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Highlights The GOP can bolster its case for re-election in 2018 by passing tax cuts and rolling back regulation. With U.S. equity valuations stretched, prolonged uncertainty in Northeast Asia may be a catalyst for a pullback. The global economic outlook is brightening and will be a tailwind for U.S. economic growth and equities. Rising wage pressure will be another headwind for EPS growth in 2018, although wages appear quite benign at the moment. Wages are not always a good leading indicator for the inflation cycle. Indeed, sometimes upturns in wage growth lags that of consumer prices. Feature Safe haven assets caught a bid last week while risk assets sold off as investors weighed geopolitical tensions in Northeast Asia and more uncertainty over fiscal policy in Washington. Last week's U.S. economic data highlighted the disconnect between a tighter labor market and a lack of wage pressures. Meanwhile, the data suggest that growth outside the U.S. is accelerating. Nonetheless, history shows that investors should be patient while waiting for an upturn in inflation. Next Up: Tax Cuts The GOP will deliver on tax cuts this year despite disarray at the White House and an incompetent Congress, but fiscal stimulus may fail to live up to its hype. Furthermore, a fiscal lift from infrastructure spending is unlikely anytime soon. Republicans need a win ahead of the 2018 mid-term elections and they have already laid the groundwork for tax reform via the budget reconciliation process. Moreover, cutting taxes is easier to justify politically than removing an entitlement program (i.e. Obamacare). Tax rates probably will not be lowered by as much as originally promised because conservative Republicans in the House will demand "revenue offsets" to pay for tax cuts. Internal GOP battles over how to fund tax cuts could spill over into some tension regarding raising the debt ceiling. However, it is in neither political party's interests to create another "fiscal cliff" out of thin air. The GOP needs Democratic votes to pass this legislation in the Senate and the Democratic leadership has indicated it is willing to support it. At what price? House Minority leader Nancy Pelosi and Senate Minority leader Chuck Schumer may link the debt ceiling and spending bill to tax reform, and push for the tax cuts to extend to the middle class and to be revenue neutral. There is a chance that both parties will agree to temporarily eliminate the debt ceiling, perhaps beyond the 2018 mid-term elections. In any event, we expect a last minute resolution to both the U.S. debt ceiling and the potential government shutdown in September. Thus, there should be no lasting impact on financial markets from the debt ceiling debate. Turning to government regulation, the NFIB survey shows that small businesses are pleased with the Trump administration's attack on red tape. President Trump has made progress on slowing regulation and is on track to enact one-tenth the amount of economically significant regulation1 passed by the Obama administration (Chart 1). By this metric, Trump is even more frugal than Reagan. Trump and the GOP-held Congress have rolled back Obama-era rules and delayed others. Still, regulatory change is slow to impact the economy and it may take years for the regulatory rollback to provide any meaningful lift to growth. Accordingly, the "Trump Put"2 is still in place. U.S. politics will remain a mess for much of the year, delaying any progress on populist economic policies that would have buoyed U.S. nominal GDP growth and given the Fed a reason to hike interest rates more aggressively (Chart 2). Chart 1Trump Has Had Success In Slowing Regulation Still Waiting For Inflation Still Waiting For Inflation Chart 2The Trump Put The Trump Put The Trump Put Bottom Line: Trump will not be impeached until after the 2018 mid-term election, and only then if the Democrats manage to take control of the House. The GOP can bolster its case for re-election in 2018 by passing tax cuts and rolling back regulation. The intensifying Mueller investigation and White House incompetence will only fuel the "Trump Put", which has been positive for U.S. equities, neutral for Treasuries, and bad for the dollar, all else equal. A significant uptick in inflation could overwhelm the "Trump Put" and spark a dollar rally. As such, investors should focus on inflation prospects rather than on White House politics. Fire And Fury Investors are on high alert and with the Q2 earnings season over, may look beyond the positive news on corporate profits for direction. Our colleagues in the BCA Geopolitical Strategy service have long maintained that Northeast Asia is ripe for economic/political risk.3 The underlying driver of uncertainty on the Korean Peninsula is the Sino-American rivalry. China is an emerging "great power" that threatens the global dominance of the U.S. and its allies. The immediate consequence is mounting friction in China's periphery. That is why Taiwan, the South China Sea, and North Korea, are all heating up. North Korea's regime is highly unpredictable as evidenced by events in the past few weeks. In that sense, it is more significant than the other "proxy battles" between the U.S. and China. In essence, North Korea is no longer merely an object of satire. A new round of negotiations over North Korea's nuclear and missile programs is about to begin. The potential for a military conflict is high unless diplomacy succeeds in convincing North Korea to freeze its weapons programs. The events on the Korean peninsula are unfolding as we expected they would. North Korea has a history of rational action. It wants a nuclear deterrent and a peace treaty, but not a regime change. The U.S. has forsworn regime change as an intention and China has recommitted to new sanctions. South Korea is pro-engagement. Moreover, we are seeing the U.S. establish a credible military as part of the "arc of diplomacy," comparable to U.S.-Iran relations 2010-15. Bottom Line: We do not expect a pre-emptive strike by the U.S. on North Korea, as the constraints to conflict are extremely high and not all diplomatic options have been exhausted. Nonetheless, with U.S. equity valuations stretched, prolonged uncertainty in the region may be a catalyst for a pullback. A Rosy Global Picture The global economic outlook is brightening and will be a tailwind for U.S. economic growth and equities. Global real GDP estimates continue to move higher, a welcome departure from years past when estimates slid relentlessly lower (Chart 3). Since the start of 2017, global GDP estimates for this year have increased from 2.8% to 3%, while 2018 forecasts have accelerated from 2.7% to 2.9%. This upward trajectory has occurred despite a recalibration by many major central banks away from accommodative policies. Aggressive central bank actions or escalating tensions in Northeast Asia, or both, may halt the improving growth forecasts. Falling oil prices would also challenge a quickening of global growth, but our view is that oil prices will move higher in the coming months.4 Chart 3Global Growth Estimates Accelerating Despite Stalled U.S. Growth Global Growth Estimates Accelerating Despite Stalled U.S. Growth Global Growth Estimates Accelerating Despite Stalled U.S. Growth Global leading indicators are on the upswing (Chart 4). The BCA Global Leading Indicator Index (excluding the U.S.) in July 2017 was the strongest since 2010 when it slowed after a sharp rebound from the global financial crisis. The increase in growth still has room to run. Admittedly, the LEI's diffusion index has dipped below 50%. It would be a warning sign for global growth if the diffusion index does not soon turn up. Nominal global GDP growth is speeding up, boosted by improving consumer and business confidence, rising capital spending and declining policy uncertainty (Chart 5). The global economic surprise index is also climbing, which provides additional support. Investors may be concerned that the global PMIs have peaked (Chart 6), but they remain at levels consistent with above-trend GDP growth and we see no reason why they should drop below 50. Chart 4LEIs Pointing Higher LEIs Pointing Higher LEIs Pointing Higher Chart 5Supports For Global Growth In Place Supports For Global Growth In Place Supports For Global Growth In Place Chart 6Global Economic Activity Brightening bca.usis_wr_2017_08_14_c6 bca.usis_wr_2017_08_14_c6 Industrial production (IP) overseas is expanding nearly twice as fast as in the U.S. (Chart 5). This suggests that U.S. economic activity will be pulled up by foreign demand. A stronger dollar (as much as a 10% appreciation in the next year) may dampen U.S. exports and earnings, but this will be more a problem for 2018 than 2017. Bottom Line: Improving economic activity outside the U.S. is a tailwind for both U.S. economic growth and profits of U.S. firms with significant business abroad. Solid foreign demand will help the economy hit the Fed's GDP target and also support additional, but gradual, tightening by the central bank. Stay overweight U.S. equities and remain short duration. Waiting For Wages Rising wage pressure will be another headwind for EPS growth in 2018, although wages appear quite benign at the moment. Both primary and secondary indicators point to a tighter U.S. labor market. The July jobs report (released in early August) was yet another sign that the slack in the jobs market is vanishing.5 Data released last week on job openings (JOLTS) and the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) further supported this trend, and indicated that the labor market may tighten even more. Job openings rose to a new all-time high along with BCA's quit rate less layoffs indicator (Chart 7). The hire rate remained at a cycle peak. The NFIB data was equally impressive, with hiring plans and job openings surging in July. Small businesses are also finding it increasingly difficult to find quality labor. (Chart 7, panel 4) The strength in the labor market has not yet translated into accelerating wages, but patience is required. The July NFIB survey noted that "while a tight job market may point to higher wages and rising consumer spending down the road, which is also good for small businesses, the current expansion efforts by small business owners are being choked by their difficulties in hiring and keeping workers." The NFIB's compensation plans (Chart 7) provided quantitative support for the group's qualitative assessment. However, the latest readings on labor compensation from the Q2 productivity report, the tepid July average hourly earnings data and the Atlanta Fed wage tracker suggest that the labor market is still not tight enough to generate much wage pressure (Chart 8). Chart 7Widespread Evidence That##BR##Labor Market Is Tightening Widespread Evidence That Labor Market Is Tightening Widespread Evidence That Labor Market Is Tightening Chart 8Not Much Wage##BR##Pressure Yet Not Much Wage Pressure Yet Not Much Wage Pressure Yet Inflation And Long-Expansion Dynamics That said, wages are not always a good leading indicator for the inflation cycle. Indeed, sometimes upturns in wage growth lag that of consumer prices. In previous research we split U.S. post-1950 economic cycles into three sets based on the length of the expansion phase: short (about 2 years), medium (4-6 years) and long (8-10 years). What distinguishes short from medium and long expansions is the speed at which the most cyclical parts of the economy accelerated, and the time it took unemployment to reach a full employment level. Long expansions were characterized by a drawn-out rise in the cyclical parts of the economy and a very slow return to full employment, similar to what has occurred since the Great Recession. Chart 9 compares the current cycle to the average of two of the long cycles (the 1980s and the 1990s). We excluded the long-running 1960s expansion because the Fed delayed far too long and fell well behind the inflation curve. We define the 'late cycle' phase to be the time period from when the economy first reached full employment to the subsequent recession (shaded portions in Chart 9). The average late-cycle phase for these two expansions lasted almost four years, highlighting that reaching full employment does not necessarily mean that a recession is imminent. Inflation pressures are slower to emerge in 'slow burn' recoveries, allowing the Fed to proceed slowly. The Fed waited an average of 25 months to tighten policy after reaching full employment in these two long expansions, in part because core CPI inflation was roughly flat. The result was an extended late-cycle phase that was very rewarding for equity investors because the economy and earnings continued to grow. Of course, inflation eventually did turn higher, signaling the beginning of the end for the expansion and equity bull phase. In Chart 10, we compare the core PCE inflation rate in the current cycle with the average of the previous two long expansion episodes (the inflection point for inflation in the previous cycles are aligned with June 2017 for comparison purposes). The other panels in the chart highlight that, in the 1980s and 1990s, wage growth gave no warning that an inflation upturn was imminent. Indeed, wages were a lagging indicator of consumer price inflation. Chart 9Labor Market, Inflation And Stocks##BR##In The Long 80's & 90's Expansions Labor Market, Inflation And Stocks In The Long 80's & 90's Expansions Labor Market, Inflation And Stocks In The Long 80's & 90's Expansions Chart 10In The 80's & 90's Wage Growth##BR##Gave No Early Warning On On Inflation In The 80s & 90s Wage Growth Gave No Early Warning On On Inflation In The 80s & 90s Wage Growth Gave No Early Warning On On Inflation Market commentators often assume that inflation is driven exclusively by "cost push" effects, such that the direction of causation runs from wage pressure to price pressure. However, causation runs in the other direction as well. Households see rising prices and then demand better wages to compensate for the added cost of living. Chart 11Leading Indicators Of Inflation##BR##In "Slow Burn" Recoveries Leading Indicators Of Inflation In "Slow Burn" Recoveries Leading Indicators Of Inflation In "Slow Burn" Recoveries This is not to say that we should totally disregard wage information. But it does suggest that we must keep an eye on a wider set of data. Indicators that provided some leading information for inflation in the previous two long cycles are shown in Chart 11. To this list we would also add the St. Louis Fed's Price Pressure index, which is not shown in Chart 11 because it does not have enough history. All of these indicators have moved higher over the past 18 months, after bottoming at extremely low levels in 2015 and early 2016. However, they have all pulled back to some extent in recent months. This year's pipeline inflation "soft patch" continued into July, according to last week's release of the Producer Price Index. The easing in cost pressures at the producer level has been broadly based (i.e. one cannot blame special factors). These indicators suggest that consumer price inflation, according to either the CPI or the PCE, will struggle to rise in the next few months. The July CPI report revealed another tepid 0.1% monthly rise in the core price index, while the year-over-year rate remained at 1.7%. Rising prices for health care goods and services were offset by price declines for new and used cars. The diffusion index for the CPI moved up to the zero line in July, indicating that disinflation was a little less broadly based in the month. Bottom Line: Our base case is that core PCE inflation edges higher in the coming months, which will be enough for the FOMC to justify a rate hike in December. We also expect that inflation will be high enough in 2018 for the Fed to hike rates by more than is discounted in the bond market. Nonetheless, the warning signs of an inflation upturn are mixed at best. It would flatter our stocks-over-bonds recommendation if we are wrong on the inflation outlook, but our short duration stance would not be profitable in this case. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) of Office of Management and Budget (OMB): https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain and https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoCountsSearchInit?action=init 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "How Long Can The Trump Put Last" dated June 14, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire, dated April 18, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "KSA's Tactics Advance OPEC' 2.0's Agenda," dated August 10, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Stay The Course" dated August 7, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights Strong corporate earnings growth will drown out worries about North Korea. Stay cyclically overweight global equities. Underlying wage growth in the U.S. is stronger than the official data suggest. Surveys point to a further acceleration in U.S. wages, as do pay gains at the lower end of the income distribution. Labor's share of income will resume its cyclical recovery. This will lead to more consumer spending, and ultimately, higher price inflation. Wage growth elsewhere in the world will also pick up as labor slack declines. Global fixed-income investors should underweight duration and increase exposure to inflation-linked securities. Feature Focus On Corporate Earnings, Not Korea Chart 1EPS Estimates Have Remained ##br##Resilient This Year EPS Estimates Have Remained Resilient This Year EPS Estimates Have Remained Resilient This Year Global equities dropped over the past few days on the back of rising risks of conflict in the Korean peninsula. Our geopolitical strategists believe that neither the U.S. nor North Korea will launch a preemptive strike.1 Despite its bluster, North Korea has a history of rational action. It wants a nuclear deterrent and a peace treaty. The U.S. has forsworn regime change as a policy goal. China has recommitted to new sanctions and the South is pro-engagement. This raises the likelihood that a diplomatic solution will be found. Unfortunately, getting from here (open hostilities) to there (negotiated solution) will take time, which leaves the door open to increased market volatility. Nevertheless, we expect any selloff to be short-lived, owing to the positive earnings picture. More than anything else, strong profit growth has underpinned the cyclical bull market in stocks, and we expect this to remain the case over the coming months. More than 80% of S&P 500 companies have reported Q2 results. Based on these preliminary numbers, EPS appears to have increased by 11% over the previous year, marking the fourth consecutive quarter of margin expansion. The strength has been broad based, with all eleven sectors reporting positive growth. U.S. earnings estimates for both 2017 and 2018 have remained steady since January, bucking the historic pattern of downward revisions throughout the course of the year (Chart 1). The picture is even more impressive outside the U.S., where earnings estimates continue to move higher. The Euro STOXX 600 is now expected to deliver EPS growth of 12.6% this year. EPS of stocks listed on the Japanese Topix is expected to rise 14.8% this year and 7.3% next year, giving them an attractive 2018E P/E of 13.6. We recommend overweighting euro area and Japanese stocks over their U.S. counterparts in currency-hedged terms. EM stocks have seen the strongest positive earnings revisions this year. We continue to worry about some of the structural headwinds facing emerging markets (high debt levels, poor governance, etc.). However, the cyclical picture remains more upbeat. Chinese H-shares remain our favorite EM market, trading at just 7.5 times 2017 earnings estimates. The U.S. Labor Market Gets A JOLT, But Where's The Wage Growth? The Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) released on Tuesday provided more good news about the state of the U.S. labor market (Chart 2). The number of job openings rose to 6.2 million in June. There are now 28% more unfilled jobs in the U.S. than at the prior peak in April 2007. The number of unemployed workers per job opening fell to 1.1, the lowest level in the history of the series. One might think that with numbers like these, wage growth would be skyrocketing. Yet, it is not. While monthly average hourly wages did surprise to the upside in the June payrolls report, the year-over-year change remained stuck at 2.5%. This week's productivity report showed that compensation per hour increased by only 1% in Q2 relative to the same period in 2016. Other measures of wage growth generally point to some softening this year (Chart 3). Chart 2More Good News For The U.S. Labor Market More Good News For The U.S. Labor Market More Good News For The U.S. Labor Market Chart 3U.S. Wage Growth Remains Soft U.S. Wage Growth Remains Soft U.S. Wage Growth Remains Soft Many commentators regard the lackluster pace of wage inflation - coming at a time when the unemployment rate has fallen below its 2007 lows - as a "mystery" that needs to be solved. As we argue in this report, there is less to this mystery than meets the eye. Properly measured, underlying wage growth in the U.S. has been rising for some time, and may actually be stronger than the "fundamentals" warrant. Wage inflation elsewhere in the world is more subdued. However, this is largely because progress towards restoring full employment has been slower outside the U.S. Is Wage Growth Being Mismeasured? How can U.S. wage growth be characterized as "strong" when it is still so weak by historic standards? Part of the answer has to do with that old bugbear: measurement error. Low-skilled workers have been re-entering the labor force en masse over the past few years, after having deserted it during the Great Recession. This has put downward pressure on average wages, arithmetically leading to slower wage growth. Most of the official wage series, including the Employment Cost Index, do not adjust for this statistical bias.2 In a recent research report, economists at the San Francisco Fed concluded that "correcting for worker composition changes, wages are consistent with a strong labor market that is drawing low-wage workers into full-time employment."3 In addition to cyclical factors, demographic shifts have depressed official measures of wage inflation. Historically, population aging has pushed up average wages because older workers tend to earn more than younger ones. The retirement of millions of well-paid baby boomers over the past few years has reversed this trend, at least temporarily. Chart 4 shows that the median age of employed workers has fallen for the past three years, the first time this has happened since the 1970s. Weak Productivity Growth Dragging Down Wages Unfortunately, there is more to the story than measurement error. Today's young workers are not better skilled or educated than those of previous generations. This, along with other factors that we have discussed extensively in past reports, has dragged down productivity growth.4 Nonfarm productivity has increased at an average annualized pace of less than 1% over the past few years, down from 3% in the early 2000s (Chart 5). Slower productivity growth gives firms less scope to raise wages. In fact, for all the talk about how wages are stagnant, real wages have risen by more than productivity since 2014. This has pushed labor's share of income off its post-recession lows. Chart 4Median Age Of Workers No Longer Rising Median Age Of Workers No Longer Rising Median Age Of Workers No Longer Rising Chart 5Real Wages Have Increased Faster ##br##Than Productivity Over The Past Few Years Real Wages Have Increased Faster Than Productivity Over The Past Few Years Real Wages Have Increased Faster Than Productivity Over The Past Few Years It remains to be seen whether the structural downtrend in the share of income going to labor will be reversed. One can make compelling arguments for both sides of the issue.5 But over a cyclical horizon of one-to-two years, it is highly likely that labor's share will rise. Labor's share of income is fairly procyclical. It increased significantly in the late 1990s and rose again in the years leading up to the Great Recession. Considering how low unemployment is today, it is not unreasonable to assume that it will maintain its cyclical uptrend. If so, this will lead to more consumer spending, and ultimately, higher inflation. Surveys Point To Faster Wage Growth... Surveys such as those conducted by the National Federation of Independent Business, Duke University/CFO Institute, National Association for Business Economics, and various regional Federal Reserve banks suggest that employers are becoming increasingly willing to raise compensation in order to fill vacancies (Chart 6). Workers, in turn, are becoming more choosy. This can be seen in an improving assessment of job availability and a rising quits rate. Both of these measures lead wage growth (Chart 7). Chart 6ASurveys Show Employers More Willing To Raise Compensation Surveys Show Employers More Willing To Raise Compensation Surveys Show Employers More Willing To Raise Compensation Chart 6BSurveys Show Employers More Willing To Raise Compensation Surveys Show Employers More Willing To Raise Compensation Surveys Show Employers More Willing To Raise Compensation Chart 7Workers Are Feeling More Confident Workers Are Feeling More Confident Workers Are Feeling More Confident ...As Do Wage Gains Among Low-Income Workers Median weekly earnings of low-income workers have accelerated this year, even as wage gains among higher-income workers have hit an air pocket (Chart 8). For example, restaurant workers have seen pay hikes of nearly 5% this year, up from 1% in 2014. Wage growth among lower-income workers tends to be less noisy than for higher-income workers. The incomes of better-paid workers are often influenced by bonuses and other variables that may be driven more by industry-specific or economy-wide profit trends rather than labor slack per se. Less-skilled workers are usually the first to get fired and the last to get hired. Thus, wage pressures at the lower end of the skill distribution often coincide with an overheated labor market. This makes the trend in lower-income wages a more reliable gauge of underlying labor market slack. Wage Inflation Will Slowly Pick Up As Global Slack Diminishes We expect U.S. wage growth to rise over the next few quarters by enough to allow the Fed to raise rates in line with the dots. However, a more rapid acceleration - one that forces the Fed to raise rates aggressively - is improbable, at least over the next 12 months. This is mainly because the relationship between domestic labor market slack and wage growth is not as tight as it once was. Trade unions have less clout these days, which means it takes longer for a tight labor market to produce larger negotiated pay hikes. The labor market has also become less fluid, as evidenced by the structural decline in both the rate of job creation and job destruction (Chart 9). Wages tend to adjust more slowly when there is less hiring and firing going on. Chart 8Better Pay For Low-Wage Earners: ##br##A Sign Of A Tighter Labor Market Better Pay For Low-Wage Earners: A Sign Of A Tighter Labor Market Better Pay For Low-Wage Earners: A Sign Of A Tighter Labor Market Chart 9Structural Declines In Job Creation##br## And Destruction Structural Declines In Job Creation And Destruction Structural Declines In Job Creation And Destruction Perhaps most importantly, an increasingly globalized workforce has given firms the ability to move production abroad in response to rising wages at home. This suggests that wage growth in the U.S. is unlikely to increase significantly until falling unemployment begins to push up wages abroad. Wage Growth Around The World For now, wage growth in America's trading partners remains subdued. Euro area wage inflation is stuck between 1% and 1.5%, although with important regional variations (Chart 10). Wage inflation has accelerated to over 2% in Germany, but is still close to zero in Italy and Spain. Considering that unemployment in both countries remains well above pre-recession levels, it will be difficult for the ECB to tighten monetary policy to any great degree over the next few years. Japanese wage growth has picked up since 2010, but is still below the level consistent with the BoJ's 2% inflation target (Chart 11). Wage inflation is likely to ratchet higher over the next few years, now that the ratio of job openings-to-applicants has risen to the highest level since 1974 (Chart 12). In a sign of the times, Yamato Transport, Japan's largest parcel delivery company, recently told Amazon that it would not be able to make same-day deliveries due to a shortage of available drivers. Chart 10Euro Area Wage Growth Remains ##br##Weak Outside Of Germany Euro Area Wage Growth Remains Weak Outside Of Germany Euro Area Wage Growth Remains Weak Outside Of Germany Chart 11Modest Pickup In Japanese Wages Modest Pickup In Japanese Wages Modest Pickup In Japanese Wages Wage growth in Canada has actually declined since 2014. However, that is likely to change given that the unemployment rate has fallen close to nine-year lows. Falling unemployment rates should also boost wage inflation in the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand. Chinese wage growth also remains brisk. Chart 13 shows that urban household future income confidence has picked up notably of late, as growth has improved and the labor market has tightened. Chart 12Job Openings Ratio Will Push Wages Higher Job Openings Ratio Will Push Wages Higher Job Openings Ratio Will Push Wages Higher Chart 13Optimism Over The Labor Market In China Optimism Over The Labor Market In China Optimism Over The Labor Market In China Faster Wage Growth Will Ultimately Lead To Higher Inflation Chart 14The Decline In Inflation Expectations ##br##Have Weighed On Wage Growth The Decline In Inflation Expectations Have Weighed On Wage Growth The Decline In Inflation Expectations Have Weighed On Wage Growth Going forward, the combination of falling labor slack abroad and an overheated labor market at home will cause U.S. wage inflation to increase more rapidly starting in the second half of 2018. This will be a break from the past. Lower longer-term inflation expectations have tempered nominal wage growth over the past eight years (Chart 14). Both market-based inflation expectations and inflation expectations 5-to-10 years out in the University of Michigan's survey have fallen by about half a point since the financial crisis. The recent decline in headline CPI inflation from 2.7% in February to 1.6% in June may also explain why wage growth has dipped this year even as payroll gains have rebounded. Rising wage growth could begin to feed on itself. As we have discussed before, the Phillips curve tends to steepen once an economy reaches full employment (Chart 15). If the unemployment rate falls from 7% to 6%, this is unlikely to have a huge effect on wages. But if it falls from 4.5% to 3.5%, the effect could be substantial. A recent Fed paper concluded that "evidence strongly suggests a non-linear effect of slack on wage growth and core PCE price inflation that becomes much larger after labor markets tighten beyond a certain point."6 The implication is that once inflation does start rising, it could rise more quickly than investors (or the Fed) expect. Concluding Thoughts The past three U.S. recessions were all caused by the unravelling of financial sector and asset market excesses: The housing bust lay the groundwork for the Great Recession; the collapse of dotcom stocks ushered in the 2001 recession; and the failure of hundreds of banks during the Savings and Loan crisis paved the way for the 1990-91 recession. Unlike the last few recessions, the next one may end up being more akin to those of 1960s, 70s, and 80s. Those earlier recessions were generally triggered by aggressive Fed rate hikes in the face of an overheated economy and rising inflation (Chart 16). Chart 15The Phillips Curve Appears To Be Non-Linear What's The Matter With Wages? What's The Matter With Wages? Chart 16Are We Heading Towards A "Retro-Recession"? Are We Heading Towards A "Retro-Recession"? Are We Heading Towards A "Retro-Recession"? The good news is that neither wage nor price inflation is likely to soar over the next 12 months. This means that the bull market in global equities can continue for a while longer. The bad news is that complacency about inflation risk is liable to cause central bankers to fall increasingly behind the curve. Rising inflation will force the Fed to pick up the pace of rate hikes in the second half of 2018. This is likely to lead to a stronger dollar and higher Treasury yields. The resulting tightening in U.S. financial conditions could trigger a recession in 2019 or 2020. Investors should remain overweight risk assets for now, but prepare to scale back exposure next summer. Peter Berezin, Global Chief Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report titled "North Korea: Beyond Satire," dated April 19, 2017. 2 Unlike the widely followed average hourly wage series published every month in the payrolls report, the quarterly Employment Cost Index (ECI) does control for shifts in the weights of different industries in total employment. Thus, an increase in the relative number of low-paid hospitality workers would depress average hourly wages, but would not affect the ECI. Nevertheless, the ECI does not control for the possibility that the composition of the workforce within industries may change over time. The Atlanta Fed's Wage Tracker does overcome this bias because it uses the same sample of workers from one period to the next. However it, too, is subject to a number of methodological problems. 3 Mary C. Daly, Bart Hobijn, and Benjamin Pyle, "What's Up with Wage Growth?" FRBSF Economic Letter 2016-07 (March 7, 2016). 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," dated March 25, 2016; and The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "Taking Off The Rose-Colored Glasses: Education and Growth In The 21st Century," February 24, 2011. 5 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Is Slow Productivity Growth Good Or Bad For Bonds?" dated May 31, 2017; and The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "Rage Against The Machines: Is Technology Exacerbating Inequality?" dated June, 2014. 6 Jeremy Nalewaik, "Non-Linear Phillips Curves With Inflation Regime-Switching," Federal Reserve Board, Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-078 (August 2016). Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Feature Visions abound of a dystopia in which Artificial Intelligence (AI) obsoletes all human jobs. In these visions, mankind becomes a subservient sideshow in a world run by robots. But while such dystopian visions make excellent narratives for Hollywood blockbusters, the chance they become a reality is nil. Technological progress is nothing new. Each generation feels it is experiencing unprecedented disruptive changes, but the constant march of technological progress has defined humanity for centuries, or even millennia. In the process, innovation has already obsoleted countless occupations. Where are today's lamplighters, ostlers,1 livery-stable keepers, newspaper criers and boiler firemen? In 1910, one third of the labour force worked on farms,2 with many of these workers tending animals; today, those proportions are near zero. In 1950, one fifth of the workforce was a machine or vehicle operative; today, that proportion is less than a tenth. More recently, in 1970, over 5% of workers were 'stenographers, typists or secretaries'; again today, most of those jobs have vanished. Yet this mass of job obsolescence has not created mass unemployment. The reason is that an advancing economy creates as many new jobs to replace the obsoleted jobs (Feature Chart and Chart I-2). In 1910, less than 5% of workers were in 'professional or technical' jobs; today the category employs over a quarter of workers. In 1950, healthcare employed 2% of workers; today it employs 8%. Moreover, the nature of many of today's jobs might have been unimaginable just a few decades ago. The rapidly growing employment sector 'medical and dental technicians' did not even exist before 1950. In the same way, the precise type of jobs that will see very strong growth in the coming years and decades might be unimaginable today. Feature ChartTechnological Progress In The 20th ##br##Century Destroyed Many Jobs... Why Robots Will Kill Middle Incomes Why Robots Will Kill Middle Incomes Feature Chart...But Created As ##br##Many New Jobs Why Robots Will Kill Middle Incomes Why Robots Will Kill Middle Incomes Chart I-2Nothing New: Technological Progress Always ##br##Involves Job Destruction And Creation Why Robots Will Kill Middle Incomes Why Robots Will Kill Middle Incomes Say's Law Tells Us That Robots Will Not Kill Job Growth Technological progress has not killed job growth. Nor will it. This is because firms choose to replace human workers with machines only if it increases their productivity and profitability (Charts I-3, Chart I-4, Chart I-5). The higher productivity increases the ability to purchase other goods and services - thereby creating jobs elsewhere in the economy (Chart I-6), often in new and surprising industries. Chart I-3Machine And Vehicle Operative ##br##Work Peaked In The 50s Why Robots Will Kill Middle Incomes Why Robots Will Kill Middle Incomes Chart I-4Secretarial Work Peaked ##br## In The 70s Why Robots Will Kill Middle Incomes Why Robots Will Kill Middle Incomes Chart I-5Clerical Work Peaked##br## In The 80s Why Robots Will Kill Middle Incomes Why Robots Will Kill Middle Incomes Chart I-6Healthcare Work Is In##br## A Strong Uptrend Why Robots Will Kill Middle Incomes Why Robots Will Kill Middle Incomes This is the idea introduced in 1803 by French economist Jean-Baptiste Say, called Say's Law: The producer of X is able to buy Y, if his products are demanded. Thereby, supply of X creates demand for Y, as long as people wish to buy X. A producer replaces human workers with machines to generate his output at higher profit, enabling him to demand new goods and services that he desires. Crucially, human desires are varied, ever changing and ultimately unlimited. Satisfying those unlimited desires creates new economies and jobs. In this way, technological progress often paves the way for completely new and unrelated goods and services. It creates whole new industries. To give just one example, railways spawned the frozen food industry. The frozen food industry satisfied the human desire to eat fresh food - which railways could now transport (frozen) to cities from distant farms and fisheries. In real time though, it was difficult to connect the advent of railways with the birth of the frozen food industry. Likewise, today it is hard to know precisely which new economies, markets and associated jobs the current new technologies will spawn. Nevertheless, a new technology's disruptive effect on an economy does depend on the broad type of job it destroys versus the broad type of job it creates. Consider a stylized economy with three types of job: a high-income innovator, a middle-income manufacturer, and a low-income animal tender. And imagine two scenarios. Scenario 1: the innovator invents a machine that obsoletes the low-income animal tender. Having replaced the animal tender with a more productive machine, the innovator will use his higher income to satisfy additional desires for manufactured goods. This enables the obsoleted animal tender to retrain and make a better living as a middle-income manufacturer. Scenario 2: the innovator instead invents a machine that obsoletes the middle-income manufacturer. In this case, the innovator will use his higher income to satisfy additional desires for animal tending services. The obsoleted manufacturer must now make a living as a low-income animal tender. So while the innovator sees a rise in his standard of living, the outcome for the unfortunate middle-income manufacturer is a massive deflation in pay. It is our strong contention that whereas previous waves of technological progress looked like scenario 1, the current and forthcoming impact of AI looks more like scenario 2. In other words, robots will kill middle-income jobs rather than low-income jobs. And the reason comes from a discovery called Moravec's Paradox.3 Moravec's Paradox Tells Us That Robots Will Kill Middle Income Jobs Moravec's Paradox is a counterintuitive discovery by robotics researchers that, for AI, the hard problems are easy and the easy problems are hard: High-level reasoning - such as logic and algebra - requires very little computation, but supposedly low-level sensorimotor skills - such as mobility and perception - require vast computational resources. Logic and algebra are considered difficult for humans, a supposed sign of intelligence. Jobs that require them are relatively well paid. Conversely, basic mobility and perception are considered innate. Jobs that rely on them are relatively poorly paid. But from an evolutionary perspective, high-level reasoning is very recent, maybe less than 100 thousand years old. This explains why it seems un-mastered and requires conscious effort. Conversely, evolution has honed and perfected our mobility and perception skills over tens of millions of years. So those low-level skills are subconscious and effortless. As AI is, in effect, just reverse-engineering the brain, the difficulty of any task for AI is roughly proportional to the amount of time it has taken for nature to evolve and encode it in the human brain. Therefore, the 100 thousand year old 'high-level' skills like logic and algebra are relatively easy for AI to replicate and even surpass, whereas the 10 million year old 'low-level' skills like mobility and perception are extremely difficult to replicate. It follows that the jobs that AI can easily replicate and replace are those that require recently evolved skills like logic and algebra. They tend to be middle-income jobs. Conversely, the jobs that AI cannot easily replicate are those that rely on the deeply evolved skills like mobility and perception. They tend to be lower-income jobs. Hence, the current wave of technological progress is following scenario 2. AI is hollowing out middle-income jobs and creating lots of lower-income jobs. Put another way: Say's Law + Moravec's Paradox = Strong Job Creation + Middle Income Wage Depression Is there any evidence of this? Yes, in the United States where the job creation data is a lot more granular than in Europe, the strongest growing employment sub-sector for many years has been 'Food Services And Drinking Places' (Table I-1 and Chart I-7). In other words, bartenders and waiters - classic low-income jobs requiring mobility and perception. Meanwhile, job losses have been concentrated in middle-income occupations. Table I-1Which Sectors Are Seeing ##br##The Job Growth? Why Robots Will Kill Middle Incomes Why Robots Will Kill Middle Incomes Chart I-7Bartenders And Waiters Is The Fastest ##br##Growing Employment Sector! Bartenders And Waiters Is The Fastest Growing Employment Sector! Bartenders And Waiters Is The Fastest Growing Employment Sector! Stronger evidence comes from the weakening Phillips curve relationship between unemployment and wage inflation. In many economies, unemployment rates are hitting multi-decade lows, yet wage inflation remains dormant. This has baffled many economists, but it shouldn't. Moravec's Paradox tells us that strong job creation is at the lower-income end of the employment distribution. So a weakening Phillips curve relationship is exactly what we should see. Moreover, as the economic impacts of AI are still in their infancy, the trends we are seeing now have much further to run. The major investment takeaway is that the structural backdrop for bonds is benign. But with the ECB about to end its ultra-accommodation, bond investors should tilt their long-term exposure towards non-euro area government bonds. A New Investment Theme: Animal Care Chart I-8Animal Care: Strong And Steady Growth Animal Care: Strong And Steady Growth Animal Care: Strong And Steady Growth Despite the on-going disruption to many middle-income jobs, developed economies have grown and will continue to grow. But as we said, economic growth can come through new and surprising industries. The early identification of such industries can create excellent investment opportunities. So we will end this report by introducing an idea. In our stylized scenario 2 we said that the innovator would use his higher income to satisfy additional desires for animal tending services. As it happens, we are witnessing this precise phenomenon today. The demand for animal tending services, such as dog walking, is booming. We fully expect the animal and pet care industry to remain one of the strongest growth sectors in developed economies (Chart I-8). The strong uptrend will be supported by three sub-themes. First, increased pet ownership among wealthy retiring baby boomers. Second, a lower birth rate means that pets are becoming a substitute for a child. Third, the 'humanization of animals': as pets become regarded as equal members of the family, spending on their welfare rises accordingly. We expect to develop this long-term theme in future reports. But today, we are starting our Animal Care basket with 3 initial stocks (Table I-2). Table I-2The Animal Care Basket Why Robots Will Kill Middle Incomes Why Robots Will Kill Middle Incomes Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 An ostler was a man employed to look after the horses of people staying at an inn. 2 Based on U.S. data. 3 Named after the robot engineer Hans Moravec. Fractal Trading Model There are no new trades this week. The short CAC40 / long Eurostoxx600 position reached the end of its 65 day term achieving half of its profit target, while the long DM / short EM position hit its stop-loss. This leaves three open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-9 Short CAC40 / Long EUROSTOXX600 Short CAC40 / Long EUROSTOXX600 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights July jobs report friendly for risk assets. Q2 earnings and July ISM confirm bullish profit environment. The Fed acknowledges softer inflation, but remains determined to tighten policy. 1H economic growth is just enough for the Fed. Housing weakness in Q2 is not a concern. Feature Chart 1Labor Market Conditions Favor Risk Assets Labor Market Conditions Favor Risk Assets Labor Market Conditions Favor Risk Assets The July jobs report suggests that the environment of solid economic growth and still muted wage pressures remains in place, a positive backdrop for equity markets. The report showed that the economy added 209,000 jobs in July, well above the consensus forecast of 178,000. Prior months were also revised higher by 2,000 pushing the 3-month moving average up to 195,000 jobs per month. Monthly job gains thus far in 2017 are nearly identical to the 187,000 jobs per month averaged in 2016. Despite an uptick in the participation rate to 62.9% from 62.8%, the unemployment rate dipped by 0.1% to 4.3%. At two decimal points, the dip in the jobless rate was from 4.36% to 4.35%. Although the monthly increase ticked up to 0.3%, the annual increase in average hourly earnings was flat at 2.5% for the fourth consecutive month (Chart 1). Nonetheless, the reacceleration in the 3-month change in average hourly earnings from 1.9% in January 2017 to 2.8% in July supports the Fed's view on inflation. Bottom Line: The July employment report paints a fairly stable picture of the U.S. economy. Job gains are continuing at a pace consistent with the 2% GDP growth rate of recent years. Meanwhile, wage gains remain modest and consistent with muted inflation. We still expect the Fed to announce the process of running down its balance sheet at the September FOMC meeting. The next rate hike will likely come at the December FOMC meeting, if inflation rebounds in the second half of the year. Steady growth, low inflation and a gentle Fed should continue to underpin U.S. risk assets. Q2 Earnings Update: Margin Expansion In Place EPS and sales growth in Q2 are running well ahead of consensus expectations as forecasted in our July 3 preview. Moreover, the counter trend rally in profit margins is still in place. More than 80% of companies have reported results so far with 73% of companies beating consensus EPS projections, just above the long-term average of 70% (Chart 2). Furthermore, 68% have posted Q2 revenues that exceeded expectations. The surprise factor for Q2 stands at 6% for EPS and 1% for sales. We anticipate the secular mean-reversion of margins to ultimately re-assert itself in the S&P data, perhaps beginning early in 2018. Nonetheless, over the nearer term, results thus far imply that Q2 will see another quarter of margin expansion. Average earnings growth (Q2 2017 versus Q2 2016) is strong at 12% with revenue growth at just 5%. The BCA Earnings model predicts EPS growth to hit roughly 24% later this year on a 4-quarter moving total basis, before moderating in 2018 (Chart 3). Measured on this basis, S&P 500 EPS growth in Q2 would be 20%, compared with 13% in Q1. Chart 2Positive Earnings Surprises Continue Positive Earnings Surprises Continue Positive Earnings Surprises Continue Chart 3Strong EPS Growth Ahead Strong EPS Growth Ahead Strong EPS Growth Ahead Importantly, the strength in earnings and revenues is broadly based (Table 1). Earnings per share are higher in Q2 2017 versus Q2 2016 in all 11 sectors. Results are particularly strong in energy, technology and financials. Energy revenues surged by 15.7% in Q2 versus a year ago. Sales gains in technology (8.2%), materials (7.2%) and utilities (5.7%) are notable. Since the start of 2017, the trajectory of EPS estimates for 2017 and 2018 (Chart 4) has been encouraging. The forecast for 2017 is 12%, up from 11% at the outset of the Q2 reporting season and unchanged from the start of the year. The 2018 estimate (11%) is also little changed from estimates made in January 2017. In a typical year, earnings estimates tend to move lower as the year progresses. Table 1S&P 500:##BR##Q2 2017 Results* Stay The Course Stay The Course Chart 4Stability In '17 & '18 EPS##BR##Estimates Supports U.S. Equities Stability in '17 & '18 EPS Estimates Supports U.S. Equities Stability in '17 & '18 EPS Estimates Supports U.S. Equities BCA's U.S. Equity Strategy service noted1 that the lagged effect from a softening U.S. dollar will also likely underpin EPS in the back half of the year. We are surprised that mentions of the greenback are absent from Q2 conference calls; the domestic market appears front of mind for both investors and management teams. We are inclined to see fading concerns about the dollar from the next Beige Book (due in early September) as evidence in favor of our colleagues' view. The July reading of the ISM manufacturing Index supports our case for accelerating profits in the second half of 2017. From the perspective of risks to our stance, industrial production (IP) has historically been a good proxy for sales of S&P 500 companies (Chart 5); and a rollover in the 12-month change in IP would challenge our constructive view towards earnings. However, strong readings on the ISM, which tracks IP, suggest that IP should accelerate in the next six months (Chart 5, panel 1). Chart 5Favorable Macro Backdrop For Earnings And Sales Favorable Macro Backdrop For Earnings And Sales Favorable Macro Backdrop For Earnings And Sales At 56.3 in July, the ISM has rebounded from its recent low of 47.9 in 2015, but ticked down from the 57.8 reading in June. For many investors, the risk is that the index has peaked and will soon roll over. While a decline is certainly possible given that the index is already elevated, the leading components of the ISM, including the new orders index and the new orders-to-inventory ratio, indicate that the ISM will remain above 50 in the months ahead (Chart 6). Moreover, the new export orders component of the ISM has also surged. The implication is that foreign demand (rather than domestic consumer or business spending) is leading the U.S. manufacturing sector. Consistent with this perspective, the 3- and 12-month changes in the industrial production indices in advanced economies outside the U.S. have outpaced domestic growth (Chart 7). Chart 6IP Poised To Accelerate##BR##And Support EPS Growth IP Poised To Accelerate And Support EPS Growth IP Poised To Accelerate And Support EPS Growth Chart 7U.S. IP Growth Still##BR##Other Developed Markets U.S. IP Growth Still Other Developed Markets U.S. IP Growth Still Other Developed Markets Bottom Line: EPS growth will continue to accelerate through the end of 2017 and into early 2018, aided by a period of margin expansion and decent top-line growth. The elevated level of ISM sets the stage for EPS growth to gather momentum in the second half of 2017. Firm readings on ISM indicate that our bullish profit story for 2017 is still intact, supporting an overweight stance towards stocks versus bonds. Fed Still On Track The July FOMC statement supports our view that the Fed will announce plans to shrink its balance sheet at the September FOMC meeting and hold off until December for the next rate hike. Policymakers upgraded their views of the labor market and downgraded their assessments of inflation. The reference to job gains moderating was dropped; instead, the Fed noted that employment growth has been robust. On inflation, the Fed stated that it is "running below" 2%, as opposed to "somewhat below" 2% in the June statement. These are only small tweaks and do not suggest any deviation from the Fed's plan to raise rates one more time this year as per its latest "dot plot" published in June. We still see the next rate hike in December if inflation begins to turn higher and shows signs of heading towards the 2% target. While the Fed is on the sidelines regarding rate hikes until the final meeting of 2017, it is creeping closer to begin shrinking its balance sheet. The July FOMC statement announced that the balance sheet normalization process will begin "relatively soon." The Fed had previously stated that the process would commence "this year." We view this shift in language as a signal that the balance sheet announcement will be made at the September meeting. Hesitation on tapering by the ECB, persistently weak readings on U.S. inflation or a tightening of U.S. financial conditions, would also give the Fed reason to reassess its plan. Bottom Line: Slight variations in the FOMC's statement indicate that rates are on hold at least until December. This will give the Fed time to determine whether inflation is moving back to its target and to assess the market impact of shrinking its balance sheet. 1H GDP: Just Enough U.S. GDP grew by 2.6% in Q2, following a revised 1.2% advance in Q1 (Chart 8). Given the potential distortions to the quarterly data from residual seasonality issues, an average of the first two quarters gives a better reading on the underlying trend in the economy. In the first half of this year, growth averaged 1.9%. On a year-over-year basis, the economy grew by 2.1%, and while that is only in line with the Fed's 2.1% forecast for 2017, it is above the central bank's view of 1.8% GDP growth in the "longer run." In addition, the NY Fed's Nowcast for Q3 is 2.0% and the Atlanta Fed's GDP now reading for Q3 is 3.7%. Moreover, in years when Q1 GDP is weak, 2H growth is faster than 1H growth 70% of the time.2 Quarterly GDP has averaged 2.2% since the current expansion started in the second half of 2009. Chart 8GDP Growth Remains Below Average, But Above Fed's Long Run Target Stay The Course Stay The Course Looking beyond the quarterly fluctuations, the U.S. economy has been relatively stable at about 2% growth for nearly 10 years. This advance has been sufficient to lower unemployment, with trend GDP growth slowing due to weak productivity gains and demographics. However, the expansion has not yet led to a material acceleration in wage growth or inflation. Inflation, a lagging indicator, warrants more attention from investors. BCA's Global Investment Strategy,3 team recently argued that both cyclical and structural forces will boost inflation in the next year and far into the next decade. In making this assessment, it was noted that inflation typically does not peak until well after a recession has begun and does not bottom until well after it has ended. The implication is that inflation could stay subdued for the next 12 months as the labor market slowly overheats, before moving higher in the second half of 2018. This also suggests that the central bank already may be behind the curve on raising rates. The implication for investors is to stay below-benchmark overall portfolio duration and favor corporate credit over government bonds over the rest of 2017. Bottom Line: Despite historically weak readings on economic growth, the U.S. economy is advancing quickly enough to reduce slack and ultimately, push up inflation. We agree with the Fed that gradual increases will forestall more aggressive hikes later in the cycle. Strong Housing Sector Dips In Q2 We expect housing to continue to add to GDP growth in 2017 and beyond. Housing - as measured by residential fixed investment - subtracted 0.27% from GDP growth in Q2 2017. However, since early 2011, the sector has contributed to growth in 20 of 25 quarters. Moreover, the Q2 decline appears to be a one off, with all of the weakness coming in "other structures," which measures broker commissions, manufactured housing and home improvement. The more economically sensitive single-family sector added 0.31% to GDP in Q2. There are few signs of the severe imbalances in housing and housing-related debt that sparked the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. Chart 9 shows that housing investment is running behind other long "slow burn" recoveries.4 These recoveries lasted well beyond the point at which the economy hit full employment, and inflationary pressures were also slower to emerge. The housing sector's lag is not surprising given the bloated inventory of vacant, unsold and foreclosed homes that needed to be absorbed in the early part of this recovery. Chart 10 shows the overhang has disappeared. Moreover, recent anecdotal reports suggest that the limited supply of homes in areas where people want to live is hurting sales. Chart 9We Are In A "Slow Burn" Expansion We are in a "Slow Burn" Expansion We are in a "Slow Burn" Expansion Chart 10Solid Housing Fundamentals In Place Solid Housing Fundamentals In Place Solid Housing Fundamentals In Place Other positive factors for housing include: A rise in FICO scores, which indicates that more renters now qualify for loans and could move from a rental unit to a single family house. We highlighted this factor in a recent Special Report on housing.5 Housing affordability: although off its all-time high, it remains favorable and the cost of owning remains cheap relative to renting. The rate of home ownership is now well below its long-term average (Chart 10, panel 2). If the pre-Lehman bubble in the homeownership rate has been unwound, it removes a headwind for construction activity because renting favors multi-family construction that produces less GDP per unit compared with single-family homes. The supply of foreclosed homes on the market is almost nil. While this may not directly impact home construction and GDP directly, it supports higher home prices. Lending standards have not eased much in this cycle, and accordingly, have not been a net plus for the housing market. Nonetheless, more selective mortgage lending by banks in this cycle stands in sharp contrast to the lax lending in the last cycle, with the net result being better credit quality for bank mortgage portfolios and less systemic risk in the banking sector. This is an area the Fed is paying close attention to in this cycle.6 That said, with lending standards tight, there is room for them to loosen and provide an additional boost to housing in the future. Household formation is still recovering from a period in which young adults stayed home with their parents for longer than normal for economic reasons. Although mild by historical standards, the tightening labor market and cyclical rebound in disposable incomes have allowed millennials to move out of their parents' basements, which has boosted housing demand (Chart 11). Chart 12 estimates the remaining pent up demand for housing, based on the deviation from its 1990-2007 trend in the ratio of the number of households to the total population. A closing of the remaining gap implies an extra 540,000 housing units. The equilibrium number of housing starts needed to cover underlying population growth, plus the units lost to scrappage, is estimated at about 1.4 million annually. If the household formation 'catch up' occurs during the next two years, adding another 250,000 units per year, then total demand could be 1.6 to 1.7 million in each of the next two years. This compares with the July housing starts level of 1.2 million. If starts rise smoothly from today's level to 1.7 million at the end of 2018, then the housing sector will contribute about 0.25 percentage points and 0.52 percentage point to real GDP growth in 2017 and 2018, respectively (Chart 13). Chart 11Household Formation##BR##Following Incomes Higher Household Formation Following Incomes Higher Household Formation Following Incomes Higher Chart 12A Catch Up In Housing Construction##BR##Will Occur If This Gap Narrows A Catch Up In Housing Construction Will Occur If This Gap Narrows A Catch Up In Housing Construction Will Occur If This Gap Narrows Chart 13Housing Catch Up##BR##Will Boost GDP Growth Housing Catch Up Will Boost GDP Growth Housing Catch Up Will Boost GDP Growth The implication for the economy is that this already-aged expansion phase could persist for a couple of more years as long as it is not hit by an adverse shock and inflationary pressures remain muted, which would allow the Fed to proceed slowly. Bottom Line: Housing starts remain well below the equilibrium level implied by underlying household formation and a "catch up" phase could stoke the current "slow burn" expansion in the coming years. Residential investment will continue to add to GDP growth in 2017 and beyond, and keep economic growth on track to hit the Fed's modest target. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report "Growth Trumps Liquidity", dated July 31, 2017, available at uses.bcarearch.com. 2 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Waiting For The Turn", dated June 26, 2017, available at usis.bcarearch.com. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report "A Secular Bottom In Inflation", dated July 28, 2017, available at gis.bcarearch.com. 4 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, dated November 24, 2016, available at bca.bcarearch.com. 5 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report "U.S. Housing: What Comes Next?", dated March 27, 2017, available at usis.bcarearch.com. 6 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed's Third Mandate", dated July 24, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com.
This week we are sending you two Special Reports (both included in this document) that were previously published in the May and June editions of The Bank Credit Analyst. Both reports discuss the long-term outlook for global bond yields. The first report emphasizes the importance of demographics and the second focuses on the outlook for productivity growth. We are also sending a Weekly Report published jointly by our Global Fixed Income Strategy and U.S. Bond Strategy services. Highlights The fundamental drivers of the low rate world are considered by many to be structural, and thus likely to keep global equilibrium bond yields quite depressed by historical standards for years to come. However, some of the factors behind ultra-low interest rates have waned, while others have reached an inflection point. The age structure of world population is transitioning from a period in which aging added to the global pool of savings to one in which aging will begin to drain that pool. Global investment needs will wane along with population aging, but the majority of the effect on equilibrium interest rates is in the past. In contrast, the demographic effects that will depress desired savings are still to come. The net impact will be bond-bearish. Moreover, the massive positive labor supply shock, following the integration of China and Eastern Europe into the world's effective labor force, is over. Indeed, this shock is heading into reverse as the global working-age population ratio falls. This may improve labor's bargaining power, sparking a shift toward using more capital in the production process and thereby placing upward pressure on global real bond yields. It is too early to declare globalization dead, but the neo-liberal trading world order that has been in place for decades is under attack. This could be inflationary if it disrupts global supply chains. Anti-globalization policies could paradoxically be positive for capital spending, at least for a few years. As for China, the fundamental drivers of its savings capacity appear to rule out a return to the days when the country was generating a substantial amount of excess savings. Technological advance will remain a headwind for real wage gains, but at least the transition to a world that is less labor-abundant will boost workers' ability to negotiate a larger share of the income pie. We are not making the case that real global bond yields are going to quickly revert to pre-Lehman averages. Global yields could even drop back to previous lows in the event of another recession. Nonetheless, from a long-term perspective, current market expectations for bond yields are too low. Investors should have a bond-bearish bias on a medium- and long-term horizon. Feature In the September 2016 The Bank Credit Analyst, we summarized the key drivers behind the major global macroeconomic disequilibria that have resulted in deflationary pressure, policy extremism, dismal productivity, and the lowest bond yields in recorded history (Chart I-1). The disequilibria include income inequality, the depressed wage share of GDP, lackluster capital spending, and excessive savings. Chart I-1Global Disequilibria Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds The fundamental drivers of the low bond yield world are now well documented and understood by investors. These drivers generally are considered to be structural, and thus likely to keep global equilibrium bond yields and interest rates at historically low levels for years to come according to the consensus. Based on discussions with BCA clients, it appears that many have either "bought into" the secular stagnation thesis or, at a minimum, have adopted the view that growth headwinds preclude any meaningful rise in bond yields. However, bond investors might have been lulled into a false sense of security. Yields will not return to pre-Lehman norms anytime soon, but some of the factors behind the low-yield world have waned, while others have reached an inflection point. Most importantly, the age structure of world population is transitioning from a period in which aging added to the global pool of savings to one in which aging will begin to drain that pool. We have reached the tipping point. Equilibrium real bond yields will gradually move higher as a result. But before we discuss what is changing, it is important to review the drivers of today's macro disequilibria. Several of them predate the Great Financial Crisis, including demographic trends, technological advances, and the integration of China's massive workforce and excess savings into the global economy. Ultra-Low Rates: How Did We Get Here? (A) Demographics And Global Savings The so-called Global Savings Glut has been a bullish structural force for bonds for the past couple of decades. We won't go through all of the forces behind the glut, but a key factor is population aging in the advanced economies. Ex-ante desired savings rose as baby boomers entered their high-income years. The Great Financial Crisis only served to reinforce the desire to save, given the setback in the value of boomers' retirement nest eggs.1 The corporate sector also began to save more following the crisis. Chart I-2Global Shifts In The Saving ##br##And Investment Curves Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Even more importantly, the surge in China's trade surplus since the 1990s had to be recycled into the global pool of savings. While China's rate of investment was very high, its propensity to save increased even faster, resulting in a swollen external surplus and a massive net outflow of capital. Other emerging economies also made the adjustment from net importers of capital to net exporters following the Asian crisis in the late 1990s. By leaning into currency appreciation, these countries built up huge foreign exchange reserves that had to be recycled abroad. In theory, savings must equal investment at the global level and real interest rates shift to ensure this equilibrium (Chart I-2). China's excess savings, together with a greater desire to save in the developed countries, represented a shift in the saving schedule to the right. The result was downward pressure on global interest rates. (B) Demographics And Global Capital Spending Demographics and China's integration also affected the investment side of the equation. A slower pace of labor force growth in the developed countries resulted in a permanently lower level of capital spending relative to GDP. Slower consumer spending growth, as a result of a more moderate expansion in the working-age population, meant a reduced appetite for new factories, malls, and apartment buildings. Chart I-3 shows that the growth rate of global capital spending that is required to maintain a given capital-to-output ratio has dropped substantially, due to the dramatic slowdown in the growth of the world's working-age population.2 Keep in mind that this estimate refers only to the demographic component of investment spending. Actual capital expenditure growth will not be as weak as Chart I-3 suggests because firms will want to adopt new technologies for competitive or environmental reasons. Nonetheless, the point is that the structural tailwind for global capex from the post-war baby boom has disappeared. Chart I-3Demographics Are A Structural Headwind For Global Capex Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds (C) Labor Supply Shock And Global Capital Spending While the working-age population ratio peaked in the developed countries years ago, it is a different story at the global level (Chart I-4). The integration of the Chinese and Eastern European workforces into the global labor pool during the 1990s and 2000s resulted in an effective doubling of global labor supply in a short period of time. Relative prices must adjust in the face of such a large boost in the supply of labor relative to capital. The sudden abundance of cheap labor depressed real wages from what they otherwise would have been, thus incentivizing firms to use more labor and less capital at the margin. The combination of slower working-age population growth in the advanced economies and a surge in the global labor force resulted in a decline in desired global capital spending. In terms of Chart I-2, the leftward shift of the investment schedule reinforced the impact of the savings impulse in placing downward pressure on global interest rates. (D) Labor Supply Shock And Income Inequality The wave of cheap labor also aggravated the trend toward greater inequality in the advanced economies and the downward trend in labor's share of the income pie (Chart I-5). Chart I-4Working-Age Population Ratios Have Peaked Working-Age Population Ratios Have Peaked Working-Age Population Ratios Have Peaked Chart I-5Labor Share Of Income Has Dropped Labor Share Of Income Has Dropped Labor Share Of Income Has Dropped In theory, a surge in the supply of labor is a positive "supply shock" that benefits both developed and developing countries. However, a recent report by David Autor and Gordon Hanson3 highlighted that trade agreements in the past were incremental and largely involved countries with similar income levels. The sudden entry of China to the global trade arena, involving a massive addition to the effective global stock of labor, was altogether different. The report does not argue that trade has become a "bad" thing. Rather, it points out that the adjustment costs imposed on the advanced economies were huge and long-lasting, as Chinese firms destroyed entire industries in developed countries. Chart I-6Hollowing Out Hollowing Out Hollowing Out The lingering adjustment phase contributed to greater inequality in the major countries. Management was able to use the threat of outsourcing to gain the upper hand in wage negotiations. The result has been a rise in the share of income going to high-income earners in the Advanced Economies, at the expense of low- and middle-income earners (Chart I-6). The same is true, although to a lesser extent, in the emerging world. Greater inequality, in turn, has weighed on aggregate demand and equilibrium interest rates because a larger share of total income flowed to the "rich" who tend to save more than the low- and middle-income classes. (E) The Dark Side Of Technology Advances in technology also contributed to rising inequality. In theory, new technologies hurt some workers in the short term, but benefit most workers in the long run because they raise national income. However, there is evidence that past major technological shocks were associated with a "hollowing out" or U-shaped pattern of employment. Low- and high-skilled employment increased, but the proportion of mid-skilled workers tended to shrink. Wages for both low- and mid-skilled labor did not keep up with those that were highly-skilled, leading to wider income disparity. Today, technology appears to be resulting in faster, wider and deeper degrees of hollowing-out than in previous periods of massive technological change. This may be because machines are not just replacing manual human tasks, but cognitive ones too. A recent IMF report made the case that technology and global integration played a dominant role in labor's declining fortunes. Technology alone explains about half of the drop in the labor share of income in the developed countries since 1980.4 Falling prices for capital goods, information and communications technology in particular, have facilitated the expansion of global value chains as firms unbundled production into many tasks that were distributed around the world in a way that minimized production costs. Chart I-7 highlights that the falling price of capital goods in the advanced economies went hand-in-hand with rising participation in global supply chains since 1990. Falling capital goods prices also accelerated the automation of routine tasks, contributing especially to job destruction in the developed (high-wage) economies. In other words, firms in the developed world either replaced workers with machinery in areas where technology permitted, or outsourced jobs to lower-wage countries in areas that remained labor-intensive. Both trends undermined labor's bargaining power, depressed labor's share of income, and contributed to inequality. The effects of technology, global integration, population aging and China's economic integration are demonstrated in Chart I-8. The world working-age-to-total population ratio rose sharply beginning in the late 1990s. This resulted in an upward trend in China's investment/GDP ratio, and a downward trend in the G7. The upward trend in the G7 capital stock-per-capita ratio began to slow as a result, before experiencing an unprecedented contraction after the Great Recession and Financial Crisis. Chart I-7Economic Integration And ##br##Falling Capital Goods Prices Economic Integration And Falling Capital Goods Prices Economic Integration And Falling Capital Goods Prices Chart I-8Macro Impact Of ##br##Labor Supply Shock Macro Impact Of Labor Supply Shock Macro Impact Of Labor Supply Shock The result has been a deflationary global backdrop characterized by demand deficiency and poor potential real GDP growth, both of which have depressed equilibrium global interest rates over the past 20 to 25 years. Transition Phase It would appear easy to conclude that these trends will be with us for another few decades because the demographic trends will not change anytime soon. Nonetheless, on closer inspection the global economy is transitioning from a period when cyclical economic pressures and all of the structural trends were pushing equilibrium interest rates in the same direction, to a period in which the economic cycle is becoming less bond-friendly and some of the secular drivers of low interest rates are gradually changing direction. First, the massive labor supply shock of the past few decades is over. The world working-age population ratio has peaked according to United Nations estimates. This ratio is already declining in the major advanced economies and is in the process of topping out in China. The absolute number of working-age people will shrink in China and the G7 countries over the next five years, although it will continue to grow at a low rate for the world as a whole (Chart I-9). Unions are unlikely to make a major comeback, but a backdrop that is less labor-abundant should gradually restore some worker bargaining power, especially as economies regain full employment. The resulting upward pressure on real wages will support capital spending as firms substitute toward capital and away from (increasingly expensive) labor. Consumer demand will also receive a boost if inequality moderates and the labor share of income begins to rise. Globalization On The Back Foot Second, it is too early to declare globalization dead, but the neo-liberal trading world order that has been in place for decades is under attack. Global exports appear to have peaked relative to GDP and average tariffs have ticked higher (Chart I-10). The World Trade Organization has announced that the number of new trade restrictions or impediments outweighed the number of trade liberalizing initiatives in 2016. The U.K. appears willing to sacrifice trade for limits to the free movement of people. The new U.S. Administration has ditched the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and is threatening to impose punitive tariffs on some trading partners. Chart I-9Working-Age Population To Shrink In G7 And China Working-Age Population To Shrink in G7 and China Working-Age Population To Shrink in G7 and China Chart I-10Globalization Peaking? Globalization Peaking? Globalization Peaking? Anti-globalization policies could paradoxically be positive for capital spending, at least for a few years. If the U.S. were to impose high tariffs on China, for example, it would make a part of the Chinese capital stock redundant overnight. In order for the global economy to produce the same amount of goods and services as before, the U.S. and other countries would need to invest more. Any unwinding of globalization would also be inflationary as it would disrupt international supply chains. Demographics And Saving: From Tailwind To Headwind... Chart I-11Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Third, the impact of savings in the major advanced economies and China on global interest rates will change direction as well. In the developed world, aggregate household savings will come under downward pressure as boomers increasingly shift into retirement. Economists are fond of employing the so-called life-cycle theory of consumer spending. According to this theory, consumers tend to smooth out lifetime spending by accumulating assets during the working years in order to maintain a certain living standard after retirement. The U.N. National Transfer Accounts Project has gathered data on spending and labor income by age cohort at a point in time. Chart I-11 presents the data for China and three of the major advanced economies. The data for the advanced economies suggest that spending tends to rise sharply from a low level between birth and about 15 years of age. It continues to rise, albeit at a more modest pace, through the working years. Other studies have found that consumer spending falls during retirement. Nonetheless, these studies generally include only private spending and therefore do not include health care that is provided by the government. The data presented in Chart I-11 show that, if government-provided health care is included, personal spending rises sharply toward the end of life. The profile is somewhat different in China. Spending rises quickly from birth to about 20 years of age, and is roughly flat thereafter. Indeed, consumption edges lower after 75-80 years of age. These data allow us to project the impact of changing demographics on the average household saving rate in the coming years, assuming that the income and spending profiles shown in Chart I-11 are unchanged. We start by calculating the average saving rate across age cohorts given today's age structure. We then recalculate the average saving rate each year moving forward in time. The resulting saving rate changes along with the age structure of the population. The results are shown in Chart I-12. The saving rates for all four economies have been indexed at zero in 2016 for comparison purposes. The aggregate saving rate declines in all cases, falling between 4 and 8 percentage points between 2016 and 2030. Germany sees the largest drop of the four countries. Chart I-12Aging Will Undermine Aggregate Saving Aging Will Undermine Aggregate Saving Aging Will Undermine Aggregate Saving The simulations are meant to be suggestive, rather than a precise forecast, because the savings profile across age cohorts will adjust over time. Moreover, governments will no doubt raise taxes to cover the rising cost of health care, providing a partial offset in terms of the national saving rate.5 Nonetheless, the simulations highlight that the major economies are past the point where the baby boom generation is adding to the global savings pool at a faster pace than retirees are drawing from it. The age structure in the major advanced economies is far enough advanced that the rapid increase in the retirement rate will place substantial downward pressure on aggregate household savings in the coming years. It is well known that population aging will also undermine government budgets. Rising health care costs are already captured in our household saving rate projection because the data for household spending includes health care even if it is provided by the public sector. However, public pension schemes will also be a problem. To the extent that politicians are slow to trim pension benefits and/or raise taxes, public pension plans will be a growing drain on national savings. Could younger, less developed economies offset some of the demographic trends in China and the Advanced Economies? Numerically speaking, a more effective use of underutilized populations in Africa and India could go a long way. Nevertheless, deep-seated structural problems would have to be addressed and, even then, it is difficult to see either of these regions turning into the next "China story" given the current backlash against globalization and immigration. ...And The Capex Story Is Largely Behind Us Demographic trends also imply less capital spending relative to GDP, as discussed above. In terms of the impact on global equilibrium interest rates, it then becomes a race between falling saving and investment rates. Some analysts point to the Japanese experience because it is the leading edge in terms of global aging. Bond yields have been extremely low for many years even as the household saving rate collapsed, suggesting that ex-ante investment spending shifted by more than ex-ante savings. Nonetheless, Japan may not be a good example because the deterioration in the country's demographics coincided with burst bubbles in both real estate and stocks that hamstrung Japanese banks for decades. A series of policy mistakes made things worse. Economic theory is not clear on the net effect of demographics on savings and investment. The academic empirical evidence is inconclusive as well. However, a detailed IMF study of 30 OECD countries analyzed the demographic impact on a number of macroeconomic variables, including savings and investment.6 They estimated separate demographic effects for the old-age dependency ratio and the working-age population ratio. Applying the IMF's estimated model coefficients to projected changes in both of these ratios over the next decade suggests that the decline in ex-ante savings will exceed the ex-ante drop in capex requirements by about 1 percentage point of GDP. This is a non-trivial shift. Moreover, our simulations highlight that timing is important. The outlook for the household saving rate depends on the changing age structure of the population and the distribution of saving rates across age cohorts. Thus, the average saving rate will trend down as populations continue to age over the coming decades. In contrast, the impact of demographics on capital spending requirements is related to the change in the growth rate of the working-age population. Chart I-13 once again presents our estimates for the demographic component of capital spending. The top panel presents the world capex/GDP ratio that is necessary to maintain a constant capital/output ratio, and the bottom panel shows the change in that ratio. The important point is that the downward adjustment in world capex/GDP related to aging is now largely behind us because most of the deceleration in the growth rate of the working-age population is done. This is in contrast to the household saving rate adjustment where all of the adjustment is still to come. China Is Transitioning Too China must be treated separately from the developed countries because of its unique structural issues. As discussed above, household savings increased dramatically beginning in the mid-1990s (Chart I-14). This trend reflected a number of factors, including: Chart I-13Demographics And Capex Requirements Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Chart I-14China's Savings Rates Have Peaked... China's Savings Rates Have Peaked... China's Savings Rates Have Peaked... the rising share of the working-age population; a drop in the fertility rate, following the introduction of the one-child policy in the late 1970s that allowed households to spend less on raising children and save more for retirement; health care reform in the early 1990s required households to bear a larger share of health care spending; and job security was also undermined by reform of the state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the late 1990s, leading to increased precautionary savings to cover possible bouts of unemployment. These savings tailwinds have turned around in recent years and the household saving rate appears to have peaked. China's contribution to the global pool of savings has already moderated significantly, as measured by the current account surplus. The surplus has withered from about 9% in 2008 to 2½% in 2016. A recent IMF study makes the case that China's national saving rate will continue to decline. The IMF estimates that for every one percentage-point rise in the old-age dependency ratio, the aggregate household saving rate will fall by 0.4-1 percentage points. In addition, the need for precautionary savings is expected to ease along with improvements in the social safety net, achieved through higher government spending on health care. The household saving rate will fall by three percentage points by 2021 according to the IMF (Chart I-15). Competitive pressure and an aging population will also reduce the saving rates of the corporate and government sectors. Chart I-15...Suggesting That External Surplus Will Shrink ...Suggesting That External Surplus Will Shrink ...Suggesting That External Surplus Will Shrink Of course, investment as a share of GDP is projected to moderate too, reflecting a rebalancing of the economy away from exports and capital spending toward household consumption. The IMF expects that savings will moderate slightly faster than investment, leading to a narrowing in the current account surplus to almost zero by 2021. A lot of assumptions go into this type of forecast such that we must take it with a large grain of salt. Nonetheless, the fundamental drivers of China's savings capacity appear to rule out a return to the days when the country was generating a substantial amount of excess savings. Moreover, a return to large current account surpluses would likely require significant currency depreciation, which is a political non-starter given U.S. angst over trade. The risk is that China's excess savings will be less, not more, in five year's time. Tech Is A Wildcard It is extremely difficult to forecast the impact of technological advancement on the global economy. We cannot say with any conviction that the tech-related effects of "hollowing out", "winner-take-all" and the "skills premium" will moderate in the coming years. Nonetheless, these effects have occurred alongside a surge in the world's labor force and rapid globalization of supply chains, both of which reinforced the erosion of employee bargaining power. Looking ahead, technology will still be a headwind for some employees, but at least the transition from a world of excess labor to one that is more labor-scarce will boost workers' ability to negotiate a larger share of the income pie. We will explore the impact of technology on productivity, inflation, growth, and bond yields in a companion report to be published in the next issue. Conclusion: The main points we made in this report are summarized in Table I-1. All of the structural factors driving real bond yields were working in the same (bullish) direction over the past 30-40 years. Looking ahead, it is uncertain how technological improvement will affect bond prices, but we expect that the others will shift (or have already shifted) to either neutral or outright bond-bearish. Table I-1Key Secular Drivers Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds No doubt, our views that globalization and inequality have peaked, and that the labor share of income has bottomed, are speculative. These factors may not place much upward pressure on equilibrium yields. Nonetheless, it seems likely that the demographic effect that has depressed capital spending demand is well advanced. We see it shifting from a positive factor for bond prices to a neutral factor in the coming years. It is also clear that the massive positive labor supply shock is over, and is heading into reverse as the global working-age population ratio falls. This may improve labor's bargaining power and the resulting boost consumer spending will be negative for bonds. This may also spark a shift toward using more capital in the production process and thereby place additional upward pressure on global real bond yields. Admittedly, however, this last point requires more research because theory and empirical evidence on it are not clear. Perhaps most importantly, the aging of the population in the advanced economies has reached a tipping point; retirees will drain more from the pool of savings than the working-age population will add to it in the coming years. We have concentrated on real equilibrium bond yields in this report because it is the part of nominal yields that is the most depressed relative to historical norms. The inflation component is only a little below a level that is consistent with central banks meeting their 2% inflation targets in the medium term. There is a risk that inflation will overshoot these targets, leading to a possible surge in long-term inflation expectations that turbocharges the bond bear market. This is certainly possible, as highlighted by a recent Global Investment Strategy Quarterly Strategy Outlook.7 Pain in bond markets would be magnified in this case, especially if central banks are forced to aggressively defend their targets. Please note that we are not making the case that real global bond yields will quickly revert to pre-Lehman averages. It will take time for the bond-bullish structural factors to unwind. It will also take time for inflation to gain any momentum, even in the United States. Global yields could even drop back to previous lows in the event of another recession. Nonetheless, from a long-term perspective, current market expectations suggest that investors have adopted an overly benign view on the outlook for yields. For example, implied real short-term rates remain negative until 2021 in the U.S. and 2026 in the Eurozone, while they stay negative out to 2030 in the U.K. (Chart I-16). We doubt that short-term rates will be negative for that long, given the structural factors discussed above. Another way of looking at this is presented in Chart I-17. The market expects the 10-year Treasury yield in ten years to be only slightly above today's spot yield, which itself is not far above the lowest levels ever recorded. Market expectations are equally depressed for the 5-year forward rate for the U.S. and the other major economies. Chart I-16Market Expects Negative Short-Term Rates For A Long Time Market Expects Negative Short-Term Rates For A Long Time Market Expects Negative Short-Term Rates For A Long Time Chart I-17Forward Rates Very Low Vs. History Forward Rates Very Low Vs. History Forward Rates Very Low Vs. History The implication is that investors should have a bond-bearish bias on a medium- and long-term horizon. Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst MarkM@bcaresearch.com 1 It is true that observed household savings rates fell in some of the advanced economies, such as the United States, at a time when aging should have boosted savings from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. This argues against a strong demographic effect on savings. However, keep in mind that we are discussing desired (or ex-ante) savings. Ex-post, savings can go in the opposite direction because of other influencing factors. As discussed below, global savings must equal investment, which means that shifts in desired capital spending demand matter for the ex-post level of savings. 2 Arithmetically, if world trend GDP growth slows by one percentage point, then investment spending would need to drop by about 3½ percentage points of GDP to keep the capital/output ratio stable. 3 David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, "The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade," Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 8, pp. 205-240 (October 2016). 4 Please see "Understanding The Downward Trend In Labor Income Shares," Chapter 3 in the IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2017). 5 In other words, while the household savings rate, as defined here to include health care spending by governments on behalf of households, will decline, any associated tax increases will blunt the impact on national savings (i.e. savings across the household, government and business sectors). 6 Jong-Won Yoon, Jinill Kim, and Jungjin Lee, "Impact Of Demographic Changes On Inflation And The Macroeconomy," IMF Working Paper no. 14/210 (November 2014). 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook: Second Quarter 2017: A Three Act Play," dated March 31, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Is Slow Productivity Growth Good Or Bad For Bonds? Productivity growth has declined in most countries. This appears to be a structural problem that will remain with us for years to come. In theory, slower productivity growth should reduce the neutral rate of interest, benefiting bonds in the process. In reality, countries with chronically low productivity growth typically have higher interest rates than faster growing economies. The passage of time helps account for this seeming paradox: Slower productivity growth tends to depress interest rates at the outset, but leads to higher rates later on. The U.S. has reached an inflection point where weak productivity growth is starting to push up both the neutral real rate and inflation. Other countries will follow. The implication for investors is that government bond yields have begun a long-term secular uptrend. The market is not at all prepared for this. Slow Productivity Growth: A Structural Problem Productivity growth has fallen sharply in most developed and emerging economies (Chart II-1). As we argued in "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," there is little compelling evidence that measurement error explains the productivity slowdown.1 Yes, the unmeasured utility accruing from free internet services is large, but so was the unmeasured utility from antibiotics, indoor plumbing, and air conditioning. No one has offered a convincing explanation for why the well-known problems with productivity calculations suddenly worsened about 12 years ago. Chart II-1Productivity Growth Has Slowed In Most Major Economies Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds If mismeasurement is not responsible for the productivity slowdown, what is? Cyclical factors have undoubtedly played a role. In particular, lackluster investment spending has curtailed the growth in the capital stock (Chart II-2). This means that today's workers have not benefited from the improvement in the quality and quantity of capital to the same extent as previous generations. However, the timing of the productivity slowdown - it began in 2004-05 in most countries, well before the financial crisis struck - suggests that structural factors have been key. These include: Waning gains from the IT revolution. Recent innovations have focused more on consumers than businesses. As nice as Facebook and Instagram are, they do little to boost business productivity - in fact, they probably detract from it, given how much time people waste on social media these days. The rising share of value added coming from software relative to hardware has also contributed to the decline in productivity growth. Chart II-3 shows that productivity gains in the latter category have been much smaller than in the former. Chart II-2The Great Recession Hit ##br##Capital Stock Accumulation The Great Recession Hit Capital Stock Accumulation The Great Recession Hit Capital Stock Accumulation Chart II-3The Shift Towards Software Has ##br##Dampened IT Productivity Gains The Shift Towards Software Has Dampened IT Productivity Gains The Shift Towards Software Has Dampened IT Productivity Gains Slower human capital accumulation. Globally, the fraction of adults with a secondary degree or higher is increasing at half the pace it did in the 1990s (Chart II-4). Educational achievement, as measured by standardized test scores in mathematics and science, is edging lower in the OECD, and is showing very limited gains in most emerging markets (Chart II-5). Test scores tend to be much lower in countries with rapidly growing populations (Chart II-6). Consequently, the average level of global mathematical proficiency is now declining for the first time in modern history. Chart II-4The Contribution To Growth ##br##From Rising Human Capital Is Falling Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Chart II-5Math Skills Around The World Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Decreased creative destruction. The birth rate of new firms in the U.S. has fallen by half since the late 1970s and is now barely above the death rate (Chart II-7). In addition, many firms in advanced economies are failing to replicate the best practices of industry leaders. The OECD reckons that this has been a key reason for the productivity slowdown.2 Chart II-6The Best Educated EMs Have The Worst Demographic Outlooks Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Chart II-7Secular Decline In U.S. Firm Births Secular Decline In U.S. Firm Births Secular Decline In U.S. Firm Births Productivity Growth And Interest Rates Investors typically assume that long-term interest rates will converge to nominal GDP growth. All things equal, this implies that faster productivity growth should lead to higher interest rates. Most economic models share this assumption - they predict that an acceleration in productivity growth will raise the rate of return on capital and incentivize households to save less in anticipation of faster income gains.3 Both factors should cause interest rates to rise. The problem is that these theories do not accord with the data. Chart II-8 shows that interest rates are far higher in regions such as Africa and Latin America, which have historically suffered from chronically weak productivity growth. In contrast, rates are lower in regions such as East Asia, which have experienced rapid productivity growth. One sees the same negative correlation between interest rates and productivity growth over time in developed economies. In the U.S., for example, interest rates rose rapidly during the 1970s, a decade when productivity growth fell sharply (Chart II-9). Chart II-8Emerging Markets: Interest Rates Tend To ##br##Be Higher Where Productivity Growth Is Weak Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Chart II-9U.S. Interest Rates Soared In ##br##The 1970s While Productivity Swooned U.S. Interest Rates Soared In The 1970s While Productivity Swooned U.S. Interest Rates Soared In The 1970s While Productivity Swooned Two Reasons Why Slower Productivity Growth May Lead To Higher Interest Rates There are two main reasons why slower productivity growth may lead to higher nominal interest rates over time: Slower productivity growth may eventually lead to higher inflation; Slower productivity growth may deplete national savings, thereby raising the neutral real rate of interest. We discuss each reason in turn. Reason #1: Slower Productivity Growth May Fuel Inflation Most economists agree that chronically weak productivity growth tends to be associated with higher inflation. Even Janet Yellen acknowledged as much, noting in a 2005 speech that "the evidence suggests that the predominant medium-term effect of a slowdown in trend productivity growth would likely be higher inflation."4 In theory, the causation between productivity and inflation can run in either direction: Weak productivity gains can fuel inflation while high inflation can, in turn, undermine growth. With respect to the latter, economists have focused on three channels: First, higher inflation may make it difficult for firms to distinguish between relative and absolute price shocks, leading to suboptimal resource allocation. Second, higher inflation may stymie capital accumulation because investors typically pay capital gains taxes even when the increase in asset values is entirely due to inflation. Third, high inflation may cause households and firms to waste time and effort on economizing their cash holdings. There are also several ways in which slower productivity growth can lead to higher inflation. For example, sluggish productivity growth may increase the likelihood that a country will be forced to inflate its way out of any debt problems. In addition, central banks may fail to recognize structural declines in productivity growth in real time, leading them to keep interest rates too low in the errant belief that weak GDP growth is due to inadequate demand when, in fact, it is due to insufficient supply. There is strong evidence that this happened in the U.S. in the 1970s. Chart II-10 shows that the Fed consistently overestimated the size of the output gap during that period. Chart II-10The Fed Continuously Overstated ##br##The Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s The Fed Continuously Overstated The Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s The Fed Continuously Overstated The Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s Reason #2: Slower Productivity Growth May Deplete National Savings, Leading To A Higher Neutral Real Rate Imagine that you have a career where your real income is projected to grow by 2% per year, but then something auspicious happens that leads you to revise your expected annual income growth to 20%. How do you react? If you are like most people, your initial inclination might be to celebrate by purchasing a new car or treating yourself to a lavish vacation. As such, your saving rate is likely to fall at the outset. However, as the income gains pile up, you might find yourself running out of stuff to buy, resulting in a higher saving rate. This is particularly likely to be true if you grew up poor and have not yet acquired a taste for conspicuous consumption. Now consider the opposite case: One where you realize that your income will slowly contract over time as your skills become increasingly obsolete. The logic above suggests that your immediate reaction will be to hunker down and spend less - in other words, your saving rate will rise. However, as time goes by and the roof needs to be changed and the kids sent off to college, you may find it hard to pay the bills - your saving rate will then fall. The same reasoning applies to economy-wide productivity growth. When productivity growth increases, household savings are likely to decline as consumers spend more in anticipation of higher incomes. Meanwhile, investment is likely to rise as firms move swiftly to expand capacity to meet rising demand for their products. The combination of falling savings and rising investment will cause real rates to increase. As time goes by, however, it may become increasingly difficult for the economy to generate enough incremental demand to keep up with rising productive capacity. At that point, real rates will begin falling. The historic evidence is consistent with the notion that higher productivity growth causes savings to fall at the outset, but rise later on. Chart II-11 shows that East Asian economies all had rapid growth rates before they had high saving rates. China is a particularly telling example. Chinese productivity growth took off in the early 1990s. Inflation accelerated over the subsequent years, while the country flirted with current account deficits - both telltale signs of excess demand. It was not until a decade later that the saving rate took off, pushing the current account into a large surplus, even though investment was also rising at the time (Chart II-12). Chart II-11Asian Tigers: Growth Took Off First, ##br##Followed By Higher Savings Asian Tigers: Growth Took Off First, Followed By Higher Savings Asian Tigers: Growth Took Off First, Followed By Higher Savings Chart II-12China: Productivity Growth Accelerated, ##br##Then Savings Rate Took Off China: Productivity Growth Accelerated, Then Savings Rate Took Off China: Productivity Growth Accelerated, Then Savings Rate Took Off Today, Chinese deposit rates are near rock-bottom levels, and yet the household sector continues to save like crazy. This will change over time. The working-age population has peaked (Chart II-13). As millions of Chinese workers retire and begin to dissave, aggregate household savings will fall. Meanwhile, Chinese youth today have no direct memory of the hardships that their parents endured. As happened in Korea and Japan, the flowering of a consumer culture will help bring down the saving rate. Meanwhile, sluggish income growth in the developed world will make it difficult for households to save much. Population aging will only exacerbate this effect. As my colleague Mark McClellan pointed out in last month's edition of The Bank Credit Analyst, elderly people in advanced economies consume more than any other age cohort once government spending for medical care on their behalf is taken into account (Chart II-14).5 Our estimates suggest that population aging will reduce the household saving rate by five percentage points in the U.S. over the next 15 years (Chart II-15). The saving rate could fall as much as ten points in Germany, leading to the evaporation of the country's mighty current account surplus. As saving rates around the world begin to fall, real interest rates will rise. Chart II-13China's Very High Rate Of National Savings ##br##Will Face Pressure From Demographics China's Very High Rate Of National Savings Will Face Pressure From Demographics China's Very High Rate Of National Savings Will Face Pressure From Demographics Chart II-14Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Chart II-15Aging Will Reduce Aggregate Savings Aging Will Reduce Aggregate Savings Aging Will Reduce Aggregate Savings The Two Reasons Reinforce Each Other The discussion above has focused on two reasons why chronically low productivity growth could lead to higher interest rates: 1) weak productivity growth could fuel inflation; and 2) weak productivity growth could deplete national savings, leading to higher real rates. There is an important synergy between these two reasons. Suppose, for example, that weak productivity growth does eventually raise the neutral real rate. Since central banks cannot measure the neutral rate directly and monetary policy affects the economy with a lag, it is possible that actual rates will end up below the neutral rate. This would cause the economy to overheat, resulting in higher inflation. Thus, if the first reason proves to be true, it is more likely that the second reason will prove to be true as well. The Technological Wildcard So far, we have discussed productivity growth in very generic terms - as basically anything that raises output-per-hour. In reality, the source of productivity gains can have a strong bearing on interest rates. Economists describe innovations that raise the demand for labor relative to capital goods as being "capital saving." Paul David and Gavin Wright have argued that the widespread adoption of electrically-powered processes in the early 20th century serves as "a textbook illustration of capital-saving technological growth."6 They note that "Electrification saved fixed capital by eliminating heavy shafts and belting, a change that also allowed factory buildings themselves to be more lightly constructed." In contrast, recent technological innovations have tended to be more of the "labor saving" than "capital saving" variety. Robotics and AI come to mind, but so do more mundane advances such as containerization. Marc Levinson has contended that the widespread adoption of "The Box" in the 1970s completely revolutionized international trade. Nowadays, huge cranes move containers off ships and place them onto waiting trucks or trains. Thus, the days when thousands of longshoremen toiled in the great ports of Baltimore and Long Beach are gone.7 If technological progress is driven by labor-saving innovations, real wages will tend to grow more slowly than overall productivity (Chart II-16). In fact, if technological change is sufficiently biased in favour of capital (i.e., if it is extremely "labor saving"), real wages may actually decline in absolute terms (Chart II-17). Owners of capital tend to be wealthier than workers. Since richer people save more of their income than poorer people, the shift in income towards the former will depress aggregate demand (Chart II-18). This will result in a lower neutral rate. Chart II-16U.S.: Real Wages Have Been ##br##Lagging Productivity Gains U.S.: Real Wages Have Been Lagging Productivity Gains U.S.: Real Wages Have Been Lagging Productivity Gains Chart II-17Examples Of Capital-Biased ##br##Technological Change Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds It is difficult to know if the forces described above will dissipate over time. Productivity growth is largely a function of technological change. We like to think that we are living in an era of unprecedented technological upheavals, but if productivity growth has slowed, it is likely that the pace of technological innovation has also diminished. If so, the impact that technological change is having on such things as the distribution of income and global savings - and by extension on interest rates - could become more muted. To use an analogy, the music might remain the same, but the volume from the speakers could still drop. Capital In A Knowledge-Based Economy Labor-saving technological change has not been the only force pushing down interest rates. Modern economies are transitioning away from producing goods towards producing knowledge. Companies such as Google, Apple, and Amazon have thrived without having to undertake massive amounts of capital spending. This has left them with billions of dollars in cash on their balance sheets. The price of capital goods has also tumbled over the past three decades, allowing companies to cut their capex budgets (Chart II-19). Chart II-18Savings Heavily Skewed ##br##Towards Top Earners Savings Heavily Skewed Towards Top Earners Savings Heavily Skewed Towards Top Earners Chart II-19Falling Capital Goods Prices Have Allowed ##br##Companies To Slash Capex Budgets Falling Capital Goods Prices Have Allowed Companies To Slash Capex Budgets Falling Capital Goods Prices Have Allowed Companies To Slash Capex Budgets In addition, technological advances have facilitated the emergence of "winner-take-all" industries where scale and network effects allow just a few companies to rule the roost (Chart II-20). Such market structures exacerbate inequality by shifting income into the hands of a few successful entrepreneurs and business executives. As noted above, this leads to higher aggregate savings. Market structures of this sort could also lead to less aggregate investment because low profitability tends to constrain capital spending by second- or third-tier firms, while the worry that expanding capacity will erode profit margins tends to constrain spending by winning companies. The combination of higher savings and decreased investment results in a lower neutral rate. As with labor-saving technological change, it is difficult to know how these forces will evolve over time. The growth of winner-take-all industries has benefited greatly from globalization. Globalization, however, may be running out of steam. Tariffs are already extremely low in most countries, while the gains from further breaking down the global supply chain are reaching diminishing returns (Chart II-21). Perhaps more importantly, political pressures for greater income distribution, trade protectionism, and stronger anti-trust measures are likely to intensify. If that happens, it may be enough to reverse some of the downward pressure on the neutral rate. Chart II-20A Winner-Take-All Economy A Winner-Take-All Economy A Winner-Take-All Economy Chart II-21The Low-Hanging Fruits Of ##br##Globalization Have Been Picked The Low-Hanging Fruits Of Globalization Have Been Picked The Low-Hanging Fruits Of Globalization Have Been Picked Investment Conclusions Is slow productivity growth good or bad for bonds? The answer is both: Slow productivity growth is likely to depress interest rates at the outset, but is liable to lead to higher rates later on. The U.S. has likely reached the inflection point where slow productivity is going from being a boon to a bane for bonds. Chart II-22 shows that the U.S. output gap would be over 8% of GDP had potential GDP grown at the pace the IMF projected back in 2008. Instead, it is close to zero and will likely turn negative if growth remains over 2% over the next few quarters. Other countries are likely to follow in the footsteps of the U.S. Chart II-22Output Gap Has Narrowed Thanks ##br##To Lower Potential Growth Output Gap Has Narrowed Thanks To Lower Potential Growth Output Gap Has Narrowed Thanks To Lower Potential Growth To be clear, productivity is just one of several factors affecting interest rates - demographics, globalization, and political decisions being others. However, as we argued in our latest Strategy Outlook, these forces are also shifting in a more inflationary direction.8 As such, fixed-income investors with long-term horizons should pare back duration risk and increase allocations to inflation-linked securities. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," dated March 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Dan Andrews, Chiara Criscuolo, and Peter N. Gal,"The Best versus the Rest: The Global Productivity Slowdown, Divergence across Firms and the Role of Public Policy," OECD Productivity Working Papers, No. 5 (November 2016). 3 Consider the widely-used Solow growth model. The model says that the neutral real rate, r, is equal to (a/s) (n + g + d), where a is the capital share of income, s is the saving rate, n is labor force growth, g is total factor productivity growth, and d is the depreciation rate of capital. All things equal, an increase in g will result in a higher equilibrium real interest rate. The same is true in the Ramsey model, which goes a step further and endogenizes the saving rate within a fully specified utility-maximization framework. In this model, consumption growth is pinned down by the so-called Euler equation. Assuming that utility can be described by a constant relative risk aversion utility function, the Euler equation states that consumption will grow at (r-d)/h where d is the rate at which households discount future consumption and h is a measure of the degree to which households want to smooth consumption over time. In a steady state, consumption increases at the same rate as GDP, n+g. Rearranging the terms yields: r=(n+g)h+d. Notice that both models provide a mechanism by which a higher g can decrease r. In the Solow model, this comes from thinking about the saving rate not as an exogenous variable, but as something that can be influenced by the growth rate of the economy. In particular, if s rises in response to a higher g, r could fall. Likewise, in the Ramsey model, a higher g could make households more willing to forgo consumption today in return for higher consumption tomorrow (equivalent to a decrease in the rate of time preference, d). This, too, would translate into a lower neutral rate. 4 Janet L. Yellen, "The U.S. Economic Outlook," Presentation to the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research, February 11, 2005. 5 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds," April 28, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 6 Paul A. David, and Gavin Wright,"General Purpose Technologies And Surges In Productivity: Historical Reflections On the Future Of The ICT Revolution," January 2012. 7 Marc Levinson, "The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger," Princeton University Press, 2006. 8 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook Second Quarter 2017: A Three-Act Play," dated March 31, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights EUR/USD is likely to correct over the course of the coming weeks, however, the picture remains too murky to be aggressive. The dollar move since 2015 is still in line with previous sideways consolidations. Economic developments suggest that the USD is more likely to break out than breakdown over the next 12 months. Inflation will hold the keys to the next big trend. The RBA is hampered by a high degree of labor underutilization, and the roll-over in the Chinese Keqiang index bodes poorly for the AUD. Feature The euro's recent strength has been nothing short of stunning. Abandoning our "dollar correction" stance at the end of May was clearly a mistake.1 Now that EUR/USD has punched back above its 2015 high, it is time to reflect whether this year's dollar decline was indeed a correction or whether the euro's bear market is over, in which case EUR/USD could move back above its PPP fair value of 1.33. A Dollar Move Chart I-1The Dollar Is Weak Against Everything The Dollar Is Weak Against Everything The Dollar Is Weak Against Everything The rally in EUR/USD has been more than just a period of euro strength: it has been reflective of a broad-based decline in the USD. As Chart I-1 illustrates, the plunge in the dollar's advance/decline line indicates the greenback has been weak against pretty much everything out there. While the White House's failures and its lack of action on the fiscal stimulus front have played a role in explaining the dollar's weakness, the Federal Reserve's absence of credibility among market participants has been an even greater factor. Weak U.S. inflation, with core CPI at 1.7% and core PCE at 1.4%, implies that the Fed is not achieving its 2% inflation target. Thus, the probability of another rate hike in December has now fallen below 50%, and the OIS curve only anticipates one interest rate hike per year for the next two years. We can add color by looking at specific contracts. At the end of 2016, the December 2019 Eurodollar futures sported a nearly 2.6% implied rate. Today, the same contract trades below 2%. This seems too complacent. For one, U.S. financial conditions have massively eased in response to the collapse in the dollar and the rally in risk assets. This suggests U.S. growth should perk up toward 3% for the remainder of 2017 (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Financial Conditions Will Support Growth Financial Conditions Will Support Growth Financial Conditions Will Support Growth Moreover, this is not happening in a vacuum. The official U.S. output gap is more or less closed, and our Composite Capacity Utilization Gauge - which incorporates both the traditional capacity utilization measure along with the unemployment gap - has now moved decisively into "no slack" territory. Under such circumstances, accelerating growth is likely to put heightened pressures on existing resources, raising the risk of a resumption in inflation. Also, in and of itself, this indicator has historically displayed long leads on inflation. Based on this measure, inflation should bottom during the third quarter of 2017 (Chart I-3). With the narrative that inflation is low forever well-entrenched in the market, an inflation surprise in the fall is a growing threat that would prompt a violent repricing of the Fed's path toward something closer to the "dots." This would support a rebound in the DXY. Would this rebound be playable? Our bias is to say yes. The U.S. labor market is still much tighter than the rest of the G10. The U.S. unemployment remains 2.7 percentage points below its 10-year moving average, versus 0.3 percentage points for the rest of the G10 (Chart I-4). Hence, U.S. rates have more upside relative to other advanced economies. This suggests that peak monetary divergences have yet to be seen. Moreover, from a technical perspective, it is far from clear that the dollar bull market is over. While the dollar A/D line has swooned, it has yet to break down - a pattern reminiscent of the second half of the 1990s, when the dollar bull market also experienced a long pause before powering ahead again (Chart I-5). Chart I-3The Trough In Inflation Is Coming The Trough In Inflation Is Coming The Trough In Inflation Is Coming Chart I-4The U.S.: In A Tighter Spot The U.S.: In A Tighter Spot The U.S.: In A Tighter Spot Chart I-5Too Early To Tell If The Greenback Is Dead Too Early To Tell If The Greenback Is Dead Too Early To Tell If The Greenback Is Dead Bottom Line: The euro's strength has been a reflection of generalized weakness in the USD. So far, the USD's weakness in 2017 continues to look and smell like a correction, similar to the action in the late 1990s. However, we cannot be dogmatic: the USD will remain under the thralls of inflationary dynamics in the U.S. The easing in U.S. financial conditions, along with the elevated level of resource utilization, suggests U.S. inflation will pick up this fall, which should prompt a repricing of the Fed's path by investors. The Euro Specifics When it comes to that specifics of the euro, the economic fundamentals are in favor of the dollar right now. First, it is undeniable the euro area inflation has been surprising to the upside relative to that of the U.S. However, this is principally a reflection of the lagging stimulative impact of the 25% collapse in the euro from April 2014 to March 2015. Its 12% appreciation since then points to a reversal of this dynamic (Chart I-6). Second, aggregate relative financial conditions (FCI) tell a similar story. The tightening in euro area FCI relative to the U.S. also points to a slowdown in relative growth in favor of the U.S. Most crucially though, this tightening in relative FCI also portends a change in relative inflation dynamics. As Chart I-7 illustrates, the change in relative FCI has been a reliable leading indicator of comparative inflation dynamics. At this juncture, it argues that inflation in Europe should slow down relative to the U.S. Chart I-6Inflation Surprises Will Move##br## From Europe To The U.S. Inflation Surprises Will Move From Europe To The U.S. Inflation Surprises Will Move From Europe To The U.S. Chart I-7FCIs Point To A Reversal ##br##Of Inflation Fortunes FCIs Point To A Reversal Of Inflation Fortunes FCIs Point To A Reversal Of Inflation Fortunes This makes sense. The U.S. has had trouble generating much inflation despite the U6 unemployment rate standing at 8.5% - a level at which wages and inflation accelerated in previous cycles. Meanwhile, the euro area's labor underutilization remains very high, especially outside Germany. This suggests that euro area inflation could be vulnerable to the tightening in financial conditions that has materialized in the wake of the euro's rally. In other words, the euro's strength is doing the ECB's job while the dollar's weakness is undoing some of the Fed's tightening. Third, the trading action around the release of the German Ifo survey this past Tuesday was very interesting. The Ifo came in at 116, another record reading and substantially above market expectations, yet the euro fell on the news until it was rescued by the Fed. What is fascinating is that, while the German Ifo is near record highs, the Belgian Business Confidence (BCC) survey has begun to sag (Chart I-8). Because Belgium is a logistical center deeply intertwined within European supply chains, the BCC has been an even better leading indicator of European growth trends than the Ifo. The current extreme gap between the Ifo and the BCC confirms that Europe owes a lot of its current health to Germany's boom - and indicates that the rest of the euro area is already suffering blowbacks from the euro's rally. Fourth, euro area equities have eradicated all of their gains for the year relative to U.S. equities. This is happening exactly as the euro area economic surprise index has rolled over against its U.S. counterpart (Chart I-9). This corroborates the economic risks created by the tightening of FCI in Europe versus the U.S. Fifth, the EUR/USD is trading at its greatest premium to our preferred intermediate-term fair value measure since December 2009 (Chart I-10). This measures incorporate real rate differentials at both the short end and long end of the curve, global risk aversion, and commodity prices, suggesting that the EUR/USD has dissociated from most reasonable guides.2 Chart I-8European Growth Is About Germany European Growth Is About Germany European Growth Is About Germany Chart I-9Stocks Are Sending A Dark Omen For The Euro Stocks Are Sending A Dark Omen For The Euro Stocks Are Sending A Dark Omen For The Euro Chart I-10Euro And Fair Value Euro And Fair Value Euro And Fair Value Bottom Line: European financial conditions have tightened considerably, especially relative to the U.S. This suggests European inflation will once again lag that of the U.S. Moreover, the pain of tighter FCIs is rearing its head: European stocks are once again underperforming the U.S., and the relative economic surprise index has markedly rolled over. We are thus experiencing a euro overshoot. Timing Chart I-1Skewed Positioning In EUR/USD Skewed Positioning In €/$ Skewed Positioning In €/$ These fundamental considerations do point to a weaker EUR/USD, but they provide little guidance in terms of timing the end of the euro bull run. Most metrics we follow are in fact pointing to trouble ahead. As we highlighted, euro longs are at all-time highs, while euro shorts have been massively purged. This suggests that chasing any further gains in the euro could be a high-risk proposition (Chart I-11). Additionally, the euro's fractal dimension is fully indicative of massive groupthink, and warns that both short-term and long-term investors are both positioned on the long side of the trade (Chart I-12). While the paucity of willing sellers in the market has been a key ingredient bidding up the euro, this also makes the currency vulnerable to a buying exhaustion phase as potential future buyers are already in the market, and will not be there to support it in the coming months. However, because of this very scarcity of sellers, only a few new buyers are necessary to bid up the euro further. Therefore, with the euro having broken above its 2015 high, a rally toward 1.2 could materialize in the blink of an eye. Because of this risk, we have been shorting the euro through the EUR/SEK, EUR/CAD, and EUR/NOK pairs, a strategy that has paid off. This week, for traders with greater liquidity needs, we recommend a tactical speculative short EUR/USD bet, with a tight stop at 1.182 and a target 1.12. Chart I-12Groupthink In Action Groupthink In Action Groupthink In Action Bottom Line: The euro is displaying signs of massive groupthink on the long side. Moreover, speculators are excessively long. Our preferred strategy is still to play a euro correction on its crosses, where the risk reward ratio seems more attractive. However, we are opening a tactical short EUR/USD bet this week with a tight stop. The Almighty AUD In a Special Report published four weeks ago, we positioned Australia in the middle of the pack within G10 central banks in terms of hiking sequence.3 Essentially, while Australia does not suffer from as much slack as the euro area and Switzerland, and from as much uncertainty as the U.K., or as severely entrenched inflation expectations as Japan, it still suffers from much more labor underutilization than Canada, Sweden, or New Zealand. As Chart I-13 illustrates, labor underutilization in Australia is still hovering near 20-year highs, underpinning low wage growth and policy rates. This weakness in wages is likely to continue to weigh on core inflation (Chart I-14). Chart I-13The Root Cause Of The RBA's Dovishness The Root Cause Of The RBA's Dovishness The Root Cause Of The RBA's Dovishness Chart I-14Wages Continue To Weigh On Core CPI Wages Continue To Weigh On Core CPI Wages Continue To Weigh On Core CPI Furthermore, while being deeply embedded in the Asian business cycle has helped Australia avoid a recession since 1991, this also means that Australian inflation has been greatly influenced by regional dynamics. Thus, based on recent trends, Aussie headline inflation could endure another down leg, especially as the AUD has rallied 16% since January 2016 (Chart I-15). This means that on all fronts, Australian inflationary pressures will remain muted. The recent speech by Governor Philip Lowe focusing on the flatness of the Australian Philips curve highlights that all these concerns are at the forefront of the Reserve Bank of Australia's mind. As a result, we continue to expect Australian interest rates to lag those in the U.S. As Chart I-16 illustrates, when the unemployment gap - as measured by the difference between unemployment and its 10-year moving average - is greater in Australia than in the U.S., the RBA lags the Fed. This also highlights that the AUD is at risk of a sharp correction once the broad USD rally resumes, especially as its recent strength is completely out of line with policy differentials. Chart I-15The Asian Inflation Anchor The Asian Inflation Anchor The Asian Inflation Anchor Chart I-16The Labour Market Points To A Weaker AUD The Labour Market Points To A Weaker AUD The Labour Market Points To A Weaker AUD Beyond the USD's own weakness, the rebound in the Chinese economy has been the main reason behind the Australian dollar's rally - despite the continued dovish bias of the RBA. Australian exports expressed in U.S. dollar terms have surged in response to the Chinese mini boom in late 2016/early 2017 (Chart I-17). However, this positive for the Australian economy and Australian profits is dissipating: the Chinese Keqiang index has rolled over, and Beijing is likely to continue to limit speculative excesses in Chinese real estate - a key source of demand for Australian exports. Chart I-17China's Boost Is Dissipating China's Boost Is Dissipating China's Boost Is Dissipating Moreover, the Australian dollar is trading 10% above its PPP, has moved out of line with interest rate differentials, and investors are massively long this currency; yet Australia still sports a negative international investment position of 60% of GDP. This combination makes the Aussie's strength untenable. When EM stocks break, a view espoused by our Emerging Market Strategy sister service, the AUD should prove the greatest victim within the G10 FX space. Bottom Line: Inflationary pressures in the Australian economy remain muted as labor underutilization remains plentiful. As a result, the RBA is likely to keep a dovish tone at least until the end of the year. The rebound in Chinese activity has been the key factor that has supported the AUD this year. However, the recent rollover in China's Keqiang index indicates this pillar of support to growth and profits is vanishing. The AUD will prove the greatest victim of any EM weakness or risk-off event. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Haaris Aziz, Research Assistant haarisa@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Bloody Potomac", dated May 19, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report titled, "In Search Of A Timing Model", dated July 22, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy and Global Alpha Sector Strategy Special Report titled, "Who Hikes Next?", dated June 30, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 U.S. Dollar U.S. data was somewhat mixed recently: Continuing and initial jobless claims both came in higher than expected; New home sales also increased at a lesser-than-anticipated pace, with home prices also fairing worse than investors hoped for; However, durable goods increased by very solid 6.5%; Building permits and housing starts, however, are also growing robustly. The DXY has hit a crucial point. It has given up all of its gains since 2015 and even from mid-2016. The greenback has previously fared well at this level, and a buying opportunity should emerge when U.S. inflation picks up as positioning is skewed against the dollar. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Look Ahead, Not Back - June 9, 2017 Capacity Explosion = Inflation Implosion - June 2, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Data in core Europe is still firm, although it is becoming increasingly mixed: Headline inflation is staying at the consensus figure of 1.3% and core inflation came in higher than expected at 1.2%; PPI is increasing at a 2.4% pace annually; The IFO survey was robust, with the current assessment, business climate and expectations all beating expectations; However, ZEW survey was weaker than expected; PMIs were also weaker across the board. The recent strength in the euro was also compounded by weakness in the U.S. The euro has failed to appreciate nearly as much against commodity currencies due to higher global growth. Given its much lofty momentum, we are reluctant to bet on more euro upside. Report Links: Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 A Market Update: June 23, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Japanese trade balance worsened as exports and imports grew at 9.7% and 15.5% respectively; However, the all-industry activity index declined by 0.9% in May; The Leading Economic Indicator increased by only 0.4 to 104.6; The Coincident Index, however, declined to 115.8 from 117.1; USD/JPY has been declining recently due to softer U.S. data and lower bond yields. However, we remain yen bears as the absence of inflation remains the key challenge facing the Japanese economy. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 A Market Update: June 23, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Data out of the U.K. was mixed: Real retail sales expanded at a 2.9% annual pace, with the 'ex-Fuel' measure expanding at 3%; PPI managed to increase by 2.9%; However, CPI came in at 2.6%, falling short of the 2.9% expected. GBP/USD has managed to appreciate close to 10% since the beginning of the year, while depreciating around 5% against EUR in the same time period. We still believe the pound has more short-term downside against the euro, and longer-term downside against the greenback. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 The economic data flow in Australia saw a somewhat softer patch this week: RBA trimmed-mean CPI increased at a 1.8% pace, in line with consensus but below the previous data point; Headline CPI, however, increased by 1.9%, which was less than expected; Both the export price index and the import price index contracted 5.7% and 0.1% quarterly. Weaker data from the U.S. is helping the AUD sustain its gains, however, external pressures from China are proving to be even more paramount to the Aussie's strength. Domestically, however, the Australian economy remained challenged by persistent underemployment. We therefore believe the RBA is unlikely to follow the Bank of Canada in 2017. Report Links: Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 Data out of New Zealand has been mixed: Visitor Arrivals increased at a 17.3% annual pace; The trade balance improved slightly, and both exports and imports also increased; The Global Dairy Trade price index increased by 0.2%; However, CPI came in at 1.7%, disappointing consensus by 0.2%, and falling short of the previous 2.2% figure. While the NZD has strengthened against the USD, it has lagged the euro and the rest of the commodity currency complex. WHile the RBNZ is better placed than the RBA to increase rates, it will continue to lag the BoC and the Fed this year. Report Links: Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 The Canadian economy continues to exhibit signs of strength: Wholesale sales increased at a 0.9% monthly pace in May; Manufacturing shipments increased at a 1.1% monthly pace; Foreign portfolio investment in Canadian securities also increased to USD 29.46 bn; The CAD has experienced an unbelievable couple of months, appreciating more than 9% in the process. Weak U.S. data, a hawkish BoC, and somewhat stronger oil, have all added to the CAD's gains. We believe that the BoC will stay hawkish and Saudi Arabia will remain adamant in reducing oil inventories to their 5-year average by the end of the year. While these factors will limit the CAD downside this year, it is now vulnerable to a short-term pullback. Report Links: Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 Swiss data has been mixed: Trade balance disappointed at 2,813 mn; UBS Consumption Indicator improved to 1.38 from 1.32; However, the ZEW Survey's Expectations increased to 34.7 from 20.7. EUR/CHF has appreciated more than 2% this past week, while USD/CHF has also been strong. This weakness is welcomed by the SNB, but more softness is needed before durable inflation trend can emerge in the Alpine Confederation. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 Norway's recent labor force survey showed that the unemployment rate fell to 4.3%, better than the consensus 4.5%. Along with rebounding oil prices, this has been a key source of support for the NOK. BCA Energy Strategists continue to believe that oil inventories will be reduced to their 5-year average by the end of the year, which should warrant a healthy degree of downside for EUR/NOK. Against the dollar, the picture will become less positive once U.S. inflation picks up again. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 A Market Update: June 23, 2017 Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 This week's data in Sweden has been somewhat weak: PPI increased at a 4.8% annual pace, less than the previous 7.2%; Consumer confidence decreased to 102.2, below the expected 103.1, and less than the previous 102.6; Unemployment rate increased to 7.4% from 7.2; However, the trade balance increased by 4.2 bn from the previous month. These explain the recent softness in the krona in recent days, however, we doubt that this represents the end of the period of weakness in EUR/SEK. The SEK's appreciation has been the result of an aggregate strengthening in Swedish data, especially on the inflation front, which has prompted a hawkish switch in the Riksbank's rhetoric. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights The RBA will not hike as quickly as markets expect. Weak wage growth and high underemployment suggest plenty of spare capacity. Inflation is only barely at the bottom of the central bank's range. Massive household debt levels will make it difficult for consumers to handle higher interest rates. Australian banks, although relatively healthy, are still enormously exposed to Australian housing and interest-only mortgages. House prices have nearly quadrupled since 2000 and exhibit the characteristics of a bubble. Still, it will likely take considerable monetary tightening before the bubble bursts. We do not think this will occur anytime soon. Maintain a neutral exposure to Australian government bonds, but enter into a 2-year/10-year Australian government bond yield curve flattener. Feature Chart 1Diverging Trends In##BR##The Australian Economy Diverging Trends In The Australian Economy Diverging Trends In The Australian Economy Australia remains one of the more difficult bond markets on which to take a decisive investment stance at the moment. The recent Moody's downgrade of Australian banks has put the spotlight back on the housing boom Down Under. With home prices continuing to climb - despite the introduction of macro-prudential measures on mortgage lending and with household indebtedness reaching exorbitant levels - investors are becoming increasingly concerned over a potential housing crash that could have spillover effects on the Australian banking system (Chart 1). At the same time, the domestic economy continues to suffer a hangover from the end of the mining boom earlier this decade, with excess capacity keeping inflation pressures subdued. Naturally, this has put the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) in a difficult position. Interest rate cuts in response to low inflation would add further fuel to the housing bubble. On the other hand, any attempt to try and normalize the current accommodative monetary policy settings with rate hikes could trigger an unwanted surge in the Australian dollar and prompt a correction in house prices. The latter could lead to financial instability and raise recession risks with consumers already dealing with negative real wage growth, low savings and massive debt loads. In this Special Report, we examine Australia's monetary policy trajectory, analyze its concentrated banking sector and the potential risks from a downturn in house prices, and revisit our positioning on Australian government debt. Our conclusions still lead us to stick with a neutral duration stance and country allocation on Australian debt, but with a bias towards a flatter government bond yield curve. RBA On Hold... For Now Chart 2Aussie Bonds Caught##BR##In The Global Selloff Aussie Bonds Caught In The Global Selloff Aussie Bonds Caught In The Global Selloff Earlier this month, the RBA decided to leave the cash rate unchanged at 1.5%. The central bank maintained its fairly neutral rhetoric, though they did cite that the "broad-based pick-up in the global economy is continuing." The central bank upgraded its economic forecasts, with real GDP growth now projected to reach slightly above 3% over the next two years. The minutes from that July 4 monetary policy meeting revealed that a discussion over the ideal level of the real cash rate took place.1 The conclusion was that equilibrium inflation-adjusted rate is now around 1%, meaning that the "neutral" nominal rate is 3.5% after adding an inflation expectation of 2.5% (the middle of the RBA inflation target band). That implies that the RBA has lots of catching up to do on interest rates once the next tightening cycle begins. The timing of that discussion on real rates came shortly after the rebound in global bond yields that began after policymakers in other countries, most notably the European Central Bank and the Bank of Canada, began hinting that a move to dial back the emergency monetary easings of 2015/16 was about to begin (Chart 2). With the RBA possibly sending a similar message, investors responded by raising interest rate expectations and bidding up the Australian dollar (AUD). 30bps of RBA hikes are now priced in over the next year, while our proxy for the market-implied pricing of the terminal (i.e. equilibrium) cash rate - the 5-year AUD overnight index swap rate, 5-years forward - shot up to just over 3%. We believe that this market repricing of potential RBA rate hikes is too optimistic. Australian monetary policy must remain highly accommodative for some time. Our more dovish case is based on our assessment of the RBA's policy mandates, which include full employment, price stability and the 'welfare of the Australian people'. Because of Australia's heavy economic exposure to iron ore prices, its largest export, we also include an outlook on the commodity to aid in our forecast of RBA policy. Employment: The latest readings on the Australian labor market have shown marked improvement so far in 2017 (Chart 3). The unemployment rate now sits at 5.6%. Employment growth is accelerating while the participation rate has edged higher in recent months. The National Australia Bank business confidence index is steadily improving, while job vacancies are at a five-year high. In the statement released after the June monetary policy meeting, RBA governor Philip Lowe stated that "forward-looking indicators point to continued growth in employment in the period ahead." Chart 3Labor Demand##BR##Picking Up... Labor Demand Picking Up... Labor Demand Picking Up... Chart 4...But All Signs Point To Lots##BR##Of Spare Labor Capacity ...But All Signs Point To Lots Of Spare Labor Capacity ...But All Signs Point To Lots Of Spare Labor Capacity While Governor Lowe also noted that the overall employment picture is 'mixed' in some aspects, we are far more pessimistic (Chart 4). The underemployment rate has been rising and now sits only slightly below its almost 50-year high of 8.8%.2 Part-time workers as a percentage of total employment has experienced a structural increase to nearly 33%, while hours worked have declined. Additionally, nominal wages have been flat and real wages are declining. This suggests that there is plenty of slack in labor markets and that Australia is still far from full employment, even with the headline jobless rate sitting slightly below the OECD's current NAIRU estimate of 5.9%.3 Inflation: Core inflation has been slowing since 2014 and only reached an anemic 1.45% in the first quarter of 2017 (Chart 5). Although headline inflation has rebounded over the past year, at 2.1% it remains only at the bottom of the RBA's 2-3% target range. Additionally, the downtrend in inflation expectations for 2017 appears to be intact. Chart 5Inflation Staying Within The RBA 2-3% Target Inflation Staying Within The RBA 2-3% Target Inflation Staying Within The RBA 2-3% Target Chart 6Australian Consumer Spending Slowing Australian Consumer Spending Slowing Australian Consumer Spending Slowing Weak productivity growth, leading to lackluster wage growth, is keeping overall inflation subdued. The trade-weighted currency has rallied since June, presenting an additional headwind for consumer prices. Even if the recovery in headline inflation persists and starts to pass through to core readings, policymakers will likely err on the side of caution. A higher realized inflation rate will be tolerated in the near term to ensure expectations stay well within the 2-3% target band - the RBA's definition of "price stability" - before any interest rate increases are considered. Consumer: Australian households face a challenging environment. Real wages are declining, with the wage cost index in a downtrend since 2011. Real retail spending growth has been slowing and is nearing negative territory, while consumer sentiment is quite pessimistic (Chart 6). As income growth is lacking, consumers have had to dip into savings to maintain consumption, with the savings rate collapsing from 10% to 5% over the last few years. Part of that decline is likely due to the rising cost of "essentials" spending, such as utilities, health care, education and transportation. The inflation rates for those sectors have been outpacing overall headline and core readings (Chart 7), suggesting that Australian households are saving less just to "make ends meet." Chart 7Spending More On The "Essentials" Spending More On The "Essentials" Spending More On The "Essentials" Overall, Australian consumers remain incredibly indebted. The household debt-to-income ratio is nearing 200% - the fourth highest figure among the OECD countries.4 Households have been able to handle the massive debt loads (so far) due to record-low interest rates, which have allowed debt service ratios to fall in line with long-term averages. However, hiking interest rates against this backdrop of highly leveraged consumers - especially given the huge exposure of Australian household balance sheets to overvalued house prices - could severely test the 'economic prosperity and welfare of the Australian people' element of the RBA's mandates. In other words, the RBA would need to see decisive signs that the economy was pushing up against inflationary capacity constraints before embarking on a tightening cycle, for fear of the spillover effects of pricking the housing bubble too soon (as we discuss later in this report). Iron Ore: Historically, Australia's growth has been tightly linked to the performance of industrial commodities, in particular iron ore which represents nearly 20% of total Australian exports. Our commodity strategists are neutral on iron ore on a cyclical horizon and bearish on a strategic basis. Chinese iron ore import growth has recently ticked up, but should remain subdued as Chinese inventories are still high (Chart 8). Chinese property construction activity, which accounts for roughly 35% of total Chinese steel demand, remains depressed. Globally, iron ore supply is set to increase throughout the year as many mining projects will come on stream. On a longer-term basis, Chinese demand for metals will likely slow due to the ongoing structural economic shift away from excessive reliance on infrastructure investment and house-building to an economy based on consumption and services. Summing it all up, none of the RBA's policy mandates is being threatened in a way that should force policymakers to begin shifting to a less dovish stance. There is little evidence that Australia has reached full employment, inflation and inflation expectations remain within the RBA target band, growth momentum remains moderate and the housing bubble remains an existential risk to the future health of the economy. Additionally, Australian policymakers will want to keep rates as low as possible to ensure that a weaker currency helps prop up exports, support the economy in its transition away from the heavy reliance on mining investment. Real GDP growth fell below 2% and the output gap is still far in negative territory, suggesting plenty of slack (Chart 9). Our own Australian Central Bank Monitor has rolled over and is now barely in the "tight policy required" zone (bottom panel). Projected fiscal drag over the next few years will also dampen growth. RBA growth forecasts appear highly optimistic relative to median economist estimates. All of these factors point to a delay in rate hikes. Chart 8No Big Boost To Iron Ore Prices From China No Big Boost To Iron Ore Prices From China No Big Boost To Iron Ore Prices From China Chart 9No Pressure On The RBA To Hike Rates No Pressure On The RBA To Hike Rates No Pressure On The RBA To Hike Rates Bottom Line: Markets are overpricing the potential for RBA tightening. There is still spare capacity in labor markets, inflation is subdued and consumers cannot handle higher rates. Monitoring The Banks In June, Moody's downgraded all Australian banks, citing a "rise in household leverage and the rising prevalence of interest-only and investment loans" (Chart 10). The downgrade raised concern among investors, with banks being the largest component of the Australian equity market, and short positions have noticeably risen. Despite subdued income growth and enormous household debt levels, escalating house prices have supported consumption through the wealth effect, but this is clearly unsustainable. Political pressures are also building, as evidenced by the introduction of a bank levy in South Australia. Chart 10A Relentless Climb In Household Debt A Relentless Climb In Household Debt A Relentless Climb In Household Debt The Chairman of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), Wayne Byres, wants to make bank capital levels "unquestionably strong." His recent comments indicate that Australian banks will need to raise capital before 2020 to adhere to global standards, with some estimates reaching as high as $20bn (in USD). This process is crucial for instilling confidence in markets that banks can meet these targets through organic capital generation or dividend re-investment plans. As the increased capital required is relatively small - only 2% of the capital base of the Australian banks - it should not be difficult to raise that amount. The greatest risk to the financial system is still the exposure to Australian housing. For the four major banks, Australian housing loans make up slightly over 50% of their lending mix, far greater than for U.S. banks prior to the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 (Chart 11). Of those loans, approximately 40% are non-traditional (interest-only, sub-prime, reverse mortgages). Several macro-prudential measures have been implemented by Australian financial regulators to decrease risks within the banking sector. The regulations have been focused on interest-only loans, which are more vulnerable to rate rises. Such loans are riskier, typically shorter in maturity and requiring larger deposit amounts. Banks are tightening their lending standards for these loans and risk weights will likely be increased, thereby requiring more capital. Additionally, the standard variable rate on interest-only loans has increased by 30-35bps and APRA has imposed a 30% cap on interest-only loans as a percentage of new loans. This will cause a meaningful decline in the risk profile of banks' mortgage books, as consumers with interest-only loans will shift to less expensive principal-plus-interest loans. Another source of risk is the Australian banks' increasing reliance on offshore short-term wholesale funding. When credit growth outpaces deposit growth, which has been the case, banks need to balance the equation through increased wholesale funding. This raises the potential for a liquidity crunch, as capital may be unavailable during a crisis. Credit growth to the private sector is slowing, though, reducing the immediate need for this type of funding. Additionally, authorities are prompting banks to substitute away from the heavy reliance on short-term wholesale funding through the implementation of a net stable funding ratio. This is defined as the available amount of stable funding (i.e. core deposits, equity and long-term wholesale funding) over the required regulatory level of stable funding. Banks will have until 2018 to increase this ratio above 100%. As a result, long-term wholesale debt issuance rose sharply in 2016 and that amount is projected to be relatively similar for 2017. Overall, current metrics suggest that Australian banks are fairly healthy, even before the additional capital requirements. Tier 1 capital ratios have gradually increased since 2007 and are fairly strong, non-performing loans are subdued and net interest margins are rising (Chart 12). In fact, Tier 1 ratios are substantially higher in Australia than they were in the U.S. prior to the Global Financial Crisis. Return-on-assets and return-on-capital have bounced slightly, although increasing capital will certainly dampen the earnings prospects for the Australian banks. Chart 11Australian Banks Heavily Exposed##BR##To Risky Mortgage Lending Australia: Stuck Between A Rock And A Hard Place Australia: Stuck Between A Rock And A Hard Place Chart 12Aussie Banks In##BR##Good Shape Right Now... Aussie Banks In Good Shape Right Now... Aussie Banks In Good Shape Right Now... Since the Moody's downgrade, credit default swap spreads for Australian banks have actually declined to near the 2014 lows, suggesting markets are not concerned about the risk of future bank stresses. We remain concerned, however. Macro-prudential measures on mortgage loan sizes and higher capital requirements are certainly welcome and will reduce perceived risks within the banking sector. However, these measures have done little to curb the rise in Australian house prices. Given their huge exposure to Australian housing, the banks will likely not be able to withstand a meaningful decline in house values - the outlook for which depends critically on the RBA's future monetary policy path. Bottom Line: Australia bank metrics are fairly healthy but they will need to raise more capital. This should not be too problematic. However, the banks' massive exposure to Australian housing, elevated number of interest-only mortgage loans and heavy reliance on short-term wholesale funding present substantial risks. Even if the bank capital levels are 'unquestionably strong,' they will not be enough to withstand a meaningful downturn in house prices. When Will The Housing Bubble Burst? House prices in Australia have nearly quadrupled since 2000. With the exception of Perth, house prices in the other major cities have continued their massive run-up over the last year, suggesting macro-prudential measures have done little to cool the market (Chart 13). Price gains have been supported by robust demand, both domestic and foreign. However, the steady rise in debt-fueled speculation (i.e. loans for investment purposes), the magnitude of the price increases, and the lack of any correction in over 25 years, suggest Australian housing is indeed in the midst of a bubble. On the supply side, steadily rising completions over the past decade have not curbed price gains (Chart 14). While construction has slowed since its peak at the end of 2016 and building approvals have declined, we find the argument that there has been a shortage in supply to be fairly weak. In fact, the rate of dwelling completions has outpaced population growth since 2012 and dwelling completions per 1,000 people are much higher in Australia than its G7 counterparts. Chart 13...Just Don't Prick##BR##The Housing Bubble ...Just Don't Prick The Housing Bubble ...Just Don't Prick The Housing Bubble Chart 14Supply Not Rising Enough To##BR##Slow House Price Growth Supply Not Rising Enough To Slow House Price Growth Supply Not Rising Enough To Slow House Price Growth History teaches us that bubbles never deflate calmly. Nevertheless, we view the likelihood of a systemic crash over the next 6-12 months as highly unlikely. While growth estimates may not meet the RBA's lofty goals, Australia will also not experience its first recession in over 25 years, which would crimp housing demand. The two most likely candidates to act as a catalyst for a housing downturn are therefore: a slowdown in capital inflows from Chinese property buyers and/or a shift to restrictive monetary policy from the RBA. It will not require a complete halt in capital inflows from China, simply a considerable slowdown, for the Australian housing market to come under pressure. While there is always a possibility for Chinese authorities to clamp down on outflows, particularly if the RMB comes under pressure, we view this as fairly unlikely. Current capital outflows have eased a bit and a long-term goal is to deregulate the capital account. Continued capital liberalization in China will aid in maintaining capital flows into Australian housing. Additionally, the millionaire class in China is growing and the private sector wants to diversify its assets. While Australian house prices are expensive, prices are far more affordable than those metropolitan areas such as Hong Kong, indicating Chinese money will continue to drift into Australian real estate. Chart 15A Long Way From Restrictive Policy Rates A Long Way From Restrictive Policy Rates A Long Way From Restrictive Policy Rates The more likely candidate for a bursting of the housing bubble is through the monetary policy channel. In the case of the U.S., multiple Fed rate hikes in the mid-2000s pushed monetary conditions into restrictive territory, prompting the housing crash. As we previously argued, the RBA will likely stay on hold for an extended period due to a lack of serious inflation pressures. Yet even if the RBA were to begin tightening sooner than we expect, it will take multiple rate hikes before monetary conditions become even close to restrictive. Using a simple measure of the equilibrium RBA cash rate, like a combination of Australian potential GDP growth and a five-year moving average of headline CPI inflation or the Taylor Rule formulation that we introduced in a recent Weekly Report, it is clear that the RBA is a long way from a restrictive policy stance (Chart 15).5 Bottom Line: Australian house prices have nearly quadrupled since 2000 and exhibit the characteristics of a bubble. Still, it will likely take considerable monetary tightening before the bubble bursts. We do not think this will occur anytime soon. Investment Implications We currently hold a neutral recommended stance on Australian government debt, both in terms of duration exposure and country allocation in global fixed income portfolios. Australian bond yields are above the lows seen in 2016 but have yet to break out of the structural downtrend with the benchmark 10-year now at 2.67% (Chart 16). We hesitate to go outright overweight on Australian debt in our model bond portfolio, however, even with our relatively dovish view on the RBA's future policy moves. Without any slowing in house prices, and with realized and expected inflation having clearly bottomed after last year's downturn, a big move lower in Australian bond yields is unlikely. At best, Australian yields will not rise by as much as we expect to see in the U.S. or Euro Area over the next 6-12 months. At the same time, if that view pans out, the Australian currency will likely underperform which will erode into the returns of an overweight Australian bond position (either through currency hedging costs or the outright losses on unhedged currency exposure). We do, however, see an opportunity to enter into an Australian 2-year/10-year yield curve flattening position (Chart 17). As previously mentioned, the short end of the curve will be anchored by an inactive central bank. The long end, however, faces multiple downward pressures. Macro-prudential measures and political pressures will continue to dampen credit growth. While we believe there is scope for realized inflation to grind a bit higher in the coming quarters, longer-term inflation expectations are likely to remain well-anchored. Additionally, the economic surprise index is elevated after several positive data releases and has plenty of scope for disappointment, which will limit any rise in longer-dated bond yields. Chart 16No Bear Market##BR##In Australian Bonds No Bear Market In Australian Bonds No Bear Market In Australian Bonds Chart 17Enter A 2yr/10yr##BR##Australian Curve Flattener Enter a 2yr/10yr Australian Curve Flattener Enter a 2yr/10yr Australian Curve Flattener The added benefit of entering a curve flattener is that the trade will likely work if our RBA view turns out to be wrong in a hawkish direction. If the RBA does indeed begin to hike rates sooner than we expect to deal with an improving economy or to begin deflating the housing bubble, this should put flattening pressure on the curve as the market prices in additional future rate increases. Only in the case of a breakout in longer-term inflation expectations that bear-steepens the curve, or a severe economic downturn that prompts RBA rate cuts and bull-steepens the curve, will a flattening trade underperform. Given our views on Australian growth and inflation, we see more likely scenarios where the curve flattens than steepens, particularly versus the only modest amount of flattening currently priced in the forwards. Bottom Line: Enter into a 2-year/10-year Australian government bond yield curve flattener. The short end of the curve will be anchored by an inactive central bank. On the long end, slowing credit growth, fiscal drag and an elevated economic surprise index will put downward pressure on yields. Patrick Trinh, Associate Editor Patrick@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 http://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-policy/rba-board-minutes/2017/2017-07-04.html 2 The "underemployed" is defined as full-time workers on reduced hours for economic reasons and part-time workers who would like, and are available, to work more hours. 3 NAIRU = Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate Of Unemployment. 4 https://data.oecd.org/hha/household-debt.htm 5 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Dangerous Duration", dated July 11 2017. Available at gfis.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights The Fed is behind the curve in raising rates, as is the Bank of Canada, the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, and the Swedish Riksbank. In contrast, the Bank of Japan, the ECB, and the Swiss National Bank have little need to tighten monetary policy. Accordingly, investors should favor USD, CAD, SEK, NZD, and to a lesser extent, AUD. EUR, CHF, and JPY will weaken. GBP will trade sideways. Short-term momentum could push EUR/USD to 1.18, but the euro will ultimately reach parity against the dollar next year, as the Fed is forced to accelerate the pace of rate hikes. Stay structurally long DXY. Go long SEK/CHF. We are closing our longstanding overweight positions in Australian and New Zealand government bonds for a handsome profit. Remain overweight global equities for now, but be prepared to turn bearish in the second half of 2018. Feature The Fed: It's Time To Get A Bit More Hawkish In our December 2015 report "The Fed Makes An Unforced Error," we made the case that the Federal Reserve would regret its decision to tighten monetary policy.1 Subsequent events validated this view: U.S. growth sagged in the first half of 2016, leading to a sharp flattening in the yield curve. It would be another 12 months before the Fed raised rates again. As bond prices and the economic data evolved over the course of 2016, our recommendations changed accordingly. On July 5th, we published a note entitled "The End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market" arguing that it was time to take profits on long duration positions.2 As luck would have it, this was the exact same date that the 10-year Treasury yield hit a record closing low of 1.37%. Fast forward to the present and investors are once again debating the next steps that central banks are likely to take. However, unlike in 2015, a strong case can be made that the Fed is now behind the curve in raising rates, rather than ahead of it. There are three reasons for this: There is less slack now than in 2015. The unemployment rate stands at 4.4%, down from 5% in December 2015. The broader U-6 unemployment rate has fallen even more, from 9.9% to 8.6%. Other measures of labor market slack are also closing in on their past business-cycle lows (Table 1). Table 1Comparing Current Labor Market Slack With Past Cycles Are Central Banks Behind The Curve Or Ahead Of It? Are Central Banks Behind The Curve Or Ahead Of It? The neutral interest rate has likely risen somewhat over the past 18 months (Chart 1). Household debt has continued to decline as a share of disposable income. The share of national income going to labor has increased. Wage growth among lower-income workers who tend to spend most of their paychecks has accelerated. All this should give consumers the wherewithal to spend more, warranting higher interest rates. Bank balance sheets have also continued to improve, as evidenced by the recent stress test results. In addition, fiscal policy has eased modestly and could ease even more if Congress is able to pass legislation cutting taxes later this year or in early 2018. Financial conditions have eased significantly since the start of the year, which should boost growth in the second half of this year (Chart 2). This is in sharp contrast to 2015, a year when financial conditions tightened sharply. Easier financial conditions are boosting credit growth. The annualized 3-month change in bank credit has accelerated from 1.1% in April to 4.2% at present. (Chart 3). Chart 1Households Have The Wherewithal To Spend More Households Have The Wherewithal To Spend More Households Have The Wherewithal To Spend More Chart 2Financial Conditions Have Eased Financial Conditions Have Eased Financial Conditions Have Eased Chart 3Credit Growth Has Picked Up Credit Growth Has Picked Up Credit Growth Has Picked Up The prospect of stronger growth over the next few quarters implies that the unemployment rate is likely to fall below 4% early next year, possibly breaking through the 2000 low of 3.8%. If that were to happen, the unemployment rate would end up being nearly a full percentage point below the Fed's estimate of NAIRU. It is possible, of course, that the true value of NAIRU is lower than official estimates suggest. Older workers change jobs less frequently, and so an aging workforce tends to produce less frictional unemployment. The internet has also improved the ability of companies to fill vacancies with suitable workers. On the flipside, declining geographical mobility and falling demand for low-skilled labor may have raised structural unemployment. On balance, we are skeptical that the current estimate of NAIRU of 4.7% - already one percentage point below its post-1960 average (Chart 4) - is significantly overstated. A tighter U.S. labor market will put upward pressure on wages. While recent wage data has been on the soft side, our wage tracker is still growing twice as fast as in 2010 (Chart 5). Indeed, for all the talk about how wage growth is "inexplicably" slow, real wages have been rising more quickly than productivity for three straight years now - the longest stretch since the late 1990s (Chart 6). Chart 4NAIRU Is Low By Historic Standards NAIRU Is Low By Historic Standards NAIRU Is Low By Historic Standards Chart 5A Stronger Labor Market Will Lead To Faster Wage Growth A Stronger Labor Market Will Lead To Faster Wage Growth A Stronger Labor Market Will Lead To Faster Wage Growth Chart 6Real Wages Now Increasing Faster Than Productivity Real Wages Now Increasing Faster Than Productivity Real Wages Now Increasing Faster Than Productivity Inflation: A Lagging Indicator When will accelerating wage growth translate into sharply higher price inflation? Probably not this year. Historically, inflation has been the mother-of-all lagging indicators. Core inflation peaked at 2.5% in August 2008, eight months after the start of the recession. In fact, core inflation has topped out in every single business cycle over the past 40 years only after the expansion has ended and the recession begun (Chart 7). Likewise, core inflation typically bottoms several years after the economic recovery is underway. This suggests that inflation could stay subdued for the next 12 months as the labor market slowly overheats, before moving higher in the second half of 2018. Chart 7Inflation Is A Lagging Indicator Are Central Banks Behind The Curve Or Ahead Of It? Are Central Banks Behind The Curve Or Ahead Of It? If the Fed drags its feet in raising interest rates, it will be difficult to achieve a soft landing. Stabilizing the economy is akin to landing a plane: You don't just need to know the speed at which you have to hit the runway, you also have to time your descent in order to touch the ground at precisely the right speed. Even if the Fed knew where the neutral interest rate stood (which it doesn't), tightening monetary policy too late could end up pushing the unemployment rate to such a low level that it has nowhere to go but up. And as we have shown before, once the unemployment rate starts rising, it generally keeps rising, owing to the presence of numerous negative feedback loops.3 The Fed has arguably already fallen into the trap of waiting too long. If so, gradual rate hikes this year will give way to more aggressive hikes late next year, setting the stage for a recession in 2019. The Bank Of Canada Turns Hawkish On the other side of the 45th parallel, the Bank of Canada raised rates last week and signaled that further hikes lie in store. The BoC revised up its GDP growth forecasts for 2017 and 2018. It also indicated that the output gap would close later this year, rather than next year as it had earlier projected. The Bank of Canada's newfound optimism was bolstered by the most recent Business Outlook Survey, which pointed to accelerating growth, dwindling spare industrial capacity, and an increasingly tight labor market (Chart 8). The moose in the living room is the Canadian housing market (Chart 9). Central bankers are generally reluctant to use the blunt tool of tighter monetary policy to target excessive property prices. However, when stricter macroprudential regulations fail to do the job, the standard prescription is to tighten monetary policy slowly but early. The Bank of Canada has done the former but not the latter. Consequently, as my colleague Jonathan LaBerge argued in last week's Special Report, the coming housing bust is likely to be a nasty affair.4 This will be the price the Bank of Canada pays for being behind the curve. Chart 8Canadian Growth Picture Is Upbeat Are Central Banks Behind The Curve Or Ahead Of It? Are Central Banks Behind The Curve Or Ahead Of It? Chart 9Housing Bubbles Abound Housing Bubbles Abound Housing Bubbles Abound For now, we remain long the Canadian dollar in our currency recommendations. We are expressing this view by being long CAD/EUR, a trade that has gained 3.5% in the nine weeks since we initiated it. We also recommend being underweight Canadian government bonds within a global fixed-income portfolio. It is important to stress, however, that these are 12-month views. Most Canadian mortgages are floating rate. Higher borrowing costs will likely trigger a housing bust late next year or in 2019, forcing the Bank of Canada to slow or even reverse the pace of rate hikes. The RBA And RBNZ ... Behind The Curve Too Australia and New Zealand have also been grappling with dangerously overvalued housing markets, and just as in Canada, the RBA and RBNZ have been behind the curve in responding to the brewing excesses. That is starting to change. The Reserve Bank of Australia struck a hawkish tone in the July 4 meeting minutes released this week, sending the Aussie dollar to a 26-month high against the greenback. The RBA highlighted the improvement in business conditions and a tightening labor market. It also indicated that the "neutral cash rate" was 3.5%, two points higher than the rate of 1.5%. Australia's terms of trade have been recovering of late and this should support the economy as well as the Aussie dollar (Chart 10). The RBNZ is even further behind the curve than the RBA (Chart 11). Nominal GDP is growing at over 6% and retail sales are expanding at nearly 8%. Population growth has risen sharply in recent years due to increased immigration, leading to greater demand for housing. The government has increased infrastructure spending and cut taxes. The unemployment rate has fallen back to an 8-year low of 4.9%, while the terms of trade is approaching record-high levels. Chart 10RBA Behind The Curve... RBA Behind The Curve... RBA Behind The Curve... Chart 11... And RBNZ Too? ... And RBNZ Too? ... And RBNZ Too? With all this in mind, we are closing our longstanding overweight positions in Australian and New Zealand government bonds for gains of 59.5% and 74.2%, respectively.5 Riksbank: End Of NIRP? The Swedish repo rate stands at -0.5%, despite the fact that the output gap has moved into positive territory (Chart 12). Inflation is still slightly below target, but is moving higher. The Riksbank is taking notice of the changing economic environment. The central bank backed away from its easing bias at its most recent policy meeting. The facts on the ground support this decision. Sweden's GDP is now 0.7% above potential and the economy continues to strengthen. The Riksbank's resource utilization indicator points to a sharp acceleration in Swedish inflation in the coming quarters. Nonfinancial private credit has reached 237% of GDP, up from 106% in 2000. If the Riksbank falls too far behind the curve, it will be forced to jack up rates very aggressively down the road, reviving the specter of the debt crisis of the early 1990s. The ECB, SNB, And BoJ: Take It Easy Whereas a strong case can be made that the central banks discussed above are behind the curve in normalizing monetary policy, the same cannot be said for the ECB, Swiss National Bank, or Bank of Japan. Labor market slack across the euro area as a whole is still 3.2 percentage points higher than in 2008 and 6.7 points higher outside of Germany (Chart 13). Moreover, as we discussed two weeks ago, the neutral rate in the euro area remains very depressed.6 Thus, even if the euro area economy were close to full employment, the ECB would still not have much scope to raise rates. Chart 12NIRP In Sweden: R.I.P. NIRP In Sweden: R.I.P. NIRP In Sweden: R.I.P. Chart 13Euro Area: Labor Market Slack Still High Outside Of Germany Euro Area: Labor Market Slack Still High Outside Of Germany Euro Area: Labor Market Slack Still High Outside Of Germany In this light, investors have gotten too optimistic about the ability of the ECB to tighten monetary policy. While the ECB will further taper asset purchases as early as this autumn, sustained rate hikes are still a few years away. Mario Draghi explicitly said during his press conference yesterday that "the last thing that the governing council may want is actually an unwanted tightening of the financing conditions." This is in sharp contrast to the Fed, which is trying to tighten financial conditions by raising rates. Swiss monetary conditions are far from accommodative, despite a policy rate that remains buried in negative territory (Chart 14). Core inflation is close to zero and wage growth is anemic. An overvalued currency has offset the benefits from lower interest rates. Given the SNB's policy of intervening in the currency markets to keep EUR/CHF within a reasonably tight range, the recent appreciation of the euro will further add to the deflationary pressures weighing on the Swiss economy. Investors should position for a weaker franc (and euro) in the months ahead. Go long SEK/CHF (Chart 15). Chart 14The Swiss Economy Still Needs Low Rates The Swiss Economy Still Needs Low Rates The Swiss Economy Still Needs Low Rates Chart 15Long SEK/CHF Long SEK/CHF Long SEK/CHF Similar to the ECB and the SNB, the Bank of Japan is in no position to tighten monetary policy. Core inflation has fallen back to zero and medium-to-long-term inflation expectations have dipped so far this year (Chart 16). The annual shunto wage negotiations this summer produced little in the way of salary hikes. And even if inflation were to rise, the government would likely want to tighten fiscal policy before contemplating removing the monetary punch bowl. The Bank Of England: A Tough Call If one didn't know what transpired last June, the case for tighter monetary policy in the U.K. would be fairly straightforward. The unemployment rate is at a 9-year low and inflation is well above target. The trade-weighted pound has weakened by 21% since November 2015, which in most cases, would translate into stronger growth in the years ahead. Reflecting these points, our Central Bank Monitors show that the U.K. is more in need of tighter money than any other major developed economy (Chart 17). Chart 16BoJ: In No Position To Tighten BoJ: In No Position To Tighten BoJ: In No Position To Tighten Chart 17The Message From Our Central Bank Monitors The Message From Our Central Bank Monitors The Message From Our Central Bank Monitors Brexit negotiations are likely to cast a pall over the economy, however. The EU will be forced to take a tough line with the U.K., for fear that the Brexit vote could prompt other countries to follow's Britain's lead. BCA's geopolitical strategists ultimately expect a "hard Brexit" to be averted, but things may need to be brought to the precipice before that happens. The pound is cheap and so we do not expect it to weaken significantly from current levels. Nevertheless, the upside for both sterling and gilt yields will remain constrained until political uncertainty abates. Investment Conclusions As a rule of thumb, investors should favor currencies in economies whose central banks are behind the curve. Such central banks are likely to find themselves in a position where they have to scramble to tighten monetary policy. We noted on July 7th that short-term momentum favors the euro and that we would not be surprised if EUR/USD reaches 1.18 over the coming weeks. Looking further ahead, the appreciation of the euro in the first half of this year will weigh on growth in the remainder of 2017 and into early 2018. This will force the ECB to cool its heels. In contrast, U.S. growth should accelerate. Against the backdrop of diminished spare capacity, this will prompt the Fed to turn more hawkish. We expect EUR/USD to fall to 1.05 by year-end, and reach parity next year as the Fed ramps up the pace of rate hikes. The market is betting that the Fed will deliver fewer rate hikes than implied by the 'dots'. Our hunch is that the Fed will deliver more hikes than what its forecast suggests, especially starting early next year when inflation is liable to accelerate. Bullish sentiment towards the dollar has collapsed. Investors should turn contrarian and position for a stronger greenback over the next 12 months. In addition to the dollar, we like the Swedish krona, Canadian dollar, and New Zealand dollar. The Aussie dollar should also perform reasonably well, provided that the Chinese economy continues to hold up, as we expect it will. The Japanese yen remains our least favorite currency. Despite the dollar selloff, USD/JPY has managed to gain 3% since mid-April. As the Fed and a number of other central banks raise rates, the spread in yields between foreign government bonds and JGBs will widen. This will push down the yen, helping Japanese stocks in the process. As far as overall risk sentiment is concerned, another rule of thumb says that stocks rarely fall on a sustained basis outside of recessions (Chart 18). We do not expect a recession in the U.S. or elsewhere until 2019. This implies that investors should maintain an overweight position in global equities for now, favoring cyclical sectors over defensive ones. Chart 18Stocks Rarely Fall On A Sustained Basis Outside Of Recessions Stocks Rarely Fall On A Sustained Basis Outside Of Recessions Stocks Rarely Fall On A Sustained Basis Outside Of Recessions Peter Berezin, Global Chief Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed Makes An Unforced Error," dated December 18, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market," dated July 5, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "When Doves Cry," dated June 9, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Canada: A (Probably) Happy Moment In An Otherwise Sad Story," dated July 14, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Calculated as the total excess return on the 10-year bond index relative to global government benchmark since inception in 2009, foreign-currency hedged since 2014. The 10-year yield for New Zealand government bonds has dropped from 4.28% at the time of inception to 2.94% today. The 10-year yield for Australian government bonds has fallen from 4.10% to 2.74% over this period. 6 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Draghi's Dilemma," dated July 7, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights BCA's Central Bank Monitors support the case for less stimulus. Yellen's "dovish" testimony does not change our Fed call. The BCA Beige Book Monitor and related indicators support our view on the economy and Fed. Maximum central bank policy divergence has not been reached. Too early to predict Trump's replacement for Yellen. Now that economic surprise index has bottomed, risk assets can outperform as the metric mean reverts. Some wage measures are accelerating as the economy approaches full employment. Feature Chart 1Sell-Off In Global Bond Markets##BR##Triggered By Central Bank Talk Sell-Off In Global Bond Markets Triggered By Central Bank Talk Sell-Off In Global Bond Markets Triggered By Central Bank Talk Global bond investors were shocked in June when central bankers announced at the ECB's Forum on Central Banking what appeared to be a global recalibration of monetary policy. Until that time, investors had been lulled into a false sense of security that growth headwinds would prevent the Fed from hiking by more than once a year and keep the other major central banks on hold "indefinitely." The heads of the Bank of England (BoE), the Bank of Canada (BoC) and the Riksbank all took a less dovish tone, as they signaled less need for ultra-stimulative policies because the threat of deflation had diminished. Together with some better-than-expected U.S. economic data, this shift in tone led to a sharp sell-off in global bond markets (Chart 1). The BoC followed up last week by kicking off a prolonged tightening cycle. The central bank now expects the Canadian economy to reach full employment and hit the BoC's inflation targets by mid-2018, which is much earlier than expected. The global bond mini-rout actually began before the ECB Forum, when the ECB President gave a very upbeat description of the underlying strength of the Euro Area economy. BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy service highlights that the Euro Area is about two percentage points closer to full employment than the U.S. was just before the infamous 2013 Taper Tantrum.1 European core inflation is admittedly below target today, but so was the U.S. rate leading up to the 2013 Tantrum. Draghi's comments confirm that the ECB will announce this fall that a further tapering of its asset purchase program will take place in early 2018. The message that "emergency" levels of monetary accommodation are no longer needed is confirmed by our Central Bank Monitors (CB), which measure pressure on central bankers to raise or lower interest rates (Chart 2). The Monitors became less useful when rates hit the zero bound and quantitative easing became popular, but the measures are relevant again. All of our CB Monitors are in "tighter policy required" territory except for Japan (although even that one appears on the verge of breaking above the critical zero line). The Monitors have been rising due more to their growth than their inflation components. Bond investors may be startled by the ECB's posture because inflation remains well below target in all the major economies except the U.K. What is most worrying is the recent deceleration in U.S. inflation, where the economy is very close to or at full employment. Almost all of the major central banks point to temporary factors that will soon fade, which would allow inflation to escalate toward the target. Our Aggregate Inflation Indicators have all signaled a modest building of underlying inflation pressure over the past year (although they have softened recently in the U.S. and Eurozone; Chart 3). In terms of the components of these indicators, rising core producer price inflation has been partly offset by slower gains in unit labor costs in some economies. Chart 2All In The "Tighter Policy Required" Zone All In The "Tighter Policy Required" Zone All In The "Tighter Policy Required" Zone Chart 3BCA Aggregate Inflation Indicators BCA Aggregate Inflation Indicators BCA Aggregate Inflation Indicators These and other indicators support our view that core consumer price inflation will grind higher in the coming months in most of the advanced economies, including the U.S. Admittedly, all models and indicators have been poor predictors of inflation in this recovery. Nonetheless, historical relationships might begin to re-establish now that capacity utilization is rising and labor market slack has moderated significantly. Did Yellen Turn Dovish? June's FOMC minutes indicated that the consensus among Fed policymakers is willing to "look through" low inflation and maintain the current timetable on rate hikes. Yellen's Congressional testimony last week did not deviate from that view, although investors interpreted her remarks as dovish. The financial press focused on her statement that "...the policy rate is not far from neutral." However, this was followed up by the statement that "...because we also anticipate that the factors that are currently holding down the neutral rate will diminish somewhat over time, additional gradual rate hikes are likely to be appropriate over the next few years to sustain the economic expansion and return inflation to our 2 percent goal." The Fed asserts there are two neutral interest rates: short-term and long-term. Yellen argued that the actual policy rate is close to the short-term level, which is depressed by economic headwinds. However, Yellen and others have made the case that the short-term neutral rate is trending up as headwinds diminish, and will converge with the long-term neutral rate over time. The Fed Chair is at risk of confusing investors by discussing the concept of two neutral rates, although this may have been to head off demands by some Congressional lawmakers that the Fed should follow a mechanical policy rule when setting policy (such as the Taylor Rule). Nonetheless, the important point is that Yellen is not saying that the actual policy rate is close to the peak for the cycle. Yellen's testimony has not altered our Fed call for this year: balance sheet runoff beginning in the fall, followed by a rate hike in December. The latter hinges importantly on at least a modest rise in core PCE inflation in the coming months. We expect more rate hikes in 2018/19 than are discounted in the bond market. That said, the soft June CPI data challenges our view that inflation will move higher in the second half. The bottom line is that the backdrop has turned decidedly bond-bearish now that central bankers in the advanced economies are in the process of scaling back the easier monetary policy that followed the deflationary 2014/15 oil shock. Global bond yields have already taken a step up in recent weeks, but they will have to rise further to catch up with the solid pace of global growth and diminishing economic slack. Duration should be kept short. The Beige Book: Another Inflation Anomaly The Beige Book released on July 12 supports the Fed's base case outlook for the economy and inflation. It also keeps the Fed on track to begin to trim its balance sheet in September and boost rates by another 25 basis points in December. Our quantitative approach2 to the qualitative data in the Beige Book points to an acceleration in GDP and inflation, less business unease from a rising U.S. dollar, and ongoing improvement in real estate, both commercial and residential (Chart 4). Chart 4Beige Book Monitors Support Fed's Outlook##BR##On Economy And Inflation Beige Book Monitors Support Fed's Outlook On Economy And Inflation Beige Book Monitors Support Fed's Outlook On Economy And Inflation At 62%, the BCA Beige Book Monitor remained near its cycle highs in July, providing more confirmation that the economy rebounded in Q2 after a desultory Q1. The July 12 Beige Book covered the period from late May through June 30. Based on the Beige Book, the dollar should not be much of an issue in Q2 earnings season. The greenback seems to have faded as a concern for small businesses and bankers, which is in sharp contrast to 2015 and early 2016 when mentions of a strong dollar in the Beige Book surged. The Q2 earnings reporting season will provide corporate managements with another forum to express their views of currency impact on their operations. Business uncertainty over government policy (fiscal, regulatory and health) remained elevated in the most recent Beige Book (not shown). The implication is that the business community is mindful of the lack of progress by Washington policymakers on Trump's agenda. Our analysis of the Beige Book also shows that real estate was still stout as Q2 ended. This implies that both residential and commercial real estate, the former a source of strength in Q1, will add to growth again in Q2. Moreover, the latest reading on the BCA Real Estate Monitor further widened the gap between the BCA Beige Book Real Estate Monitor and the relative performance of REITS to the S&P 500. Nonetheless, BCA's U.S. Equity Strategy service recently downgraded REITS to neutral,3 citing our expectation of higher Treasury yields, modest rent growth, some cracks in CRE credit quality, and tightening standards for bank lending in the CRE marketplace. Echoing the market's disagreement with the Fed on inflation, the big disconnect in the Beige Book showed up in the number of inflation words. Inflation words hit a new peak in July, in sharp contrast with the recent soft readings on CPI and PCE. In the past, increased references to inflation have led measured inflation by a few months, suggesting that the CPI and core PCE may soon turn up. Bottom Line: The Beige Book backs the Fed's assertion that the economy will expand around 2% this year and inflation will move higher in the coming months, supporting a gradual removal of policy accommodation. Uncertainty in Washington is distressing, but worries over the dollar seem to be fading. Max Policy Divergence Has Not Been Reached What about the dollar? Tighter Fed policy is dollar-bullish on its own, but some of the major central banks are also starting to remove the monetary punchbowl as well. Recent dollar action suggests that investors have decided that the peak Fed/ECB policy divergence is now behind us. We do not agree. The ECB may be tapering, but raising interest rates is a long way off because there is still a lot of economic slack in the Eurozone. In contrast, the Fed is increasingly concerned that allowing the unemployment rate to fall further below its estimate of full-employment risks too large an overshoot of the 2% target. We still believe that market pricing for the fed funds rate is too benign. As Fed rate hike expectations ratchet up in the coming months, interest rate differentials versus Europe will widen in favor of the dollar. It is the same story for the dollar/yen rate. The major exception is the Canadian dollar, which we expect to appreciate versus the greenback. Does Gary Cohn Have What It Takes? A key wildcard in the financial outlook is the Fed Chair's replacement. Yellen's term as Chair will end in February 2018 and the markets have not yet shown any concerns about her potential replacement. The current frontrunner is Gary Cohn, the Chairman of President Trump's National Economic Committee; his appointment would conform to some historical precedents but violate others. Our March 6 Weekly Report4 provides a list of potential Fed appointees and also provides some background on the potential for the Fed to become more politicized under Trump. Since the late 1970s, Presidents have selected the Fed Chair based on their trust relationship with a candidate. Arthur Burns (Chair from 1970-1978) was the head of President Eisenhower's Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) and was a special counselor to President Nixon. William Miller (1978-1979) worked for the presidential campaigns of Hubert Humphrey and Jimmy Carter. Alan Greenspan (1987-2006) served as the Chair of President Reagan's Social Security Commission in the early 1980s, was the Chair of President Ford's CEA and advised President Nixon's campaign in 1968. Ben Bernanke (2006-2014) was George W. Bush's chief economist in 2005 and 2006 before Bush chose him to lead the Fed. Janet Yellen (2014-present) was Chair of Bill Clinton's CEA in the late 1990s, when she worked with many of Obama's economic team members. Paul Volcker (1979-1987) was the lone exception to this rule; he worked for Nixon, but not Carter, before becoming Fed Chair (Table 1). Table 1Characteristics Of Fed Chairs Since 1970 Global Monetary Policy Recalibration Global Monetary Policy Recalibration Cohn does not have any experience as a central banker, but that does not preclude him from holding the position. Volcker, Bernanke and Yellen, all held posts in the Federal Reserve System before their appointments as Chair. However, Miller was an outside director for the Boston Fed, and Burns and Greenspan had no prior experience at the monetary authority. Party identification is one area where Gary Cohn would stand out. Since at least 1970, the party affiliation of a new Fed Chair has matched that of the President. However, Presidents have crossed party lines to reappoint sitting Fed Chairmen to additional terms. Volker, Greenspan and Bernanke were reappointed to lead the Fed by Presidents from opposing political parties. The timing of Trump's announcement on Yellen's replacement may be critical. In the summer of 2013, names were already being floated by the Obama White House (and mainly rejected) by markets, before he finally settled on Yellen. The official announcement came in early October 2013. In August 2009, President Obama reappointed Bernanke for a second four-year term. Bernanke was initially nominated to be Fed Chair by George W. Bush in October of 2005. If the appointment comes in October and the nominee is perceived to be hawkish, the risk is that markets may begin to price in the regime change sometime in the next few months. Our U.S. Bond Strategy service argued in a recent report5 that rate hike expectations may already be ramping up, while the data on the economy and inflation begin to beat expectations again. Bottom Line: It is too early for the markets to be concerned about the next Fed Chair and their policies. The names mentioned in the summer may not be the ones offered the job in the fall. Surprise Index Finally Bottomed Out The June employment report marked a turning point for the Citigroup surprise index, following an extended period of disappointment that depressed the dollar and bond yields. The June reports on CPI and retail sales were disappointing, but June industrial production exceeded expectations. What does this mean for relative asset returns? After 86 days, expectations moved low enough to allow economic reality to begin to run ahead. It took as few as 8 business days (in 2009) and as many as 164 (2015) for the surprise index to return to the zero line, an average of 52 days (Chart 5). Chart 5Risk Assets Tend To Outperform As Economic Surprise Index Rebounds Risk Assets Tend To Outperform As Economic Surprise Index Rebounds Risk Assets Tend To Outperform As Economic Surprise Index Rebounds Mean-reversions in the surprise index following troughs have generally been good for risk assets in this recovery (Table 2). We have identified 11 periods since late 2009 when the surprise index bottomed out and then moved up toward zero. In 8 of those episodes, the total return on stocks was higher than 10-year Treasuries. Equities beat Treasuries by an average of 286 bps across all 11 periods, with a median outperformance of 400 basis points. Table 2U.S. Financial Market Performance As Economic Surprise Index Rises Global Monetary Policy Recalibration Global Monetary Policy Recalibration The total return on investment-grade corporate debt outperformed Treasuries in 6 of 11 episodes. In those six instances, investment grade credit outperformed on average by 132 bps. Nonetheless over all 11 episodes, the excess return was 0%. In contrast, high-yield bonds beat Treasuries in 7 of the 11 periods, with a median outperformance of 188 basis points. Similarly, small caps beat large caps 72% of the time as the economic surprise index moved back toward the zero line. The median outperformance of small over large in all 11 periods was 124 basis points. The performance of commodities was mixed as economic surprises climbed. Gold rose in 6 of the 11 times, but fell in 5. Oil prices posted increases in only 5 of the 11, but the median return for oil after economic surprise bottomed was -2.7%. Bottom Line: Economic expectations that ramped up post-election have now declined and allowed the economic surprise index to trough. The implication for investors is that risk assets tend to outperform as the economic surprise index moves back to zero. This supports our tactical views of stocks over bonds, small over large caps, and credit over Treasury. What's Up With Wages? The June jobs report released in early July6 only added to the market's fears that the Phillips Curve is dead because wage growth softened even as the labor market tightened. Unfortunately, no Fed officials including Yellen have addressed the topic in depth recently. The market does not believe the Fed when it says that the tighter labor market is pushing up wages. We see it another way. Chart 6 shows that wage inflation has accelerated since mid-to-late 2012, but some measures of wages have made more progress than others. Chart 7 and Chart 8 reinforce that, setting aside the rollover in average hourly earnings (AHE), wage inflation is accelerating, albeit modestly. Chart 6Plenty Of Signs That##BR##Wages Are Accelerating Plenty Of Signs That Wages Are Accelerating Plenty Of Signs That Wages Are Accelerating Chart 7Compositional Effects Do Not##BR##Explain Recent Rollover Compositional Effects Do Not Explain Recent Rollover Compositional Effects Do Not Explain Recent Rollover Chart 8Acceleration In Hours Worked Should##BR##Lead To Faster Wage Growth Acceleration In Hours Worked Should Lead To Faster Wage Growth Acceleration In Hours Worked Should Lead To Faster Wage Growth The Employment Cost Index (ECI) excluding bonuses (Chart 6, panel 1) is our favorite measure of labor compensation. It has accelerated steadily since 2010. It adjusts for compositional changes in the labor market (unlike the average hourly earnings measure) and is the broadest and most comprehensive wage metric. Its drawbacks are that it is released with a long lag. For example, the Q2 ECI data will not be released until the end of July. The AHE data is already available for June and Q2. On the other hand, unit labor costs (ULC) (panel 2) have stagnated for the past five years. Data starts in 1947, so it has the most history of any of the wage measures. However, it is even more delayed than the ECI: it is released five weeks after the end of the quarter. Moreover, these data are subject to revisions and tend to be more volatile than other wages measures, which makes it difficult to identify a change in trend. Productivity, which is used to construct ULC, is also very difficult to estimate. A recent BIS report7 notes that there is evidence that the relationship between ULC and labor market slack has diminished over time, but that ULC is a better measure of inflationary pressures than AHE. Median usual weekly earnings (panel 3) have also accelerated. This is not a pure wage measure; it combines hourly pay and hours worked and, therefore, is a good proxy for incomes. Income growth has picked up the pace, providing a solid underpinning for consumer spending. Panel 4 shows compensation per hour worked. It, too, has stalled and is subject to the same strengths and weakness as ULC because it is part of the quarterly Productivity and Costs report. This metric has run near 2% with no trend. Finally, average hourly earnings (panel 5) have sped up since 2012, but rolled over in late 2016. This wage gauge gets most of the market's attention although it is only one of many measures that the Fed watches. AHE is a timely data set, released alongside monthly payroll numbers. It includes average earnings of private non-farm production and non-supervisory positions. The major disadvantage of this measure is that hourly wage earners represent only about 58% of workers and do not account for trends in salaried jobs. Earnings do not include bonus pay or employee benefits. The data are available beginning only in 2006. In Chart 7, we created an "equally-weighted" AHE measure to adjust for shifts in the composition of the labor market, but we found that the recent deceleration is not linked to compositional effects. Since wage growth bottomed out in late 2012, the compositional shifts slightly lowered wage inflation on average, but the growth rates today are roughly the same. The Atlanta Fed wage tracker (not shown) is in a distinct uptrend. The Tracker has the advantage that it is not biased by compositional shifts. Chart 8 shows our update to a study by the Kansas City Fed8 that found only a few industries (mostly in the goods-producing sector of the economy) have accounted for most of the rise in wages, notably manufacturing, construction and wholesale trade. Financial services, retail, professional and business services, and leisure and hospitality - all service sector industries - were the laggards. The report shows that although earnings growth has fallen behind in service-oriented industries since 2015, hours worked have seen faster growth than in the goods-producing sector. We concur with the author that labor demand was strong in the past few years in areas that have not experienced much wage growth. As the labor market continues to tighten, wages in these industries may accelerate, but patience will be required. Bottom Line: The various measures of wage inflation provide a mixed picture. Taken as a group, however, we believe that wage growth has indeed accelerated as the labor market has tightened. The acceleration has admittedly been modest, but it is only recently that unemployment reached a full employment level. The real test for the Phillips curve will be in the coming quarters as the economy moves further into "excess labor demand" territory. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Central Banks Are Now Playing Catch-Up", dated July 4, 2017. Available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "The Great Debate Continues", dated April 17, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report "SPX 3000?, dated July 10, 2017. Available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Trump And The Fed", dated March 6, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "Summer Snapback", dated July 11, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Sizing up the Second Half", dated July 10, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Monetary policy: inching towards normalization", Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 25 June 2017. 8 Wage Leaders and Laggards: Decomposing The Growth In Average Hourly Earnings", Willem Van Zandweghe, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, February 15, 2017.
Highlights Duration: Investor optimism about U.S. growth and inflation will return in the coming months. Remain at below-benchmark duration and enter a short position in the July fed funds futures contract. Close short positions in the January contract for a small gain. Credit Spreads: Spreads are at risk of widening as Fed rate hike expectations ramp up in the second half of the year, though we would be inclined to view a Fed-driven back-up in spreads as a buying opportunity. Bank Bonds: Banks continue to shore up their balance sheets and are likely to see rising profits in the coming months. Bank bonds also offer a spread advantage compared to other similarly risky sectors. Feature Chart 1Synchronized Global Selloff Synchronized Global Selloff Synchronized Global Selloff The bond selloff is now two weeks old. What began as a reaction to perceived hawkish policy shifts from central banks outside of the U.S. - the European Central Bank in particular - is now morphing into a selloff built on optimism about U.S. growth. Needless to say, we think the recent bearish price action has further to run. Global participation makes it more likely that the weakness in U.S. Treasuries will persist because it prevents the dollar from strengthening as yields move higher (Chart 1). In recent years, most U.S. bond selloffs have been met with an appreciating exchange rate. The stronger dollar then caused investors to lower their U.S. growth expectations, and capped the upside in yields. We view the dollar's current stability as a bearish signal for U.S. bonds. But it has not just been non-U.S. factors driving the uptrend in yields. Last week's positive ISM and employment figures are ushering in renewed optimism about U.S. growth. We also think that U.S. growth is poised to bounce back in the second half of the year, and the Fed is inclined to agree. The Fed's median projection calls for one more 25 basis point rate hike before the end of the year, and we also expect the committee to announce the run-off of the balance sheet in September. With the market still only priced for 15 bps of hikes between now and year-end, there remains scope for further upside surprises. Of course, this forecast for balance sheet run-off in September and another rate hike in December hinges on a second-half snapback in growth, continued strength in labor markets and a rebound in core inflation. Growth Is On The Way Although GDP growth averaged just 1.75% during past two quarters, all signs suggest that the next two quarters will be much stronger. As was mentioned above, both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing ISM surveys delivered strong readings in June. The manufacturing ISM came in at 57.8 and the non-manufacturing survey came in at 57.4, both signal stronger GDP growth in the coming months (Chart 2). The crucial new orders-to-inventories figure calculated from the manufacturing survey is also displaying remarkable strength (Chart 2, bottom panel). We can also infer the current trend in growth from the employment and productivity data. In fact, aggregate hours worked - a combination of total employment and average weekly hours - plus labor productivity growth is more or less equivalent to GDP (Chart 3). After last week's payrolls report, aggregate hours worked are now growing at 1.99% year-over-year. If we combine that growth rate with quarterly productivity growth of 0.7%, the average since 2012, we get a tracking estimate of just below 2.7% for GDP growth. The Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model also currently expects that second quarter growth will be 2.7%. Chart 2PMIs Point To Stronger Growth... PMIs Point To Stronger Growth... PMIs Point To Stronger Growth... Chart 3...As Does The Labor Market ...As Does The Labor Market ...As Does The Labor Market Labor Markets: Watching The Participation Rate Last week's jobs report showed that the economy added 222k jobs in June, and that the prior two months were also revised higher. This pushed the 3-month moving average up to +180k jobs per month, right in line with the +187k jobs per month averaged in 2016. However, despite robust payroll gains, the unemployment rate actually ticked higher in June. This is because many previously sidelined workers re-entered the labor force, pushing the labor force participation rate up to 62.8%. Going forward, for the Fed to have confidence that wage growth and inflation will continue to rise, the unemployment rate will have to remain under downward pressure (Chart 4). As long as the labor force participation rate remains flat (or declines) this should be relatively easy to achieve. We calculate that the economy needs to add just above 117k jobs per month for the unemployment rate to continue falling. However, if we assume a higher labor force participation rate of 63.2%, we would need to add 195k jobs per month, a much higher hurdle.1 We detailed the main drivers of the labor force participation rate in a recent report,2 and while we do not see much potential for a significant increase in the participation rate, its trend is critical for the monetary policy outlook and should be monitored closely going forward. Inflation: Is The Fed Too Sanguine? The most important question for policymakers is whether inflation will rebound in the second half of the year. While the Fed will probably start winding down its balance sheet in September no matter what, another rate hike in December is likely contingent on core inflation showing some signs of strength in the next few months. We have previously written3 that if the Fed were to proceed with a December rate hike in the face of low and falling inflation, the market would start to price in a "policy mistake" scenario. The yield curve would flatten, credit spreads would widen, TIPS breakevens would narrow and long-dated Treasury yields could even decline. However, we do expect that core inflation will trend higher in the coming months, mostly driven by strength in the core services (excluding shelter and medical care) component. That component is historically the most sensitive to tight labor markets and rising wage growth (Chart 5). Chart 4Falling Unemployment Rate = ##br##Rising Inflation Falling Unemployment Rate = Rising Inflation Falling Unemployment Rate = Rising Inflation Chart 5A Boost From Import##br## Prices Is Coming A Boost From Import Prices Is Coming A Boost From Import Prices Is Coming Although it is unlikely to be a long-run driver of inflation, the core goods component also has some upside in the coming months in response to recent dollar weakness and rising non-oil import prices (Chart 5, bottom 2 panels). Investment Strategy Chart 6Too Few Hikes In The Price Too Few Hikes In The Price Too Few Hikes In The Price We think U.S. growth and inflation are poised to snap back during the second half of the year, probably by enough for the Fed to deliver another hike before year-end. We therefore continue to recommend that investors maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. We have also been advising clients to hold short positions in the January 2018 fed funds futures contract since March 21.4 That contract is now priced for the fed funds rate to increase 15 bps between now and the end of the year. Given that even an optimistic economic scenario would likely only result in a 25 bps increase in the funds rate, there is not much potential for further gains in this trade. We close this position, booking a small profit of +1 bp. Looking further out, we now see an attractive opportunity to short the July 2018 fed funds futures contract. That contract is currently priced for 32 bps of rate hikes between now and next June (Chart 6), and would therefore turn a profit in the event of two or more rate hikes during that timeframe. Bottom Line: Investor optimism about U.S. growth and inflation will return in the coming months. Remain at below-benchmark duration and enter a short position in the July fed funds futures contract. Close short positions in the January contract for a small gain. Credit Spreads: When Good News Is Bad News Chart 7High Risk Of A Near-Term Selloff High Risk Of A Near-Term Selloff High Risk Of A Near-Term Selloff Renewed optimism on U.S. growth and inflation could ironically pose a problem for credit spreads, at least in the very short term. As we have often discussed in the context of our Fed Policy Loop,5 hawkish shifts in Fed policy tend to result in wider credit spreads and tighter financial conditions more broadly. Fortunately, these periods are usually short lived. Once financial conditions tighten, the Fed backs away from its hawkish stance, allowing financial conditions to ease once again. An extreme example of this dynamic is the 2014/15 selloff in credit markets. Of course, the plunge in oil prices and related stress in the energy sector was the chief catalyst, but what is often overlooked is that Fed rate hike expectations were also quite elevated during that period (Chart 7). It is the combination of stress in the energy sector and unsupportive Fed policy that resulted in the prolonged rise in spreads. A more benign example is the price action from this past March. Junk spreads widened from 344 bps on March 2 to 406 bps on March 22, as rate hike expectations ramped up heading into the March FOMC meeting. Ultimately, this period of spread widening represented a buying opportunity in credit markets. It is a March 2017 style selloff that we see as quite likely in the coming months as growth recovers by just enough to give the Fed cover for another rate increase. Bottom Line: Credit spreads are at risk of widening as Fed rate hike expectations ramp up in the second half of the year. But with inflation and inflation expectations still well below target, the Fed will ultimately be forced to remain supportive. We would therefore view any period of Fed-driven weakness in credit markets as a buying opportunity. Bank Bonds: Still A Strong Buy The Federal Reserve released the results of its annual bank stress tests last month and for once it did not object to the capital plans of any of the 34 participating bank holding companies, a recognition of the fact that banks have dramatically boosted their capital ratios since the first round of stress tests in 2009 (Chart 8). For the most part bank profit growth has also outpaced debt growth during this period, with the exception of last year when profit growth turned negative and debt growth surged (Chart 8, panel 2). A large portion of last year's increase in debt growth was likely a response to the new Total Loss Absorbing Capital (TLAC) regulations which require banks to issue a specified minimum amount of securities that can be easily written off in case of bankruptcy. This includes capital and long-term unsecured debt. Regardless, bank debt growth has already fallen back close to zero and we see upside for bank profits in the next 6-12 months. Meanwhile, non-financial corporate profits have had a much more difficult time outpacing debt growth in recent years (Chart 8, bottom panel). Bank Profits On The Rise A number of forward looking loan growth indicators suggest that credit and capital formation are on an upward trajectory (Chart 9). Our U.S. Equity Strategy service's proprietary Capex Indicator,6 consumer and business confidence, manufacturing new orders and our own C&I loan growth model all point to accelerating loan growth in the coming months. Net interest margins also have scope to widen. A recent blog post from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York7 showed that net interest margins are sensitive to both the level of interest rates and the slope of the yield curve (Chart 10). Lower rates and a flatter curve have both compressed margins in recent years. In addition, net interest margins tend to narrow when banks take less risk on the asset side of their balance sheets, we proxy this by showing banks' risk-weighted assets as a percent of total assets (Chart 10, bottom panel). Chart 8Bank Health Still Improving Bank Health Still Improving Bank Health Still Improving Chart 9Loan Growth Will Accelerate Loan Growth Will Accelerate Loan Growth Will Accelerate Chart 10A Higher, Steeper Curve Will Help NIMs A Higher, Steeper Curve Will Help NIMs A Higher, Steeper Curve Will Help NIMs Going forward, higher rates and a steeper yield curve8 will apply widening pressure to net interest margins. Similarly, risk-weighted assets have already risen considerably as a fraction of total assets and will increase further as the Fed starts to drain reserves from the banking system. Bank Bonds Are Still Cheap The truly remarkable thing is that even though banks have been raising capital while the non-financial sector has been taking on leverage, bank spreads still look attractive compared to most non-financial sectors after adjusting for credit rating and duration (Chart 11). This is true for both senior and subordinated bank debt. As can be seen in Chart 11, senior bank debt has a low duration-times-spread (DTS) compared to the overall index. This means that it acts as a "low-beta" sector, underperforming the investment grade benchmark during rallies and outperforming during selloffs. Conversely, subordinate bank bonds are a high-DTS sector. They tend to outperform during rallies and underperform during selloffs (Chart 12). Chart 11Corporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* Summer Snapback Summer Snapback LegendCorporate Sector Abbreviations Summer Snapback Summer Snapback Chart 12Add "Beta" With Subordinate Bank Debt Add "Beta" With Subordinate Bank Debt Add "Beta" With Subordinate Bank Debt While we strongly recommend grabbing the extra spread available in both senior and subordinate bank debt relative to other similarly risky alternatives, subordinate bank bonds look particularly attractive in the current environment. This is because they both add some pro-cyclical risk ("beta") to a corporate bond portfolio and offer a spread advantage compared to other similarly risky bonds. Bottom Line: Banks continue to shore up their balance sheets and are also likely to see rising profits in the coming months. Meanwhile, bank bonds still offer a spread advantage compared to other similarly risky sectors. Remain overweight both senior and subordinate bank debt. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 These calculations assume population growth of 0.08% per month, or 1% per year. 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Three Scenarios For Treasury Yields In 2017", dated June 20, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Three Scenarios For Treasury Yields In 2017", dated June 20, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Yield Curve On A Cyclical Horizon", dated March 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk Rally Extended", dated June 27, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Unfazed", dated June 12, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 7 http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2017/06/low-interest-rates-and-bank-profits.html 8 For further details on the case for a bear-steepening yield curve please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Yield Curve On A Cyclical Horizon", dated March 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification