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Highlights The Fed will shrink its balance and is determined to raise rates. Implications of synchronized global growth and global NAIRU. Consumers are upbeat and ready to spend. What's the signal from record high consumer expectations for equities? Feature Risk assets and Treasury yields rose up to and after last week's Fed meeting, but late-week saber-rattling by North Korea left most asset classes little changed on the week. The U.S. economic data released last week continued to be impacted by Hurricanes Harvey and Irma, but the Fed notes that the storms are "unlikely to materially alter the course of the national economy beyond the next few months". The backdrop has turned more bearish for bonds even before the Fed's recommitment last week to raising rates gradually and shrinking its balance sheet. The Fed's hawkish stance short term and dovish stance long term will allow risk assets to outperform Treasury bonds and cash, but a sudden move higher in inflation would challenge that view. FOMC: Short Term Hawkish... The Fed sent a hawkish short-term signal on the outlook for monetary policy at its meeting last week. The vast majority of FOMC members, 12 out of 16, expect to raise rates again by December (Chart 1). A 0.2% downward revision to the Fed's 2017 core PCE inflation forecast was offset by an equal 0.2% upward revision to its GDP growth forecast. Moreover, Fed Chair Janet Yellen downplayed this year's soft inflation figures and stressed that inflation expectations remain "reasonably well anchored". Although the relationship may have weakened somewhat recently, the Fed is loath to throw the Phillips curve model into the dust bin just yet. The unemployment rate forecasts were lowered from 4.2% to 4.1% for 2018 and 2019, while the Fed kept its NAIRU estimate at 4.6%. The tightening labor market is expected to place upward pressure on wage inflation and push PCE inflation to the 2% target by 2019. Chart 1Market Expects A Hike In December Market Expects A Hike In December Market Expects A Hike In December Incoming data on actual inflation and inflation expectations will determine whether the Fed will be able to pull the trigger in December. Further softness in the core PCE inflation and CPI will raise doubts as to whether the inflation undershoot is indeed transitory. And especially worrisome will be a decline in inflation expectations. It is noteworthy that 10-year inflation breakevens fell nearly 4bps immediately following yesterday's FOMC announcement. At 1.85%, 10-year breakevens are already running below the 2.4-2.5% range that is consistent with the Fed's 2% target for PCE inflation. Any further decline in breakevens will call into question the Fed's view that inflation expectations remain well anchored. Further, with the decline in inflation expectations, the 2/10-year yield curve flattened following the Fed's announcement. This is could be considered a sign of a slight lowering in growth expectations. Finally, there was little surprise on the Fed's balance sheet announcement. For now, the Fed is committed to slowly unwinding its bond holdings. Janet Yellen said that the Fed will only resume full reinvestment of maturing bonds after it had cut the policy rate back to the zero bound. In other words, the Fed funds rate is now the primary tool to set monetary policy. The odds of another Fed rate hike by year-end have certainly increased (Chart 1). This need not upset risk assets if the incoming data justify higher rates. Only a policy error, where the Fed hikes rates even as inflation expectations decline and the yield curve flattens, will trigger a sizeable pullback in risk assets. This is not our baseline scenario. Softness in inflation and inflation expectations will force the Fed to back down. ...But Long Term Dovish Although the Fed signaled a greater probability of an interest rate hike in the near-term, it lowered the long-run outlook for policy rates. First, the median FOMC member now expects only two rate increases in 2019, down from three in the June forecast (not shown). Second, the estimate for the terminal rate was lowered to 2.75% from 3.0% (Chart 2, panel 4). With the long-run inflation target being 2% (Chart 2, panel 3), this means that the FOMC collectively believes the long-term neutral real Fed funds rate to be just 0.75%. Currently, the Laubach-Williams estimate of the neutral real Fed funds rate is near zero (Chart 3). Therefore, the FOMC sees it rising only modestly from current levels over the coming years. Chart 2The FOMC's "Long Run" Forecasts Since 2012 The FOMC's "Long Run" Forecasts Since 2012 The FOMC's "Long Run" Forecasts Since 2012 Chart 3Neutral Real Rate Near Zero Neutral Real Rate Near Zero Neutral Real Rate Near Zero For any given term premium, a lower short-term interest rate path will mean a lower 10-year yield. If estimates for the terminal policy rate outside the U.S. remain unchanged, the Fed's lower projection will mean narrower interest rate differentials, reducing the relative attractiveness of the dollar. As for equities, a lower estimate for the long-run policy rate would be a wash if it also reflected a lower estimate for long-term GDP growth. However, the Fed kept its longer run real GDP growth estimate unchanged at 1.8% (Chart 2, panel 1). If that proves accurate, lower interest rates and a weaker dollar will be more supportive for U.S. equities over the long-term. Notably, the Fed did not adjust its view of NAIRU, keeping it at 4.6%, where it has been since April (Chart 2, panel 2). Bottom Line: In terms of investment implications, the lower estimate of the long-run neutral rate is supportive for 10-year Treasuries, negative for the dollar and positive for equities. Stay overweight stocks versus bonds and short duration. Don't Downplay NAIRU Synchronous global growth remains in place in 2017 and will persist into 2018, but this growth alone may not be enough to push up inflation. BCA's OECD Real GDP Diffusion Index is at 100% after it dipped to 14% during the financial crisis. The index was also above 90% from 1994 through 1998, and then again from 2001 through 2007. Moreover, the OECD expects that GDP growth will climb above zero in all the member countries in BCA's diffusion index again in 2018. The broad-based global GDP growth has historically been associated with a rising stock-to-bond ratio, rising global trade flows, a narrowing output gap and accelerating industrial production (Chart 4). However, there is no consistent pattern on the dollar, the unemployment rate, or core inflation. Chart 5 shows that during prior periods of robust global growth, equities beat bonds, the U.S. output gap tightened and industrial production increased. U.S. exports tend to contribute more to GDP growth during these phases, but not in a uniform way. Meantime, the Fed has both raised and lowered rates during these periods. Chart 4Widespread##BR##Global Growth... Widespread Global Growth... Widespread Global Growth... Chart 5... Supports Risk Assets,##BR##Trade And A Narrower Output Gap ... Supports Risk Assets, Trade And A Narrower Output Gap ... Supports Risk Assets, Trade And A Narrower Output Gap Nonetheless, while the dollar jumped in the 1990s when BCA's OECD growth index was above 90%, it fell from 2001 to 2007, and it's performance since 2015 has been mixed. The unemployment rate declined in the mid-to-late 1990s, but initially rose in the 2001-2007 period and has dropped since 2010. The Fed both raised and lowered rates during the previous episodes, but has only boosted rates in the current phase. Core inflation slowed in the 1990s when 90% of countries saw positive GDP growth, but accelerated in the early 2000s. Since 2015, core inflation has both climbed and decelerated. What will trigger higher inflation if more than 90% of the globe is experiencing positive economic growth? BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy service notes that1 67% of OECD nations have unemployment rates under the organization's assessment of "global NAIRU", a level not seen since before the Great Recession when inflation expanded in both the goods and service sectors (Chart 6). However, the link between inflation and NAIRU waned during and just after the 2007-2009 recession and only reconnected lately. The implication for investors is that there is a global NAIRU level (or global output gap), which is more important in determining worldwide inflation rates than individual country NAIRU measures. Chart 6The NAIRU Concept Is Not Dead Yet The NAIRU Concept Is Not Dead Yet The NAIRU Concept Is Not Dead Yet Bottom Line: Surging global growth is a precondition for higher inflation, but sustained improvement in the labor market is needed to drive up inflation and prompt more action from the Fed. Investors may be downplaying the NAIRU concept at a time when it is finally set to bite. If that is the case, inflation expectations around the world are too low, although it will take some evidence of faster realized inflation (especially in the U.S. and Europe) before the markets begin to discount that view in bond yields. Stay underweight duration. Flow Of Funds Update On Consumer And Corporate Health The latest readings on the health of household and corporate balance sheets from the Fed's flow of funds accounts reinforce BCA's stance that consumer spending will provide strong support for the U.S. economy through 2017 and 2018. Household net worth continues to rise and is well above average at this point in a long expansion (Chart 7). The total wealth effect for consumer spending is still lagging prior cycles, but remains supportive. Debt-to-income ratios are at multi-decade lows. The ongoing repair of consumer balance sheets has led to an all-time high in FICO scores (Chart 7, panel 4). Last week's U.S. flow of funds report also allows us to update BCA's Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) (Chart 8). The level of the CHM improved slightly between Q1 and Q2, but the overall level still suggests corporate balance sheets are deteriorating. The progress in Q2 was broadbased, as all the components improved, notably the net leverage component. Profit growth surged while debt moved up modestly in Q2, modestly reducing leverage. The Monitor has been a reliable indicator of the trend in corporate bond spreads. The upswing in the CHM in Q2 - and particularly the dip in leverage - supports our corporate bond overweight. On the consumer front, while the recent weakness in vehicle sales and overall retail sales are noteworthy, they do not signal the end of the business cycle. We found2 that a peak in vehicle sales leads the end of the economic cycle by two years. Moreover, Hurricane Harvey weighed on August's retail sales report and Irma will have the same impact on September's sales.3 Instead, the backdrop for consumer spending remains strong. For example, the most recent Fed Senior Loan Officer's Survey suggests that the banking sector is willing to lend to households and that consumers are open to borrowing, although household demand for loans has weakened in recent quarters (Chart 9). Chart 7Support For The Consumer##BR##Remains In Place Support For The Consumer Remains In Lace Support For The Consumer Remains In Lace Chart 8Improved A Bit In Q2##BR##But Still Deteriorating Improved A Bit In Q2 But Still Deteriorating Improved A Bit In Q2 But Still Deteriorating Chart 9Senior Loan Officers##BR##Survey Still Supportive Senior Loan Officers Survey Still Supportive Senior Loan Officers Survey Still Supportive In addition, consumer spending intentions remain in an uptrend and the decade-high readings on "plans to buy" a house and a car are telling (Chart 10, panels 1 and 2). Overall measures of consumer confidence remain at 16-year peaks (Chart 10, panel 3). Furthermore, the sturdy labor market, modest wage growth and low inflation are all factors that support a solid pace of real income growth, which reinforces the spending backdrop (Chart 10, panel 4). Student loan debt increased again in Q2 and investors are concerned by the risks posed by the upswing. The Bank Credit Analyst covered the topic in a comprehensive report in November 2016.4 The key message was that student debt is a modest drag on economic growth, but is not a threat to U.S. government finances and does not represent the next subprime crisis. Nearly a year later, BCA's conclusions remain unchanged. A recent report5 by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York provides data on student loans through Q2 2017. The report noted that while student debt levels were little changed between Q1 and Q2 2017, they are up $85B from a year ago and at record highs (Chart 11). Although student loan delinquencies ticked higher in Q2, and remain elevated by historical standards, they have moved sideways in recent years. We will continue to monitor all types of consumer indebtedness as we assess hazards in the U.S. economy. Student loans are only a mild economic headwind and do not represent a source of systemic financial risk. Chart 10Consumers Upbeat And Ready To Spend Consumers Upbeat And Ready To Spend Consumers Upbeat And Ready To Spend Chart 11Student Loan Debt Is Elevated Student Loan Debt Is Elevated Student Loan Debt Is Elevated Bottom Line: The consumer - a key driver of the U.S. economy and corporate earnings - will provide a solid backdrop for the economy through 2017 and beyond. This climate will allow the Fed to boost rates one more time this year and begin paring its balance sheet starting next month. The solid underpinnings for the consumer will sustain corporate earnings growth and, ultimately, higher stock prices. However, favorable consumer attitudes toward U.S. equity prices are a mild concern. Signals From Stock Sentiment Surveys Record U.S. consumer optimism - as measured by the University of Michigan (UM) - on forward stock returns does not necessarily signal a market top. On the other hand, it supports BCA's view that investors be prudent with risk allocations. Respondents to the UM Survey of Consumers assign a 65% probability that the U.S. stock market will move higher in the next 12 months, surpassing the previous zenith in mid-2004. Interestingly, before the 2014 high (60%), the top reading was in mid-2007 (62%), only three months prior to the October 2007 equity market peak. A cursory look at Chart 12, panel 1 shows that peaks on this metric line up with those in equities. We view it another way. Investors should not assume that stocks are peaking based on the UM data. The bottom panel of Chart 12 shows that at just 5.6%, the annual change in the percentage of respondents who expect stocks to move higher in the next 12 months is not at an extreme. The 12-month change was as high as 18% in early 2004 and again in March 2010. Stock returns in the 12 months after these peaks in sentiment were lower than in the 12 months prior. However, we are not yet in the danger zone based on this indicator. Furthermore, BCA's Investor Sentiment Composite Index (not shown) is not at an extreme, although it is at the top end of its bull market range. We expect the stock-to-bond ratio to move higher in the next 6-to-12 months, despite the elevated readings on households' expected return on stocks. Our position is driven more by our bearish stance on Treasury bond prices than on an overly bullish call on equity returns. Chart 13 illustrates this point across three time horizons given our view of fair value on the 10-year Treasury yield (2.67%).6 Our analysis assumes a 2% annualized dividend yield on the S&P 500. Panel 1 shows the ratio between now and year end will remain positive if U.S. equities dip by 5%. Looking ahead 6 and 12 months (Panels 2 and 3), the S&P 500 will have to drop by between 5% and 10% to signal a localized peak in the stock-to-bond ratio. Chart 12Consumers' Expectations For Equity Returns Are Elevated Consumers' Expectations For Equity Returns Are Elevated Consumers' Expectations For Equity Returns Are Elevated Chart 13Scenarios For Stock-To-Bond Ratio Scenarios For Stock-To-Bond Ratio Scenarios For Stock-To-Bond Ratio Bottom Line: Despite heightened consumer sentiment toward equities, we expect the stock-to-bond ratio to move higher in the next 6 to 12 months. Nonetheless, investors should be prudent with risk assets, paring back any maximum overweight positions and holding some safe-haven assets within diversified portfolios. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Have Bond Yields Peaked For The Cycle? No.", September 12, 2017. Available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Disconnected," September 11, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Shelter From The Storm, "September 5, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "Student Loan Blues: Can't Replay What I Borrowed", November 2016. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 5 https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/pdf/HHDC_2017Q2.pdf 6 Please see BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "The Cyclical Sweet Spot Rolls On," September 5, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights This week's FOMC statement telegraphed another rate hike in December and three more hikes in 2018. The ability of the Fed to deliver on these hikes will depend on whether inflation picks up. We think it will. Stronger GDP growth will push the unemployment rate below 4% next year, the threshold at which the Phillips curve becomes quite steep. The often-cited reasons for why the Phillips curve has become defunct - well-anchored inflation expectations, decreased union bargaining power, a more globalized economy, and technological trends - are less convincing than they appear. Underweight long-term government bonds and overweight equities for the next 12 months. Look to reduce risk exposure late next year. The beleaguered dollar could catch a bid over the coming months. We are closing our long Brent oil trade for a gain of 13.8%. Feature The Fed Delivers A "Hawkish Hold" Going into this week's FOMC meeting, there was some speculation among market participants that the Fed would signal a reluctance to raise rates in December and reduce the number of rate hikes planned for next year. In the end, that didn't happen. Twelve of the sixteen participants indicated that they expected the fed funds rate to rise in December, exactly the same number as in June. The Fed downplayed the effects of the hurricanes, noting that they would not "materially alter" medium-term growth prospects. The median number of rate hikes planned for next year also remained at three. The FOMC kept the long-term estimate of unemployment at 4.6%, despite trimming the forecast for end-2018 unemployment rate from 4.2% to 4.1%. The only substantive dovish changes to the dots came in the form of a cut in the number of hikes planned for 2019 from three to two, and a reduction in the terminal rate from 3% to 2.75%. Not surprisingly, the somewhat hawkish tone of the FOMC statement caused the implied odds of a December rate hike to jump from about one-in-two to two-in-three. The dollar also rallied, with the euro falling a full big figure against the greenback immediately following the release of the statement. Don't Write Off The Phillips Curve Just Yet Last week's higher-than-expected inflation print undoubtedly increased the Fed's willingness to keep raising rates. Nevertheless, despite the tentative rebound in inflation, core CPI inflation is down 0.6 percentage points since January on a year-over-year basis, while core PCE inflation is down 0.5 points over the same period. The failure of inflation to accelerate in response to diminished economic slack has convinced many people that the Fed will not be able to continue scaling back monetary stimulus. It has also prompted numerous commentators to pen obituaries for the so-called Phillips curve. Named after New Zealand economist William Phillips, the curve predicts that falling unemployment will lead to rising inflation. It is certainly true that the Phillips curve has become flatter over the past few decades (Chart 1). However, we think that it is premature to write it off as a useful tool for predicting inflation. This is because the Phillips curve tends to become much steeper once the economy reaches full employment. As we have discussed in the past, a variety of measures suggest that the U.S. is approaching this "kink" in the curve (Chart 2).1 Chart 1The Phillips Curve Has Gotten Flatter Is The Phillips Curve Dead Or Dormant? Is The Phillips Curve Dead Or Dormant? Chart 2U.S. Economy At Full Employment U.S. Economy At Full Employment U.S. Economy At Full Employment The idea that the Phillips curve steepens at low levels of unemployment is very intuitive: If excess capacity is high to begin with, a modest decline in slack will still leave many workers idle. In such a setting, inflation is unlikely to rise. However, once the output gap is fully closed, any further decline in slack will cause bottlenecks to emerge, pushing wages and prices higher. The empirical evidence supports this conclusion. Chart 3 shows that U.S. wage growth has tended to accelerate once the unemployment rate falls into the range of 4%-to-5%. Chart 3U.S. Wage Growth Accelerates Once The Unemployment Rate Falls To Low Levels Is The Phillips Curve Dead Or Dormant? Is The Phillips Curve Dead Or Dormant? The Absence Of Evidence Is Not Evidence Of Absence The past three U.S. business-cycle expansions never reached the stage where the economy had the chance to fully overheat. The 1982-90 cycle was cut short by the spiraling effects of the Savings & Loan crisis, while the 2001-2007 cycle was short-circuited by the housing bust. The closest the economy came to boiling over was during the 1990s expansion. However, that cycle was also prematurely terminated by the dotcom bust and the adverse knock-on effect this had on business investment spending. Moreover, the late 1990s expansion occurred against the backdrop of a soaring dollar, turmoil in emerging markets, and plummeting commodity prices. These external deflationary forces arguably overwhelmed the inflationary impulse stemming from an overheated domestic economy. The tendency of financial imbalances to metamorphize into full-blown recessions before inflation has had a chance to take off means that the U.S. has spent the past 30 years on the flat side of the Phillips curve. One can see this point analytically: Between 1964 and 1980, the unemployment rate was below the Fed's estimate of NAIRU 79% of the time, compared to only 29% of the time since 1980. It is thus no wonder that the Phillips curve looks dead - it has not been given a chance to come alive. This makes us sceptical of studies such as the recent one by the Philadelphia Fed which purported to show that the Phillips curve is no longer useful for forecasting inflation.2 The Kinky Sixties We argued several weeks ago that the next recession could resemble the "classic recessions" of the post-war era, which were caused by the Fed's decision to raise rates aggressively after realizing it was behind the curve in normalizing monetary policy.3 The 1960s provides a useful lesson in that regard. Just like today, inflation hovered below 2% during the first half of that decade, even though unemployment was trending downward over this period. To most observers back then, the Phillips curve would have also appeared defunct. However, once the unemployment rate fell below 4%, core inflation took off, rising from 1.5% in early 1966 to nearly 4% in 1967 (Chart 4). The kink in the Phillips curve had been reached. Inflation ultimately made its way to 6% in 1970, four years before the first oil shock struck. One might challenge the 1960s comparison on four grounds: First, inflation expectations are allegedly better anchored today; Second, trade unions play a much smaller role in the wage bargaining process; Third, globalization has purportedly made both product and labour markets much more competitive than they were back then, thus severely limiting the scope of firms to raise prices and wages; Fourth, the deflationary impact of new technologies such as robotics and online commerce has become more pervasive. We think all four of these explanations leave much to be desired. As far as inflation expectations are concerned, it is certainly true that central banks did not pursue explicit inflation targets during the 1960s. However, this does not mean that inflation expectations were necessarily poorly anchored. Ten-year Treasury yields averaged 4.1% in the first half of the sixties, well below the 6.6% pace of nominal GDP growth. Investors back then were clearly quite relaxed about inflation risk. This is not that surprising, given that the U.S. had not seen a period of sustained inflation since the Civil War. A decline in unionization rates is also often cited as a reason for why the Phillips curve may be flatter today. The problem with this argument is that it is very U.S.-centric. For example, while the U.S. has experienced a pronounced drop in unionization rates since the 1960s, Canada has not (Chart 5). Yet, the sensitivity of inflation to economic fluctuations has fallen in both countries by roughly the same magnitude. Likewise, the increased use of inflation-linked wage contracts in the 1970s appears mainly to have been a response to rising inflation rather than the cause of it (Chart 6). Chart 4Inflation In The 1960s Took Off Once The Unemployment Rate Fell Below 4% Inflation In The 1960s Took Off Once The Unemployment Rate Fell Below 4% Inflation In The 1960s Took Off Once The Unemployment Rate Fell Below 4% Chart 5Inflation Fell In Canada Despite A High Unionization Rate Inflation Fell In Canada Despite A High Unionization Rate Inflation Fell In Canada Despite A High Unionization Rate Chart 6Wage Indexation Was Mainly A Response To Rising Inflation Wage Indexation Was Mainly A Response To Rising Inflation Wage Indexation Was Mainly A Response To Rising Inflation Globalization And The Phillips Curve The extent to which globalization has flattened the Phillips curve remains the subject of intense debate. The empirical evidence is mixed, with most studies leaning towards the conclusion that globalization has had only a limited impact on the slope of the curve in large economies such as the U.S. This makes perfect sense, considering that the import share in U.S. personal consumption stands at less than 15%.4 Supporting this conclusion is the fact that wage growth appears to be just as sensitive to changes in the unemployment rate in industries that are highly exposed to trade as those which face little import competition. Upon deeper inspection, many of the arguments for why globalization has led to a flatter Phillips curve are really arguments for why globalization has limited the degree of movement along the Phillips curve. In a highly globalized world, a decline in slack in one country - unless matched by reduced slack in other countries - will lead to higher interest rates in that country and a stronger currency. A stronger currency, in turn, will choke off growth, preventing the unemployment rate from falling as much as it otherwise would. Clearly, such a sequence of events has not applied to the U.S. dollar since the start of the year. This suggests that the unemployment rate will either keep falling towards the steeper part of the Phillips curve, or the Fed will be forced to turn more hawkish. The Effects Of Technology What about the possibility that technological advances have led to a flatter Phillips curve? The problem here is that the data do not fit the story. As my colleague Mark McClellan has pointed out, almost all of the decline in inflation since the Great Recession has occurred in categories of the CPI - such as energy, food, and rent - that have little to do with e-commerce (Table 1).5 Also keep in mind that while online sales have grown rapidly during the past two decades, they still account for only 8.9% of total retail sales and less than 5% of the U.S. Consumer Price Index. Amazon's recent growth has actually lagged behind what Walmart experienced during its heyday (Chart 7). Table 1Comparison Of Pre- And Post-Lehman Inflation Rates Is The Phillips Curve Dead Or Dormant? Is The Phillips Curve Dead Or Dormant? Chart 7Amazon Vs. Walmart: Who's More Deflationary? Is The Phillips Curve Dead Or Dormant? Is The Phillips Curve Dead Or Dormant? The proliferation of big-box retailers pushed up productivity growth in the retail sector to 3.9% between 1992 and 2007. Productivity growth in this sector has fallen to 2.1% since then. This undercuts the notion that the explosion in e-commerce has produced major efficiency gains for the broader economy, thus contributing to deflationary pressures.6 Investment Conclusions U.S. inflation is likely to trend higher over the coming months as a variety of one-off factors that depressed inflation earlier this year fall out of the equation. The effects of the hurricanes complicate the picture, but history suggests that both inflation and growth tend to renormalize fairly quickly after such disasters. Hence, the markets will look through any near-term noise in the data, focusing instead on the cyclical growth outlook, which remains reasonably upbeat. Chart 8 shows that fluctuations in the ISM manufacturing index have often predicted changes in inflation. The current level of the ISM implies that core inflation will rebound to about 2% by the second half of next year. Risk assets are unlikely to suffer if inflation rises towards the Fed's target against the backdrop of stronger growth. However, if inflation moves above the Fed's target due to brewing supply bottlenecks, the Fed will have little choice but to pick up the pace of rate hikes. This could unsettle markets and sow the seeds for the next recession, which we tentatively expect to occur in the second half of 2019. What should investors do? Right now, none of our leading indicators are warning of an imminent economic downturn (Chart 9). Thus, we continue to recommend a cyclically overweight position in equities. However, we would not fault longer-term investors for starting to take money off the table, especially in light of today's lofty valuations. Chart 8ISM Has Often Predicted Changes In Inflation ISM Has Often Predicted Changes In Inflation ISM Has Often Predicted Changes In Inflation Chart 9No Warnings Of An Imminent Downturn No Warnings Of An Imminent Downturn No Warnings Of An Imminent Downturn The Fed is likely to raise rates in December and three or four more times in 2018. We are positioned for this by being short the December 2018 Fed funds futures contract, a trade that has gained 22 basis points so far. Considering that the market is pricing in only 42 basis points of hikes between now and the end of next year, there is plenty of juice left in this trade. A more aggressive-than-expected Fed could give the beleaguered dollar a much-needed lift. We see EUR/USD falling back to 1.15 by the end of the year and USD/JPY moving to 115. We are less bearish towards the British pound and the Swedish krona. Our short EUR/GBP and long SEK/CHF trades are up 2.6% and 5.4%, respectively, since we initiated them. Finally, we are closing our long December 2017 Brent oil futures contract for a gain of 13.8%. We still see modest upside for oil prices, and are expressing this view by being long the Canadian dollar and Russian ruble against the euro. Both currency trade recommendations remain in the money. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Secular Bottom In Inflation," dated July 28, 2017; and "What's the Matter With Wages?" dated August 11, 2017. 2 Michael Dotsey, Shigeru Fujita, and Tom Stark, "Do Phillips Curves Conditionally help To Forecast Inflation?"Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working Paper no. 17-26 (August 2017). 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "From Slow Burn Recovery To Retro-Recession?" dated August 18, 2017. 4 Galina Hale and Bart Hobijn, "The U.S. Content of "Made in China"," FRBSF Economic Letter 2011-25 (August 8, 2011). 5 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Did Amazon Kill The Phillips Curve?" dated August 31, 2017. 6 Ironically, if technological change has made the Phillips curve more flat, it may be because it has reduced competition rather than fostered it. The shift to a digital economy has allowed more companies to dominate their markets by virtue of network and scale effects. The expansion of such "winner-take-all markets" helps explain why industry concentration has risen over the past few decades, boosting profit margins in the process. A recent NBER working paper by Jan De Loecker and Jan Eeckhout found that the average U.S. publicly-listed firm set prices 67% above marginal costs in 2014 compared to 30% in 1990 and 18% in 1980. Economic theory suggests that firms with significant market power will tend to raise prices by less than highly competitive firms in response to costs increases. This would make the Phillips curve more flat. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Dear Client, We are sending you a Special Report prepared by my colleague Matt Gertken, associate vice president of our Geopolitical Strategy team. This report focuses on the upcoming 19th Party congress and discusses its implications on China’s economic and political outlook, as well as its impact on financial markets. I trust you will find this report insightful. Best regards, Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy Highlights The Communist Party will hold its nineteenth National Congress on Oct. 18. This is the "midterm election" for President Xi Jinping, whose political capital will be replenished; Recent Chinese leaders have a greater impact in their second term than their first; Base case: Xi consolidates power while preserving a balance on the Politburo Standing Committee; Stay long Chinese equities versus emerging market peers. Feature China's Communist Party will hold the nineteenth National Party Congress on October 18-25. This is a critical "midterm" leadership reshuffle that will also mark the halfway point of General Secretary Xi Jinping's term in office. Investors around the world will watch closely to see what insight can be gained about the political trajectory of the world's second-largest economy. This report serves as a "primer" for readers to understand the party congress and its investment takeaways. Why Is The Party Congress Important? Because it rotates China's political leaders! Chart 1So Long To The 18th Central Committee China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer In a political system without popular representation, the rotation of personnel according to promotion and retirement is the only way to rejuvenate the policy process. The average rate of turnover on the Communist Party's Central Committee at each five-year congress has been 62%, which is a remarkably high rate (Chart 1). It reveals an underrated dynamism in Chinese politics. This leadership rotation also allows the top leader (Xi Jinping) to consolidate power by putting his supporters into key positions. This in turn alters the policymaking environment and the way in which China formulates policies and responds to external events. China has a "parallel" political system in which the ruling Communist Party operates alongside (and above) the state. Xi Jinping is "General Secretary" of the party, president of the People's Republic of China, and (not least) chairman of the Central Military Commission. The party maintains supremacy by independently controlling the state and the army. Since fall 2016, Xi has been dubbed the "core" of the Communist Party, putting him on a par with previous core leaders Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin.1 The party's nearly 90 million members convene large congresses of about 2,000 members every five years to select the membership of the key decision-making bodies (Diagram 1), a practice known as "intra-party democracy."2 The key body is the Central Committee, which consists of about 200 full members and another 100-some alternative members. The Central Committee then "elects" the General Secretary, Political Bureau (a.k.a. "Politburo," the top 25 or so leaders) and Politburo Standing Committee (the "PSC," the top five-to-nine leaders) - though in reality the Politburo and the PSC are chosen through intense negotiations among the incumbent PSC and former leaders. Diagram 1National Party Congress Of The Communist Party Of China China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer The handful of men on the PSC are the chief decision-makers in China, often in league with the broader Politburo (and former PSC members who exercise some power through the back door). Most of the key personnel decisions will have been made before the Central Committee votes.3 Hence the current top leaders have a chance to put their loyalists and supporters in key positions, potentially improving the implementation of their agenda. The outgoing eighteenth Central Committee will meet for its last session on October 11, and then the nineteenth party congress will meet on October 18 to elect a new Central Committee. It will in turn ratify the new Politburo and PSC. At the beginning of the party congress, Xi Jinping will deliver a keynote political report on the state of the party and nation, reviewing the progress of the past five years and mapping out a vision for the next five. The party congress will also amend the Communist Party constitution.4 By the end of the week, the members of the new PSC will step out to meet the press together for the first time. Only later will the party's key decisions be incorporated by the state, i.e. China's central government, including key personnel appointments and policy initiatives. This will occur when the legislature, the National People's Congress ("NPC," not to be confused with party congress), convenes at its annual "Two Sessions" in early March 2018. Chart 2Bold Action Can Follow Midterm Congresses China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer Any NPC session following a five-year party congress carries more weight than usual not only because it approves of the party congress's leadership decisions but also because it kicks off major new policy initiatives. For instance, Premier Zhu Rongji was appointed to launch the "assault stage" of President Jiang Zemin's reforms of state-owned enterprise at the NPC in March 1998 (Chart 2). Similarly, Hu Jintao's Premier Wen Jiabao launched extensive administrative reforms at the NPC meeting in early 2008.5 How does a "midterm" party congress differ from others? Typically, in even-numbered years, the top two leaders change over, as with Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang in 2012. These transitions are highly significant as they mark a leadership succession, a transfer of power to a new general secretary in a heavily centralized, authoritarian system that does not have a codified succession process. By contrast, in odd-numbered years like 2017, the Communist Party promotes, demotes, and retires a large number of other top leaders. Thus Xi Jinping's place is assured, and Li Keqiang's place is probably assured as well, but most likely the other five members of the PSC will be gone.6 This year's transition is also significant because the total turnover on the Central Committee is expected to be higher than usual (perhaps 70%) as a result of President Xi's aggressive anti-corruption campaign and other factors (see Chart 1 above).7 Leaders often spend the bulk of their first five years consolidating power and the second five years pushing forward their true policy agenda. Even President Hu Jintao, who failed to see his preferred social safety-net policies fully implemented, had a vastly more influential second term than first term in office: the 2007-12 period saw the 4 trillion RMB stimulus package to thwart the Global Recession. Moreover, Chinese leaders do not normally become "lame ducks" toward the end of their last term: Deng Xiaoping recommitted the country to pro-market reforms in 1992, after having stepped down as general secretary, while Jiang Zemin reached the height of his power at the end of his term in 2002, when he chose to hang onto the position of top military leader for two extra years. Many observers suspect that Xi Jinping will hold onto power beyond 2022. Bottom Line: The National Party Congress coincides with a sweeping rotation of the Chinese political elites, which is a critical way of ensuring that China, unlike a monarchy or personalized "dictatorship," has an orderly way of updating its policy-makers and (hopefully) policies. Midterm reshuffles allow top leaders to promote supporters and re-energize the implementation of their policy agenda. The past two Chinese leaders were more consequential in their second term than their first. How Is The Nineteenth Congress Unique? Chart 3Xi Jinping's Generation Taking Command China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer The most important change this year is the passing of a generation.8 China's political elites are classified into "leadership generations," with Mao Zedong symbolizing the first generation, Deng Xiaoping the second, Jiang Zemin the third, Hu Jintao the fourth, and Xi Jinping the fifth generation. The current reshuffle will see the following generational trends: The End of the Jiang Zemin Era: The key figures retiring on the PSC are those who were born before 1950 and put in place by Jiang Zemin. Thus in a very real sense, Jiang Zemin's influence is coming to a close (Chart 3).9 This generational shift is likely to force the retirement of 11 of the 25-member Politburo, and five of the seven PSC members (Table 1), as well as other major figures, such as the long-serving central bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan. Table 1Chinese Leaders Set To Retire On Politburo And Politburo Standing Committee China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer Jiang-era leaders are defined by certain characteristics that are now fading. As Chart 4 demonstrates, these leaders came of age in the early, idealistic days of the Revolution, leading them to have a conservative streak in ideological matters. Yet they are well-known pragmatists in economic matters. They studied engineering and natural sciences in answer to the call for the young to develop the country's heavy industry. They tended to hail from capitalist-leaning coastal provinces, and often gained first-hand experience operating China's state-owned enterprises. This last point became especially important when they pioneered pro-market corporate reforms in the 1990s. By contrast, fewer of them served as government ministers on the State Council (China's cabinet) than subsequent generations. Chart 4Leadership Characteristics Of The Politburo Standing Committee China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer The Middle of the Hu Jintao Era: The passing of Jiang's cohort will necessarily give his successor Hu Jintao's cohort a boost in relative influence at the top levels. Hu's generation is marked by leaders who studied the "soft sciences" (like law and economics). Several of them (including Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao) have links with the politically liberal wing of the party. They have far less experience in the military or state-owned business, but are more likely to have governing experience in the central government and especially the provinces (Chart 4 above). This includes the interior provinces from which they often hail. They are thus highly attuned to the problem of maintaining social stability, arguably to the neglect of economic dynamism. Hu Jintao's influence may be underrated. Xi's administration has shown important continuities with Hu's, and Hu's followers are well positioned in the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the provincial governments (though not the current PSC). If Xi does not take decisive moves to replace some of Hu's acolytes on the PSC at the coming party congress, then Hu's men will likely outnumber Xi's on the PSC as they graduate up the ladder from the Politburo.10 A strong showing by Hu's faction could affect China's policy priorities, given that Xi showed different preferences from Hu in the first few years of his rule (Table 2). However, the factions do not maintain consistent policy platforms. The bottom line is that Hu's faction could act as more or less of a constraint on Xi regardless of what policies the latter pursues. Table 2Fiscal Priorities Of Recent Chinese Presidents China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer The True Beginning of the Xi Jinping Era: Xi's generation has yet to reveal its full character - the demographics of the new Central Committee will help determine it. So far it is a continuation of the trends above: more likely than not to come from interior than coastal provinces, to have studied the humanities, to have governed in the provinces or central ministries, and to lack military or business experience (Chart 4 above). The coming reshuffle could initiate a change in some of these trends, given some of Xi's revealed preferences, but that will not become clear until this fall.11 Xi is not stereotypical when it comes to China's political cycles: he consolidated power rapidly in his first term.12 The question, then, is whether Xi can continue to accrue power at the party congress, or whether his second term will become complicated by an infusion of Hu Jintao supporters into top party posts. Thus the success of Hu's supporters (particularly on the PSC) is the critical moving part that could determine the political constraints on Xi Jinping from 2017-22. Will Xi be able to arrange a favorable power-sharing agreement? Or will he go further and try to remove this political constraint entirely, even at the risk of political instability? The above points raise two critical questions: Will Chinese politics become more institutionalized? Investors should expect China to maintain a stridently informal political system. Rules and norms can and will be bent, but key principles will be upheld. In other words, the goal posts can be moved, but not too far. Going beyond certain limits would be destabilizing for China's political, institutional, and factional balances, and so far Xi has exhibited poise and the desire to maintain stability that is characteristic of post-1978 Chinese leaders.13 We think there is a low probability that Xi will overthrow all the norms of leadership selection and overturn the balance of power on the Politburo and PSC. If he does, it will raise alarms that he is setting up a new "cult of personality" like Mao, which could cause domestic economic and market instability. Rather, we expect him to modify the rules to maintain control of the PSC without excluding Hu Jintao's faction from power. Will Xi initiate the succession process for 2022? Some commentators suspect that Xi will use the party congress to pave the way for him to cling to power beyond 2022. Clearly Xi could retain the top military post and stay within recent precedent. But any hints at altering recent succession patterns, despite the fact that they are informal, are dangerous for investors in the long run because they raise deep uncertainty about the range of possibilities and political conflicts that could occur upon the actual change of power in 2022. Nevertheless, bear in mind the following points: The question of succession will not be resolved this October. If Xi plans to hang on beyond 2022, then he will continue amassing power and positioning loyalists over the next five years so that he will have full institutional support at the critical moment in 2022 - like Jiang Zemin did when he chose to hang onto the military chairmanship from 2002-04. Thus while Xi may lay some groundwork that makes political observers uneasy, the question will not be resolved either way this fall. Xi's tenure will be an ongoing topic for investors to monitor. Xi is already set to be the most powerful Chinese leader well into the 2020s. Xi's anti-corruption campaign is remarkable evidence of his strength as a ruler. Significantly, this campaign has focused on rooting out Jiang Zemin's influence. Yet Jiang stepped down way back in 2004! In other words, Jiang wielded massive influence between 2004 and 2017. Indeed, Xi's boldest move this year so far was to remove Sun Zhengcai, a Jiang acolyte. It stands to reason that, even if Hu Jintao's faction pulls off a relative victory this year, Xi Jinping's faction will likely be well positioned for a victory in 2022. And if Hu loses out this year, Xi's followers will be better positioned in 2027, as well as 2022. In short, market participants are unlikely to be able to tell the difference this October between (1) Xi getting a boost of political capital for his second term and (2) Xi getting such a big boost that he is on track to overstay his second term.14 Xi might intend to become a dictator and cling to power for longer, but all the market will know for certain is that he has maintained control of the PSC and his general policy framework will be more or less continuous, which is likely a relief in the near term. Finally, investors may not initially care if Xi seizes additional power at the expense of party norms and the succession process. A-shares sold off, but H-shares rallied, when Jiang Zemin decided not to step down entirely in 2002 (Chart 5). Russian stocks and the RUB/USD only fleetingly sold off when Vladimir Putin made clear his intention to return to the presidency yet again in 2011 (Chart 6). Chart 5Foreign Investors Cheered Jiang's Clinging To Power Foreign Investors Cheered Jiang's Clinging To Power Foreign Investors Cheered Jiang's Clinging To Power Chart 6Russian Investors Cheered Putin's Second Presidency Russian Investors Cheered Putin's Second Presidency Russian Investors Cheered Putin's Second Presidency While it is impossible to know whether markets will cheer any signs of "Papa Xi" doing away with term limits, it is bad for China's governance in the long run if Xi does not clearly begin grooming a successor with this fall's promotions. An heir-apparent for 2022 would reduce the risks of disruptive power-struggle and would impose a personal deadline on Xi Jinping's reform agenda. That is, a deadline above and beyond the 2020 deadline in the 13th Five Year Plan and the 2021 deadline for the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party's founding. That reform agenda, in turn, is essential for improving China's long-term productivity.15 Bottom Line: The Chinese political system is informal, which means that rules and norms can be bent without altering the underlying principles of balance among the key factions and stability of the regime and society as a whole. Our baseline scenario is a market-positive one: that Xi Jinping will win a victory at the party congress, but that he will not overthrow Hu Jintao's followers and abandon the "collective leadership" model, since that would destroy the overall balance of power and heighten domestic political risks. If Xi loses out to the Hu faction, then we would expect Chinese and China-exposed risk assets to sell off, at least initially. If Xi romps to total victory, excluding Hu's clique from power, we would fade any market rally. Such a development would heighten political risks for the foreseeable future. Investment Conclusions The prospect of a Xi-dominated, yet stable, PSC in China is promising because it suggests that China will have at least a marginally improved policy framework for managing the immense challenges it faces. On the economic front, the loss of the demographic dividend threatens to make China old before it gets rich (Chart 7). Xi will need a unified party, as well as loyal supporters in key posts, if he is to re-energize his productivity-enhancing reforms. On the socio-political front, China's intensifying focus on domestic security is symbolized by draconian media censorship ahead of the party congress and, more broadly, a faster rate of spending on public security than national defense in recent years (Chart 8). Such trends suggest that policy makers are concerned about public support. Income inequality and regional disparities are burning issues in an authoritarian country with a larger and more connected middle class and an incipient civil rights movement. Chart 7Rising Participation Boosted Euro Area Labor Force Growth China's Demographic Challenge Rising Participation Boosted Euro Area Labor Force Growth China's Demographic Challenge Rising Participation Boosted Euro Area Labor Force Growth China's Demographic Challenge Chart 8Social Stability A Major Concern In China China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer In terms of the likely economic and market response, we have highlighted in the past that larger macro-economic trends tend to swamp any effects of China's five-year party congresses. There is no observable correlation between these events and the deviations of China's nominal GDP, credit, or fixed investment from long-term averages going back to 1992 (Chart 9). Chart 9No Clear Policy Impact From Past Party Congresses No Clear Policy Impact From Past Party Congresses No Clear Policy Impact From Past Party Congresses Moreover, China only has two midterm party congresses to compare to today's party congress, and both occurred in the thick of global financial crises (1997, 2007). This makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions about any impact on Chinese risk assets. A-shares were mostly flat after the 1997 congress but fell after 2007, while H-shares broadly fell after both meetings, as one might expect given the crises raging around them (Chart 10 A&B). Chart 10AChinese Stocks Were Flat Or Down ... Chinese Stocks Sold Off After Past Midterm Congresses Chinese Stocks Sold Off After Past Midterm Congresses Chart 10B... After Past Midterm Party Congresses Chinese Stocks Sold Off After Past Midterm Congresses Chinese Stocks Sold Off After Past Midterm Congresses H-shares, being highly responsive to global financial market turmoil, fell relative to emerging market (EM) equities as well in 1997 and 2007. A-shares were more insulated and outperformed EM stocks during the 1997 crisis, though not in the 2007 crisis (Chart 11 A&B). What is clear - for Chinese domestic investors - is that A-shares outperformed H-shares after the party congresses in 1997 and 2007 (Chart 12). Chart 11AChinese Stocks Sold Off In Relative Terms... Chinese Stocks Sold Off In Relative Terms... Chinese Stocks Sold Off In Relative Terms... Chart 11B...Except A-Shares During The Asian Crisis ...Except A-Shares During The Asian Crisis ...Except A-Shares During The Asian Crisis Chart 12A-Shares Outperformed H-Shares After Midterm Congresses A-Shares Outperformed H-Shares After Midterm Congresses A-Shares Outperformed H-Shares After Midterm Congresses This fall, it would not be surprising to see Chinese and global risk-on attitudes prevail in the immediate aftermath of China's party congress: in the broadest sense, the meeting represents a political recapitalization for the Xi administration. Moreover, the backdrop is positive: global and Chinese growth are on a synchronized upswing, Chinese industrial profits have improved, the Fed is on hold, and China's growth risks and capital outflow pressures have diminished.16 This suggests a marginal positive impact for H-shares as well as A-shares. However, Chinese stocks are no longer trading at a discount relative to peers. Moreover, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy believes that the Xi administration's reform reboot will likely bring tougher financial and environmental regulation that will slow credit growth and cut into corporate profits.17 It also seems likely that 2018 will see the dollar stage a comeback as inflation recovers and the Fed resumes hiking rates.18 For all these reasons, we recommend staying long Chinese stocks relative to EM, on the basis that China's reform efforts will be positive for China's productivity outlook but negative for commodities and EM in 2018. Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Mao's successor Hua Guofeng, and Xi's predecessor Hu Jintao, are the two leaders who did not obtain "core" status. 2 The current norms developed mostly in the 1980s and have evolved since. The list of candidates is mostly pre-arranged by the top leaders. The party congress then votes on which candidates to include, leaving a remainder of about 10% who do not take seats in the Central Committee. 3 Nevertheless, the Central Committee could produce a few surprises. It is almost inevitable that a few major personalities will fail to get promoted into key positions, while others will be catapulted to higher places. There will also be some tea leaves to read about the share of negative votes or abstentions and the implications for different candidates. 4 The political report is filled with arcane Communist Party jargon but is very important. It is a consensus document that takes multiple committees a year or more to draft, though Xi Jinping will give the finishing touches. It will cover a comprehensive range of policies and will be scrutinized closely by experts for slight changes of terminology, emphasis, or omission. Key things to watch for are whether Xi adds or removes entire sections; whether he alters developmental goals outlined in previous administrations; and whether he inserts new concepts or revises party ideology to make way for contentious reforms. As for the party's constitution, the main question of any change is whether Xi's leadership philosophy is incorporated into the Communist Party's guiding thought, and if so, whether Xi's name is explicitly attached to it. The latter in particular would be a sign that Xi's political capital within the party is massive. For additional commentary, please see Alice Miller, "How To Read Xi Jinping's 19th Party Congress Political Report," China Leadership Monitor 53 (2017), available at www.hoover.org. 5 For the "assault stage" of reform, see Robert Lawrence Kuhn, The Man Who Changed China: The Life And Legacy Of Jiang Zemin (NY: Crown, 2004). Jiang had first targeted SOE reform in 1996 in a speech, he launched the policy itself at the party congress in September 1997, and the state began to implement it at the NPC in March 1998. For Hu Jintao's and Wen Jiabao's administrative reforms after the seventeenth party congress, see Willy Wo Lap Lam, "Beijing Unveils Plan For Super Ministries," China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, February 4, 2008. These reforms, which were only part of the overall agenda after the congress, included restructuring the State Council, empowering the National Development and Reform Commission, and setting up "Super-Ministries" to streamline cabinet-level functions. 6 Rumor has it that Xi will keep his anti-corruption chief, Wang Qishan, on the PSC beyond the 69-year mandatory retirement age, and that he could even replace Premier Li Keqiang. We do not expect either to happen, but both are well within the realm of political possibility - particularly retaining Wang. 7 For this estimate, please see Cheng Li, Chinese Politics In The Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2016), chapter 9. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Traces of Jiang's power will persist here and there, especially if Wang Qishan remains on the PSC, but the overall effect will be a diminishment of this powerful leadership cohort. Symbolically, just as Deng Xiaoping's death loomed over the fifteenth party congress in 1997, Jiang's impending death will loom over the nineteenth party congress today. 10 Indeed judging solely by the cyclical rotation of Chinese leaders according to generation and faction, Hu Jintao's acolytes are favored to outnumber Jiang Zemin's and Xi Jinping's in the 2017 reshuffle. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "China: Two Factions, One Party," dated September 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. However, Xi's effectiveness and good luck since coming to power lead us to believe that he will secure his followers on the PSC and Politburo this year: please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook 2017, "We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 For example, Xi Jinping's recent promotions have re-emphasized SOE managers and his policies have supported large "state champion" SOEs. Please see Cheng Li and Lucy Xu, "The rise of state-owned enterprise executives in China's provincial leadership," Brookings, February 22, 2017, available at www.brookings.edu. 12 He came to the top office at a time of significant public dissatisfaction (2012), which meant that he received a kind of "mandate" to make big changes. His faction dominated the PSC, and his sweeping anti-corruption campaign purged the party and state of formidable rivals. In the fall of 2016 he clinched his status as the "core" of the party. 13 As to specific rules, no one should be surprised if they are altered. Take the age limit, which is hotly debated: Jiang Zemin introduced a hard age limit into the PSC in 1997, specifically in a way that prevented the promotion of a heavy-hitting politician, Qiao Shi, while allowing Jiang to continue in power. Now, assume Xi alters the rules to preserve Wang Qishan: this would not necessarily mean that Xi plans to overstay his term limits, though some observers will take it that way. For market participants, the important point is that slight tweaks to informal rules are unlikely to have a big market impact. Consider that Wang has overseen a massive crackdown on corruption, helping clean up the party's image, and is known to be competent in financial regulation as well. If he is retained, will the market really protest? We doubt it. Having said that, we expect him to retire according to the existing rule of thumb. 14 The exception to this statement is if Xi reforms Communist Party political institutions, as some commentators suspect he might, in order to allow the Central Committee to elect the Politburo and PSC directly from its members, thus expanding "intra-party democracy" while also giving Xi a higher likelihood of staying in power. Please see Bo Zhiyue, "Commentary: Sweeping Reforms Expected At Party Congress, But Will Xi Jinping Get All He Wants?" Channel News Asia, August 20, 2017, available at www.channelnewsasia.com. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Reflections On China's Reforms," in "The Great Risk Rotation - December 2013," dated December 11, 2013; and Special Report, "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Please also see BCA China Investment Strategy, "Understanding China's Master Plan," dated November 20, 2013, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Reports, "China: Earnings Scorecard And Market Tea Leaves," dated September 7, 2017, and "Monitoring Chinese Capital Outflows And The RMB Internationalization Process," dated August 24, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Closer Look At Chinese Equity Valuations," dated August 31, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. For the reform agenda, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 18 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Central Bank Showdown," dated September 8, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights The Communist Party will hold its nineteenth National Congress on Oct. 18. This is the "midterm election" for President Xi Jinping, whose political capital will be replenished; Recent Chinese leaders have a greater impact in their second term than their first; Base case: Xi consolidates power while preserving a balance on the Politburo Standing Committee; Stay long Chinese equities versus emerging market peers. Feature China's Communist Party will hold the nineteenth National Party Congress on October 18-25. This is a critical "midterm" leadership reshuffle that will also mark the halfway point of General Secretary Xi Jinping's term in office. Investors around the world will watch closely to see what insight can be gained about the political trajectory of the world's second-largest economy. This report serves as a "primer" for readers to understand the party congress and its investment takeaways. Why Is The Party Congress Important? Because it rotates China's political leaders! Chart 1So Long To The 18th Central Committee China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer In a political system without popular representation, the rotation of personnel according to promotion and retirement is the only way to rejuvenate the policy process. The average rate of turnover on the Communist Party's Central Committee at each five-year congress has been 62%, which is a remarkably high rate (Chart 1). It reveals an underrated dynamism in Chinese politics. This leadership rotation also allows the top leader (Xi Jinping) to consolidate power by putting his supporters into key positions. This in turn alters the policymaking environment and the way in which China formulates policies and responds to external events. China has a "parallel" political system in which the ruling Communist Party operates alongside (and above) the state. Xi Jinping is "General Secretary" of the party, president of the People's Republic of China, and (not least) chairman of the Central Military Commission. The party maintains supremacy by independently controlling the state and the army. Since fall 2016, Xi has been dubbed the "core" of the Communist Party, putting him on a par with previous core leaders Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin.1 The party's nearly 90 million members convene large congresses of about 2,000 members every five years to select the membership of the key decision-making bodies (Diagram 1), a practice known as "intra-party democracy."2 The key body is the Central Committee, which consists of about 200 full members and another 100-some alternative members. The Central Committee then "elects" the General Secretary, Political Bureau (a.k.a. "Politburo," the top 25 or so leaders) and Politburo Standing Committee (the "PSC," the top five-to-nine leaders) - though in reality the Politburo and the PSC are chosen through intense negotiations among the incumbent PSC and former leaders. Diagram 1National Party Congress Of The Communist Party Of China China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer The handful of men on the PSC are the chief decision-makers in China, often in league with the broader Politburo (and former PSC members who exercise some power through the back door). Most of the key personnel decisions will have been made before the Central Committee votes.3 Hence the current top leaders have a chance to put their loyalists and supporters in key positions, potentially improving the implementation of their agenda. The outgoing eighteenth Central Committee will meet for its last session on October 11, and then the nineteenth party congress will meet on October 18 to elect a new Central Committee. It will in turn ratify the new Politburo and PSC. At the beginning of the party congress, Xi Jinping will deliver a keynote political report on the state of the party and nation, reviewing the progress of the past five years and mapping out a vision for the next five. The party congress will also amend the Communist Party constitution.4 By the end of the week, the members of the new PSC will step out to meet the press together for the first time. Only later will the party's key decisions be incorporated by the state, i.e. China's central government, including key personnel appointments and policy initiatives. This will occur when the legislature, the National People's Congress ("NPC," not to be confused with party congress), convenes at its annual "Two Sessions" in early March 2018. Chart 2Bold Action Can Follow Midterm Congresses China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer Any NPC session following a five-year party congress carries more weight than usual not only because it approves of the party congress's leadership decisions but also because it kicks off major new policy initiatives. For instance, Premier Zhu Rongji was appointed to launch the "assault stage" of President Jiang Zemin's reforms of state-owned enterprise at the NPC in March 1998 (Chart 2). Similarly, Hu Jintao's Premier Wen Jiabao launched extensive administrative reforms at the NPC meeting in early 2008.5 How does a "midterm" party congress differ from others? Typically, in even-numbered years, the top two leaders change over, as with Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang in 2012. These transitions are highly significant as they mark a leadership succession, a transfer of power to a new general secretary in a heavily centralized, authoritarian system that does not have a codified succession process. By contrast, in odd-numbered years like 2017, the Communist Party promotes, demotes, and retires a large number of other top leaders. Thus Xi Jinping's place is assured, and Li Keqiang's place is probably assured as well, but most likely the other five members of the PSC will be gone.6 This year's transition is also significant because the total turnover on the Central Committee is expected to be higher than usual (perhaps 70%) as a result of President Xi's aggressive anti-corruption campaign and other factors (see Chart 1 above).7 Leaders often spend the bulk of their first five years consolidating power and the second five years pushing forward their true policy agenda. Even President Hu Jintao, who failed to see his preferred social safety-net policies fully implemented, had a vastly more influential second term than first term in office: the 2007-12 period saw the 4 trillion RMB stimulus package to thwart the Global Recession. Moreover, Chinese leaders do not normally become "lame ducks" toward the end of their last term: Deng Xiaoping recommitted the country to pro-market reforms in 1992, after having stepped down as general secretary, while Jiang Zemin reached the height of his power at the end of his term in 2002, when he chose to hang onto the position of top military leader for two extra years. Many observers suspect that Xi Jinping will hold onto power beyond 2022. Bottom Line: The National Party Congress coincides with a sweeping rotation of the Chinese political elites, which is a critical way of ensuring that China, unlike a monarchy or personalized "dictatorship," has an orderly way of updating its policy-makers and (hopefully) policies. Midterm reshuffles allow top leaders to promote supporters and re-energize the implementation of their policy agenda. The past two Chinese leaders were more consequential in their second term than their first. How Is The Nineteenth Congress Unique? Chart 3Xi Jinping's Generation Taking Command China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer The most important change this year is the passing of a generation.8 China's political elites are classified into "leadership generations," with Mao Zedong symbolizing the first generation, Deng Xiaoping the second, Jiang Zemin the third, Hu Jintao the fourth, and Xi Jinping the fifth generation. The current reshuffle will see the following generational trends: The End of the Jiang Zemin Era: The key figures retiring on the PSC are those who were born before 1950 and put in place by Jiang Zemin. Thus in a very real sense, Jiang Zemin's influence is coming to a close (Chart 3).9 This generational shift is likely to force the retirement of 11 of the 25-member Politburo, and five of the seven PSC members (Table 1), as well as other major figures, such as the long-serving central bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan. Table 1Chinese Leaders Set To Retire On Politburo And Politburo Standing Committee China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer Jiang-era leaders are defined by certain characteristics that are now fading. As Chart 4 demonstrates, these leaders came of age in the early, idealistic days of the Revolution, leading them to have a conservative streak in ideological matters. Yet they are well-known pragmatists in economic matters. They studied engineering and natural sciences in answer to the call for the young to develop the country's heavy industry. They tended to hail from capitalist-leaning coastal provinces, and often gained first-hand experience operating China's state-owned enterprises. This last point became especially important when they pioneered pro-market corporate reforms in the 1990s. By contrast, fewer of them served as government ministers on the State Council (China's cabinet) than subsequent generations. Chart 4Leadership Characteristics Of The Politburo Standing Committee China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer The Middle of the Hu Jintao Era: The passing of Jiang's cohort will necessarily give his successor Hu Jintao's cohort a boost in relative influence at the top levels. Hu's generation is marked by leaders who studied the "soft sciences" (like law and economics). Several of them (including Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao) have links with the politically liberal wing of the party. They have far less experience in the military or state-owned business, but are more likely to have governing experience in the central government and especially the provinces (Chart 4 above). This includes the interior provinces from which they often hail. They are thus highly attuned to the problem of maintaining social stability, arguably to the neglect of economic dynamism. Hu Jintao's influence may be underrated. Xi's administration has shown important continuities with Hu's, and Hu's followers are well positioned in the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the provincial governments (though not the current PSC). If Xi does not take decisive moves to replace some of Hu's acolytes on the PSC at the coming party congress, then Hu's men will likely outnumber Xi's on the PSC as they graduate up the ladder from the Politburo.10 A strong showing by Hu's faction could affect China's policy priorities, given that Xi showed different preferences from Hu in the first few years of his rule (Table 2). However, the factions do not maintain consistent policy platforms. The bottom line is that Hu's faction could act as more or less of a constraint on Xi regardless of what policies the latter pursues. Table 2Fiscal Priorities Of Recent Chinese Presidents China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer The True Beginning of the Xi Jinping Era: Xi's generation has yet to reveal its full character - the demographics of the new Central Committee will help determine it. So far it is a continuation of the trends above: more likely than not to come from interior than coastal provinces, to have studied the humanities, to have governed in the provinces or central ministries, and to lack military or business experience (Chart 4 above). The coming reshuffle could initiate a change in some of these trends, given some of Xi's revealed preferences, but that will not become clear until this fall.11 Xi is not stereotypical when it comes to China's political cycles: he consolidated power rapidly in his first term.12 The question, then, is whether Xi can continue to accrue power at the party congress, or whether his second term will become complicated by an infusion of Hu Jintao supporters into top party posts. Thus the success of Hu's supporters (particularly on the PSC) is the critical moving part that could determine the political constraints on Xi Jinping from 2017-22. Will Xi be able to arrange a favorable power-sharing agreement? Or will he go further and try to remove this political constraint entirely, even at the risk of political instability? The above points raise two critical questions: Will Chinese politics become more institutionalized? Investors should expect China to maintain a stridently informal political system. Rules and norms can and will be bent, but key principles will be upheld. In other words, the goal posts can be moved, but not too far. Going beyond certain limits would be destabilizing for China's political, institutional, and factional balances, and so far Xi has exhibited poise and the desire to maintain stability that is characteristic of post-1978 Chinese leaders.13 We think there is a low probability that Xi will overthrow all the norms of leadership selection and overturn the balance of power on the Politburo and PSC. If he does, it will raise alarms that he is setting up a new "cult of personality" like Mao, which could cause domestic economic and market instability. Rather, we expect him to modify the rules to maintain control of the PSC without excluding Hu Jintao's faction from power. Will Xi initiate the succession process for 2022? Some commentators suspect that Xi will use the party congress to pave the way for him to cling to power beyond 2022. Clearly Xi could retain the top military post and stay within recent precedent. But any hints at altering recent succession patterns, despite the fact that they are informal, are dangerous for investors in the long run because they raise deep uncertainty about the range of possibilities and political conflicts that could occur upon the actual change of power in 2022. Nevertheless, bear in mind the following points: The question of succession will not be resolved this October. If Xi plans to hang on beyond 2022, then he will continue amassing power and positioning loyalists over the next five years so that he will have full institutional support at the critical moment in 2022 - like Jiang Zemin did when he chose to hang onto the military chairmanship from 2002-04. Thus while Xi may lay some groundwork that makes political observers uneasy, the question will not be resolved either way this fall. Xi's tenure will be an ongoing topic for investors to monitor. Xi is already set to be the most powerful Chinese leader well into the 2020s. Xi's anti-corruption campaign is remarkable evidence of his strength as a ruler. Significantly, this campaign has focused on rooting out Jiang Zemin's influence. Yet Jiang stepped down way back in 2004! In other words, Jiang wielded massive influence between 2004 and 2017. Indeed, Xi's boldest move this year so far was to remove Sun Zhengcai, a Jiang acolyte. It stands to reason that, even if Hu Jintao's faction pulls off a relative victory this year, Xi Jinping's faction will likely be well positioned for a victory in 2022. And if Hu loses out this year, Xi's followers will be better positioned in 2027, as well as 2022. In short, market participants are unlikely to be able to tell the difference this October between (1) Xi getting a boost of political capital for his second term and (2) Xi getting such a big boost that he is on track to overstay his second term.14 Xi might intend to become a dictator and cling to power for longer, but all the market will know for certain is that he has maintained control of the PSC and his general policy framework will be more or less continuous, which is likely a relief in the near term. Finally, investors may not initially care if Xi seizes additional power at the expense of party norms and the succession process. A-shares sold off, but H-shares rallied, when Jiang Zemin decided not to step down entirely in 2002 (Chart 5). Russian stocks and the RUB/USD only fleetingly sold off when Vladimir Putin made clear his intention to return to the presidency yet again in 2011 (Chart 6). Chart 5Foreign Investors Cheered Jiang's Clinging To Power Foreign Investors Cheered Jiang's Clinging To Power Foreign Investors Cheered Jiang's Clinging To Power Chart 6Russian Investors Cheered Putin's Second Presidency Russian Investors Cheered Putin's Second Presidency Russian Investors Cheered Putin's Second Presidency While it is impossible to know whether markets will cheer any signs of "Papa Xi" doing away with term limits, it is bad for China's governance in the long run if Xi does not clearly begin grooming a successor with this fall's promotions. An heir-apparent for 2022 would reduce the risks of disruptive power-struggle and would impose a personal deadline on Xi Jinping's reform agenda. That is, a deadline above and beyond the 2020 deadline in the 13th Five Year Plan and the 2021 deadline for the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party's founding. That reform agenda, in turn, is essential for improving China's long-term productivity.15 Bottom Line: The Chinese political system is informal, which means that rules and norms can be bent without altering the underlying principles of balance among the key factions and stability of the regime and society as a whole. Our baseline scenario is a market-positive one: that Xi Jinping will win a victory at the party congress, but that he will not overthrow Hu Jintao's followers and abandon the "collective leadership" model, since that would destroy the overall balance of power and heighten domestic political risks. If Xi loses out to the Hu faction, then we would expect Chinese and China-exposed risk assets to sell off, at least initially. If Xi romps to total victory, excluding Hu's clique from power, we would fade any market rally. Such a development would heighten political risks for the foreseeable future. Investment Conclusions The prospect of a Xi-dominated, yet stable, PSC in China is promising because it suggests that China will have at least a marginally improved policy framework for managing the immense challenges it faces. On the economic front, the loss of the demographic dividend threatens to make China old before it gets rich (Chart 7). Xi will need a unified party, as well as loyal supporters in key posts, if he is to re-energize his productivity-enhancing reforms. On the socio-political front, China's intensifying focus on domestic security is symbolized by draconian media censorship ahead of the party congress and, more broadly, a faster rate of spending on public security than national defense in recent years (Chart 8). Such trends suggest that policy makers are concerned about public support. Income inequality and regional disparities are burning issues in an authoritarian country with a larger and more connected middle class and an incipient civil rights movement. Chart 7Rising Participation Boosted Euro Area Labor Force Growth China's Demographic Challenge Rising Participation Boosted Euro Area Labor Force Growth China's Demographic Challenge Rising Participation Boosted Euro Area Labor Force Growth China's Demographic Challenge Chart 8Social Stability A Major Concern In China China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer In terms of the likely economic and market response, we have highlighted in the past that larger macro-economic trends tend to swamp any effects of China's five-year party congresses. There is no observable correlation between these events and the deviations of China's nominal GDP, credit, or fixed investment from long-term averages going back to 1992 (Chart 9). Chart 9No Clear Policy Impact From Past Party Congresses No Clear Policy Impact From Past Party Congresses No Clear Policy Impact From Past Party Congresses Moreover, China only has two midterm party congresses to compare to today's party congress, and both occurred in the thick of global financial crises (1997, 2007). This makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions about any impact on Chinese risk assets. A-shares were mostly flat after the 1997 congress but fell after 2007, while H-shares broadly fell after both meetings, as one might expect given the crises raging around them (Chart 10 A&B). Chart 10AChinese Stocks Were Flat Or Down ... Chinese Stocks Sold Off After Past Midterm Congresses Chinese Stocks Sold Off After Past Midterm Congresses Chart 10B... After Past Midterm Party Congresses Chinese Stocks Sold Off After Past Midterm Congresses Chinese Stocks Sold Off After Past Midterm Congresses H-shares, being highly responsive to global financial market turmoil, fell relative to emerging market (EM) equities as well in 1997 and 2007. A-shares were more insulated and outperformed EM stocks during the 1997 crisis, though not in the 2007 crisis (Chart 11 A&B). What is clear - for Chinese domestic investors - is that A-shares outperformed H-shares after the party congresses in 1997 and 2007 (Chart 12). Chart 11AChinese Stocks Sold Off In Relative Terms... Chinese Stocks Sold Off In Relative Terms... Chinese Stocks Sold Off In Relative Terms... Chart 11B...Except A-Shares During The Asian Crisis ...Except A-Shares During The Asian Crisis ...Except A-Shares During The Asian Crisis Chart 12A-Shares Outperformed H-Shares After Midterm Congresses A-Shares Outperformed H-Shares After Midterm Congresses A-Shares Outperformed H-Shares After Midterm Congresses This fall, it would not be surprising to see Chinese and global risk-on attitudes prevail in the immediate aftermath of China's party congress: in the broadest sense, the meeting represents a political recapitalization for the Xi administration. Moreover, the backdrop is positive: global and Chinese growth are on a synchronized upswing, Chinese industrial profits have improved, the Fed is on hold, and China's growth risks and capital outflow pressures have diminished.16 This suggests a marginal positive impact for H-shares as well as A-shares. However, Chinese stocks are no longer trading at a discount relative to peers. Moreover, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy believes that the Xi administration's reform reboot will likely bring tougher financial and environmental regulation that will slow credit growth and cut into corporate profits.17 It also seems likely that 2018 will see the dollar stage a comeback as inflation recovers and the Fed resumes hiking rates.18 For all these reasons, we recommend staying long Chinese stocks relative to EM, on the basis that China's reform efforts will be positive for China's productivity outlook but negative for commodities and EM in 2018. Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Mao's successor Hua Guofeng, and Xi's predecessor Hu Jintao, are the two leaders who did not obtain "core" status. 2 The current norms developed mostly in the 1980s and have evolved since. The list of candidates is mostly pre-arranged by the top leaders. The party congress then votes on which candidates to include, leaving a remainder of about 10% who do not take seats in the Central Committee. 3 Nevertheless, the Central Committee could produce a few surprises. It is almost inevitable that a few major personalities will fail to get promoted into key positions, while others will be catapulted to higher places. There will also be some tea leaves to read about the share of negative votes or abstentions and the implications for different candidates. 4 The political report is filled with arcane Communist Party jargon but is very important. It is a consensus document that takes multiple committees a year or more to draft, though Xi Jinping will give the finishing touches. It will cover a comprehensive range of policies and will be scrutinized closely by experts for slight changes of terminology, emphasis, or omission. Key things to watch for are whether Xi adds or removes entire sections; whether he alters developmental goals outlined in previous administrations; and whether he inserts new concepts or revises party ideology to make way for contentious reforms. As for the party's constitution, the main question of any change is whether Xi's leadership philosophy is incorporated into the Communist Party's guiding thought, and if so, whether Xi's name is explicitly attached to it. The latter in particular would be a sign that Xi's political capital within the party is massive. For additional commentary, please see Alice Miller, "How To Read Xi Jinping's 19th Party Congress Political Report," China Leadership Monitor 53 (2017), available at www.hoover.org. 5 For the "assault stage" of reform, see Robert Lawrence Kuhn, The Man Who Changed China: The Life And Legacy Of Jiang Zemin (NY: Crown, 2004). Jiang had first targeted SOE reform in 1996 in a speech, he launched the policy itself at the party congress in September 1997, and the state began to implement it at the NPC in March 1998. For Hu Jintao's and Wen Jiabao's administrative reforms after the seventeenth party congress, see Willy Wo Lap Lam, "Beijing Unveils Plan For Super Ministries," China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, February 4, 2008. These reforms, which were only part of the overall agenda after the congress, included restructuring the State Council, empowering the National Development and Reform Commission, and setting up "Super-Ministries" to streamline cabinet-level functions. 6 Rumor has it that Xi will keep his anti-corruption chief, Wang Qishan, on the PSC beyond the 69-year mandatory retirement age, and that he could even replace Premier Li Keqiang. We do not expect either to happen, but both are well within the realm of political possibility - particularly retaining Wang. 7 For this estimate, please see Cheng Li, Chinese Politics In The Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2016), chapter 9. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Traces of Jiang's power will persist here and there, especially if Wang Qishan remains on the PSC, but the overall effect will be a diminishment of this powerful leadership cohort. Symbolically, just as Deng Xiaoping's death loomed over the fifteenth party congress in 1997, Jiang's impending death will loom over the nineteenth party congress today. 10 Indeed judging solely by the cyclical rotation of Chinese leaders according to generation and faction, Hu Jintao's acolytes are favored to outnumber Jiang Zemin's and Xi Jinping's in the 2017 reshuffle. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "China: Two Factions, One Party," dated September 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. However, Xi's effectiveness and good luck since coming to power lead us to believe that he will secure his followers on the PSC and Politburo this year: please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook 2017, "We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 For example, Xi Jinping's recent promotions have re-emphasized SOE managers and his policies have supported large "state champion" SOEs. Please see Cheng Li and Lucy Xu, "The rise of state-owned enterprise executives in China's provincial leadership," Brookings, February 22, 2017, available at www.brookings.edu. 12 He came to the top office at a time of significant public dissatisfaction (2012), which meant that he received a kind of "mandate" to make big changes. His faction dominated the PSC, and his sweeping anti-corruption campaign purged the party and state of formidable rivals. In the fall of 2016 he clinched his status as the "core" of the party. 13 As to specific rules, no one should be surprised if they are altered. Take the age limit, which is hotly debated: Jiang Zemin introduced a hard age limit into the PSC in 1997, specifically in a way that prevented the promotion of a heavy-hitting politician, Qiao Shi, while allowing Jiang to continue in power. Now, assume Xi alters the rules to preserve Wang Qishan: this would not necessarily mean that Xi plans to overstay his term limits, though some observers will take it that way. For market participants, the important point is that slight tweaks to informal rules are unlikely to have a big market impact. Consider that Wang has overseen a massive crackdown on corruption, helping clean up the party's image, and is known to be competent in financial regulation as well. If he is retained, will the market really protest? We doubt it. Having said that, we expect him to retire according to the existing rule of thumb. 14 The exception to this statement is if Xi reforms Communist Party political institutions, as some commentators suspect he might, in order to allow the Central Committee to elect the Politburo and PSC directly from its members, thus expanding "intra-party democracy" while also giving Xi a higher likelihood of staying in power. Please see Bo Zhiyue, "Commentary: Sweeping Reforms Expected At Party Congress, But Will Xi Jinping Get All He Wants?" Channel News Asia, August 20, 2017, available at www.channelnewsasia.com. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Reflections On China's Reforms," in "The Great Risk Rotation - December 2013," dated December 11, 2013; and Special Report, "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Please also see BCA China Investment Strategy, "Understanding China's Master Plan," dated November 20, 2013, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Reports, "China: Earnings Scorecard And Market Tea Leaves," dated September 7, 2017, and "Monitoring Chinese Capital Outflows And The RMB Internationalization Process," dated August 24, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Closer Look At Chinese Equity Valuations," dated August 31, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. For the reform agenda, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 18 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Central Bank Showdown," dated September 8, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights Bonds As A Safe Haven: Global bond yields have been driven lower by safe haven buying, despite ample evidence of faster global growth and central bankers that are still biased to shift to a less easy policy stance. There is now considerable upside risk for global bond yields over the next 6-12 months from these current depressed levels. ECB: The ECB is giving strong indications that a decision on tapering its asset purchase program will be made next month. With the Euro Area economy growing at a solid pace, and with inflation creeping higher, a reduction in the pace of bond buying in 2018 is highly probable. Canada: The Bank of Canada will continue to deliver on rate hikes without decisive signs that the current booming Canadian economy is slowing down, which leading indicators do not suggest is imminent. Stay underweight Canadian government debt, with a curve flattening bias. Feature Fade The Doomsday Trade Investors have had a lot of depressing news to process over the past several weeks. From threats of nuclear war with North Korea, to fears of a U.S. government shutdown over the debt ceiling, to the potential of Biblical flooding from hurricanes in Texas and Florida, the environment has not been conducive to risk-taking. This has triggered a flight into safe-haven assets like gold and U.S. Treasuries as investors have looked to protect portfolios from "existential" risks (Chart of the Week). Yet despite this rapid run-up in the value of save-havens, risky assets like equities and corporate credit have performed relatively well since the most recent peak in bond yields in early July (Table 1). Chart of the WeekFalling Yields Reflect Save Haven Demand,##BR##Not Slower Growth Falling Yields Reflect Save Haven Demand, Not Slower Growth Falling Yields Reflect Save Haven Demand, Not Slower Growth Table 1Changes In Risk Assets Since##BR##U.S. Treasury Yields Peaked On July 7th Have Bond Yields Peaked For The Cycle? No. Have Bond Yields Peaked For The Cycle? No. This move toward safety and risk aversion has widened the disconnect between global bond yields and economic fundamentals - specifically, growth momentum and central bank guidance - to extreme levels. Investors are now underestimating the potential for additional rate hikes in the U.S. in 2018, and are not fully appreciating the likelihood that the European Central Bank (ECB) will slow the pace of its asset purchases next year. Investors plowing money into government bonds now can only be rewarded if global monetary policy was set to ease, which would only be the case if global growth was slowing. That is not happening right now, even in the U.S. where the most apocalyptic headlines have been occurring. While the impact of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma will likely weigh on U.S. growth in the next few months, the underlying trend remains one of steady above-potential growth that is boosting both corporate profits and household incomes. More globally, depressed investor sentiment, indicated by measures such as the global ZEW survey, has helped drive bond yields lower despite the steady upturn in leading economic indicators (Chart 2). When looking at indicators of actual economic activity, like manufacturing PMIs, the growth story looks far stronger. As a sign of how much this "sentiment versus reality" divergence has distorted bond yields, look no further than our own valuation model for the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield. This model, which only uses the global manufacturing PMI and sentiment towards the U.S. dollar as inputs, indicates that the current "fair value" of the 10-year Treasury yield is 2.67%, nearly 60bps higher than market levels seen as this publication went to press (Chart 3). This is a level of overvaluation that even exceeds the extreme levels seen after the U.K. Brexit vote in July of 2016. Chart 2Bond Investors Are##BR##Ignoring Strong Growth Bond Investors Are Ignoring Strong Growth Bond Investors Are Ignoring Strong Growth Chart 3U.S. Treasuries Are##BR##Now Extremely Overvalued U.S. Treasuries Are Now Extremely Overvalued U.S. Treasuries Are Now Extremely Overvalued In Table 2, we present a decomposition of the 10-year yield changes in the major Developed Markets since that recent peak in U.S. Treasury yields on July 7th. As can be seen in the first two columns of the table, yields declined everywhere but Canada where the central bank has been hiking interest rates (as we discuss later in this report). Yet the vast majority of the yield decline has come from falling real yields and not lower inflation expectations. This has also occurred via a bull-flattening move in government bond yield curves (again, ex-Canada where the curve has bear-flattened), which suggests it is risk-aversion that has driven yields lower. Table 2Developed Market Bond Yield Changes Since U.S. Treasury Yields Peaked On July 7th Have Bond Yields Peaked For The Cycle? No. Have Bond Yields Peaked For The Cycle? No. The relative lack of movement in inflation expectations is a bit surprising given how strongly global oil prices have risen, denominated in any currency (see the final column of Table 2). When plotting the Brent oil price (in local currency terms) vs. the 10-year market-based inflation expectations (from inflation-linked bonds or CPI swaps), some notable divergences stand out. Inflation expectations in the U.S., U.K., Australia and even Japan look around 10-20bps too low relative to where they were the last time oil prices were at current levels (Charts 4 & 5). Meanwhile, inflation expectations are largely in lines with levels implied by oil and currency levels in the Euro Area and Canada. Most importantly, expectations are depressed in all countries, largely because actual inflation has stayed stubbornly low. Chart 4Inflation Expectations Vs. Oil Prices (1) Inflation Expectations Vs Oil Prices (1) Inflation Expectations Vs Oil Prices (1) Chart 5Inflation Expectations Vs. Oil Prices (2) Inflation Expectations Vs Oil Prices (2) Inflation Expectations Vs Oil Prices (2) The lack of realized inflation in places with allegedly "full employment" economies like the U.S. has led to questions over the usefulness of frameworks like the NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) in predicting inflation. A reduced link between the NAIRU and inflation does appear in many countries, but not necessarily in all countries when viewed in aggregate. Chart 6The NAIRU Concept Is Not Dead Yet The NAIRU Concept Is Not Dead Yet The NAIRU Concept Is Not Dead Yet In Chart 6, we present an indicator that shows the percentage of OECD economies (34 in total) that have an unemployment rate below the NAIRU rate. Currently, there are 67% of the countries in this list with unemployment rates under the OECD estimate of NAIRU, which is back to levels seen before the 2009 Great Recession. During that pre-crisis period, global inflation rates were accelerating for both goods and services inflation (bottom two panels). While the correlation between this global NAIRU indicator and realized inflation rates declined in the years after the recession, the linkages have improved over the past couple of years. This may be a sign that there is a "global NAIRU level" (or global output gap) that is more important in determining global inflation rates than individual country NAIRU measures. Or put more simply, investors are downplaying the NAIRU concept just at the time when it could be expected to strengthen. If that were the case, inflation expectations around the world would be too low, although it will take some evidence of faster realized inflation (especially in the U.S. and Europe) before the markets begin to discount that in bond yields. In the meantime, markets have become even too pessimistic on growth prospects and the implications for bond yields. Investors have driven down rate hike expectations in the U.S. and U.K. (and, to a lesser extent, the Euro Area) during this latest bond market rally, dragging longer-term bond yields down with them (Chart 7). Yet growth in the developing world is showing little signs of slowing down outside of the U.K., with leading economic indicators still pointing to a continued steady expansion (Chart 8). Even if central bankers are starting to question how fast their economies can grow before inflation pressures pick up in a meaningful way, they are unlikely to stand by and see faster growth prints without responding with less stimulative monetary policies. Chart 7Not Much Tightening Priced##BR##(Except For Canada)... Not Much Tightening Priced (except for Canada)... Not Much Tightening Priced (except for Canada)... Chart 8...Despite Improving Growth##BR##In Most Countries ...Despite Improving Growth In Most Countries ...Despite Improving Growth In Most Countries Net-net, bond markets are now discounting too pessimistic of an outcome for both global growth and inflation. We continue to see more upside risks for global yields on a 6-12 month horizon, although it will take some signs of faster global inflation (not just growth) before bond yields respond. Bottom Line: Global bond yields have been driven lower by safe haven buying, despite ample evidence of faster global growth and central bankers that are still biased to shift to a less easy policy stance. There is now considerable upside risk for global bond yields over the next 6-12 months from these current depressed levels. September ECB Meeting: All Systems Go For A 2018 Taper Last week's ECB meeting provided no changes on interest rates or the size of asset purchases, but plenty of clues on the central bank's next move. A reduction in the size of the ECB's asset purchase program in 2018, to be announced next month, is now highly probable - even with a strengthening euro. The ECB's GDP forecast for 2017 was revised higher from the June forecasts (2.2% vs. 1.9%), while the projections for 2018 (1.8%) and 2019 (1.7%) were unchanged. Meanwhile, the inflation forecast for 2017 was left unchanged at 1.5% and the forecasts for the next two years were only revised slightly lower (2018: 1.2% vs. 1.3%, 2019: 1.5% vs. 1.6%). The fact that the 14% rise in euro versus the U.S. dollar seen so far in 2017 was not enough to move the needle much on the ECB's projections speaks volumes about the central bank's confidence in the current European economic expansion, as well as its comfort level with the rising currency. That makes sense when looking at the euro rally more broadly, as the currency has only gone up 6% in trade-weighted terms year-to-date. Simply put, the ECB does not yet seem overly worried that the strengthening euro represent a serious threat to the economy that could cause a more prolonged medium-term undershoot in Euro Area inflation. ECB President Mario Draghi did make references to currency volatility as being something that should be closely monitored with regards to the growth and inflation outlook. Right now, the realized volatility of the euro has been quite subdued, even as the currency has steadily appreciated (Chart 9). At the same time, our Months-to-Hike indicator has also fallen as the market has pulled forward the date of the next ECB rate hike. That hike is still not expected until late 2019 - pricing that we agree with. However, the fact that the euro can appreciate with such low volatility alongside a slightly-more-hawkish repricing of ECB rate expectations suggests that the market thinks that a move towards reduced monetary stimulus in the Euro Area is credible. That will remain true until the rising euro starts to become a meaningful drag on the economy or inflation, which is not evident in the broad Euro Area data at the moment (Chart 10). Chart 9A "Credibly Hawkish" ECB? A "Credibly Hawkish" ECB? A "Credibly Hawkish" ECB? Chart 10No Impact (Yet) From A Stronger Euro No Impact (Yet) From A Stronger Euro No Impact (Yet) From A Stronger Euro Draghi did note that the "bulk of decisions" regarding the ECB's asset purchase program would likely take place in October. That means a reduction in the size of the monthly purchases starting in January of next year, but without any changes in short-term interest rates (the ECB reiterated that rates will stay at current levels until after the end of the asset purchase program). Nonetheless, the ECB is incrementally moving towards a less accommodative policy stance that will continue to put upward pressure on the euro and, eventually, trigger a move toward higher longer-term Euro Area bond yields. Bottom Line: The ECB is giving strong indications that a decision on tapering its asset purchase program will be made next month. With the Euro Area economy growing at a solid pace, and with inflation creeping higher, a reduction in the pace of bond buying in 2018 is highly probable. Maintain an underweight medium-term stance on Euro Area government debt. Bank Of Canada: Shock Hawks The Bank of Canada (BoC) continues to confound investors with a surprisingly hawkish policy bias. Another 25bp rate hike was delivered at last week's monetary policy meeting, a move that was not fully discounted by the market, bringing the BoC Overnight Rate up to 1%. The Bank cited the impressive strength of the Canadian economy, as well as the more synchronous global expansion that was supporting higher industrial commodity prices, as reasons for the rate hike. With Canadian real GDP growth surging to a 3.7% year-over-year pace in the 2nd quarter, in a broad-based fashion across all components, perhaps policymakers can be forgiven for feeling that interest rate settings are still too stimulative for an economy with a potential growth rate of only 1.4% (the most recent BoC estimate). In the statement announcing the rate hike, it was noted that the level of Canadian GDP was now higher than the BoC had been expecting after the last Monetary Policy Statement (MPS) published in July. The BoC was already projecting that the output gap in Canada would be closed by the end of 2017. Thus, a higher realized level of GDP suggests an output gap that will be closed even sooner than the BoC was forecasting. This alone would be enough to move sooner on rate hikes for a central bank that focuses so much on its own measures of the output gap when making inflation projections. However, at the moment, there is not much inflation for the central bank to worry about. Chart 11The Great White North The Great White North The Great White North Headline CPI inflation sits at 1.2%, well below the midpoint of the BoC's 1-3% target band, while the various measures of core inflation that the BoC monitors are between 1.3% and 1.7%. Annual wage growth accelerated to the faster growth rate of the year in August, but still only sits at 1.7% even with the unemployment rate now down to a nine-year low of 6.2%. Meanwhile, the Canadian dollar has appreciated 13% vs. the U.S. dollar, and 10% on a trade-weighted basis, since bottoming out in early May. This move has been supported by growth and interest rate differentials that favor Canada. This is especially true versus the U.S. where the 2-year gap between Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rates is now positive at +21bps - the highest level since January 2015 (Chart 11). The BoC acknowledged this in last week's policy statement, suggesting acceptance of a strong loonie as a reflection of a robust Canadian economy that requires higher interest rates. The strength in the Canadian dollar will likely weigh on import price inflation in the coming months, and act as a drag on overall inflation. This will not trigger any move by the BoC to back off from its hawkishness unless there is also some weakness in the Canadian economic data. For a central bank that focuses so much on the output gap in its assessment of its own policy stance, the inflationary impact from a booming economy will far outweigh the disinflationary effects of a stronger currency. It remains to be seen if the BoC will be proven right on delivering actual rate hikes with inflation well below target. This is a problem that many central banks are facing at the moment, but the robust Canadian economy is forcing the BoC's hand. An appreciating currency may limit the number of rate hikes that the BoC eventually undertakes, but given its own assessment that that terminal interest rate is around 3%, there are plenty of additional hikes that the BoC can deliver before getting anywhere close to "neutral". The key risk will come from the spillover effects on the overheated Canadian housing market from the interest rate increases. Already, house prices are coming off the boil in the most overheated markets like Toronto, where median home values are down 20% since April due to regulatory changes aimed at reducing leveraged speculation in Canadian housing. It remains to be seen how much the BoC hikes will exacerbate the latest downturn in house price inflation and, potentially, have spillover effects on consumer confidence given high levels of household indebtedness. For now, we do not recommend fighting the BoC, with Canadian leading economic indicators still accelerating and the BoC's own business surveys showing that the economy is likely to remain strong. While there are already 50bps of rate hikes priced next twelve months, this would only take the Overnight Rate to 1.5% - still a stimulative level in the eyes of the central bank. This could also create additional strength in the loonie, although that impact should be lessened if the Fed comes back into play and delivers additional rate hikes in 2018, as we expect. We continue to recommend a below-benchmark duration stance on Canadian government bonds, with yields likely to surpass the relatively modest increases currently priced into the forwards (Chart 12, top panel). We also continue to advise an underweight allocation to Canadian government bonds in hedged global fixed income portfolios (middle panel). We also are staying with our winning Canadian trades in our Tactical Overlay portfolio, where are positioned for wider Canada-U.S. bond spreads and a flatter Canadian yield curve (Chart 13). Chart 12Stay Underweight##BR##Canadian Government Bonds Stay Underweight Canadian Government Bonds Stay Underweight Canadian Government Bonds Chart 13Sticking With Our Tactical##BR##Canadian Bond Trades Sticking With Our Tactical Canadian Bond Trades Sticking With Our Tactical Canadian Bond Trades Bottom Line: The Bank of Canada will continue to deliver on rate hikes without decisive signs that the current booming Canadian economy is slowing down, which leading indicators do not suggest is imminent. Maintain an underweight stance on Canadian government debt, with a curve flattening bias. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Have Bond Yields Peaked For The Cycle? No. Have Bond Yields Peaked For The Cycle? No. Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights Monetary Policy: A prominent Fed Governor has acknowledged that inflation expectations have become un-anchored to the downside. This is an important signal and suggests that the Fed will keep policy easy enough for inflation expectations to recover. TIPS: The combination of a Fed that communicates a desire for higher inflation expectations and an end to the current downtrend in realized core inflation will send TIPS breakevens wider. Yield Curve: Higher inflation expectations will cause the yield curve to steepen on a 6-12 month horizon. Although steepener trades no longer appear cheap on our model, we remain overweight the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. Feature Chart 1Flight To Safety Focused In Real Yields Flight To Safety Focused In Real Yields Flight To Safety Focused In Real Yields Bond markets digested two important events last week. The first was a politically driven flight to safety. The 10-year yield fell 10 bps (Chart 1) and the average junk spread widened 8 bps as the daily U.S. Policy Uncertainty index1 averaged 121 for the week, its second-highest reading since February. As we have noted in past reports,2 historically the best strategy has been to fade politically driven flights to safety. The second, and more significant, event was a speech3 given by Fed Governor Lael Brainard in which she suggested that inflation expectations have become un-anchored to the downside. As is explained below, this acknowledgement represents an important change in tone from the Fed. One that reinforces our outlook for higher Treasury yields, a steeper yield curve and wider TIPS breakevens on a 6-12 month horizon. You Had One Job The key passage from Governor Brainard's speech is the following: Nonetheless, a variety of measures suggest underlying trend inflation may be lower than it was before the crisis, contributing to the ongoing shortfall of inflation from our objective. To understand the significance of this statement we need some background on how the Fed thinks about inflation. FOMC members tend to apply an expectations-augmented Phillips curve framework to the task of forecasting inflation (Chart 2). Fed Chair Janet Yellen explained this approach in a September 2015 speech.4 In Yellen's words: ...economic slack, changes in imported goods prices, and idiosyncratic shocks all cause core inflation to deviate from a longer-term trend that is ultimately determined by long-run inflation expectations. [...] An important feature of this model of inflation dynamics is that the overall effect that variations in resource utilization, import prices, and other factors will have on inflation depends crucially on whether these influences also affect long-run inflation expectations. In other words, the Fed's model distinguishes between core inflation's long-run trend and its cyclical fluctuations. Cyclical fluctuations are driven by: Resource utilization (usually measured as the unemployment rate minus its estimated natural rate) Non-oil import prices Idiosyncratic shocks In contrast, core inflation's long-run trend is purely a function of long-term inflation expectations. In the Fed's view, monetary policy can be used effectively in response to shifts in the cyclical drivers of inflation. However, if inflation expectations were to become unanchored, then inflation's long-run trend would be altered and monetary policy would become less effective. In a sense, the worst possible outcome would be if inflation expectations became un-anchored to the downside. Once again, in Janet Yellen's own words: Anchored inflation expectations were not won easily or quickly: Experience suggests that it takes many years of carefully conducted monetary policy to alter what households and firms perceive to be inflation's "normal" behavior, and, furthermore, that a persistent failure to keep inflation under control - by letting it drift either too high or too low for too long - could cause expectations to once again become unmoored. This describes precisely the conventional wisdom as to why the Japanese economy has experienced two decades of deflation despite reasonably high levels of resource utilization. Policymakers did not act quickly or strongly enough following the burst stock market bubble of 1989-91, and this allowed deflationary expectations to become entrenched. In this sense the Japanese experience provides a roadmap for what could happen in the U.S. if the Fed doesn't act quickly to bring inflation expectations back up to target levels. It is true that not all measures of U.S. inflation expectations currently display weakness. For example, the measure we used in our expectations-augmented Phillips curve in Chart 2 - median 10-year PCE expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters - appears stable in recent years. However, Governor Brainard pointed to several measures that suggest inflation expectations have already declined (Chart 3). Chart 2The Fed's Inflation Model The Fed's Inflation Model The Fed's Inflation Model Chart 3Still Well Anchored? Still Well Anchored? Still Well Anchored? Comparing the three-year period ending in the second quarter of this year with the three-year period ended just before the financial crisis, 10-year-ahead inflation compensation based on TIPS [...] yields is ¾ percentage point lower. Survey-based measures of inflation expectations are also lower. The Michigan survey measure of median household expectations of inflation over the next five to 10 years suggests a ¼ percentage point downward shift over the most recent three-year period compared with the pre-crisis years, similar to the five-year, five-year forward forecast for the consumer price index from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.5 Investment Implications In our view, there are two important facts to keep in mind: In the Fed's model of inflation it is crucial that long-term inflation expectations do not fall. Otherwise, the odds of replicating the Japanese scenario start to increase. A prominent Fed Governor has now suggested that U.S. inflation expectations have become un-anchored to the downside. Chart 4The Market's Rate Hike Expectations The Market's Rate Hike Expectations The Market's Rate Hike Expectations Taken together, these two facts have important investment implications. First, the two facts suggest that TIPS breakevens will move wider. While the Japanese experience has taught us that "open mouth operations" become less effective once deflationary expectations are entrenched, they should still have some impact in the States. Notice that the decline in Treasury yields that followed Brainard's comments last week was concentrated in the real component. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate actually rose 2 bps (Chart 1). The combination of a Fed that communicates a desire for higher inflation expectations and an end to the current downtrend in realized core inflation (see "Economy & Inflation" section below) will be enough to send long-dated TIPS breakevens wider on a 6-12 month horizon. Second, a Fed that is committed to staying accommodative for as long as is necessary to ensure that inflation expectations move higher will cause the yield curve to steepen (see section titled "Inflation Expectations Drive The Curve" below). Third, a Fed that is more committed to fighting deflation should bias Treasury yields lower. However, inflationary pressures in the U.S. economy are strong enough that the Fed will be able to move inflation expectations higher while still delivering more rate hikes than are currently priced into the curve. At present, the overnight index swap curve is discounting that the next 25 basis point rate hike will not occur until November 2018 (Chart 4)! Bottom Line: A prominent Fed Governor has acknowledged that inflation expectations have become un-anchored to the downside. This represents an important signal about the future path of policy and reinforces our view that the Treasury curve will bear-steepen during the next 6-12 months, led by wider TIPS breakevens. Inflation Expectations Drive The Curve Our research6 shows that inflation expectations are the most important driver of changes in the slope of the yield curve. This runs counter to the conventional wisdom which states that the curve flattens when the Fed hikes rates, and steepens when it cuts rates. While the correlation between Fed rate moves and the slope of the curve is undeniable, the relationship results purely from the fact that the Fed responds to changes in inflation. The link between inflation expectations and the yield curve is the dominant relationship. To see this we look at Charts 5 and 6. Both charts show monthly changes in the 5-year, 5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate plotted against monthly changes in the nominal 2/10 slope. Chart 5 shows all available historical data, and we observe a strong positive correlation. In fact, 63% of monthly observations fall into either the top-right or bottom-left quadrants indicating that wider breakevens correlate with a steeper curve and vice-versa. Chart 52/10 Nominal Treasury Slope Vs. TIPS Breakeven Inflation Rate 5-Year / ##br##5-Year Forward (February 1999-Present) Open Mouth Operations Open Mouth Operations Chart 62/10 Nominal Treasury Slope Vs. TIPS Breakeven Inflation Rate 5-Year / 5-Year Forward ##br##During Fed Tightening Cycles (June 1999 To May 2000 & June 2004 To June 2006) Open Mouth Operations Open Mouth Operations The more important question, however, is whether this correlation still holds when the Fed is raising rates. Chart 6 focuses only on prior rate hike cycles and still shows a strong positive correlation. 73% of the monthly observations fall into either the top-right or bottom-left quadrants, although in this case there are more observations in the bottom-left quadrant because typically the Fed lifts rates with the goal of sending inflation and inflation expectations lower. In this respect the current rate hike cycle is unique. The Fed is in the process of lifting rates, but as Brainard's speech shows, it still critically needs inflation expectations to rise. We conclude that the Fed will stay easy enough, long enough, for long-dated TIPS breakevens to return to their pre-crisis trading range between 2.4% and 2.5%. An upward adjustment to this range will occur alongside a steeper 2/10 curve. Unit Labor Costs And The Yield Curve The logic presented above also suggests an inverse relationship between the slope of the curve and wage growth. In a world where inflation expectations are well anchored, stronger wage growth encourages the Fed to tighten policy more quickly, this causes the yield curve to flatten. Conversely, softer wage growth leads to a steeper curve. Our research shows that unit labor costs are the measure of wage growth that correlates most closely with the slope of the curve. The reason is that unit labor costs actually measure both wage growth (compensation per hour) and labor productivity (output per hour). Put differently, the yield curve can flatten because labor compensation is rising and the Fed is tightening policy (bear flattening) or it can flatten because productivity is falling and investors are discounting a slower pace of potential growth and a lower terminal fed funds rate (bull flattening). Unit labor costs capture both of these dynamics. Last week saw second quarter productivity growth revised higher from 0.9% to 1.5% and unit labor cost growth revised down from 0.6% to 0.2% (Chart 7). We expect that productivity will continue to experience a modest late-cycle bounce. Usually, payroll growth starts to moderate late in the business cycle as the labor market tightens. The cost of labor typically rises and encourages firms to substitute capital for workers. This late-cycle boost in capital spending tends to correlate with stronger productivity growth (Chart 8), and this dynamic looks to be in full swing at the moment. Payroll growth has been decelerating since early 2015, and durable goods orders have picked up sharply since the end of last year (Chart 8, bottom panel). Chart 7Weakness In Unit Labor Costs Weakness In Unit Labor Costs Weakness In Unit Labor Costs Chart 8Productivity: Look For A Late-Cycle Rebound Productivity: Look For A Late-Cycle Rebound Productivity: Look For A Late-Cycle Rebound A modest late-cycle upswing in productivity growth will put downward pressure on unit labor costs and lead to curve steepening. How To Position For Steepening We have been expressing our yield curve view via a long position in the 5-year bullet and a short position in a duration-matched 2/10 barbell since last December.7 So far that trade has returned +28 bps, even though the 2/10 slope has flattened more than 50 bps since its inception. The reason our curve steepener has outperformed even as the curve has flattened is that, when we initiated our trade, the 2/5/10 butterfly spread was discounting an even larger curve flattening. Put differently, the 5-year bullet looked extremely cheap on the curve (Chart 9).8 Chart 92/5/10 Butterfly Spread Fair Value Model 2/5/10 Butterfly Spread Fair Value Model 2/5/10 Butterfly Spread Fair Value Model This state of affairs has now changed. Our fair value model shows that the 5-year bullet appears slightly expensive compared to the barbell, or alternatively, that the 2/5/10 butterfly spread is priced for a 20 bps steepening of the 2/10 slope during the next six months. According to our model, the 2/10 slope will have to steepen by more than 20 bps during the next six months for our trade to outperform from current levels. Bottom Line: Higher inflation expectations will cause the yield curve to steepen on a 6-12 month horizon. Although steepener trades no longer appear cheap on our model, we remain overweight the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell for now. Economy & Inflation Updates received during the past few weeks indicate that U.S. growth is running solidly above trend, and may even be accelerating. Real second-quarter GDP growth was revised higher from 2.6% to 3%. Second quarter labor productivity growth was also revised higher, as was discussed above. Even following a lackluster August employment report, our back-of-the-envelope tracking estimate for U.S. growth - the sum of year-over-year growth in aggregate hours worked and average quarterly productivity growth since 2012 - is running at 2.7%, well above the Fed's 1.8% estimate of trend (Chart 10). Survey measures also suggest that growth has further upside in the second half of the year, at least according to a simple growth model based on the ISM non-manufacturing survey, our own BCA Beige Book Monitor and a composite of new orders surveys (Chart 11). Chart 10Growth Tracking Above-Trend... Growth Tracking Above-Trend... Growth Tracking Above-Trend... Chart 11...And Surveys Suggest Further Upside ...And Surveys Suggest Further Upside ...And Surveys Suggest Further Upside But bond markets are not getting the message. The 10-year yield is stuck at 2.12%, and the markets seem to be saying that the link between stronger growth and rising inflation has been permanently broken. We disagree and think that investors are simply underestimating the often long and variable lags between economic growth and inflation. Chart 12Inflation Lags Growth Inflation Lags Growth Inflation Lags Growth Chart 12 shows that real GDP growth has tended to lead core inflation by about 18 months, while changes in year-over-year core CPI (the second derivative of prices) have tended to follow the ISM Manufacturing index with a lag of about 12 months. All signs suggest that the recent downtrend in inflation is nothing more than a reaction to the growth deceleration seen between mid-2015 and mid-2016. Now that growth has re-accelerated, inflation is poised to move higher. Bottom Line: Bond markets are priced as though the link between growth and inflation is broken. We expect they will be proven wrong as inflation regains its uptrend during the next few months. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 The daily policy uncertainty index measures the number of news items related to economic uncertainty. For further details please see www.policyuncertainty.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "What We Know About Uncertainty", dated July 12, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20170905a.htm 4 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm 5 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20170905a.htm 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Yield Curve On A Cyclical Horizon", dated March 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 For further details on how butterfly trades respond to changes in the yield curve, and on how we use our fair value yield curve models please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies", dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Portfolio Strategy A supply/demand imbalance has created a playable opportunity in the niche refining energy sub-index. Increase exposure to overweight. Safe haven demand is supporting gold mining equities, but shifting macro forces suggest that it will soon be time to move to the sidelines. Global gold miners are now on downgrade alert. Recent Changes Lift the S&P oil & gas refining & marketing index to overweight today. Put the global gold mining equity index (ticker GDX:US) on downgrade alert. Table 1 Still Goldilocks Still Goldilocks Feature The S&P 500 moved laterally last week as sustained geopolitical uncertainty offset encouraging economic data. Synchronized global growth coupled with the related global liquidity-to-growth transition remain the dominant macro themes. Dovish Fed speeches triggered a recalibration of market rate hike expectations and a lower 10-year Treasury yield. As long as lower bond yields reflect a less hawkish Fed rather than a deflationary relapse, they should underpin stock prices. Encouragingly, the latest ISM manufacturing survey catapulted higher to a level last seen in early 2011, diverging steeply from the bond market, as manufacturing optimism reigns supreme (Chart 1). The labor market confirmed this data. The most cyclical parts of the U.S. economy are firing on all cylinders, with manufacturing and construction job creation comprising 1/3 of nonfarm payroll growth last month (Chart 2). This is the highest reading since July 2011. Chart 1Unsustainable Divergence Unsustainable Divergence Unsustainable Divergence Chart 2Manufacturing Flexing Its Muscle Manufacturing Flexing Its Muscle Manufacturing Flexing Its Muscle Meanwhile, despite the Trump administration's shortcomings, America's CEOs are going against the grain. Capex is up smartly for the second consecutive quarter adding to real GDP growth and our capital spending model remains upbeat heralding additional outlays for the remaining two quarters of the year (Chart 3). Similarly, regional Fed surveys of capex intentions point to a sustainable pickup in capital spending in the coming months (Chart 3). Still generationally low interest rates, a less hawkish sounding Fed, coupled with a tamed greenback (Chart 4) and synchronized global growth have combined to revive animal spirits. The implication is that profit growth rests on solid foundations, a message corroborated by our S&P 500 EPS growth model (Chart 5). Chart 3CapEx To The Rescue CapEx To The Rescue CapEx To The Rescue Chart 4Dollar... Dollar… Dollar… Chart 5...And EPS Model Waving Green Flag …And EPS Model Waving Green Flag …And EPS Model Waving Green Flag Adding it up, the macro backdrop remains favorable for stocks. In fact, it represents a goldilocks equity scenario. This week we continue to add some cyclicality to our portfolio by further boosting a niche energy play. We also update our view on a portfolio hedge. Buy Refiners For A Trade In early July, we lifted refiners to neutral and locked in impressive gains for our portfolio, but three reasons kept us at bay and prevented us from turning outright bullish on this niche energy sub-sector.1 Namely, all-time high refining production, high refined product stocks and breakneck pace refinery runs were offsetting the nascent recovery in gasoline consumption, rising crack spreads and a mini V-shaped recovery in industry shipments. Net, we posited that a balanced EPS outlook would prevail in coming quarters. Hurricane Harvey has significantly changed this calculus and now clearly refiners are in a sweet earnings spot for at least the remainder of the year, compelling us to lift exposure to overweight. Severe refinery shutdowns are likely to return industry production levels to what prevailed early in the decade, representing a major, albeit temporary, setback (Chart 6). This production curtailment will result in sizable petroleum products inventory drawdowns and a likely halt (if not reversal) in refined product net exports in order to satisfy domestic demand. The longer it takes for refinery production to return to normalcy, the greater the inventory whittling down. Historically, relative share price momentum has been inversely correlated with inventory growth and the Harvey-related inventory clear-out is heralding additional relative performance gains (bottom panel, Chart 7). It is notable that both industry net exports and inventories had already been receding since the beginning of 2017, suggesting that hurricane Harvey will only accelerate a downtrend that was already in place. Chart 6Hurricane Related Blues... Hurricane Related Blues… Hurricane Related Blues… Chart 7... Are A Boon For Crack Spreads … Are A Boon For Crack Spreads … Are A Boon For Crack Spreads Taken together, this represents an ultra-bullish pricing power backdrop for the U.S. refining industry, at a time when capacity additions are also likely to, at least, pause for breath (bottom panel, Chart 6). Chart 8Brisk Demand Brisk Demand Brisk Demand Indeed, refining margins have jumped recently and will likely remain elevated as the Brent/WTI spread is widening anew (middle panel, Chart 7). Surging crack spreads are synonymous with higher earnings for this extremely capital-intensive and high operating leverage industry. Nevertheless, the refining supply disruptions only tell half the story. Refined product demand is exploding higher, pushing all-time highs and signaling that a substantial supply/demand imbalance is in the works (top panel, Chart 8). Typically this gets resolved via higher gasoline prices, further boosting industry EPS prospects (third panel, Chart 8). As a result, we expect a re-rating phase in relative valuations in the coming months, reversing the year-to-date deflation in the relative price-to-sales ratio. The second panel of Chart 8 shows that relative valuations and refined product consumption move in lockstep, and the current message is to expect a catch up phase in the former. In sum, a playable rally in refiners is in the offing on the back of a budding profit recovery that has yet to filter through analysts' EPS estimates (bottom panel, Chart 8). The longer-than-usual hurricane Harvey-related refining production disruptions, along with the spike in refined product demand, have created an exploitable opportunity. Bottom Line: Boost the S&P oil & gas refining & marketing index (PSX, VLO, MPC, ANDV) to overweight. What To Do With Gold Mining Equities? Gold and gold mining equities serve as great portfolio hedges especially in times of duress. Recent geopolitical jitters surrounding North Korea along with inaction in Washington and the substantial year-to-date selloff in the U.S. dollar have served as catalysts for gold to shine anew, hitting one-year highs. So is it time to trim exposure to shiny metal equities? The short answer is not yet. Real yields are sinking courtesy of a moderately less hawkish Fed (top panel, Chart 9). The probability of a December Fed hike has now collapsed to 30%, and the 5th hike this cycle is only priced in for next June. This is keeping a bid under gold and gold miners, as zero yielding bullion and near-zero yielding gold mining equities appear at the margin relatively more appealing. The equity risk premium has also stopped falling owing largely to the lower 10-year Treasury yield (bottom panel, Chart 9), representing another source of support for global gold miners. Meanwhile, policy uncertainty in the U.S. and around the globe is hooking up especially given North Korea's unpredictability, Washington's polarization, the upcoming German elections and, most importantly, the looming Chinese Congress. Historically, the policy uncertainty index and relative performance have been joined at the hip and the current message is positive for bullion related stocks (middle panel, Chart 9). Similarly, the Philly Fed's Partisan Conflict Index2 ("The Partisan Conflict Index tracks the degree of political disagreement among U.S. politicians at the federal level by measuring the frequency of newspaper articles reporting disagreement in a given month. Higher index values indicate greater conflict among political parties, Congress, and the President.") and bullion enjoy a tight positive correlation since the early 1980s (Chart 10), likely warning that the precious metal's run has more upside in the short term. Chart 9Shining Shining Shining Chart 10Increase In Partisanship Is Bullish Gold Increase In Partisanship Is Bullish Gold Increase In Partisanship Is Bullish Gold Moreover, demand for safe haven assets remains upbeat as evidenced by recent flows into gold-related ETFs. Positioning in the commodity pits are also signaling that more gains are in store for gold and the relative share price ratio (Chart 11). Nevertheless, there are some pockets of weakness that are pointing to a more cautious stance toward this portfolio hedge. The improving U.S. economic backdrop is weighing on gold mining equities (ISM manufacturing shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 12). Not only U.S. growth, but also synchronized global growth suggests that eventually demand for bullion will subside. In fact, global growth expectations continue to perk up (GDP expectations shown inverted, Chart 12), and G10 economic surprises are also shooting higher, anchoring gold and gold related equities (economic surprise index shown inverted, top panel, Chart 12). Chart 11Safe Haven Demand Comeback Safe Haven Demand Comeback Safe Haven Demand Comeback Chart 12Not All The Glitters Is Gold Not All The Glitters Is Gold Not All The Glitters Is Gold Tack on the inevitable liquidity withdrawal once the Fed starts to wind down its balance sheet later this month, and the handoff from liquidity-to-growth represents a bearish backdrop for gold and gold mining equities. Chart 13 shows that the Fed's balance sheet is positively correlated with bullion's relative performance versus the broad commodity complex, warning that the recent push toward multi-decade highs in relative performance are on borrowed time. Finally, our relative EPS model for the global gold mining index encapsulates most of these macro forces and suggests that relative profit growth will gravitate lower in the coming months (Chart 14). Chart 13Watch The Fed's Balance Sheet Watch The Fed’s Balance Sheet Watch The Fed’s Balance Sheet Chart 14EPS Model Is Outright Bearish EPS Model Is Outright Bearish EPS Model Is Outright Bearish Bottom Line: While our confidence in maintaining the gold-related equity portfolio hedge has fallen a notch, we are staying patient before moving to the sidelines. Put the global gold mining index (ticker GDX:US) on downgrade alert. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy & Global Alpha Sector Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the July 10, 2017 U.S. Equity Strategy Report titled "SPX 3,000?", available at uses.bcaresearch.com 2 https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/partisan-conflict-index Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.
Dear Client, I have been visiting clients in Europe this week, so today's report is somewhat shorter than usual. We will be back next week with an exciting Special Report on the macro effects of bitcoin and other virtual currencies. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy Highlights Global growth remains strong and broad-based. U.S. GDP growth will accelerate over the next few quarters thanks to the easing in financial conditions so far this year. The market is pricing in only 20 basis points in cumulative rate hikes between now and the end of next year. This is far too low. Go short the Dec-2018 fed funds futures contract. The euro has strengthened more this year than one would have expected based solely on the change in interest rate differentials. Positioning shifts are the likely culprit. In real terms, the terminal rate in the U.S. based on 5-year, 5-year forward OIS rates is currently only 13 bps higher than in the euro area. We will automatically open a tactical short EUR/USD position if the euro moves above $1.22 any time over the next three weeks. Feature Global Economy Firing On All Cylinders The global economy continues to chug along. All 46 countries monitored by the OECD are on track to grow this year, the first time this has happened since 2007. Usually, economists are too optimistic about growth prospects. This has not been the case over the past 12 months. Consensus global growth estimates for 2017 and 2018 have marched higher during this time, led by the euro area, Japan, and a number of emerging economies (Chart 1). U.S. growth projections have been broadly stable, but these too are likely to be revised higher. Both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing ISM indices improved in August. The same goes for core capital goods orders, consumer confidence, retail sales, and homebuilder sentiment. The employment report was on the weak side, but it was probably distorted by seasonal factors - August payrolls have now fallen short of expectations for seven years in a row, a suspiciously long streak. Hiring intention surveys and perceptions of job availability both remain strong. The net share of households who see jobs as "plentiful" as opposed to "hard to get" rose further in August. It is now well above its pre-recession peak (Chart 2). Chart 1Higher And Higher Higher And Higher Higher And Higher Chart 2A Healthy U.S. Labor Market A Healthy U.S. Labor Market A Healthy U.S. Labor Market A Healthy U.S. Labor Market A Healthy U.S. Labor Market Fed Rate Expectations Are Too Dovish The Treasury market remains oblivious to these developments, focusing only on the failure of inflation to rise. This could prove to be a fatal mistake. Inflation is a highly lagging indicator. It typically does not peak until well after a recession has begun and does not bottom until well after it has ended (Chart 3). Trying to infer the true level of economic slack from today's inflation rate is like trying to read the speedometer of an automobile when there is a 30-second delay between what the dial says and when you step on the accelerator. Many market participants and a number of Fed officials have argued that interest rates are already close to neutral, implying little need for further rate hikes. We agree that the neutral rate is lower than in the past, but their argument misses a crucial point. Even if the Fed knew what the level of the neutral rate is - which, of course, it doesn't - it would still need to get the timing right. If the Fed waits too long to bring rates up to neutral, the unemployment rate will end up falling below NAIRU. This could force the Fed to raise rates more aggressively than it (or the markets) would like. Such an outcome now looks increasingly likely. The easing in U.S. financial conditions since the start of the year should boost real GDP growth over the next few quarters (Chart 4). This could cause the unemployment rate to fall to 3.5% by next summer, leaving it below its 2000 lows and more than a full point below most estimates of NAIRU. If this were to happen, it would prompt the Fed to turn up the hawkish rhetoric. Chart 3Inflation Is A Lagging Indicator Central Bank Showdown Central Bank Showdown Chart 4Easing Financial Conditions In The U.S. Bode Well For Growth Easing Financial Conditions In The U.S. Bode Well For Growth Easing Financial Conditions In The U.S. Bode Well For Growth The market is not giving enough weight to such an outcome. The December-2018 fed funds futures contract is pricing in only 20 basis points in cumulative rate hikes between now and the end of next year. That is much too low. We recommend that clients short this contract and are initiating a new tactical trade to this effect. ECB Will Take It Easy In contrast to the U.S., euro area financial conditions have tightened this year. During his press conference, Mario Draghi expressed confidence in the growth outlook, but acknowledged the risks to the region from a stronger currency. He noted that "the recent volatility in the exchange rate represents a source of uncertainty which requires monitoring with regard to its possible implications for the medium-term outlook for price stability." As we predicted last week, the ECB trimmed its 2018 inflation forecast from 1.3% to 1.2%, and its 2019 forecast from 1.6% to 1.5%. Chart 5 shows the market's estimate of the gap in terminal interest rates between the U.S. and the euro area using 5-year, 5-year forward OIS rates. The gap has narrowed by around 50 bps since the start of the year. However, EUR/USD has strengthened more than one would have expected based solely on the movement in interest rate differentials. Specifically, the market now expects U.S. five-year yields to be 78 basis points higher in 2022 than in the euro area. This is precisely the same gap that prevailed last October. Yet, EUR/USD was $1.10 back then. Today, it is $1.20. Shifts in positioning help explain why the euro has strengthened so much. Traders were heavily short the euro at the start of this year. Today, they are heavily long (Chart 6). Looking out, with few euro shorts left, EUR/USD is likely to trade off the interest rate gap between the two regions. Chart 5U.S. Vs. Euro Area: Interest Rate Gap Has Narrowed U.S. Vs. Euro Area: Interest Rate Gap Has Narrowed U.S. Vs. Euro Area: Interest Rate Gap Has Narrowed Chart 6Euro Positioning: From Deeply Short To Long Euro Positioning: From Deeply Short To Long Euro Positioning: From Deeply Short To Long Chart 7Fiscal Policy Is More Stimulative In The U.S. Central Bank Showdown Central Bank Showdown In real terms, the terminal rate in the U.S. is currently only 13 bps higher than in the euro area. That seems rather low to us. Trend growth is faster in the U.S., the banking system is in better shape, and fiscal policy is more stimulative (Chart 7). All this suggests that the real neutral rate is substantially higher in the U.S. As such, we will automatically open a tactical short EUR/USD position if the euro moves above $1.22 at any time over the next three weeks, with a stop of $1.24 and a year-end target of $1.15. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights Based on long-term moving averages and the advance/decline line, the dollar selloff is still only a severe correction. These factors need to be monitored closely as they stand on the edge. To rebound, the dollar will need U.S. inflation to pick up, which will lift the U.S. OIS curve. Signs are accumulating that U.S. inflation will trough toward the end of 2017. Buying the dollar versus the yen is a much safer bet than shorting the euro. The CAD has more upside, especially on its crosses. Feature The U.S. dollar continues to be tested by investors. As paradoxical as it may sound, it is still too early to sound the death knell for the dollar bull market. However, it is not time either to aggressively bet on a rebound. For that to happen, U.S. inflation must regain its footing in a more convincing fashion. Why Isn't The Bull Market Dead? There are many facets to this question, but let's begin with technical considerations. First, the dollar's advance / decline line has not broken down (Chart I-1). A breakdown in this measure would be one of the key technical signals that the dollar has begun a new cyclical downtrend. In the mid-1990s, the dollar did experience a period of correction. During that time frame, the A/D line was also unable to break down, later highlighting that what was initially perceived as the beginning a new bear market was ultimately a prolonged period of consolidation. Chart I-1Still Not A Cyclical Bear Market Still Not A Cyclical Bear Market Still Not A Cyclical Bear Market Second, the dollar's trend has been best approximated by the four-year moving average of monthly prices. Since the Smithsonian Agreement of 1971, during bear markets, the dollar tends to find its ceiling around this indicator, and during bull markets, it tends to put a floor around this moving average (Chart I-2). Today, the dollar has yet to end a month below this measure. Third, positioning in the dollar is now depressed, as investors have purged their stale USD longs (Chart I-3). When one looks at net long speculative positions in EUR/USD - the most convenient and liquid instrument to bet on the dollar - investors are clearly enamored with the euro, which by definition illustrates their dislike of the greenback. Chart I-2No Trend Break For Now No Trend Break For Now No Trend Break For Now Chart I-3Dollar Downside Is Limited Dollar Downside Is Limited Dollar Downside Is Limited Technical indicators argue that we have experienced a painful correction in the USD, but valuation considerations suggest it will be difficult for these technical indicators to deteriorate enough to begin flagging a cyclical bear market. Our long-term fair value model, which incorporates productivity differentials, highlights that the dollar never hit the nosebleed levels associated with bull market tops in 1985 or in 2001 (Chart I-4). The stability in the trade balance and the current account - both have been stable at around 3% of GDP and 2.5% of GDP, respectively - are at odds with the sharp deterioration in the balance of payments that has occurred when the dollar has been genuinely expensive. Our intermediate-term valuation models point to an even more unequivocal conclusion. Based on this metric, the DXY is at its cheapest level since 2009, a discount that historically has been associated with dollar bottoms, at least temporary ones (Chart I-5). This gives us comfort that the A/D line is unlikely to break down for now, or that the dollar will end September significantly below its crucial four-year moving average. However, if these things happen, the dollar could experience significant downside. Chart I-4The Dollar Never Reached Nosebleed Valuations The Dollar Never Reached Nosebleed Valuations The Dollar Never Reached Nosebleed Valuations Chart I-5Big Discount To IRP Big Discount To IRP Big Discount To IRP Economic forces too do not point to a sharp move in the DXY below 91 - one that could drive the dollar down into the low 80s. After a period of deep underperformance, the U.S.'s economic surprises relative to the G10 have begun to stabilize, as have inflation surprises. More saliently, the incredible strength in the U.S. ISM manufacturing index, especially when compared to other PMIs around the world, points to a rebound in the USD, or at the very least, stabilization (Chart I-6). Finally, the market has now all but priced out additional hikes from the U.S. interest rate curve. There are only 30 basis points of hikes priced in over the next 24 months. Moreover, the probability of the fed funds rate remaining between 1% and 1.25% only falls below 50% in September 2018 (Table I-1). This seems to be a sanguine scenario. Chart I-6Cyclical Support ##br## For USD Cyclical Support For USD Cyclical Support For USD Table I-1Investors See U.S. Rates At Current ##br##Levels Until Late 2018 Conflicting Forces For The Dollar Conflicting Forces For The Dollar Bottom Line: The dollar's technicals are not yet indicative of the end of the cyclical bull market. However, they do need to be monitored closely. Additionally, the dollar is trading at a large discount to interest rate parity relationships, and the Federal Reserve is not expected to execute its next hike until late 2018. While these factors may not point to an imminent rebound in the USD, they do suggest that the down-wave in the dollar is very long in the tooth. Chasing the dollar lower is dangerous. Too Early To Bet The House On A Renewed Upleg Chart I-7The Global Deflation Anchor The Global Deflation Anchor The Global Deflation Anchor This observation on the probability of a Fed move brings us to the vital question of what could lift the U.S. interest rate curve higher, and thus the dollar. This would be the outlook for inflation. As Fed Governor Lael Brainard clearly argued this week, the Fed is not meeting its inflation mandate, warranting a slower pace of rate increases as global deflationary forces remain very potent. The dovish path implied by interest rate markets shows that investors already agree with this assessment. There is no denying that inflation has been globally and structurally pulled down by various forces. While the "Amazon effect" has grabbed headlines, Mark McClellan argues in The Bank Credit Analyst this month that the effect of e-commerce on inflation is no greater than that of Walmart in the 1990s - and probably amounts to a meagre 0.1-0.2% depressive impact on inflation.1 Instead, we peg the capacity buildup in EM and China - which has lifted the global capital stock massively since the turn of the millennia - as the main source of global deflation (Chart I-7). Now that global credit growth is lower than it was before 2008, it has become clearer that the global supply side of the economy has expanded faster than underlying demand, resulting in downward pressure on prices. Nonetheless, while there is a lid on inflation, this does not imply that cyclical determinants of inflation have been fully neutered. They simply have become weaker. Inflation can still ebb and flow in response to the business cycle, but the upside is not as strong as it once was. This limits how high nominal interest rate can go, which is why it is hard to envision a terminal rate much above 3% - a very low reading by post-war standards. Here, we continue to see a turning point coming later this year for inflation, one that would pull core PCE closer to the 2% mark wanted by the Fed in 2018. In the background, our composite capacity utilization indicator is now firmly in "no slack" territory, an environment in which inflation tends to perk up and where interest rate exhibit upside (Chart I-8). This is not enough to warrant fears of inflation, but healthy growth in this context should be a red flag for deflationists. This is exactly the set of circumstances we envision for the next 12 months, even if hurricane Harvey and its potential successors create noise in upcoming data. The U.S. economy has benefited from a strong easing in financial conditions since February 2016. The recent fall in real rates, which has been the key driver of the 60 basis-points fall in Treasury yields since December 2016, is now demonstrably reflationary. Lumber prices are once again at the top of their trading range since 2013, and gold prices have regained vigor. In this optic, the ratio of metal to bond prices - adjusted for their very different volatilities - has been a reliable leading indicator of U.S. growth (Chart I-9). Today, it is pointing to an acceleration of GDP growth relative to potential, the very definition of declining slack. Chart I-8Tight U.S. Capacity Is Inflationary Tight U.S. Capacity Is Inflationary Tight U.S. Capacity Is Inflationary Chart I-9Relfation Will Boost U.S. Growth Above Trend Relfation Will Boost U.S. Growth Above Trend Relfation Will Boost U.S. Growth Above Trend The labor market continues to display signs of resilience as well. True, the last employment report was paltry, but August has been marked by seasonal weaknesses for the past seven years. Moreover, August weaknesses have tended to be minimized in the wake of the notorious revisions typical of the U.S. Department of Labor. However, the strength in the labor market components of the NFIB small businesses survey highlights the potential for more job gains going forward. Where this indicator really shines though, is in its capacity to forecast household total wages and salaries (Chart I-10). Today, this gauge highlights that the income of middle class households will accelerate over the next six months. This matters because if the middle class - a category of U.S. households that gather the vast majority of their income from wages - experiences strong income growth, this will create robust support for consumption. With consumption accounting for 70% of U.S. GDP, a boost to this component would go a long way in lifting aggregate growth. Stronger growth in a tight economy is inflationary, and monetary dynamics confirm this risk. The U.S. velocity of money has picked up meaningfully, and now suggests that inflation will gather steam later this year (Chart I-11). Chart I-10The Labor Market Is Still Strong The Labor Market Is Still Strong The Labor Market Is Still Strong Chart I-11Monetary Dynamics Point To More Inflation Monetary Dynamics Point To More Inflation Monetary Dynamics Point To More Inflation We therefore expect that when this turnaround in inflation emerges, investors will re-assess their expectations for the path of U.S. monetary policy, and the dollar will finally be able to resume its upward trek toward new highs. But until inflation turns the corner, the dollar will continue to struggle to rally durably. Bottom Line: The U.S. economy is still on a firming path. With the amount of slack in the economy vanishing and with the velocity of money accelerating, this will lead to a pick-up in inflation late this year. The end of Q4 is likely to prove the moment when the dollar will finally be able to begin firming up. Investment Implications Shorting the Yen Is Still The Safest Bet Shorting the yen remains the best way to play a dollar rebound for now. The yen has not benefited much from the recent bout of risk aversion prompted by the renewed flare-up of in tensions in the Korean peninsula. It remains weak on its crosses like EUR/JPY, CAD/JPY or even AUD/JPY. USD/JPY seems incapable of staying below 108.5, and may even be forming a consolidation pattern reminiscent of the one experienced in 2013 (Chart I-12). In late 2013, this pattern was resolved by U.S. bond yields moving higher. This time is likely to be similar. The recent weakness in Japanese wages remains a key hurdle that the Bank of Japan does not seem able to shake off. Wage growth hit it slowest pace since 2015 and real wages are worryingly weak (Chart I-13). This is not the picture of an economy with any hint of inflation, even if the labor market is tight. Illustrating this point, contrarily to the euro area, Japanese inflation expectations have not kept pace with the U.S. in recent months (Chart I-14). This argues that the BoJ faces the greatest burden of any central bank. With the BoJ now packed with doves, we expect that interest rates and bond yields in Japan will remain capped for the foreseeable future. As a result, if U.S. bond yields can rise in the face of a strong U.S. economy, JGB yields will not follow higher. This will flatter USD/JPY. Chart I-12Consolidation Pattern In USD/JPY Consolidation Pattern In USD/JPY Consolidation Pattern In USD/JPY Chart I-13Falling Labor Income In Japan Falling Labor Income In Japan Falling Labor Income In Japan Chart I-14Japanese CPI Swaps Are Outliers Japanese CPI Swaps Are Outliers Japanese CPI Swaps Are Outliers A More Complex Picture For The Euro As investors have become more comfortable with the economic and political prospects of the euro area, the euro has become increasingly over-owned, but most importantly, has completely deviated from interest rate parity relationship (Chart I-15). At first glance, this would indicate the euro is greatly vulnerable. This reality, along with very long positioning of speculators in EUR/USD, highlights that it will be difficult for the euro to stay above 1.20 in the coming months. However, for the euro to move below 1.15, U.S. inflation has to pick up. Thus, for the remainder of the year, the EUR/USD is likely to remain range bound between these two numbers. Two factors make the picture less clear for EUR/USD than for USD/JPY. First, the European Central Bank is intent on beginning to taper its asset purchases this year, a move that will be announced in October. At yesterday's press conference, ECB President Mario Draghi was unequivocal about this, despite the slight curtailments to the central bank's inflation forecasts. Moreover, the seeming lack of concern vis-à-vis this year's 6% increase in the trade-weighted euro was perceived by investors as a green light to keep betting on a stronger EUR/USD. Second, as we argued five months ago, exchange rate dynamics are more a function of assets' expected returns than just interest rate differentials.2 As Chart I-16 illustrates, when a portfolio of eurozone stocks, bonds and cash outperforms a similar U.S. one, this leads to a durable rally in EUR/USD. Today, the relative performance of this European portfolio is toward the bottom of its historical distribution, and may even be already turning the corner. If this move has durability, inflows into the euro area could push EUR/USD back into the 1.3 to 1.4 range. Chart I-15Euro Is Expensive ##br##To IRP Euro Is Expensive To IRP Euro Is Expensive To IRP Chart I-16Outperforming Euro Area Assets##br### Could Support EUR/USD Outperforming Euro Area Assets Could Support EUR/USD Outperforming Euro Area Assets Could Support EUR/USD The Loonie Will Keep Flying The Bank of Canada delivered another rate hike this week. The BoC continues to focus on closing the Canadian output gap and the strong economy, ignoring weak wages and inflation. The BoC was rather sanguine regarding the slowdown in real estate activity in Toronto, Canada's largest city, and seemed comfortable with the CAD's recent strength, arguing it was a reflection of Canada's strength and not yet an impediment to it. The CAD interpreted this announcement bullishly. We agree. In a Special Report written last July, we argued that the BoC was among the best-placed central banks to tighten policy among the G10.3 Additionally, the CAD is cheap, trading at a 7% discount to PPP. It is also still below its fair value, implied by interest rate differentials. As such, we continue to overweight the Canadian dollar, being long the loonie against the euro and the Aussie. It also has upside against the USD, but could prove vulnerable to a pick-up in U.S. inflation. Thus, we remain committed to buying the CAD on its crosses. Bottom Line: The euro may be expensive relative to interest rate differentials, but the anticipation around the ECB's tapering continues to represent a support under EUR/USD. As a result, this pair is likely to remain range-bound, roughly between 1.2 and 1.15. USD/JPY has more upside as Japanese inflation expectations and wages are sagging, suggesting the BoJ is nowhere near the ECB in terms of moving away from an ultra-accommodative stance. The CAD will continue to experience upside for the remainder of the year; stay long the loonie on its crosses. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, "Did Amazon Kill The Phillips Curve?" dated August 3, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot", dated April 14, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy And Global Alpha Sector Strategy Special Report, "Who Hikes Next?", dated June 30, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 The dollar had a particularly eventful week. With Fed officials Brainard and Kashkari unleashing their dovish remarks, the greenback suffered as investors pushed down 10-year yields. While Brainard highlighted her concern over the "recent low readings of inflation", Kashkari took it further and said that the hikes may be "doing real harm" to the economy. Adding to the Fed's concerns, Stanley Fischer, a long-serving Fed official and an ardent supporter of policy normalization, announced his resignation on Wednesday. Mario Draghi's hawkish press conference added further downward pressure on the dollar, with the DXY making a new low of 91.41. It is unlikely that the dollar will be able to meaningfully rally until inflation re-emerges, a year-end event. Report Links: 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 Fade North Korea, And Sell The Yen - August 11, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 The euro reacted very positively to the ECB monetary policy speech. Draghi highlighted the uncertainty associated with the strong currency, but noted that the ECB doesn't expect it to have a large impact on inflation, which helped the euro hit a high of EUR/USD 1.2018. He nonetheless highlighted that achieving the ECB's price mandate will require "patience" and "persistence" and he expects inflation to hit its target by 2020. Additionally, the ECB lowered its inflation forecasts, while increasing its 2017 growth forecasts. In terms of QE, Draghi clarified that details will be revealed in the next meeting held on October 26, but that interest rates will remain accommodative for an extended period of time. Although President Draghi laid out some concerns about the strong euro, it seems momentum is unlikely to falter unless markets become more positive on the dollar or the pound. We expect this to occur by the end of this year, when inflation picks up again in the U.S. Report Links: 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been negative: Industrial production yearly growth declines substantially from June's 5.5% number, coming in at 4.7%. This data point also underperformed expectations. Housing starts contracted by 2.3% on a YoY basis, also underperforming expectations. Meanwhile, labor cash earnings also contracted by 0.3% on a yearly basis, underperforming expectations. As we highlighted a few weeks ago, multiple indicators are signaling a slowdown in the Japanese economy. The recent batch of negative data seems to confirm this view, which means that the dovish bias of the BoJ will only be further reinforced. Consequently the yen will be the mirror image of U.S. bonds. Given that rate expectations have collapsed to the point that the market is only anticipating 30 basis points in hikes in the U.S. over the next 2 years, risks point upwards for USD/JPY. Report Links: 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 Fade North Korea, And Sell The Yen - August 11, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in U.K. has been mixed: Markit manufacturing PMI increased from August to July, coming in at 56.9. This data point also outperformed expectations. Meanwhile, both construction and Markit services PMI underperformed expectations coming in at 51.2 and 53.2, respectively. Finally, nationwide house price year-on-year growth also underperformed expectations, coming in at 2.1%. At the beginning of August, we warned of a repricing of rate expectations in the U.K. given that the pass through from the currency was set to dissipate, while the housing market and real disposable income were undergoing a major slowdown. So far, this view has proven correct, with the pound falling against the dollar and the euro. We expect that GBP/USD has further downside on a 12 month basis, as rate expectations in the U.S. have likely found a bottom. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Data out of Australia was not particularly strong: TD Securities Inflation dropped on an annual basis to 2.6% from 2.7%; Gross operating profits contracted at a 4.5% rate, below the expected 4% contraction; Current account balance came in at AUD -9.862 bn, below expectations, following a 59% decrease in the trade balance from the last quarter, and a 4% decrease in the net primary income; Most notably, GDP grew at the expected 1.8% annual rate, albeit faster than the previous growth rate of 1.7%. The RBA decided to leave rates unchanged, but with a slightly hawkish tone. While growth is generally in line with the Bank's forecasts, it was also highlighted that the appreciating exchange rate and low wages remain headwinds for inflation. A brighter housing market was noted as house price increases are slowing down, owing to macroprudential measures. While the Bank sees an improving labor market, we remain skeptical as the underemployment rate has not improved, which is limiting wage growth. Report Links: 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 Surprisingly, in spite of the weakness of the U.S. dollar, the kiwi has been falling for the past month. This has been in part due to some weak data coming out of New Zealand: Building permits continued their decline, with a Month-on-Month decline in July of 0.7%. Both the ANZ Activity Outlook and the Business Confidence indicators declines in August relative to July. The New Zealand terms of trade Index underperformed expectations, coming in at 1.5%. Additionally July's number was revised down from 5.1% to 3.9%. The recent weakness in the NZD might be indicative of some weakness permeating from EM, given that the New Zealand economy is highly sensitive to the global economy. If an EM selloff materializes we expect significant downside for the NZD particularly against the yen. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 Data has been quite strong out of the Canadian economy recently: The current account deficit was better than expected at CAD -16.32 bn, with the merchandise trade balance also improving; Manufacturing PMI came in at 51.7, beating the expected 51.3; GDP growth came in at an astonishing 4.5% annualized rate; Accordingly, the BoC raised the overnight rate to 1%. Markets were expecting hawkish remarks, but not a hike. The CAD rallied more than 1% against USD on the news, and outperformed all other G10 currencies. Current expectations for a December hike are at 68%, and we agree. The CAD will see further strength against all G10 currencies except USD by the end of the year. Report Links: 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland has been mixed: Gross Domestic Product yearly growth came in at 0.3%, underperforming expectations and deaccelerating from a month ago. Headline inflation came in line with expectations at 0.5%, it also increase from the previous month reading of 0.3%. Real retails sales underperformed expectations, contracting by 0.7% on a YoY basis. However the SVME PMI outperformed and increased from the July reading, coming in at 61.2. After reaching 1.15 in early August, EUR/CHF has stabilized around to 1.135. Overall the Swiss economy is still too weak for the SNB to change their stance on currency intervention. Core Inflation will have to pick up to at least 1% for the SNB to consider a change in stance and let go of the implied floor in EUR/CHF. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway has been positive: Retails sales monthly growth came in at 0.4%, recovering from last month negative reading ad outperforming expectations. Manufacturing output growth also outperformed expectations, coming in at 1.5%. Finally registered unemployment came in at 2.7%, declining from last month reading and coming in line with expectations. USD/NOK has continued to go down as rate expectations for the U.S. have decreased and oil prices have increased thanks to the refining shut-downs in Texas due to hurricane Harvey. We expect this trend to reverse once rate expectations in the U.S. start to go up. However, we do expect more downside in EUR/NOK as this cross is much more sensitive to oil prices. Report Links: 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 Swedish data was largely downbeat: Retail sales are growing at a 3.7% annual rate, in line with expectations; The Swedish trade balance went into a deficit in July of SEK -0.5 bn from a SEK 5.4 bn surplus in June; Consumer confidence decreased to 100.3 from 102.2 and below the expected 103; Manufacturing PMI also disappointed at 54.7, below the expected 60; Swedish IP is growing at a still high 5.3% annual pace, but less than the previous 8.9% rate; While this data was somewhat weak, Swedish inflation is at or above its target across all measures. The Riksbank left its repo rate unchanged at -0.5%. In its press release, the Bank highlighted high growth and inflation but stated that the rate will not be increased until the middle of 2018. It also increased inflation forecasts, with CPI and CPIF predicted at 2.9% and 2.1% by 2019. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Closed Trades
Feature Healthy consumer spending driving a booming sales environment, along with the operating leverage that high revenue growth produces, have been the key underpinnings of the nascent revival in the S&P 500 margin expansion. This has occurred against the backdrop of muted wage growth in most sectors which has amplified margin expansion. We recently showed that S&P 500 operating leverage has historically added $1.4 of earnings for every $1 of incremental revenues (please see our Weekly Report of April 17, 2017 for more details). On a trailing 12-month basis, the S&P 500 has added more than $3 of earnings for every $1 of incremental revenues, more than double the historical average operating leverage. Clearly this pace of margin expansion is unsustainable, particularly since the tight labor market seems likely to force a reacceleration in wage growth. A common narrative among investors has been that late-cycle dynamics will soon force a mean reversion in S&P 500 operating margins. However, and while every economic cycle is different, true mean reversion only happens in recessions (Chart 1). Chart 1Margins Can Expand From Here Margins Can Expand From Here Margins Can Expand From Here Further, the absolute margin level of the S&P 500 is far from being without precedent. Since the 1970's, margins have typically peaked for the cycle only after approaching one standard deviation above the trend and the current S&P500 margin is just past halfway there. It is also worth noting that margins can stay extended for a considerable time; margins have surpassed one standard deviation above trend twice this decade without a material retrenchment. Chart 2 shows the high, low and current trailing operating margins of the S&P 500 and the eleven GICS1 sectors. At first glance, it appears that margins are particularly high in the heavyweight financials and IT sectors. Some context is required; both sectors experienced bubbles in the last two decades that saw operating profits plumb extreme lows in the subsequent busts, making their profit ranges appear unusually broad. Chart 3 corrects to exclude two-standard deviation events for all sectors. The message is clear: margins still have significant room to run. Chart 2High, Low And Current Trailing S&P 500 Operating Margins Sector Margin Outlook: Profit Growth Is Not Done Yet Sector Margin Outlook: Profit Growth Is Not Done Yet Chart 3High, Low And Current Trailing S&P 500 Operating Margins, Normalized Sector Margin Outlook: Profit Growth Is Not Done Yet Sector Margin Outlook: Profit Growth Is Not Done Yet Operating margins in isolation only tell part of the story. In Chart 4, we compare profitability to the capital deployed in pursuit of said profits. Capital deployed and its earned return should theoretically plot on a linear function; plotting above the fitted regression line implies insufficient returns, while plotting below the line indicates excess returns. In our analysis, most sectors plot relatively closely to the market line with a few notable outliers. Financials are likely earning significant excess returns on capital, while utilities are waving a warning flag. We reiterate our overweight and underweight ratings on these two sectors, respectively (Chart 4). Chart 4Capital Intensity Of Profits Sector Margin Outlook: Profit Growth Is Not Done Yet Sector Margin Outlook: Profit Growth Is Not Done Yet The upshot of high margins and low capital requirements is above-average return on capital. Consequently, rising valuation multiples move in tandem with ROIC and vice-versa. Our analysis bears that out; financials are relatively far along the continuum along which most of the S&P 500 sectors plot, though still modestly below the fitted regression line indicating fair value. Conversely, real estate, while attractive from a return on capital perspective, is highly overvalued (Chart 5). Chart 5Margin Efficiency And Valuation Sector Margin Outlook: Profit Growth Is Not Done Yet Sector Margin Outlook: Profit Growth Is Not Done Yet This Special Report takes a sector-by-sector view on the margin outlook that supports our thesis of ongoing margin gains delivering an earnings-driven stock market rally. Chris Bowes, Associate Editor U.S. Equity Strategy chrisb@bcaresearch.com Chart 6Oil Stocks Look Set To Decline Oil Stocks Look Set To Decline Oil Stocks Look Set To Decline Chart 7Capital Formation Should Take Off Capital Formation Should Take Off Capital Formation Should Take Off Chart 8Consumers Have Opened Their Wallets Consumers Have Opened Their Wallets Consumers Have Opened Their Wallets Chart 9Surging Global Manufacturing Surging Global Manufacturing Surging Global Manufacturing Chart 10Real Estate Rents Look##br## Set To Decline Real Estate Rents Look Set To Decline Real Estate Rents Look Set To Decline Chart 11The Right Conditions For Industrial##br## Margin Expansion The Right Conditions For Industrial Margin Expansion The Right Conditions For Industrial Margin Expansion Chart 12Dark Clouds On The Horizon ##br##For Health Care Margins Dark Clouds On The Horizon For Health Care Margins Dark Clouds On The Horizon For Health Care Margins Chart 13Utilities Margins Are##br## Likely To Contract Utilities Margins Are Likely To Contract Utilities Margins Are Likely To Contract S&P Energy (Overweight) Chart 14S&P Energy S&P Energy S&P Energy Energy operating profit margins have been on a wild ride, collapsing with the underlying commodity and then partially recovering as the industry rationalized. Analysts are forecasting more of the same, with the industry forecast to generate profits for the first time in more than two years. Pricing power has spiked higher, though from an extremely low base, as the aforementioned industry rationalization has taken hold. Wage growth looks fairly tepid and the net margin impact supports the forecast view of margin expansion. Rampant cost inflation appears to be a thing of the past. Accordingly, the essential component for margin recovery will be top line growth. The key factors in a top-line growth scenario for the energy sector will be a demand-driven recovery in crude oil prices, supported by continued supply-side discipline. The current global economic revival and pause in the U.S. dollar bull market are catalysts for the former while OPEC 2.0 supply cuts (with effective compliance) and lower crude supply are catalysts for the latter. Encouragingly, the rig count remains well below peak levels, Cushing crude oil inventories are contracting on a year-over-year basis and OECD oil stocks appear poised to contract in late autumn/early winter (Chart 6). Net, we are constructive on energy sector margins (Chart 14). S&P Financials (Overweight) Chart 15S&P Financials S&P Financials S&P Financials Margins, though below historic peak levels, have improved dramatically. The stock market has not rewarded the sector for the solid performance, making financials a standout sector where earnings have led prices higher, rather than multiple expansion. A healthy consumer, housing market and corporate sector should lead to strong capital formation which, in turn, implies improving revenue growth for financials. This is captured by our loans & leases model which points to the largest upswing in credit growth of the past 30 years (Chart 7) Banks in particular benefit from a healthy economy as very low unemployment should be accompanied by solid loan quality which makes the industry's margin gains more durable (Chart 7). We expect banks, as the largest segment of the financials sector, to lead the index higher. Pricing power and wage growth have recently been diverging with the former moving steeply positive and the latter falling to the slowest growth of the past 5 years. These moves bode well for future margin expansion; analysts agree, with forecasts pointing to margins approaching twenty-year highs (Chart 15). S&P Consumer Discretionary (Overweight) Chart 16S&P Consumer Discretionary S&P Consumer Discretionary S&P Consumer Discretionary Consumer discretionary margins have inflated dramatically and, despite a moderation in actual and forecast profitability, they remain more than one standard deviation above normal. Wage growth is declining from fairly eye-watering levels but still remains faster than the muted sector pricing power. The net of these points is falling margins, in line with analyst forecasts. Spending has recently poked higher as a much improved household balance sheet and wage growth have made the consumer feel flush enough to start spending some of their accumulated savings of the past few years (Chart 8). This resurgence in demand should mean, barring any external shock, that pricing power will recover, though a tight labor market could present a considerable offset via above-normal wage growth. Within the index, margin strength is particularly notable in Home Improvement Retail and Cable & Satellite; both are benefitting from the themes noted above and have seen revenue growth driving wider margins. The Auto Components index is a rare underperformer with margins shrinking as the companies adjust to slowing North American light vehicle production. Net, we remain positive on consumer discretionary profit growth (Chart 16). S&P Consumer Staples (Overweight) Chart 17S&P Consumer Staples S&P Consumer Staples S&P Consumer Staples Consumer staples margins have seen a general upward trajectory over the past three years, though have recently rolled over. The key culprits have been food & drug deflation with retail struggling to maintain profits. Forecasts are pointing to a resumption of the upward margin trend, in line with our improving proxy measure (Chart 17, bottom panel). Eventually staples will regain some share of the consumer's wallet. The wage bill is moving in the right direction and even a modest uptick in sector pricing power could trigger margin expansion. It is worth noting that consumer staples is our only remaining overweight defensive index as we have drifted toward cyclical sectors with our increasingly bullish stance over the course of the year. Still, we remain confident of a modest sector margin recovery, though expect consumer discretionary to have a better profit growth profile. S&P Telecommunication Services (Neutral) Chart 18S&P Telecom Services S&P Telecom Services S&P Telecom Services S&P telecom services is at the very bottom of the GICS1 sector EPS growth table this year despite easy comparable quarters in 2016; this is reflected in the index's steady downward drift (Chart 18, top panel). Still, margins have started staging a recovery and the sell-side appears reasonably optimistic. The issue is pricing, the weakness of which is taking profits down regardless of margin resilience. Encouragingly, selling prices cannot contract at 10% per annum indefinitely and recent anecdotal evidence from earnings calls suggests that the peak deflationary impulse is likely behind the industry. Impressive labor cost discipline along with even a modest pricing power rebound signal that a grinding higher margin backdrop is likely in the coming months, though our margin proxy is weighed down by still-falling pricing power (Chart 18, bottom panel). S&P Materials (Neutral) Chart 19S&P Materials S&P Materials S&P Materials Margins in the S&P materials index have recovered sharply from their recent lows, with analysts forecasting continued margin expansion. Said margin expansion will be dependent on the industry holding on to the pricing power gains it has made over the past year; we think odds are good this can happen. A global manufacturing rebound appears to be underway; the global manufacturing PMI has recently reaccelerated and jumped to a six year high (Chart 9). Further, it looks likely that a coordinated central bank tightening cycle has begun which should make U.S. exports relatively more attractive, even if the greenback moves laterally from current levels. With respect to chemicals, the dominant materials component industry, a wave of global mergers (Chart 9) should limit price competition while also stripping out some overcapacity which has been a perennial margin overhang. As well, domestic operating conditions have taken a turn for the better as U.S. chemical production has troughed and utilization rates have improved (Chart 9). Still, inventories have surged in advance of the manufacturing recovery (not shown) and any demand misstep could have serious margin implications. Our materials margin proxy points to modest margin gains (Chart 19). S&P Real Estate (Neutral) Chart 20S&P Real Estate S&P Real Estate S&P Real Estate The S&P Real Estate index comprises mostly REITs and does not compare well to the other sectors on an operating margin basis, owing to the vastly different business model. Still, a discussion of drivers of both revenues and costs is worthwhile. Real estate occupancy rates have crested and generationally high supply additions in the apartment space are all but certain to push vacancies higher still (Chart 10). The implication is that rental inflation will remain under intense downward pressure, as has been the case since the beginning of 2016. Worrisomely, credit quality in select commercial real estate (CRE) segments is deteriorating at the margin (Chart 10). Should the trend worsen, REIT margins will deteriorate. According to a recent Fed Senior Loan Officer Survey, bankers are less willing to extend CRE credit. In fact, if one excludes the GFC spike, the tightening in CRE lending standards is near the two previous recessionary highs (Chart 10 on page 8). If banks continue to close the credit taps, CRE prices will suffer a setback. Nevertheless, the tight labor market and accelerating industrial production should keep the appetite for CRE upbeat and prices may have a bit more room to run before reaching a cyclical peak (Chart 20). S&P Industrials (Neutral) Chart 21S&P Industrials S&P Industrials S&P Industrials A demand revival, both domestic and globally, has helped drive a recovery of S&P industrials margins from the mini manufacturing recession of 2015/early-2016. The U.S. dollar bull market has paused (Chart 11), global demand and credit growth has recovered (Chart 11) and domestic optimism abounds (Chart 11); all the conditions look supportive of the consistent margin profile forecast by the sell-side. However, the margin expansion thesis is not without risk; pricing power gains appear to have rolled over while the wage bill, the weakness of which was a significant margin driver, has spiked. The result is that our industrials margin proxy has eased, though we discount the measure as it has not correlated well with observed margins. Still, if demand continues to remain upbeat, the operating leverage impact on the relatively high fixed cost sector should offset labor cost spikes. Net, we expect margins to drift mostly sideways (Chart 21). S&P Health Care (Underweight) Chart 22S&P Health Care S&P Health Care S&P Health Care S&P health care margins are showing warning signs of a potential retreat. Pricing power has worsened significantly since recent highs in 2016 which could warn of a top line contraction, particularly in the context of drug price inflation. Chart 12 shows that since 2005 drug prices have nearly doubled and the slope has actually steepened since 2011. Health care spending in the U.S. comprises over 17% of GDP, the highest in the world, but it has likely plateaued. Real health care spending is decelerating in absolute terms, and had been contracting compared with overall PCE earlier this year (Chart 12). This suggests that selling price blues are demand driven and will likely continue to weigh on health care profits. Not only are selling prices softening, but also the health care sector wage bill is on fire, pushing multi-year highs. Taken together, operating margins will continue to compress, sustaining the recent down drift. Should margins worsen as we expect, the recent updraft in the index price should follow earnings downward (Chart 22). S&P Utilities (Underweight) Chart 23S&P Utilities S&P Utilities S&P Utilities In earlier sections of this report, we have discussed the beneficiaries of growing ebullience in global economic expectations; utilities are at the opposite end of the spectrum. Now that the Fed is ready to start unwinding its balance sheet, the ECB is preparing the waters for QE tapering and a slew of CBs are on the cusp of a new tightening interest rate cycle, there are high odds that fixed income proxies, utilities among them, will continue to suffer. From a profit perspective, our margin proxy is pointing to a pricing driven recovery. However, contracting natural gas prices, the marginal price setter for the industry, suggest that recent utilities pricing power gains are running on empty (Chart 13). Tack on waning productivity, with labor additions handily outpacing electricity production, and the ingredients for a margin squeeze are in place (Chart 13). Importantly, industry utilization rates are probing multi-decade lows and overcapacity is negative for pricing power. Chart 13 confirms that utilities construction is relentless at a time when turbine and generator inventories have been hitting all-time highs. This is a deflationary backdrop, and suggests that sell-side analyst optimism is wrong footed. Net, we think margin weakness should persist (Chart 23). S&P Information Technology (Underweight) Chart 24S&P Information Technology S&P Information Technology S&P Information Technology Margins in the S&P information technology index are pushing their 20-year highs. However, the sector is a story of leaders and laggards. The technology hardware, storage & peripherals sub-index (almost entirely AAPL), for example, has seen their operating margin roughly double in the past ten years. Conversely, communications equipment is in the midst of a collapse in pricing power as intense competition has engulfed telcos (their principal customer group) and the uncertainty in the federal government has held back outlays. Our margin proxy is pointing to a modest margin contraction, a result of slipping sector pricing power partially offset by a flat to slightly negative sector wage bill. This stands in contrast to sell-side forecasts who expect margins to hit record levels in the next year. We view the sell-side as overly sanguine with respect to margins and expect pricing power to weigh in coming months (Chart 24).