Middle East & North Africa
Highlights OPEC 2.0 will meet in June to decide whether to continue its production cuts into 2H19. Once again, the leaders are sending conflicting signals – KSA is subtly indicating OPEC 2.0’s 1.2mm b/d of production cuts will need to be extended to year-end. Russia, not so much. Much will depend on whether the U.S. extends waivers on Iran oil-export sanctions when they expire May 2. Not surprisingly, Trump administration officials also are not providing much in the way of forward guidance to markets, other than to insist they want Iran’s exports at zero. Our modeling indicates OPEC 2.0 – the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – will need to raise production in 2H19, as markets tighten on the back of Venezuela’s collapse, continued unplanned outages (most recently in Libya) and still-strong demand. This aligns our view somewhat with that of Russia. That said, OPEC 2.0’s leaders – and member states – all benefit from higher prices, as we show below. Some, like Russia, more so than others – e.g., KSA, hard as that is to reconcile with their respective stances on production cuts. But none benefits if EM demand is crushed by high prices. It’s a delicate balancing act, given the aggregate GDP of EM commodity-importing countries exceeds that of commodity-exporting countries (Chart of the Week).1 Chart of the WeekEM Commodity Importers Dominate Aggregate EM Oil Demand We continue to expect Brent to trade at $75/bbl this year and $80/bbl next year, given our expectation for global supply and demand. KSA and Russia remain the fulcrum of the oil market, as we argued recently, and anticipating their decision-making process remains the critical task for understanding the new political economy of oil.2 Highlights Energy: Overweight. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo demanded opposing forces in Libya cease fighting this week. The country recently lifted oil production over 1mm b/d, but renewed fighting threatens this output. Base Metals: Neutral. China’s National Development & Reform Commission (NDRC) earlier this week tee’d up markets to expect higher infrastructure and transportation spending, which lifted steel and iron ore markets. Markets continue to tighten on the back of the Vale high-grade iron-ore supply losses, which could lift prices above $100/MT in the short term. Precious Metals: Neutral. Central banks continued buying gold in February, the World Gold Council reported this week. Central-bank holdings rose a net 51 tonnes in February bringing total additions to 90 tonnes in the first two months of the year. Agriculture: Underweight. The USDA lifted its estimate of global ending stocks for corn by 5.5mm tons for the 2018/19 crop year. With total use estimates unchanged at 1.13 billion tons, this raises ending stocks-to-use estimates, which will continue to exert downward pressure on prices. Feature KSA and Russia share a common feature in that both are petro states, and thus heavily dependent on crude and product exports to fund their governments and economies. Both suffered a near-death experience during the 2014-16 oil-market-share war launched by OPEC, and both have seen their GDPs slowly recover, following the successful production-cutting agreements they jointly engineered to drain excess inventories and restore balance to the market beginning in 2017 and renewed this year (Chart 2). Russia’s GDP gets more than twice the lift from higher Brent prices than KSA’s does. At first blush, it would be logical to assume KSA’s and Russia’s GDPs are driven by the same economic forces of oil supply and demand. In broad terms, they are. Both benefit from higher oil prices, given they are predominantly petro-economies, although Russia tends to benefit more as prices rise (Chart 3). In the post-GFC era, we find that a 1% increase in Brent prices lifts Russia’s GDP ~ 0.07%, while KSA’s goes up ~ 0.03%. Another way of saying this is Russia’s GDP gets more than twice the lift from higher Brent prices than KSA’s does. Chart 2KSA, Russia GDPs Recover, Following OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts Chart 3Russia Benefits More From Higher Brent Prices Looking a bit deeper into KSA’s and Russia’s GDPs’ sensitivities to Brent prices, we modeled income growth for both using our Brent forecast (Table 1), the futures markets’ forward curve and compare both to the World Bank’s expectation (Chart 4, bottom panel). KSA tends to benefit more from higher EM oil demand, with its GDP rising almost 1% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Given our expectation for EM GDP growth (Chart of the Week), we expect KSA’s GDP to show relatively strong growth with GDP up ~ 5.4% this year and ~ 3.5% next year, propelled partly by higher oil prices (Chart 4, top panel). KSA tends to benefit more from higher EM oil demand, with its GDP rising almost 1% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand. Russia’s GDP goes up ~ 0.25% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand. We expect Russia’s GDP to dip then recover in 4Q19, then rise 3.5% by the end of 3Q20 before tapering off toward the end of 2020. This is not surprising given the trajectory for Brent prices in our forecasts and in the futures curves, and the sensitivity of Russia’s GDP to oil prices.We found a similar impact of EM oil demand on Russia and KSA GDPs when controlling for EM FX rates instead of Brent prices (Chart 5).3 Chart 4Higher Oil Prices Will Lift KSA's And Russia's GDPs Chart 5While KSA Benefits More From Higher EM Demand U.S. Waivers Dictate OPEC 2.0’s Decision On Production KSA has indicated it sees a need to extend OPEC 2.0’s production-cutting deal into 2H19, when the coalition’s ministers meet in June. Of late, Khalid al-Falih, KSA’s oil minister, is indicating no further cuts in the Kingdom’s output are needed, however. Russia’s a bit of a cipher. President Vladimir Putin this week stated Russia will continue to cooperate with KSA vis-à-vis managing production, although his energy minister, Alexander Novak, has indicated he sees no reason for extending OPEC 2.0’s production deal. Both sides are waiting on fundamental data, and the decision of the U.S. on its waivers on Iranian oil-export sanctions. There’s also the ever-likely collapse of Venezuela to consider, and renewed violence in Libya, both of which argue against letting the waivers expire. The Trump administration has no incentive to risk inducing an oil shock on the global economy. The countries granted waivers on U.S. sanctions against Iranian crude oil imports appear to be exercising their option to lift additional barrels, based on data showing loadings out of Iran increased for the fourth consecutive month (Chart 6 and Table 2).4 Loadings out of Iran rose to 1.30mm b/d in March, from 1.24mm b/d in February. Table 2Iran Exports By Country 2018-2019 (‘000 b/d) Bottom Line: We continue to expect U.S. waivers on Iranian oil sanctions will be extended to year end in some form. The collapse of Venezuela and renewed violence in Libya show how tenuously balanced oil markets are at present. Going into a general election in the U.S. next year, the Trump administration has no incentive to risk inducing an oil shock on the global economy. When they meet in June, ministers from OPEC 2.0 member states will be ideally set up to respond to the Trump administration’s decision on waivers for Iranian oil imports, which expire May 2. We are closing our June 2019 $70 vs. $75/bbl call spread, as the position is close to expiry. Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 In the post-GFC world, we find total EM oil demand rises ~ 0.4% for each 1% rise in EM commodity-importers’ GDP, while it only rises ~ 0.3% for each 1% rise in EM commodity exporters’ GDP, based on our modeling. According to World Banks’ constant 2010 USD series, EM commodity importers’ GDP represented 66% of total EM GDP in 2018, up from 56% in 2010. The EM income elasticity of oil demand has remained at roughly ~ 0.60 from 2000 to now, meaning a 1% increase in EM GDP – hence EM income – lifts oil demand by ~ 0.6%. This has been remarkably stable pre-GFC, post-GFC and from 2000 to now. 2 The new political economy of oil is a continuing theme in our research. For an extended discussion of this theme, please see “The New Political Economy of Oil,” and “OPEC 2.0: Oil’ Price Fulcrum,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy on February 21 and March 21, 2019. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 When using EM FX rates instead of Brent prices as an explanatory variable, we find KSA’s GDP still increases a little more than 1% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand, but Russia’s rises closer to 0.6%. NB: All GDP measures use historical World Bank data, and BCA Research estimates using the Bank’s projections in constant 2010 USD. We proxy EM oil demand using non-OECD oil consumption. KSA’s production is crude oil only, while Russia’s production is crude and liquids. 4 For a discussion of the waivers’ optionality, please see our BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report “OPEC 2.0: Oil’ Price Fulcrum,” published on March 21, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2019 Q1 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades
Political economy – i.e., the interplay between critical nation states’ policies and markets – often trumps straightforward supply-demand analysis in oil. This is because policy decisions affect production and consumption, along with global trade. These decisions, in turn, determine constraints states – central and tangential – confront in pursuit of their interests. Presently, U.S. policies toward Venezuela and Iran dominate oil supply considerations, while Sino – U.S. trade tensions and their effect on EM consumption dominate the demand side. In this month’s balances assessment, we revised some of our supply-side assumptions to include the high probability U.S. waivers on Iranian export sanctions will have to be extended until Venezuela stabilizes. OPEC 2.0 appears to be flexible -- positioning for either an extension of waivers, or sanctions. This keeps our baseline oil-supply assumptions fairly steady this year as the coalition adjusts to changes in Venezuela’s output. Adjustments could be volatile, however. On the demand side, we continue to expect growth of 1.49mm b/d this year and 1.57mm b/d in 2020. Steadier production and unchanged demand assumptions lower our price forecasts slightly to $75/bbl and $80/bbl this year and next for Brent, with WTI trading $7.0/bbl and $3.25/bbl below those levels, respectively (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekExpect OPEC 2.0 To Smooth Venezuelan Production Losses In 2019 Highlights Energy: Overweight. Nigeria’s elections, scheduled for this past weekend, were unexpectedly postponed until Saturday. Political leaders urged Nigerians to “refrain from civil disorder and remain peaceful, patriotic and united to ensure that no force or conspiracy derail our democratic development.”1 Nigeria produces ~ 1.7mm b/d of oil. Base Metals/Bulks: Neutral. Estimated LMEX, CME, SHFE and bonded Chinese warehouse copper inventories are down 29.8% y/y, which will continue to be supportive of prices. Precious Metals: Neutral. Palladium is trading ~ $111/oz over gold, as concerns over supply deficits persist. The last time this occurred was on November, 2002. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Chinese buyers are believed to have cancelled as much as 1.25mm bushels of soybean purchases last week, according to feedandgrain.com. Feature The analytical framework informing global political economy provides a useful augmentation to our standard supply-demand analysis, particularly now, when U.S. policy continues to play a pivotal role in the evolution of oil fundamentals. In particular, we believe the near-term evolution of oil prices hinges on how events in Venezuela play out, following the imposition of U.S. trade and financial sanctions directed against the state-owned PDVSA oil company and the Maduro regime. The evolution of the U.S.’s PDVSA sanctions will directly determine whether waivers on Iranian export sanctions granted by the Trump administration in November are extended when they expire in May.2 These tightly linked evolutions, in turn, will drive OPEC 2.0 production policy, and whether its production-cutting agreement is extended beyond its June 2019 termination. As we discussed recently, we see OPEC 2.0 building its flexibility to adjust quickly to either an extension of the waivers on Iranian sanctions, or to accommodate the termination of these sanctions at the end of May. Given the state of the market, which we discuss below, we believe waivers on Iranian export sanctions almost surely will be extended when they expire in May. Global Oil Markets Are Tightening Our supply assumptions are driven by our assessment that global spare capacity of just over 2.5mm b/d could accommodate the loss of Venezuelan oil exports with little difficulty (in a matter of months), aside from a further tightening at the margin in the heavy-sour crude oil market (Chart of the Week and Table 1). In fact, the loss of up to 1mm b/d or more of Iranian exports – versus the ~ 800k b/d we now expect if waivers are extended until December – could also be accommodated by OPEC 2.0’s spare capacity, given the rebuilding of this potential output on the back of OPEC production cuts, which have the effect of increasing spare capacity (Chart 2).3 Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply – Demand Balances (MMb/d) (Base Case Balances) However, should this combination of events be realized, an unplanned outage similar to the one that removed ~ 1mm b/d of Canadian production due to wildfires in the summer of 2016, with Venezuela production falling toward 650k b/d and Iranian exports even partially constrained, could move the oil market perilously close to the limits of global spare capacity, which now stands just over 2.5mm b/d, based on the EIA’s reckoning. This would increase the risk of dramatically higher prices, simply because the flex in the system would approach zero. Iranian Waivers Hinge On Venezuela The manner in which U.S. sanctions against PDVSA and the Maduro regime evolve – in particular, whether regime change is affected – will determine whether waivers on the oil-export sanctions the U.S. re-imposed on Iran last November are extended beyond their end-May terminal point. In turn, this will affect OPEC 2.0’s production policies, particularly after its production-cutting agreement expires in June. In our current model of OPEC 2.0 production, we now expect its 2019 production to continue to decline in 1H19, to drain the overhang resulting from the ramp-up member states undertook in preparation for U.S. sanctions against Iran. This policy was substantially reversed with the last-minute granting of waivers to eight importing countries by the Trump administration prior to sanctions kicking in in November. This led to a sharp sell-off in crude oil prices in 4Q18, as market participants re-calibrated the supply side of global balances. In 2H19, our base case assumes OPEC 2.0’s production rises by ~ 900mm b/d (December vs. July 2019 level), to smooth out the loss of Venezuelan output as it falls to 650k b/d by the end of this year from just under 1.1mm b/d now. The goal of this policy is to quickly drain global inventories to levels comfortably below the five-year average (in 1H19), and then to keep Brent prices in the $75/bbl to $80/bbl range over 2H19 – end-2020 (Chart 3). We expect core OPEC 2.0 countries, led by KSA, core GCC states and Russia production to rise by more than 500k b/d in 2H19 (vs. 1H19 levels), to maintain inventories at desired levels and prices in the $75/bbl to $80/bbl range. Chart 3Core OPEC And Non-OPEC Output Will Rise To Offset Venezuelan Losses To this end, we assume core OPEC 2.0’s production rises in 2020 to 33.52mm b/d from 32.98mm b/d in 2019, led by a ~ 200k b/d increase from KSA – which takes its output to ~ 10.4mm b/d from ~ 10.2mm b/d in 2019. We expect Russian production to rise to 11.7mm b/d from ~ 11.5mm b/d in 2019. Additional output hikes come from core OPEC and other non-OPEC producers (Chart 4, Table 1). Chart 4OPEC 2.0's Goal: Quickly Reduce Inventories In 1H19 We do not try to forecast how the sanctions against PDVSA and the Maduro government play out – i.e., whether the incumbent government survives, or whether a peaceful or violent regime change occurs. If Venezuela were to descend into civil war, or were to experience a violent revolution, the outcome would be unpredictable and the rebuilding of that economy – regardless of who emerges to take control of the state – would require years. Likewise, if President Maduro and the military leaders supporting him were to quietly decamp, it still would require years to rebuild that country’s oil industry and economy.4 We view the odds of a confrontation between the U.S. and Venezuela’s benefactors/creditors as extremely low. We believe the U.S. would revive the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and that Russia and China most likely would concede Venezuela is within the U.S.’s sphere of influence, as neither intend to project the force and maintain the supply lines such a confrontation would require.5 Because the resolution of the political uncertainty in Venezuela is unsure and the outcome unknowable – particularly when unplanned outages represent such a non-trivial risk to global supply at the margin – we strongly believe waivers granted on U.S. sanctions against Iranian oil exports will be extended at least by 90 to 180 days when they expire at the end of May. As we discuss above, global spare capacity is insufficient to cover the loss of Venezuelan and Iranian output, and still have the flexibility required to meet a large unplanned outage over the course of this year or next. For this reason, Iranian sanctions will not be immediately re-imposed following the termination of U.S. waivers on exports from that state; importers most likely will be increasing their liftings of Iranian crude, in line with the extension of the waivers we expect over the course of 2H19 (Chart 5). Oil Demand Continues To Hold Up We continue to expect global oil demand to grow by 1.49mm b/d this year and 1.57mm b/d in 2020, led as always by strong EM demand growth, with China and India at the forefront (Table 1). DM demand growth is expected to slow this year, but put in a respectable performance, as well. EM commodity demand growth generally has been trending down at a slow and constant pace since the beginning of 2018, as we discussed last week when we presented our new Global Industrial Activity (GIA) index. The index indicates demand is not as stellar as it was during the synchronized global upturn of 2017, but that it also is not as bad as sentiment and expectations would indicate.6 Pulling It All Together On balance, we expect the combination of stronger OPEC 2.0 output, plus an 800k b/d increase in U.S. shale-oil production, which lifts total U.S. crude-oil output from 12.42mm b/d to 13.49mm b/d next year, is enough to keep Brent prices close to $80/bbl next year, vs. the $75/bbl we expect this year (Chart 6). We revised our expectation for WTI slightly, and now expect it to trade ~ $7.0/bbl under Brent this year and at a $3.75/bbl discount next year. Chart 6Balanced Oil Market Expected This Year and Next ... The OPEC 2.0 production discipline and lower U.S. shale-oil output, coupled with strong – not stellar – demand growth combine to allow OECD commercial oil inventories (crude and products) to resume drawing and to fall comfortably below OPEC 2.0’s 2010 – 2014 five-year average target (Chart 7). This will be supportive of the Brent backwardation trade we recommended on January 3, 2019 which now is up 265.5%, as of Tuesday’s close. Chart 7... And Oil Inventories Resume Falling Bottom Line: We revised our supply estimates, and now expect OPEC 2.0 to cover lost Venezuelan output arising from the imposition of U.S. sanctions on PDVSA and the continued deterioration of that state’s oil industry. Because global spare capacity cannot handle the loss of Venezuelan and Iranian oil exports at the same time and still cover a large unplanned outage, we expect the waivers on U.S. sanctions of Iranian oil exports to be extended for up to 180 days following their termination at the end of May. We expect Brent crude oil prices to average $75/bbl this year and $80/bbl next year as oil markets balance. We expect WTI to trade ~ $7.0/bbl below Brent this year, and $3.25/bbl under in 2020. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see “Nigeria Election 2019: Appeal For Calm After Shock Delay,” published February 16, 2019, by bbc.com. 2 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the producer coalition of OPEC states, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and non-OPEC states led by Russia, which recently agreed to cut production by ~ 1.2mm b/d to drain commercial oil inventories and re-balance markets globally. OPEC 2.0’s market monitoring committee meets in April to assess the production-cutting deal it reached in November, which is set to expire in June. The full coalition meets in May to set policy going forward. This is just ahead of the expiration of U.S. waivers on Iranian oil exports. For a discussion of OPEC 2.0’s production optionality, please see “OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy January 24, 2019. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 We are watching the evolution of the partial closure of the offshore Safaniya field in KSA about two weeks ago closely. With 1mm b/d capacity, this is the world’s largest offshore producing field; no updates have been provided by KSA this week. 4 Please see “What Next For Venezuela,” by Anne Kreuger published by project-syndicate.org on February 15, 2019 for a discussion. 5 We note here that Gazprombank, the Russian bank, froze PDVSA’s accounts over the weekend to avoid running afoul of U.S. sanctions against the company. Please see “Russia’s Gazprombank decided to freeze PDVSA accounts – source,” published by reuters.com February 17, 2019. See also “What Comes Next For Venezuela’s Oil Industry,” published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies February 12, 2019, which details how U.S. sanctions amount to the equivalent of a full-on embargo by forcing payment for Venezuelan oil to be deposited in accounts that cannot be accessed by the government or PDVSA. 6 We discuss our global demand outlook in last week’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, in an article entitled “Oil, Copper Demand Worries Are Overdone.” It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 4Q18 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Trades Closed in
OPEC 2.0 is building physical optionality, to deal with different possible moves the U.S. can make on Iranian oil export sanctions and waivers. This comes despite an apparent break in the sense of urgency Saudi Arabia and Russia feel re production cuts. The coalition’s market monitoring committee meets in April, followed by a full gathering in May, when U.S. waivers expire. If the U.S. extends waivers, OPEC 2.0 can extend production cuts; if it doesn’t, it can add supply as needed.1 On the demand side, markets appear to be overly concerned about a sharper-than-expected slowdown in China, which, if borne out, would restrain EM growth. We believe these fears are overdone, and expect a slight improvement in EM demand generally this year and next. In our new balances estimates, we see the OECD commercial oil inventory overhang clearing in 1H19, on the back of resilient demand, OPEC 2.0 discipline, and a more moderate level of growth in U.S. shale oil output. This keeps Brent on track to average $80/bbl this year and $85/bbl next year, with WTI trading $74/bbl this year, and $82/bbl next year. Highlights Energy: Overweight. Mandatory cuts of 325k b/d, coupled with additional exports of ~ 190k b/d due to additional train and pipeline capacity out of Canada, will drain the 35mm barrels of excess crude oil inventories targeted by the Alberta government in December by 1H19. The WCS – WTI spread narrowed to -$10/bbl from -$50/bbl on these mandatory cuts. By 2H19, we expect Canadian production cuts to average 95k b/d. Base Metals: Neutral. Aluminum output in China surged 11.3% y/y in December, hitting 3.05mm MT, according to Metal Bulletin. Total output for 2018 was 35.8mm MT, a 7.4% y/y increase. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold is holding its recent gains, as markets become more comfortable with the Fed pausing on its rates-normalization policy until 2H19. Agriculture: Underweight. Hot and dry weather in Brazil is threatening crop yields there. The unfavorable weather is expected to affect three-quarters of cotton-growing regions, half of sugar areas, a third of first-crop corn acreage, and a quarter of soy regions. Feature The first signs of fraying in the relationship between the putative leaders of OPEC 2.0 – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), which cut production ~ 450k b/d m/m in December, and Russia, which raised output – are emerging, as world leaders meet in Davos. While this casts doubt on the leadership’s carefully cultivated amity, and their shared willingness to abide by the recently agreed output cuts, we do not believe it signals the end of the historic cooperation between these states. Total OPEC output – estimated by production-tracking sources outside the Cartel – stood at 31.6mm b/d in December, a prodigious 751k b/d reduction m/m. We expect continued oil production cuts from core OPEC states and decline-curve losses among non-Gulf OPEC and non-OPEC states within the coalition this year to remove at least 1.2mm b/d from the market, per the quotas agreed by members in December (Chart of the Week, Table 1). On top of this, mandatory Canadian production cuts of 325k b/d in 1H19 and 95k b/d in 2H19 will keep average production cuts at ~ 1.4mm b/d this year. Chart of the WeekOPEC 2.0 Will Resume Production CutsTable 1OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts Could Exceed Quotas OPEC 2.0’s cuts could persist into 2020, depending on how the U.S. deals with Iranian oil-export sanctions and waivers. Even though KSA and Russia apparently do not share the same sense of urgency re production cuts right now, we believe OPEC 2.0 is committed to draining oil inventories, particularly in the OECD.2 To do so, they’re increasing their operational flexibility – creating physical options, in a manner of speaking – to deal with a range of uncertain outcomes when U.S. waivers on Iranian export sanctions expire in May. Sanctions And OPEC 2.0’s Physical Options Despite the waivers granted to its eight top consumers shortly after U.S. sanctions took effect in November, Iranian exports plunged below 0.5mm b/d in December. As of December, China had substituted almost all of its Iranian imports for alternative barrels.3 This coincided with a production surge by OPEC 2.0 at the behest of the U.S. leading up to the November sanctions deadline of November 4, 2018, which swelled OECD inventories and took them above their rolling 5-year average level (Chart 2). India retained 30% of its May import levels from Iran, while Europe complied at 100% with U.S. sanctions (Table 2). Chart 3 shows the decrease in exports in preparation for the sanctions over the course of 2018. Chart 2OECD Inventory Overhang Will Draw As OPEC 2.0 Cuts and Losses Kick InTable 2Iran Exports By Destination 2018 (‘000 b/d) Whether or not the waivers are extended is anyone’s guess. It is possible waivers will be extended for 90 or 180 days, as a way to counter OPEC 2.0 production cuts, and to offset the lag between filling new pipeline takeaway capacity in the Permian. We expect importers to queue up for Iranian barrels as the market tightens in 1H19. OPEC 2.0’s market monitoring committee will meet in April, followed by a ministerial meeting in May, just ahead of the expiration of the waivers.4 If the U.S. extends them, OPEC 2.0 can extend production cuts after it meets in May; if waivers are not extended, the Cartel can calibrate an appropriate supply response. Either way, we expect OPEC 2.0 will closely align its production schedule with any U.S. action on the sanctions and waivers. This will, we believe, keep change in the overall market’s supply side relatively constant, except for the month or two required to adjust OPEC 2.0 output. Permian Will Drive OPEC 2.0 Policy The larger issue for OPEC 2.0 comes in 4Q19, when ~ 2mm b/d of new pipeline takeaway capacity comes on line in the Permian Basin in West Texas. With additional takeaway capacity due to come on in 2020, the Cartel will have its work cut out for it next year.5 Our models show a slight decrease then flattening in U.S. rig counts over the coming months, as a result of the 4Q18 sell-off in WTI, with a rebound around mid-year (Chart 4). This is because rig count lags oil prices by ~4 months. Chart 4U.S. Shales Continue to Drive Lower 48 Production Growth (ex GOM) We are expecting production in the Big 5 shale basins to average 8.4mm b/d in 2019 and 9.0mm b/d next year, a somewhat higher level than projected by the EIA. Growth in the shales accounts for close to 80% of the 2.3mm b/d of growth in the U.S. over 2019 – 2020. Globally, U.S. shales will continue to provide the bulk of y/y crude oil production growth, accounting for 73% of the 2.5mm b/d of growth we will see over the next two years. Given the near-death experience OPEC 2.0 member states had in the price collapse of 2014 – 2016, we remain convinced OPEC 2.0 member states will once again have to embark on a strategy to backwardate the Brent forward curve as they did in 1H18, to moderate the growth of shale-oil production in the U.S. (Chart 5). Reducing production in the short term will force refiners to draw inventories to supply their units and produce products like gasoline, diesel, jet fuel and a wide range of petrochemicals. Chart 5OPEC 2.0 Needs Backwardated Brent Forwards This will backwardate the Brent forward curve – i.e., prompt-delivery barrels will be more expensive than deferred-delivery barrels. A backwardated forward curve means OPEC 2.0 member states with term contracts indexed to spot prices receive higher prices for their oil than shale producers hedging 2 years forward, all else equal. The trick for OPEC 2.0 will be to keep the Brent forwards backwardated when the Permian takeaway capacity starts to fill, and exports from the U.S. rise in the early 2020s, as deep-water harbors are brought on line. If OPEC 2.0 is successful in keeping the Brent forwards in backwardation, this will, over time, moderate the growth of shale production: Hedgers’ revenue is constrained by lower forward prices.6 We would not be surprised if OPEC 2.0 states started announcing final investment decisions on select investments in spare capacity to augment existing resources, so they are able to quickly bring production to market in the event of unplanned outages that could lift the entire forward curve and incentivize hedging at higher prices. Demand Still Looks Good Oil markets continue to fret over a possible hard landing in China – resulting either from an internal policy error or a ratcheting up of tensions in the Sino – U.S. trade war. This is causing markets to extrapolate into the wider EM space, and take oil-demand projections lower on an almost-daily basis. In a word, markets are overwrought. Chinese policymakers are sensitive to the tight financial conditions that prevailed in 2H18, which, along with the trade war with the U.S., slowed growth and fostered uncertainty among households and firms in China. We agree with our Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy groups that presidents Trump and Xi are pragmatists dealing with restive populations, and want to deliver a deal ahead of U.S. elections and the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021.7 We’ve been expecting the government to deploy a modest amount of stimulus in 1H19, which will begin having an effect on the Chinese economy in the second half of this year. Toward the end of the year and into 2020, we expect the larger stimulus to be deployed in the run-up to put a bid under industrial commodities – oil, base metals and bulks in particular. Overall, we are seeing signs global growth may be reviving over the next few months via an apparent bottoming in our Global LEI Diffusion index (Chart 6). The diffusion index measures the proportion of countries where Leading Economic Indicators (LEIs) are rising relative to those in which LEIs are falling. As is apparent in Chart 6, the diffusion index suggests the downturn in the global LEI has bottomed. The index leads the global LEI by a few months. Chart 6BCA's Global LEI Likely Bottoming In our latest supply-demand balances, we are expecting Chinese oil demand to average 14.3mm b/d this year, and 14.8mm b/d next year. Along with India – expected to consume 5.0mm b/d this year, and 5.2mm b/d next year – these two states account for 36% of the total 54.3mm b/d of EM demand we expect in 2019 and 2020 (Table 3).8 Table 3BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Overall EM demand, the powerhouse of global oil-demand growth led by China and India, is expected to increase 1.1mm b/d this year – slightly more than we estimated last month – and 1.3mm b/d in 2020. DM demand growth, as always, comes in lower, at 390k b/d this year and 280k b/d next year. Oil Supply-Demand Balances Will Tighten We expect global oil production to average 100.9mm b/d this year and 102.9mm b/d in 2020. Consumption is expected to average 101.8mm b/d this year and 103.4mm b/d next year, respectively (Chart 7). This puts OECD inventories back on a downward trajectory, as storage draws resume (Chart 2). Chart 7Global Oil Balances Will Resume Tightening On the back of these estimates, we expect Brent to average $80/bbl this year and $85/bbl next year, with WTI averaging $74/bbl and $82/bbl, respectively. Given our expectation for higher prices in Brent and WTI, we continue to favor being long crude oil exposure. We are long outright WTI spot futures; long July 2019 Brent vs. short July 2020 Brent; long call spreads along the 2019 forward Brent curve, and long the S&P GSCI. Bottom Line: Markets will continue to tighten as a combination of lower supply growth and rising consumption allows OECD commercial oil inventories to resume their downward trajectory. The apparent lack of a shared sense of urgency by OPEC 2.0’s leaders – KSA and Russia – will be resolved, in our view. OPEC 2.0 will once again focus on backwardating the Brent forward curve, in order to gain some control over the rate at which U.S. shale oil production grows. We continue to favor long exposures to the crude oil futures. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Pavel Bilyk, Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy PavelB@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 In last week’s Commodity & Energy Strategy we noted these upcoming meetings, and OPEC 2.0’s resolve to drain the market. Please see “Fed’s Capitulation Will Boost Oil,” published by BCA Research January 17, 2019. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 Bloomberg reported this week KSA’s and Russia’s oil ministers cancelled a planned meeting in Davos, following al-Falih’s criticism of the pace at which Russian oil production is being cut. Please see “Saudi, Russian Energy Ministers Cancel Planned Davos Meeting,” published by bloomberg.com January 22, 2019. KSA cut its crude oil output 450k b/d m/m in December to 10.64mm b/d from 11.09mm b/d in November. Russia increased crude and liquids production to a record 11.65mm b/d in December, an 80k b/d increase m/m, according to OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report published January 17, 2019. OPEC expects Russian oil output to average 11.47mm b/d in 1H19, and 11.49mm b/d in 2019. We are carrying something close to this in our balances (11.51mm b/d) for 2019 and 2020. 3 China imported 10.3mm b/d of crude oil in December after posting a record 10.4mm b/d of imports in November 2018, just as sanctions were kicking in. 4 In our base case estimate, we assume Iran’s crude oil output will average ~ 2.8mm b/d, down ~ 1.0mm b/d from its 3.8mm b/d production level in 1H18, which was prior to the U.S.’s announcement it intended to re-impose export sanctions. One way or another, we expect OPEC 2.0 to adjust production to compensate for whatever production is lost due to sanctions. 5 Please see “Permian tracker: Production growth slowing as pipeline race still on,” published by S&P Global Platts July 2, 2018, for a discussion of the new takeaway capacity planned for the Permian Basin by midstream companies in 2019 and 2020. 6 The Permian basin is closely tied to hedging activity in the WTI futures market. It is the only basin for which WTI commercial short open interest is an explanatory variable for rig counts in our modeling. Commercial short open interest in the WTI futures also Granger causes Permian rig counts. 7 Please see the Special Report entitled “Is China Already Isolated,” published by BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy January 23, 2019. It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com and cis.bcaresearch.com. 8 Our EM demand assumptions are driven by the IMF and World Bank EM GDP forecasts. This week the IMF lowered its global growth forecast for 2019 and 2020 by 0.2 and 0.1 percentage points to 3.5% and 3.6%, respectively. This is only slightly down from our lower estimate last month, but still above the World Bank’s expectation. We are using these variables directly in regressions to estimate prices and EM consumption. This replaced our earlier income-elasticity models used to calculate EM oil consumption. We proxy EM demand with non-OECD oil consumption. We discuss this in “Fed’s Capitulation Will Boost Oil,” published by BCA Research January 17, 2019. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 4q18 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Insert table images here Summary Of Trades Closed In 2018
OPEC 2.0’s meeting next week in Vienna once again will feature a full cast of dignitaries representing member states, including the energy ministers from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia, Khalid al-Falih and Alexander Novak. They have led the coalition since it was formed two years ago to halt a destructive oil-price collapse occasioned by the disastrous OPEC market-share war, which was launched at a similar gathering in November 2014. U.S. President Donald Trump will be present in Vienna, if only in spirit; and via Twitter, of course, continuing to press the oil exporters to maintain production at record high levels. We expect Trump’s demands to go unheeded. The leaders of OPEC 2.0 – and their bosses – likely will agree to production cuts in Buenos Aries at the G20 meeting starting tomorrow, which energy ministers will ratify in Vienna. If they don’t, the 30.2% decline in Brent since early October will mark a stopping-off point in a larger down move (Chart 1). Chart 1Another Price Collapse Looms, Without An OPEC 2.0 Production Cut Our 2019 Brent forecast remains at $82/bbl, with WTI $6/bbl lower. We expect OPEC 2.0 will agree to cut 1.0 – 1.4mm b/d of production, to undo the supply shock delivered via waivers on the U.S. export sanctions against Iran.1 Without production cuts our forecast will be lowered. Highlights Energy: Overweight. Canadian crude oil prices likely will remain depressed, as takeaway pipeline capacity remains fully booked and producers are forced to use expensive rail transport to move their barrels south (see below). The WCS – WTI differential recently traded close to -$50/bbl, due to pipeline constraints. Base Metals: Neutral. Zinc’s near-record physical-to-prompt futures backwardation remains close to recent highs, on the back of sharply lower stocks at the LME and SHFE. 2 Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold remains in the middle of the range it’s occupied since 2013, on either side of $1,225/oz going into the G20 meeting. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Soybeans recovered slightly ahead of the G20 meeting in Buenos Aries tomorrow. Markets will be watching for any sign of a thaw in the Sino – U.S. trade war. Feature Two years into the oil-price recovery, OPEC 2.0 member states continue to suffer from post-traumatic budget disorders (PTBD). The coalition’s leaders need higher prices, as do the rest of its members. KSA, Russia and the other OPEC 2.0 member states are coming off weak recoveries from the oil-price collapse of 2015 – 16. The oil price required to balance KSA’s budgetary obligations – its fiscal breakeven (FBE) price – averages $82.90/bbl this year and next, according to the IMF’s most recent estimates.3 If prices remain lower for longer, KSA’s official reserves will continue to fall, as its sovereign wealth fund continues to be tapped to fill budget gaps. The Kingdom’s official reserves, which stand at ~ $495 billion by the IMF’s reckoning, have fallen by almost one-third versus their 2014 peak, as a result of the lingering effects of the oil-price collapse.4 The Kingdom needs higher prices to transition to a less oil-dependent economy, and to meet its budget obligations in the present. Lastly, if it ever hopes to IPO its state oil company, Aramco, to fund its diversification efforts, KSA will have to have higher prices. The Middle East oil exporters as a group (ex Libya and Yemen, which are failed states), also are especially vulnerable to another oil-price collapse. The IMF estimates that every $10/bbl reduction in oil prices translates into 3 percentage-point drop in these states’ GDPs, and spawns untoward economic ramifications – e.g., tightening financial conditions leading to asset-price corrections, deterioration of banks’ assets, and slower growth. 5 As for Russia, it only started recovering last year from the oil-price shock of 2015 – 16 and the imposition of Western sanctions following its annexation of Crimea. Prior to that, real wages fell precipitously, and the government was required to tighten fiscal and monetary policy to control inflation following the collapse of the rouble, when the central bank stopped defending it in the wake of falling oil prices. Real GDP fell 2.5% in 2015 and 0.2% in 2016, then grew at a 1.5% rate last year, which was below expectations, according to the IMF. Growth is expected to come in at 1.7% this year, although the recent collapse in oil prices and renewed tensions with Ukraine could temper this outlook.6 The IMF warned in its July 2018 assessment of the economy, that “structural constraints” – high levels of state control, economic concentration and regulation, weak institutions and infrastructure – and geopolitical tensions “raised uncertainty and dampened domestic and foreign private investment.” Against this backdrop, President Trump’s insistence upon keeping KSA’s and OPEC’s production higher to keep U.S. gasoline prices lower puts his “oil policy” directly in opposition to the interests of KSA and its Gulf allies. Even though Russia has geared its budget to withstand oil prices as low as $40/bbl, lower prices will impact it, albeit to a lesser extent than the Middle East OPEC states. These states are not alone in being disadvantaged by President Trump’s insistence on lower-for-longer oil prices. U.S. shale-oil producers, which are driving the country’s oil output surge, do not benefit from lower prices. WTI prices in the low-$50s – and West Texas Midland prices trading ~ $6/bbl below that, because of pipeline constraints in the Permian Basis – will reduce capex in the shales and imperil growth (Chart 2). Chart 2Bottlenecks Pressure Spreads In addition, the U.S. defense contractors, whose interest President Trump recently cited as his principal foreign policy driver when he was demanding higher OPEC production, know that without stronger oil prices, KSA will not be able to follow through on the $110+ billion of arms deals contained in various letters of intent signed last year during the president’s visit to the Kingdom.7 Net, we expect OPEC 2.0 to agree on production cuts of between 1.0mm and 1.4mm b/d at its December 6 meeting. In our balances modeling, to be conservative, we assume OPEC 2.0 (ex Libya, Nigeria and Venezuela) production next year will be 900k b/d below the peak reached this month (Chart 3). This, along with steady demand – we assume growth of 1.46mm b/d next year, which takes global demand over 101.6mm b/d next year – drives our $82/bbl forecast for Brent. We expect WTI to trade $6/bbl below Brent next year. Chart 3Lower OPEC 2.0 Production Expected In addition to the above assumptions, we also believe KSA and its Gulf allies will maintain their production cuts in 2H19, to make room for higher U.S. shale production once Permian Basin pipeline transportation is de-bottlenecked. With the exception of the 2014 – 16 price collapse, which resulted from the ill-fated market-share war launched by OPEC in an attempt to limit Iran’s revenues when it returned to export markets following the removal of export sanctions in 2015, OPEC’s modus operandi has been to reduce production to make room for non-OPEC production increases.8 Canada’s Takeaway Dilemma Unlike the Permian Basin, Canada’s takeaway bottlenecks – i.e., insufficient pipeline capacity to move all of the oil-sands crude it can produce south to the U.S. refining or Gulf Coast export market – are not likely to be resolved in the near future. This will reduce investment in oil-sands development, and keep pressure on oil producers selling their crude on a Western Canadian Select (WCS) basis, the Canadian benchmark. At present, there is a large takeaway deficit in the Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin (WCSB). Pipeline capacity has been maxed out since 2H17. There were five planned pipeline projects in the basin, four of which have been either cancelled or indefinitely delayed – i.e., the Trans Mountain Expansion, Northern Gateway, Energy Est and Keystone XL – while one is expected to be constructed in 4Q19 (i.e., the Line 3 Replacement). The outlook for pipeline capacity does not bode well for WCS prices. Since 2017, around 3mm b/d of needed pipeline infrastructure has been cancelled/delayed. The Enbridge Line 3 Replacement is expected to increase crude delivery to Superior, WI, in 4Q19, by ~ 370k b/d. Absent a major policy or court ruling U-turn, projected pipeline additions will be insufficient to cover Alberta’s growing oil sands surplus until 2022, and possibly beyond (Chart 4).9 Chart 4Expected Pipeline Additions In Canada Fall Short This persistent takeaway deficit pushed the WTI – WCS spread past the crude-by-rail cost range (Chart 5). This means prices are signaling the need for additional takeaway capacity – i.e., building additional pipeline, or importantly, additional trains/crews/rail infrastructure – and that production should be reduced. Chart 5WCS Differentials Signal More Takeaway, Less Production Is Required Our analysis of takeaway capacity in the WCSB leads us to believe investments in oil sands will be curtailed, which will lead to a slowdown in production starting in 2021 (Chart 6). According to IHS Markit, production growth this year and next is expected to come mainly from projects under construction before 2014. Capex is still low compared to pre-2014 levels (Chart 7). The current WTI – WCS spread should limit production growth to ~ 600k b/d between 2018 and ~ 2022. If, as we expect, the delayed pipelines are built in late 2021- early 2022, investment should start to rise again prior to this. Hence, production growth could resume close to 2022, or slightly thereafter. This is in line with the Canadian National Energy Board’s low-price scenario, in which oil production increases by 600k b/d from now to 2021, and plateau/declines afterward due to lack of investments. Chart 6Expect Lower Oil-Sands Capex Chart 7Capex Below Pre-2014 Levels The lack of pipeline takeaway capacity has forced crude producers to pay higher rates to move their oil out of the provinces via rail. In the short-term, this is a reasonable – although partial – solution. In theory, Saskatchewan and Alberta have enough loading-terminal capacity to transport all of the excess crude supply above pipeline capacity (Chart 8). Chart 8Takeaway Capacity Can Be Found However, loading-terminals are currently underutilized and shared with other commodities produced in the regions.10 Hence, crude-by-rail can only increase by: Taking capacity from other commodities currently using the rail cars, crews and locomotives. However, most of these substitute transportation modes are in already-agreed long- and medium term contracts with the railroad companies (Chart 9). Railroad companies are not willing to give away space paid for by grain shippers, which are long-term reliable customers – as opposed to uncertain crude-oil customers. Earlier this year, railroads said they would only pursue multi-year contracts with oil producers to finance new crews, locomotives, and track capacity: Short-term contracts are too risky, in the event oil shipments stop suddenly. This is ongoing; crude-by-rail volume should continue to rise through the end of the year, and part of next year.11 The fact that there is a low level of uncertainty around the lack of pipeline capacity for the next 3-4 years helps increase rail investments. Chart 9Railroads Make Grain Contracts First Priority Investing in new equipment, crews and infrastructures. The Alberta Government recently announced it wants the Federal government to invest in new rail cars and infrastructure to increase takeaway capacity by 120k to 140k b/d. However, those new rail cars are only projected to start moving oil in 2H19.12 We expect crude-by-rail volumes to increase in the next few months, but the growth should slow or even flatten in 1H19, given new capacity takes time to be brought on line and other commodities already have a claim on most of the rail space.13 Crude-by-rail growth should resume in 2H19, however. We expect crude-by-rail volume to reach ~ 300k b/d by year-end and ~ 450k b/d by 4Q19. This will help alleviate some of the pressure on WCS prices (Chart 10). The fact that no pipelines are expected in the next 3 years or so suggests the WCS discount to WTI will remain in the crude-by-rail price range shown in Chart 5 – i.e., a $15-to-$22/bbl discount over the quality discount for heavy sour crude vs. the light-sweet WTI benchmark.14 Chart 10Crude-by-rail Should Increase In 2H19 As bad as things sound for Canadian producers, there are two potentially important – and conflicting – regulatory and policy wildcards that could affect our projections. First the good news, then the bad news: Government-imposed production cuts: The current abnormally wide WCS spreads are caused by the marginal excess production above pipeline and rail capacity. We estimate this excess to be ~ 200k b/d. This means the marginal price received for producing these volumes sets the selling prices of the other ~ 4mm b/d produced in Canada by ~ $10-15/bbl. Therefore, as suggested by two leading Canadian oil producers, a relatively small government-imposed production reduction would have a large positive effect on WCS prices (Chart 11). As present, we assign a low probability to this outcome. Chart 11Government-Imposed Production Cut Would Lift Prices IMO 2020 regulation: The January 1, 2020, implementation of the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO’s) sulphur cap on marine fuels of 0.50% could contribute to widening the WCS price discount. A recent study by CERI concluded the new regulation would decrease prices of heavy sour crude, by driving down demand for these grades. This would significantly affect Canadian oil, as it competes with other heavy streams for limited complex refining capacity worldwide. According to CERI’s analysis, IMO 2020 regulation alone could maintain the differential at $31-33/bbl. We will be exploring the implications of IMO 2020 in future research. Bottom Line: Canada’s oil industry faces a Herculean lift if it is to attract capital to grow. Pipeline constraints limiting crude takeaway capacity to the south in the WCSB strongly suggest investment in oil sands will be curtailed, which will lead to a slowdown in production starting in 2021. Crude-by-rail is a palliative, which does not fully address the underlying transportation bottlenecks limiting the growth of the Canadian crude-oil industry. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report “All Fall Down: Vertigo In The Oil Market … Lowering 2019 Brent Forecast To $82/bbl,” published November 15, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 LME stocks are at 10-year lows, and the SHFE’s are just over 20% of their August levels. Please see “METALS – Zinc falls as weaker Chinese demand outweighs supply fears,” published by reuters.com November 26, 2018. 3 This assumes average crude-oil production of 10.1mm b/d by the IMF. Please see the IMF’s Regional Economic Outlook Update for the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, for May 2018, Statistical Appendix Table 6. 4 Please see the IMF’s Regional Economic Outlook Update for the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, for May 2018, Statistical Appendix Table 22. 5 Please see the IMF’s Regional Economic Outlook Update for the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, for May 2018 (p. 8). 6 The Russian seizure of Ukrainian ships and sailors earlier this week could prompt additional sanctions from the West. In its immediate aftermath, the ruble fell, credit-default insurance rates rose and the yield on local-currency bonds approached 9% p.a. Please see “Russian Assets Retreat as Ukraine Clash Revives Sanctions Risk,” published by bloomberg.com November 26, 2018. See also the IMF’s Country Report No. 18/275, Russian Federation, published in September 12, 2018, press release, and the full report published July 17, 2018. 7 Please see “In Trump’s Saudi Bargain, the Bottom Line Proudly Wins Out,” published by the nytimes.com October 14, 2018. 8 A failure by OPEC 2.0 to cut production and an extension of waivers on the Iran sanctions could add as much as 1.2mm b/d of oil to the market next year, which would renew the global inventory-building cycle and push Brent prices down by $20/bbl versus our forecasts, in our estimation. 9 Prior to the cancellation/delay by U.S. and Canadian Courts of the Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain and TransCanada Keystone XL pipeline projects – and before the record blow-out of the WTI – WCS basis – the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) projected Canadian production would grow from 4.5mm b/d in 2018 to 6.1mm b/d in 2035. All of this growth is projected to come from the WCSB oil sands. On August 30, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal ruled against the expansion of the Trans Mountain pipeline. The National Energy Board (NEB) now has to conduct a new review, which will require it to increase consultations with indigenous groups, and to assess the impact of marine shipping before submitting the project. On November 8, U.S. District Judge in Montana issued a ruling on the Keystone XL pipeline forcing the State Department to analyze new information in the environmental assessment of the project. The project is not cancelled, but it now needs a new environmental impact assessment. Please see the CAPP’s July report entitled 2018 Crude Oil Forecast. 10 Please see the CAPP’s July report entitled “2018 Crude Oil Forecast: Markets And Transportation,” for more details. 11 Cenovus signed three-year deals to transport approximately 100,000 barrels per day (bbls/d) of heavy crude oil from northern Alberta to the U.S. by rail. (https://www.cenovus.com/news/news-releases/2018/09-26-2018-cenovus-signs-rail-deals-to-transport-oil-to-u.s.-gulf-coast.html). GE Transportation announced CN ordered 60 new locomotives on top of an order of 200 made in December 2017 (http://trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2018/09/05-cn-orders-60-locomotives-from-ge). 12 Please see “Desperate to move crude, Alberta may buy trains alone if Canada balks,” published November 22, 2018, by ca.reuters.com. The odds of the Federal government participating in this investment are low: First, the request wasn’t mentioned in the most recent Federal economic statement. Second, the Federal government already stepped in to buy the controversial Trans Mountain pipeline; Ottawa is now focused on making sure this will be approved in court challenges. 13 Both Canadian National and Canadian Pacific railroads mentioned their priority was to handle the Canadian grain harvest during the “challenging winter months” before allocating rail space to crude oil. Grains-to-oil rail space substitution should increase in spring 2019. http://trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2018/11/14-cn-and-cp-expect-to-bring-on-even-more-crude-oil-traffic-next-year 14 The discount to get Canadian crude to Cushing, OK, where the NY Mercantile Exchange’s WTI futures contract delivers, can increase by $5/bbl for Gulf deliveries. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2018 Trades Closed in Summary of Trades Closed in 2017
Highlights When we flagged the increasing likelihood of higher volatility a few weeks ago, we did not expect the Trump Administration's granting of waivers on sanctions against Iranian oil exports, which ultimately led to the oil-price meltdown.1 Neither, it seems, did the market, as the surge in Brent and WTI implied volatilities attests (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekOil-Price Volatility Surges As Markets Process Conflicting News In one fell swoop, the Trump Administration's volte-face on Iran oil-export sanctions transformed the threat of an oil-price spike to $100/bbl in 1Q19 into a price rout. Whether that persists depends on how OPEC 2.0 responds to sharply higher short-term supply. Our updated supply - demand balances and price forecast are highly conditional on our expectation OPEC 2.0 will reduce output in response to the 1mm+ b/d or so of oil put back into the market early next year because of waivers. Inventories globally are at risk of swelling once again, if OPEC 2.0 does not cut output. OPEC 2.0's interests will conflict with the Trump Administration's agenda. Going into OPEC 2.0's December 6 meeting in Vienna, we lowered our 2019 Brent expectation $82/bbl, and continue to expect WTI to trade $6/bbl below that. We expect volatility to persist. Energy: Overweight. Natgas futures raced above $4.00/MMBtu on the NYMEX as the U.S. heating season kicked off with inventories of 3.2 TCF - 16% below their five-year average, and the lowest since 2005, according to EIA data. Base Metals: Neutral. China's benchmark copper treatment and refining charges are expected to remain on either side of $82.25/MT next year, as concentrate supply tightens slightly, Metal Bulletin's Fastmarkets reported. Precious Metals: Neutral. The Fed is on course to lift the fed funds range 25bp to 2.25% - 2.50% at its December meeting, which will keep gold under pressure. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA's latest ending stocks estimates for the 2018/19 crop year came in below trade expectations for corn and wheat - at 1.74 billion and 949mm bushels, respectively, vs. expectations of 1.78 billion and 969mm, according to agriculture.com. Soybean estimates came in at 955mm vs. an expected 906mm bushels. Feature Brent and WTI crude oil prices air-dropped from a high of $86.10/bbl in early October to a Wednesday low of $65.01/bbl as we went to press. This was a 24% drop in a little more than a month, reflecting the difficulty markets experienced recalibrating supply - demand balances in the wake of the Trump Administration's volte-face on Iranian export sanctions, which took effect last week. Over the past weeks, markets appear to be pricing the return of more than 1mm b/d of Iranian exports in 1Q19, on the back of these waivers for importers of Iranian crude. The full extent of the additional volumes that will be allowed back on the market still is unknown. Lacking certain information, market participants have to assume the waivers will dramatically expand short-term supplies, which already had been boosted by OPEC 2.0 and U.S. producers, in the lead-up to sanctions (Table 1).2 The sell-off on the back of the waivers did, however, dissipate some of the risk premium we identified in prices in October, and brought price more in line with actual balances (Chart 2).3 Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d) (Base Case Balances) Chart 2Oil Risk Premium Dissipates Prior to the granting of waivers, markets were girding for sanctions-induced losses of as much as 1.7mm b/d. Now markets could see a far lower supply loss of 500k b/d in Iranian exports. This lower loss of exports from Iran reduced expected prices by $10/bbl in 1H19, vs. our previous expectation of $85/bbl for 1H19 using our ensemble forecast (Chart 3). For market participants hedging or trading based on the expectation of higher losses of Iranian exports, the granting of waivers creates even more "new-found" and unanticipated supply. In a simulation with the waivers extended to end-2019, average 2019 Brent prices fall to $75/bbl vs. $82/bbl using our current assumptions. Chart 3OPEC 2.0 Production Hike Pushes Price Spike To 2Q19 In our estimation, "finding" this much supply via waivers amounts to a supply shock. This was compounded by surging U.S. crude and liquids production, which is boosting oil and product exports from America. Uncertain Balances, Volatile Prices Waivers are not the only factor contributing to price volatility. Fears of weaker global demand come up repeatedly - particularly as regards Asia in general, and China in particular.4 Those fears are not showing up in actual demand. In our balances estimates, we expect demand growth of 1.46mm b/d next year, down slightly from our previous estimate, given realized oil consumption remains strong (Chart 4 and Table 1). Supporting data - e.g., EM import volumes - continue to indicate incomes are holding up. Chart 4Demand Expected To Hold; Supply Highly Conditional On OPEC 2.0 On the supply side, references to an apparent disagreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia - the leaders of OPEC 2.0 - over the need to cut 1mm b/d of production next year, to keep inventories from once again swelling as they did in 2014 - 2016, compounding risks.5 While it appears KSA has carried the day on the need to cut production, that could change at OPEC 2.0's December meeting in Vienna. Output from OPEC 2.0's weakest member states - i.e., Libya and Nigeria - remains strong. Even Venezuela's rate of decline slowed some. Therefore, even without the waivers, KSA and its Gulf Arab allies would have had to reduce output to make room for these states, which are desperately trying to rebuild war-torn infrastructure. In addition to the OPEC 2.0 output surge, U.S. production has been unexpectedly strong, as have U.S. crude and refined product exports (Chart 5). The EIA - in an adjustment that surprised its analysts - revised its U.S. production estimate for October by 400k b/d vs. September's estimate to 11.4mm b/d. Production in the Big 4 shale plays - Permian, Eagle Ford, Bakken, Niobrara - is proving to be even stronger as well (Chart 6). U.S. shale output will be just under 8mm b/d by December, months ahead of schedule. The infrastructure buildout in the Permian will no doubt absorb this production and the subsequent growth in shale output by ~1.35mm b/d next year easily. Chart 5U.S. Production, Exports Surge Chart 6U.S. Shale Production Will Surge U.S. producers do not have an interest in managing their production. OPEC 2.0 does, however. We expect KSA and its Gulf Arab allies to reduce production in December and keep it low until the recently formed overhang brought on by the waivers to Iranian sanctions clears. This means OECD inventory levels will once again be a key variable for OPEC 2.0 in its production management decisions (Chart 7). Chart 7Once Again, OECD Stocks Are OPEC 2.0's Policy Variable We assume KSA will mobilize 800k to 1mm b/d of cuts in the coalition's production at least through 1H19. KSA already has said it will reduce exports by 500k b/d in Dec18, and that could be extended to Jun19. We also expect the rest of the Gulf Arab producers to follow suit, and cut back on the production increases they brought on line at President Trump's urging. By 2H19, the waivers will have expired, but U.S. shale output will be surging and newly built pipelines will be filling. We have been carrying lower 2H19 OPEC 2.0, particularly KSA, production estimates in anticipation of this increased production and exports from the U.S. (Table 1). OPEC 2.0 + 1? President Trump apparently wants to continue to have a say in OPEC 2.0's policy deliberations, as he obviously did in the run-up to U.S. mid-term elections earlier this year. In response to persistent messaging from President Trump, KSA, Russia and their allies surged production ~ 750k b/d in July - November over their 1H18 output, in preparation for the U.S. sanctions against Iran. In addition to pushing for higher production, the U.S. has taken a more activist approach to boosting oil production among U.S. allies, possibly ahead of another attempt to impose sanctions on Iran when the current waivers expire next year in June, assuming the 180-day wind-down begins in January. For example, the U.S. has taken a more active role in re-starting exports of oil from Iraq's semi-autonomous Kurdish province - some 400k b/d, which would flow to Turkey and on to Western consumers. Without higher production from Iraq and others in OPEC 2.0, the Iran waivers almost surely will have to be extended when they expire. As we have shown in our research, Brent prices mostly likely would push toward $100/bbl without a substantial increase in spare capacity within OPEC 2.0.6 President Trump gives every impression he and his administration now share our assessment, as the FT noted: "US president Donald Trump said this week he was 'driving' oil prices down and that he had granted waivers to some of Iran's customers as he did not want to see '$100 a barrel or $150 a barrel' crude."7 BCA's Geopolitical Strategy notes the waivers also send two very important messages to KSA: "First, the U.S. cares about its domestic economic stability. Second, the U.S. does not care about Saudi domestic economic stability. Our commodity strategists believe that Saudi fiscal breakeven oil price is around $85. As such, the U.S. decision to slow-roll the sanctions against Iran will be received with chagrin in Riyadh, especially as the latter will now have to shoulder both lower oil prices and the American request for higher output."8 Forecasting supply-demand fundamentals and, therefore, prices in this environment is extremely difficult, as it involves reconciling conflicting goals between the Trump Administration and OPEC 2.0. If President Trump prevails and KSA increases output - against its own best interests, given it requires higher prices to fund its budget - then prices will be lower for longer, once again. We are inclined to believe President Trump's alarm bells start sounding when oil prices are approaching the $85/bbl level. This also is the price level KSA needs to fund its fiscal obligations. For this reason, we expect KSA and its Gulf allies to reduce output in the near term until the waivers-induced overhang clears. Depending on how quickly they act, this could be done in fairly short order. Bottom Line: Volatility likely will persist as global markets absorb an unexpected supply surge resulting from the Trump Administration's last-minute volte-face on Iranian export sanctions, which is compounded by the supply ramp undertaken by OPEC 2.0 ahead of sanctions being imposed, and surging U.S. production gains. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Risk Premium In Oil Prices Rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity," published on October 25, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the OPEC - non-OPEC producer coalition formed at the end of the price collapse of 2014 - 16 to get control over global output and bring down swollen crude oil and refined product inventories. The coalition meets December 6 in Vienna to consider formalizing the union as a production-management cartel. 3 Our price-decomposition model's residual term is our proxy for the risk premium in oil prices. This is the red bar in Chart 2. Please see discussion in "Risk Premium In Oil Prices rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity," which is cited above. 4 Please see "Asia's weakening economies, record supply threaten to create oil glut," published November 14, 2018, by uk.reuters.com. 5 Please see "OPEC and Russia Prepare for Clash Over Oil Output Cuts," published online by the Wall Street Journal November 9, 2018. 6 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Reports "Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl," published on September 20, 2018, and "Risks From Unplanned Oil-Outage Rising; OPEC 2.0's Spare Capacity Is Suspect," published September 27, 2018. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see "Iraq close to deal to restart oil exports from Kirkuk," published by the Financial Times November 9, 2018. 8 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report "Insights From The Road - Constraints And Investing," published on November 14, 2018. It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017
Highlights So What? The Trump administration is focusing on re-election in 2020, which could push the recession call into 2021. Why? The midterms were investment-relevant, just not in the way most of our clients thought. We are downgrading our alarmism on Iran; Trump is aware of his constraints. But investor optimism regarding the trade war may be overdone. China has contained its capital outflows, which suggests Beijing will be comfortable with more CNY/USD downside. A new GPS mega-theme: Bifurcated Capitalism! Watch carefully for any upcoming trade action on semiconductors. Feature There is no better feeling than hearing from our clients that we got a call wrong because we misjudged the constraints of the Trump administration by focusing too much on its preferences. Why? Because it means that clients are keeping us honest by employing our most important method: constraints over preferences. This is one of the takeaways from a quarter filled with meetings with our clients in the Midwest, Toronto, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Frankfurt, Berlin, Auckland, Melbourne, Sydney, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and sunny Marbella, Spain! In this report, we discuss several pieces of insight from our clients. Midterms Are Investment Relevant Generally speaking, few of our clients agreed with our assessment that the midterm elections were not investment-relevant. The further away from the U.S. we traveled, the greater the sense among investors that equity markets influence U.S. politics: both the upcoming takeover of the House of Representatives by the Democratic Party and the odds of trade war intensification. We strongly disagree with this assessment. Both periods of equity market turbulence this year were preceded by a rising U.S. 10-year yield, not any particularly damning trade war chatter (Chart 1). In fact, the intensification of the trade war this summer occurred amidst a fairly buoyant S&P 500! Meanwhile, the odds of a Democratic takeover of the House were priced in well before the October equity decline began. Chart 1Yields, Not Trade, Matter For Stocks Generally speaking, even midterms that produce gridlock have led to a relief rally (Chart 2). This time could be the same, especially because the likely next Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, has signalled that the main policy goal for 2019 would be infrastructure spending. In her "victory" speech following the election, Pelosi mentioned infrastructure numerous times (impeachment, zero times). Chart 2Stocks Are Indifferent To Midterm Results Democratic Representative Peter DeFazio, likely head of the House of Representatives committee overseeing transportation, has already signalled that he will ask for "real money, real investment."1 DeFazio has previously proposed a $500bn infrastructure plan, backed by issuance of 30-year Treasuries and raising fuel taxes. He has rejected the February 2017 Trump proposal, which largely relied on raising private money for the job. Would President Trump go with such a plan? Maybe. In early 2018, he stunned lawmakers by saying that he supported hiking the federal gasoline tax by 25 cents a gallon (the federal 18.4 cent-a-gallon gasoline tax has not been hiked since 1993). He has since confirmed that "everything is on the table" to achieve an infrastructure deal. Several clients from around the world pointed out that both Democrats and President Trump have an incentive to make a deal. President Trump wants to avoid the deeply negative fiscal thrust awaiting him in 2020 (Chart 3). Given the House takeover by the Democrats, it is tough to imagine that new tax cuts are the means for Trump to avoid the "stimulus cliff." As such, another round of stimulative fiscal spending may be the only way for him to avoid a late-2020 recession (although the latter is currently the BCA House View). Chart 3Can Trump And Pelosi Reverse... Democrats, on the other hand, have an incentive to ditch "Resistance" and embrace policy-making. Yes, hastening the recession in 2020 would be the Machiavellian play, but President Trump would be able to blame Democrats for the downturn - since they will necessarily have had to participate in planning an infrastructure bill only to sink it. They also learned the lesson from the January 2018 government shutdown, which backfired at the polls and forced Senate Democrats to come to an agreement quickly on a two-year stimulative budget deal. What about the GOP fiscal conservatives? They don't necessarily need to come on board. The House is held by Democrats. And the Democrats in the Senate would only need 15-18 GOP Senators to support a profligate infrastructure plan. Given that infrastructure is popular, that the president will be pushing it, and that the GOP-controlled Senate agreed with the budget bill in January, we think that even more Republican Senators can go along with an infrastructure plan. Another big takeaway from the midterms is that the GOP suffered deep losses in the Midwest. President Trump's party lost ten out of twelve races in the region (Table 1). The two most representative contests were the loss of Republican Wisconsin Governor and one-time rising presidential star Scott Walker, and the victory of the left-wing and über-protectionist Democratic Senator Sherrod Brown of Ohio. Table 1Massive Republican Losses Across The Midwest Senator Brown won his contest comfortably by 6.4% in a state that Trump carried by 8.13%. The appeal of Brown to the very blue-collar voters that Trump himself won is obvious. On trade, there is no daylight between the left-wing Brown and President Trump. Meanwhile, Walker, an establishment Republican who built his reputation on busting public-sector unions, could not replicate Trump's success in Wisconsin. Several of our clients suggested that the GOP performance in the Midwest was poor because of the aggressive trade rhetoric. But that makes little sense. Republicans did not run Trump-style populists in the Midwest, to their obvious detriment. Democrats have always claimed to be for "fair trade" rather than "free trade." And we know, empirically, that Trump saw a key swing of turnout in 2016 in these states, largely thanks to his protectionist rhetoric (Chart 4). Chart 4Trump Owes The Midwest The Presidency President Trump cannot take Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin lightly. His performance in 2016 was extraordinary, but also tight. The Democrats will win these states if Trump does not grow voter turnout and support, according to demographic projections - and they lost them by less than a percentage point of white voters (Map 1). As such, we think that Democrats will talk tough on trade and try to reclaim their union and blue-collar voters, while President Trump has to double down on an aggressive trade posture towards China. Map 1Can 'White Hype' Work In 2020? Trump's Margins Are Small The midterms are investment relevant after all, but not in the way some might think. The Democratic takeover of the House, and the resultant gridlock, will potentially avert the "stimulus cliff" in 2020. This ought to support short-term inflation expectations and thus allow the Fed to stay-the-course. For markets, this could be unsettling given the correlation between yields and downturns in 2018. For the dollar, this should be supportive. The odds of an infrastructure deal are good, above 50%, with the key risk being a Democratic House focused on impeaching Trump. Such a bill would augur even higher levels of fiscal spending through 2020, possibly prolonging the business cycle, and setting up an even wider budget deficit when the next recession hits (Chart 5). Chart 5Pro-Cyclical Policy Has To Continue Meanwhile, the shellacking in the Midwest ought to embolden the president to go even harder against China on trade. Rather than the upcoming Xi-Trump meeting in Buenos Aires, the key bellwether of this thesis is whether Trump signals afterwards that he will implement the tariff rate hike on January 1, 2019 (and whether he announces a third round of tariffs). Bottom Line: Go long building products and construction material stocks. Stay short China-exposed S&P 500 companies. The 10-year yield may end the year even closer to 3.5% when the market realizes that the odds of an infrastructure deal are higher than previously thought. The political path of least resistance in the U.S. continues to point towards greater profligacy. Trump Is Aware Of His Constraints In The Middle East Throughout 2018, we have flagged U.S.-Iran tensions as the risk for 2019. In early October, we went long Brent / short S&P 500 as a hedge against this risk, a trade that we closed for a 6% gain last week. During our meetings with clients this quarter, however, several astute observers pointed out that in our own analyses we have stressed the geopolitical and political constraints to President Trump. First, we have argued that the original 2015 nuclear deal signed by President Obama had a deep geopolitical logic, allowing the U.S. to pivot to Asia and stare down China by geopolitically deleveraging the U.S. from the Middle East. If President Trump undermined the détente with Iran, he would be opening up a two-front conflict with both China and Iran, diluting his administration's focus and capabilities. Second, we noted that a rise in oil prices could precipitate an early recession and push up gasoline prices in 2019, a probable death knell for any president's re-election prospects. Our clients were right to ask: Why would President Trump face down these constraints, given the high cost that he would incur? We did not have a very good answer to this question. It is difficult to understand President Trump's preferences for raising tensions against Iran beyond the fact that he promised to do so in his campaign, appears to want to undermine all of President Obama's policies, and turned to Iran hawks to head his foreign policy. Are these preferences worth the risk of a recession in 2019? Or worth the risk of triggering yet another military conflict in the Middle East over a country that only 7% of Americans consider is the 'greatest enemy' (Chart 6)? Chart 6Americans Don't Perceive Iran As 'The Greatest Enemy' Given that the administration has offered exemptions to the oil embargo to eight key importers, it now appears that President Trump is well aware of his geopolitical and domestic constraints. The combined imports of Iranian oil by these eight states is ~1.4mm b/d. While we do not have the detail of the volumes that will be allowed under the waivers, it is likely that these Iranian sales will recover some of the ~1mm b/d of exports lost already (Chart 7). Chart 7Waivers Will Restore Iranian Exports For 180 Days What does this mean for investors? On one hand, it means that the risk of oil prices spiking north of $100 per barrel have substantively decreased. On the other hand, however, it also means that the Trump administration agrees with BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy view that oil markets remain tight and that OPEC 2.0's spare capacity may be a constraint to future production increases. Bottom Line: The risks of an oil-price-shock-induced 2019 recession have fallen. However, oil prices may yet surge in 2019 to the $85-95 level (Brent) on the back of supply risks in Venezuela and Iran, especially if Saudi Arabia and Russia prove unable to expand production much beyond their current levels. Most of our clients in the Middle East shared the skepticism of our commodity strategists that Saudi Arabia would be able to increase production much higher than current levels in 2019. However, the view was not unanimous. Risks Of Saudi Arabia Going Rogue Have Declined Clients in the Middle East were convinced that the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi would have no impact on Saudi oil production decisions. However, the insight from the region is that the incident has probably ended the "blank cheque" that the Trump administration initially gave Riyadh on foreign policy. For global investors, this may not have a major impact. But it may have been at least part of the administration's reasoning behind giving embargo exemptions to such a large number of economies. The incident has likely forced Saudi Arabia to adjust its calculus on three issues: Qatar: The Saudi-Qatari split never made much sense in the first place. It was initially endorsed by President Trump, who may not have understood the strategic value of Qatar to the United States. Defense Secretary James Mattis almost immediately responded by reaffirming the U.S. commitment to the Persian Gulf country which hosts one of the most strategic U.S. air bases in the world. Yemen: The U.S. has now openly called on Saudi Arabia to end its military operations in Yemen. We would expect Riyadh to acquiesce to the request. Iran: With the U.S. giving major importers of Iranian oil exemptions, the message is twofold. First, the U.S. cares about its domestic economic stability. Second, the U.S. does not care about Saudi domestic economic stability. Our commodity strategists believe that Saudi fiscal breakeven oil price is around $85. As such, the U.S. decision to slow-roll the sanctions against Iran will be received with chagrin in Riyadh, especially as the latter will now have to shoulder both lower oil prices and the American request for higher output. Could Saudi Arabia break with the U.S.? Not a chance. The U.S. is the Saudis' security guarantor. As such, it is up to Saudi Arabia to acquiesce to American foreign policy goals, not the other way around. While we think that President Trump ultimately succumbed to geopolitical and political constraints when he decided to take the "phoney war" approach to Iran, he may have been nudged in that direction by Khashoggi's tragic murder. Bottom Line: A major risk for investors in 2019 was that the Trump administration would treat Saudi preferences for a major confrontation with Iran as its own interests. Such a strategy would have destabilized the global oil markets and potentially have unwound the 2015 U.S.-Iran détente that has allowed the U.S. to focus on China. However, the death of Khashoggi has marginally hurt President Trump domestically - given that it makes him look soft on Saudi Arabia, an unpopular stance in the U.S. Moreover, the administration has come to grips with the risks of a dire oil shock should Iran retaliate. The shift in U.S. policy vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia will therefore refocus the Trump administration on its own priorities, not that of its ally in the Middle East. Trade War Is All About CNY/USD In The Short Term... Clients in Australia and New Zealand are the most sophisticated Western investors when it comes to China. The level of macro understanding of the Chinese economy and the markets in these two countries is unparalleled (outside of China itself, of course). We therefore always appreciate the insights we pick up from our clients Down Under. And they are convinced that the massive capital outflow from China has clearly ceased. The flow of Chinese capital into Auckland, Melbourne, and Sydney real estate has definitely slowed, and anecdotal evidence appears to be showing up in the price data (Chart 8). Separately, this intel has been confirmed by clients from British Columbia and California. Chart 8Pacific Rim Home Prices Rolling Over The reality is that China has successfully closed its capital account. How else can we explain that a 4.7% CNY/USD depreciation in 2015 precipitated a $483 billion outflow of forex reserves, whereas a 10.1% depreciation this year has not had a major impact (Chart 9)? Chart 9On Balance, China Is Experiencing Modest Outflows To be fair, forex reserves declined by $34bn in October, but that is still a far cry from the panic in 2015. Our other indicators suggest that the impact on capital seepage is muted this time around, largely due to the official crackdown on various forms of capital outflows: Quarterly data (Chart 10) reflecting the change in foreign exchange reserves minus the sum of the current account balance and FDI, indicate that while net inflows have remained negative, they are still a far cry from 2015 levels. Chart 10Far Cry From 2016 Crisis Import data (Chart 11) no longer show the massive deviation between Chinese national statistics and IMF figures. Imports from Hong Kong (Chart 12), specifically, are now down to normal levels, with the fake invoicing problem having quieted down for now. Chart 11No More Confusion Regarding Imports Chart 12Fake Invoicing Has Been Curbed Growth rate of foreign reserves (Chart 13) is not clearly contracting yet, and has been positive this year. Chart 13Severe FX Reserve Drawdown Has Ended Chinese foreign borrowing (Chart 14) is down from stratospheric levels, which limits the volume of potential outflows. Chart 14China's Foreign Lending Has Eased And the orgy of M&A and investment deals in the U.S. (Chart 15) has ended. Chart 15M&A Deals Have Eased Bottom Line: Anecdotal and official data suggest that capital outflows are in check despite their recent uptick. This could embolden Chinese leaders to continue using CNY/USD depreciation as their primary weapon against President Trump's tariffs, especially if the global backdrop is not collapsing. An increase of the 10% tariff rate to 25% on January 1 could, therefore, precipitate further weakness in the CNY/USD. The announcement of a third round of tariffs covering the remainder of Chinese imports could do the same. This would be negative for global risk assets, particularly EM equities and currencies. ... In the Long Term, Bifurcated Capitalism Our annual pilgrimage to Oceania included our traditional meeting with The Smartest Man In Oceania The Bloke From Down Under.2 He shares our belief that the long-term result of the broader Sino-American geopolitical conflict will be a form of Bifurcated Capitalism. His exact words were that "countries may soon have to choose between being in the Amazon or Alibaba camp," a great real-world implication of our mega-theme. Australian and New Zealand clients are particularly sensitive to the idea that the world may soon be split into spheres of influence because both countries are so high-beta to China, while obviously retaining their membership card in the West. Our suspicion is that both will be fine as they export mainly a high-grade and diversified range of commodities to China. Short of war, it is unlikely that the U.S. will one day demand that New Zealand stop its dairy exports to China, or that Australia stop iron ore and LNG exports. Countries exporting semiconductors to China, on the other hand, could face a choice between enforcing a future embargo or incurring the wrath of their closest military ally. The Bloke From Down Under has pointed out that, given China's dependency on semiconductor technology, a U.S. embargo of this critical tech could be comparable to the U.S. oil embargo against Japan that precipitated the latter's attack on Pearl Harbor. Chart 16China Accounts For 60% Of Global Semiconductor Demand The global semiconductor market reached $354 billion in 2016, with China accounting for 60% of total consumption (Chart 16). Despite the country's insatiable appetite for semiconductors, no Chinese firm is among the world's top 20 makers. This is why Beijing's "Made in China 2025" plan has focused so much on semiconductor capability (Chart 17). The goal is for China to become self-sufficient in semiconductors, gaining 35% share of the global design market. Chart 17China's High-Tech Protectionism A key feature of Bifurcated Capitalism will be impairment of investment in high-tech that has dual-use applications in military. Semiconductors obviously make that list. Another key feature would be investment restrictions in such high-tech sectors, particularly the kind of investments and M&A deals that China has been looking for in the U.S. this decade. Further, clients in California are very concerned about the U.S.'s proposed export controls, which would cut off access to China and wreak havoc on the industry. The Trump administration has already signalled that it will restrict Chinese inbound investment. Congress passed, with a large bipartisan majority, an expanded review system, the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA). The law has expanded the purview of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), a secretive interagency panel nominally under control of the Treasury Department that can block inbound investment on national security grounds. CFIUS, at its core, has always been an entity focused on China. While the Treasury Department initially signalled it would take as much as 18 months to adopt the new FIRRMA rules, Secretary Mnuchin has accelerated the process. The procedure now will expand review from only large-stake takeovers to joint ventures and smaller investments by foreigners, particularly in technology deemed critical for national security reasons. This oversight began on November 10 and will allow CFIUS to block foreigners from taking a stake in a business making sensitive technology even if it gives the foreign investors merely a board seat. Countries of "special concern" will inherently receive heightened scrutiny, and a country's history of compliance with U.S. law, as well as cybersecurity and American citizens' privacy, will be considerations. A new interagency process led by the Commerce Department will focus on refurbishing export controls so as to protect "emerging and foundational technologies." Such impediments to capital flows are likely to become endemic and expand beyond the U.S. We may be seeing the first steps in the Bifurcated Capitalism concept that one day comes to dominate the global economy. Entire countries and sectors may become off-limits to Western investors and vice-versa for Chinese market participants. At the very least, companies whose revenue growth is currently slated to come from expansion in overseas markets may see those expectations falter. At its most pessimistic, however, Bifurcated Capitalism may precipitate geopolitical conflict if it denies China or the U.S. critical technology or commodities. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see David Shepardson, "Democrats to push for big infrastructure bill with 'real money' in 2019," Reuters, dated November 7, 2018, available at reuters.com. 2 At the time of publication, the said investor was unable to secure the permission of his wife for the "The Smartest Man" moniker. Geopolitical Calendar
Highlights Gold's performance during the "Red October" equities sell-off, coupled with that of the most widely followed gold ratios (copper- and oil-to-gold), indicates investors and commodity traders are not pricing in a sharp contraction in global growth. These ratios are, however, picking up divergent trends in EM and DM growth (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekGold Ratios Lead Divergence Of Global Bond Yields In the oil markets, the Trump Administration appears to have blinked on its Iran oil-export sanctions. On Monday, the U.S. granted waivers to eight "jurisdictions" - China, India, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Italy, Greece and Taiwan - allowing them to continue to import Iranian oil for 180 days (Chart 2).1 The higher-than-expected number of waivers indicates the Trump Administration is aligned with our view that the global oil market is extremely tight, despite the recent production increases from OPEC 2.0 and the U.S.2 The U.S. State Department, in particular, apparently did not want to test the ability of OPEC spare capacity - mostly held by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) - to cover the combined losses of Iranian exports, Venezuela's collapse, and unplanned random production outages. No detail of volumes that will be allowed under these waivers was available as we went to press. Chart 2Waivers Will Restore Iranian Exports For 180 Days Energy: Overweight. Iran's exports are reportedly down ~ 1mm b/d from April's pre-sanction levels of ~ 2.5mm b/d. We assume Iran's exports will fall 1.25mm b/d. Base Metals: Neutral. Close to 45k MT of copper was delivered to LME warehouses last week, according to Metal Bulletin's Fastmarkets. This was the largest delivery into LME-approved warehouses since April 7, 1989. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold is trading close to fair value, while the most widely followed gold ratios - copper- and oil-to-gold - indicate global demand is holding up. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA's crop report shows the corn harvest accelerated at the start of November, reaching 76% vs. 68% a year ago. Feature Gold Ratios Suggest Continued Growth Gold is trading mostly in line with our fair-value model, based on estimates using the broad trade-weighted USD and U.S. real rates (Chart 3).3 Safe-haven demand - e.g., buying prompted by the fear of a global slowdown or a deepening of the global equity rout dubbed "Red October" in the press - does not appear to be driving gold's price away from fair value. Neither is rising volatility in the equity markets. Chart 3Gold Trading Close To Fair Value This assessment also is supported by the behavior of the widely followed gold ratios - copper-to-gold and oil-to-gold - which have become useful leading indicators of global bond yields and DM equity levels following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). From 1995 up to the GFC, the gold ratios tracked changes in the nominal yields of 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds fairly closely. During this period, bond yields led the ratios as they expanded and contracted with global growth, as seen in Chart 4. Post-GFC, this relationship has reversed, and the gold ratios now lead global bond yields. Chart 4Gold Ratios Followed Global 10-Year Yields Pre-GFC To understand this better, we construct two variables to isolate the common growth-related and idiosyncratic factors driving these ratios over the long term, particularly following the GFC.4 The common factor is labeled growth vs. safe-haven in the accompanying charts. It consistently tracks changes in global bond yields and DM equities, which also follow global GDP growth closely. If investors were fleeing economically sensitive assets and buying the safe haven of gold, the correlation between these variables would fall. As it happens, the strong correlation held up well following the "Red October" equities rout, indicating investors have not become overly risk-averse or fearful global growth is taking a downturn. When regressing our proxy for global 10-year yields and the U.S. 10-year yields on the growth vs. safe-haven factor, we found this factor explains a significantly larger part of the variation in global yields than U.S. bond yields alone (Chart 5).5 This common factor also is highly correlated with DM equity variability (Chart 6). Chart 5Gold Ratios' Common Factor Correlates With 10-Year Global Yields ... Chart 6... And DM Equities The second, or idiosyncratic, factor we constructed, captures the fundamental drivers that impact each of the gold ratios through supply-demand fundamentals in the copper and oil markets, and EM vs. DM economic performance. The latter is proxied using EM equity returns relative to DM returns.6 This analysis shows oil outperforms copper in periods of rising DM and slowing EM economic growth (Chart 7). Our analysis also indicates this idiosyncratic factor explains the divergence of the gold ratios seen in 2018: Copper demand is heavily influenced by EM demand, particularly China, which accounts for ~ 50% of global copper demand, but less than 15% of global oil demand. Oil demand - some 100mm b/d - is much more affected by the evolution of global GDP. Chart 7Relative DM Outperformance Drives Idiosyncratic Factors At the moment, this idiosyncratic factor is driving both ratios apart because of: Relative economic underperformance of EM vs. DM, which favors oil over copper; and Persistent fears of escalating Sino-U.S. trade tensions, which are weighing on copper. Price-supportive supply-shocks in the oil market (sanctions on Iranian oil exports, falling Venezuelan production) and still-strong demand continue to drive oil prices. These dynamics likely will remain in place for the foreseeable future (1H19), which will favor oil over copper. Gold Ratios As Leading Indicators To round out our analysis, we looked at causal relationships between the performance of financial assets - EM and DM stocks and bonds - and the gold ratios.7 From 1995 to 2008, the causality ran from stocks and bond yields to our growth vs. safe-haven factor for the gold ratios. However, since 2009, causality has gone from the common factor to bond yields (Table 1). Table 1Granger-Causality Results In our view, this suggests that the widely traded industrial commodities - copper and oil being the premier examples of such commodities - convey important economic information on the state of the global economy, as a result of their respective price-formation processes.8 It also suggests that in the post-GFC world, commodity markets assumed a larger role in discounting the impacts on the real economy of the numerous monetary experiments of central banks in the post-GFC era. Bottom Line: Our analysis of the factors driving the copper- and oil-to-gold ratios supports our view that demand for cyclical commodities - mainly oil and metals - is still strong. The behavior of our idiosyncratic factor leads us to favor oil over copper due to the rising EM vs. DM divergence, and the price-supportive supply dynamics in the oil market. Waivers On U.S. Sanctions Roil Oil Markets A week ago, we cautioned clients to "expect more volatility" on the back of news leaks the Trump administration was considering granting waivers to importers of Iranian crude oil, just before the sanctions kicked in this week. We certainly got it. Since hitting $86.1/bbl in early October, Brent crude oil prices have fallen $15.4/bbl (18%), as markets attempt to price in how much Iranian oil is covered by the sanctions and when importers can expect to see it arrive. On Monday, the U.S. granted waivers to eight "jurisdictions" - China, India, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Italy, Greece and Taiwan - allowing them to continue to import Iranian oil for 180 days. This was a higher-than-expected number of waivers than we - and, given the volatility in prices - the market was expecting. This pushed down the elevated risk premium, which had been supporting prices over the past few months.9 The combined imports of these eight states is ~1.4mm b/d, according to Bloomberg estimates. The loss of these volumes in a market that was progressively tightening as OPEC 2.0 brought more of its spare capacity on line - while the USD continued to strengthen - likely would have driven the local-currency cost of fuel steadily higher (Chart 8). Because they are a de facto supply increase - albeit temporary, based on Trump Administration statements - they also will restrain price hikes in EM generally, barring an unplanned outage in 1H19 (Chart 9). Chart 8Waivers Will Contain Oil Price Rises In Local-Currency Terms\ Chart 9Oil Prices Rises In EM Economies No detail of volumes that will be allowed under these waivers was available as we went to press. Although it is obvious Iranian sales will recover some of the ~ 1mm b/d of exports lost in the run-up to the re-imposition of sanctions, it is not clear how much will be recovered. We believe the 180-day effective period for the waivers most likely was sought by KSA and Russia to give them time to bring on additional capacity to cover Iranian export losses. Markets will find out just how much spare capacity these states have in 1H19. By 2H19, additional production out of the U.S. from the Permian Basin will hit the market, as transportation bottlenecks are alleviated. This will allow U.S. exports to increase as well. However, it's not clear how much of this can get to export markets, given most of the dredging work needed to accommodate very large crude carriers (VLCCs) in the U.S. Gulf Coast has yet to be done. This could explain why the WTI - Cushing vs. WTI - Midland differentials are narrowing, while WTI spreads vs. Brent remain wide (Chart 10). Chart 10WTI Spreads Diverge It is important to note the market still is exposed to greater-than-expected declines in Venezuela's production, and to any unplanned outage anywhere in the world. OPEC spare capacity is 1.3mm b/d, according to the EIA and IEA, and most of that is in KSA. Russia probably has another 200k b/d or so it can bring on line. These production increases both are undertaking are cutting deeply into spare capacity, as the Paris-based International Energy Agency noted in its October 2018 Oil Market Report: Looking ahead, more supply might be forthcoming. Saudi Arabia has stated it already raised output to 10.7 mb/d in October, although at the cost of reducing spare capacity to 1.3 mb/d. Russia has also signaled it could increase production further if the market needs more oil. Their anticipated response, along with continued growth from the US, might be enough to meet demand in the fourth quarter. However, spare capacity would fall to extremely low levels as a percentage of global demand, leaving the oil market vulnerable to major disruptions elsewhere (p. 17). Bottom Line: We expected continued crude-oil price volatility, as markets sort out the U.S. waivers on Iranian oil imports. The supply side of the market remains tight, and spare capacity is being eroded by production increases. We believe OPEC 2.0 will use the 180 days contained in the waivers to mobilize additional production. How much of this becomes available is yet to be determined. Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "As U.S. starts oil sanctions against Iran, major buyers get waivers," published by reuters.com November 5, 2018. 2 OPEC 2.0 is a name we coined for the producer coalition led by KSA and Russia. Please see "Risk Premium In Oil Prices Rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity" for our most recent supply-demand balances and price assessments, published October 25 by Commodity & Energy Strategy, and is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 We use the USD broad trade-weighted index (TWIB) and U.S. inflation-adjusted real rates as explanatory variables in these models. As Chart 3 indicates, actual gold prices are in line with these variables. 4 The first factor accounts for ~ 80% of the variation in the gold ratios. The second idiosyncratic factor, which captures (1) supply-demand fundamentals in the oil and copper markets, and (2) divergences in global growth using EM vs. DM equities as proxies, accounts for the remaining ~ 20% of the variation. 5 Throughout this report, we proxy global yield by summing the yield on the 10-year German Bunds, Japanese Government Bonds and U.S. Treasurys. Please see BCA Research European Investment Strategy Weekly Report titled "The 'Rule Of 4' For Equities And Bonds," dated August 2, 2018. Available at eis.bcaresearch.com. The adjusted R2 in the global yield model is 0.94 compared to 0.88 for the U.S. Treasury model. 6 Using MSCI Emerging Market Index and MSCI Word Index price index. 7 To conduct this analysis, we use a statistical technique developed by the 2003 Nobel laureate, Clive Granger. The eponymous Granger-causality test is used to see whether one variable (i.e., time series) can be said to precede the other in terms of occurrence in time. This test measures information in the variables, particularly the effect of information from the preceding variable on the following variable. Please see Granger, C.W.J. (1980). "Testing for Causality, Personal Viewpoint,"Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2 (pp. 329 - 352). 8 This assessment is consistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis, the literature on which is countably infinite at this point. Sewell notes: "A market is said to be efficient with respect to an information set if the price 'fully reflects' that information set (Fama, 1970), i.e. if the price would be unaffected by revealing the information set to all market participants (Malkiel, 1992). The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) asserts that financial markets are efficient." The EMH has been debated and tested for decades. Please see Sewell, Martin (2011). "History of the Efficient Market Hypothesis," Research Note RN/11/04, published by University College London (UCL) Department of Computer Science. 9 Please see BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Risk Premium In Oil Prices Rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity," published October 25, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017