with the 14% increase in USD/TRY and the 17% decline in the TUR Turkish equities ETF following the sacking of Naci Ağbal, the CBRT governor. President Erdogan is prioritizing growth over economic stability because his AKP party is polling poorly ahead of the 2023 election. The Turkish economy is already overheating, and the lack of independence of the CBRT under the leadership of Şahap Kavcıoğlu promises a substantial increase in Turkish inflation, which already stands at 16%. Hence, foreign investors will flee this market, creating further downward pressures on the lira and Turkish assets. European banks have a meaningful exposure to Turkey. Turkish assets account for 3% of Spanish bank assets or 28% of Tier-1 capital. For France, this exposure amounts to 0.7% and 5% respectively, and for the UK, it reaches 0.3% and 2%. As a comparison, claims on Turkey only represent 0.3% and 0.5% of the assets and Tier-1 capital of US banks. Unsurprisingly, fluctuations in the Turkish lira have had a significant impact one the share prices of European banks in recent years, even after controlling for EPS and domestic yield fluctuations (Table 1). Table 1TRY Is Important To European Banks… The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward Nonetheless, today’s TRY fluctuations are unlikely to have the same lasting impact on European banks share prices as they did from 2017 to 2019 because European banks have already shed significant amounts of Turkish assets (Chart 16).  This does not mean that European banks are out of the woods yet. The level of European yields remains a key determinant of the profitability of Eurozone’s banks, and thus, of their share prices (Chart 17, top panel). Moreover, the euro still tightly correlates with European bank stocks as well (Chart 17, bottom panel). As a result, our view that the global manufacturing cycle will experience a temporary downshift and the consequent downside in EUR/USD both warn of further underperformance of European banks. Chart 16… But Less Than It Once Was The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward Chart 17Higher Yields And A stronger Euro, These Are Few Of My Favorite Things Higher Yields And A stronger Euro, These Are Few Of My Favorite Things Higher Yields And A stronger Euro, These Are Few Of My Favorite Things These same views also suggest that this decline in bank prices is creating a buying opportunity. Ultimately, we remain cyclically bullish on the euro and the transitory nature of the manufacturing slowdown implies that global yields will resume their ascent. The cheap valuations of European banks, which trade at 0.6-times book value, make them option-like vehicles to bet on these trends, even if the banking sectors long-term prospects are murky. Moreover, they are a play on Europe’s domestic recovery this summer. We will explore banks in greater detail in future reports.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Investment Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Trades Currency Performance The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward Fixed Income Performance Government Bonds The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward Corporate Bonds The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward Equity Performance Major Stock Indices The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward Geographic Performance The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward Sector Performance The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward  

Dear Client, We are sending you our Strategy Outlook today, where we outline our thoughts on the macro landscape and the direction of financial markets for the rest of 2021 and beyond. Next week, please join me for a webcast on Thursday, April 1 at 10:00 AM EDT (3:00 PM BST, 4:00 PM CEST, 10:00 PM HKT) where I will discuss the outlook. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Growth outlook: The global economy will rebound over the course of the year, with momentum rotating from the US to the rest of the world. Inflation: Structurally higher inflation is not a near-term risk, even in the US, but could become a major problem by the middle of the decade. Global asset allocation: Investors should continue to overweight equities on a 12-month horizon. Unlike in the year 2000, the equity earnings yield is still well above the bond yield. Equities: Value stocks will maintain their recent outperformance. Investors should favor banks and economically-sensitive cyclical sectors, while overweighting stock markets outside the US. Fixed income: Continue to maintain below average interest-rate duration exposure. Spread product will outperform safe government bonds. Favor inflation-protected securities over nominal bonds. Currencies: While the dollar could strengthen in the near term, it will weaken over a 12-month period. Large budget deficits, a deteriorating balance of payments profile, and an accommodative Fed are all dollar bearish. Commodities: Tight supply conditions and a cyclical recovery in oil demand will support crude prices. Strong Chinese growth will continue to buoy the metals complex. I. Macroeconomic Outlook Global Growth: The US Leads The Way… For Now The global economy should rebound from the pandemic over the remainder of the year. So far, however, it has been a two-speed recovery. Whereas the Bloomberg consensus has US real GDP growing by 4.8% in the first quarter, analysts expect the economies in the Euro area, UK, and Japan to contract by 3.6%, 13.3%, and 5%, respectively. Chart 1Dismantling Of Lockdown Measures Occurring At Varying Pace Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Chart 2US Is Among The Vaccination Leaders US Is Among The Vaccination Leaders US Is Among The Vaccination Leaders Two things explain US growth outperformance. First, the successful launch of the US vaccination campaign has allowed state governments to begin dismantling lockdown measures (Chart 1). Currently, the US has administered 40 vaccine shots for every 100 inhabitants. Among the major economies, only the UK has performed better on the vaccination front (Chart 2). In contrast, parts of continental Europe are still battling a new wave of Covid infections, prompting policymakers there to further tighten social distancing rules. Second, US fiscal policy has been more stimulative than elsewhere (Chart 3). On March 11, President Biden signed the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan Act into law. Among other things, the Act provides direct payments to lower- and middle-class households, extends and expands unemployment benefits, and offers aid to state and local governments (Chart 4). Unlike President Trump’s Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, the Democrats’ legislation will raise the incomes of the poor much more than the rich (Chart 5). Chart 3The US Tops The Stimulus Race Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? We expect growth leadership to shift from the US to the rest of the world in the second half of the year. Nevertheless, US real GDP in Q4 of 2021 will probably end up 7% above the level of Q4 of 2020, enough to close the output gap. In Section II of this report, we discuss whether this could cause inflation to take off on a sustained basis. We conclude that such an outcome is unlikely for the next two years. However, materially higher inflation is indeed a risk over a longer-term horizon. Chart 4Composition Of The American Rescue Plan Act Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Chart 5Biden’s Package Will Boost The Income Of The Poor More Than The Rich Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh?   The EU: Recovery After Lockdown The EU will benefit from a cyclical recovery later this year as the vaccination campaign picks up steam. The recent weakness in Europe was concentrated in services (Chart 6). The latest European PMI data shows that the service sector may have turned the corner. As in the US, European households have accumulated significant excess savings. The unleashing of pent-up demand should drive consumption over the remainder of the year (Chart 7). Chart 6For Now, The Service Sector Is Doing Better In The US Than The Euro Area Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Chart 7European Households Have Accumulated Excess Savings European Households Have Accumulated Excess Savings European Households Have Accumulated Excess Savings Meanwhile, the manufacturing sector continues to do well, with the Euro area manufacturing PMI hitting all-time highs in March. Sentiment indices such as the Sentix and ZEW surveys point to further upside for manufacturing activity (Chart 8).   Chart 8Positive Outlook For Euro Area Manufacturing Activity Positive Outlook For Euro Area Manufacturing Activity Positive Outlook For Euro Area Manufacturing Activity Fiscal policy should also turn modestly more expansionary. The EU recovery fund will begin disbursing aid in the second quarter. This should allow the southern European economies to maintain more generous levels of fiscal support. It also looks increasingly likely that the Green Party will either lead or join the coalition government in Germany, which could translate into greater spending. UK: Recovering From A One-Two Punch The UK had to shutter its economy late last year due to the emergence of a new, more contagious, strain of the virus. The resulting hit to the economy came on top of a decline in exports to the EU following Brexit. The economic picture will improve over the coming months. Thanks to the speedy vaccination campaign, the government plans to lift the “stay at home” rules on March 29. Most retail, dining, and hospitality businesses are scheduled to reopen on April 12. A strong housing market and the extension of both the furlough schemes and tax holidays should also sustain demand. Japan: More Fiscal Support Needed Like many other countries, Japan had to introduce new lockdown measures in late 2020 after suffering its worst wave of the pandemic. While the number of new cases has dropped dramatically since then, they have edged up again over the past two weeks. Japanese regulations require that vaccines be tested on Japanese people. Prime Minster Yoshihide Suga has promised that vaccine shots will be available to the country’s 36 million seniors by the end of June. However, with less than 1% of the population vaccinated so far, strict social distancing will persist well into the summer. The Japanese government passed a JPY 73 trillion (13.5% of GDP) supplementary budget in December. However, only 40 trillion of that has been allocated for direct spending. Due to negative bond yields, the Japanese government earns more interest than it pays on its debt. It should be running much more expansionary fiscal policy. China: Policy Normalization, Not Deleveraging Chart 9China: Tailwind For Easier Monetary And Fiscal Policies Will Fade Over The Remainder Of The Year China: Tailwind For Easier Monetary And Fiscal Policies Will Fade Over The Remainder Of The Year China: Tailwind For Easier Monetary And Fiscal Policies Will Fade Over The Remainder Of The Year China’s combined credit/fiscal impulse peaked late last year (Chart 9). The impulse leads growth by about six months, implying that the tailwind from easier monetary and fiscal policies will fade over the rest of the year. Nevertheless, we doubt that China’s economy will experience much of a slowdown. First and foremost, the shock from the pandemic should fade, helping to revive consumer and business confidence. Second, the Chinese authorities are likely to pursue policy normalization, rather than outright deleveraging. Jing Sima, BCA’s chief China strategist, expects the general government deficit to remain broadly stable at 8% of GDP this year. She also thinks that the rate of credit expansion will fall by only 2-to-3 percentage points in 2021, bringing credit growth back in line with projected nominal GDP growth of 8%. Total credit was 290% of GDP at end-2020. Thus, credit growth of 8% would still generate 290%*8%=23% of GDP of net credit formation, providing more than enough support to the economy. II. Feature: Will The US Economy Overheat? As of February, US households were sitting on around $1.7 trillion in excess savings. About two-thirds of those savings can be chalked up to reduced spending during the pandemic, with the remaining one-third arising from increased transfer payments (Chart 10). The recently passed stimulus bill will boost household savings by an additional $300 billion, bringing the stock of excess savings to $2 trillion by April. This cash hoard will support spending. Already, real-time measures of economic activity have hooked up. Traffic congestion in many US cities is approaching pre-pandemic levels. OpenTable’s measure of restaurant occupancy is progressing back to where it was before the pandemic (Chart 11). J.P. Morgan reported that spending using its credit cards rose 23% year-over-year in the 9-day period through to March 19 as stimulus payments reached bank accounts. Anecdotally, airlines and cruise line companies have been expressing optimism on the back of a surge in bookings. Chart 10Lower Spending And Higher Income Led To Mounting Excess Savings Lower Spending And Higher Income Led To Mounting Excess Savings Lower Spending And Higher Income Led To Mounting Excess Savings Chart 11Real-Time Measures Of Economic Activity Have Hooked Up Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh?   Meanwhile, the supply side of the economy could face temporary constraints. Under the stimulus bill, close to half of jobless workers will receive more income through to September from extended unemployment benefits than they did from working. This could curtail labor supply at a time when firms are trying to step up the pace of hiring. The Fed Versus The Markets In the latest Summary of Economic Projections released last week, the median “dot” for the fed funds rate remained stuck at zero through to end-2023. The bond market, in contrast, expects the Fed to start raising rates next year. Why is there a gap between the Fed and market expectations? Part of the answer is that the “dots” and market expectations measure different things. Whereas the dots reflect a modal, or “most likely” estimate of where short-term rates will be over the next few years, market expectations reflect a probability-weighted average. The fact that rates cannot fall deeply into negative territory – but can potentially rise a lot in a high-inflation scenario – has skewed market rate expectations to the upside. That said, there is another, more fundamental, reason at work: The Fed simply does not think that a negative output gap will lead to materially higher inflation. The “dots” assume that core PCE inflation will barely rise above 2% over the next two years, even though, by the Fed’s own admission, the unemployment rate will fall firmly below NAIRU in 2023 (Chart 12). Chart 12The Fed Sees Faster Recovery, Same Rate Path Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Chart 13Just Like It Did In 2011, The Fed Will Disregard What It Sees As Transitory Price Shocks Just Like It Did In 2011, The Fed Will Disregard What It Sees As Transitory Price Shocks Just Like It Did In 2011, The Fed Will Disregard What It Sees As Transitory Price Shocks Is the Federal Reserve’s relaxed view towards inflation risk justified? The Fed knows full well that headline inflation could temporarily reach 4% over the next two months due to base effects from last year’s deflationary shock, lingering supply chain disruptions, the rebound in gasoline prices, and the lagged effect from dollar weakness. However, as it did in late 2011, when headline inflation nearly hit 4% and producer price inflation briefly topped 10%, the Fed is inclined to regard these price shocks as transitory (Chart 13). The Fed believes that PCE inflation will tick up to 2.4% this year but then settle back down to 2% by the end of next year as supply disruptions dissipate and most fiscal stimulus measures roll off. Our bet is that the Fed will be right about inflation in the near term, but wrong in the long term. That is to say, we think that core inflation will probably remain subdued for the next two years, as the Fed expects. However, inflation is poised to rise significantly towards the middle of the decade, an outcome that is likely to surprise both the Fed and market participants. War-Time Inflation, But Which War? In some respects, the Fed sees the current environment as resembling a war, except this time the battle is against an invisible enemy: Covid-19. Chart 14 shows what happened to US inflation during WWI, WWII, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. In the first three of those four wars, inflation rose but then fell back down after the war had concluded. That is what the Fed is counting on. What about the possibility that the coming years could resemble the period around the Vietnam War, where inflation continued to rise even though the number of US military personnel engaged in the conflict peaked in 1968?   Chart 14Inflation During Wartime: Which War Is Most Relevant For Today? Inflation During Wartime: Which War Is Most Relevant For Today? Inflation During Wartime: Which War Is Most Relevant For Today? Chart 15Inflation Started Accelerating Quickly Only When Unemployment Reached Very Low Levels In The 1960s Inflation Started Accelerating Quickly Only When Unemployment Reached Very Low Levels In The 1960s Inflation Started Accelerating Quickly Only When Unemployment Reached Very Low Levels In The 1960s In the near term, this does not appear to be a major risk. In 1966, when the war effort was ramping up, the US unemployment rate was two percentage points below NAIRU (Chart 15). As of February, US employment was still more than 5% below pre-pandemic levels.   Chart 16Employment Has Been Weak And Edging Lower At The Bottom Quartile Of The Wage Distribution Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? We estimate that the US output gap currently stands at around 5%-to-6% of GDP. Among the bottom quartile of the wage distribution, employment is 20% below pre-pandemic levels, and has been edging lower, not higher, since last October (Chart 16). Thus, for now, hyperbolic talk of how fiscal stimulus is crowding out private-sector spending is unwarranted. Inflation Nation Looking further out, the parallels between today and the late sixties are more striking. As we discussed in a report titled 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again, much of what investors believe about how inflation emerged during the late 1960s is either based on myths, or at best, half-truths. To the extent that there are differences between today and that era, they don’t necessarily point to lower inflation in the coming years. For example, in the late sixties, the baby boomers were entering the labour force, supplying the economy with a steady stream of new workers. This helped to temper wage pressures. Today, baby boomers are leaving the labour force. They accumulated a lot of wealth over the past 50 years – so much so that they now control more than half of all US wealth (Chart 17). Over the coming two decades, they will run down that wealth, implying that household savings rates could drop. By definition, a lower savings rate implies more spending in relation to output, which is inflationary. Chart 17Baby Boomers Have Accumulated A Lot Of Wealth Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? III. Financial Markets A. Portfolio Strategy Overweight Stocks Versus Bonds Stocks usually outperform bonds when economic growth is strong and money is cheap (Chart 18). The end of the pandemic and ongoing fiscal stimulus should support growth over the next 12-to-18 months, allowing the bull market in equities to continue. With inflation slow to rise, monetary policy will remain accommodative over this period. Chart 18AStocks Usually Outperform Bonds When Economic Growth Is Strong... Stocks Usually Outperform Bonds When Economic Growth Is Strong... Stocks Usually Outperform Bonds When Economic Growth Is Strong... Chart 18B... And Money Is Cheap ... And Money Is Cheap ... And Money Is Cheap The recent back-up in long-term bond yields could destabilize stocks for a month or two. However, our research has shown that as long as bond yields do not rise enough to trigger a recession, stocks will shrug off the effect of higher yields (Chart 19 and Table 1). Indeed, there is a self-limiting aspect to how high bond yields can rise, and stocks can fall, in a setting where inflation remains subdued. Higher bond yields lead to tighter financial conditions. Tighter financial conditions, in turn, lead to weaker growth, which justifies an even longer period of low rates. It is only when inflation rises to a level that central banks find uncomfortable that tighter financial conditions become desirable. We are far from that level today. Chart 19What Happens To Equities When Treasury Yields Rise? What Happens To Equities When Treasury Yields Rise? What Happens To Equities When Treasury Yields Rise?   Table 1As Long As Bond Yields Don’t Rise Into Restrictive Territory, Stocks Will Recover Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh?   It’s Not 2000 In recent months, many analysts have drawn comparisons between the year 2000 and the present day. While there are plenty of similarities, ranging from euphoric retail participation to the proliferation of dubious SPACs and IPOs, there is one critical difference: The forward earnings yield today is above the real bond yield, whereas in 2000 the earnings yield was below the bond yield (Chart 20). The US yield curve inverted in February 2000, with the 10-year Treasury yield peaking a month earlier at 6.79%. An inverted yield curve is one of the most reliable recession predictors. We are a far cry from such a predicament today. By the same token, the S&P 500 dividend yield was well below the bond yield in 2000. Today, they are roughly the same. Even if one were to pessimistically assume that US companies are unable to raise nominal dividend payments at all for the next decade, the S&P 500 would need to fall by 20% in real terms for equities to underperform bonds. Many other stock markets would have to decline by an even greater magnitude (Chart 21). Chart 20Relative To Bonds, Stocks Are More Favorably Valued Now Than In 2000 Relative To Bonds, Stocks Are More Favorably Valued Now Than In 2000 Relative To Bonds, Stocks Are More Favorably Valued Now Than In 2000 Chart 21Stocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds Stocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds Stocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds   Protecting Against Long-Term Inflation Risk The bull market in stocks will end when central banks begin to fret over rising inflation. In the past, central banks have used forecasts of inflation to decide when to raise rates. The Federal Reserve’s revised monetary policy framework, which focuses on actual rather than forecasted inflation, almost guarantees that inflation will overshoot the Fed’s target. This is because monetary policy fully affects the economy with a lag of 12-to-18 months. By the time the Fed decides to clamp down on inflation, it will have already gotten too high. Investors looking to hedge long-term inflation risk should reduce duration exposure in fixed-income portfolios, favor inflation-protected securities over nominal bonds, and own more “real assets” such as property. In fact, one of the best inflation hedges is simply to buy a nice house financed with a high loan-to-value fixed-rate mortgage. In a few decades, you will still own the nice house, but the value of the mortgage will be greatly reduced in real terms. Gold Versus Cryptos Historically, gold has offered protection against inflation. Increasingly, many investors have come to believe that cryptocurrencies are a better choice. We disagree. As we recently discussed in a report titled Bitcoin: A Solution In Search Of A Problem, not only are cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin highly inefficient mediums of exchange, they are also likely to turn out to be poor stores of value. Bitcoin’s annual electricity consumption now exceeds that of Pakistan and its 217 million inhabitants (Chart 22). About 70% of Bitcoin mining currently takes place in China, mainly using electricity generated by burning coal. Much of the rest of the mining takes place in countries such as Russia and Belarus with dubious governance records. Bitcoin and ESG are heading for a clash. We suspect ESG will win out. Chart 22Bitcoin Is Not Your Eco-Currency Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? B. Equities Favor Cyclicals, Value, And Non-US Stocks Chart 23Cyclicals And Ex-US Stocks Do Best When Global Growth Is On The Upswing Cyclicals And Ex-US Stocks Do Best When Global Growth Is On The Upswing Cyclicals And Ex-US Stocks Do Best When Global Growth Is On The Upswing The vast majority of stock market capitalization today is concentrated in large multinational companies that are more leveraged to global growth rather than to the growth rate of countries in which they happen to be domiciled. Thus, while country-specific factors are not irrelevant, regional equity allocation often boils down to figuring out which stock markets will gain or lose from various global trends. The end of the pandemic will prop up global growth. In general, cyclical sectors outperform when global growth is on the upswing (Chart 23). As Table 2 illustrates, stock markets outside the US have more exposure to classically cyclical sectors such as industrials, energy, materials, and consumer discretionary that usually shine coming out of a downturn. This leads us to favor Europe, Japan, and emerging markets. We place banks in the cyclical category because faster economic growth tends to reduce bad loans, while also placing upward pressure on bond yields. Chart 24 shows that there is a very close correlation between the relative performance of bank shares and long-term bond yields. As government yields trend higher, banks will benefit. Table 2Financials Are Overrepresented In Ex-US Indices, While Tech Dominates The US Market Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Chart 24Close Correlation Between Relative Performance Of Banks And Long-Term Bond Yields Close Correlation Between Relative Performance Of Banks And Long-Term Bond Yields Close Correlation Between Relative Performance Of Banks And Long-Term Bond Yields Banks and most other cyclical sectors dominate value indices (Table 3). Not only is value still exceptionally cheap in relation to growth, but traditional value sectors have seen stronger upward earnings revisions than tech stocks since the start of the year (Chart 25). The likelihood that global bond yields put in a secular bottom last year, coupled with the emergence of a new bull market in commodities, makes us think that the nascent outperformance of value stocks has years to run.   Table 3Breaking Down Growth And Value By Sector Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Chart 25AValue Is Attractive On Multiple Levels (I) Value Is Attractive On Multiple Levels (I) Value Is Attractive On Multiple Levels (I) Chart 25BValue Is Attractive On Multiple Levels (II) Value Is Attractive On Multiple Levels (II) Value Is Attractive On Multiple Levels (II) US Corporate Tax Hikes Coming Finally, there is one country-specific factor worth mentioning, which reinforces our view of favoring non-US, cyclical, and value stocks: US corporate taxes are heading higher. BCA’s geopolitical strategists expect the Biden Administration and the Democrat-controlled Congress to raise the statutory corporate tax rate from 21% to as high as 28% later this year in order to fund, among other things, a major infrastructure investment program. Capital gains taxes will also rise. While tax hikes are unlikely to bring down the whole US stock market, they will detract from the relative performance of US stocks compared with their international peers. Cyclical sectors will benefit from the infrastructure spending. To the extent that such spending boosts growth and leads to a steeper yield curve, it should also benefit banks. In contrast, tech companies outside the clean energy sector will lag, especially if the bill introduces a minimum corporate tax on book income and raises taxes on overseas profits, as President Biden pledged to do during his campaign. C. Fixed Income Expect More US Curve Steepening As discussed above, inflation in the US and elsewhere will be slow to take off. However, when inflation does rise later this decade, it could do so significantly. Investors currently expect the Fed to start raising rates in December 2022, bringing the funds rate to 1.5% by the end of 2024 (Chart 26). In contrast, we think that a liftoff in the second half of 2023, preceded by a 6-to-12 month period of asset purchase tapering, is more likely. This implies a modest downside for short-dated US bond yields. Chart 26The Market Sees The Fed Rate Hike Cycle Kicking Off In Late 2022 The Market Sees The Fed Rate Hike Cycle Kicking Off In Late 2022 The Market Sees The Fed Rate Hike Cycle Kicking Off In Late 2022 Chart 27Long-Term US Real Yield Expectations Have Recovered But Remain Below Pre-Pandemic Levels Long-Term US Real Yield Expectations Have Recovered But Remain Below Pre-Pandemic Levels Long-Term US Real Yield Expectations Have Recovered But Remain Below Pre-Pandemic Levels In contrast, long-term yields will face upward pressure first from strong growth, and later from higher inflation. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS yield currently stands at 0.35%, which is still below pre-pandemic levels (Chart 27). Given structurally looser fiscal policy, the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS yield should be at least 50 basis points higher, which would translate into a 10-year Treasury yield of a bit over 2%. Regional Bond Allocation While the Fed will be slow out of the gate to raise rates, most other central banks will be even slower. The sole exception among developed market central banks is the Norges bank, which has indicated its intention to hike rates in the second half of this year. Conceivably, Canada could start tightening monetary policy fairly soon, given strong jobs growth and a bubbly housing market. While the Bank of Canada is eager to begin tapering asset purchases later this year, our global fixed-income strategists suspect that the BoC will wait for the Fed to raise rates first. An early start to rate hikes by the Bank of Canada could significantly push up the value of the loonie, which is something the BoC wants to avoid. New Zealand will also hike rates shortly after the Fed, followed by Australia. Bank of England governor Andrew Bailey has downplayed the recent rise in gilt yields. Nevertheless, the desire to maintain currency competitiveness in the post-Brexit era will prevent the BoE from hiking rates until 2024. Among the major central banks, the ECB and the BoJ will be the last major central banks to raise rates. Putting it all together, our fixed-income strategists advocate maintaining a below-benchmark stance on overall duration. Comparing the likely path for rate hikes with market pricing region by region, they recommend overweighting the Euro area and Japan, assigning a neutral allocation to the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and an underweight on the US. Credit: Stick With US High Yield Corporates Corporate spreads have narrowed substantially since last March. Nevertheless, in an environment of strong economic growth, it still makes sense to favor riskier corporate credit over safe government bonds. Within corporate credit, we favor high yield over investment grade. Geographically, we prefer US corporate bonds over Euro area bonds. The former trade with a higher yield and spread than the latter (Chart 28). CHART 28Favor High-Yield Bonds Over Investment-Grade And US Corporates Over Euro Area (I) Favor High-Yield Bonds Over Investment-Grade And US Corporates Over Euro Area (I) Favor High-Yield Bonds Over Investment-Grade And US Corporates Over Euro Area (I) Chart 28Favor High-Yield Bonds Over Investment-Grade And US Corporates Over Euro Area (II) Favor High-Yield Bonds Over Investment-Grade And US Corporates Over Euro Area (II) Favor High-Yield Bonds Over Investment-Grade And US Corporates Over Euro Area (II) One way to gauge the attractiveness of credit is to look at the percentile rankings of 12-month breakeven spreads. The 12-month breakeven spread is the amount of credit spread widening that can occur before a credit-sensitive asset starts to underperform a duration-matched, risk-free government bond over a one-year horizon. For US investment-grade corporates, the breakeven spread is currently in the bottom decile of its historic range, which is rather unattractive from a risk-adjusted perspective. In contrast, the US high-yield breakeven spread is currently in the middle of the distribution. In the UK, high-yield debt is more appealing than investment grade, although not quite to the same extent as in the US. In the Euro area, both high-yield and investment-grade credit are fairly unattractive (Chart 29). Chart 29US High-Yield Stands Out The Most Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? D. Currencies Faster US Growth Should Support The Dollar In The Near Term… Chart 30US Has A Smaller Share Of Manufacturing Than Most Other Developed Economies US Has A Smaller Share Of Manufacturing Than Most Other Developed Economies US Has A Smaller Share Of Manufacturing Than Most Other Developed Economies The US has a “low beta” economy. Compared to most other economies, the US has a bigger service sector and a smaller manufacturing base (Chart 30). The US economy is also highly diversified on both a regional and sectoral level. This tends to make US growth less volatile than growth abroad. The relatively low cyclicality of the US economy has important implications for the US dollar. While the US benefits from stronger global growth, the rest of the world usually benefits even more. Thus, when global growth accelerates, capital tends to flow from the US to other economies, dragging down the value of the dollar. This relationship broke down this year. Rather than lagging other economies, the US economy has led the charge thanks to bountiful fiscal stimulus and a successful vaccination campaign. As growth estimates for the US have been marked up, the dollar has caught a temporary bid (Chart 31). Chart 31US Growth Outperformance Could Be A Near-Term Tailwind For The Dollar US Growth Outperformance Could Be A Near-Term Tailwind For The Dollar US Growth Outperformance Could Be A Near-Term Tailwind For The Dollar … But Underlying Fundamentals Are Dollar Bearish As discussed earlier in the report, growth momentum should swing back towards the rest of the world later this year. This should weigh on the dollar in the second half of the year. To make matters worse for the greenback, the US trade deficit has ballooned in recent quarters. The current account deficit, a broad measure of net foreign income flows, rose by nearly 35% to $647 billion in 2020. At 3.1% of GDP, it was the largest shortfall in 12 years (Chart 32). Consistent with the weak balance of payments picture, the dollar remains overvalued by about 10% on a purchasing power parity basis (Chart 33). Chart 32The Widening US External Gap The Widening US External Gap The Widening US External Gap Chart 33The Dollar Is Expensive Based On Its PPP Fair Value The Dollar Is Expensive Based On Its PPP Fair Value The Dollar Is Expensive Based On Its PPP Fair Value Historically, the dollar has weakened whenever fiscal policy has been eased in excess of what is needed to close the output gap (Chart 34). Foreigners have been net sellers of Treasurys this year. It is equity inflows that have supported the dollar (Chart 35). However, if non-US stock markets begin to outperform, foreign flows into US stocks could reverse. Chart 34The Greenback Tends To Weaken When Fiscal Policy Is Eased Relative To What The Economy Needs The Greenback Tends To Weaken When Fiscal Policy Is Eased Relative To What The Economy Needs The Greenback Tends To Weaken When Fiscal Policy Is Eased Relative To What The Economy Needs Chart 35Equity Inflows Supported The Dollar This Year (I) Equity Inflows Supported The Dollar This Year (I) Equity Inflows Supported The Dollar This Year (I) Chart 35Equity Inflows Supported The Dollar This Year (II) Equity Inflows Supported The Dollar This Year (II) Equity Inflows Supported The Dollar This Year (II) Meanwhile, stronger US growth has pushed long-term real interest rate differentials only modestly in favor of the US. At the short end of the curve, real rate differentials have actually widened against the US since the start of the year, reflecting rising US inflation expectations and the Fed’s determination to keep rates near zero for an extended period of time (Chart 36). Chart 36Real Rate Differentials Have Moved In Favor Of The Dollar At The Long End Of The Curve, But Not At The Short End (I) Real Rate Differentials Have Moved In Favor Of The Dollar At The Long End Of The Curve, But Not At The Short End (I) Real Rate Differentials Have Moved In Favor Of The Dollar At The Long End Of The Curve, But Not At The Short End (I) Chart 36Real Rate Differentials Have Moved In Favor Of The Dollar At The Long End Of The Curve, But Not At The Short End (II) Real Rate Differentials Have Moved In Favor Of The Dollar At The Long End Of The Curve, But Not At The Short End (II) Real Rate Differentials Have Moved In Favor Of The Dollar At The Long End Of The Curve, But Not At The Short End (II) On balance, while the dollar could strengthen a bit more over the next month or so, the greenback will weaken over a 12-month horizon. Chester Ntonifor, BCA’s chief currency strategist, expects the dollar to fall the most against the Norwegian krone, Swedish krona, Australian dollar, and British pound over a 12-month horizon. In the EM space, stronger global growth will disproportionately benefit the Mexican peso, Chilean peso, Colombian peso, South African rand, Czech koruna, Indonesian rupiah, Korean won, and Singapore dollar. Chart 37Weak Dollar Is Usually A Tailwind For Cyclicals, Non-US Stocks, And Value Stocks (I) Weak Dollar Is Usually A Tailwind For Cyclicals, Non-US Stocks, And Value Stocks (I) Weak Dollar Is Usually A Tailwind For Cyclicals, Non-US Stocks, And Value Stocks (I) Chart 37Weak Dollar Is Usually A Tailwind For Cyclicals, Non-US Stocks, And Value Stocks (II) Weak Dollar Is Usually A Tailwind For Cyclicals, Non-US Stocks, And Value Stocks (II) Weak Dollar Is Usually A Tailwind For Cyclicals, Non-US Stocks, And Value Stocks (II) Consistent with our equity views, a weaker dollar would be good news for cyclical equity sectors, non-US stock markets, and value stocks (Chart 37). E. Commodities Favorable Outlook For Commodities Strong global growth against a backdrop of tight supply should sustain momentum in the commodity complex over the next 12-to-18 months. Capital investment in the oil and gas sector has fallen by more than 50% since 2014 (Chart 38). BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service, led by Robert Ryan, expects annual growth in crude oil demand to outstrip supply over the remainder of this year (Chart 39). Chart 38Oil & Gas Capex Collapses In COVID-19’s Wake Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Chart 39Crude Oil Demand Growth To Outstrip Supply Over The Remainder Of This Year Crude Oil Demand Growth To Outstrip Supply Over The Remainder Of This Year Crude Oil Demand Growth To Outstrip Supply Over The Remainder Of This Year A physical deficit in the metals markets – particularly for copper and aluminum – should also persist this year (Chart 40). While the boom in electric vehicle (EV) production represents a long-term threat to oil, it is manna from heaven for many metals. A battery-powered EV can contain more than 180 pounds of copper compared with 50 pounds for conventional autos. By 2030, the demand from EVs alone should amount to close to 4mm tonnes of copper per year, representing about 15% of annual copper production. Chart 40ACopper Will Be In Physical Deficit... Copper Will Be In Physical Deficit... Copper Will Be In Physical Deficit... Chart 40B...As Will Aluminum ...As Will Aluminum ...As Will Aluminum China’s Commodity Demand Will Remain Strong Chart 41China Keeps Buying More And More Commodities China Keeps Buying More And More Commodities China Keeps Buying More And More Commodities Strong demand for metals from China should also buoy metals prices. While trend GDP growth in China has slowed, the economy is much bigger in absolute terms than it was in the 2000s. China’s annual aggregate consumption of metals is five times as high as it was back then. The incremental increase in China’s metal consumption, as measured by the volume of commodities consumed, is also double what it was 20 years ago (Chart 41). As we discussed in our report To Deleverage Its Economy, China Needs MORE Debt, the Chinese government has no choice but to continue to recycle persistently elevated household savings into commodity-intensive capital investment. This will ensure ample commodity demand from China for years to come. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com   Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Special Trade Recommendations Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Current MacroQuant Model Scores Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh? Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh?

Highlights Biden’s policy on China is hawkish so far, as expected, but temporary improvement is possible. We are cyclically bearish on the dollar but are taking a neutral tactical stance as the greenback’s bounce could go higher than expected if US-China relations take another downward dive. US-Iran tensions are on track to escalate in the second quarter as the pressure builds toward what we think will be a third quarter restoration of the 2015 nuclear deal. Oil price volatility is the takeaway. The anticipated US-Russia conflict has emerged and will bring negative surprises, especially for Russian and emerging European markets. Europe still enjoys relative political stability. A German election upset would bring upside risk to the euro and bund yields, while Scottish independence risk is contained for now. In this report we are launching the first in a new series of regular quarterly outlook reports that will supplement our annual Geopolitical Strategy strategic outlook. Feature The decline in global policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk that attended the US election and COVID-19 vaccine discovery has largely played out. Global investors have witnessed successful vaccine rollouts in the US and UK and can look forward to other countries, namely the EU-27, catching up. They have witnessed a splurge of US fiscal spending – $2.8 trillion since December – unprecedented in peacetime. And they have seen the Chinese government offer assurances that monetary tightening will not undermine the economic recovery. The risk of the US doubling down on belligerent trade protectionism has fallen by the wayside along with the Trump presidency. Going forward, there are signs that policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk will revive. First, as the global semiconductor shortage and Suez Canal blockage highlight, the world economy will sputter and strain at the sudden eruption of economic activity as the pandemic subsides and vast government spending takes effect. Financial instability is a likely consequence of the sudden, simultaneous adoption of debt monetization across a range of economies combined with a global high-tech race and energy overhaul. Second, the defeat of the Trump presidency does not reverse the secular increase in geopolitical tensions arising from America’s internal divisions and weakening hand relative to China, Russia, and others. On the contrary, large monetary and fiscal stimulus lowers the economic costs of conflict and encourages autarkic, self-sufficiency policies that make governments more likely to struggle with each other to secure their supply chains. Chart 1AThe Return Of Geopolitical Risk The Return Of Geopolitical Risk The Return Of Geopolitical Risk Chart 1BThe Return Of Geopolitical Risk The Return Of Geopolitical Risk The Return Of Geopolitical Risk If we look at simple, crude measures of geopolitical risk we can see the market awakening to the new wall of worry for this business cycle – Great Power struggle, the persistence of “America First” with a different figurehead, China policy tightening, and a vacuum of European leadership. The US dollar is rising, developed market equities are outperforming emerging markets, safe-haven currencies are ticking up against commodity currencies, and gold is perking back up (Charts 1A & 1B). The cyclical upswing should reverse most of these trends over the medium term but investors should be cautious in the short term. US Stimulus, Chinese Tightening, And The Greenback The US remains the world’s preponderant power despite its political dysfunction and economic decline relative to emerging markets. The US has struggled to formulate a coherent way to deal with declining influence, as shown by dramatic policy reversals toward Iraq, Iran, China, and Russia. The pattern of unpredictability will continue. The Biden administration’s longevity is unknown so foreign states will be cautious of making firm commitments, implementing deals, or taking irrevocable actions. This does not mean the Biden administration will have a small impact – far from it. Biden’s national policy seeks to fire up the American economy, refurbish alliances, export liberal democratic ideology, and compete with China and Russia. The firing up is largely already accomplished – the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) and Biden’s forthcoming “Build Back Better” proposals will ultimately rank with Johnson’s Great Society. The Fed estimates that US GDP growth will hit 6.5% this year, higher than the consensus of economic forecasts estimates 5.5%, driven by giant government pump-priming (Chart 2). The US, which is already an insulated economy, is virtually inured to foreign shocks for the time being. Chart 2US Injects Steroids Second Quarter Outlook 2021: Geopolitics Upsets The "Return To Normalcy" Second Quarter Outlook 2021: Geopolitics Upsets The "Return To Normalcy" Next comes the courting of allies to form a united democratic front against the world’s ambitious dictatorships. This process will be very difficult as the allies are averse to taking risks, especially on behalf of an erratic America. Chart 3US Stimulus Briefly Halts Decline In Global Economic Share Second Quarter Outlook 2021: Geopolitics Upsets The "Return To Normalcy" Second Quarter Outlook 2021: Geopolitics Upsets The "Return To Normalcy" The Obama administration spent six full years creating a coalition to pressure an economically miniscule Iran into signing the 2015 nuclear deal. Imagine how long it will take Biden to convince the EU-27 and small Asian states to stick their necks out against Xi Jinping’s China. Especially if they suspect that the US’s purpose is to force China to open its doors primarily for the Americans. If the US grows at the rate of consensus forecasts then its share of global GDP will be 17.6% by 2025 (Chart 3). However, the US’s decline should not be exaggerated. Consider the lesson of the past year, in which the US seemed to flounder in the face of the pandemic. The US’s death count, on a population basis, was in line with other developed markets and yet its citizens exercised a greater degree of individual freedom. It maintained the rule of law despite extreme polarization, social unrest, and a controversial election. Its development of mRNA vaccines highlighted its ongoing innovation edge. And it has rolled out the vaccines rapidly. Internal divisions are still extreme and likely to produce social instability (we are still in the zone of “peak polarization”). But the US economic foundation is now fundamentally supported – political collapse is improbable. Chart 4US Vs China: The Stimulus Impulse US Vs China: The Stimulus Impulse US Vs China: The Stimulus Impulse In short, the US saw the “Civil War Lite” and has moved onto “Reconstruction Lite,” with a big expansion of the social safety net and infrastructure as well as taxes already being drafted. Meanwhile General Secretary Xi has managed to steer China into a good position for the much-ballyhooed 100th anniversary of the Communist Party on July 1. His administration is tightening monetary and fiscal policy marginally to resume the fight against systemic financial risk. China faces vast socioeconomic imbalances that, if left unattended, could eventually overturn the Communist Party’s rule. So far the tightening of policy is modest but the risk of a policy mistake is non-negligible and something global financial markets will have to grapple with in the second quarter. Comparing the US and China reveals an impending divergence in relative monetary and fiscal stimulus (Chart 4). China’s money and credit impulse is peaking – some signs of economic deceleration are popping up – even as the US lets loose a deluge of liquidity and pump-priming. The result is that the world is likely to experience waning Chinese demand and waxing US demand in the second half of the year. It is almost the mirror image of 2009-10, when China’s economy skyrocketed on a stimulus splurge while the US recovered more slowly with less policy support. The medium-to-long-run implication is that the US will have a bumpy downhill ride over the coming decade whereas China will recover more smoothly. Yet the analogy only goes so far. The structural transition facing China’s society and economy is severe and US-led international pressure on its economy will make it more severe. The short-run implication – for Q2 2021 – is that the US dollar’s bounce could run longer than consensus expects. Commodity prices, commodity currencies, and emerging market assets face a correction from very toppy levels. The global cyclical upswing will continue as long as China avoids a policy mistake of overtightening as we expect but the near-term is fraught with downside risk. Bottom Line: We are neutral on the dollar from a tactical point of view. While our bias is to expect the dollar to relapse, in line with the BCA House View and our Foreign Exchange Strategy, we are loathe to bet against the greenback given US stimulus and Chinese tightening. This is not to mention geopolitical tensions highlighted below that would reinforce the dollar. Biden’s China Policy And The Semiconductor Shortage Any spike in US-China strategic tensions in Q2 would exacerbate the above reasoning on the dollar. It would also lead to a deeper selloff in Chinese and EM Asian currencies and risk assets. A spike in tensions is not guaranteed but investors should plan for the worst. One of our core views for many years has been that any Democratic administration taking office in 2020 would remain hawkish on China, albeit less so than the Trump administration. So far this view is holding up. It may not have been the cause of the drop in Chinese and emerging Asian equities but it has not helped. However, the jury is still out on Biden’s China policy and the second quarter will likely see major actions that crystallize the relative hawkish or dovish change in policy. The acrimonious US-China meeting in Alaska meeting does not necessarily mean anything. The Biden administration has a full China policy review underway that will not be completed until around early June. The first bilateral summit between Biden and Xi could occur on Earth Day, April 22, or sometime thereafter, as the countries are looking to restart strategic dialogue and engage on nuclear non-proliferation and carbon emission reductions. Specifically China wants to swap its help on North Korea – which restarted ballistic missile launches as we go to press – for easier US policies on trade and tech. Only if and when a new attempt at engagement breaks down will the Biden administration conclude that it has a basis for pursuing a more offensive policy toward China. The problem is that new engagement probably will break down, sooner or later, for reasons we outlined last week: the areas of cooperation are limited – obviously so on health and cybersecurity, but even on climate change. Engagement on Iran and North Korea may have more success but the bigger conflicts over tech and Taiwan will persist. Ultimately China is fixated on strategic self-sufficiency and rapid tech acquisition in the national interest, leaving little room for US market access or removal of high-tech export controls. The threat that Biden will ultimately adopt and expand on Trump’s punitive measures will hang over Beijing’s head. The risk of a Republican victory in 2024 will also discourage China from implementing any deep structural concessions. The crux of the conflict remains the tech sector and specifically semiconductors.1 China is rapidly gaining market share but the US is using its immense leverage over chip design and equipment to cut off China’s access to chips and industry development. The ongoing threat of an American chip blockade is now being exacerbated by a global shortage of semiconductors as the economy recovers (Chart 5), exposing China’s long-term economic vulnerability. Chart 5Global Semiconductor Shortage Global Semiconductor Shortage Global Semiconductor Shortage There is room for some de-escalation but not much – and it is not to be counted on. The Biden administration, like the Obama administration, subscribes to the view that the US should prioritize maintaining its lead in tech innovation rather than trying to compete with China’s high-subsidy model, which is gobbling up the lower end of the computer chip market. Biden’s policy will at first be defensive rather than offensive – focused on improving US supply chain security rather than curtailing Chinese supply. Biden’s proposal for domestic infrastructure program will include funds for the semiconductor industry and research. While the Biden administration likely prizes leadership and innovation over the on-shoring of US chip production, the US government must also look to supply security, specifically for the military, so some on-shoring of production is inevitable.2 Ultimately the Biden administration can continue using export controls to slow China’s semiconductor development or it can pare these controls back. If it does nothing then China’s state-backed tech program will lead to a rapid increase in Chinese capabilities and market share as has occurred in other industries. If it maintains restrictions then it will delay China’s development, especially on the highest end of chips, but not prevent China from gaining the technology through circumventing export controls, subsidizing its domestic industry, and poaching from Taiwan and South Korea. Given that technological supremacy will lead to military supremacy the US is likely to maintain restrictions. But a full chip blockade on China would require expanding controls and enforcing them on third parties, and massively increases strategic tensions, should Biden ever decide to go this ultra-hawkish route. The Biden administration can adjust the pace and intensity of export controls but cannot give China free rein. Biden will want to block China’s access to the US market, or funds, or parts when these feed its military-industrial complex but relax pressure on China’s commercial trade. This is only a temporary fix. The commercial/military distinction is hard to draw when Beijing continually pursues “civil-military fusion” to maximize its industrial and strategic capabilities. Therefore US-China strategic tensions over tech will worsen over the long run even if Biden pursues engagement in the short run. Bottom Line: Biden’s China policy has started out hawkish as expected but the real policy remains unknown. The second quarter will reveal key details. Biden could pursue engagement, leading to a reduction in tensions. Investors should wait and see rather than bet on de-escalation, given that tensions will escalate anew over the medium and long term and therefore may never really decline. Iran And Oil Price Volatility Biden’s other foreign policy challenges in the second quarter hinge on Iran and Russia. The Biden administration aims to restore the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal and is likely to move quickly. This is not merely a matter of intention but of national capability since US grand strategy is pushing the US to shift focus to Asia Pacific, and an Iranian nuclear crisis divides US attention and resources. Biden has the ability to return to the 2015 deal with a flick of his wrist. The Iranians also have that ability, at least until lame duck President Hassan Rouhani leaves office in August – beyond that, a much longer negotiation would be necessary. US-Iran talks will lead to demonstrations of credible military threats, which means that geopolitical attacks and tensions in the Middle East will likely go higher before they fall on any deal. The past several years have already seen a series of displays of military force by the Iranians and the US and its allies and this process may escalate all summer (Map 1). Map 1Military Incidents In Persian Gulf Since Abqaiq Refinery Attack, 2019 Second Quarter Outlook 2021: Geopolitics Upsets The "Return To Normalcy" Second Quarter Outlook 2021: Geopolitics Upsets The "Return To Normalcy" It is too soon to draw conclusions regarding the Israeli election on March 23 but it is possible that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will remain in power (Chart 6). If this is the case then Israel will oppose the American effort to rejoin the Iranian nuclear deal, culminating in a crisis sometime in the summer (or fall) in which the Israelis make a major show of force against Iran. Even if Netanyahu falls from power, the new Israeli government will still have to show Iran that it cannot be pushed around. Fundamentally, however, a change in leadership in Israel would bring the US and Israel into alignment and thus smooth the process for a deal that seeks to contain Iran’s nuclear program at least through 2025. Any better deal would require an entirely new diplomatic effort. Chart 6Israeli Ruling Coalition Share Of Knesset Shares In Recent Elections Second Quarter Outlook 2021: Geopolitics Upsets The "Return To Normalcy" Second Quarter Outlook 2021: Geopolitics Upsets The "Return To Normalcy" The Russians or Saudi Arabians might reduce their oil production discipline once a deal becomes inevitable, so as not to lose market share to Iranian oil that will come back onto global markets. Thus oil markets could face unexpected oil supply outages due to conflict followed by OPEC or Iranian supply increases, implying that prices will be volatile. Our Commodity & Energy Strategy expects prices to average $65/barrel in 2021, $70/barrel in 2022, and $60-$80/barrel through 2025. Bottom Line: Oil prices will be volatile in the second quarter as they may be affected by the twists and turns of US-Iran negotiations, which may not reach a new equilibrium until July or August at earliest. Otherwise a multi-year diplomatic process will be required, which will suck away the Biden administration’s foreign policy capital, resulting either in precipitous reduction in Middle East focus or a neglect of greater long-term challenges from China and Russia. Russian Risks, Germany Elections, And Scottish Independence European politics are more stable than elsewhere in the world – marked by Italy’s sudden formation of a technocratic unity government under Prime Minister Mario Draghi. Draghi is focused on using EU recovery funds to boost Italian productivity and growth. Europe’s economic growth has underperformed that of the US so far this year. The EU is not witnessing the same degree of fiscal stimulus as the US (Chart 7). The core member states all face a fiscal drag in the coming two years and meanwhile the bloc has struggled to roll out COVID-19 vaccines efficiently. However, the vaccines are proven to be effective and will eventually be rolled out, so investors should buy into the discount in the euro and European stocks as a result of the various mishaps. Global and European industrial production and economic sentiment are bouncing back and German yields are rising albeit not as rapidly as American (Chart 8). Chart 7EU Stimulus Lags But Targets Productivity Second Quarter Outlook 2021: Geopolitics Upsets The "Return To Normalcy" Second Quarter Outlook 2021: Geopolitics Upsets The "Return To Normalcy" Chart 8Global And Euro Area Production To Accelerate Global And Euro Area Production To Accelerate Global And Euro Area Production To Accelerate Chart 9German Conservatives Waver in Polls German Conservatives Waver in Polls German Conservatives Waver in Polls The main exceptions to Europe’s relative political stability come from Germany and Scotland. German Chancellor Angela Merkel is a lame duck and her party is falling in opinion polls with only six months to go before the general election on September 26 (Chart 9). Merkel even faced the threat of a no-confidence motion in the Bundestag this week due to her attempt to extend COVID lockdowns over Easter and sudden retreat in the face of a public backlash. Merkel apologized but her party is looking extremely shaky after recent election losses on the state level. The rise of a new left-wing German governing coalition is much more likely than the market expects. The second quarter will see the selection of a chancellor-candidate for her Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union. Table 1 highlights the likeliest chancellor-candidates of all the parties and their policy stances, from the point of view of whether they have a “hawkish,” hard-line policy stance or “dovish,” easy policy stance on the major issues. What stands out is that the entire German political spectrum is now effectively centrist or dovish on monetary and fiscal policy following the lessons of the 13 years since the global financial crisis. Table 1German Chancellor Candidates, 2021 Second Quarter Outlook 2021: Geopolitics Upsets The "Return To Normalcy" Second Quarter Outlook 2021: Geopolitics Upsets The "Return To Normalcy" In other words, while Germany’s conservatives will seek an earlier normalization of policy in the wake of the crisis, none of them are as hawkish as in the past, and an election upset would bring even more dovish leaders into power. Thus the German election is a political risk but not a global market risk. It should not fundamentally alter the trajectory of German equities or bond yields – which is up amid global and European recovery – and if anything it would boost the euro. The potential German chancellor candidates show more variation when it comes to immigration, the environment, and foreign policy. Germany has been leading the charge for renewable energy and will continue on that trajectory (Chart 10). However it has simultaneously pursued the NordStream II natural gas pipeline with Russia, which would bring 55 billion cubic meters of natural gas straight into Germany, bypassing eastern Europe and its fraught geopolitics. This pipeline, which could be completed as early as August, would improve Germany’s energy security and Russia’s economic security, which remain closely intertwined despite animosity in other areas (Chart 11). But the pipeline would come at the expense of eastern Europe’s leverage – and American interests – and therefore opposition is rising, including among the ascendant German Green Party. Chart 10Germany’s Switch To Renewables Second Quarter Outlook 2021: Geopolitics Upsets The "Return To Normalcy" Second Quarter Outlook 2021: Geopolitics Upsets The "Return To Normalcy" Chart 11Germany Puts Multilateralism To The Test Second Quarter Outlook 2021: Geopolitics Upsets The "Return To Normalcy" Second Quarter Outlook 2021: Geopolitics Upsets The "Return To Normalcy" Chart 12UK-EU Trade Deal Dampens Scots Nationalism UK-EU Trade Deal Dampens Scots Nationalism UK-EU Trade Deal Dampens Scots Nationalism While Merkel and the Christian Democrats are dead-set on completing the pipeline, global investors are underrating the possibility of a major incident in which the US uses diplomacy and sanctions to halt the project. This is not intuitive because Biden is focused on restoring the US alliance with Europe, particularly Germany. But he is doing so in order to counter Russian and Chinese authoritarianism. Therefore the pipeline could mark the first real test of Biden’s – and Germany’s – understanding of multilateralism. Importantly the US is not pursuing a diplomatic “reset” with Russia at the outset of Biden’s term. This has now been confirmed with Biden’s accusation that Russian President Vladimir Putin is a “killer” and the ensuing, highly symbolic Russian withdrawal of its ambassador to the United States, unseen even in the Cold War. The Americans are imposing sanctions in retaliation for Russia’s alleged interference in the 2016 and 2020 elections. Russia is largely inured to US sanctions at this point but if the US wanted to make a difference it would insist on a stop to NordStream by cutting off access to the US market to the various European engineering and insurance companies critical to construction.3 Yet German leaders would have to be cajoled and it may be more realistic for the US to demand other concessions from Germany, particularly on countering China. The US-German arrangement will go a long way toward defining Germany’s and the EU’s risk appetite in the context of Biden’s proposal to build a more robust democratic alliance to counter revisionist authoritarian states. The Russians say they want to avoid a permanent deterioration in relations with the US, which they warn is on the verge of occurring. There is some space for engagement, such as on restoring the Iran deal, which Russia ostensibly supports. Biden may want to keep Russia pacified until he has an Iranian deal in hand. Ultimately, however, US-Russian relations are headed to new lows as the Biden administration brings counter-pressure on the Russians in retribution for the past decade of actions to undermine the United States. Germany’s place in this conflict will determine its own level of geopolitical risk. Clearly we would favor German assets over those of emerging Europe or Russian in this environment. One final risk from Europe is worth mentioning for the second quarter: the UK and Scotland. Scottish elections on May 6 could enable the Scottish National Party to push for a second independence referendum. So far our assessment is correct that Scottish independence will lose momentum after Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s post-Brexit trade deal with the European Union. Scottish nationalists are falling (Chart 12) and support for independence has dropped back toward the 45% level where the 2014 referendum ended up. Nevertheless elections can bring surprises and this narrative bears vigilance as a threat to the pound’s sharp rebound. Bottom Line: Europe’s relative political stability is challenged by US-Russia geopolitical tensions, the higher-than-expected risk of a German election upset, and the tail risk of Scottish independence. Of these only a US-Russia blowup, over NordStream or other issues, poses a major downside risk to global investors. We continue to underweight EM Europe and Russian currency and financial assets. Investment Takeaways Our three key views for 2021, in addition to coordinated monetary and fiscal stimulus, are largely on track for the year so far: China’s Headwinds: China’s renminbi and stock market are indeed suffering due to policy tightening and US geopolitical pressure. Risk to our view: if Biden and Xi make major compromises to reengage, and Xi eases monetary and fiscal policy anew, then the global reflation trade and Chinese equities will receive another boost. US-Iran Triggered Oil Volatility: The US and Iran are still in stalemate and the window of opportunity for a quick restoration of the 2015 deal is rapidly narrowing. Tensions are indeed escalating prior to any resolution, which would come in the third quarter, thus producing first upside then downside pressures for oil prices. Risk to our view: the Biden administration has no need for a new Iran deal and tensions escalate in a major way that causes a major risk premium in oil prices and forces the US to downgrade its pressure campaign against China. Europe’s Outperformance: So far this year the dollar has rallied and the EU has botched its vaccine rollout, challenging our optimistic assessment of Europe. But as highlighted in this report, we anticipated the main risks – government change in Germany, a Scots referendum – and the former is positive for the euro while the downside risk to the pound is contained. The major geopolitical problem is Russia, where we always expected substantial market-negative risks to materialize after Biden’s election. Risk to our view: A US-Russian reset that lowers geopolitical tensions across eastern Europe or a German status quo election followed by a tightening of fiscal policy sooner than the market expects.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For an excellent recent review of the issues see Danny Crichton, Chris Miller, and Jordan Schneider, "Labs Over Fabs: How The U.S. Should Invest In The Future Of Semiconductors," Foreign Policy Research Institute, March 2021, issuu.com. 2 Alex Fang, "US Congress pushes $100bn research blitz to outcompete China," Nikkei Asia, March 23, 2021, asia.nikkei.com. In anticipation of the Biden administration’s dual attempt to promote, on one hand, innovation, and on the other hand, semiconductor supply security, the US semiconductor giant Intel has announced that it will build a $20 billion chip fabrication plant in Arizona. This is in addition to TSMC’s plans to build a plant in Arizona manufacturing chips that are necessary for the US Air Force’s F-35 jets. See Kif Leswing, "Intel is spending $20 billion to build two new chip plants in Arizona," CNBC, March 23, 2021, cnbc.com. 3 See Margarita Assenova, "Clouds Darkening Over Nord Stream Two Pipeline," Eurasia Daily Monitor 18:17 (2021), Jamestown Foundation, February 1, 2021, Jamestown.org.   Appendix: GeoRisk Indicator China China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator UK UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights Fiscal stimulus is no longer a free lunch. US mortgage applications are down by 20 percent since the start of February. With rising bond yields now starting to choke private sector borrowing, bond yields are nearing an upper-limit, and even a reversal point. In which case, the tide out of defensives into cyclicals, and growth into value, will be a tide that reverses. New 6-month recommendation: underweight US banks (XLF) versus consumer staples (XLP). Fractal trade shortlist: US banks, bitcoin, ether, and GBP/JPY. Feature Chart of the WeekMortgage Applications Are Down 20 Percent Mortgage Applications Are Down 20 Percent Mortgage Applications Are Down 20 Percent Why would anybody not get excited about trillions of dollars of fiscal stimulus? The two word answer is: crowding out. If a dollar that is borrowed and spent by the government (or even forecast to be borrowed and spent by the government) pushes up the bond yield, it makes it more expensive for the private sector to borrow and spend. If, as a result, the private sector scales back its borrowing by a dollar, the dollar of government spending has crowded out a dollar of private sector spending. In this case, fiscal stimulus will have no impact on GDP. The fiscal multiplier will be zero. Under some circumstances though, fiscal stimulus does not crowd out the private sector and the fiscal multiplier is extremely high. 2020 was the perfect case in point. As the pandemic gripped the world, much of the private sector was on its knees. Or to be more precise, in lockdown at home, doing nothing, receiving no income, and unwilling and unable to borrow. In such a crisis, the government became the ‘borrower of last resort’. It could, and had to, borrow at will to replace the private sector’s lost income and thereby to stabilise the collapse in demand. With no competition from private sector borrowers for the glut of excess savings, bond yields stayed depressed. Meaning that fiscal stimulus was a free lunch: it had lots of benefit with little cost (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Fiscal Stimulus Was A Free Lunch In 2020, But Not In 2021 Fiscal Stimulus Was A Free Lunch In 2020, But Not In 2021 Fiscal Stimulus Was A Free Lunch In 2020, But Not In 2021 Fiscal Stimulus Is No Longer A Free Lunch Covid-19 is still with us, and could be with us forever. Yet the economy will adapt and even thrive with structural changes, such as decentralisation, hybrid office/home working, a shift to online shopping, and less international travel. In fact, all these structural changes were underway long before Covid-19. Meaning that the pandemic was the accelerant rather than the cause of what was happening to the economy anyway. As the private sector now gets back on its feet to restructure, spend, and invest accordingly, fiscal stimulus is no longer a free lunch. Fiscal stimulus is most effective when it is not pushing up the bond yield. To repeat, last year’s massive fiscal stimulus was highly effective because it had little impact on the bond yield, so there was no crowding out of private sector borrowing. The markets have fully priced the 2021 stimulus, but not the crowding out. However, the most recent stimulus package has pushed up the bond yield or, at least, is a major culprit for the recent spike in yields. Hence, there will be some crowding out of private sector borrowing. Worryingly, US mortgage applications, for both purchasing and refinancing, are down by 20 percent since the start of February (Chart of the Week and Chart I-3). Chart I-3Mortgage Applications For Refi Are Down 20 Percent Mortgage Applications For Refi Are Down 20 Percent Mortgage Applications For Refi Are Down 20 Percent The resulting choke on private sector borrowing and investment will at least partly negate any putative boost from this fiscal stimulus. The concern is that the markets have fully priced the stimulus, but not the crowding out. Time To Rotate Back In our February 18 report, The Rational Bubble Is Turning Irrational, we warned that high-flying tech stocks were at a point of vulnerability. Specifically, since 2009, the technology sector earnings yield had always maintained a minimum 2.5 percent premium over the 10-year T-bond yield, defining the envelope of a ‘rational bubble.’ In February, this envelope was breached, indicating that tech stock valuations were in a new and irrational phase (Chart I-4). Chart I-4The Rational Bubble Turned Irrational The Rational Bubble Turned Irrational The Rational Bubble Turned Irrational The warning proved to be prescient. In the second half of February, tech stocks did sell off sharply and entered a technical correction.1 As a result, tech-dominated stock markets such as China and the Netherlands also suffered sharp declines. Proving once again that regional and country stock market performance is nothing more than an extension of sector performance (Chart I-5). Chart I-5As Tech Corrected, So Did Tech-Heavy Markets As Tech Corrected, So Did Tech-Heavy Markets As Tech Corrected, So Did Tech-Heavy Markets But the aggregate stock market has remained more resilient than we expected, and is only modestly down versus its mid-February peak. The reason is that while highly-valued growth stocks suffered the anticipated correction, value stocks continued to advance (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Time To Rotate Back Time To Rotate Back Time To Rotate Back We can explain this divergence in terms of the three components of stock market valuation: The bond yield. The additional return or ‘risk premium’ for owning stocks. The expected growth of earnings. Tech and other growth stocks are ‘long-duration’ assets meaning that their earnings are weighted into the distant future. Hence, for growth stocks the relevant valuation comparison is a long-duration bond yield, say the 10-year yield. Whereas for ‘shorter-duration’ value stocks the relevant valuation comparison is a shorter-duration bond yield, say the 2-year yield. Given that the 10-year yield has risen much more than the 2-year yield, the pain has been much more pronounced for growth stock valuations. Turning to the ‘risk premium’ for owning stocks, at ultra-low bond yields the risk premium just moves in tandem with the bond yield. Hence, as the 10-year yield has spiked, the combination of a rising yield plus a rising risk premium has doubled the pain for growth stock valuations. For a detailed explanation of this dynamic please see our February 18 report. Regarding the expected growth of earnings, the market believes that stimulus is much more beneficial for economically sensitive value stocks than for economically insensitive growth stocks. But now that we are at the point where rising bond yields are starting to choke private demand, the rise in bond yields is nearing a limit, and even a reversal point. In which case, the strong tide out of defensives into cyclicals will also be a tide that reverses. On this basis, and supported by the strong technical arguments in the next section, we are opening a new 6-month position: Underweight US banks versus US consumer staples, expressed as underweight XLF versus XLP. US Banks, Bitcoin, Ether, And The Pound This week we have identified susceptibilities to countertrend moves in three areas. The bullish groupthink in US banks is at an extreme. First, based on its fragile fractal structure, the (bullish) groupthink in US banks versus consumer staples is at an extreme approaching February 2016 (bearish), December 2016 (bullish), and March 2020 (bearish). All these previous extremes in fragility proved to be turning points in relative performance. If this proves true again, the next six months could see a reversal of US bank outperformance (Chart I-7). Chart I-7The Groupthink In US Banks Is At An Extreme The Groupthink In US Banks Is At An Extreme The Groupthink In US Banks Is At An Extreme Second, we are extremely bullish on the structural prospects for cryptocurrencies, and are preparing a report detailing the compelling investment case. Look out for it. That said, the composite fractal structures of both bitcoin and ethereum indicate that they are technically very overbought (Chart I-8 and Chart I-9). Accordingly, we are hoping for pullbacks that provide better strategic entry points for bitcoin at $40,000, and for ethereum at $1300. Chart I-8Bitcoin Is Technically Overbought Bitcoin Is Technically Overbought Bitcoin Is Technically Overbought Chart I-9Ethereum Is Technically Overbought Ethereum Is Technically Overbought Ethereum Is Technically Overbought Third, the UK’s Covid-19 vaccination program was one of the fastest out of the blocks. As the vaccination rate quickly rose to over half the adult population (based on at least one vaccination dose), the pound was a major beneficiary. But now, the UK vaccination program is facing the hurdle of reduced supplies. Additionally, there is the danger that the third wave of infections in Continental Europe washes onto the shores of Britain. Hence, the recent strong rally in the pound is susceptible to a countertrend reversal (Chart 10). This week’s recommended trade is short GBP/JPY setting the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 2.2 percent. Chart I-10The Pound Is Susceptible To A Reversal The Pound Is Susceptible To A Reversal The Pound Is Susceptible To A Reversal Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 A technical correction is defined as a 10 percent price decline. Fractal Trading System Fiscal Stimulus Is Hurting Fiscal Stimulus Is Hurting Structural Recommendations Fiscal Stimulus Is Hurting Fiscal Stimulus Is Hurting Closed Fractal Trades Fiscal Stimulus Is Hurting Fiscal Stimulus Is Hurting Fiscal Stimulus Is Hurting Fiscal Stimulus Is Hurting Fiscal Stimulus Is Hurting Fiscal Stimulus Is Hurting Asset Performance Fiscal Stimulus Is Hurting Fiscal Stimulus Is Hurting Equity Market Performance Fiscal Stimulus Is Hurting Fiscal Stimulus Is Hurting Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Interest Rate Chart II-5Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations ​​​​​​