Policy

Highlights Expectations for monetary policy in Australia have turned aggressively hawkish over the past month, with markets now discounting multiple rate hikes next year. This pricing defies guidance from the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), which calls for no rate hikes until 2024. An update of our RBA Checklist shows that while there is a growing case for the RBA to tighten, there are still enough lingering uncertainties about the trajectory for growth (specifically, Chinese import demand) and inflation (specifically, wage growth) for the RBA to credibly remain on the sidelines next year. Fade the aggressive 2022 rate hike profile discounted in Australian interest rate markets by staying overweight Australian government bonds in global bond portfolios. Also position for a steeper yield curve (that should also benefit Australian bank stocks) and wider breakevens on Australian inflation-linked bonds. The Australian dollar offers compelling medium-term value, but play that through positions on the crosses (long AUD/NZD & AUD/CHF) with the RBA/Fed policy gap keeping a lid on AUD/USD in the near term. Feature With inflation surging across the world, investors have become hyper-sensitive to any potentially hawkish turn by central banks that have used ultra-accommodative monetary policy to fight the economic shock of the COVID-19 pandemic. Rapidly shifting interest rate expectations have triggered bouts of bond and currency volatility in countries like the UK, Canada and New Zealand over the past several months – with perhaps the biggest shock seen in Australia. Australian government bonds had enjoyed an impressive period of outperformance versus developed market peers between March and September of 2021. All that changed in late October (Chart 1), when the RBA effectively abandoned its yield curve control policy that anchored shorter-maturity bond yields with asset purchases, triggering a spike in Australian yields (the yield on the April 2024 government bond that was targeted by the RBA jumped +80bps in a single week). Interest rate expectations have rapidly been repriced higher to the point where there are now nearly four rate hikes in 2022 discounted in the Australian overnight index swap (OIS) curve – even with the RBA still formally saying that it does not expect to lift rates until 2024 (Chart 2). Chart 1The RBA Will Likely Disappoint Market Expectations The RBA Will Likely Disappoint Market Expectations The RBA Will Likely Disappoint Market Expectations Chart 2A Very Aggressive Term Structure For Aussie Interest Rates A Very Aggressive Term Structure For Aussie Interest Rates A Very Aggressive Term Structure For Aussie Interest Rates   In this Special Report, we revisit our RBA Checklist, originally introduced in January of this year, to determine if the time is indeed right to expect tighter monetary policy in Australia next year, which has implications for not only the Australian bond market but also the Australian dollar. While much of the checklist is flashing a need for the RBA to begin lifting rates, there are still enough lingering uncertainties on the outlook for inflation, the labor market and export demand to keep the central bank on hold in 2022. Checking In On Our RBA Checklist Chart 3Tentative Signs Of A Rebound In Aussie Economic Activity Tentative Signs Of A Rebound In Aussie Economic Activity Tentative Signs Of A Rebound In Aussie Economic Activity Before the recent Australian bond market turbulence, the potent policy mix from the RBA since the start of the pandemic – cutting the Cash Rate to 0.1%, with aggressive quantitative easing (QE) and yield curve control, all reinforced with very dovish forward guidance – helped cap market pricing for interest rate hikes. A sharp outbreak of the Delta Variant earlier this year, leading to severe economic restrictions in Australia’s major cities, also helped anchor bond yields Down Under on a relative basis compared with other countries. As RBA Governor Philip Lowe noted in his speech following the November 2 RBA policy meeting, “At the outset of the pandemic, economic policy, including monetary policy, set out to build a bridge to the other side. That other side is now clearly in sight. As [pandemic] restrictions are eased, spending is expected to pick up relatively quickly as people seek a return to a more normal way of life.” At the same time, Lowe stated that “the latest data and forecasts do not warrant an increase in the Cash Rate in 2022.” Thus, any attempt to begin unwinding RBA policy accommodation would require clear evidence that the impacts of the pandemic on economic growth, and also on inflation and financial stability, were evolving such that emergency policy settings were no longer required. On the growth front, there are already signs of recovery looking at reliable cyclical indicators like the manufacturing and services PMIs, which have rebounded by 6.2 points and 8.9 points, respectively, from the August lows (Chart 3). Yet while inflation expectations have remained fairly stable – the 5-year/5-year Australia CPI swap rate has stayed in a 2.2-2.5% range throughout 2021, despite the Delta outbreak – our RBA Monitor has rolled over, led by the economic growth components. This suggests there may be some diminished pressure for tighter monetary policy in Australia. To get a clearer picture on the outlook for Australian monetary policy over the next year, it is a good time to revisit our RBA Checklist - the most important things to monitor to determine when the RBA could be expected to turn more hawkish. We compiled the Checklist back in January, and the elements are still relevant today. 1.  The COVID-19 vaccination process goes quickly and smoothly (✓) We are placing a checkmark next to this part of our RBA Checklist. After a very slow start earlier in 2021, Australia has executed a successful vaccination campaign with 71% of the population now fully vaccinated (Chart 4). More importantly, the number of daily new infections is rolling over rapidly, and hospitalization rates remain low. This is allowing economic restrictions to be lifted quickly. Chart 4The Beginning Of The End Of Australia's 2021 COVID Crisis The Beginning Of The End Of Australia's 2021 COVID Crisis The Beginning Of The End Of Australia's 2021 COVID Crisis 2.  Private sector demand accelerates as the impulse from COVID fiscal stimulus fades (✓?) We are tentatively giving a checkmark for this component of the Checklist, but with a question mark given some of the cross-currents visible on the consumer spending side. Real consumer spending rebounded sharply in the first half of 2021 (Chart 5). However,  the Delta lockdowns weighed on consumer confidence and demand in Q3, with retail sales contracting on a year-over-year basis (both in nominal and inflation-adjusted terms). Furthermore, much of the spending boom was fueled by Australian households running down the high savings accumulated during the 2020 COVID lockdowns. The household savings rate fell from a peak of 22% in Q2 2020 to 10% in Q2 2021, the last data point available, while real disposable income growth actually fell by -2.6% on a year-over-year basis in Q2. We expect the next few consumer confidence prints to improve sharply as economic restrictions are lifted, with consumer spending following suit. This would lead us to remove the question mark next to this item of the RBA Checklist. Already, business confidence is rebounding with the NAB survey bouncing 6 points in October (Chart 6), which should translate into increased capital spending and hiring activity by Australian companies that have maintained profitability during the pandemic (top panel). Chart 5Australia's Economy Holding Up Well Despite COVID Wave Australia's Economy Holding Up Well Despite COVID Wave Australia's Economy Holding Up Well Despite COVID Wave Chart 6Resilient Business Confidence Will Support Employment Resilient Business Confidence Will Support Employment Resilient Business Confidence Will Support Employment   3. Inflation, both realized and expected, returns to the RBA’s 2-3% target (✓?) Chart 7 We are giving another tentative checkmark with a question mark for this entry in the RBA Checklist, given that wage growth remains modest despite high realized inflation. Australian headline CPI inflation, on a year-over-year basis, was 3.8% in Q2/2021 and 3.0% in Q3/2021, above the top of the 2-3% RBA target. Much of that inflation has come from the Transport sector, which includes the prices of both car fuel and new car prices, which contributed 1.1% to inflation in Q3 (Chart 7). The former is impacted by high oil prices and the latter is influenced by the global supply chain disruption and shortage of semiconductors used in cars. Beyond those sectors, there was a modest pickup in inflation across much of the consumption basket. Underlying inflation was more subdued but did pick up over the same Q2/Q3 period. Annual growth in the trimmed mean CPI accelerated from 1.6% in Q2 to 2.1% in Q3 - returning to the bottom half of the RBA’s target range for the first time since Q4/2015 (Chart 8). The latest RBA projections call for underlying inflation to stay in the lower half of the inflation target range in 2022 (2.25%) and 2023 (2.5%), although this is conditional on a steady tightening of the Australian labor market. The RBA is forecasting the unemployment rate, which was at 5.2% in October, to fall to 4.25% by the end of 2022 and 4% by the end of 2023. The RBA expects a tighter labor market to eventually boost wage growth to a pace consistent with underlying inflation staying within the RBA target band – which would then augur for tighter monetary policy. The central bank has repeatedly stated that annual growth in the Wage Cost Index, its most preferred measure of Australian wages, has historically been in the 3-4% range when underlying inflation was consistently between 2-3%. The Wage Cost Index grew by only 2.2% on a year-over-year basis in Q3, so still well below the pace that would convince the RBA that underlying inflation would stay within the target. This argues for a wait-and-see approach. Chart 8Wage Uncertainty Preventing A Hawkish RBA Turn Wage Uncertainty Preventing A Hawkish RBA Turn Wage Uncertainty Preventing A Hawkish RBA Turn Chart 9A Rising Participation Rate Will Cushion Tightening In The Labor Market A Rising Participation Rate Will Cushion Tightening In The Labor Market A Rising Participation Rate Will Cushion Tightening In The Labor Market RBA Governor Lowe has noted that there is still ample spare capacity in labor markets that opened up because of COVID lockdowns, which will prevent a more rapid decline in the unemployment rate even with labor demand still quite strong. On that note – the Australian labor force participation rate fell from a 2021 high of 66.3% in March of this year to 64.7% in October, a 1.6 percentage point decline that provides a buffer to absorb the strong labor demand in Australia (Chart 9). Given that Australian inflation and wages are reported less frequently (quarterly) than employment data (monthly), it is a challenge for the RBA to quickly assess to true state of inflationary pressure in the Australian economy. We see the inflation data as being far more important than labor market developments in assessing the RBA’s next move. The RBA will likely want to a few more Wage Cost Index and CPI prints before signaling any move to hike rates sooner than currently projected. The RBA will not have a complete reading on wages for the first half of 2022 until August, when the Q2/2022 Wage Cost Index is released. Thus, it would not be until well into the latter half of 2022 before any shift in hawkish messaging could plausibly occur, at the earliest, even if CPI inflation were to surprise to the upside over the same period. The RBA will need to see price inflation confirmed by wage inflation before changing its stance. In a nutshell, robust inflation prints out of Australia will need to be reinforced by strong wage data, for the RBA to move the dial closer to market expectations for interest rate hikes. 4. House price inflation is accelerating (✓) We are placing a checkmark next to this piece of our Checklist. Given Australia’s past history with periods of surging home values, signs that housing markets are overheating could prompt the RBA to consider tightening monetary policy sooner than expected. On that front, there is plenty of evidence to give the RBA anxiety. Median house prices grew at a 16.8% year-over-year rate in Q2, the fastest pace since 2003, and now appear very expensive relative to median incomes (Chart 10). Chart 10House Price Appreciation Could Moderate House Price Appreciation Could Moderate House Price Appreciation Could Moderate High prices may eventually begin to turn away buyers, as the “good time to buy a home” component of the Melbourne/Westpac consumer confidence survey has fallen sharply (bottom panel). Some of that decline may also be due to the Delta wave, as the growth rate of new building approvals has also slowed alongside rising COVID cases (top panel). The RBA will likely want to see a few post-Delta prints on Australian house prices and housing demand to determine the true underlying trends. But given the extreme readings on overall house prices, the housing market is a legitimate reason for the RBA to turn more hawkish. 5. Export demand, particularly from China, is strong (x) We are NOT placing a checkmark next to this item of our RBA Checklist. A booming external environment could lead the RBA to feel more comfortable signaling rate hikes. So far, that has been the case via a rising terms of trade, which has positive implications for the valuation of the Australian dollar, as we discuss below. But on the volume front - which is critical for the growth outlook, and RBA policy decisions, given the importance of the export sector to the Australian economy - there is reason for caution. First, the Chinese economy continues to slow down. The Chinese credit impulse, one of the key gauges of momentum in domestic activity peaked in October last year and has been rolling over since. Historically, this has been a bad omen for Aussie exports in general, as well as the performance of the AUD (Chart 11). Almost 40% of Australian exports go to China. This suggests that exports of both coal and iron ore are particularly susceptible to a further slowdown in Chinese construction activity. That said, the slowdown in China has probably passed the “maximum deceleration” phase and the odds are that, going forward, both monetary and fiscal policy will be marginally eased. This will help cushion the Australian dollar and bond yields from undershooting below current levels. Chinese bond yields have already declined, reflecting an easing in domestic financial conditions. With the Chinese bond market becoming more and more liberalized, it has become a good proxy for monetary conditions. As such, the trend in Chinese bond yields has tended to lead Chinese imports. As Chinese going concerns finance working capital requirements at lower rates, this could help stabilize import volumes (Chart 12). Chart 11A Slowdown In China Is A Risk For The AUD A Slowdown In China Is A Risk For The AUD A Slowdown In China Is A Risk For The AUD Chart 12Easing Financial Conditions In China Easing Financial Conditions In China Easing Financial Conditions In China Political tensions between Australia and China remain a key point of contention for higher Aussie terms of trade and an improving basic balance. However, many Australian exports are fungible and have been redirected to other countries. For example, despite China’s ban on Australian coal imports, Aussie export volumes and terms of trade remain robust, leading to a sharp improvement in Australia’s external accounts (Chart 13). This is because Australian exports to Japan, India, and South Korea have picked up as China has redirected imports of coal from Australia to other countries. Commodity prices remain resilient, but could face downside in the coming months. This is especially the case for Australian export prices, which have outperformed that of other commodity-producing nations, leading to the sharp improvement in the terms of trade (Chart 14). Part of the story has been a supply-side shock. But Australia is also relatively competitive in supplying the types of raw materials that China needs and wants such as higher-grade iron ore, which is more expensive, pollutes less, and is in high demand. Similarly, Australia is one of the largest exporters of liquefied natural gas, of which prices have been soaring in recent months amidst a global push to clean the planet. Chart 13An Improving Basic Balance Supports The AUD An Improving Basic Balance Supports The AUD An Improving Basic Balance Supports The AUD Chart 14Australian Terms Of Trade Are Robust Australian Terms Of Trade Are Robust Australian Terms Of Trade Are Robust Historically, the terms of trade has been one of the best explanatory variables for the AUD. That said, our model suggests that even a 15%-20% decline in forward prices will still keep the AUD undervalued relative to levels implied by terms of trade (Chart 15). While Australian export prices have overtaken their 2011 highs, the AUD remains around 35% below 2011 levels. On a longer-term basis, Australia’s terms-of-trade improvement is likely to continue. First, a boom in global infrastructure spending is likely to keep the prices of the commodities Australia exports well bid. This includes both copper and iron ore. Second, China’s clean energy policy shift away from coal and towards natural gas will buffet LNG export volumes (Chart 16). Given that reducing - if not outright eliminating - pollution is a long-term strategic goal in China, this will provide a multi-year tailwind for both cleaner ore and LNG import volumes. Chart 15A Drop In Commodities Is Well Discounted By The AUD A Drop In Commodities Is Well Discounted By The AUD A Drop In Commodities Is Well Discounted By The AUD Chart 16 In a nutshell, Australia sports the best improvement in both trade and current account balances in the G10 over the last few years (Chart 17). Significant investment in resource projects over the last decade are now bearing fruit, easing the external funding requirement. This has ended the 35-year-long deficit in the current account. A rising current account naturally increases the demand for the Australian dollar, even in the absence of RBA rate hikes. This argues for short-term caution, but a longer-term bullish view on the Aussie. Chart 17External Funding Will Face Competition From Domestic Savings External Funding Will Face Competition From Domestic Savings External Funding Will Face Competition From Domestic Savings Investment Implications A check of our RBA Checklist shows that the argument in favor of tighter monetary policy is becoming more compelling. However, the uncertainties over Australian wages and Chinese growth – both critical for the RBA’s next move - will not be resolved until the second half of 2022, so RBA tightening is not likely until the first half of 2023 at the earliest. There are a number of ways that investors can position for continued RBA dovishness in 2022. Fixed Income Bond investors should overweight Australian government bonds in global portfolios, as the RBA will not match the policy tightening expected in the US, Canada or the UK. Those overweights should be concentrated versus the US, given the lower yield beta of Australian government bonds versus US Treasuries (Chart 18). For dedicated Australian bond investors, maintain a below-benchmark duration stance as longer-maturity yields have more room to rise as the economy continues to recover from the Delta wave. In addition, favor inflation-linked debt over nominal bonds, as both survey-based inflation expectations and the fair value from our 10-year breakeven spread model are rising. Wider breakevens pushing up longer-term yields, and a dovish RBA capping shorter-maturity bond yields, both point to a bearish steepening of the government bond yield curve over the next 6-12 months (Chart 19). Chart 18Remain Overweight Aussie Bonds... Remain Overweight Aussie Bonds... Remain Overweight Aussie Bonds... Chart 19...And Position For A Steeper Yield Curve ...And Position For A Steeper Yield Curve ...And Position For A Steeper Yield Curve Currency A lot of pessimism is already embedded in the Aussie dollar, making it a potent candidate for a powerful mean-reversion rally. One catalyst will be a continued reversal in COVID-19 infection rates. The second is valuation. The Aussie is at fair value on a PPP basis, but remains very cheap on a terms-of-trade basis. Historically, terms of trade have had much better explanatory power for the direction of the Aussie, compared to relative real interest rates or fluctuations from purchasing power parity. Even accounting for falling commodity prices, the valuation margin of safety makes the AUD a good bet over a cyclical horizon, though in the very near-term, it is fraught with risks. We have a limit-buy on AUD/USD at 70 cents, which could be a capitulation level. On the upside, if the Aussie closes its undervaluation gap vis-à-vis terms of trade as it has done historically, this will lift AUD/USD towards 85 cents and beyond. Finally, sentiment on the Aussie is very depressed. Extreme short positioning suggests a dearth of buyers and the potential for a short covering rally (Chart 20). On the crosses, we are already long AUD/NZD, but AUD/CHF and AUD/CAD should also be winners in any Aussie short squeeze. Chart 20Lots Of Shorts In The Aussie Lots Of Shorts In The Aussie Lots Of Shorts In The Aussie Equities 37% of the MSCI Australia index is financials, while 16% is materials. Therefore, a call on the Australian equity market is a call on banks and resources. On the resource front, Australian producers will benefit from a pickup in natural gas exports and a shift away from coal. Therefore, the strategy will be to overweight Australian LNG producers in a resource portfolio. On banks, a relatively dovish RBA will keep the Australian yield curve steep. Meanwhile, banks have still underperformed the improvement in the interest rate term structure. A bottoming economy will also benefit banks, as investors start to price in the prospect for interest rate hikes beyond 2023 (Chart 21). Chart 21A Steeper Yield Curve Will Benefit Banks A Steeper Yield Curve Will Benefit Banks A Steeper Yield Curve Will Benefit Banks   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com   Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark Image The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index

Dear Client, There will be no report next week as we will be working on our Quarterly Strategy Outlook, which will be published the following week. In the meantime, please keep an eye out for BCA Research’s Annual Outlook, featuring long-time BCA client Mr. X, who visits towards the end of each year to discuss the economic and financial market outlook for the year ahead. Best regards, Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist Highlights Inflation in the US, and to a lesser extent, in other major economies, will follow a “two steps up, one step down” trajectory of higher highs and higher lows.  While inflation will fall in the first half of next year as goods prices stabilize, an overheated labor market will cause inflation to re-accelerate into 2023. The Fed will be slow to respond to high inflation, implying that monetary policy will remain accommodative next year. This should help propel stocks to new highs. Chinese stimulus will offset much of the drag from a weaker domestic property market. The dollar is a high momentum currency, so we wouldn’t bet against the greenback in the near term. Nevertheless, with “long dollar” now a consensus trade, we would position for a weaker dollar over a 12-month horizon. A depreciating dollar next year should help non-US equities, especially beleaguered emerging market stocks. The dollar will strengthen anew in 2023, as the Fed is forced to turn more hawkish, and global equities begin to buckle. From Ice To Fire In past reports, we have contended that inflation in the US, and to a lesser extent, in other major economies, would follow a “two steps up, one step down” trajectory of higher highs and higher lows.  We are currently near the top of those two steps. The pandemic ushered in a major re-allocation of spending from services to goods (Chart 1). US inflation should dip over the next 6-to-9 months as the demand for goods decelerates and supply-chain disruptions abate. Chart 1The Pandemic Caused A Major Shift In Spending From Services To Goods The Pandemic Caused A Major Shift In Spending From Services To Goods The Pandemic Caused A Major Shift In Spending From Services To Goods CHart 2Those With Low Paid Jobs Are Enjoying Stronger Wage Gains Those With Low Paid Jobs Are Enjoying Stronger Wage Gains Those With Low Paid Jobs Are Enjoying Stronger Wage Gains The respite from inflation will not last long, however. The labor market is heating up. So far, most of the wage growth has been at the bottom end of the income distribution (Chart 2). Wage growth will broaden over the course of 2022, setting the scene for a price-wage spiral in 2023. We doubt that either fiscal or monetary policy will tighten fast enough to prevent such a spiral from emerging. As a result, US inflation will surprise meaningfully on the upside. Our view has no shortage of detractors. In this week’s report, we address the main counterarguments in a Q&A format:   Q: What makes you think that service spending will rebound fast enough to offset the drag from weaker goods consumption? Chart 3Inventory Restocking Could Be A Source Of Growth Next Year Inventory Restocking Could Be A Source Of Growth Next Year Inventory Restocking Could Be A Source Of Growth Next Year A: There is still a lot of pent-up demand for goods. Try calling any auto dealership. You will hear the same thing: “We have nothing in stock now, but if you put in an order today, you might get a vehicle in 3-to-6 months.” Thus, durable goods sales are unlikely to weaken quickly. And with inventories near record low levels, firms will need to produce more than they sell (Chart 3). Inventory restocking will support GDP growth. As for services, real spending in the US grew by 7.9% in the third quarter, an impressive feat considering that this coincided with the Delta-variant wave. Service growth will stay strong in the fourth quarter. The ISM non-manufacturing index jumped to a record high of 66.7 in October, up from 61.9 in September. The Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow model is tracking real PCE growth of 9.2% in Q4. Goldman’s Current Activity Indicator has hooked up (Chart 4). Chart 4 Q: Aren’t you worried that spending on services might stall next year? A: Not really. Chart 5 shows the percentage change in real spending for various types of services from January 2020 to September 2021, the last month of available data. Chart 5 Chart 6 The greatest decline in spending occurred in those sectors that were most directly affected by the pandemic. Notably, spending on movie theaters, amusement parks, and live entertainment in September was still down 46% on a seasonally-adjusted basis compared to last January. Hotel spending was down 22%. Spending on public transport was down 26%. Only spending on restaurants was back to normal. The number of Covid cases has once again started to trend higher in the US, so that path to normalization will take time (Chart 6). Nevertheless, with vaccination rates still edging up and new antiviral drugs set to hit the market, it is reasonable to assume that many of the hardest-hit service categories will recover next year.   Q: What about medical services? Some have speculated that the shift to telemedicine will require much lower spending down the road. A: It is true that spending on outpatient services in September was $43 billon below pre-pandemic levels. However, over two-fifths of that shortfall was in dental services, which are not amenable to telemedicine. Spending on dental services was down 16% from its January 2020 levels, compared to 6% for physician services. A more plausible theory is that many people are still worried about venturing to the doctor’s or dentist’s office. In addition, a lot of elective procedures were canceled or postponed due to the pandemic. Clearing that backlog will lift medical spending next year. Chart 7The Flow Of Savings Has Fallen Back To Pre-Pandemic Levels But The Stock Of Accumulated Savings Remains High The Flow Of Savings Has Fallen Back To Pre-Pandemic Levels But The Stock Of Accumulated Savings Remains High The Flow Of Savings Has Fallen Back To Pre-Pandemic Levels But The Stock Of Accumulated Savings Remains High In any case, the cost of a telemedicine appointment is typically no different from an in-person one. And, to the extent that telemedicine does become more widespread, this could encourage more people to seek medical assistance. Lastly, even if spending on certain services does not fully recover after the pandemic, this will probably simply result in a permanent increase in spending on goods. The only way that overall consumer spending will falter is if the savings rate rises, which seems unlikely to us. Q: Why do you say that? The savings rate has been very high throughout the pandemic. A: The savings rate did spike during the pandemic, but that was mainly because fewer services were available, and because households were getting transfer payments from the government. Now that these payments have ended, the savings rate has dropped to 7.5%, roughly where it was prior to the pandemic. There is good reason to think the savings rate will keep falling next year. Households are sitting on $2.3 trillion in excess savings, most of which reside in bank deposits (Chart 7). As they run down those savings, consumption will rise in relation to income. The household deleveraging cycle is over. After initially plunging during the pandemic, credit card balances are rising (Chart 8). Banks are eager to make consumer loans (Chart 9). Household net worth has risen by over 100% of GDP since the start of the pandemic (Chart 10). As we discussed three weeks ago, the wealth effect alone could boost annual consumer spending by up to 4% of GDP. Chart 8APost-GFC Deleveraging Has Ended And People Are Swiping Credit Cards Again Following The Pandemic Scare Post-GFC Deleveraging Has Ended And People Are Swiping Credit Cards Again Following The Pandemic Scare Post-GFC Deleveraging Has Ended And People Are Swiping Credit Cards Again Following The Pandemic Scare Chart 8BPost-GFC Deleveraging Has Ended And People Are Swiping Credit Cards Again Following The Pandemic Scare Post-GFC Deleveraging Has Ended And People Are Swiping Credit Cards Again Following The Pandemic Scare Post-GFC Deleveraging Has Ended And People Are Swiping Credit Cards Again Following The Pandemic Scare   Chart 9Banks Are Easing Credit Standards For Consumer Loans Banks Are Easing Credit Standards For Consumer Loans Banks Are Easing Credit Standards For Consumer Loans Chart 10A Record Rise In Household Net Worth A Record Rise In Household Net Worth A Record Rise In Household Net Worth   Q: Household wealth could fall as the Fed starts tapering and eventually raising rates. Wouldn’t that cool the economy? A: The taper is a fait accompli, and markets are already pricing in rate hikes starting in the second half of next year. If the Fed were to signal its intention to raise rates more quickly than what has been priced in, then home prices and stocks could certainly weaken. We do not think the Fed will pivot in a more hawkish direction before the end of next year, however. The Fed’s estimate of the neutral rate is only 2.5%, a big step down from its estimate of 4.25% in 2012. The market’s view is broadly in line with the Fed’s (Chart 11).  Despite the upward move in realized inflation, long-term inflation expectations remain in check – expected inflation 5-to-10 years out in the University of Michigan survey has increased from 2.3% in late 2019 to 2.9%, bringing it back to where it was between 2010 and 2015. The 5-year/ 5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate is near the bottom end of the Fed’s comfort zone (Chart 12). Chart 11The Fed And Investors Still Believe In Secular Stagnation The Fed And Investors Still Believe In Secular Stagnation The Fed And Investors Still Believe In Secular Stagnation Chart 12Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Not Yet A Concern For The Fed Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Not Yet A Concern For The Fed Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Not Yet A Concern For The Fed   Q: What about fiscal policy? Isn’t it set to tighten sharply next year? A: The US budget deficit will decline next year. However, this will happen against the backdrop of strong private demand growth. Moreover, budget deficits are likely to remain elevated in the post-pandemic period. This week, President Biden signed a $1.2 trillion infrastructure bill into law, containing $550 billion in new spending. BCA’s geopolitical strategists expect Congress to pass a $1.5-to-$2 trillion social spending bill using the reconciliation process. All in all, the IMF foresees the US cyclically-adjusted primary budget deficit averaging 4.9% of GDP between 2022 and 2026, compared to 2.0% of GDP between 2014 and 2019 (Chart 13). Chart 13 Chart 14While Overall Consumption Has Recovered, Business Spending and Direct Government Expenditures Remain Below Trend While Overall Consumption Has Recovered, Business Spending and Direct Government Expenditures Remain Below Trend While Overall Consumption Has Recovered, Business Spending and Direct Government Expenditures Remain Below Trend   It should also be noted that government spending on goods and services has been quite weak over the past two years (Chart 14). The budget deficit surged because transfer payments exploded. Unlike direct government spending, which is set to accelerate over the next few years, households saved a large share of transfer payments. Thus, the fiscal multiplier will increase next year, even as the budget deficit shrinks.   Q: We have focused a lot on demand, but what about supply? There are over 4 million fewer Americans employed today than before the pandemic and yet the job openings rate is near a record high. Chart 15Despite A Notable Decline, There Are Still A Lot Of People Avoiding Work Because Of Worries About Contracting Or Transmitting Covid Despite A Notable Decline, There Are Still A Lot Of People Avoiding Work Because Of Worries About Contracting Or Transmitting Covid Despite A Notable Decline, There Are Still A Lot Of People Avoiding Work Because Of Worries About Contracting Or Transmitting Covid A: Some people who left the workforce will regain employment. According to the Census Bureau’s Household Pulse Survey, there are still 2.5 million people not working because they are afraid of catching or transmitting the virus (Chart 15). That said, some workers may remain sidelined for a while longer. The very same survey also revealed that about 8 million of the 100 million workers currently subject to vaccine mandates say that “they will definitely not get the vaccine.” In addition, about 3.6 million workers have retired since the start of the pandemic, about 1.2 million more than one would have expected based on pre-existing demographic trends. Most of these retirees will not work again. Lifestyle choices may keep others from seeking employment. Female labor participation has declined much more during the pandemic and than it did during the Great Recession (Chart 16). While many mothers will re-enter the labor force now that schools have reopened, some may simply choose to stay at home. Chart 16 The bottom line is that the pandemic has reduced labor supply at a time when labor demand remains very strong. This is likely to exacerbate the labor shortage.   Q: Any chance that higher productivity will offset some of the damage to the supply side of the economy from decreased labor participation? A: US labor productivity did increase sharply during the initial stages of the pandemic. However, that appears to have been largely driven by composition effects in which low-skilled, poorly-paid service workers lost their jobs. As these low-skilled workers have returned to the labor force, productivity growth has dropped. The absolute level of productivity declined by 5.0% at an annualized rate in the third quarter, leading to an 8.3% increase in labor costs. It is telling that productivity growth has been extremely weak outside the US (Chart 17). This gives weight to the view that the pandemic-induced changes in business practices have not contributed to higher productivity, at least so far. It is also noteworthy that a recent study of 10,000 skilled professionals at a major IT company revealed that work-from-home policies decreased productivity by 8%-to-19%, mainly because people ended up working longer. Increased investment spending should eventually boost productivity. Core capital goods orders, which lead corporate capex, are up 18% since the start of the pandemic (Chart 18). However, the near-term impact of increased investment spending will be to boost aggregate demand, stoking inflation in the process. Chart 17 Chart 18US Capex Should Pick Up US Capex Should Pick Up US Capex Should Pick Up   Q: We have spoken a lot about the US, but the world’s second biggest economy, China, is facing a massive deflationary shock from the implosion of its real estate market. Could that deflationary impulse potentially cancel out the inflationary impulse from an overheated US economy? A: You are quite correct that inflation has risen the most in the US. While inflation has picked up in Europe, this mainly reflects base effects (Chart 19). Inflation in China has fallen since the start of the pandemic despite booming exports. There are striking demographic parallels between China today and Japan in the early 1990s. The bursting of Japan’s property bubble corresponded with a peak in the country’s working-age population (Chart 20). China’s working-age population has also peaked and is set to decline by more than 40% over the remainder of the century. Chart 19The US Stands Out As The Inflation Leader The US Stands Out As The Inflation Leader The US Stands Out As The Inflation Leader Chart 20Demographic Parallels Between China And Japan Demographic Parallels Between China And Japan Demographic Parallels Between China And Japan That said, there are important differences between the two nations. In 1990, Japan was a rich economy; output-per-hour was nearly 70% of US levels. China is still a middle-income economy; output-per-hour is only 20% of US levels (Chart 21). China has the ability to outgrow some of its problems in a way that Japan did not. In addition, Chinese policymakers have learned from some of Japan’s mistakes. They have been trying to curb the economy’s dependence on property development; real estate development investment has fallen from 12% of GDP in 2014 to less than 10% of GDP (Chart 22). China is still building too many new homes, but unlike Japan in the 1990s, the government is likely to pursue stimulus measures to compensate for a shrinking property sector. This should keep the economy from entering a deflationary slump. Chart 21 Chart 22Real Estate Investment Has Peaked In China Real Estate Investment Has Peaked In China Real Estate Investment Has Peaked In China   Q: Let’s bring this back to markets. What is the main investment takeaway from your view? A: The main takeaway is that investors should remain bullish on stocks and other risk assets for the next 12 months but be prepared to turn more cautious in 2023. The neutral rate of interest in the US is higher than generally assumed. This means that monetary policy is currently more accommodative than widely believed, which is good for stocks. Unfortunately, it also means that a policy error is likely: The Fed will keep rates too low for too long, causing the economy to overheat. Chart 23Bank Stocks Tend To Outperform When Yields Rise Bank Stocks Tend To Outperform When Yields Rise Bank Stocks Tend To Outperform When Yields Rise This overheating will not be evident over the next six months. As we noted at the outset of this report, the US economy is currently at the top of the proverbial two steps in our projected “two steps up, one step down” trajectory for inflation. The cresting in durable goods inflation will provide a temporary respite from inflationary worries, even as the underlying long-term driver of higher inflation – an increasingly tight labor market – gains traction. Strong consumer demand and persistent labor shortages will incentivize companies to invest in new capacity and automate production. This will benefit industrial stocks and select tech names. Rising bond yields will also boost bank shares (Chart 23). A country’s current account balance is simply the difference between what it saves and what it invests. With savings on the downswing and investment on the upswing, the US will find it increasingly difficult to finance its burgeoning trade deficit. The US dollar is a high momentum currency, so we wouldn’t necessarily bet against the greenback in the near term (Chart 24). Nevertheless, with “long dollar” now a consensus trade, we would position for a weaker dollar over a 12-month horizon (Chart 25). Chart 24 Chart 25Long Dollar Is A Crowded Trade Long Dollar Is A Crowded Trade Long Dollar Is A Crowded Trade   Chart 26A Depreciating Dollar Next Year Should Help Non-US Equities A Depreciating Dollar Next Year Should Help Non-US Equities A Depreciating Dollar Next Year Should Help Non-US Equities A depreciating dollar next year should help non-US equities, especially beleaguered emerging markets (Chart 26). The dollar will strengthen anew in 2023, as the Fed is forced to turn more hawkish, and global equities begin to buckle.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Image Special Trade Recommendations Image Current MacroQuant Model Scores Image

Highlights Remain neutral on the US dollar. A breakout of the dollar would cause a shift in strategy. Russia’s conflict with the West is heating up now that Germany has delayed the certification of the Nord Stream II pipeline. As long as the focus remains on the pipeline, the crisis will dissipate sometime in the middle of next year. But there is an equal chance of a massive escalation of strategic tensions. Our GeoRisk Indicators will keep rising in Europe, negatively affecting investor risk appetite. Stick with DM Europe over EM Europe stocks. If the dollar does not break out, South Korea and Australia offer cyclical opportunities. Turkish and Brazilian equities will not be able to bounce back sustainably in the midst of chaotic election cycles and deep structural problems. Rallies are to be faded.  Feature We were struck this week by JP Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon’s claim that his business will “not swayed by geopolitical winds.”1  If he had said “political winds” we might have agreed. It is often the case that business executives need to turn up their collars against the ever-changing, noisy, and acrimonious political environment. However, we take issue with his specific formulation. Geopolitical winds cannot shrugged off so easily – or they are not truly geopolitical. Geopolitics is not primarily about individual world leaders or topical issues. It is primarily about things that are very hard and slow to change: geography, demography, economic structure, military and technological capabilities, and national interests. This is the importance of having a geopolitically informed approach to macroeconomics and financial markets: investment is about preserving and growing wealth over the long run despite the whirlwind of changes affecting politicians, parties, and local political tactics.  In this month’s GeoRisk Update we update our market-based, quantitative geopolitical risk indicators with a special focus on how financial markets are responding to the interplay of near-term and cyclical political risks with structural and tectonic pressures underlying a select group of economies and political systems. Is King Dollar Breaking Out? Chart 1King Dollar Breaking Out? King Dollar Breaking Out? King Dollar Breaking Out? Our first observation is that the US dollar is on the verge of breaking out and rallying (Chart 1). This potential rally is observable in trade-weighted terms and especially relative to the euro, which has slumped sharply since November 5th. Our view on the dollar remains neutral but we are watching this rally closely. This year was supposed to be a year in which global growth recovered from the pandemic on the back of vaccination campaigns, leading the counter-cyclical dollar to drop off. The DXY bounce early in the year peaked on April 2nd but then began anew after hitting a major resistance level at 90. The United States is still the preponderant power within the international system. The USD remains the world’s leading currency by transactions and reserves. The pandemic, social unrest, and contested election of 2020 served as a “stress test” that the American system survived, whether judging by the innovation of vaccines, the restoration of order, or the preservation of the constitutional transfer of power. Meanwhile Europe faces several new hurdles that have weighed on the euro. These include the negative ramifications of the slowdown in Asia, energy supply shortages, a new wave of COVID-19 cases, and the partial reimposition of social restrictions. Moreover the Federal Reserve is likely to hike interest rates faster and higher than the European Central Bank over the coming years. Potential growth is higher in the US than Europe and the US growth is supercharged by fiscal stimulus whereas Europe’s stimulus is more limited. Of course, the US’s orgy of monetary and fiscal stimulus and ballooning trade deficits raise risks for the dollar. Global growth is expected to rotate to other parts of the world over the coming 12 months as vaccination spreads. There is still a chance that the dollar’s bounce is a counter-trend bounce and that the dollar will relapse next year. Hence our neutral view. Yet from a geopolitical perspective, the US population and economy are larger, more dynamic, more innovative, safer, and more secure than those of the European Union. The US still exhibits an ability to avoid the reckoning that is overdue from a macroeconomic perspective.  Russia-West Conflict Resumes In our third quarter outlook we argued that European geopolitical risk had hit a bottom, after coming off the sovereign debt crisis of 2010-15, and that geopolitical risk would begin to rise over the long term for this region. Our reasoning was that the markets had fully priced the Europeans’ decision to band together in the face of risks to the EU’s and EMU’s integrity. What markets would need to price going forward would be greater risks to Europe’s stability from a chaotic external environment that Europe lacked the willingness or ability to control: conflict with Russia, immigration, terrorism, and the slowdown in Asia. In particular we argued that Russia’s secular conflict with the West would resume. US-Russia relations would not improve despite presidential summits. The Nord Stream II pipeline would become a lightning rod for conflict, as its operation was more likely to be halted than the consensus held. (German regulators paused the approval process this week, raising the potential for certification to be delayed past the expected March-May months of 2022.) Most importantly we argued that the Russian strategy of political and military aggression in its near-abroad would continue since Russia would continue to feel threatened by domestic instability at home and Western attempts to improve economic integration and security coordination with former Soviet Union countries.  Chart 2Putin Showdown With West To Escalate Further Putin Showdown With West To Escalate Further Putin Showdown With West To Escalate Further For this reason we recommended that investors eschew Russian equities despite a major rally in commodity prices. Any rally would be undercut by the slowing economy in Asia or geopolitical conflicts that frightened investors away from Russian companies, or both. Today the market is in the process of pricing the impact on Russian equities from commodity prices coming off the boil. But politics may also have something to do with the selloff in Russian equities (Chart 2). The selloff can continue given still-negative hard economic data from Asia and the escalation of tensions around Russia’s strategically sensitive borders: Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, Lithuania, Moldova, and the Black Sea. The equity risk premium will remain elevated for eastern European markets as a result of the latest materialization of country risk and geopolitical risk – the long running trend of outperformance by developed Europe has been confirmed on a technical resistance level (Chart 3). Our mistake was closing our recommendation to buy European natural gas prices too early this year. Chart 3Favor DM Europe Amid Russia Showdown Favor DM Europe Amid Russia Showdown Favor DM Europe Amid Russia Showdown In early 2021, our market-based geopolitical risk indicator for Russia slumped, implying that global investors expected a positive diplomatic “reset” between the US and Russia. We advised clients to ignore this signal and argued that Russian geopolitical risk would take back off again. We said the same thing when the indicator slumped again in the second half of the year and now it is clear the indicator will move sharply higher (Chart 4). The point is that geopolitics keeps interfering with investors’ desire to resuscitate Russian equities based on macro and fundamental factors: cheap valuations, commodity price rises, some local improvements in competitiveness, and the search for yield.   Chart 4Russian GeoRisk Indicator - Risks Not Yet Priced Russian GeoRisk Indicator - Risks Not Yet Priced Russian GeoRisk Indicator - Risks Not Yet Priced Russia may or may not stage a new military incursion into Ukraine – the odds are 50/50, given that Russia has invaded already and has the raw capability in place on Ukraine’s borders. The intention of an incursion would be to push Russian control across the entire southern border of Ukraine to Odessa, bringing a larger swathe of the Black Sea coast under Moscow’s control in pursuit of Russia’s historic quest for warm water ports. The limitations on Russia are obvious. It would undertake new military and fiscal burdens of occupation, push the US and EU closer together, provoke a stronger NATO defense alliance, and invite further economic sanctions. Yet similar tradeoffs did not prevent Russia from taking surprise military action in Georgia in 2008 or Ukraine in 2014. After the past 13 years the US and EU are still uncoordinated and indecisive. The US is still internally divided. With energy prices high, domestic political support low, and Russia’s long-term strategic situation bleak, Moscow may believe that the time is right to expand its buffer territory further into Ukraine. We cannot rule out such an outcome, now or over the next few years. If Russia attacks, global risk assets will suffer a meaningful pullback. It will not be a bear market unless the conflict spills out beyond Ukraine to affect major economies. We have not taken a second Ukraine invasion as our base case because Russia is focused primarily on getting the Nord Stream pipeline certified. A broader war would prevent that from happening. Military threats after Nord Stream is certified will be more worrisome.  A less belligerent but still aggressive move would be for Russia to militarize the Belarussian border amid the conflict with the EU over Belarus’s funneling of Middle Eastern migrants into the EU via Poland and Lithuania. A closer integration of Russia’s and Belarus’s economies and militaries would fit with Russia’s grand strategy, improve Russia’s military posture in eastern Europe, and escalate fears of eventual war in Poland and the Baltic states. The West would wring its hands and announce more sanctions but may not have a higher caliber response as such a move would not involve hostilities or the violation of mutual defense treaties. This outcome would be negative but also digested fairly quickly by financial markets. Our European GeoRisk Indicators (see Appendix) are likely to respond to the new Russia crisis, in keeping with our view that European geopolitical risk will rise in the 2020s: German risk has dropped off since the election but will now revive at least until Nord Stream II is certified. If Russia re-invades Ukraine it will rise, as it did in 2014.  French risk was already heating up due to the presidential election beginning April 10 (first round) but now may heat up more. Not that Russia poses a direct threat to France but more that broader regional insecurities would hurt sentiment. The election itself is not a major risk to investors, though terrorist attacks could tick up. President Macron has an incentive to be hawkish on a range of issues over the next half year. The UK is in the midst of the Russia conflict. Its defense cooperation with Ukraine and naval activity in the Black Sea, such as port calls in Georgia, have prompted Russia’s military threats – including a threat to bomb a Royal Navy vessel earlier this year. Not to mention ongoing complications around Brexit. The Russian situation is by far the most significant factor. Spain is at a further remove from Russia but its risks are rising due to domestic political polarization and the rising likelihood of a breakdown in the ruling government. Bottom Line: We still favor these countries’ equities to those of eastern Europe but our risk indicators will rise, suggesting that geopolitical incidents could cause a setback for some or all of these markets in absolute terms. A pickup in Asian growth would be beneficial for developed European assets so we are cyclically constructive. We remain neutral on the USD-EUR though a buying opportunity may present itself if and when the Nord Stream II pipeline is certified.  Korea: Nobody’s Heard From Kim In A While Chart 5Korea GeoRisk Indicator Still Elevated Korea GeoRisk Indicator Still Elevated Korea GeoRisk Indicator Still Elevated Geopolitical risk has risen in South Korea due to COVID-19 and its aftershocks, including supply kinks, shortages, and policy tightening by the giant to the West (Chart 5). South Korea’s geopolitical risk indicator is still very high but not because of North Korea. Our Dear Leader Kim Jong Un has not been overly provocative, although he has restarted the cycle of provocations during the Biden administration. Yet South Korean geopolitical risk has skyrocketed. The problem is that investors have lost a lot of appetite for South Korea in a global environment in which demographics are languishing, globalization is retreating, a regional cold war is developing, and debt levels are high. Domestic politics have become more redistributive without accompanying reforms to improve competitiveness or reform corporate conglomerates. The revival of the South Korean conservatives ahead of elections in 2022 suggests political risk will remain elevated. Of course, North Korea could still move the dial. A massive provocation, say something on the scale of the surprise naval attack on the Chonan in the wake of the global financial crisis in spring of 2010, could push up the risk indicator higher and increase volatility for the Korean won and equities. Kim could take such an action to insist that President Biden pay heed to him, like President Trump did, or at least not ignore him, in a context in which Biden is doing just that due to far more pressing concerns. Biden would be forced to reestablish a credible threat.  Still, North Korea is not the major factor today. Not compared to the economic and financial instability in the region. At the same time, if global growth surprises pick up and the dollar does not break out, Korea will be a beneficiary. We have taken a constructive cyclical view, although our specific long Korea trade has not worked out this year. Korean equities depreciated by 11.2% in USD terms year-to-date, compared to 0.3% for the rest of EM. Structurally, Korea cannot overcome the negative demographic and economic factors mentioned above. Geopolitically it remains a “shrimp between two whales” and will fail to reconcile its economic interests with its defense alliance with the United States.   Australia: Wait On The Dollar Chart 6Australian GeoRisk Indicator Still Elevated Australian GeoRisk Indicator Still Elevated Australian GeoRisk Indicator Still Elevated Australian geopolitical risk has not fallen back much from this year’s highs, according to our quant indicator (Chart 6). Global shortages and a miniature trade war were the culprits of this year’s spike. The advantage for Australia is that commodity prices and metals look to remain in high demand as the world economy fully mends. Various nations are implementing large public investment programs, especially re-gearing their energy sectors to focus more on renewables. The reassertion of the US security alliance is positive for Australia but geopolitical risk is rising on a secular basis regardless.   Cyclically we would look positively toward Australian stocks. Yet they have risen by 4.3% in common currency terms this year so far, compared to the developed market-ex-US average of 11.0%. Moreover the Aussie’s latest moves confirm that the US dollar is on the verge of breaking out which would be negative for this bourse. Structurally Australia will go through a painful economic transition but it will be motivated to do so by the new regional cold war and threats to national security. The US alliance is a geopolitical positive.   Turkey And Brazil The greenback’s rally could be sustainable not only because of the divergence of US from Asian and global growth but also because of the humiliating domestic political environment of most prominent emerging markets. Chart 7Emerging Market Bull Trap Emerging Market Bull Trap Emerging Market Bull Trap We booked gains our “short” trade of the currencies of EM “strongmen,” such as Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro and Turkey’s Recep Erdogan, earlier this year. But we noted that we still hold a negative view on these economies and currencies. This is especially true today as contentious elections approach in both countries in 2022 and 2023 respectively (Chart 7). Turkey is trapped into an inflation spiral of its own design, which enervates the economy, as our Emerging Markets Strategy has shown. It is also trapped in a geopolitical stance in which it has repeatedly raised the stakes in simultaneous clashes with Russia, the US, Europe, Israel, the Arab states, Libya, and Iran. Russia’s maneuvers in the Black Sea are fundamentally threatening to Turkey, so while Erdogan has maintained a balance with Russia for several years, Russian aggression could upset that balance. Turkey has backed off from some recent confrontations with the West lately but there is not yet a trend of improvement. The COVID-19 crisis gave Erdogan a badly needed bump in polls, unlike other EM peers. But this simply reinforces the market’s overrating of his odds of being re-elected. In reality the odds of a contested election or an election upset are fairly high. New lows in the lira show that the market is reacting to the whole negative complex of issues around Turkey. But the full weight of the government’s mismanaging of economic policy to stay in power and stay geopolitically relevant has not yet been felt. The election is still 19 months away. A narrow outcome, for or against Erdogan and his party, would make things worse, not better. Brazil’s domestic political and geopolitical risks are more manageable than Turkey’s. But it faces a tumultuous election in which institutional flaws and failures will be on full display. Investors will try to front-run the election believing that former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva will restore the good old days. But we discourage that approach. We see at least two massive hurdles for the market: first, Brazil has to pass its constitutional stress test; second, the next administration needs to be forced into difficult decisions to preserve growth and debt management. These will come at the expense of either growth or the currency, according to our Emerging Markets Strategy. We still prefer Mexican stocks. Geopolitically, Turkey will struggle with Russia’s insecurity and aggression, Europe’s use of economic coercion, and Middle Eastern instability. Brazil does not have these external problems, although social stability will always be fragile. Investment Takeaways The dollar is acting as if it may break out in a major rally. Our view has been neutral but our generally reflationary perspective on the global economy is being challenged. Russia’s conflict with the West will escalate, not de-escalate, in the wake of Germany’s decision to delay the certification of the Nord Stream II pipeline. Russia has greater leverage now than usual because of energy shortages. A re-invasion of Ukraine cannot be ruled out. But the pipeline is Russia’s immediate focus. Investors have seen conflict in Ukraine so they will be desensitized quickly unless the conflict spreads into new geographies or spills out to affect major economies. The same goes for trouble on Belarus’s borders. Stick with long DM Europe / short EM Europe. Opportunities may emerge to become more bullish on the euro and European equities if and when the Nord Stream II situation looks to be resolved and Asian risks to global growth are allayed. If the dollar does not break out, South Korea and Australia are cyclical beneficiaries. Whereas “strongman” regimes will remain volatile and the source of bull traps, especially Turkey.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  “JP Morgan chief becomes first Wall Street boss to visit during pandemic,” Financial Times, November 15, 2021, ft.com. Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Open Trades & Positions Image Section II: Appendix: GeoRisk Indicator Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator United Kingdom UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Australia Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Australia: GeoRisk Indicator South Africa South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Dear Client, This week, the US Bond Strategy service is hosting its Quarterly Webcast (November 16 at 10:00 AM EST, 15:00 PM GMT, 16:00 PM CET and November 17 at 9:00 HKT, 11:00 AEST). In addition, we are sending this Quarterly Chartpack that provides a recap of our key recommendations and some charts related to those recommendations and other areas of interest for US bond investors. Please tune in to the Webcast and browse the Chartpack at your leisure, and do let us know if you have any questions or other feedback. To view the Quarterly Chartpack PDF please click here. Best regards, Ryan Swift, US Bond Strategist

Highlights US growth will slow next year, not because demand will falter, but because supply-side constraints will prevent the economy from producing as much output as households and businesses want to buy. If aggregate demand exceeds aggregate supply, the price level will rise. We argue that the US aggregate demand curve is currently quite steep. This implies that the price level may need to rise a lot to restore balance to the economy. In fact, if the aggregate demand curve is not just steep but upward-sloping, which is quite possible, there may be no price level that brings aggregate demand in line with supply; the US economy could go supernova. When supply is the binding constraint to growth, investors need to throw the old playbook for dealing with growth slowdowns out the window. Rather than positioning for lower bond yields, investors should position for higher yields. Rather than expecting a stronger dollar, investors should expect a weaker one. Rather than favoring growth stocks, large caps, and defensives, investors should favor value stocks, small caps, and cyclicals. The Binding Constraint To Growth Is Now Supply After a post-Delta wave rebound in Q4, the US economy is expected to slow over the course of 2022. The Bloomberg consensus is for US growth to decelerate from 4.9% in 2021Q4 to 4.1% in 2022Q1, 3.9% in 2022Q2, 3.0% in 2022Q3, and 2.5% in 2022Q4. Growth in the first quarter of 2023 is expected to dip further to 2.3%. We agree that US growth will slow next year but think the market narrative around this slowdown is misguided. Chart 1Plenty Of Pent-Up Demand Plenty Of Pent-Up Demand Plenty Of Pent-Up Demand The standard market playbook for dealing with an economic slowdown is to position for lower bond yields, a stronger US dollar, and a decline in commodity prices. On the equity side, the playbook calls for shifting equity exposure from cyclicals to defensives, favoring large caps over small caps, and growth stocks over value stocks. There are two major problems with this narrative. First, growth is peaking at much higher levels than before and is unlikely to return to trend at least until the second half of 2023. Second, and more importantly, US growth will slow due to supply-side constraints rather than inadequate demand. US final demand will remain robust for the foreseeable future. Households are sitting on $2.3 trillion in excess savings, equivalent to 15% of annual consumption (Chart 1). The household deleveraging cycle is over. After initially plunging during the pandemic, credit card balances are rising (Chart 2). Banks are falling over themselves to make consumer loans (Chart 3). Chart 2Revolving Credit On The Rise Again Revolving Credit On The Rise Again Revolving Credit On The Rise Again Chart 3Banks Are Easing Credit Standards For Consumers Banks Are Easing Credit Standards For Consumers Banks Are Easing Credit Standards For Consumers Chart 4A Record Rise In Household Net Worth A Record Rise In Household Net Worth A Record Rise In Household Net Worth Household net worth has risen by over 100% of GDP since the start of the pandemic (Chart 4). As we discussed two weeks ago, the wealth effect alone could boost annual consumer spending by up to 4% of GDP. Investment demand should remain strong. Business inventories are near record low levels (Chart 5). Core capital goods orders, a leading indicator for corporate capex, have soared (Chart 6). Chart 5Business Inventories Are Near Record Low Levels Business Inventories Are Near Record Low Levels Business Inventories Are Near Record Low Levels Chart 6Rise In Durable Goods Orders Bodes Well For Capex Rise In Durable Goods Orders Bodes Well For Capex Rise In Durable Goods Orders Bodes Well For Capex Chart 7The Homeowner Vacancy Rate Is Signaling The Need For More Homebuilding The Homeowner Vacancy Rate Is Signaling The Need For More Homebuilding The Homeowner Vacancy Rate Is Signaling The Need For More Homebuilding The Dodge Momentum Index, which tracks planned nonresidential construction, rose to a 13-year high in October. The home­owner vacancy rate is at multi-decade lows, signifying the need for more homebuilding (Chart 7). While increased investment will augment the nation’s capital stock down the road, the short-to-medium term effect will be to inflate demand. Policy Won’t Tighten Enough To Cool The Economy What is the mechanism that will push down aggregate demand growth towards potential GDP growth? It is unlikely to be policy. While budget deficits will narrow over the next few years, the IMF still expects the US cyclically-adjusted primary budget deficit to be nearly 3% of GDP larger between 2022 and 2026 than it was between 2014 and 2019 (Chart 8). Chart 8 Chart 9The Fed And Investors Still Believe In Secular Stagnation The Fed And Investors Still Believe In Secular Stagnation The Fed And Investors Still Believe In Secular Stagnation   As Matt Gertken, BCA’s Chief Geopolitical Strategist, writes in this week’s US Political Strategy report, the passage of the $550 billion infrastructure bill has increased, not decreased, the odds of President Biden and the Democrats passing their social spending bill via the partisan budget reconciliation process. On the monetary side, the Federal Reserve will finish tapering asset purchases next June and begin raising rates shortly thereafter. However, the Fed has no intention of raising rates aggressively. Most FOMC members see the Fed funds rate rising to only 2.5% this cycle (Chart 9). The “dots” call for only one rate hike in 2022 and three rate hikes in both 2023 and 2024. Investors expect rates to rise even less by end-2024 than the Fed foresees (Chart 10).   Chart 10 The Inflation Outlook Hinges On The Slope Of The Aggregate Demand Curve If policy tightening will not suffice in cooling demand, the economy will overheat and inflation will rise. But by how much will inflation increase? The answer is of great importance to investors. It also hinges on a seemingly technical question: What is the slope of the aggregate demand curve? As Chart 11 illustrates, prices will rise more if the aggregate demand curve is steep than if it is flat. Chart 11 Chart 12Wages Rose Faster Than Prices During The Inflationary Late-60s and 70s Wages Rose Faster Than Prices During The Inflationary Late-60s and 70s Wages Rose Faster Than Prices During The Inflationary Late-60s and 70s It is tempting to think of the aggregate demand curve in the same way one might think of the demand curve for, say, apples. When the price of apples rises, there is both a substitution and an income effect. An increase in the price of apples will cause shoppers to substitute away from apples towards oranges. In addition, if apples are so-called “normal goods,” shoppers will buy fewer apples in response to lower real incomes. This chain of reasoning breaks down at the aggregate level. When economists say the price level has risen, they are referring to all prices; hence, there is no substitution effect. Moreover, since one person’s spending is another’s income, rising prices do not necessarily translate into lower overall real incomes. Granted, if nominal wages are sticky, as they usually are in the short run, an unanticipated increase in prices will reduce real wage income. However, this will be offset by higher business income. Over time, wages tend to catch up with prices. In fact, wage growth usually outstrips price growth during inflationary periods. For example, real wages rose during the late-1960s and 70s but fell during the disinflationary 1980s (Chart 12). Textbook Reasons For A Downward-Sloping Aggregate Demand Curve According to standard economic theory, there are three main reasons why aggregate demand curves are downward-sloping: The Pigou Effect: Higher prices erode the purchasing power of money, resulting in a negative wealth effect. The Keynes Effect: Higher prices reduce the real money supply. This pushes up real interest rates, leading to lower investment spending. The Mundell-Fleming Effect: Higher real rates push up the value of the currency, causing net exports to decline. None of these three factors are particularly important for the US these days. Chart 13Base Money Has Swollen Since The Subprime Crisis Base Money Has Swollen Since The Subprime Crisis Base Money Has Swollen Since The Subprime Crisis Strictly speaking, the Pigou wealth effect applies only to “base money,” also known as “outside money.” Outside money includes cash notes, coins, and bank reserves. Inside money such as bank deposits are not included in the Pigou effect because while an increase in consumer prices decreases the real value of bank deposits, it also decreases the real value of commercial bank liabilities.1  In the US, the monetary base has swollen from 6% of GDP in 2008 to 28% of GDP as a result of the Fed’s QE programs (Chart 13). Nevertheless, even if one were to generously assume a wealth effect of 10% from changes in monetary holdings, this would still imply that a 1% increase in consumer prices would reduce spending by only 0.03% of GDP. Simply put, the Pigou effect is just not all that big. Chart 14 In contrast to the Pigou effect, the Keynes effect has historically had a significant impact on the business cycle. However, the importance of the Keynes effect faded following the Global Financial Crisis as the Fed found itself up against the zero lower bound on interest rates. When interest rates are very low, there is little to distinguish money from bonds. Rather than holding money as a medium of exchange (i.e., for financing transactions), households and businesses end up holding money mainly as a store of wealth. In the presence of the zero bound, the demand for money becomes perfectly elastic with respect to the interest rate (Chart 14). As a result, changes in the real money supply have no effect on interest rates, and by extension, interest-rate sensitive spending. And if a decline in the real money supply does not push up interest rates, this undermines the Mundell-Fleming effect as well. Could The Aggregate Demand Curve Be Upward-Sloping? The discussion above, though rather theoretical in nature, highlights an important practical point: The aggregate demand curve may be quite steep. This means that the price level might need to rise a lot to equalize aggregate demand with aggregate supply. Chart 15US Real Bond Yields Hitting Record Lows US Real Bond Yields Hitting Record Lows US Real Bond Yields Hitting Record Lows In fact, one can easily envision a scenario where a rising price level boosts spending; that is, where the demand curve is not just steep but upward-sloping. One normally assumes that higher inflation will prompt central banks to raise rates by more than inflation has risen, leading to higher real rates. However, if the Fed drags its feet in hiking rates, as it is wont to do given its concerns about the zero bound, rising inflation will translate into a decline in real rates. Lower rates will boost demand, leading to higher inflation, and even lower real rates. In addition, lower real rates will benefit debtors, who tend to have a higher marginal propensity to spend than creditors. This, too, will also boost aggregate demand. It is striking in this regard that real bond yields hit a record low this week, with the 10-year TIPS yield falling to -1.17% and the 30-year yield drooping to -0.57% (Chart 15). Black Holes Vs. Supernovas Chart 16 In the case where the aggregate demand curve is upward-sloping, there is no stable equilibrium (Chart 16). If demand falls short of supply, demand will continue to shrink as the price level declines, leading to ever-rising unemployment. Unless policymakers intervene with stimulus, the economy will sink into a deflationary black hole. In contrast, if demand exceeds supply, demand will continue to rise as the price level increases exponentially. The economy will go supernova. Tick Tock Young stars fuse hydrogen into helium, releasing excess energy in the process. After the star has run out of hydrogen, if it is big enough, it will start fusing helium into heavier elements such as carbon and oxygen. The process of nucleosynthesis continues until it reaches iron. That is the end of the line. Fusing elements heavier than iron requires a net input of energy. Unable to generate enough external pressure through fusion, the star loses its battle to gravity. The core collapses, spewing material deep into interstellar space (a good thing since your body is mainly made from this stardust). Observing the star from afar, one would be hard-pressed to see anything abnormal until it explodes. The path to becoming a supernova is highly non-linear. The same is true for inflation. Just like a star with an ample supply of hydrogen, the Fed can burn through its credibility for a while longer. During the 1960s, it took four years for inflation to take off after the economy had reached full employment (Chart 17). By that time, the unemployment rate was two percentage points below NAIRU. Most of today’s inflation is confined to durable goods. This is not a sustainable source of inflation. The durable goods sector is the only part of the CPI where prices usually fall over time (Chart 18). Chart 17Inflation Spiked In The 1960s Only Once The Unemployment Rate Had Fallen Far Below Equilibrium Inflation Spiked In The 1960s Only Once The Unemployment Rate Had Fallen Far Below Equilibrium Inflation Spiked In The 1960s Only Once The Unemployment Rate Had Fallen Far Below Equilibrium Chart 18Inflation Has Been Concentrated In Durable Goods, A Sector Where Prices Usually Fall Over Time Inflation Has Been Concentrated In Durable Goods, A Sector Where Prices Usually Fall Over Time Inflation Has Been Concentrated In Durable Goods, A Sector Where Prices Usually Fall Over Time To get inflation to go up and stay up in modern service-based economies, wages need to rise briskly. While US wage growth has picked up, the bulk of the increase has been among low-wage workers, particularly in the services and hospitality sector (Chart 19). Chart 19Wage Growth Has Picked Up, But Mainly At The Bottom Of The Income Distribution Wage Growth Has Picked Up, But Mainly At The Bottom Of The Income Distribution Wage Growth Has Picked Up, But Mainly At The Bottom Of The Income Distribution The most likely scenario for next year is that firms will simply ration output, fearful that raising prices too quickly will hurt brand loyalty and trigger accusations of price gouging. Shortages will persist, but this time they will be increasingly concentrated in the service sector. Such a state of affairs will not last, however. Competition for workers will cause wages to rise much more than they have so far. Keen to protect profit margins, firms will start jacking up prices. A wage-price spiral will develop. The US economy could go supernova. Investment Conclusions Chart 20Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Near The Bottom End Of The Fed's Comfort Zone Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Near The Bottom End Of The Fed's Comfort Zone Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Near The Bottom End Of The Fed's Comfort Zone US growth will slow next year, not because demand will falter, but because supply-side constraints will prevent the economy from producing as much output as households and businesses want to buy. This means that the old playbook for dealing with growth slowdowns needs to be thrown out the window. Rather than positioning for lower bond yields, investors should position for higher yields. Rather than expecting a stronger dollar, investors should expect a weaker one. Rather than favoring growth stocks, large caps, and defensives, investors should favor value stocks, small caps, and cyclicals. While inflation expectations have recovered from their pandemic lows, the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate is still near the bottom end of the Fed’s comfort zone (Chart 20). Rising inflation expectations will lift long-term bond yields, justifying a short duration stance in fixed-income portfolios. Higher bond yields will benefit value stocks. Chart 21 shows that there has been a strong correlation between the relative performance of growth and value stocks and the 30-year bond yield this year. Rising input prices will make the US export sector less competitive, leading to a weaker dollar. Historically, non-US stocks have done well when the dollar has been weakening (Chart 22). Chart 21The Relative Performance of Value Stocks Has Closely Tracked Bond Yields This Year The Relative Performance of Value Stocks Has Closely Tracked Bond Yields This Year The Relative Performance of Value Stocks Has Closely Tracked Bond Yields This Year Chart 22Non-US Stocks Tend To Do Best When The US Dollar Is Weakening Non-US Stocks Tend To Do Best When The US Dollar Is Weakening Non-US Stocks Tend To Do Best When The US Dollar Is Weakening As for the overall stock market, with the Fed still in the dovish camp, it is too early to turn negative on equities. An equity bear market is coming, but not until rising inflation forces the Fed to step up the pace of rate hikes. That will probably not happen until mid-2023. Short Gilt Trade Activated We noted last week that we would go short the 10-year UK Gilt if the yield broke below 0.85%. Our limit order was activated on November 5th and we are now short this security.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  To distinguish between inside and outside money, one should ask where the liability resides. If the liability resides within the private sector, it is inside money. By convention, central bank reserves are classified as outside money. However, one could argue that since taxpayers ultimately own the central bank, an increase in the price level will benefit taxpayers by eroding the real value of the central bank’s liability. If one were to take this view, the Pigou effect would be even weaker. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Image Special Trade Recommendations Image Current MacroQuant Model Scores Image

Highlights Geopolitical conflicts point to energy price spikes and could add to inflation surprises in the near term. However, US fiscal drag and China’s economic slowdown are both disinflationary risks to be aware of.  Specifically, energy-producers like Russia and Iran gain greater leverage amid energy shortages. Europe’s natural gas prices could spike again. Conflict in the Middle East could disrupt oil flows.    President Biden’s $1.75 trillion social spending bill is a litmus test for fiscal fatigue in developed markets. It could fail, and even assuming it passes it will not prevent overall fiscal drag in 2022-23. However, it is inflationary over the long run. China’s slowdown poses the chief disinflationary risk. But we still think policy will ease to avoid an economic crash ahead of the fall 2022 national party congress.  We are closing this year’s long value / short growth trade for a loss of 3.75%. Cyclical sectors ended up being a better way to play the reopening trade. Feature Equity markets rallied in recent weeks despite sharp upward moves in core inflation across the world (Chart 1). Inflation is fast becoming a popular concern and we see geopolitical risks that could drive headline inflation still higher in the short run. We also see underrated disinflationary factors, namely China’s property sector distress and economic slowdown.     Several major developments have occurred in recent weeks that we will cover in this report. Our conclusions: Biden’s domestic agenda will pass but risks are high and macro impact is limited. Congress passed Biden’s infrastructure deal and will probably still pass his signature social spending bill, although inflation is creating pushback. Together these bills have little impact on the budget deficit outlook but they will add to inflationary pressures.  Energy shortages embolden Russia and Iran. Winter weather is unpredictable, the energy crisis may not be over. But investors are underrating Russia’s aggressive posture toward the West. Any conflict with Iran could also cause oil disruptions in the near future. US-China relations may improve but not for long. A bilateral summit between Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping will not reduce tensions for very long, if at all. Climate change cooperation is an insufficient basis to reverse the cold war-style confrontation over the long run. Chart 1Inflation Rattles Policymakers Inflation Rattles Policymakers Inflation Rattles Policymakers The investment takeaway is that geopolitical tensions could push energy prices still higher in the short term. Iran and Russia need to be monitored. However, China’s economic slowdown will weigh on growth. China poses an underrated disinflationary risk to our views. US Congress: Bellwether For Fiscal Fatigue While inflation is starting to trouble households and voters, investors should bear in mind that the current set of politicians have long aimed to generate an inflation overshoot. They spent the previous decade in fear of deflation, since it generated anti-establishment or populist parties that threatened to disrupt the political system. They quietly built up an institutional consensus around more robust fiscal policy and monetary-fiscal coordination. Now they are seeing that agenda succeed but are facing the first major hurdle in the form of higher prices. They will not simply cut and run. Inflation is accompanied by rising wages, which today’s leaders want to see – almost all of them have promised households a greater share of the fruits of their labor, in keeping with the new, pro-worker, populist zeitgeist. Real wages are growing at 1.1% in the US and 0.9% across the G7 (Chart 2). Even more than central bankers, political leaders are focused on jobs and employment, i.e. voters. Yet the labor market still has considerable slack (Chart 3). Almost all of the major western governments have been politically recapitalized since the pandemic, either through elections or new coalitions. Almost all of them were elected on promises of robust public investment programs to “build back better,” i.e. create jobs, build infrastructure, revitalize industry, and decarbonize the energy economy. Thus while they are concerned about inflation, they will leave that to central banks, as they will be loathe to abandon their grand investment plans.  Chart 2Higher Wages: Real Or Nominal? Higher Wages: Real Or Nominal? Higher Wages: Real Or Nominal? Still, there will be a breaking point at which inflation forces governments to put their spending plans on hold. The US Congress is the immediate test of whether today’s inflation will trigger fiscal fatigue and force a course correction.      Chart 3Policymakers Fear Populism, Focus On Employment Policymakers Fear Populism, Focus On Employment Policymakers Fear Populism, Focus On Employment President Biden’s $550 billion infrastructure bill passed Congress last week and will be signed into law around November 15. Now he is worried that his signature $1.75 trillion social spending bill will falter due to inflation fears. He cannot spare a single vote in the Senate (and only three votes in the House of Representatives). Odds that the bill fails are about 35%. Democratic Party leaders will not abandon the cause due to recent inflation prints. They see a once-in-a-generation opportunity to expand the role of government, the social safety net, and the interests of their constituents. If they miss this chance due to inflation that ends up being transitory then they will lose the enthusiastic left wing of the party and suffer a devastating loss in next year’s midterm elections, in which they are already at a disadvantage.   Biden’s social bill is also likely to pass because the budget reconciliation process necessary to pass the bill is the same process needed to raise the national debt limit by December 3. A linkage of the two by party leaders would ensure that both pass … and otherwise Democrats risk self-inflicting a national debt default. The reconciliation bill is more about long-term than short-term inflation risk. The bill does not look to have a substantial impact on the budget outlook: the new spending is partially offset by new taxes and spread out over ten years. The various legislative scenarios look virtually the same in our back-of-the-envelope budget projections (Chart 4). Chart 4 However, given that the output gap is virtually closed, this bill combined with the infrastructure bill will add to inflationary pressures. The fiscal drag will diminish by 2024, not coincidentally the presidential election year 2024, not coincidentally the presidential election year. The deficit is not expected to increase or decrease substantially between 2023 and 2024. From then onward the budget deficit will expand. The increased government demand for goods and services and the increased disposable income for low-earning families will add to inflationary pressures. Other developed markets face a similar situation: inflation is picking up, but big spending has been promised and normalizing budgets will marginally weigh on growth in the next few years (Chart 5). True, growth should hold up since the private economy is rebounding in the wake of the pandemic. But politicians will not be inclined to renege on campaign promises of liberal spending in the face of fiscal drag. The current crop of leaders is primed to make major public investments. This is true of Germany, Japan, Canada, and Italy as well as the United States. It is partly true in France, where fiscal retrenchment has been put on hold given the presidential election in the spring. The effect will be inflationary, especially for the US where populist spending is more extravagant than elsewhere. Chart 5 The long run will depend on structural factors and how much the new investments improve productivity. Bottom Line: A single vote in the US Senate could derail the president’s social spending bill, so the US is now the bellwether for fiscal fatigue in the developed world. Biden is likely to pass the bill, as global fiscal drag is disinflationary over the next 12 months. Yet inflation could stay elevated for other reasons. And this fiscal drag will dissipate later in the business cycle. Russia And Iran Gain Leverage Amid Energy Crunch The global energy price spike arose from a combination of structural factors – namely the pandemic and stimulus. It has abated in recent weeks but will remain a latent problem through the winter season, especially if La Niña makes temperatures unusually cold as expected. Rising energy prices feed into general producer prices, which are being passed onto consumers (Chart 6). They look to be moderating but the weather is unpredictable.   There is another reason that near-term energy prices could spike or stay elevated: geopolitics. Tight global energy supply-demand balances mean that there is little margin of safety if unexpected supply disruptions occur. This gives greater leverage to energy producers, two of which are especially relevant at the moment: Russia and Iran.      Russia’s long-running conflict with the West is heating up on several fronts, as expected. Russia may not have caused the European energy crisis but it is exacerbating shortages by restricting flows of natural gas for political reasons, as it is wont to do (Chart 7). Moscow always maintains plausible deniability but it is currently flexing its energy muscles in several areas: Chart 6Energy Price Depends On Winter ... And Russia/Iran! Energy Price Depends On Winter ... And Russia/Iran! Energy Price Depends On Winter ... And Russia/Iran! Ukraine: Russia has avoided filling up and fully utilizing pipelines and storage facilities in Ukraine, where the US is now warning that Russia could stage a large military action in retaliation for Ukrainian drone strikes in the still-simmering Russia-Ukraine war.    Belarus: Russia says it will not increase the gas flow through the major Yamal-Europe natural gas pipeline in 2022 even as Belarus threatens to halt the pipeline’s operation entirely. Belarus, backed by Russia, is locked in a conflict with Poland and the EU over Belarus’s funneling of migrants into their territory (Chart 8). The conflict could lead not only to energy supply disruptions but also to a broader closure of trade and a military standoff.1 Russia has flown two Tu-160 nuclear-armed bombers over Belarus and the border area in a sign of support. Moldova: Russia is withholding natural gas to pressure the new, pro-EU Moldovan government. Chart 7 Chart 8 Russia’s main motive is obvious: it wants Germany and the EU to approve and certify the new Nord Stream II pipeline. Nord Stream II enables Germany and Russia to bypass Ukraine, where pipeline politics raise the risk of shortages and wars. Lame duck German Chancellor Angela Merkel worked with Russia to complete this pipeline before the end of her term, convincing the Biden administration to issue a waiver on congressional sanctions that could have halted its construction. However, two of the parties in the incoming German government, the Greens and the Free Democrats, oppose the pipeline. While these parties may not have been able to stop the pipeline from operating, Russia does not want to take any chances and is trying to force Germany’s and the EU’s hand. The energy crisis makes it more likely that the pipeline will be approved, since the European Commission will have to make its decision during a period when cold weather and shortages will make it politically acceptable to certify the pipeline.2 The decision will further drive a wedge between Germany and eastern EU members, which is what Russia wants. EU natural gas prices will likely subside sometime next year and will probably not derail the economic recovery, according to both our commodity and Europe strategists. A bigger and longer-lasting Russian energy squeeze would emerge if the Nord Stream II pipeline is not certified. This is a low risk at this point but the next six months could bring surprises. More broadly, the West’s conflict with Russia can easily escalate from here. First, President Vladimir Putin faces economic challenges and weak political support. He frequently diverts popular attention by staging aggressive moves abroad. There is no reason to believe his post-2004 strategy of restoring Russia’s sphere of influence in the former Soviet space has changed. High energy prices give him greater leverage even aside from pipeline coercion – so it is not surprising that Russia is moving troops to the Ukraine border again. Growing military support for Belarus, or an expanded conflict in Ukraine, are likely to create a crisis now or later.   Second, the US-Germany agreement to allow Nord Stream II explicitly states that Russia must not weaponize natural gas supply. This statement has had zero effect so far. But when the energy shortage subsides, the EU could pursue retaliatory measures along with the United States. Of course, Russia has been able to weather sanctions. But tensions are already escalating significantly.  After Russia, Iran also gains leverage during times of tight energy supplies. With global oil inventories drawing down, Iran is in the position to inflict “maximum pressure” on the US and its allies, a role reversal from the 2017-20 period in which large inventories enabled the US to impose crippling sanctions on Iran after pulling out of the 2015 nuclear deal (Chart 9). Iran is rapidly advancing on its nuclear program and a new round of diplomatic negotiations may only serve to buy time before it crosses the “breakout” threshold of uranium enrichment capability as early as this month or next. In a recent special report we argued that there is a 40% chance of a crisis over Iran in the Middle East. Such a crisis could ultimately lead to an oil shock in the Persian Gulf or Strait of Hormuz.  Chart 9Now Iran Can Use 'Maximum Pressure' Now Iran Can Use 'Maximum Pressure' Now Iran Can Use 'Maximum Pressure' Bottom Line: Russia’s natural gas coercion of Europe could keep European energy prices high through March or May. More broadly Russia’s renewed tensions with the West confirm our view that oil producers gain geopolitical leverage amid the current supply shortages. Iran also gains leverage and its conflict with the US could lead to global oil supply disruptions anytime over the next 12 months. Until Nord Stream II is certified and a new Iranian nuclear agreement is signed, there are two clear sources of potential energy shocks. Moreover in today’s inflationary context there is limited margin of safety for unexpected supply disruptions regardless of source. Xi’s Historical Rewrite China continues to be a major source of risk for the global economy and financial markets in the lead-up to the twentieth national party congress in fall 2022. While Chinese assets have sold off this year, global risk assets are still vulnerable to negative surprises from China.  The five-year political reshuffle in 2022 is more important than usual since President Xi Jinping was originally supposed to step down but will instead stick around as leader for life, like China’s previous strongmen Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.3 Xi’s rejection of term limits became clear in 2017 and is not really news. But Xi will fortify himself and his faction in 2022 against any opposition whatsoever. He is extremely vigilant about any threats that could disrupt this process, whether at home or abroad.  The Communist Party’s sixth plenary session this week highlights both Xi’s success within the Communist Party and the sensitivity of the period. Xi produced a new “historical resolution,” or interpretation of the party’s history, which is only the third such resolution. A few remarks on this historical resolution are pertinent: Mao’s resolution: Chairman Mao wrote the first such resolution in 1945 to lay down his version of the party’s history and solidify his personal control. It is naturally a revolutionary leftist document. Deng’s revision of Mao: General Deng Xiaoping then produced a major revision in 1981, shortly after initiating China’s economic opening and reform. Deng’s interpretation aimed to hold Mao accountable for “gross mistakes” during the Cultural Revolution and yet to recognize the Communist Party’s positive achievements in founding the People’s Republic. His version gave credit to the party and collective leadership rather than Mao’s personal rule. Two 30-year periods: The implication was that the party’s history should be divided into two thirty-year periods: the period of foundations and conflict with Mao as the party’s core and the period of improvement and prosperity with Deng as the core. Jiang’s support of Deng: Deng’s telling came under scrutiny from new leftists in the wake of Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. But General Secretary Jiang Zemin largely held to Deng’s version of the story that the days of reform and opening were a far better example of the party’s leadership because they were so much more stable and prosperous.4 Xi’s reaction to Jiang and Deng: Since coming to power in 2012, Xi Jinping has shown an interest in revising the party’s official interpretation of its own history. The central claim of the revisionists is that China could never have achieved its economic success if not for Mao’s strongman rule. Mao’s rule and the Communist Party’s central control thus regain their centrality to modern China’s story. China’s prosperity owes its existence to these primary political conditions. The two periods cannot be separated.  Xi’s synthesis of Deng and Mao: Now Xi has written himself into that history above all other figures – indeed the communique from the Sixth Plenum mentions Xi more often than Marx, Mao, or Deng (Chart 10). The implication is that Xi is the synthesis of Mao and Deng, as we argued back in 2017 at the end of the nineteenth national party congress. The synthesis consists of a strongman who nevertheless maintains a vibrant economy for strategic ends. Chart 10 What are the practical policy implications of this history lesson? Higher Country Risk: China’s revival of personal rule, as opposed to consensus rule, marks a permanent increase in “country risk” and political risk for investors. Autocratic governments lack institutional guardrails (checks and balances) that prevent drastic policy mistakes. When Xi tries to step down there will probably be a succession crisis. Higher Macroeconomic Risk: China is more likely to get stuck in the “middle-income trap.” Liberal or pro-market economic reform is de-emphasized both in the new historical resolution and in the Xi administration’s broader program. Centralization is already suppressing animal spirits, entrepreneurship, and the private sector.  Higher Geopolitical Risk: The return to autocracy and the withdrawal from economic liberalism also entail a conflict with the United States, which is still the world’s largest economy and most powerful military. The US is not what it once was but it will put pressure on China’s economy and build alliances aimed at strategic containment. Bottom Line: China is trying to escape the middle-income trap, like Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, but it is trying to do so by means of autocracy, import substitution, and conflict with the United States. These other Asian economies improved productivity by democratizing, embracing globalization, and maintaining a special relationship with the United States. China’s odds of succeeding are low. China will focus on power consolidation through fall 2022 and this will lead to negative surprises for financial markets.    China Slowdown: The Disinflationary Risk While it is very unlikely that Xi will face serious challenges to his rule, strange things can happen at critical junctures. Therefore the regime will be extremely alert for any threats, foreign or domestic, and will ultimately prioritize politics above all other things, which means investors will suffer negative surprises. The lingering pandemic still poses an inflationary risk for the rest of the world while the other main risk is disinflationary:    Inflationary Risk – Zero COVID: The “Covid Zero” policy of attempting to stamp out any trace of the virus will still be relevant at least over the next 12 months (Chart 11). Clampdowns serve a dual purpose since the Xi administration wants to minimize foreign interference and domestic dissent before the party congress. Hence the global economy can suffer more negative supply shocks if ports or factories are closed.  Inflationary Risk – Energy Closures: The government is rationing electricity amid energy shortages to prioritize household heating and essential services. This could hurt factory output over the winter if the weather is bad. Disinflationary Risk – Property Bust: The country is still flirting with overtightening monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policies. Throughout the year we have argued that authorities would avoid overtightening. But China is still very much in a danger zone in which policy mistakes could be made. Recent rumors suggest the government is trying to “correct the overcorrection” of regulatory policy. The government is reportedly mulling measures to relax the curbs on the property sector. We are inclined to agree but there is no sign yet that markets are responding, judging by corporate defaults and the crunch in financial conditions (Chart 12). Chart 11 Chart 12China Has Not Contained Property Turmoil China Has Not Contained Property Turmoil China Has Not Contained Property Turmoil Evergrande, the world’s most indebted property developer, is still hobbling along, but its troubles are not over. There are signs of contagion among other developers, including state-owned enterprises, that cannot meet the government’s “three red lines.” 5 Credit growth has now broken beneath the government’s target range of 12%, though money growth has bounced off the lower 8% limit set for this year (Chart 13). China is dangerously close to overtightening.   China’s economic slowdown has not yet been fully felt in the global economy based on China’s import volumes, which are tightly linked to the combined credit-and-fiscal-spending impulse (Chart 14). The implication is that recent pullbacks in industrial metal prices and commodity indexes will continue. Chart 13China Tries To Avoid Over-Tightening China Tries To Avoid Over-Tightening China Tries To Avoid Over-Tightening Chart 14China Slowdown Not Yet Fully Felt China Slowdown Not Yet Fully Felt China Slowdown Not Yet Fully Felt ​​​​​​​Until China eases policy more substantially, it poses a disinflationary risk and a strong point in favor of the transitory view of global inflation.    It is difficult for China to ease policy – let alone stimulate – when producer prices are so high (see Chart 6 above). The result is a dangerous quandary in which the government’s regulatory crackdowns are triggering a property bust yet the government is prevented from providing the usual policy support as the going gets tough. Asset prices and broader risk sentiment could go into free fall. However, the party has a powerful incentive to prevent a generalized crisis ahead of the party congress. So we are inclined to accept signs that property curbs and other policies will be eased. Bottom Line: The full disinflationary impact of China’s financial turmoil and economic slowdown has yet to be felt globally.     Biden-Xi Summit Not A Game Changer As long as inflation prevents robust monetary and fiscal easing, Beijing is incentivized to improve sentiment in other ways. One way is to back away from the regulatory crackdown in other sectors, such as Big Tech. The other is to improve relations with the United States. A stabilization of US ties would be useful before the party congress since President Xi would prefer not to have the US interfering in China’s internal affairs during such a critical hour. No surprise that China is showing signs of trying to stabilize the relationship.   The US is apparently reciprocating. Presidents Biden and Xi also agreed to hold a virtual bilateral summit next week, which could lead to a new series of talks. The US Trade Representative also plans to restart trade negotiations. The plan is to enforce the Phase One trade deal, issue waivers for tariffs that hurt US companies, and pursue new talks over outstanding structural disputes. The Phase One trade deal has fallen far short of its goals in general but on the energy front it is doing well. China will continue importing US commodities amid global shortages (Chart 15). Chart 15 Chart 15 The summit alone will have a limited impact. Biden had a summit with Putin earlier this year but relations could deteriorate tomorrow over cyber-attacks, Ukraine, or Belarus. However, there is some basis for the US and China to cooperate next year: Iran. Xi is consolidating power at home in 2022 and probably wants to use negotiations to keep the Americans at bay. Biden is pivoting to foreign policy in 2022, since Congress will not get anything done, and will primarily focus on halting Iran’s nuclear program. If China assists the US with Iran, then there is a basis for a reduction in tensions. The problem is not only Iran itself but also that China will not jump to enforce sanctions on Iran amid energy shortages. And China is not about to make sweeping structural economic concessions to the US as the Xi administration doubles down on state-guided industrial policy. Meanwhile the US is pursuing a long-term policy of strategic containment and Biden will not want to be seen as appeasing China ahead of midterm elections, especially given Xi’s reversion to autocracy. What about cooperation on climate change? The US and China also delivered a surprise joint statement at the United Nations climate change conference in Scotland (COP26), confirming the widely held expectation that climate policy is an area of engagement. These powers and Europe have a strategic interest in reducing dependency on Middle Eastern oil (Chart 16). Climate talks will begin in the first half of next year. However, climate cooperation is not significant enough alone to outweigh the deeper conflicts between the US and China. Moreover climate policy itself is somewhat antagonistic, as the EU and US are looking at applying “carbon adjustment fees” to carbon-intensive imports, e.g. iron and steel exports from China and other high-polluting producers (Chart 17). While the EU and US are not on the same page yet, and these carbon tariffs are far from implementation, the emergence of green protectionism does not bode well for US-China relations even aside from their fundamental political and military disputes. Chart 16 Bottom Line: Some short-term stabilization of US-China relations is possible but not guaranteed. Markets will cheer if it happens but the effect will be fleeting. Chinese assets are still extremely vulnerable to political and geopolitical risks.   Chart 17 Investment Takeaways Gold can still go higher. Financial markets are pricing higher inflation and weak real rates. Gold has been our chief trade to prepare both for higher inflation and geopolitical risk. We are closing our long value / growth equity trade for a loss of 3.75%. We are maintaining our long DM Europe / short EM Europe trade. This trade has performed poorly due to the rally in energy prices and hence Russian equities. But while energy prices may overshoot in the near term, investors will flee Russian equities as geopolitical risks materialize. We are maintaining our long Korea / short Taiwan trade despite its being deeply in the red. This trade is valid over a strategic or long-term time horizon, in which a major geopolitical crisis and/or war is likely. Our expectation that China will ease policy to stabilize the economy ahead of fall 2022 should support Korean equities.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com       Footnotes 1     Over the past year President Alexander Lukashenko’s repression of domestic unrest prompted the EU to impose sanctions. Lukashenko responded by organizing an immigration scheme in which Middle Eastern migrants are flown into Belarus and funneled into the EU via Poland. The EU is threatening to expand sanctions while Belarus is threatening to cut off the Yamal-Europe pipeline amid Europe’s energy crisis. See Pavel Felgenhauer, “Belarus as Latest Front in Acute East-West Standoff,” Jamestown Foundation, November 11, 2021, Jamestown.org. 2     Both Germany and the EU must approve of Nord Stream II for it to enter into operation. The German Federal Network Agency has until January 8, 2022 to certify the project. The Economy Ministry has already given the green light. Then the European Commission has two-to-four months to respond. The EU is supposed to consider whether the pipeline meets the EU’s requirement that gas transport be “unbundled” or separated from gas production and sales. This is a higher hurdle but Germany’s clout will be felt. Hence final approval could come by March 8 or May 8, 2022. The energy crisis will put pressure for an early certification but the EU Commission may take the full time to pretend that it is not being blackmailed. See Joseph Nasr and Christoph Steitz, “Certifying Nord Stream 2 poses no threat to gas supply to EU – Germany,” Reuters, October 26, 2021, reuters.com. 3    Xi is not serving for an “unprecedented third term,” as the mainstream media keeps reporting. China’s top office is not constant nor were term limits ever firmly established. Each leader’s reign should be measured by their effective control rather than technical terms in office. Mao reigned for 27 years (1949-76), Deng for 14 years or more (1978-92), Jiang Zemin for 10 years (1992-2002), and Hu Jintao for 10 years (2002-2012).  4    See Joseph Fewsmith, “Mao’s Shadow” Hoover Institution, China Leadership Monitor 43 (2014), and “The 19th Party Congress: Ringing In Xi Jinping’s New Age,” Hoover Institution, China Leadership Monitor 55 (2018), hoover.org.  5    Liability-to-asset ratios less than 70%, debt-to-equity less than 100%, and cash-to-short-term-debt ratios of more than 1.0x.   Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Open Trades & Positions  Image

Dear client, This week, we are introducing our new “Currency Month-In-Review” report. The new format should dovetail nicely with the historical back sections you have become accustomed to, but with a more holistic approach to interpreting data releases, along with actionable investment advice. We would appreciate any comments, criticisms, and feedback to help us better serve you. Kind regards, The Foreign Exchange Strategy team   Highlights The DXY index has broken above our 95-threshold level. As a momentum currency, the prospect for further gains in the near term are high. That said, we are sticking with our longer-term (12-18 month) bearish view. Most of the catalysts propping the dollar in the near-term should reverse. The Fed will continue to lag the inflation curve, and economic growth will rotate from the US to other economies that are getting their populations vaccinated. Both are dollar bearish. Speculative positioning in the dollar is now approaching extremes. This warns against establishing fresh long positions. Amidst the volatility in currency markets, trading opportunities are emerging. This week, we are initiating a limit-buy on EUR/CHF trade at 1.05. Feature The latest CPI report from the US was strong, taking markets much by surprise. In the currency world, the spread between the 3-month Eurodollar and Euribor interest rate shot up, pushing up the dollar (Chart 1). December 2022 Eurodollar futures are now pricing in a much faster pace of rate hikes than they did earlier this year. This helped cement the dollar as king this year (Chart 2). Chart 1The Dollar And Interest Rates The Dollar And Interest Rates The Dollar And Interest Rates Chart 2AThe Strength In The DXY Is Not Fully Justified By The Economic Picture The Strength In The DXY Is Justified By The Economic Picture The Strength In The DXY Is Justified By The Economic Picture Chart 2BThe Strength In The DXY Is Not Fully Justified By The Economic Picture The Strength In The DXY Is Justified By The Economic Picture The Strength In The DXY Is Justified By The Economic Picture Chart 2CThe Strength In The DXY Is Not Fully Justified By The Economic Picture The Strength In The DXY Is Justified By The Economic Picture The Strength In The DXY Is Justified By The Economic Picture Chart 2DThe Strength In The DXY Is Not Fully Justified By The Economic Picture The Strength In The DXY Is Justified By The Economic Picture The Strength In The DXY Is Justified By The Economic Picture Economic data has also been moving in favor of the US of late. The economic surprise index in the US is at 19, while in the eurozone and Japan, it is at -50 and -73.9, respectively. From a broader perspective, the recovery in the services PMI in the US had been more robust than most other developed economies. That said, there are also signs that US economic momentum is giving way to other countries. The US is likely to be the first country to close its output gap, and commensurately, inflation is surprising to the upside (Chart 3). Wage growth has also inflected higher. This is raising the prospect that inflation might be more of a genuine concern. For many other countries, surging house prices are threatening financial stability. In New Zealand, the central bank now has a mandate to consider house prices when calibrating policy. Chart 3AThe US Is Generating Genuine Inflation. This Is Depressing Real Rates The US Is Generating Genuine Inflation. This Is Depressing Real Rates The US Is Generating Genuine Inflation. This Is Depressing Real Rates Chart 3BThe US Is Generating Genuine Inflation. This Is Depressing Real Rates The US Is Generating Genuine Inflation. This Is Depressing Real Rates The US Is Generating Genuine Inflation. This Is Depressing Real Rates Chart 3CThe US Is Generating Genuine Inflation. This Is Depressing Real Rates The US Is Generating Genuine Inflation. This Is Depressing Real Rates The US Is Generating Genuine Inflation. This Is Depressing Real Rates Chart 3DThe US Is Generating Genuine Inflation. This Is Depressing Real Rates The US Is Generating Genuine Inflation. This Is Depressing Real Rates The US Is Generating Genuine Inflation. This Is Depressing Real Rates The key point is that many central banks have already withdrawn accommodation ahead of the Fed, which puts the recent dollar rally into question. QE has ended in Canada and New Zealand. Norway and New Zealand have hiked interest rates. Forward curves suggest that most central banks should continue to withdraw accommodation. The key question is whether the Fed turns more hawkish that what is already priced in, or disappoints market expectations. We side with the latter. In the meantime, real rates continue to remain deeply negative in the US. With negative real rates and a deteriorating trade balance, the US will need to significantly raise interest rates to attract portfolio investment. For the US, portfolio investment has mostly been in the form of equity purchases rather than bond flows (Chart 4) and Chart 5). But even an increase in the US 10-year yield to 2.25% will keep real interest rates low. In the following sections, we look at the latest economic releases and provide our assessment of the impact going forward on various currencies. Chart 4AThe Fed Could Disappoint Market Expectations The Fed Could Disappoint Market Expectations The Fed Could Disappoint Market Expectations Chart 4BThe Fed Could Disappoint Market Expectations The Fed Could Disappoint Market Expectations The Fed Could Disappoint Market Expectations Chart 4CThe Fed Could Disappoint Market Expectations The Fed Could Disappoint Market Expectations The Fed Could Disappoint Market Expectations Chart 4 Chart 5AThe US Trade Deficit Needs To Be Financed Externally The US Trade Deficit Needs To Be Financed Externally The US Trade Deficit Needs To Be Financed Externally Chart 5BThe US Trade Deficit Needs To Be Financed Externally The US Trade Deficit Needs To Be Financed Externally The US Trade Deficit Needs To Be Financed Externally Chart 5CThe US Trade Deficit Needs To Be Financed Externally The US Trade Deficit Needs To Be Financed Externally The US Trade Deficit Needs To Be Financed Externally Chart 5DThe US Trade Deficit Needs To Be Financed Externally The US Trade Deficit Needs To Be Financed Externally The US Trade Deficit Needs To Be Financed Externally US Dollar The last month has seen US economic data outperform that of its peers. Within the G10, the Citigroup economic surprise index is much higher in the US (+19), than say, the euro area (-50) or Japan (-74). This has supported the DXY, which is up almost 1% over the last month. For risk-management purposes, we are turning neutral on the DXY in the near term, even though our longer-term view remains bearish. The two most important releases in the US over the last month were the jobs report and this week’s CPI report. Nonfarm payrolls increased by 531,000 jobs and unemployment fell to 4.6% in October. This is inching closer to NAIRU. Meanwhile, headline CPI came in at 6.2% year-on-year in September while core inflation came in at 4.9%, the highest for several decades. This is occurring within the context of accelerating wage growth (unit labor costs in the nonfarm business sector surged 8.3% in Q3), higher house prices, and an ebullient stock market, reinforcing the wealth effect.  That said, strong domestic demand in the US will have to trigger a much more hawkish Fed for the dollar to reach escape velocity. This is because it will push real interest rates lower as it inflates the US current account deficit. The trade deficit grew 11.2% in September, the sharpest monthly increase since July of 2020. Equity portfolio flows, which have been sustaining the trade deficit, are softening of late. Bond portfolio flows will need a much weaker dollar, or higher Treasury yields, to accelerate. Against such a backdrop, the Fed recently announced a “dovish taper” by reducing the monthly pace of its asset purchases by $15 billion, with the tapering expected to be completed by mid-2022. No imminent rate hike was signaled. The market is likely to continue to challenge such a dovish stance, which will put near-term upward pressure on the dollar, until inflation eventually rolls over. From a relative standpoint, the Fed is lagging many other major developed market central banks in normalizing monetary policy. We are sticking to our long-term bearish view on the dollar index, but a more proactive Fed is a risk to this view. We are upgrading our near-term outlook on the dollar to neutral.  Chart 6AUS Dollar US Dollar US Dollar Chart 6BUS Dollar US Dollar US Dollar Euro The euro has been breaking down in recent sessions and is the main cause of the surge in the DXY index. The euro is down 0.7% over the last month and is currently at 1.145. The key catalyst for the weakness in the euro is the perception that the ECB will severely lag the Fed in normalizing policy settings. This is occurring within the context of surging inflation in the euro area. Headline CPI came in at 4.1% in October, above expectations of 3.7% and well above September’s 3.4% print. The is dampening real rates in the entire eurozone. On the flip side, there is credence to the ECB’s dovish stance given that unemployment is still above NAIRU and eurozone wage growth remains very tepid. On the economy, the recent improvement in both the Sentix and ZEW expectations bode well for euro area activity.  Lower real rates have been the proximate driver of a soft euro in recent trading sessions. That said, real rates could improve if inflation proves transitory. The energy component of the CPI was up 23% year-on-year, by far the biggest contributor to the headline print. Any sign that the ECB is tilting towards a more hawkish direction will initially materialize in the form of reduced asset purchases. This would curtail the significant portfolio outflows from the eurozone this year. From a positioning standpoint, speculative long positions in the euro have also been liquidated, which provides some footing for the currency. We are maintaining a neutral stance on the euro in the very near term, with a bias to buy on weakness.  Chart 7AEuro Euro Euro Chart 7BEuro Euro Euro   Japanese  Yen JPY is the worst-performing currency this year and it is also one of the most shorted. Over the last month, the yen is down 0.4%. Japan is just now emerging from the pandemic, having vaccinated most of its population. Ergo, the economic surprise index, which currently sits at -74, could stage a powerful rebound. While both the inflation print and employment data were in line with expectations (the unemployment rate came in at 2.8% in September), there were other encouraging signs. In October, the Eco Watcher’s Survey rose from 42.1 to 55.5, the manufacturing PMI rose from 51.5 to 53.2, and machine tool orders accelerated 81.5% year-on-year.  The Bank of Japan kept monetary policy unchanged at its latest meeting. The policy stance of the BoJ remains dovish, with little prospect of any interest rate increase until 2025. Therefore, in an environment where interest rates rise, that will hurt the yen at the margin. That said, the underperformance of Japanese assets is attracting portfolio inflows, especially from equity investors. As we wrote last week, the underperformance of certain Japanese equity sectors has not been fully justified by the improving earnings picture. From a valuation standpoint, the yen is the cheapest G10 currency according to our PPP models, and it is also quite cheap according to our intermediate-term timing model. Therefore, even given the breakout in the DXY index, we are maintaining our near-term positive for the yen. Chart 8AJapanese Yen Japanese Yen Japanese Yen Chart 8BJapanese Yen Japanese Yen Japanese Yen British Pound As a high-beta currency, sterling has been one of the victims of dollar strength. GBP is down 1.6% over the last month. The biggest driver was the volte-face from the BoE. The BoE kept rates on hold despite their seemingly hawkish messaging weeks ahead of the MPC meeting. Gilt yields fell along with the pound. Following the expiry of the furlough scheme in September, the central bank is waiting to the see the potential impact on the labor market before curtailing accommodation. Hence, a hike in December is still on the table. Incoming data continues to strengthen the case for the BoE to tighten policy. CPI is at 3.5%, with the transport and housing sectors continuing to see surging prices. At 4.5%, the unemployment rate is at NAIRU. Wages are also inflecting higher. The latest GDP report (Q3 GDP rose 6.6% year-on-year) continues to suggest the UK economy maintains upward momentum. The October manufacturing PMI rose from 57.1 to 57.8.  Near term, the pound could continue to face weakness as speculators liquidate positions and capital inflows soften. This is especially the case as the post-Brexit environment remains quite volatile. As a play on this trend, we are tactically long EUR/GBP. However, we remain bullish sterling on a cyclical horizon as real rates should continue to normalize. Chart 9ABritish Pound British Pound British Pound Chart 9BBritish Pound British Pound British Pound Australian Dollar The Australian dollar is down 0.8% over the last month, as both a stronger dollar and lower iron ore prices exert downward pressure on the exchange rate. The biggest developments over the last few weeks in Australia were the CPI report and the RBA policy meeting. The Q3 print for CPI was 3%, the upper bound of the central bank’s target range, with the trimmed-mean and weighted-median figure coming in at 2.1%. This helped justify the RBA’s decision to abandon the 0.1% yield target on the April 2024 bond. That said, the central bank maintained its cash rate target of 0.1% until earliest 2023 and left the pace of asset purchases unchanged. The RBA trimmed its forecast for GDP for this year to 3% from 4% and said more than 50% of jobs were currently experiencing little to no wage growth. Wages grew just 1.7% in the year to June, far below the 3%-plus levels the RBA believes is necessary to keep inflation sustainably within the 2%-3% band and trigger a rate hike. Hence, the release of the Q3 wage price index, on November 17, will be closely watched. Any upward surprise can challenge the RBA’s measured projections. The bearish case for the Aussie is well known, with speculative positioning near a record short. That said, real yields in Australia have been improving and portfolio flows are accelerating, especially into the mining and energy sectors, which are benefiting from a terms-of-trade tailwind. This sets the stage for a coil-spring rebound in the Aussie. Meanwhile, the AUD is cheap, especially on a terms-of-trade basis. At the crosses, we are long AUD/NZD as a play on these trends. From a tactical standpoint, we are neutral the Aussie, but will buy outright at 70 cents.  Chart 10AAustralian Dollar Australian Dollar Australian Dollar Chart 10BAustralian Dollar Australia Dollar Australia Dollar New Zealand Dollar The New Zealand dollar is up 1.3% over the last month. New Zealand’s economy is firing on all cylinders. CPI accelerated sharply from 3.3% to 4.9% in Q3, well above the RBNZ’s target band of 1%-3%, and behind only that of the US. The unemployment rate fell to 3.4% in Q3, far lower than the 3.9% forecasted by economists polled by Reuters. Wage growth was strong in the quarter with the private sector labor cost index registering a 0.7% lift. The seasonally adjusted employment number jumped 2.0% on the quarter, beating expectations of a 0.4% increase. The participation rate also rose to 71.2%, higher than the 70.6% forecast. Meanwhile, house prices continue to move higher, especially in Wellington.  As a result, the RBNZ has been one of the most hawkish G10 central banks, hiking rates last month for the first time in seven years to 0.5%. Another 0.25% hike is likely at the November 24 meeting. Meanwhile, at 2.6%, New Zealand currently has the highest G10 10-year bond yield. This is bullish for the kiwi. The one caveat is that the Covid-19 situation in New Zealand continues to deteriorate, which could be a catalyst for a pause.  Portfolio flows into New Zealand have turned negative in recent quarters. The equity market, which is quite expensive, has underperformed and the currency is overvalued according to our models, which has dampened the appeal of higher yields. We continue to believe the NZD will fare well cyclically, but hawkish expectations from the RBNZ are already priced in. This provides room for disappointment.  Chart 11ANew Zealand Dollar New Zealand Dollar New Zealand Dollar Chart 11BNew Zealand Dollar New Zealand Dollar New Zealand Dollar Canadian Dollar The CAD is the best-performing currency this year, even though it is down 1% over the last month. The key driver of the CAD in recent weeks remains the outlook for monetary policy, and the path of energy prices. CPI inflation came in at 4.4% year-on-year for September, beating market expectations and among the highest across the G10. The CPI-trim hit 3.4% year-on-year. With all eight major components of the CPI rising year-over-year, upward price pressures are broad-based. The housing market also appears bubbly, all providing fertile ground for tighter monetary settings. At first blush, the October employment report was disappointing, with only 31,000 jobs added. However, employment in Canada is already above pre-pandemic levels and is likely to now settle towards trend growth of around 2%. This suggests a print of 30,000 - 40,000 jobs, in line with October’s release. The unemployment rate continues to drop, hitting 6.7%. Incoming data justified the Bank of Canada’s policy response. It delivered a hawkish surprise announcing an end to its quantitative easing program and shifting to the reinvestment phase whereby its holdings of Canadian government bonds will be held constant. It also brought forward the first rate hike to Q2 2022. The BoC will marginally diverge from the US Fed, which is expected to keep rates unchanged through most of next year. This will continue to boost real rates in Canada. Meanwhile, net purchases of Canadian securities continue to inflect higher, as the commodity sector benefits from a terms-of-trade boom. That said, from a tactical standpoint, speculators are marginally long the CAD. As such, our near-term view is cautious. We however doubt the CAD will significantly break below 78 cents, given burgeoning tailwinds.  Chart 12ACanadian Dollar Canadian Dollar Canadian Dollar Chart 12BCanadian Dollar Canadian Dollar Canadian Dollar Swiss Franc The Swiss franc is up 1% against the dollar over the last month. EUR/CHF has also been very weak in recent trading sessions, constantly testing the 1.054 level. In our view, this has been much more due to euro weakness (see euro section above) than franc strength. The Swiss franc is trading near 11-month highs versus the euro. On the economic front, the labor market is improving and inflation in Switzerland is picking up. House prices have also risen quite robustly. This is lessening the need for the central back to maintain ultra-accommodative settings.  That said, the Swiss National Bank is likely to lag the rest of the G10 in lifting rates from -0.75%, currently the lowest benchmark interest rate in the world. This suggests that market pricing of a 25 basis-point rate rise by the SNB by the end of 2022 is misplaced. Inflation would have to rise substantially more - above the SNB's target range of less than 2% - before any hike is possible. The SNB has also said it remained ready to intervene to weaken a highly valued Swiss franc. The ECB’s dovish stance is one reason why the SNB will be loath to let the currency appreciate. Our guess is that the 1.05 level provides a near-term line in the sand, which will prompt the SNB to intervene. We would be buyers of EUR/CHF below 1.05.  Chart 13ASwiss Franc Swiss Franc Swiss Franc Chart 13BSwiss Franc Swiss Franc Swiss Franc Norwegian Krone The Norwegian krone has violently sold off in recent weeks, prompting our long Scandinavian basket to be stopped out. This has been mostly due to low liquidity and the high-beta nature of the krone. Norway’s central bank kept interest rates on hold at its latest meeting but reiterated it will likely hike its key rate by 25 basis points to 0.5% in December. The central bank noted that the economic recovery pushed activity back to pre-pandemic levels, while unemployment receded further. That said, underlying inflation still runs below the bank’s target.  The recent surge in oil prices has provided strong support for Norway’s trade balance and terms of trade. Oil and gas make up around 18% of Norway’s GDP. This is encouraging portfolio flows and has provided underlying support for the NOK. That said, given that much of the Norges Bank’s hawkishness has likely been priced into the NOK, the rewards of going long the currency should start shifting to its carry.  Chart 14ANorwegian Krone Norwegian Krone Norwegian Krone Chart 14BNorwegian Krone Norwegian Krone Norwegian Krone Swedish Krona The SEK was up 0.9% over the last month. Sweden never closed its economy, yet Covid-19 still had an impact. The good news is that this is mostly behind them. GDP expanded by 1.8% on the quarter in Q3, beating forecasts and the country recently ended all pandemic curbs. The labor market is recovering, and inflation is rising. CPIF inflation, on which the Riksbank sets its 2% target, is at 2.8%. Surging energy prices should turn out to be less of a problem for Sweden than the more coal-dependent countries in Europe, suggesting any increase in prices will be more genuine.  The Riksbank will complete its planned balance-sheet expansion later this year and has committed to maintaining the size of its bond holdings through 2022. The central bank, one of the most dovish amongst the G10, is slated to keep its policy rate flat at least until 2024. This could change if inflationary pressures remain persistent.  The big risk for Sweden is a slowdown in Europe and China. Supply chain bottlenecks are another issue. Several Swedish car and truck makers were forced to halt production in August due to semiconductor shortages. With the recent surge in the dollar, we were stopped out of our short EUR/SEK and USD/SEK positions for a profit. We will be looking to reinstate these trades from higher levels.  Chart 15ASwedish Krona Swedish Krona Swedish Krona Chart 15BSwedish Krona Swedish Krona Swedish Krona Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Kate Sun Research Analyst kate.sun@bcaresearch.com   Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Cyclical Holdings (6-18 months) Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary