Labor Market

Highlights Strikes result from divergent perceptions of bargaining power: A strike reflects a negotiating failure, and negotiations fail when parties cannot agree on which side has the stronger position, typically because at least one of them overestimates its leverage. Once a strike starts, broad macro factors influence the outcome: Labor market slack, economic concentration, trends in labor relations law and regulations, and the gap between labor’s and management’s fortunes (if extreme) are the key macro determinants of negotiating leverage. Key factors that have bolstered management for decades are poised to reverse: Legal and regulatory trends have little room to improve from management’s perspective, and the gap between management’s and labor’s share of rewards is ripe for narrowing. A union resurgence is a low-probability, high-impact event: We view the potential for labor to gain the upper hand over management as a low-probability event that would have a significant impact on markets if it did come to pass, so it merits a close look. Feature We concluded Part 1 by highlighting two consistent themes from the modern history of the US labor movement: successful strikes beget strikes, and employees are unlikely to make gains if judges and government officials are disposed to favor management. In this installment, we will focus on the factors that encourage strikes and the non-government determinants of their success. Part 3 will focus on public opinion, elected officials and the judiciary. Our ultimate goal is to evaluate relative bargaining power, and the potential for organized labor to push wages significantly higher, upending the risk-friendly status quo. The Origin Of Strikes Strikes (and lockouts) occur when labor and management cannot reach a mutually acceptable settlement, often because at least one side overestimates its bargaining power. It is easy to agree when labor and management hold similar views about each side’s relative power, as when both perceive that one of them is considerably stronger. In that case, a settlement favoring the stronger side can be reached fairly quickly, especially if the stronger side exercises some restraint and does not seek to impose terms that the weaker side can scarcely abide. Restraint is rational in repeated games like employer-employee bargaining, and when both parties recognize that relative bargaining positions are fluid, they are likely to exercise it. History shows that the pendulum between labor and management swings, albeit slowly, as societal views evolve1 and the business cycle fluctuates. As a general rule, management will have the upper hand during recessions, when the supply of workers exceeds demand, and labor will have the advantage when expansions are well advanced, and capacity tightens. A high unemployment rate broadly favors employers, and a low unemployment rate favors employees. Neither the number of work stoppages (Chart 1, top panel), nor the number of workers involved (Chart 1, middle panel) correlates very well with the unemployment gap (Chart 1, bottom panel), in the Reagan-Thatcher era, however, as work stoppages have dwindled almost to zero. Chart 1Swamped By The Legal And Regulatory Tide Swamped By The Legal And Regulatory Tide Swamped By The Legal And Regulatory Tide Game theory is better equipped than simple regression models to offer insight into the origin of strikes. We posit a simple framework in which each side can hold any of five perceptions of its own bargaining power, resulting in a total of 25 possible joint perceptions. Management (M) can believe it is way stronger than Labor (L), M >> L; stronger than Labor, M > L; roughly equal, M ≈ L; weaker than Labor, L > M; or way weaker than Labor, L >> M. Labor also holds one of these five perceptions, and the interaction of the two sides’ perceptions establishes the path negotiations will follow. The fur flies when each party thinks the other should make the bulk of the concessions: labor negotiations over the next couple of years could be interesting. Limiting our focus to today’s prevailing conditions, Figure 1 displays only the outcomes consistent with management’s belief that it has the upper hand. For completeness, the exhibit lists all of labor’s potential perceptions, but we deem the two in which labor is feeling its oats (circled) to be most likely, given the success of recent high-profile strikes.2 Management’s confidence follows logically from four decades of victories, but may prove to be unfounded if its power has already peaked. Figure 1The Eye Of The Beholder Labor Strikes Back, Part 2: Where Strikes Come From And Who Wins Them Labor Strikes Back, Part 2: Where Strikes Come From And Who Wins Them Strike outcomes turn on which side has overestimated its leverage. The broad factors we use to assess leverage are overall labor market slack; economic concentration; regulatory and legal trends; and the sustainability of either side’s accumulated advantage, which we describe as the labor-management rubber band. Other factors that matter on a case-by-case basis, but are beyond the scope of our analysis, include industry-level slack, a labor input’s susceptibility to automation, and the degree of labor specialization/skill involved in that input. For these micro-level factors, a given group of workers’ leverage is inversely related to the availability of substitutes for their input. Labor Market Slack Chart 2Surprise Wage Retracements Surprise Wage Retracements Surprise Wage Retracements Despite muted wage growth (Chart 2), the labor market is demonstrably tight. The unemployment rate is at a 50-year low, the broader definition of unemployment is at the lowest level in its 26-year history, and the prime-age employment-to-population ratio is back to its 2001 levels, having surpassed the previous cycle’s peak (Chart 3). The job openings rate is high, indicating that demand for workers is robust, and so is the quits rate, indicating that employers are competing vigorously to meet it. The NFIB survey’s job openings and hiring plans series (Chart 4) echo the JOLTS findings. Chart 3Prime-Age Employment Is At An 18-Year High ... Prime-Age Employment Is At An 18-Year High ... Prime-Age Employment Is At An 18-Year High ... Chart 4... But There Are Still Lots Of Help Wanted Signs ... But There Are Still Lots Of Help Wanted Signs ... But There Are Still Lots Of Help Wanted Signs The lack of labor market slack decisively favors workers’ negotiating position. It is a sellers’ market when demand outstrips supply, and labor victories tend to be self-reinforcing. Successful strikes beget strikes, and management volunteers concessions as labor peace becomes a competitive advantage during strike waves. Given that the crisis-driven damage to the labor force participation rate has healed as the gap between the actual part rate (Chart 5, solid line) and its demographically-determined structural proxy has closed (Chart 5, dashed line), the burden of proof rests squarely with those who argue that there is an ample supply of workers waiting to come off the sidelines. Chart 5The Labor Force Participation Gap Has Closed The Labor Force Participation Gap Has Closed The Labor Force Participation Gap Has Closed Economic Concentration Chart 6Less Competition = More Power Labor Strikes Back, Part 2: Where Strikes Come From And Who Wins Them Labor Strikes Back, Part 2: Where Strikes Come From And Who Wins Them The trend toward economic concentration (Chart 6) has endowed the largest companies with greater market power, as evidenced by surging corporate profit margins. The greater the concentration of employment opportunities in local labor markets, the more closely they resemble monopsonies.3 Unfortunately for labor, monopsonies restrain prices just as monopolies inflate them. As our Bank Credit Analyst colleagues have shown,4 there is a robust inverse relationship between employment concentration and real wages (Chart 7). Chart 7One Huge Buyer + Plus Multiple Small Sellers = Low Prices Labor Strikes Back, Part 2: Where Strikes Come From And Who Wins Them Labor Strikes Back, Part 2: Where Strikes Come From And Who Wins Them Economic concentration has been a major driver of management’s Reagan-Thatcher era dominance. Sleepy to indifferent antitrust enforcement has helped businesses capture market power, and it will continue to prevail through 2024 unless the Democrats take the White House in November. The silver lining for workers is that concentration could have the effect of promoting labor organization in services, where unions have heretofore made limited progress. The only way for employees to combat employers’ monopsony power is to organize their way to becoming a monopoly supplier of labor. Regulatory And Legal Trends Over the last four decades, unions have endured a near-constant drubbing from state capitols, federal agencies and the courts, as union and labor protections have been under siege from all sides. Since the air traffic controllers’ disastrous strike, labor’s regulatory and legal fortunes have most closely resembled the competitive fortunes of the Harlem Globetrotters’ beleaguered opposition. But the regulatory and legal tide has been such a huge benefit for management since the beginning of the Reagan administration that it cannot continue to maintain its pace. Employees and employers need each other, and their tether can only be stretched so far before it starts pulling them back together. Investors seem to assume that it will, however, to the extent that they think about it at all. It stands to reason that employers may be similarly complacent. We will look more closely at the presidential election and its potential consequences in Part 3, but labor concerns and inequality are capturing more attention, even among Republicans. With Republicans’ inclination to side with business only able to go in one direction, the chances are good that it has peaked. The Labor-Management Rubber Band For all of the romantic allure of labor’s battles with management in the Colosseum era, employees and employers have a deeply symbiotic relationship. One can’t exist without the other, and pursuing total victory in negotiations is folly. Even too many incremental wins can prove ruinous, as the UAW discovered to its chagrin in 2008. A half-century of generous compensation and stultifying work rules saddled Detroit automakers with a burden that would have put them out of business had the federal government not intervened. Table 1Average Salaries Of Public School Teachers By State Labor Strikes Back, Part 2: Where Strikes Come From And Who Wins Them Labor Strikes Back, Part 2: Where Strikes Come From And Who Wins Them We think of labor and management as being linked by a tether with a finite range. Since neither side can thrive for long if the other side is suffering, the tether pulls the two sides closer together when the gap between them threatens to become too wide. When labor does too well for too long at management’s expense, profit margins shrink and the company’s viability as a going concern is threatened. When management does too well, deteriorating living standards drive the best employees away, undermining productivity and profitability. Before the low-paying entity’s work force becomes a listless dumping ground for other firms’ castoffs, it may rise up and strike out of desperation. Teachers’ unions might have appeared to be setting themselves up for a fall in 2018 by illegally striking in staunchly conservative West Virginia, Oklahoma and Arizona, but desperate times call for desperate measures. Per the National Education Association’s data for the 2017-18 academic year, average public school teacher pay in West Virginia ranked 50th among the 50 states and the District of Columbia, Oklahoma ranked 49th and Arizona ranked 45th (Table 1). Adjusting the nominal salaries for cost disparities across states, West Virginia placed 41st, Oklahoma 44th and Arizona 48th. Given that real teacher salaries had declined by 8% and 9% since 2009-10 in West Virginia and Arizona, respectively, the labor-management rubber band had stretched nearly to the breaking point. Consolidating The Macro Message Parties to negotiations derive leverage from the availability of substitutes. When alternative employment opportunities are prevalent, workers have a lot of leverage, because they can credibly threaten to avail themselves of them. Teaching is a skill that transfers easily, and every state has a public school system, so teachers in low-salary states have a wealth of ready alternatives. The converse is true for low-salary states; despite much warmer temperatures, it is unlikely that teachers from top-quintile states will be willing to take a 25-33% cost-of-living-adjusted pay cut to decamp to Arizona (Table 2). Table 2Cost Of Living-Adjusted Public School Teacher Salaries By State Labor Strikes Back, Part 2: Where Strikes Come From And Who Wins Them Labor Strikes Back, Part 2: Where Strikes Come From And Who Wins Them It is easy to see from Figure 2 why management has had the upper hand. Economic concentration and the legal and regulatory climate have increasingly favored it for decades. The immediate future seems poised to favor labor, however, as the legal and regulatory climate cannot get materially better for employers, and the labor-management rubber band has become so stretched that some sort of mean reversion is inevitable. We have high conviction that labor’s one current advantage, a tight labor market, will remain in its column over the next year or two. On a forward-looking basis, the macro factors as a whole are poised to support labor. Figure 2Macro Drivers Of Negotiating Leverage Labor Strikes Back, Part 2: Where Strikes Come From And Who Wins Them Labor Strikes Back, Part 2: Where Strikes Come From And Who Wins Them ​​​​​​​ Takeaways After discussing this Special Report series with clients, we realized our views could easily be misinterpreted. We are not calling for an imminent union revival that drives wages higher across industries. To be clear, we think it is more likely than not that the labor movement in the United States will remain weak relative to its 1950s to 1970s heyday. We do think, however, that the probability that unions could rise up to exert the leverage that accrues to workers in a tight labor market is considerably larger than the great majority of investors perceive. Alpha – market-beating return – arises from surprises. An investor captures excess returns when s/he successfully anticipates something that the consensus does not. If the disparity involves a trivial outcome, then any excess return is likely to be trivial, but if the outcome is significant, the investor who zigged when the rest of the market zagged stands to separate him/herself from the pack. Management has been in the driver's seat, but the factors that have kept it there have a high risk of reversing. We think the outcome of a shift in leverage from employers to employees would be very large indeed. We would expect that aggregate wage gains of 4% or higher would quickly drive the Fed to impose restrictive monetary policy settings, eventually inducing the next recession and the end of the bull markets in equities, credit and property. A union revival may be a low-probability event, but it would have considerable impact on markets and the economy. Given our conviction that the probability, albeit low, is much greater than investors expect, we think the subject is well worth sustained attention. We will examine public opinion and its effect on elected officials and the courts in Part 3, which will conclude our examination of labor-management dynamics. We will publish that installment on February 3rd; next week we will publish a joint US Investment Strategy – US Bond Strategy Special Report on commercial real estate, lead-authored by Jennifer Lacombe.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 We will discuss public opinion, and its impact on elected officials and courts, in Part 3. 2 Please see the January 13, 2020 US Investment Strategy Special Report, “Labor Strikes Back, Part 1: An Investor’s Guide To US Labor History,” available at www.bcaresearch.com. 3 A monopsony is a market with a single buyer, akin to a monopoly, which is a market with only one seller. 4 Please see the July 2019 Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, “The Productivity Puzzle: Competition Is The Missing Ingredient,” available at bcaresearch.com.

Highlights The balance of power in US labor negotiations has shifted infrequently in the industrial age: Management completely dominated labor before the New Deal, which gave rise to a 45-year labor golden age that lasted until the Reagan revolution and globalization put employers firmly back in control. Employees rarely make gains without sympathetic elected officials and judges: The New Deal was a watershed in labor relations history because it granted workers legal protections that leveled the playing field with employers. Successful strikes beget strikes: Momentum matters in labor negotiations. One union’s win may embolden other unions to strike, blazing a path for further gains by demonstrating that the price of labor peace has risen. The pendulum may be swinging back in labor’s favor: Unions still face formidable headwinds in Washington, DC and state capitals, but a run of successful strikes may signal that rumors of the labor movement's demise have been exaggerated. Feature Where will inflation come from, and when will it arrive? An investor who answers these questions will have advance notice of the end of the expansion and the bull markets in equities and credit. Per our base-case scenario, the expansion won’t end until monetary policy settings become restrictive, and the Fed won’t pursue restrictive policy unless inflation pressures force its hand. Inured by a decade of specious warnings that “money printing” would let the inflation genie out of the bottle, investors are skeptical that inflation will ever re-emerge. The inflation backdrop has become much more supportive in the last few years, however, upon the closing of the output gap, and the stimulus-driven jolt in aggregate demand. Output gaps in other major economies will have to narrow further (Chart 1) for global goods inflation to gain traction, and mild inflation elsewhere in the G7 (Chart 2) suggests that goods prices are not about to surge. Chart 1There's Still Enough Spare Capacity ... There's Still Enough Spare Capacity ... There's Still Enough Spare Capacity ... Chart 2... To Restrain Global Goods Inflation ... To Restrain Global Goods Inflation ... To Restrain Global Goods Inflation Services are not so easily imported, though, and services inflation is a more fully domestic phenomenon. Rising wages could be the spur for services inflation, and the labor market is tight on several counts: the unemployment rate is at a 50-year low; the broader definition of unemployment, also encompassing discouraged workers and the underemployed, reached a new all-time (25-year) low in December; the JOLTS job openings and quits rates at or near their all-time (19-year) highs; and the NFIB survey and a profusion of anecdotal reports suggest that employers are having a hard time finding quality candidates. With labor demand exceeding supply, wages for nonsupervisory workers have duly risen (Chart 3). Gains in other compensation series have been muted, however, and investors have come to yawn and roll their eyes at any mention of the Phillips Curve. Chart 3Wage Growth Is Solid, But It's Lost A Good Bit Of Momentum Wage Growth Is Solid, But It's Lost A Good Bit Of Momentum Wage Growth Is Solid, But It's Lost A Good Bit Of Momentum Perhaps it’s not the Phillips Curve that’s broken, but workers’ spirits. A supine organized labor movement could explain why the Phillips Curve itself is so flat. As the old saying goes, if you don’t ask, you know what you’re going to get, and beleaguered unions and their memberships, cowed by two decades of woe coinciding with China’s entry into the WTO (Chart 4), have been afraid to ask. Strikes are the most potent weapon in labor’s arsenal; if it can’t credibly wield them, it is sure to be steamrolled. Chart 4Globalization Has Been Unkind To Labor Globalization Has Been Unkind To Labor Globalization Has Been Unkind To Labor Two years of high-profile strike victories by public- and private-sector employees may suggest that the sands have begun to shift, however, and inspired our examination of labor’s muscle. This first installment of a multi-part Special Report focuses on the history of US labor relations, with an eye toward identifying themes that shape relative bargaining power. We will subsequently examine the factors influencing the propensity for labor and management militancy, with a focus on where wages are headed in the near future. The Colosseum Era (1800-1933) We view US industrial labor history as having three distinct phases. We label the first, which lasted until the New Dealers took over Washington, the Colosseum era (Figure 1), because labor and management were about as evenly matched as the Christians and the lions in ancient Rome. Uprisings in textile mills, steel factories, and mines were swiftly squelched, often violently. Management was able to draw on public resources like the police and state National Guard units to put down strikes, or was able to unleash its own security or ad hoc militia forces on strikers or union organizers without state interference. The public, staunchly opposed to anarchists and Communists, generally sided with employers. Figure 1Significant Events In The Colosseum Era Labor Strikes Back, Part 1: An Investor’s Guide To US Labor History Labor Strikes Back, Part 1: An Investor’s Guide To US Labor History Unions won some small-bore victories during the period, but they nearly all proved fleeting as companies regularly took back concessions and public officials and courts failed to enforce the loose patchwork of laws aimed at ameliorating industrial workers’ plight. Labor inevitably suffered the brunt of the casualties when conflicts turned violent. Workers were hardly choir boys, and seem to have initiated violence as often as employers’ proxies, but they were inevitably outgunned, especially when police, guardsmen or soldiers were marshaled against them. Societal norms have changed dramatically since the Colosseum era, but the lore of past “battles” encourages an us-versus-them union mentality that occasionally colors negotiations. The UAW Era (1933-1981) Established presumptions about the employer-employee relationship were upended when FDR entered the White House. Viewing labor organization as a way to ease national suffering, New Dealers passed the Wagner Act to grant private-sector workers unionization and collective bargaining rights, and created the National Labor Relations Board to ensure that employers respected them. The Wagner Act greatly aided labor organization, enabling unions to build up the heft to engage with employers on an equal footing. Unionized workers still fought an uphill battle in the wake of the Depression, but tactics like the sit-down strike (Box) produced some early labor victories that paved the way for more. The UAW signed a similar accord with Chrysler immediately after the Flint sit-down strike, and the CIO (the UAW’s parent union) swiftly reached an agreement with US Steel that significantly improved steelworkers’ pay and hours. Labor unions’ path wasn’t always smooth – Ford fiercely resisted unionization until 1941, and ten protesters were killed, and dozens injured, by Chicago police at a peaceful Memorial Day demonstration in support of strikers against the regional steelmakers that did not follow US Steel’s conciliatory lead – but it generally trended upward after the New Deal (Figure 2). From the 1950 signing of the Treaty of Detroit, a remarkably generous five-year agreement between the UAW and the Big Three automakers, the UAW ran roughshod over the US auto industry for three-plus decades. The New Deal’s encouragement of unionization had given labor a fighting chance, and was the foundation on which all of its subsequent gains were built. Figure 2Significant Events In The UAW Era Labor Strikes Back, Part 1: An Investor’s Guide To US Labor History Labor Strikes Back, Part 1: An Investor’s Guide To US Labor History Box David Topples Goliath: The Flint Sit-Down Strike The broad mass of factory workers had not been organized to any meaningful degree before the New Deal, and the United Auto Workers (UAW) was not formed until 1935. Despite federal protections, the fledgling UAW had to conduct its operations covertly, lest its members face employer reprisals. At the end of 1936, when it took on GM, only one in seven GM employees was a dues-paying member. The strike began the night of December 30th when workers in two of GM’s Flint auto body plants sat down at their posts, ignoring orders to return to work. The sit-down action was more effective than a conventional strike because it prevented GM from simply replacing the workers with strikebreakers. It also made GM think twice about attempting to remove them by force, lest valuable equipment be damaged. GM was unsure how to dislodge the workers after a court injunction it obtained on January 2nd went nowhere once the UAW publicized that the presiding judge held today’s equivalent of $4 million in GM shares. It turned off the heat in one of the plants on January 11th, before police armed with tear gas and riot guns stormed it. The police were rebuffed by strikers who threw bottles, rocks, and car parts from the plant’s upper windows while spraying torrents of water from its fire hoses. No one died in the melee, but the strike was already front-page news across the country, and the attack helped the strikers win public sympathy. Michigan’s governor responded by calling out the National Guard to prevent a rematch, shielding the strikers from any further violence. The strike was finally settled on February 11th when GM accepted the UAW as the workers’ exclusive bargaining agent and agreed not to hinder its attempts to organize its work force. The Reagan-Thatcher Era (1981 - ??) The disastrous strike by the air traffic controllers’ union (PATCO) is the watershed event that heralded the end of unions’ golden age. Strikes by federal employees were illegal, so PATCO broke the law when it went on strike in April 1981, spurning the generous contract terms its leaders had negotiated with the Reagan administration. PATCO had periodically held the flow of air traffic hostage throughout the seventies to extract concessions from its employer, earning the lasting enmity of airlines, government officials and the public. Other unions were aghast at PATCO’s openly contemptuous attitude, and declined to support it with sympathy strikes, while conservatives blasted the new administration behind closed doors for the profligacy of its initial PATCO offer. President Reagan therefore had an unfettered opportunity to make an example out of the controllers, and he seized it, firing those who failed to return to work within 48 hours and banning them from ever returning to government employment. A fed-up public supported the president’s hard line, and employers and unions got the message that a new sheriff was in town. His deputies were not inclined to enforce labor-friendly statues, or investigate labor grievances, with much vigor, and they would not necessarily look the other way when public sector unions illegally struck. Unions also found themselves on the wrong side of the growing disaffection with bureaucracy that was bound up with the push for deregulation. The globalization wave further eroded labor’s power. Unskilled workers in the developed world would be hammered by the flat world that allowed people, capital and information to hopscotch around the globe. Eight years of a Democratic presidency brought no relief, as the “Third Way” Clinton administration embraced the free-market tide (Chart 5), and the unionized share of employees has receded all the way back to mid-thirties levels (Chart 6). Chart 5Inequality Took Off ... Inequality Took Off ... Inequality Took Off ... Chart 6... As Unions Lost Their Way ... As Unions Lost Their Way ... As Unions Lost Their Way A Fourth Phase? A handful of data points do not make a trend, especially in a series that stands out for its persistence, but the bargaining power pendulum could be shifting. Public school teachers won improbable statewide victories with illegal strikes in three highly conservative states in the first half of 2018 (Table 1); a canny hotel workers union steered its members to big gains in their contract negotiations with Marriott in the second half of 2018; and the UAW bested General Motors and the rest of the Big Three automakers last fall. Unions may have more bargaining power than markets and employers realize, and they could be on the cusp of becoming more aggressive in flexing it. The next installment(s) in this series will examine the factors determining whether or not unions will become more assertive and the likelihood that more assertive bargaining would meet with success. Table 1Teachers' Unions Conquer The Red States Labor Strikes Back, Part 1: An Investor’s Guide To US Labor History Labor Strikes Back, Part 1: An Investor’s Guide To US Labor History Takeaways There is not sufficient space to explore those factors in this installment, but we conclude by highlighting two key themes that emerge from our historical review. US industrial history makes it clear that employees are unlikely to gain ground if government sides with employers. Employees no longer have to fear that the state will look the other way while strikers are beaten, or fail to prosecute those responsible for loss of life, but they face especially long odds when the government is inclined to favor employers. Its thumb weighs heavily on the scale when it drags its feet on enforcement; cuts funding to agencies policing workplace standards; and appoints agency or department heads that are conditioned to see things solely from employers’ perspective, shaped by long careers in management. Successful strikes beget strikes, and the converse is also true. Withholding their labor is employees’ most powerful weapon, and when employers can’t replace them cheaply and easily, strikes often succeed. Striking is frightening for an individual, however, because it cuts off his or her income (or sharply reduces it, if the striker’s union has a strike fund) until the strike is over. If the strike fails, the employee may find him/herself blacklisted, impairing his/her long-term income prospects on top of his/her short-term losses. Prudent workers should therefore strike sparingly, with the due consideration that a prudent poker player exercises before going all-in. When other unions facing comparable conditions pull off successful strikes, it makes it much easier for another union to take the leap, in addition to making success more likely, provided conditions truly are comparable. “Before they occur, successful strikes appear impossible. Afterward, they seem almost inevitable .”1 The retrospective inevitability stiffens the spine of potential strikers who observe successful outcomes, and raises the bar for action among potential strikers who observe failures. “Just as defeats in struggle lead to demoralization and resignation, victories tend to beget more victories .”2 Public opinion matters just as surely as momentum, and it proved decisive in the Flint sit-down strike and in the air traffic controllers’ showdown with President Reagan. According to Gallup’s annual poll, Americans now regard unions as favorably as they did before Thatcher and Reagan came to power (Chart 7). We will dive more deeply into the topic in our next installment, as we probe labor market conditions for insight into the direction of inflation, and its implications for Fed policy, the business cycle and markets. Chart 7Could Unions Make A Comeback? Could Unions Make A Comeback? Could Unions Make A Comeback?   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Blanc, Eric. Red State Revolt: The Teachers’ Strike Wave and Working-Class Politics, Verso: New York (2019), p. 204. 2 Ibid, p. 209.

Highlights Easy monetary policy is the linchpin of our 2020 market views and investment strategy, … : As we outlined in our 2020 Key Views report, easy monetary policy should extend the economic expansion and the bull markets in risk assets. ... and last week’s FOMC meeting made it crystal clear that the Fed’s default policy setting for next year is easy: The meeting came and went without much of a fuss, but the FOMC revealed that it will take a major inflation surprise to bring it off the sidelines in 2020. The labor market still has plenty of momentum, and should help keep the real economy humming, … : Through November, 2019’s average net monthly job gains are snugly within the last nine years’ range, and the JOLTS and NFIB surveys point to more hiring and accelerated wage gains. … while trade tensions are apparently less likely to derail it: Details remained vague as we went to press, but Chinese and American trade negotiators have reportedly reached a Phase 1 agreement that will be executed soon. Feature Dear Client, This is our last report of 2019. Our regular publishing schedule will resume on Monday, January 6th. We wish you a happy, healthy and prosperous new year. Chart 1The Fed Stood Down In 2019 The Fed Stood Down In 2019 The Fed Stood Down In 2019 Why bother fighting the Fed? Central bankers exert tremendous sway over the economy and markets, and although they’re hardly infallible, they typically get their way over the timeframes that most investors are judged. It’s much easier to make money going with the monetary policy flow than it is to try to resist it, because resistance is only viable when the Fed is plainly behind the curve. Consistent money-making investment strategies revolve around deploying capital when the odds are in one’s favor, and they’re stacked in favor of risk assets when policy is easy, and against them when it’s tight. We missed the latest instance when the Fed was fighting a losing battle at this time last year, when we continued to stick with our below-benchmark-duration recommendation. The money markets called for a 25-basis-point rate cut in 2019 in defiance of the FOMC, which projected 50 basis points ("bps") of hikes (Chart 1). We sided with the Fed, and wound up on the wrong side of the 10-year Treasury rally from 2.70% at the beginning of January to under 1.50% at the end of August. Since the crisis, however, BCA has remained squarely in the easier-for-longer monetary policy camp, which has led us to recommend overweighting stocks throughout the longest US equity bull market on record. The importance of the Fed’s influence was all over the 2020 outlook we laid out last week. The common thread linking our market views and investment strategy is the expectation that monetary policy settings will remain amply accommodative until the election is over. Easy monetary conditions are not confined to the US; major central banks around the world are deliberately pursuing reflationary policy. With the wind of an additional year of generous accommodation filling their sails, we expect that equities and spread product will easily outperform Treasuries and cash in 2020. The Latest From The Fed Chart 2Same Outlook, Fewer Hikes Paddling With The Current Paddling With The Current The run-up to last week’s FOMC meeting was devoid of suspense, but members’ dot-plot projections and Chair Powell’s press conference supported our sense that promoting higher inflation expectations is the Fed’s foremost priority. Our base case remains that the Fed will stay on hold at least until its November meeting. Although the Fed remains at pains to remind investors that policy is not on a preset course, the committee clearly expects the growth-without-inflation sweet spot will last through 2020 and beyond. As a group, the 17 FOMC members dialed back their rate-hike expectations from the September meeting, rescinding a net 13 votes for 25-bps hikes in 2020 (Chart 2, top panel) and 7 in 2021 (Chart 2, bottom panel). Several of Powell’s comments at the press conference reinforced the take that the Fed is on hold for the foreseeable future. In his prepared remarks, he repeated the message from the July, September and October meetings that the Fed has not yet accomplished its full-employment mandate. “[W]ages have been rising, particularly for lower-paying jobs. [I]n low- and middle-income communities, … many who have struggled to find work are now finding new opportunities. [Broad-based employment gains] underscore … the importance of sustaining the expansion so that the strong job market reaches more of those left behind.” When the chair says that unemployment can be a full percentage point below NAIRU for an extended period without generating "unwanted upward pressure on inflation," ... He characterized low inflation as a mixed blessing, and was more explicit about the need to get it higher than he was in the past three meetings, when the committee actually cut rates. “While low and stable inflation is certainly a good thing, inflation that runs persistently below our objective can lead to an unhealthy dynamic in which longer-term inflation expectations drift down, pulling actual inflation even lower. In turn, interest rates would be lower as well and closer to their effective lower bound. As a result, the scope for interest rate reductions to support the economy in a future downturn would be diminished, resulting in worse economic outcomes for American families and businesses. … We are strongly committed to achieving our symmetric 2 percent inflation goal.” In the Q&A segment of the press conference, Powell amplified the boilerplate employment language with repeated assertions that the labor market still has some slack. [W]e think we’ve learned that unemployment can remain at quite low levels for an extended period of time without unwanted upward pressure on inflation. In fact, we need some upward pressure [on] inflation to get back to 2 percent. … [E]ven though we’re at three-and-a-half percent unemployment, there’s actually more slack out there. … I’ll say that the labor market is strong. I don’t know that it’s tight because you’re not seeing wage increases[.] … Ultimately[,] … to call it hot, you’d want to see heat. You’d want to see … higher wages. That take contrasts with the Congressional Budget Office’s 4.6% NAIRU estimate, but NAIRU is only a concept. To this point, the economy has been supporting an unemployment rate in the low-3s without overheating, and economists will only have a clear idea of where NAIRU is today well after the fact. The relevant point for investors is that an FOMC that believes the natural rate of unemployment is below its current 50-year low is an FOMC that has sworn off proactive tightening. ... you know the FOMC isn't going to tighten policy pre-emptively. The chair also elaborated on the inflation mandate by saying that “a significant move up in inflation that’s also persistent” is a personal prerequisite for tightening policy. Our US Bond Strategy colleagues interpret “persistent” as meaning that inflation expectations have to get back to the 2.3-2.5% range that is consistent with the Fed’s 2% inflation target. Taken together, the prepared remarks, the Q&A and the fairly significant downward adjustment in the dots – absent any change in the outlook – suggest that the Fed’s reaction function has shifted materially. It will take a significant pickup in inflation, or undeniable signs of froth in the financial markets, for the Fed to tighten policy. The Labor Market Remains On Track November marked the record 110th consecutive month that net nonfarm payrolls have expanded, and the rest of the employment situation report confirmed that the jobs machine continues to motor along eleven years into the expansion (Chart 3). The annual job gains have not been as large as they often were in the 1991-2001 expansion, but they have been remarkably steady since 2011, averaging an even 200,000 net additions per month without once dipping below 170,000 for a full year (Chart 4). The unemployment rate fell back to the 3.5% 50-year low first reached in September, and the broader unemployment rate, capturing discouraged workers and involuntary part-time workers, is just a tick above the dot-com boom’s 6.8% low (Chart 5). Chart 3The Job Gains Haven't Been As Big As They Were In The '90s, ... The Job Gains Haven't Been As Big As They Were In The '90s, ... The Job Gains Haven't Been As Big As They Were In The '90s, ... Chart 4... But They've Been Remarkably Steady ... But They've Been Remarkably Steady ... But They've Been Remarkably Steady Chart 5All Unemployment Measures Are Extremely Low All Unemployment Measures Are Extremely Low All Unemployment Measures Are Extremely Low Neither the JOLTS nor the NFIB survey offers any indication that employment gains are about to dry up. JOLTS job openings have exceeded the number of unemployed workers since early 2018, and job openings as a share of overall employment remain way above the last cycle’s peak (Chart 6). The NFIB survey’s share of small businesses with unfilled job openings is similarly extended (Chart 7, top panel), and the diffusion index of firms planning to expand payrolls in the next three months is around its dot-com highs (Chart 7, middle panel). Hiring momentum appears as if it will remain solid over the visible horizon. Chart 6Survey Says ... Survey Says ... Survey Says ... With labor demand exceeding readily available supply, wage gains ought to accelerate. The prime-age employment-to-population ratio remained at an 11-year high last month, shy of only its dot-com boom highs (Chart 8). The Phillips Curve using the prime-age employment-to-population ratio is not kinked, and exhibits a strong correlation with compensation gains (Chart 9). Chart 7... More Jobs Are On The Way ... More Jobs Are On The Way ... More Jobs Are On The Way Chart 8Prime-Age Employment Is Back To Its Pre-Crisis Peak Prime-Age Employment Is Back To Its Pre-Crisis Peak Prime-Age Employment Is Back To Its Pre-Crisis Peak   Average hourly earnings for production and nonsupervisory employees, which comprise about 80% of the labor force, have already been growing at a 3.7-3.8% clip, and the Conference Board’s consumer confidence survey (Chart 10, middle panel) and the quits rate (Chart 10, bottom panel) suggest that they can keep climbing. So, too, does the Fed’s pivot; it usually tightens policy to slow the economy when real wage gains reach today’s levels, but now it appears bent on abetting further gains (Chart 10, top panel). Chart 9There Will Be Upward Pressure On Wages, ... Paddling With The Current Paddling With The Current Bottom Line: The labor market is strong, and poised to stay that way for the immediate future, especially given that the Fed seems to be egging it on in an attempt to boost inflation expectations and spread the expansion’s gains more evenly. Chart 10... And The Fed Doesn't Mind At All ... And The Fed Doesn't Mind At All ... And The Fed Doesn't Mind At All Investment Implications A robust labor market should keep household income growing nicely, and fortified balance sheets will enable households to spend much of their income gains, supporting consumption. Government spending is certain to support the economy ahead of a hotly contested election. We have worried about volatile fixed investment’s potential to stymie growth, largely because of concerns that the uncertainty surrounding trade tensions could cause corporations to pull back on capex until they get a better sense of the rules of the road. The apparent breakthrough in the US-China trade negotiations may resolve some of that uncertainty. With the Fed seemingly settling in for an extended period of holding the target fed funds rate at 1.75%, the risk to our view may be that we’re being insufficiently bullish on the markets. Another year of generous accommodation, here and abroad, is likely to keep life insurers, pension funds and endowments avidly searching for yield. It will be hard to default while that search is afoot, and it will also be hard for spreads to widen in an appreciable way. The combination should allow spread product to continue to generate excess returns over Treasuries and cash, though we echo our US Bond Strategy colleagues’ preference for high-yield over investment-grade corporates. Easy policy also supports equity outperformance. Global ex-US acceleration will benefit international indexes more than US indexes, but US equities will still generate attractive absolute returns. S&P 500 earnings will pick up a little as the rest of the world begins to stir, though truly juicy equity returns will require multiple expansion. We are not yet ready to call for a couple of points of re-rating, but note that it would be consistent with the monetary policy backdrop, the historical sprint-to-the-finish equity bull market pattern, and investors’ need for investment destinations in a persistently low-yield world.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com

Mr. X and his daughter, Ms. X, are long-time BCA clients who visit our office toward the end of each year to discuss the economic and financial market outlook for the year ahead. This report is an edited transcript of our recent conversation. Mr. X: I have been eagerly looking forward to this meeting given my many concerns about the outlook. Our portfolio has done well in the past year thanks to the surge in bond prices and the outperformance of defensive equities. However, I am deeply troubled by the amount of monetary stimulus required to support risk assets, and by how expensive bonds and equities are. Moreover, the global economy remains engulfed in deflationary risks, and policymakers are running out of ammunition. As always, there is much to talk about. Ms. X: Let me add that I am also pleased to once again be here to discuss the major risks and opportunities in the global marketplace. A year ago, I held a more positive market view than my father. Directly after our meeting, the deep market correction gave me second thoughts, but ultimately, the rebound in stock prices vindicated my view. Clearly, your assertion that markets would be turbulent proved correct. Since I joined the family firm in early 2017, I have been pushing my father to keep a higher equity exposure than he was normally comfortable with. We agreed to still favor stocks last year, albeit, with a bias toward defensive sectors, and this strategy paid off. But after the past year’s powerful rally in both bonds and stocks, we are again left wondering how to position our portfolio. Ultimately, I do not believe a recession is imminent. Yes, stocks are expensive, but bonds are even more so. Since I expect economic growth to pick up, I am inclined to tilt the portfolio further into equities and move away from our preference for defensive sectors. As usual, I am very interested to hear your views. BCA: Our core theme for 2019 was that we would face classic late-cycle turbulence. Despite this volatility, a run-up in asset prices was likely. Soon after we met, the stock market plunged, hitting a low on December 26, 2018. We anticipated the Federal Reserve to be much more hawkish than what actually transpired. Wage growth and even core inflation have remained firm in the US, but the weakness in global inflation expectations drove central banks’ reaction functions more powerfully than we anticipated. Moreover, the rapid escalation of the Sino-US trade war added a layer of uncertainty that exacerbated the economic slowdown that had started in mid-2018, forcing global central banks to ease policy as an indemnity against recession. Looking ahead, central bankers are highly unlikely to tighten monetary policy as long as inflation expectations remain below their normal range consistent with a 2% inflation target. We agree that the odds of a US recession in the coming year are still low because financial conditions are set to remain accommodative, Chinese authorities are setting policy to shore up growth, and a trade truce is likely. Global economic activity will rebound in early 2020. Instead, the most probable timeframe for a broad based recession is late 2021/early 2022. As a result, we remain positive on risk assets, especially foreign stocks. We are also underweighting bonds as they offer extremely poor absolute and relative value. Mr. X: I can see we will have a lively discussion because I do not share your or my daughter’s optimism. My list of concerns is long, I hope we have time to get through them all. But first, let’s briefly review your predictions from last year. BCA: This exercise is always interesting and often humbling, too. A year ago, our key conclusions were that: Tensions between policy and markets would be an ongoing theme in 2019. With the US unemployment rate at a 48-year low, it would take a significant slowdown for the Fed to stop hiking rates. Ultimately, the Fed would deliver more hikes in 2019 than discounted in the markets. This would push up the dollar and keep the upward trend in Treasury yields intact. The dollar would peak in mid-2019. China would also become more aggressive in stimulating its economy, which would boost global growth. However, until both of these things happened, emerging markets would remain under pressure. We favored developed market equities over their EM peers. We also preferred defensive equity sectors such as healthcare and consumer staples over cyclical sectors such as industrials and materials. Within the developed market universe, the US would outperform Europe and Japan over the next few quarters, especially in dollar terms. Stabilization in global growth would ignite a blow off rally in global equities. If the Fed was raising rates in response to falling unemployment, it would be unlikely to derail the stock market. However, once supply-side constraints began to bite fully in early 2020 and inflation began to rise well above the Fed’s target of 2%, stocks would begin to buckle. This would mean that a window would exist in 2019 for stocks to outperform bonds. We would maintain a benchmark allocation to stocks, but increase exposure if global bourses were to fall significantly from then (late 2018) current levels without a corresponding deterioration in the economic outlook. Corporate credit would underperform stocks as government bond yields rise. A major increase in credit spreads was unlikely as long as the economy remained in expansion mode, but spreads could still widen modestly. US shale companies had been the marginal producers in the global oil sector. With breakeven costs in shale close to $50/bbl, crude prices would be unlikely to rise much from current levels over the long term. However, we expected production cuts in Saudi Arabia would push prices up, with Brent crude averaging around $82/bbl in 2019. A balanced portfolio was likely to generate average returns of only 2.8% a year in real terms over the next decade. This compares to average returns of around 6.6% a year between 1982 and 2018. As already noted, our forecast for more Fed rate hikes was wrong. This meant that we were offside in our duration call. Ultimately, 10-year Treasuries have generated returns of 10.8% so far this year, and German bunds and Japanese government bonds returns of 5.8% and 1.0% in EUR and JPY terms, or 2.5% and 2.0% in USD terms, respectively (Table 1). Nonetheless, our expectation of a run-up in risk asset prices was spot on. Equities outperformed bonds, with global stocks climbing 22.2% in USD terms. We missed the initial outperformance of corporate bonds relative to Treasuries, as investment grade credit rose by 13.9%. However, our bond team took a more constructive stance on corporates as the year progressed. Table 1Market Performance OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Chart 12019 Was A Good Year For Stocks 2019 Was A Good Year For Stocks 2019 Was A Good Year For Stocks In terms of regional allocation recommendations, we were correct to overweight US equities which beat non-US stocks by 13.4%, partly thanks to the dollar’s appreciation. We were also right to underweight EM equities, with Asia and Latin America generating dollar returns of only 12.6% and 6.9%. Overall, it was a good year for financial markets (Chart 1). Our growth forecasts were mixed. We predicted global growth would slow in the first half of 2019 but improve thereafter. Instead, the slowdown extended and intensified into the second half of the year as the Sino-US trade war escalated more than expected, and Chinese policymakers were more reluctant to reflate than anticipated. The IMF also revised down its growth forecasts. In the October 2019 World Economic Outlook report, growth in advanced economies for the year was cut to 1.7% from 2.1% compared to 2018 forecasts, led by a downward revision to 1.5% from 2% in Europe (Table 2). They also pared down 2019 EM growth estimates to 3.9% from 4.7%. Consequently, inflation was softer than originally predicted. These trends in economic activity meant that our dollar call was partially right. The currency did not peak in the middle of the year as we foresaw, but has been flat since the spring and today trades where it was in April. Meanwhile, the weaker-than-expected growth put our oil call offside, with Brent averaging $62/bbl this year, not $82/bbl. Table 2IMF Economic Forecasts OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game The Cycle’s End Game Mr. X: You mentioned that you remain positive on risk assets and stocks for 2020. You will not be surprised that I am extremely skeptical of this view. The Fed could only raise rates to 2.5% before all hell broke loose, and it has now cut them back to 1.75%. The European Central Bank has lowered its deposit rate to -0.5% and is resuming its asset purchase program, while the Bank of Japan is clearly out of ammunition. Yet global growth remains weak. Despite this lack of economic traction, US stocks are at a record high and are unequivocally expensive. This situation seems untenable. If global growth weakens further, there is little more policymakers can do. I think the risk of a recession is a lot more elevated than you believe, especially as we cannot count on a lasting trade détente. Meanwhile, the US presidential election makes me uncomfortable, and I cannot see how business leaders will want to deploy capital to expand capacity given the risk that the regulatory and tax environment could become hostile to the corporate sector. If I’m wrong about growth – and I hope I am – then inflationary pressures will build and central banks will have to tighten policy suddenly. As bond yields rise, stocks will be sold and yet bonds will not offer any protection since they yield so little. Also, I have not even talked about negative interest rates. $12.1 trillion of debt yields less than zero percent. This is obviously preventing creative destruction from purging the system of rot. It is also promoting capital misallocation and undue risk-taking by financial institutions who cannot meet fiduciary liabilities. Ms. X: Based on this tirade, you can easily imagine what life at the office has been like in recent months. I do share some of my father’s concerns. Negative rates cannot be a good thing, especially from a long-term perspective. If growth weakens further, I’m also concerned that central banks have few options left. However, I do not see these risks as imminent. There are nascent signs that the global economy will stabilize soon; both President Trump and President Xi have strong incentives to reach a trade truce; and central banks are nowhere near removing the proverbial punch bowl. While US stocks are expensive, other risk assets offer value if global growth rebounds. The wall of worry is high, but stocks can and will climb that wall. BCA: Your debate is similar to our own internal discussions. It is undeniable that the investing landscape looks shaky at the moment, especially with the S&P 500 currently trading at 18-times forward earnings. However, the situation you are describing is a direct consequence of one BCA’s long running macro themes: The end of the debt supercycle. While the debt supercycle is dead in advanced economies, it remains very much alive in emerging markets, and China in particular. The private debt load in advanced economies has declined by 20% of GDP since 2009 (Chart 2A). Despite the burgeoning US federal government deficit, public debt accumulation has not been strong enough to cause total debt loads to increase. Instead, aggregate indebtedness has been stuck slightly above 260% of GDP for the past 10 years. Depressed, and in some cases, negative interest rates reflect weak demand for credit. Chart 2AThe Debt Supercycle Is Dead In DM... The Debt Supercycle Is Dead In DM... The Debt Supercycle Is Dead In DM... Chart 2B...But Not In EM ...But Not In EM ...But Not In EM   The end of the debt supercycle has both a negative and positive impact. Without increasing leverage, domestic demand cannot grow faster than trend GDP. Thus, it takes much more time for inflationary pressures to build. Concurrently, in the absence of inflationary pressure, more time passes before monetary policy reaches a restrictive level causing recession. The upshot is that the business cycle can last much longer. Moreover, a world less geared to credit accumulation reduces the fragility of the financial system, at the margin. While the debt supercycle is dead in advanced economies, it remains very much alive in emerging markets, and China in particular (Chart 2B), where the demand for credit is still very sensitive to changes in monetary settings. EM countries are the major source of volatility in the global business cycle. Chinese policymakers’ management of the tradeoff between growth and leverage will determine whether the global economy can avoid deflation. If they decide to tackle debt excesses head on, EM credit growth will contract and EM final demand will suffer. In this scenario, negative rates will persist in low-growth advanced economies, and the Fed will be incapable of raising rates because global deflationary forces will be too strong. Chart 3The World Is In The Midst Of A Deflationary Episode The World Is Experiencing A Deflationary Episode... The World Is Experiencing A Deflationary Episode... The second half of 2018 and the whole of 2019 gave us a taste of these forces. When China tightened credit conditions, the EM economies slowed first. Trade and manufacturing hubs like Europe, Australia and Japan quickly followed. A deflationary wave spread around the world, as evidenced by a drop in global producer prices (Chart 3). The US is a comparatively closed economy, but it could not avoid this gravitational pull. The ISM manufacturing survey ultimately started to contract in August 2018, converging to weakness in the rest of the world. The trade war’s hit to business confidence added insult to the injury of an already weak economic environment. Looking ahead, our optimism reflects an expectation that Chinese policymakers will adopt a more pro-growth policy stance because they too are spooked by the downtrend in their economy. While the Politburo Standing Committee has not abandoned its structural reform agenda, it realizes that aggressive deleveraging is dangerous. The Chinese economy is growing at its weakest pace in nearly 30 years and deflation is once again taking hold. In response to date, policymakers have lowered China’s reserve requirement ratio by 400 basis points, cut taxes by 2.8% of GDP, increased the issuance of local government bonds to finance public infrastructure projects, and boosted capex at state-owned enterprises. EM economies will respond to these stimulative measures. The Chinese credit and fiscal impulse has stabilized (Chart 4). Meanwhile, the Fed has pushed the real fed funds rate 74.4 basis points below the Holston-Laubach-Williams estimate of the neutral rate, and coordinated global policy easing points to a rebound in the global manufacturing sector (Chart 4, bottom panel). Moreover, the global inventory purge that magnified the industrial sector’s pain is getting exhausted and the auto sector is looking up. Finally, we agree with Ms. X that both President Trump and President Xi have their own incentives to deescalate trade policy uncertainty. We are entering the end game of this business cycle and bull market. Global borrowing rates will rise, but only to a limited extent. Rightly or wrongly, major central banks are terrified by the prospect of the Japanification of their economies. Practically speaking, this means that they want inflation expectations to move back up to normal levels (Chart 5). However, after undershooting their 2% targets for 11 years, achieving this objective will require central banks to let realized inflation overshoot these targets first. Thus, central banks are unlikely to tighten policy until late next year at the earliest, which will limit how far yields can climb in 2020. Chart 4…But Do Not Bet Against Reflation ...But Do Not Bet Against Reflation ...But Do Not Bet Against Reflation Chart 5Depressed Inflation Expectations Depressed Inflation Expectations Depressed Inflation Expectations   Equities and other risk assets should perform well if global growth re-accelerates but interest rates don’t rise much at first. Some benefit of this fertile backdrop is already priced in, but many pockets of value levered to stronger global growth still exist. We are entering the end game of this already long business cycle. While the general environment favors remaining invested in risk assets in 2020, this is likely the last window of opportunity to do so. Today’s accommodative monetary policy will revive inflationary pressures in 2021, and central banks will ultimately be forced to lift rates much more aggressively. China will continue to resist excessive leverage. Neither the business cycle nor the equity bull market will withstand these final assaults. Mr. X: Your benign outlook reminds me of when we met in December 2007. Do you remember? You told me that the housing slowdown and the credit market seizure were large risks, but central banks would put a floor under global growth. How did that turn out? I agree that in advanced economies, overall debt loads have been stable. But this belies major disparities. For example, US corporate debt has never represented a larger share of GDP than it does today. This must be a major vulnerability. While household balance sheets look healthy, I do not think consumption will save the day if companies are cutting capex and employment while they clean up their balance sheets. Countries like Canada and Australia are drowning in private sector debt. How can you ignore these vulnerabilities? BCA: A comparison with 2008 actually reveals why advanced economies, particularly the US, are not the powder keg that they once were. US corporate debt is elevated when compared to GDP, but profits also represent a much larger share of GDP than they did 10 or 20 years ago, and interest rates are close to historic lows. As a result, interest coverage ratios are still adequate (Chart 6). In 2007, household debt loads were large, but interest payments also accounted for 18.1% of disposable income, the highest proportion since 1972. Additionally, US firms’ debt-to-asset ratio is in line with the post-1970 average of 22.1%. Finally, US businesses have not used rising leverage to fund capital spending, as demonstrated by the elevated age of the capital stock. Thus, the US corporate sector continues to generate positive net savings. Ahead of recessions, US businesses typically generate negative net savings. The composition of the creditors is another important difference. In 2007, an extremely large share of the spurious borrowings resided on banks’ balance sheets. Moreover, the banking system was woefully undercapitalized with a leverage ratio of 17x. Weak banks had to absorb 2.2 trillion of losses after 2008. Consequently, the money creation mechanism broke down, and money multipliers collapsed (Chart 7). Today, US banks boast relatively stronger balance sheets, and they are still judicious about extending credit despite being less exposed to the corporate sector than they were to the mortgage market in 2008. Instead, most corporate debt is held by less levered entities such as ETFs, pension plans, and insurance companies. The leveraged losses that proved so debilitating in 2008 are less likely to be a source of systemic risk in this cycle. Chart 6US Businesses Can Still Service Their Debt US Businesses Can Still Service Their Debt US Businesses Can Still Service Their Debt Chart 72008 Heralded A Destruction Of Money 2008 Heralded A Destruction Of Money 2008 Heralded A Destruction Of Money   Countries like Australia and Canada have much more worrisome private sector debt dynamics, as their servicing costs are elevated (Chart 8). However, these economies are unlikely to collapse when global rates are low, as long as the global economy can avoid a recession, which would reduce export revenue in these trade-sensitive countries. You expect a moderate rebound in global growth next year, but not a sharp acceleration because Chinese stimulus will not be that aggressive. The bottom line is that both the US corporate sector and at-risk countries like Canada should avoid a day of reckoning until interest rates rise meaningfully. As we have already mentioned, central banks are very clear that they will allow inflation to overshoot before tightening policy anew. We monitor US inflation breakeven rates to gauge the likely timing of that outcome. At 1.6%, they remain well below the 2.3% to 2.5% range, which is historically consistent with central banks durably achieving their inflation target (Chart 9). Until inflation expectations are re-anchored back up in that range, we will not worry about an imminent tightening in monetary conditions. Chart 8Canada And Australia Are Close To Their Debt Walls Canada And Australia Are Close To Their Debt Walls Canada And Australia Are Close To Their Debt Walls Chart 9The Fed Is In No Rush To Tighten The Fed Is In No Rush To Tighten The Fed Is In No Rush To Tighten   Chart 10Inflation Is A Lagging Indicator OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game It is true that inflationary pressures are building in the US. Historical evidence points to a kink in the Phillips curve, the link between wage growth and the unemployment rate. Since the labor market is tight, we are already seeing average hourly earnings growth accelerate. Moreover, the output gap is mostly closed. However, keep in mind that inflation is also a lagging economic indicator (Chart 10). Consequently, the recent global economic slowdown is likely to keep US inflation at bay for most of 2020. The sharp fall in US capacity utilization along with the decline in imported goods and core producer price inflation corroborate this picture. Mr. X: So you believe that as long as rates stay low, the day of reckoning will be delayed. But ultimately, that it is unavoidable. BCA: Correct. No matter what, we are entering the end game of this already long business cycle. The current period of easy policy will allow cyclical spending to rise as a share of output, and debt to build up again over the coming 18 months. Because slack is clearly limited, this latest wave of policy easing will generate inflationary pressures. Ultimately, the Fed will be forced to play catch up and tighten more aggressively than expected in 2021. Paradoxically, the longer the onset of recession is delayed, the deeper it is likely to be… Mr. X: Because imbalances and vulnerabilities will only grow larger! BCA: Absolutely! Mr. X: That is something we can agree on. Ms. X: The way you complete one another’s sentences is a testament to how many years you have been talking to each other. For me, the most concerning issue is political risk. While I am more positive on the outlook for trade policy than my father, I do worry about the impact of US election risk on capital spending. Chart 11If The 2012 Election Is Any Guide, Trump Can Still Win A Second Term OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game BCA: On the trade war, we would like to address your father’s concerns. All politicians, even unconventional ones like President Trump, seek re-election. Yet, President Trump’s overall approval rating is low (Chart 11). If the election were held today, his odds of winning would be minimal. However, US presidential elections do ultimately favor the incumbent. If the re-election of President Obama in 2012 is any guide, President Trump has enough time to boost his approval rating over the coming 12 months to secure a second term through the Electoral College. In order to achieve this outcome, he must reverse the large slowdown in wage growth currently plaguing the swing states he won by only a small margin in 2016 (Chart 12). Workers in states like Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin are suffering disproportionately from the uncertainty created by the trade tensions. President Trump will have to pause the tariffs – and even cut tariff rates – to support the economy and reassure voters. Chart 12Trump's Fear Is Coming True Trump's Fear Is Coming True Trump's Fear Is Coming True China is willing to accept a trade truce. The Chinese economy is weak and producer prices are once again deflating. President Xi doesn’t want to preside over another massive surge in leverage or a 1930’s Irving Fisher-style deflationary spiral. Reviving private sector investment sentiment via a reduction in trade policy uncertainty would help stabilize spending and avoid a disorderly economic slump. Moreover, President Xi may not trust the current White House, but the prospect of a Democratic administration that will be tough on both environmental standards and human rights would offer little solace. This brings us to the US election. The recent Bank of America Merrill Lynch positioning survey shows that the investment community shares your concerns. This risk is hard to quantify. The Democratic nomination is wide open. Former Vice President Joe Biden leads the opinion polls, and is a known quantity. Meanwhile, the rising progressive wing of the party, embodied in Senator Elizabeth Warren, is hostile to business and likely to cause concerns in boardrooms across the US, especially in the tech, energy, financial services and healthcare sectors. This could dampen animal spirits. Biden’s and Warren’s odds of beating President Trump are overstated by current polls, especially if the President softens his stance on trade to allow for a growth pick-up. Moreover, to be competitive nationally, Senator Warren will have to abandon some of her more progressive plans and pivot toward the center. The recent upbeat equity market performance of sectors like managed healthcare suggests that markets are discounting this shift. Thus, we doubt the election is currently really weighing on business intentions. The recent pick up in capital spending intentions in various Fed Manufacturing surveys fades this risk. Chart 13A Structural Tailwind Has Vanished A Structural Tailwind Has Vanished A Structural Tailwind Has Vanished What is clear though is that if the economy were to weaken further, Senator Warren’s chances would improve and CEOs would genuinely begin to worry about re-regulation, potentially unleashing a vicious cycle. Thus, the end game is an unstable equilibrium. On a structural basis, whether one looks at the rise of populism or the geopolitical rivalry between China and the US, trade tensions will remain a pesky feature of the global economy. In effect, the trade truce will not be a permanent deal. The global economy has therefore lost the tailwind of deepening global integration achieved through trade (Chart 13). This will limit global potential GDP growth. Ms. X: Thank you. I think the time is right to explore your economic outlook in more detail. The Economic Outlook Chart 14China: Modest Reflation Is Underway China: Modest Reflation Is Underway China: Modest Reflation Is Underway Mr. X: From your arguments, it seems that the outlook for China and Emerging Markets is critical, so let’s start there. My impression is that President Xi is not abandoning his structural reform agenda. Avoiding the middle-income trap will require decreasing China’s dependence on credit as a growth driver. Can economic activity really stabilize under those circumstances? BCA: You are correct: Senior Chinese administrators are reluctant to allow another major phase of debt accumulation to take hold. However, as we already highlighted, policymakers are taking steps to end the most severe economic slowdown since the first half of the 1990s. China is currently implementing a middling stimulus program. The positive impact of the lower bank reserve requirement ratio, the tax cuts and increased public infrastructure spending is being mitigated by strong regulatory constraints on the shadow banking system and small financial institutions, by efforts to limit real estate speculation, and by the cash crunch facing real estate developers. These crosscurrents make it unlikely that the credit impulse will rise as sharply as it did following the reflationary campaigns of 2009, 2012 or 2016. Nonetheless, the Chinese economy is indeed exhibiting some mildly positive signals. Our monetary indicator and state-owned enterprise capital spending point to a rebound in overall Chinese economic activity (Chart 14). Moreover, household spending is trying to bottom. If China stabilizes, then the EM slowdown will end soon. Without a deepening drag from the Chinese economy, EM countries should be able to take advantage of the easing in global financial and liquidity conditions. But the end of the Chinese drag on EM growth does not mean a massive tailwind will be forthcoming. Additionally, deflationary forces remain stronger in the emerging world than in the US. As a result, EM real rates will remain stubbornly above the level that real economic activity warrants, posing a headwind for capital and durable goods spending. Generally speaking, EM and China are moving from a headwind for the world to a mild tailwind. Treasury yields are unlikely to move significantly higher than the 2.25% to 2.5% zone. Ms. X: I’m somewhat more positive than you on global growth next year. The policy easing around the world looks very promising for economic activity. How do you factor the impact of improving global liquidity conditions into your outlook for 2020? BCA: It is undeniable that global liquidity conditions have eased massively. As we already highlighted, the majority of global central banks cutting rates is a very positive dynamic for global growth. Trends in measures of liquidity ratify this message. Foreign exchange reserves are again growing and our BCA US Financial Liquidity index has rallied sharply over the past 12 months. Historically, this indicator forecasts the trend in the BCA Global Leading Economic Indicator, commodity prices and EM export prices by 18 months (Chart 15). Moreover, money aggregates are growing faster than credit across the major advanced economies. Such developments typically foretell an acceleration in global economic activity (Chart 16). Chart 15Liquidity Dynamics: Fueling A Global Growth Recovery Liquidity Dynamics: Fueling A Global Growth Recovery Liquidity Dynamics: Fueling A Global Growth Recovery Chart 16Rising Money Supply Is A Good Thing Rising Money Supply Is A Good Thing Rising Money Supply Is A Good Thing   The duration of the current slowdown also warrants optimism. We have often highlighted that since the early 1990s, the global manufacturing sector evolves over 36-month symmetric cycles (Chart 17). The current soft patch has lasted more than 18 months. In the context of easing liquidity and depleted inventories, pent-up demand can easily translate into actual spending. The recent surge in the new orders-to-inventories ratio confirms that global manufacturing activity should soon pick up (Chart 18). The auto sector’s weakness, which was exacerbated by previous inventory buildups, changing emission standards, and rising borrowing costs, is also ebbing. Chart 17The Mid-Cycle Slowdown Is Long In The Tooth The Mid-Cycle Slowdown Is Long In The Tooth The Mid-Cycle Slowdown Is Long In The Tooth Chart 18The New Order-To-Inventory Ratio Points To A Global Rebound The New Orders-To-Inventories Ratio Points To A Global Rebound The New Orders-To-Inventories Ratio Points To A Global Rebound     Various growth indicators are sniffing out this positive inflection point. The recent trough in the global ZEW survey is revealing (Chart 19). It materialized quickly after Sino-US trade tensions began to ease. Enough positive global economic momentum exists such that a minor decline in policy uncertainty could unleash a large improvement in growth expectations. The rebound in Taiwanese equities and European luxury stocks confirms that the global economy should soon bottom. There are two things we cannot emphasis enough. First, this is the end game of the business cycle, after which a recession will ensue. Second, investors should not expect the kind of strong synchronized growth rebound witnessed in 2017. Without a Chinese and EM boom, a crucial source of demand will be wanting. Mr. X: What about US growth? The yield curve inverted this summer and deteriorating consumer and business confidence raised the specter of an imminent recession. Moreover, the fiscal stimulus that helped the economy in the first half of 2019 is now over. In fact, with a $1 trillion federal deficit despite an unemployment rate of only 3.6%, we have run out of fiscal room to support activity if and when a recession materializes. BCA: The recent yield curve inversion most likely overstated the risk of an economic contraction. First, in the mid-1990s, if the term premium had been as low as it is today, the curve would have also inverted without any recession materializing from 1995 to 2000. Second, this summer, the curve inverted up to the 5-year tenor and steepened for longer maturities. Prior to recessions, the curve inverts across all maturities. Recessions are not born out of thin air. They are caused by imbalances and tight monetary policy. The large debt buildup and other investment imbalances that have preceded prior US recessions are not yet apparent. Prior to the 1991, 2001 and 2008 recessions, the private sector debt load had increased by 20.6%, 14.6% and 25.6% of GDP in the previous five years, not the current 1.4% run rate. The Fed’s policy is now clearly accommodative. Not only is the real fed funds rate 74.4 basis points below the Fed’s favored estimate of the neutral rate of interest, but also real estate, the most interest-rate sensitive economic sector, is rebounding. In 2018, real estate activity collapsed in response to mortgage rates rising to 4.9%. Today, the NAHB Homebuilding index has retraced 79% of its losses; mortgage demand has improved; and housing starts and building permits have recovered (Chart 20). When policy is tight, real estate activity never recovers this quickly, even as yields fall. Chart 19Positive Signals For Global Growth Positive Signals For Global Growth Positive Signals For Global Growth Chart 20The Housing Market Signals That Policy Is Accommodative The Housing Market Signals That Policy Is Accommodative The Housing Market Signals That Policy Is Accommodative   Chart 21Robust Household Financial Health OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game A counterargument is that real estate price appreciation is weak. However, tight monetary policy is not the cause. Two forces are dampening house prices. First, the Jobs and Tax Act of 2017 lowered allowable mortgage interest and state and local tax deductions. High-end properties in high-tax states such as California, New York and Massachusetts have suffered from this adjustment. Second, the US housing market has an overhang of large, pricey homes relative to strong demand for smaller, starter homes. Median home prices outpacing average ones show this divergence. We also to need to gauge if consumer spending is likely to follow the manufacturing sector lower. If it does, a recession will be unavoidable. On this front, we are hopeful because: The outlook for household income is positive. As you noted, the unemployment rate is still extraordinarily low, and more Americans will be working by the end of 2020 than today. Additionally, the rising employment-to-population ratio for prime-age workers is tightly linked to stronger wages (Chart 21). Also, the recent pick up in productivity growth points to higher real wage growth. The household savings rate is elevated and has limited upside. Households already have a large cushion insulating them from unforeseen shocks. At 8.1% of disposable income, the savings rate is in the 65th percentile of its post-1980 distribution. It is especially lofty if we take into account robust American households’ net worth (Chart 21, bottom panel). Consumer credit demand is rising, according to the Fed’s Senior Loan officer survey. Since household liquid assets are quickly expanding and the household formation rate is robust, consumption of durable goods should pick up, especially in light of the large decrease in borrowing costs. This is particularly true since the household debt-to-assets ratio is at its lowest level since 1985 and debt-servicing costs only represent 9.7% of disposable income, the lowest share for nearly 40 years. The corporate sector outlook should brighten soon. The modest rise in productivity protects margins from higher wages, an effect that will linger given that capacity expansion is consistent with further productivity gains (Chart 22). Crucially, the combined fiscal and monetary easing in China should bolster capital-spending intentions around the world, including the US (Chart 23). Rising productivity will only consolidate these trends. Chart 22Capacity Growth Provides Some Support For Productivity Capacity Growth Provides Some Support For Productivity Capacity Growth Provides Some Support For Productivity Chart 23Chinese Reflation Will Revive US Capital Spending Chinese Reflation Will Revive US Capital Spending Chinese Reflation Will Revive US Capital Spending   The most positive development for the US corporate sector is our outlook for non-US growth. If the global manufacturing sector mends itself, so will the US. Ample liquidity is a positive for the world economy, as well as for US manufacturing conditions (Chart 24). On the fiscal front, we appreciate your worries, but they are not a story for 2020. The US fiscal thrust will not be as positive as it was in 2018 or 2019, but it is set to remain a small tailwind, not a drag. Furthermore, given that 2020 is an election year it is unlikely that politicians will tighten purse strings over the coming 12 months. Fiscal risks are undoubtedly greater in the long run. However, a sudden fiscal consolidation is a remote probability because fiscal austerity has gone out of style. Instead, the federal debt burden will be a major source of long-term inflation because there is no other easy way to address this gigantic pile of liabilities. The path of least resistance will be more spending and financial repression. In other words, real rates will stay too low and excess government spending will push prices higher, conveniently eroding the real value of that high federal debt burden. This was a big story in the 20th century and it will remain so in the 21st (Chart 25), especially since an aging population and the peak in globalization will weigh on global savings. Chart 24The US Manufacturing Slowdown Has Run Its Course The US Manufacturing Slowdown Has Run Its Course The US Manufacturing Slowdown Has Run Its Course Chart 25Inflation Is About Political Decisions Inflation Is About Political Decisions Inflation Is About Political Decisions   Ms. X: Your point about demographics makes me think of Europe and Japan. Brexit has not been resolved; populism remains a concern in Italy; and the European banking system is still fragile. Japan suffers from an even worse demographic profile and the recent VAT increase was ill-timed, economically. Given these headwinds, can these regions participate in the global recovery you foresee? BCA: The short answer is yes, albeit to varying degrees. The outlook for Europe is more promising than Japan. A No-Deal Brexit is now a very low probability event, even after next month’s UK election. The conservatives’ support for Prime Minister Johnson’s Brexit plan will ensure as much. A large source of uncertainty is being lifted, which will allow European businesses to resume investment planning. The situation in the European periphery is also improving. Non-performing loans in Spain and Italy are falling (Chart 26), which is allowing for a normalization of credit origination. The narrowing Italian and peripheral spreads to German bunds will be helped by easing financial conditions in the European economies that need it most. Higher Italian bond prices improve banks’ solvency and cut borrowing costs for the private sector. Finally, populism is alive and well in Europe, rejecting fiscal austerity, but not embracing euro-skepticism. More generous fiscal spending would be a positive for Europe. European liquidity conditions are also generous. Deposit growth has strengthened and financial conditions have benefited from lower German yields and a cheap euro, which trades 15% below fair-value estimates. Our model for European banks’ return on tangible equity is rising, which is a clear indication that easy financial and liquidity conditions should deliver stronger incremental economic activity (Chart 27). Chart 26Declining Non-Performing Loans Are A Positive For The European Periphery Declining Non-Performing Loans Are A Positive For The European Periphery Declining Non-Performing Loans Are A Positive For The European Periphery Chart 27European Banks' Return On Equity Will Improve In 2020 European Banks' Return On Equity Will Improve In 2020 European Banks' Return On Equity Will Improve In 2020   The fiscal outlook is murkier. European fiscal thrust was a positive 0.4% of GDP in 2019, but it will decline to 0.1% in 2020. However, fiscal policy affects economic activity with a lag. The impact of this year’s easing has yet to be fully felt. Since European rates are so low and the economy is not operating at full capacity, the fiscal multiplier is greater than one. Therefore, Europe can still reap a substantial fiscal dividend next year. Finally, Europe remains a very pro-cyclical economy. A large share of euro area GDP is connected to manufacturing and exports. As a result, Europe will be one of the prime beneficiaries of a pickup in global growth. Already, the sharp rebound in the German and euro area ZEW survey expectation components point to a brighter outlook for the region. Japan is also a very pro-cyclical economy, which will reap a dividend from a bottom in global manufacturing activity. However, the Land of the Rising Sun is still subject to idiosyncratic constraints. Japanese financial conditions have not improved as much as those in Europe. The yen has appreciated 2.6% in trade-weighted terms this year, while Japanese yields have not melted as much as European ones (because Italian and peripheral yields fell so much in 2019). Japan will also have to reckon with the impact of the October VAT increase. Ahead of the tax hike, retail sales spiked by 9.1% on a year-on-year basis, or 7.1% compared to the previous month, a script similar to 2014. 2015 was a payback year where consumption was depressed. This scenario will play out again, even if the Abe government has implemented some fiscal offsets. Ultimately, the Japanese economy will lag Europe’s in the first half of the year but should catch up in the second half. The impact of the tax hike will dissipate. Most importantly, rebounding global growth will hurt the yen, at least on a trade-weighted basis, providing a lift to export prospects and easing Japanese financial conditions relative to the rest of the world, which will produce a growth dividend later in 2020. Ms. X: To summarize, you expect a moderate rebound in global growth next year, but not a sharp acceleration because Chinese stimulus will not be that aggressive. EM activity will also pick up but will not generate fireworks. The US will be okay but Europe will probably deliver the largest positive growth surprise as external and domestic conditions align positively. Japan will also stabilize on the back of stronger global growth, but domestic headwinds mean that a true reacceleration won’t happen until the latter part of the year. This recovery constitutes the business cycle’s end game as inflation will become a concern in 2021, forcing the Fed to tighten then. BCA: Yes, this is correct. Ms. X: Thank you! Bond Market Prospects Chart 28Global Bonds Are Extremely Overvalued Global Bonds Are Extremely Overvalued Global Bonds Are Extremely Overvalued Ms. X: I do not like US Treasuries at current yields. They do not protect me against an inflation surprise and will do nothing for me in an economic recovery. However, my bearishness is tempered by the large stock of bonds with negative yields in Europe and Japan. As long as this strange situation persists, I doubt US yields will experience much upside. US paper is too attractive to foreign asset managers right now. BCA: We share your view and are recommending an underweight to global government bonds. Global yields offer little value and are vulnerable to a rebound in economic activity or a trade détente. Our Global Bond Valuation index is flashing a clear sell signal (Chart 28). As yields rise, global yield curves are bound to steepen. We also agree that the upside for Treasury yields is limited, but we disagree with the limiting factor. Foreign investors are not the major buyers of Treasuries. Indeed, the data shows that European and Japanese investors have not been aggressive purchasers of US government securities. The US yield curve is flat and US short rates tower above European and Japanese ones, hedging currency exposure when buying Treasuries is expensive. In euro or yen terms, a hedged Treasury yields -67 basis points and -60 basis points, less than 10-year bunds or JGBs, respectively. Meanwhile, EM central banks are diversifying their FX reserves away from the US dollar into gold. Instead, our view is governed by the concept we dub the “Golden Rule of Treasury Investing.” According to this principle, the outperformance of Treasuries relative to cash is a direct function of the Fed’s ability to surprise the market. If the Fed cuts rates more than the OIS curve anticipated 12 months prior, Treasuries outperform. The opposite happens if the Fed delivers a hawkish surprise (Chart 29). Chart 29The Golden Rule Of Treasury Investing The Golden Rule Of Treasury Investing The Golden Rule Of Treasury Investing Treasury yields are unlikely to move significantly higher than the 2.25% to 2.5% zone, because the OIS curve is now only pricing in 28 basis points of rate cuts over the next year. It is not just the US OIS curve that has priced out a large amount of rate cuts; this phenomenon has materialized around the world over the past five weeks. Chart 30The Term Premium Is Too Low The Term Premium Is Too Low The Term Premium Is Too Low Any upside risk to that 2.25% to 2.5% forecast for 2020 will come from the inflation expectations and term premium components of yields. Central banks, including the Fed, have telegraphed an intention to allow inflation expectations to rise, initially, in response to stronger global growth. Moreover, declining risk aversion should also allow the exceptionally depressed term premium to normalize (Chart 30). Only in late 2020 or early 2021 will Treasury yields durably move above this 2.25-2.5% zone. Punching above these levels will require core PCE inflation to have been above target long enough to re-anchor inflation expectations back up to their 2.3% to 2.5% target zone. Only then will the Fed give the all-clear signal to the bond market to lift yields higher. Mr. X: You still have not directly addressed the question of negative yields in Europe and Japan. This story will not end well. Do you worry about these bond markets over the next year? BCA: Our answer is an emphatic yes. But we assume you will not let us leave it at that. Mr. X: You know me too well. BCA: Over the course of the past 50 years, we have learned a thing or two about you. In all seriousness, let’s start with our simple but effective valuation ranking. It compares the current level of real yields for each country to their historical averages and standard deviations. You can see that the most unattractive bond markets right now are all in Europe (Chart 31). Chart 31European Bonds Are Too Dear OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Chart 32Swiss Bonds Are A Lose-Lose Proposition Swiss Bonds Are A Lose-Lose Proposition Swiss Bonds Are A Lose-Lose Proposition The lower bound of interest rates is another reason to avoid these markets. This floor seems to lie around -1% in nominal terms. Because of these constraints, in recent months, Swiss, Swedish, Dutch and German 10-year bonds have failed to rally as much as their higher-yielding US, Canadian or Australian counterparts when global yields are declining. However, they also underperform when yields are rising (Chart 32). They have become a lose-lose proposition. The only pockets of value left in DM bond markets are Greece, Portugal or Italy. Despite their apparent risks, we still like them. Support for the euro in Greece and Italy is 70% and 65%, respectively. Even populist governments in these nations are reluctant to attack euro membership anymore. Moreover, the ECB remains committed to the survival of the euro area in its current form. Christine Lagarde will not change that. For 2020 or 2021, the risk of euro breakup is practically zero. The same may not be true on a 5- to 10-year investment horizon, but for the coming year, these bonds offer an attractive risk-adjusted carry. Ms. X: Unsurprisingly, my father does not like corporate bonds because of highly levered corporate balance sheets. I think this is a long-term problem, but not a risk for 2020, so I’m looking to stay overweight spread product relative to Treasuries. Where do you stand on this market? BCA: On this issue, we sit somewhere between you both. Our Corporate Health Monitor continues to deteriorate (Chart 33). The high debt load of the US business sector coupled with the decline of the return on capital worries us. Furthermore, the covenant-lite trend in recent issuance suggests that corporate borrowers, not lenders, are getting the good deals. Essentially, too much cash is still chasing too little available yield pick-up. In this environment, capital is sure to be misallocated, and money ultimately lost. We find the reward-to-risk tradeoff more attractive in Europe and Japan than in emerging markets. On a short-term basis, the spreads will not widen much. An easy Fed, recovering global growth, and the gigantic pile of negative-yielding bonds around the world will make sure of that. We advocate a neutral stance on investment grade corporates because IG bonds have high modified duration such that breakeven spread compensation versus Treasuries is near the bottom of its historical distribution across the IG credit spectrum (Chart 34). This means that credit will generate poor returns if government bond yields rise. Chart 33Dangerous Long-Term Picture For US Corporates A Precarious Long-Term Picture For US Corporates A Precarious Long-Term Picture For US Corporates Chart 34No Value Left In IG No Value Left In IG No Value Left In IG   Chart 35EMs Still Experiencing Deflation EMs Still Experiencing Deflation EMs Still Experiencing Deflation Thankfully, they are ways around this problem: emphasizing exposure to high-yield (HY) bonds and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) instead. HY breakeven spreads remain much more attractive than in the IG space, and option-adjusted spreads will benefit if our growth and inflation forecasts materialize. Investors reluctant to commit capital to these products should look into high quality agency MBS. After the recent wave of mortgage refinancing, these securities’ duration has collapsed to 3.0 compared to 7.9 for IG corporates. These securities therefore offer much better protection in a rising-yield environment. Ms. X: Before we move on to equities, where do you stand on EM bonds? BCA: We need to differentiate between EM local-currency bonds and EM USD-denominated bonds. We do like some EM local currency bonds. Inflation in EM countries is low and dropping. Money and credit growth is slowing, which implies that the disinflationary trend will remain in place through 2020 (Chart 35). Weaker nominal growth means that central banks in EM will continue to cut rates, providing a nice tailwind for local-currency bond prices. This comes with a caveat. Lower policy rates will boost bond prices but hurt EM currencies, especially because most EM currencies are not cheap and are already over-owned. Next year, it will be preferable to garner exposure to those countries interest rate moves via the swap market rather than the cash bond market. Chart 36The Mexican Peso Is Cheap The Mexican Peso Is Cheap The Mexican Peso Is Cheap There are some exceptions, like Mexico. The MXN is already very cheap because of fears surrounding the economic policies of President Andres Manual Lopez Obrador (AMLO) (Chart 36). However, we doubt he will turn out to be as dangerous as feared. Hence, MXN Mexican bonds are attractive to foreign investors in unhedged terms. We are currently avoiding EM USD-denominated debt, corporate and sovereign. Since emerging markets sport $5.1 trillion of dollar-denominated debt, falling EM exchange rates will increase the cost of servicing this debt, which makes it riskier. Mr. X: I think we will continue to underweight corporate and EM bonds in our fixed income portfolio. Spread levels still make no sense in terms of providing compensation for credit risk. I must admit that I find your recommendation to overweight MBS intriguing. We will need to ponder this idea further. Ms. X: And please wish me luck trying to convince my father to buy some high-yield bonds. Equity Market Outlook Mr. X: US stocks are too expensive for my taste, with the S&P 500 trading at a forward P/E ratio of 18. I’m well aware of the argument that equities may be expensive but that they are actually cheap compared to bonds, which implies that I should favor stocks over bonds. However, you know that I emphasize capital preservation. With stocks this rich already, equities offer no margin of safety. If I own stocks, I am therefore exposed to any unexpected shocks. Because I do not share your optimism on the economy, I am more worried about downside risk. Moreover, even if the economy performs better than I fear, I suspect stocks will respond poorly to higher yields. Chart 37The S&P Is Very Expensive The S&P Is Very Expensive The S&P Is Very Expensive Ms. X: I agree with my father that stocks are expensive. Nonetheless, as Keynes famously quipped, “Markets can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent.” In today’s context, to me this means that stocks can ignore their overvaluation so long as liquidity is plentiful, rates are low, and a recession is avoided. BCA: On this question, we agree with Ms. X. We all agree that US equities are expensive. As you mentioned, their price-to-earnings ratio is 18. Only at the apex of the tech bubble and in early 2018 was the S&P 500 more expensive. Worryingly, the price-to-sales ratio is at 2.3, an even larger historical outlier than the P/E (Chart 37). Chart 38Low Yields And Plentiful Liquidity Are Still Fertile Ground For Stocks Low Bond Yields And Plentiful Liquidity Are Still Fertile Ground For Stocks Low Bond Yields And Plentiful Liquidity Are Still Fertile Ground For Stocks Ms. X is correct that we cannot look at stock valuations in isolation. Investing is about opportunity cost and the macroeconomic context. On this front, even US equities have their merit. Despite the S&P 500’s expensive multiples, our Composite Valuation Indicator is no more elevated than it was in 2013. Meanwhile, our Monetary Indicator has rarely been as supportive of stock prices as it is today, and our Speculation Indicator is in line with its January 2016 reading (Chart 38). Moreover, BCA’s Composite Sentiment indicator is still below its long-term historical average and margin debt has declined by $47.5 billion to the lowest share of US market capitalization since June 2005. These are hardly signs of irrational exuberance. Ultimately, bear markets and recessions travel together. A durable 20% drop in stock prices requires a significant and long-lasting decline in earnings. These developments happen during recessions (Chart 39). Our call is for a recession in the next 24 months or so. We must also remember that while equities perform poorly six months ahead of a recession, the end of a bull market, its last 12 to 18 months, tend to be very rewarding (Table 3). We are within this window. Chart 39Bear Markets And Recessions Travel Together Bear Markets And Recessions Travel Together Bear Markets And Recessions Travel Together Table 3The End Game Can Be Rewarding OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Based on our forecast for interest rates, we do not share the concerns that rising bond yields will topple stocks right away. Stock prices are an inverse function of risk-free rates, but a positive function of growth expectations. Higher yields will initially reflect stronger growth, not restrict it. But remember: the upside for yields is limited because central banks do not want to choke off the recovery. They will maintain accommodative policy. In other words, we expect real rates to lag behind growth expectations. Because long-term growth expectations, whether from sell-side analysts or extracted out of market prices using the Gordon Growth Model, are low, we are willing to make this bet (Chart 40). Equities will suffer if the global bond yield rises above 2.5%. This is more a story for 2021, and not our central scenario for 2020. It is nonetheless a reminder that we are entering the end game of the business cycle, so we are also entering the end-game of the bull market. Mr. X: I think you are playing with fire. Stocks are so expensive that if you are wrong on either the growth call or the yield call, they will suffer. I would rather miss the last melt-up in stocks than unnecessarily expose my portfolio to a meltdown. Additionally, you have not addressed the fact that S&P 500 margins have begun to soften but are still extremely elevated. Shouldn’t this dampen your optimism? BCA: Aggregate S&P 500 margins have some downside. Our Composite Margin Proxy, Operating Margins Diffusion index and Corporate Pricing Power indicator all remain weak (Chart 41). The deceleration in the crude PPI excluding food and energy and the past strength in the dollar confirm this insight, especially as the corporate wage bill climbs in a tight labor market. The biggest mitigating factor is that productivity is also on the mend, which curbs the negative impact of higher worker pay. Chart 40Growth Expectations Are Muted Profit Growth Expectations Are Muted Profit Growth Expectations Are Muted Chart 41US Margins Under Pressure US Margins Under Pressure US Margins Under Pressure   This danger must be put into perspective though. Margin expansion has been dominated by the tech sector (Chart 42). Excluding this industry, S&P 500 margins are roughly in line with their previous peak, and are not declining. The aggregate softness in margins is a reflection of the sharper decline in tech margins. Declining margins do not spell the imminent end of the bull market either. Table 4 shows that on average, the S&P 500 rises by 9.5% following the peak in margins. Equities can rise after margins crest because this is often an environment where wages are climbing, which boosts consumption. Consequently, top-line growth can accelerate and earnings can rise even if they represent a lower proportion of sales. This is the environment we foresee over 2020. Chart 42Tech Margins Have Likely Peaked Tech Margins Have Likely Peaked Tech Margins Have Likely Peaked Table 4Margin Peaks Do Not Spell S&P Doom OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game   Chart 43Taiwanese Stocks Are Sniffing Out Better Global Growth Taiwanese Stocks Are Sniffing Out Better Global Growth Taiwanese Stocks Are Sniffing Out Better Global Growth Ms. X: You have talked about the tech sector being a drag on overall margins. How would you position a US stock portfolio? BCA: First, around the world, we prefer cyclical sectors to defensive ones. Cyclical stocks are depressed relative to defensive firms’ shares. Rebounding global growth and rising bond yields will favor cyclical sectors. Globally, the performance of cyclical equities relative to defensive ones correlates with Taiwanese equities, which are currently rallying smartly (Chart 43). This suggests that at the margin, the most cyclical asset markets are beginning to express optimism about global growth. Within the S&P 500, our favorite pair trade to express this bias is to overweight energy stocks at the expense of utilities. Utilities are bond proxies which will substantially underperform energy stocks when the rate of change of Treasury yields moves up (Chart 44). Moreover, based on our valuation indicators, energy stocks have never traded at such a deep discount to utilities, nor have they ever been as oversold. Chart 44Favor Energy Over Utilities Favor Energy Over Utilities Favor Energy Over Utilities Second, we are currently neutral on tech stocks but have put them on a downgrade alert. Tech equities are expensive, trading at a forward P/E ratio 21% above the other cyclicals. Moreover, since software spending has remained surprisingly resilient despite the global economic slowdown, it will likely lag investment in machinery and structures when industrial demand rebounds. Consequently, tech earnings will lag other traditional cyclical sectors. Tech multiples will also suffer when bond yields rise. As high-growth stocks, tech equities derive a large proportion of their intrinsic value from long-term deferred cash flows and their terminal value. Thus, tech multiples are highly sensitive to changes in the discount rate We implement this view by way of an underweight in tech and an overweight to industrials. Industrials have suffered disproportionately from the trade war. Any near term truce is unlikely to contain a grand bargain on intellectual property rights transfer that galvanizes tech exports, but it will remove some of the uncertainty weighing on industrials. Moreover, industrials are a much cheaper play on a global growth rebound. The global manufacturing slowdown has caused industrial equities to trade at their greatest discount to the tech sector since the financial crisis. Finally, the wage bill for the industrial sector is melting relative to tech, and our margin proxy is surging (Chart 45). This has created a very positive backdrop for this pair trade. We also like financials. They will be a key beneficiary of rising yields and a steepening yield curve. Additionally, household credit demand has picked up and overall credit growth should accelerate as central banks will maintain very accommodative monetary conditions. The yield impulse already points toward higher bank credit growth and companies are issuing an increasingly large stock of bonds (Chart 46). Chart 45Operating Metrics Will Boost Industrials Versus Tech Equities Operating Leverage Will Boost Industrials Versus Tech Equities Operating Leverage Will Boost Industrials Versus Tech Equities Chart 46Easing Financial Conditions Will Support Credit Creation Easing Financial Conditions Will Support Credit Creation Easing Financial Conditions Will Support Credit Creation   Ms. X: When combining valuation analysis with your fundamental sectoral slant, I am guessing that you must favor European, Japanese and EM stocks over the S&P 500? BCA: We do favor European and Japanese equities. Based on valuation alone, all the regions you mentioned offer higher expected long-term real rates of return than the US (Chart 47). Moreover, the dollar is expensive relative to advanced economies’ currencies. Hence, these markets are cheaper vehicles than the S&P 500 to bet on a global economic recovery. But valuation alone is not enough. US stocks are trading at unprecedented levels relative to global equities because of the FAANG craze (Chart 48). Looking at sector representation, our positive view on non-tech cyclicals also flatters exposure to Europe and Japan (Table 5). Chart 47Non US Equities Offer Better Value OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Chart 48FAANG-Driven US Outperformance FAANG-Driven US Outperformance FAANG-Driven US Outperformance   Table 5Equity Market Sector Composition OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Chart 49European Banks Are Cheap European Banks Are Cheap European Banks Are Cheap Europe is particularly attractive because of its large skew towards industrials and financials, which represent 32.3% of the market versus 22.3% in the US. Moreover, European financials are also a tantalizing bet because they trade at a 50% discount to US financials, according to their price-to-book ratio. Additionally, their return on tangible equity will benefit from higher German yields, easing financial conditions, declining non-performing loans in the periphery and rebounding global growth. Our RoE model for European banks already points to a resurgence in their stock prices (Chart 49). Of the major markets we track, Japan offers the highest prospective long-term real returns. Its strong cyclical slant and low share of tech stocks means it is another market investors should overweight to bet on a global recovery. The biggest problem for Japanese equities is the yen. When global yields climb higher, a weak JPY will clip some of the Nikkei’s gains for foreign investors. Finally, we are reluctant to overweight EM stocks just yet. In this space, median P/E ratios are much higher than on a market capitalization-weighted basis (Chart 50). State-owned companies explain this bifurcation, Chinese banks in particular. Since we expect Chinese banks to remain a conduit for policy, credit origination may flatter economic growth more than shareholders’ interests. Moreover, we have a negative outlook on EM currencies, and hedging this exposure is expensive. Finally, if China’s economic activity improves only modestly in 2020, the 2012 experience suggests that EM stocks can still underperform the global equity universe as global growth improves and yields rise (Chart 51). In other words, we find the reward-to-risk tradeoff more attractive in Europe and Japan than in emerging markets. Chart 50EM Stocks Are No Bargain Yet EM Stocks Are No Bargain Yet EM Stocks Are No Bargain Yet Chart 51EM Stocks Can Underperform When Global Growth Improves EM Stocks Can Underperform Even When Global Growth Improves EM Stocks Can Underperform Even When Global Growth Improves     Mr. X: Thank you. I am still not sure what share of our portfolio will be dedicated to stocks. However, I think that whatever this proportion will be, buying global equities makes more sense than US ones. Your valuation argument alone is swaying me, considering my more conservative instincts. Ms. X: I’m glad we will not have to argue on this point, but I know we will nonetheless battle on the stock/bond/gold split. Should we move on to your currency and commodity forecasts? BCA: It would be our pleasure. Currencies And Commodities Mr. X: You have often argued that the dollar is a countercyclical currency. Based on our discussion so far, you must expect the dollar to decline until we get closer to the next recession. I am not fully convinced. Specifically, I remember that in the back half of 2016 global growth was rebounding, but the dollar soared. Therefore, the growth/dollar relationship can be more complex than you argue. Meanwhile, with negative interest rates in Europe, Japan and Switzerland, why would I even consider divesting out of my positive yielding dollar assets? Chart 52The Dollar Is A Counter Cyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Counter Cyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Counter Cyclical Currency BCA: You raise interesting questions, and you are correct that we expect the dollar to depreciate if our constructive view on global growth pans out for 2020. The inverse relationship between global industrial production (excluding the US) and the trade-weighted dollar is unambiguous (Chart 52). As you also mentioned, the reality is a little bit more nuanced. To understand why, it is important to remember how currencies function. We can think of an exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism that solves for the gap in growth between any two countries. This is at the root of the dollar’s counter-cyclicality. When global growth is picking up, returns tend to be higher in cyclical markets, which are highly concentrated outside of the US. Flows then gravitate from the US to other markets and the dollar declines. After a while, the dollar becomes cheap enough that these flows reverse. In the second half of 2016, three factors drove the dollar rebound. First, US manufacturing was improving at a faster pace than that of the rest of the world. Second, the Fed resumed its interest rate hikes, so interest rate differentials suddenly flattered the dollar anew. Finally, the election of President Trump, who campaigned on large scale fiscal stimulus, elicited memories of the Reagan dollar bull market of the first half of the 1980s. These factors eventually faded as global growth rebounded. Today, the Fed’s policies are hurting the dollar. Aside from recent interest rate cuts, the Fed has been injecting liquidity into the banking system through repurchase agreements and renewed asset (T-Bills) purchases. Moreover, the rate cuts are also easing global funding conditions and promoting a re-steepening of the yield curve. This will incentivize banks to lend and boost the US money supply. As growth re-accelerates and demand for imports (machinery, commodities, and consumer goods) rises, the current account deficit will widen further. This process will increase the international supply of dollars. Historically, these dynamics usually hurt the dollar. What we have described is a tentative abatement in geopolitical risk at best – but it would be cavalier to get overly enthusiastic. Like you, we are deeply uncomfortable with negative interest rates. Thankfully, the nascent pickup in global economic activity is lifting global bond yields. So far, foreign bond markets have led this move. More specifically, countries that have suffered most from the global manufacturing slowdown are now seeing their bond yields rise the quickest (Chart 53). For example, yields in Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Japan have risen by a lot more than those in the US since global yields troughed in September. Should the initial signals of stabilization in global growth morph into a synchronized recovery, the US yield advantage will evaporate. In a nutshell, interest rates might be negative in Europe and Switzerland, but the positive carry offered by US assets is rapidly fading. Chart 53AAre Interest Rate Differentials Flashing A Signal About Exchange Rates? Are Interest Rate Differentials Flashing A Signal About Exchange Rates? Are Interest Rate Differentials Flashing A Signal About Exchange Rates? Chart 53BAre Interest Rate Differentials Flashing A Signal About Exchange Rates? Are Interest Rate Differentials Flashing A Signal About Exchange Rates? Are Interest Rate Differentials Flashing A Signal About Exchange Rates?   Chart 54Foreigners Are Selling Treasuries Foreigners Are Selling Treasuries Foreigners Are Selling Treasuries For international investors, the currency risk inherent in owning US bonds is just too large at the current juncture. Remember, the trade-weighted dollar stands 25% above its long-term equilibrium and the US twin deficits are expanding. Markets priced in cheap currencies with some potential upside, such as Australia, Canada, Norway or even the European periphery, might be better bets. Flows highlight just how precarious the situation is for the US dollar. Since last August, overall flows into the US Treasury market have been negative. Net foreign purchases by private investors are still positive at an annualized US$180 billion, but they are clearly rolling over. Moreover, official net outflows are running at $350 billion, easily cancelling out the private sector’s inflows (Chart 54). Essentially, foreigners’ appetite for US fixed-income assets is waning exactly as interest rate differentials have started moving against the dollar. Ms. X: I share my father’s concerns, but how would you implement your negative dollar view. Which currencies should I be loading up on as we enter the business cycle’s end game? BCA: The more export-dependent economies (and currencies) should benefit the most from a rebound in global growth. Within the G-10, we particularly like the Swedish krona, the Norwegian krone and the British pound. Bond yields for these currencies are rising the fastest vis-à-vis the US. As a result, the currencies themselves should soon follow (previously mentioned Chart 53). We also expect commodity currencies to benefit, but only upon clearer signs that the resource-thirsty Chinese economy is improving. Until then, they are likely to lag the pro-cyclical European currencies, which are less directly dependent on Chinese stimulus. The euro could become the greatest beneficiary from a weaker dollar because a large headwind for European economic activity is disappearing for now. For the past ten years, European real interest rates have been too low for the most productive, competitive exporter – Germany – but too high for others such as Spain and Italy. Consequently, the euro has been caught in a tug-of-war between a rising neutral rate of interest for Germany and a very low one for the peripheral economies. Via its rate cuts, asset purchase programs, and aggressive TLTRO packages, the ECB may have now finally eased policy to the point where nearly all Eurozone countries enjoy an accommodative monetary environment. 10-year government bond yields in France, Spain, Portugal and even Italy now all sit close to the neutral rate of interest for the entire eurozone (Chart 55). Chart 55The ECB Has Eased Policy Enough The ECB Has Eased Policy Enough The ECB Has Eased Policy Enough Finally, the euro is likely to benefit from inflows into European equity markets. The euro’s drop since 2018 has eased financial conditions and made euro area businesses more competitive. This is an important tailwind for European corporate profits and thus stocks. Moreover, European equities, especially those in the periphery, remain unloved, as illustrated by their cheap valuations compared to other advanced economies. Additionally, analysts’ earnings expectations for eurozone equities are perking up relative to US stocks. If the sell-side is right, powerful inflows into the region will lift the euro in 2020. Mr. X: Thank you. I find it difficult to share your enthusiasm for the euro, a currency backed by such a flimsy edifice. While I would agree that it could rebound next year, I find currencies highly unpredictable on such a time horizon. I prefer to think about them on a long-term basis, and while the euro is cheap, its weak institutional underpinning is too concerning. Let’s move on to commodities. Following our meeting last year, we took your advice on oil and gold. Overall, these calls helped our portfolio. Going forward, these markets are extremely perplexing. There is so much risk in oil markets, such as the tensions in the Middle East and the uncertainty stemming from the trade war between the US and China. How would you recommend playing the oil market in 2020? Chart 56Inventory Drawdown Will Support Oil Inventory Drawdown Will Support Oil Inventory Drawdown Will Support Oil BCA: Your assessment of these markets is spot on. Yet, price risk is skewed to the upside because fiscal and monetary stimulus will revive commodity demand. The oil-producer coalition led by Saudi Arabia and Russia will continue to restrain production, and will probably extend its 1.2mm b/d production cut due to expire at the end of March to year-end 2020. In the US, market-imposed capital discipline will keep reducing the growth of US shale-oil supply. Additionally, US shale-oil supply growth is threatened by flaring of associated natural gas in the Bakken and Permian basins. Failure to limit the burn-off at oil-production sites could provide the environmental lobby an opening to challenge growth. Ms. X: What about the demand side of the oil markets? The fall in the growth rate of demand this year caught most participants off guard. What do you make of that? BCA: Demand data shows a lot of lingering weakness, much of which was caused by tight financial conditions last year in the US and China. But now, most global central banks are pursuing highly accommodative monetary policy and many governments are also easing fiscal policy. As a result, this demand weakness will fade next year. We think next year growth will clock in at 1.4mm b/d. Not as robust as 2017, but still respectable. This should stop the downward pressure on oil prices that has prevailed since May (Chart 56). Mr. X: You’re describing a fairly strong market for next year. What are the downside risks to your view? BCA: Global economic policy uncertainty remains elevated. Uncertainty is one of the key factors driving demand for USD, which is one of the most popular safe havens in the world (Chart 57). A strong dollar creates a headwind for commodity demand. It raises the local-currency costs of consumers in the EM economies that drive oil demand, and lowers production costs outside of the US, encouraging supply growth at the margin. Chart 57Elevated Global Economic Uncertainty Has Kept The USD Well Bid OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Chart 58Gold: A Valuable Portfolio Hedge OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Ms. X: So, pulling it all together, what is your call for 2020? BCA: The weaker 2019 demand data and the upward revisions to global oil inventories pushed our 2020 Brent Oil forecast to $67/bbl from $70/bbl. We still expect WTI to trade at a $4/bbl discount to Brent. As we mentioned earlier, the risk to our forecast is to the upside: a resolution of the US-China trade war, and lower global economic policy uncertainty could trigger a sharp rally in crude prices. Mr. X: Thank you for your insight on oil. I would like to hear your thoughts on gold. You can tell that I see little absolute value in stocks or bonds at the moment, so I have an outsized preference for the yellow metal this year. Also, how could the US dollar and gold both rally at the same time in 2019? BCA: Let’s start with your dollar/gold question. It is very rare to see gold and the dollar rally together. Normally a strong dollar hurts gold. As you know, we’ve been recommending an allocation to gold since 2017, mostly as a portfolio hedge. We like that gold strongly outperforms other safe havens in equity bear markets and can participate in the upside (even if to a limited extent) in bull markets. We think the safe-haven properties of gold and the US dollar really have come to the fore over the past couple of years (Chart 58). Economic policy uncertainty, and divisive politics globally have raised the level of uncertainty to record levels. In such an environment, the dollar and gold both provide a safe haven and a portfolio hedge. Hence, their joint popularity this past year. We should also remember that gold is a good inflation hedge, and is particularly negatively correlated with real interest rates. A Fed that is willing to let the economy overheat is a Fed that will limit how high real rates climb. Moreover, global liquidity is plentiful. Finally, EM central banks have been slowly divesting from Treasuries and diversifying into gold lately, buying most of the new supply in the process. This backdrop, along with our forecast of a weaker dollar, should support gold again in 2020. That being said, because gold is tactically overbought and could face temporary headwinds if global uncertainty recedes, we prefer silver, which is not as stretched. Furthermore, silver’s higher industrial use means that it should also benefit from a global manufacturing recovery. Geopolitics Chart 59Multipolarity Creates An Unstable Environment Multipolarity Creates An Unstable Environment Multipolarity Creates An Unstable Environment Mr. X: Let’s return to geopolitical and policy risks, both of which abound. Global economic policy uncertainty is the highest it has been since academics began measuring it. The world is fraught with populism, authoritarianism, war, immigration, technological disruption, inequality, and corruption. With so much chaos, and so little consensus, is there anything solid for an investor to grasp about the political backdrop next year? BCA: Geopolitics is the likeliest candidate to short circuit this long bull market, given that the Federal Reserve, the usual culprit, has paused its rate tightening campaign. On a secular basis, geopolitical risk is rising because the United States’ national power is declining relative to that of other world powers (Chart 59). China’s rise, in particular, is stirring conflict with the US and its allies in the western Pacific. Beijing’s technological and military advance is generating fear across the American political establishment. Russia and China continue to deepen their relationship in the face of an increasingly unpredictable United States. These strategic tensions will persist despite any tariff ceasefire with China. Chart 60Globalization Has Peaked Globalization Has Peaked Globalization Has Peaked Competition among the great powers makes for a world of contested authority. As the rules of the road have become less certain, the tailwind behind international trade and investment has weakened (Chart 60). Deglobalization is a headwind for the earnings of large cap global companies in the long run. Emerging markets, which are exposed to trade, face persistent unrest. Mr. X: Given the above, how can an investor take an optimistic view of the global economy and markets next year? BCA: We have a framework for analyzing politics: constraints over preferences. We cannot predict what the chief politicians will prefer at any given time, but we can try to identify and measure the constraints that will restrict their freedom of movement. With global growth slowing, world leaders have become more sensitive to their constraints. The Fed has reversed rate hikes; China is easing policy; President Trump has refrained from attacking Iran; and President Trump and President Xi are negotiating a ceasefire. The UK has avoided a “no deal” Brexit – not once but twice. In short, the risk of recession (or conflict) has been sufficient to alter the policy trajectory. As a result, there is a prospect for global geopolitical risks to abate somewhat in 2020. Both the American and Chinese administrations need to see growth stabilize despite their ongoing strategic conflict. Both the British and European governments need to avoid a disorderly Brexit despite their lack of clarity beyond that. Geopolitical risk is declining, albeit from an extremely elevated level. Mr. X: The US and China have already come close to a deal only to get cold feet and back away from it. The British Prime Minister is committed to leaving the EU with or without a deal. Surely you cannot believe that the Middle East, Russia, other emerging markets, or North Korea will be any bastion of stability. BCA: The US-China trade war is still the single greatest threat to the equity bull market. Brexit is not resolved and a new deadline for a trade deal looms at the end of 2020. Investors must remain vigilant and hedge their portfolios, particularly with gold. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore this year’s reaffirmation of the Fed put, the China put, and Trump’s “Art of the Deal.” The base case for next year should be constructive, albeit with vigilant attention to the major risks: President Trump, China and Iran. The other issues you mention have varying degrees of market relevance. Russia is focusing on pacifying domestic discontent. North Korea is on a diplomatic track with the United States. Emerging market unrest is particularly relevant where it can have a bearing on global stability: Iraq, Iran and Hong Kong in particular. Ms. X: If I may interject: It seems to me that the worst of the trade war has passed, that the risk of a no-deal Brexit is negligible, and that Iran is unlikely to outdo its attack against Saudi Arabia in September. Doesn’t this imply that geopolitical risk is overrated and that investors should rush to capture the risk premium in equities? BCA: What we have described is a tentative abatement in geopolitical risk at best – but it would be cavalier to get overly enthusiastic. After all, any fall in global risks will be amply made up for by the impending rise in US domestic political risk. Indeed, US politics are the chief source of global political risk in 2020. First, if President Trump becomes a “lame duck” then he could take actions that are hugely disruptive to global markets in a desperate attempt to win reelection as a “war president.” Chart 61European Political Risk Is Now Low Europe Political Risk Is Now Low Europe Political Risk Is Now Low Second, if President Trump is reelected, then his disruptive populism will have a new mandate and his “America First” foreign and trade policy will be unshackled. Third, if the opposition Democrats succeed in unseating an incumbent president, they will likely take the Senate too, removing the main hurdle to a dramatic policy change. That would mark the third 180-degree reversal in national policy in 12 years. Moreover, investors may find the country merely exchanged right-wing populism for left-wing populism, which has a more negative impact on corporate earnings prospects. Polarization and institutional erosion will continue. The election results may be razor thin; swing states may have to recount votes; and the outcome could hinge on rare or unprecedented developments in the Electoral College, the Supreme Court or cyberspace. A crisis of legitimacy could easily afflict the next administration. In short, there are few scenarios in which US political risk does not rise over the next 12-24 months. Rising American risk stands in stark contrast to Europe (Chart 61), where the will to integrate has overcome several challenges since the sovereign debt crisis. Substantial majority of voters support the euro and the European Union. Germany is on the brink of a major political succession but it is not turning its back on the European project. France is successfully pursuing structural reforms. Italy remains the weakest link, but even the populist Northern League accepts the euro. This leaves two remaining global risks: China and Iran. Chinese political risk is generally understated. President Xi Jinping, lacking President Trump’s electoral constraint, could overestimate his leverage. He could overreach in the trade talks, in his battle to prevent excessive debt growth, or in his handling of Hong Kong, Taiwan, North Korea, or Iran. The result could be a breakdown in the trade talks or a separate strategic crisis with the United States. Another cold war-style escalation in tensions could easily kill the green shoots in global growth. As for Iran, the regime is under crippling American sanctions and faces unrest both at home and within its regional sphere of influence. There is a non-negligible risk that it will lash out and cause an extended oil supply shock. Conclusions Mr. X: This is a good place to conclude our discussion. We have covered a lot of ground but I remain deeply concerned that staying invested in risk assets today is akin to picking-up pennies in front of a steamroller. I accept your opinion that a recession is unlikely in 2020, but valuations of both stocks and bonds are uncomfortably stretched for my taste. As a result, I believe stocks could suffer whether growth is good or bad next year. Finally, since so many things need to go right for the global economy to continue to defy gravity, a recession may hit faster than you envision. To me, there is simply not enough margin of safety in stocks to compensate me for the risk! Ms. X: I agree with my father that the risks are high because we are entering the end game of the cycle. But I also see pockets of value, some of which you have mentioned today. Moreover, I am sympathetic to your view that global growth will recover next year. Corporate earnings should therefore expand. Hence, I fear that being out of the market will be very painful, especially because policy is quite accommodative. While stocks may not perform as well as they did in 2019, I expect them to outperform bonds handily. I’m therefore willing to continue holding risk assets, even if I need to be more judicious in my sector and regional allocation. BCA: Your family debate mirrors our own internal discussions. There is always a trade-off between maximizing short-term returns and taking a longer-term approach. Valuations are the ultimate guidepost for long-term return prospects. Because so many assets have become more expensive this year, long-term returns are likely to be uninspiring compared to recent history. Table 6 shows our baseline calculations of what a balanced portfolio will earn over the coming decade. We estimate that such a portfolio will deliver average annual returns of 4.4% over the next ten years, or 2.4% after adjusting for inflation. That is a noticeable deterioration from our inflation-adjusted estimate of 2.8% from last year, and also still well below the 6.5% real return that a balanced portfolio earned between 1982 and 2019. Table 6Asset Market Return Projections OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Our outlook for next year hinges on global growth rebounding and policy uncertainty receding. Monetary policy is less of a threat to equities than it was last year because central banks have already eased considerably and have been very open about their willingness to let inflation run above target for a while before retightening the monetary screws. We propose the following list of easy-to-track milestones to monitor whether or not our central scenario for the global economy and asset markets is playing out, and how close we are to the end of the cycle: Chinese money and credit numbers. Chinese credit growth must stabilize for the economy to do so. If credit origination continues to decelerate, this will indicate that Beijing has decided to tolerate the slowdown and prioritize its reform and deleveraging agenda. In this case, the Chinese debt supercycle is over sooner and the global economy will pay the price. Our China Investment Strategy Activity Index. Global policy is accommodative and liquidity conditions have improved significantly. However, if the Chinese economy continues to deteriorate, global growth will not rebound. The China Activity Index must stabilize and even improve somewhat for our global growth view to come to fruition. Progress in the “phase one” deal. China and the US must agree to a trade détente. As long as uncertainty around immediate tariffs remain high and retaliation risks stay alive, global capital spending intentions and thus the global manufacturing sector will be hamstrung. Surveys of global growth. The Global manufacturing PMI and the global growth expectation component of the ZEW survey must both recover. If these variables cannot gain any traction, the global economy is sicker than we estimate and risk assets will suffer. Commodity prices and the dollar. In the first quarter, industrial commodity prices must rebound and the dollar must start to depreciate. These two developments will not only reflect an improvement in global growth. They will also alleviate deflationary pressures around the world, revive profits and sponsor a business spending recovery. Moreover, a weaker dollar will also ease global financial conditions by decreasing the global cost of capital. 10-year inflation breakeven rate. If US breakevens move above the 2.3% to 2.5% zone, the Fed will become more proactive about raising rates. This would provoke a quicker end to the business cycle. President Trump’s approval rating. If President Trump’s approval rating stabilizes below 42%, he could give up on the economy and instead bet on a “rally around the flag” as his best strategy for re-election. This would result in a much more hawkish and confrontational White House that would become an even greater source of uncertainty for the economy, and thus risk asset prices. Ms. X: Thank you for this comprehensive list of variables to monitor. As always, you have left us with much to think about. We look forward to these discussions every year. Before we conclude, it would be helpful to have a recap of your key views. BCA: It will be our pleasure. The key points are as follow: Global equities are entering the end game of their nearly 11-year bull market. Stocks are expensive, but bonds are even more so. As a result, if global growth can recover and the US can avoid a recession in 2020, earnings will not weaken significantly and stocks will again outperform bonds. Low rates reflect the end of the debt supercycle in the advanced economies. However, the debt supercycle is still alive in EM in general, and in China, in particular. The global economic slowdown that begun more than 18 months ago started when China tried to limit debt growth. If Beijing continues to push for more deleveraging, global growth will continue to suffer as the EM debt supercycle will end. Nonetheless, we expect China to try to mitigate domestic deflationary pressures in 2020. As a result, a small wave of Chinese reflation, coupled with the substantial easing in global monetary and liquidity conditions should promote a worldwide re-acceleration in economic activity. Policy uncertainty will recede next year. Domestic constraints are forcing China and the US toward a trade détente. The risk of a no-deal Brexit is now marginal, and President Trump is still the favorite in 2020. A decline in policy risk will foster a global economic rebound. That being said, some pockets of risk remain, such as in the Middle East. Global central banks are highly unlikely to remove the punch bowl anytime soon. Not only will it take some time before global deflationary forces recede, monetary authorities in the G10 want to avoid the Japanification of their economies. As a result, they are already announcing that they will allow inflation to overshoot their 2% target for a period of time. This will ultimately raise the need for higher rates in 2021, which will push the global economy into recession in late 2021, or early 2022. These dynamics are key to our categorization of 2020 as the end game. US growth will re-accelerate. The US consumer remains in good shape thanks to healthy balance sheets and robust employment and wage growth prospects. Meanwhile, corporate profits and capex should benefit from a decline in global uncertainty and a pick-up in global economic activity. China will continue to stimulate its economy but will not do so as aggressively as it did over the past 10 years. Consequently, EM growth will also bottom but is unlikely to boom. Europe and Japan will re-accelerate in 2020. Bond yields will grind higher in 2020. However, Treasury yields are unlikely to break above the 2.25% to 2.5% range until much later in the year. Inflationary pressures won’t resurface quickly, so the Fed is unlikely to signal its intention to raise interest rates until late 2020 or later. European bonds are particularly unattractive. Corporate bonds are a mixed offering. Investment grade credit is unattractive owing to low option-adjusted spreads and high duration, especially when corporate health is deteriorating. Agency mortgage-backed securities and high-yield bonds offer better risk-adjusted value. Global stocks will enjoy their last-gasp rally in 2020. As global growth recovers, favor the more cyclical sectors and regions which also happen to offer the best value. US stocks are the least attractive bourse; they are very expensive and loaded with defensive and tech-related exposure, two groups that could suffer from higher bond yields. We are neutral on EM equities. Investors should pare exposure to equities after inflation breakevens have moved back into their 2.3% to 2.5% normal range and the Fed funds rate has moved closer to neutral. We anticipate this to be a risk in 2021. The dollar is likely to decline because it is a countercyclical currency. Balance of payment dynamics and valuation considerations are also becoming headwinds. The pro-cyclical European currencies and the euro should be the main beneficiary of any dollar depreciation. Oil and gold will have upside next year. Crude will benefit from both supply-side discipline and a recovery in oil demand on the back of the improving growth outlook. Gold will strengthen as global central banks limit the upside to real rates by allowing inflation to run a bit hot. A weaker dollar will flatter both commodities. A balanced portfolio is likely to generate average returns of only 2.4% a year in real terms over the next decade. This compares to average returns of around 6.5% a year between 1982 and 2019. We would like to take this opportunity to wish you and all of our clients a very peaceful, healthy and prosperous New Year. The Editors November 22, 2019

Highlights Maintaining an adequate level of aggregate demand has proven to be one of the biggest macroeconomic challenges of the modern era. Yet, in principle, it should not be difficult to increase demand. After all, people like to consume. If households are not spending enough, governments can just give them money or increase spending directly on public infrastructure and other worthwhile endeavors.  Various explanations have been proposed for why these solutions either won’t work or are bad ideas even if they do work. These include Ricardian Equivalence-type arguments; claims that periods of high unemployment may be necessary to cleanse financial and economic imbalances; and concerns about excessive levels of government debt. None of these explanations are particularly persuasive, which suggests that politics, rather than economics, may be at the heart of the demand-side secular stagnation problem. Bondholders benefit from low inflation, which has often led them to oppose meaningful fiscal stimulus. Looking out, the influence of bondholders is likely to wane as populism proliferates. Investors should favor “real assets” such as equities, real estate, and commodities over “nominal assets” such as bonds and cash. A Rather Peculiar Problem Some problems are hard to solve. Curing cancer is hard. Reconciling quantum mechanics with general relativity is hard. But why should getting people to spend more be so difficult? After all, people like to consume. It is getting them to save that should be challenging. And yet, the most pressing macroeconomic problem in many countries over the past decade (and much longer in Japan) has been generating enough spending to achieve full employment, which is a precondition for allowing central banks to move away from extreme measures such as quantitative easing and negative rates. It would be one thing if secular stagnation were primarily a problem of inadequate supply. Increasing supply is difficult. While some economists such as Robert Gordon have focused on the poor prospects for potential GDP growth in developed economies (sluggish productivity and labor force growth being among the key culprits), the Larry Summers characterization of secular stagnation is first and foremost about inadequate demand. If people are not spending enough, why can’t the government simply increase transfers to households or spend money directly on public infrastructure, scientific exploration, or other worthwhile endeavors? Three arguments have been advanced as to why this strategy either will not work or is a bad idea even if it does work: 1) Ricardian Equivalence-type theories claiming that the private sector will increase savings by enough to counter larger budget deficits, thus leaving overall demand unchanged; 2) claims that periods of high unemployment are both necessary and desirable for shifting resources to more productive uses; and 3) concerns that higher government debt levels stemming from larger budget deficits will impose long-term costs that swamp the short-term growth benefits of fiscal stimulus. As we discuss below, none of these arguments are particularly persuasive. This suggests that politics, rather than economics, explains why there has been so much reluctance towards fiscal easing. Ricardian Equivalence Ricardian Equivalence stipulates that the lifetime present value of after-tax income determines household consumption. This implies that if a government issues each person a check for $1 million, everybody will just save the money in anticipation of higher taxes down the road. If that sounds a tad implausible, this is because the theory assumes, among other things, that everyone is perfectly rational, can borrow as much as they want, and lives forever (or at least values their heirs’ or beneficiaries’ welfare as much as their own).  The theory is even less convincing when applied to government spending. Only in the extreme scenario where the government permanently increases spending would rational, infinitely-lived households cut their spending by exactly enough to offset the rise in government expenditures. If the increase in government spending were perceived to be temporary, aggregate demand would still rise, even if everyone is completely rational. To see this, consider a case where the government increases spending by $1 billion per year for three years. The “rational” response would be for households to cut their own expenditures by the annual carrying cost of the additional $3 billion in debt. Assuming an interest rate of 2%, this would amount to a reduction in annual consumption of about $60 million, leaving a net annual fiscal boost of $940 billion. The example above almost certainly overstates the negative impact on consumption in situations where the economy is operating below potential. This is because raising government spending in a depressed economy will boost output, thus increasing the present value of lifetime incomes. The expectation of higher income will lift consumption. The bottom line is that Ricardian Equivalence applies only in a very narrow range of circumstances, none of which are relevant in the real world. Indeed, as Box 1 discusses, the empirical evidence clearly suggests that fiscal multipliers are positive, especially in economies grappling with high unemployment. The Urge To Purge One popular view, often associated with the Austrian School of economics, is that recessions cleanse the economy and the financial system of excesses, paving the way for faster growth. The main problem with this view is that it assumes that resources will only shift to more worthwhile uses if many people are unemployed. In practice, this is not the case. In any given month, about five million US workers will either quit or lose their job, while a slightly higher number will find new work (Chart 1). Chart 1Labor Market Churn Tends To Increase As Unemployment Falls Labor Market Churn Tends To Increase As Unemployment Falls Labor Market Churn Tends To Increase As Unemployment Falls Chart 2Residential Construction Accounted For Only 20% Of The Job Losses During The Great Recession Secular Stagnation: The Easiest Problem In The World? Secular Stagnation: The Easiest Problem In The World?   The small difference between gross inflows and outflows is the net change in employment. This is the number investors focus on every month when the payroll report is released; it is usually less than 5% of gross flows. Strikingly, gross separations usually rise when the unemployment rate falls, implying that labor market churn increases when the economy strengthens. This occurs because more people tend to quit their jobs when the labor market is tight and job openings are plentiful. The pro-cyclicality of the quits rate dominates the counter-cyclicality of the discharge rate. The Great Recession demonstrated that most of the job losses during severe downturns are gratuitous in the sense that they impose needless suffering on workers without making the economy more productive. Chart 2 shows that only 20% of US job losses between 2007 and 2009 took place in the residential building sector and related financial activities where excesses were plainly evident. The rest of the losses were in parts of the economy that had little to do with the housing bubble.   Too Much Debt? Opponents of loose fiscal policy often point to rising government debt levels as an unwelcome side effect of larger budget deficits. Worries about high debt levels are certainly justified for countries that do not print their own currencies. When a country lacks a buyer of last resort for its debt, a self-fulfilling crisis can develop where rising bond yields make it more difficult for the government to service its obligations, leading to even higher bond yields (Chart 3). Chart 3Multiple Equilibria In Debt Markets Are Possible Without A Lender Of Last Resort Secular Stagnation: The Easiest Problem In The World? Secular Stagnation: The Easiest Problem In The World? In contrast, central banks in countries that are able to issue debt in their own currencies can always purchase their own government’s bonds with newly issued cash. They can also set short-term interest rates at whatever level they want, thus ensuring that the government has a reliable source of financing. The “golden rule” for debt sustainability says that a country’s debt-to-GDP ratio will stabilize as long as the interest rate the government pays on its debt is less than the growth rate of the economy. This is true regardless of how big a primary budget deficit the government runs (Chart 4).1 Chart 4Debt Dynamics When r Is Less Than g Secular Stagnation: The Easiest Problem In The World? Secular Stagnation: The Easiest Problem In The World? In fact, the higher the debt-to-GDP ratio is, the larger the sustainable level of the budget deficit that the government can achieve. For example, if nominal GDP growth is 4% and the target debt-to-GDP ratio is 50%, the government can run a budget deficit of 2% of GDP in perpetuity; in contrast, if the target debt-to-GDP ratio is 250%, the government can run a budget deficit of 10% of GDP. The catch is that this magic only works if the interest rate stays below the growth rate of the economy. When there is a lot of spare capacity, this is not a major issue since interest rates can be kept low without the worry that inflation will accelerate. Things get trickier once the economy reaches full employment. At that point, if the budget deficit remains high, inflation could rise as aggregate demand begins to outstrip the economy’s productive capacity. This may cause the central bank to raise interest rates, which could be a vexing problem for a highly indebted government. One might argue that the government could preempt the central bank from having to raise rates simply by tightening fiscal policy once the economy begins to overheat. In many cases, this would indeed be the correct response. However, there may be some occasions where tightening fiscal policy is politically impossible. In such cases, the preferred political response may be to allow inflation to rise. Higher inflation would push up nominal income, thus putting downward pressure on the debt-to-GDP ratio. Once the real value of the debt has been inflated away, the central bank could raise rates in order to cool the economy. Would such an inflationary strategy be preferable to not running a large budget deficit to begin with? It depends on who you ask! If you ask bondholders, they would certainly say no. If anything, bondholders might prefer a deflationary environment since falling prices would increase the purchasing power of their bonds. In contrast, workers and businesses may prefer more stimulus. For them, higher inflation down the road is a price worth paying if it means continued low unemployment and rising profits. How do these competing interests balance out? In most cases, the economy would be better off following the bigger budget deficit/higher inflation strategy. This is partly because deflation is generally a greater risk to the financial system and the broader economy than inflation. It is also because the capital stock is likely to grow more quickly in an economy that is able to stay close to full employment than one that suffers from deficient demand (firms generally invest more when unemployment is low). Hence, not only can fiscal stimulus provide short-term support to employment and consumption during the period when demand is depressed, it can even generate longer-term gains in the form of higher labor productivity and lower structural unemployment compared to what would have happened in the absence of any fiscal easing. The Political Economy Of Debt And Inflation The discussion above suggests that political forces, rather than economic logic, explain why some countries fail to take the necessary steps to solve what should be an elementary problem: increasing demand. In particular, demand-side secular stagnation is likely to be a bigger threat in countries where the preferences of bondholders and others who benefit from very low inflation hold sway. The appreciation of this fact helps explain some key developments in economic history, while shedding light on what the future may hold. Chart 5Universal Suffrage Made Inflation Politically More Palatable Than Deflation Universal Suffrage Made Inflation Politically More Palatable Than Deflation Universal Suffrage Made Inflation Politically More Palatable Than Deflation The introduction of universal suffrage in the first few decades of the twentieth century made inflation politically more palatable (Chart 5). A poor farmer did not need to worry quite as much about losing his land to the bank, since he could vote for someone who would ensure that crop prices increased rather than decreased. In William Jennings Bryan's colorful words, the rich and powerful would no longer “crucify mankind upon a cross of gold." Today, populism is on the rise again. Whether it is rightwing populism or leftwing populism, the result is usually the same: bigger budget deficits and higher inflation. Retirees may not welcome higher inflation, but given the choice between rising prices and cuts to pensions and health care programs, they are likely to opt for the former. For their part, today’s youth has become increasingly enamored with socialism. According to a recent YouGov poll, 70% of Millennials would be somewhat or extremely likely to vote for a socialist candidate (Chart 6). More than one-third of Millennials view communism favorably, while about 20% think the Communist Manifesto “better guarantees freedom and equality” than the Declaration of Independence. No wonder the Democrats are talking about introducing Universal Basic Income, Medicare For All, and a Green New Deal. Chart 6Woke Millennials Cozying Up To Socialism Secular Stagnation: The Easiest Problem In The World? Secular Stagnation: The Easiest Problem In The World? Contrary to conventional wisdom, an individual’s political attitudes are fairly stable over their lifespan.2 This suggests that the average political orientation of US voters will continue to move leftward as older voters pass away. Meanwhile, globalization – a historically deflationary force – has peaked (Chart 7). And despite all the hype about game-changing technological innovation, productivity growth in advanced economies continues to underwhelm (Chart 8). Chart 7Globalization Has Peaked Globalization Has Peaked Globalization Has Peaked   In a world of excess savings, inflation could be held at bay. However, the ratio of workers-to-consumers has now begun to decline as ever more baby boomers leave the labor force (Chart 9). As more people stop working, aggregate savings will fall. The shortage of savings will put upward pressure on the neutral rate. If central banks drag their feet in raising policy rates in response to an increase in the neutral rate, monetary policy will end up being too stimulative. As economies overheat, inflation will pick up. Chart 8Productivity Growth In Advanced Economies Has Decelerated Materially Productivity Growth In Advanced Economies Has Decelerated Materially Productivity Growth In Advanced Economies Has Decelerated Materially Chart 9The Worker-To-Consumer Ratio Has Peaked Globally The Worker-To-Consumer Ratio Has Peaked Globally The Worker-To-Consumer Ratio Has Peaked Globally   Investment Conclusions Few people are worried about rising inflation these days, as evidenced by the weakness in long-term market-based inflation expectations (Chart 10). For now, most of our leading inflation indicators remain contained (Chart 11). However, we suspect this will change in the next few years as the unemployment rate – which is already at a generational low in the G7 – continues to fall (Chart 12). Chart 10Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Muted Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Muted Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Muted Chart 11An Inflation Breakout Is Not Imminent An Inflation Breakout Is Not Imminent An Inflation Breakout Is Not Imminent   Chart 12Falling Unemployment Rate Across Developed Markets Falling Unemployment Rate Across Developed Markets Falling Unemployment Rate Across Developed Markets Chart 13Prices And Wages In Japan Have Been Rising Since 2014... Albeit At A Sluggish Pace Prices And Wages In Japan Have Been Rising Since 2014... Albeit At A Sluggish Pace Prices And Wages In Japan Have Been Rising Since 2014... Albeit At A Sluggish Pace   Chart 14Japan: Labor Market Tightening May Eventually Spur Higher Inflation Japan: Labor Market Tightening May Eventually Spur Higher Inflation Japan: Labor Market Tightening May Eventually Spur Higher Inflation As we discussed two weeks ago in our analysis of whether negative rates will spread out across the world, both the theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that the Phillips curve is kinked.3 This means that a decline in the unemployment rate may not have a significant effect on inflation until unemployment reaches a threshold that is low enough to trigger a price-wage spiral. The US will probably be the first major economy to reach the kink, but others will follow. This includes the mother of all recent deflationary economies: Japan. Chart 13 shows that Japanese prices are rising again, albeit still at a slower pace than the BoJ’s target. Japanese inflation will accelerate if the labor market continues to tighten. Already, the ratio of job openings-to-applicants is near a 45-year high (Chart 14). All this suggests that investors should favor “real assets” such as equities, real estate, and commodities over “nominal assets” such as bonds and cash. To the extent that investors need to maintain exposure to fixed income, we would recommend a short-duration stance and above-benchmark exposure to inflation-linked securities. Box 1 Fiscal Multipliers: How Large? Secular Stagnation: The Easiest Problem In The World? Secular Stagnation: The Easiest Problem In The World? Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Is There Really Too Much Government Debt In The World?” dated February 22, 2019, for a fuller discussion of this debt sustainability equation. 2Johnathan Peterson, Kevin Smith, and John Hibbing, “Do People Really Become More Conservative as They Age? ” The Journal of Politics, (2018). 3Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “Is The Entire World Heading For Negative Rates?” dated October 25, 2019.   Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Secular Stagnation: The Easiest Problem In The World? Secular Stagnation: The Easiest Problem In The World? Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights Duration: The upturn in bond yields is not yet confirmed by our preferred global growth indicators. We anticipate that a reduction in trade uncertainty during the next few months will cause our indicators to rebound. But until then, investors should view the bond sell-off as tenuous. Yield Curve: Expect modest 2/10 steepening during the next few months, as the Fed keeps rates low even as economic growth improves. Steepening will show up in real yields, not in the TIPS breakeven inflation curve. The 2/10 slope will stay in a range between 0 bps and 50 bps for the next 6-12 months. Yield Curve Strategy: The 5-year Treasury note looks expensive compared to the rest of the yield curve, and historical correlations suggest it will rise the most if the Fed delivers fewer rate cuts than are currently expected. We recommend that investors short the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/30 barbell. Await Confirmation Bond yields look like they might be bottoming. The 2-year and 10-year Treasury yields are up 10 bps and 31 bps, respectively, since the 2/10 slope briefly inverted in late August (Chart 1). We are cautiously optimistic that the growth revival getting priced into Treasury yields will materialize. However, it’s vital to note that the yield rebound is not yet confirmed by the economic data. Even timely global growth indicators like the CRB Raw Industrials index remain downbeat (Chart 1, bottom panel). If global growth measures don’t bottom soon, then Treasury yields are certain to fall back. Chart 1Yields Are Ahead Of The Data Yields Are Ahead Of The Data Yields Are Ahead Of The Data We do expect the economic data to follow bond yields higher. We noted in last week’s report that the weakness in US economic data is concentrated in survey measures (aka “soft” data), while measures of actual economic activity (aka “hard data”) are holding up well.1    For example: The ISM Manufacturing survey is below its 2016 trough, but the year-over-year growth rate in industrial production is well above 2016 levels (Chart 2, top panel). Capacity utilization also remains elevated (Chart 2, bottom panel). New orders for core capital goods are holding firm, even with CEO confidence at its lowest since 2009 (Chart 2, panel 2). Employment growth remains strong, despite the employment component of the ISM Non-Manufacturing survey being just above the 50 boom/bust line (Chart 2, panel 3). Chart 2Will "Soft" Data Rebound? Will "Soft" Data Rebound? Will "Soft" Data Rebound? Our interpretation of the divergence is that uncertainty about the US/China trade war is weighing on sentiment and holding survey measures down. If that uncertainty is removed, survey measures will quickly rebound and converge with the “hard” data. On that front, we think it’s very likely that trade uncertainty diminishes during the next few months. The US and China have already agreed to an informal “phase one deal” that will require China to buy $40-$50 billion of US agricultural goods while the US delays the October 15 tariff hike. Odds are that President Trump will also delay the planned December 15 tariff hike and probably roll back some existing tariffs.2 The reason is that while Trump’s overall approval rating has been consistently low; until recently, he had been receiving high marks for his handling of the economy (Chart 3). But his economic approval rating took a tumble this summer and, as we head toward the 2020 election, he desperately needs an economic boost and/or policy victory to push up his numbers. We already see some tentative signs of a rebound in the regional Fed manufacturing surveys. A tactical retreat on trade should improve sentiment and cause survey data to move higher, alongside bond yields. And in fact, we already see some tentative signs of a rebound in the regional Fed manufacturing surveys (Chart 4). October figures are out for the New York, Philadelphia, Richmond, Kansas City and Dallas surveys, and they have all diverged positively from the national ISM. Chart 3It's Trump's Economy It's Trump's Economy It's Trump's Economy Chart 4Some Optimism From Regional Surveys Some Optimism From Regional Surveys Some Optimism From Regional Surveys Bottom Line: The upturn in bond yields is not yet confirmed by our preferred global growth indicators. We anticipate that a reduction in trade uncertainty during the next few months will cause our indicators to rebound. But until then, investors should view the bond sell-off as tenuous. Yield Curve: Macro Drivers We noted in the first section that the 2/10 Treasury slope has steepened sharply since it briefly broke below zero in late August. In this section, we consider whether this 2/10 steepening might continue. To do this we run through the main macro drivers of the yield curve. The Fed Funds Rate Traditionally, there is a very tight correlation between the fed funds rate and the slope of the curve (Chart 5). Fed tightening puts upward pressure on the curve’s front-end relative to the back-end, leading to a bear-flattening. Conversely, Fed easing drags the front-end down relative to the long-end, leading to bull-steepening. Chart 5The Fed's Yield Curve Control The Fed's Yield Curve Control The Fed's Yield Curve Control The traditional pattern broke down between 2009 and 2015 when the fed funds rate was pinned at zero. This period saw many episodes of bear-steepening and bull-flattening. But since the funds rate has been off zero, the traditional correlation has begun to re-assert itself. Our base case outlook calls for one more 25 bps rate cut tomorrow, followed by an extended on-hold period. This scenario might be expected to impart some mild steepening pressure to the curve, except for the fact that the front-end is already priced for 53 bps of easing during the next 12 months, significantly more than we expect. Our base case outlook calls for one more 25 bps rate cut tomorrow, followed by an extended on-hold period. If our base case scenario is incorrect, and growth continues to deteriorate, forcing the Fed to cut rates all the way back to zero. Then we would expect some initial bull-steepening, followed by bull-flattening as the funds rate approaches the zero bound. Wage Growth Wage growth is another excellent yield curve indicator, mainly because it helps determine the direction of the fed funds rate. Stronger wage growth causes the Fed to tighten and the curve to flatten. On the flipside, wage growth is a less effective indicator during Fed easing cycles, when it tends to lag changes in the funds rate (Chart 6). In fact, while wage growth is tightly correlated with the 2/10 slope, it lags changes in the slope by about 12 months (Chart 6, panel 2). Chart 6Wages Lead Tightening, But Lag Easing Wages Lead Tightening, But Lag Easing Wages Lead Tightening, But Lag Easing The upshot is that if the economy heads toward recession, then wage growth will not be a timely indicator of Fed rate cuts. However, if recession is avoided and wages continue to accelerate (Chart 6, bottom 2 panels), strong wage growth will limit how accommodative the Fed can be as it seeks to re-anchor inflation expectations. As such, persistently strong wage growth will limit the amount of curve steepening that can occur. Inflation Expectations The Fed’s need to re-anchor inflation expectations in a range consistent with its target is the main reason to forecast curve steepening. At present, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is a mere 1.66%, well below the 2.3%-2.5% range that the Fed would consider “well anchored”. One might conclude that if the Fed succeeds in driving this rate higher, it will impart significant steepening pressure to the curve. However, we must also note that the 2-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is even lower than the 10-year rate (Chart 7). Given our view that long-dated inflation expectations adapt only slowly to the actual inflation data, we would expect both the 2-year and 10-year breakevens to rise in tandem, exerting some modest flattening pressure on the curve.3 Chart 7Any Steepening Will Come From Real Yields Any Steepening Will Come From Real Yields Any Steepening Will Come From Real Yields Ironically, if the Fed is successful in re-anchoring long-dated inflation expectations, we expect it will cause the yield curve to steepen, but through its impact on real yields. At present, the 2-year and 10-year real yields are 0.37% and 0.14%, respectively. The act of holding rates steady for long enough to re-anchor inflation expectations will exert downward pressure on the 2-year real yield, while the 10-year real yield will rise in response to an improved growth outlook. The Fed’s goal of re-anchoring inflation expectations will likely lead to some curve steepening, but through the real component of yields, not the inflation component. The Neutral Rate The neutral rate – the fed funds rate that is neither inflationary nor deflationary – is a major wild card when it comes to the yield curve. Right now, the median Fed estimate calls for a neutral rate of 2.5%, while the market is pricing-in an even lower rate of 2%, at least according to the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield (Chart 8). Neutral rate estimates have been revised lower during the past few years, exerting significant flattening pressure on the yield curve. In theory, if we reach an inflection point where neutral rate estimates are revised higher, it would lead to substantial curve steepening. One thing to watch to help predict movement in neutral rate estimates is the gold price.4 Gold performs well when the market perceives monetary policy as increasingly accommodative, either because the Fed is cutting rates or because the assumed neutral rate is rising. The 2013 drop in gold foreshadowed downward revisions to the Fed’s neutral rate estimate (Chart 8, bottom panel). A further increase in gold, especially once the Fed stops cutting rates, would send a strong signal that current neutral rate estimates are too low. Monetary policy arguably exerts its greatest economic impact through the housing market. Investors can also watch the housing market for clues about the neutral rate. Monetary policy arguably exerts its greatest economic impact through the housing market. If housing activity starts to wane, it can be a strong signal that interest rates are too high. Last year, housing activity started to flag once the mortgage rate moved above 4% (Chart 9). If 4% proves to be the ceiling on mortgage rates, it would mean that the Fed’s current neutral rate estimate is roughly correct. However, home prices have moderated since last year, and new construction has started to focus more on the low-end of the market, where supply remains scarce.5 This shift in focus from homebuilders has caused the price of new homes to fall considerably (Chart 9, bottom panel), a supply side re-adjustment that could make the housing market more resilient in the face of higher rates. Chart 8Tracking The Neutral Rate: Gold Tracking The Neutral Rate: Gold Tracking The Neutral Rate: Gold Chart 9Tracking The Neutral Rate: Housing Tracking The Neutral Rate: Housing Tracking The Neutral Rate: Housing An upward re-assessment of the neutral rate would impart steepening pressure to the yield curve, but only if it occurs quickly, before the Fed has time to deliver offsetting rate hikes. However, we think it’s more likely that any increase in neutral rate estimates will occur gradually, alongside Fed tightening. In that case, a roughly parallel upward shift in the yield curve would be the most likely outcome. Verdict Considering all of the above factors, we would look for some modest 2/10 curve steepening during the next few months. The steepening will be driven by the Fed’s desire to re-anchor long-dated inflation expectations, a desire that will result in them keeping rates steady (apart from one more cut tomorrow), even as economic growth improves. As noted above, this steepening will show up in real yields, not in the TIPS breakeven inflation curve. That being said, strong wage growth and overly dovish market rate cut expectations will ensure that any steepening is well contained. We expect the 2/10 slope to stay in a range between 0 bps and 50 bps for the next 6-12 months. Yield Curve Strategy Chart 10Treasury Yield Curve Position For Modest Curve Steepening Position For Modest Curve Steepening When thinking about how to position a Treasury portfolio for our expected yield curve outcome, we first look at the value proposition offered by different Treasury maturities. Chart 10 shows the Treasury yield curve, and also each maturity’s 12-month rolling yield. The rolling yield is simply the combination of each maturity’s 12-month yield income and the price impact of rolling down the curve. It can be thought of as the return you would earn holding each bond for 12 months in an unchanged yield curve environment. The first thing that sticks out in Chart 10 is that the 5-year note offers poor value. We also note that the curve steepens sharply beyond the 5-year maturity point, so maturities greater than 5 years benefit a lot from rolldown. The simple intuition from Chart 10 is confirmed by our butterfly spread models.6  Chart 11shows that the 5-year bullet looks very expensive relative to a duration-matched barbell portfolio consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes. In fact, with only a few exceptions, bullets are expensive relative to barbells across the entire Treasury curve (see Appendix). Chart 11Bullets Are Very Expensive Bullets Are Very Expensive Bullets Are Very Expensive All else equal, bullets tend to outperform barbells when the yield curve steepens. However, given current valuations, it would take a lot of steepening for bullets to outperform barbells during the next few months. Chart 12Yield Curve Correlations Yield Curve Correlations Yield Curve Correlations Further, Chart 12 shows that the front-end of the yield curve – out to about the 5-year/7-year point – tends to steepen when our 12-month discounter rises, while the long-end of the curve – beyond the 7-year point – tends to flatten. Given that our 12-month discounter is currently -53 bps, meaning that the market is priced for 53 bps of rate cuts during the next year, we expect it will rise during the next few months. This should exert the most upward pressure on the 5-year/7-year part of the curve. We have been recommending that investors play the curve by going long a 2/30 barbell and shorting the 7-year bullet. But given the significant rolldown advantage in the 7-year compared to the 5-year, we amend that recommendation this week. We now recommend that investors short the 5-year bullet and go long a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 30-year maturities. Bottom Line: The 5-year Treasury note looks expensive compared to the rest of the yield curve, and historical correlations suggest it will rise the most if the Fed delivers fewer rate cuts than are currently expected. We recommend that investors short the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/30 barbell. Appendix Table 1Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As of October 25, 2019) Position For Modest Curve Steepening Position For Modest Curve Steepening Table 2Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As of October 25, 2019) Position For Modest Curve Steepening Position For Modest Curve Steepening Ryan Swift U.S. Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Crisis Of Confidence”, dated October 22, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 For further details on BCA’s outlook for US/China trade negotiations please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “How Much To Buy An American President?”, dated October 25, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 3 For further details on how inflation expectations adapt to the actual inflation data please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A Signal From Gold?”, dated May 1, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Long Awkward Middle Phase”, dated July 2, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 For details on our butterfly spread models please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights No, it’s not: We expect negative rates to remain the exception rather than the rule. A growing body of evidence suggests that negative rates may be doing more harm than good. Stronger global growth is likely to lift inflation over the next few years, thus making the debate around negative rates increasingly irrelevant. Contrary to conventional wisdom, there is scant evidence that structural forces related to globalization, automation, weak trade unions, and demographics are holding back inflation. Asset allocators should overweight global equities during the next 12-to-24 months, while maintaining a short duration bias in fixed-income portfolios.  A more defensive stance towards equities may be necessary starting in 2022. Just A Matter Of Time? Chart 1A Spike In Negative-Yielding Debt Is The Entire World Heading For Negative Rates? Is The Entire World Heading For Negative Rates? There is nearly $14 trillion of negative-yielding debt outstanding today (Chart 1). While most of this debt has been issued in the euro area and Japan, many investment professionals believe that negative yields will eventually become the norm in the U.S. and other developed economies. The rationale for this belief is easy to understand: The current expansion, like all past expansions, will inevitably end (in many investors’ minds, it already has). Once a recession is afoot, central banks will try to ease monetary policy even more than they already have. The Fed has cut rates by more than five percentage points on average during past recessions (Chart 2). Even a mild recession could see U.S. rates fall to zero. Once rates reach zero, pushing them into negative territory could become the logical next step. Chart 2Will The U.S. Join The Negative Rate Club After The Next Recession? Will The U.S. Join The Negative Rate Club After The Next Recession? Will The U.S. Join The Negative Rate Club After The Next Recession? It is a compelling argument. However, it rests on two assumptions. The first is that negative rates are an effective tool against an economic downturn. That is far from clear. Second, the argument presupposes that the forces which have pushed some countries to adopt negative rates will endure until the next recession. To those who see the current expansion as very “late stage” and regard the persistence of low interest rates as largely structural in nature, this is a perfectly plausible assumption. However, as we discuss later on, it is probably flawed. The Merits (Or Lack Thereof) Of Negative Rates In theory, negative rates could incentivize banks to loan out excess funds in order to avoid paying interest on reserves. It could also boost demand for credit. In practice, banks have been reluctant to force depositors to pay interest on their savings. Instead, they have absorbed the cost of negative rates through lower net interest margins. At a time when some banks are still struggling to shore up their balance sheets, the introduction of negative rates may have perversely resulted in less lending. Labor market slack has diminished significantly around the world. Some policymakers have slowly come around to the conclusion that negative rates may be doing more harm than good. Most senior Fed officials have rejected negative rates as an effective policy tool. Japanese and European officials have been more supportive of negative rates. The ECB even cut rates further into negative territory in September. However, ECB officials have acknowledged the harm done to the banking system by introducing a tiering system that shields a portion of excess bank reserves from negative deposit rates. The Swedish Riksbank, an early pioneer of negative rates, has even gone as far as to warn that “if negative nominal interest rates are perceived as a more permanent state, the behavior of agents may change and negative effects may arise.” Groundhog Day Judging by today’s low level of bond yields, it is easy to conclude that deflationary forces are just as powerful as they were a decade ago. There are, however, at least two important differences between now and then. First, the deleveraging cycle has ended in most developed economies. As a share of GDP, U.S. nonfinancial private-sector debt has risen over the past four years. Even in Japan, private debt levels have moved off their lows. The ratio of private debt-to-GDP has been broadly flat in the euro area, with rising debt levels in France offsetting falling leverage in Italy and Spain (Chart 3). Second, labor market slack has diminished significantly around the world. The unemployment rate in the G7 has fallen from a peak of 8.4% in 2009 to 4.2%. It is currently a full percentage point below its pre-recession low of 5.2% set in 2007 (Chart 4). Chart 3Deleveraging Has Ended In Most Developed Markets Deleveraging Has Ended In Most Developed Markets Deleveraging Has Ended In Most Developed Markets Chart 4Falling Unemployment Rate Across Developed Markets Falling Unemployment Rate Across Developed Markets Falling Unemployment Rate Across Developed Markets Some have argued that disguised joblessness is distorting the official unemployment statistics. While this was a major problem earlier in the recovery, it is much less of a concern today. In the U.S., the share of the working-age population that wants a job, but is not actively looking for one, is smaller than in 2007 (Chart 5). Whither The Phillips Curve? Falling unemployment has pushed up wage growth. Indeed, for all the talk about how the Phillips curve is dead, the “wage version” of the curve – which is how William Phillips originally formulated the concept – is very much alive and well (Chart 6). Chart 5U.S. Labor Market Slack Has Diminished U.S. Labor Market Slack Has Diminished U.S. Labor Market Slack Has Diminished Chart 6Falling Unemployment Has Pushed Up Wage Growth Falling Unemployment Has Pushed Up Wage Growth Falling Unemployment Has Pushed Up Wage Growth Chart 7Rising Labor Share Of Income Occurring Alongside Labor Market Tightening Rising Labor Share Of Income Occurring Alongside Labor Market Tightening Rising Labor Share Of Income Occurring Alongside Labor Market Tightening What is true is that the “price version” of the Phillips curve – the one that compares unemployment with price inflation – still looks very flat in most countries. This is another way of saying that rising nominal wages have mainly translated into higher real wages, with an accompanying increase in labor’s share of income (Chart 7). Workers tend to spend more of their incomes than companies. If the share of national income flowing to workers continues to rise, aggregate demand will increase. Unless supply expands in tandem, shortages of goods and services will arise, leading to higher inflation. Getting Close To The Kink There is considerable theoretical and econometric evidence suggesting that the Phillips curve is kinked.1  When slack is plentiful, modest declines in spare capacity have little effect on inflation. When slack disappears altogether, however, inflation can surge. This was certainly what happened during the 1960s. Chart 8 shows that U.S. core inflation was remarkably stable at around 1.5% in the first half of the decade. It was only in 1966 that inflation took off, rising to nearly 4% in less than two years. Core inflation proceeded to make its way to over 6% in 1970, a full three years before the first oil shock. The U.S. unemployment rate was two percentage points below NAIRU in 1966. By most estimates, the unemployment rate today is still a bit less than a point below its full employment level. Thus, an inflationary breakout is not imminent. This is confirmed by a wide variety of leading indicators for inflation (Chart 9). Chart 8Inflation Took Off In The 1960s Amid An Overheated Economy Inflation Took Off In The 1960s Amid An Overheated Economy Inflation Took Off In The 1960s Amid An Overheated Economy Chart 9An Inflation Breakout Is Not Imminent... An Inflation Breakout Is Not Imminent... An Inflation Breakout Is Not Imminent... Nevertheless, U.S. inflation has begun to firm at the margin (Chart 10). Trimmed mean inflation, which according to one Fed study does a better job of tracking underlying inflationary trends than more conventional measures, has been running at over 2% for much of the past 12 months.2  The median item in the CPI basket is rising by about 3%. Inflation has been slower to accelerate outside the U.S., partly because there is still more slack abroad. Nonetheless, embryonic signs of inflation are emerging. The deflationary pressures which plagued countries such as Spain have receded (Chart 11). Prices in Japan have been rising since 2014, albeit at a slower pace than the Bank of Japan is targeting (Chart 12). Chart 10... But Inflation Is Firming At The Margin ... But Inflation Is Firming At The Margin ... But Inflation Is Firming At The Margin Chart 11Deflationary Pressures Have Receded in Spain Deflationary Pressures Have Receded in Spain Deflationary Pressures Have Receded in Spain Chart 12Prices In Japan Have Been Rising Since 2014... Albeit At A Slower Pace Than The BoJ's Target Prices In Japan Have Been Rising Since 2014... Albeit At A Slower Pace Than The BoJ's Target Prices In Japan Have Been Rising Since 2014... Albeit At A Slower Pace Than The BoJ's Target The Myth Of Structurally Low Inflation Will structural forces contain the extent to which inflation rises even if unemployment continues to decline? Perhaps, but we would not bet on it. While globalization, automation, weak trade unions, and demographics are often cited as structural deflationary forces, the importance of these factors is greatly exaggerated. Globalization Conceptually, the disinflationary force stemming from globalization should be a function of the degree to which globalization is increasing. Yet, as Chart 13 illustrates, the ratio of global trade-to-GDP has been flat for over a decade. Correspondingly, the share of U.S. imports from emerging markets has stabilized at below 25%. Chart 13AGlobalization Has Peaked Globalization Has Peaked Globalization Has Peaked Chart 13BGlobalization Has Peaked Globalization Has Peaked Globalization Has Peaked A variety of studies have concluded that slack abroad has only a minimal effect on U.S. inflation.3 This is not surprising. The lion’s share of GDP consists of services, which are not easily tradeable. Imports account for only 14.8% of U.S. GDP. Many imported goods also have U.S. substitutes, which means that a large appreciation in the dollar is often necessary to induce Americans to shift purchases abroad.  Automation The belief that faster productivity growth is necessarily deflationary involves a fallacy of composition. Yes, above-average productivity gains in one sector of the economy will cause prices in that sector to decline relative to other prices. But falling prices will also boost real incomes, leading to more spending. Rising spending will lift prices elsewhere in the economy. Chart 14Globally, Productivity Growth Has Been Falling For Over A Decade Globally, Productivity Growth Has Been Falling For Over A Decade Globally, Productivity Growth Has Been Falling For Over A Decade Chart 15Steadier Prices For Computer Hardware And Software In Recent Years Steadier Prices For Computer Hardware And Software In Recent Years Steadier Prices For Computer Hardware And Software In Recent Years In any case, the whole narrative about how faster productivity growth is deflationary seems rather antiquated considering that productivity growth has been quite weak in most of the world for over a decade (Chart 14). Consistent with this, the price deflator for electronic goods has been falling a lot less rapidly in recent years than it has in the past (Chart 15). Chart 16Retail Sector Profit Margins Are Strong Retail Sector Profit Margins Are Strong Retail Sector Profit Margins Are Strong What about the so-called Amazon effect? The problem with the claim that online shopping is undermining corporate pricing power is that outside of department stores, profit margins in the retail sector remain quite high (Chart 16). In fact, recent productivity growth in the U.S. distribution sector has actually been slower than in the 1990s, a decade which produced large productivity gains stemming from the displacement of “mom and pop” stores with “big box” retailers such as Walmart and Costco. Trade Unions The declining influence of trade unions is often cited as a reason for why inflation will remain subdued. There are a number of problems with this argument. First, unionization rates in the U.S. peaked in the mid-1950s, more than a decade before inflation began to accelerate. Second, while the unionization rate continued to decline in the U.S. during the 1980s and 1990s, it remained elevated in Canada. Yet, this did not prevent Canadian inflation from falling as rapidly as it did in the United States (Chart 17). Chart 17Inflation Fell In Canada, Despite A High Unionization Rate Inflation Fell In Canada, Despite A High Unionization Rate Inflation Fell In Canada, Despite A High Unionization Rate Chart 18Higher Inflation Led To More Inflation-Indexed Wage Contracts, Not The Other Way Around Higher Inflation Led To More Inflation-Indexed Wage Contracts, Not The Other Way Around Higher Inflation Led To More Inflation-Indexed Wage Contracts, Not The Other Way Around The widespread use of inflation-linked wage contracts in the 1970s also appears to have been a consequence of rising inflation rather than the cause of it (Chart 18).   Demographics Demographics has undoubtedly been a deflationary force for most of the past 40 years. Slower population growth reduced spending on everything from houses to refrigerators, thus sapping demand from the economy. The influx of women into the labor force also boosted the available supply of goods and services, while the increase in the share of the population in their prime earning years – ages 30-to-50 – raised savings. Chart 19The Worker-To-Consumer Ratio Has Peaked Globally The Worker-To-Consumer Ratio Has Peaked Globally The Worker-To-Consumer Ratio Has Peaked Globally Now that baby boomers are starting to retire, however, they are transitioning from being savers to dissavers. Chart 19 shows that the ratio of workers-to-consumers has begun to decline globally as the post-war generation leaves the labor force. As more people stop working, aggregate savings will fall. The shortage of savings will put upward pressure on the neutral rate. If central banks drag their feet in raising policy rates in response to an increase in the neutral rate, monetary policy will end up being too stimulative. As economies overheat, inflation will pick up. It Shouldn’t Be Hard There are many hard problems in the world. Finding a cure for cancer is hard. Reconciling general relativity with quantum mechanics is hard. In contrast, getting people to spend money should not be hard. People like to consume! Just give them money and they will spend it. If they don’t spend enough of the money that they receive, just give them some more. So why has raising demand proven to be so difficult in many countries? The answer is that central banks have been asked to do too much. Fiscal policy should have been a lot more stimulative. If there is one potential benefit of negative rates, it is that they could incentivize governments to loosen fiscal policy by cutting taxes and/or raising spending. After all, if you can get paid to issue debt, why not do it? In an age of brewing political populism, the temptation to run larger budget deficits will grow. Central banks will indulge governments by keeping rates low. The path to higher rates is lined with lower rates. As economies eventually overheat, inflation will rise, thus allowing central banks to finally move away from negative rates. Real rates will stay low, but nominal rates will increase in line with higher inflation. Of course, if inflation eventually gets too high, central banks will be forced to step on the brakes. We do not see that happening in the next two years, but it could occur later on. Thus, asset allocators should overweight equities during the next 12-to-24 months, while maintaining a short duration bias in fixed-income portfolios. A more defensive stance towards equities may be necessary starting in 2022.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Jeremy Nalewaik, “Non-Linear Phillips Curves with Inflation Regime-Switching,” Federal Reserve Board (Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs) (August 2016); and Anil Kumar and Pia Orrenius, “A Closer Look at the Phillips Curve Using State Level Data,” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Working paper No. 1409 (May 2015). 2 Jim Dolmas and Evan F. Koenig, “Two Measures Of Core Inflation: A Comparison,” Federal Reserve Bank Of Dallas, Working Paper No. 1903 (February 25, 2019). 3 Please Jane Ihrig, Steven B. Kamin, Deborah Lindner, and Jaime Marquez, “Some Simple Tests of the Globalization and Inflation Hypothesis,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (International Finance Discussion Papers No. 891) (April 2007); Janet. L. Yellen, 'Panel discussion of William R. White “Globalisation and the Determinants of Domestic Inflation”,' Presentation to the Banque de France International Symposium on Globalisation, Inflation and Monetary Policy (March 2008); and Fabio Milani, “Global Slack And Domestic Inflation Rates: A Structural Investigation For G-7 Countries,”Journal of Macroeconomics, (32:4) (2010). Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Is The Entire World Heading For Negative Rates? Is The Entire World Heading For Negative Rates? Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights The currency market is bifurcated in terms of shorter-term expectations versus longer-term factors. The Swedish krona, Norwegian krone, and British pound are solid long-term buys, but could remain very volatile in the short term. We continue to focus on the crosses rather than outright dollar bets. Remain long SEK/NZD, GBP/JPY, and NOK/SEK. Tighten stops on long GBP/JPY to protect profits. EUR/SEK should top out once global growth improves. Sell the gold/silver ratio at 90, as recommended in last week’s report.1 Feature Chart I-1One Way Street Since 2018 One Way Street Since 2018 One Way Street Since 2018 Of all the G10 currencies we follow, the Swedish krona is probably the one that is the most perplexing. The Riksbank is one of the few central banks to have raised rates this year, but the krona remains the weakest G10 currency. Admittedly, the performance of the Swedish manufacturing sector has been dismal, and was especially so in September, but this has not been a story specific to Sweden alone. The euro area, which is also experiencing a deep manufacturing recession, has seen better currency performance despite a more dovish European Central Bank (ECB). The underperformance of the krona begs the question of whether it signals a much prolonged global manufacturing recession, or is indicative of something more endogenous to Sweden. Put another way, has the driver of USD/SEK (and even USD/NOK) strength been an appreciating dollar, or more domestic factors (Chart I-1)? And if it is the latter, what are the important signposts to look out for should a turnaround be around the corner? The Soft Versus Hard Data Debate The big question for Sweden is whether the manufacturing sector is just in a volatile bottoming process, or about to contract much further. Industrial production is currently growing at 4% year-over-year, but the signal from the soft data is that it should be contracting in the double digits (Chart I-2, top panel). As such there is either a big disconnect between the perception of investors and reality, or we are on the verge of a much deeper manufacturing slump. Exchange rates tend to be extremely fluid in discounting a wide swath of economic data, and in the case of Sweden, in discounting the outcome for global growth. However, with EUR/SEK at 10.8 and USD/SEK at 9.7 – the latter well above its 2008 highs – it is fair to assume that anything other than a deep recession will justify a stronger SEK.  One of the more consistent ratios in calling a bottom in the Swedish manufacturing sector in particular (and that of the Eurozone in general) is the manufacturing new orders-to-inventories ratio (Chart I-2, bottom panel). The tick down in September was disconcerting. However, unlike the manufacturing PMI, this ratio is not hitting new lows, tentative evidence that we might be in a volatile bottoming process rather than a protracted slump. The last time we encountered such a divergence was in 2011/2012, at the height of the European debt crisis; in that instance, Swedish hard data ended up sending the right signal for the overall economy. The deterioration in the manufacturing sector has yet to hit domestic consumption in general or the labor market in particular.  The deterioration in the manufacturing sector has yet to hit domestic consumption in general or the labor market in particular. The import component of the PMI index remains well above that of exports. Meanwhile, the employment component of the PMI index began to stabilize around the middle of this year, meaning employment growth should bottom at around 1% or so (Chart I-3). Swedish exports are higher up the manufacturing food chain than in most other developed economies, and autos are quite important. But so far, the Swedish economy has weathered the auto slowdown quite well, with production still clocking in at 7% per year. Chart I-2Soft Data Is Much Worse Soft Data Is Much Worse Soft Data Is Much Worse Chart I-3Domestic Demand Is Holding Up Well Domestic Demand Is Holding Up Well Domestic Demand Is Holding Up Well The tick up in the Swedish unemployment rate is problematic, but we do not believe it constitutes a major change in labor market dynamics. Sweden has a long history of higher openness toward asylum seekers and refugees than many other European countries. The Syrian crisis a couple of years ago led to an exceptional surge, where the number of asylum seekers skyrocketed to over 150,000 or almost 1.5% of the total population (Chart I-4). Historically, immigration has provided a big labor dividend to Sweden, allowing growth to outpace both the U.S. and the euro area. But this has also been a source of frictional unemployment, as new migrants integrate into the labor force. Chart I-4A New Pool Of Labor That Has To Be Integrated A New Pool Of Labor That Has To Be Integrated A New Pool Of Labor That Has To Be Integrated Foreign-born workers now constitute about 20% of the total population, a big portion of which need to learn a new language and adopt new skills (Chart I-5A). This growth dividend will be reaped for many years to come. Integration is a politically contentious issue, and so the highly restrictive asylum and reunification law adopted in mid-2016 probably means the immigration boom is behind us. The rise of the anti-immigration Sweden Democrats in the September 2018 elections is a case in point. However, the pivot of the democratic population towards the right has been a global phenomenon, and so is not as negative for Sweden on a relative basis. All that to say, compared to most developed nations, Sweden still enjoys a relatively positive demographic outlook (Chart I-5B). Chart I-5AA Huge Labor Dividend A Huge Labor Dividend A Huge Labor Dividend Chart I-5BNo Apparent Demographic Cliff No Apparent Demographic Cliff No Apparent Demographic Cliff The inflow of migrants has a mixed impact on inflation. While there is downward pressure on wages, due to an increase in the share of employment that pays lower wages, there is still upward pressure on housing and consumption in response to the increased number of workers. This comes on top of a fiscal boost as the government spends more on social services. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate among foreign-born people is around 15%. This means that the Phillips curve is flat for the first few years, before it starts to steepen. But as the new labor force is finally absorbed into the economy, it should start to generate meaningful wage pressures. The Riksbank clearly understands these dynamics, which is why over the prior years, its stance has been dovish even when the Swedish economy has been holding up well. Interest rates were cut to negative territory in 2015 and held at -0.5% (lower than the ECB policy rate) all through the global recovery in 2016 and 2017. Quantitative easing has also been extended up until 2020, well ahead of the ECB’s renewed asset purchase program announcement. Both have tremendously eased monetary conditions in Sweden, including via a weaker currency. Going forward, there are a few key reasons to believe  the path of least resistance for the krona is now up: A weak krona has typically helped the manufacturing sector with a lag of twelve months.  A weak krona has typically helped the manufacturing sector with a lag of twelve months. Negative divergences only tend to happen ahead of deep recessions. Unless we are in that particular situation now, better demand for relatively cheaper Swedish goods (think Volvo versus BMW) should lead to a stronger krona (Chart I-6). Yes, the Riskbank has been conducting QE, but the pace of expansion in its balance sheet has been slowing in recent quarters. USD/SEK has tended to track relative balance sheet trends between the Riksbank and the Fed, but a gaping wedge has opened up in favor of the krona (Chart I-7). Meanwhile, with the Fed about to re-expand its balance sheet, this should also favor a stronger SEK versus the USD. Chart I-6Swedish Krona And Manufacturing Swedish Krona And Manufacturing Swedish Krona And Manufacturing Chart I-7USD/SEK And Relative Balance Sheets USD/SEK And Relative Balance Sheets USD/SEK And Relative Balance Sheets The Swedish housing market is becoming a thorn in the Riksbank’s side. When negative rates were introduced in 2015, growth in house prices exploded to the tune of 15% year-on-year (Chart I-8). More recently, a curb on migration has allowed a cooling of sorts, but Swedish household leverage remains very elevated. With the memory of the 1990s housing crisis still fresh in their minds, this is making the Riksbank quite uncomfortable with its current policy stance. The carry cost is lower from being short NZD compared to being short the U.S. dollar. Our bias is that though Governor Stefan Ingves prefers to renormalize policy as quickly as possible, given that he is managing a small-open economy with trade a whopping 45% of GDP, but is held hostage to external conditions. The SEK is the cheapest currency in the G10 universe, and could bounce sharply on even the softest evidence indicating global growth has bottomed. Furthermore, rising global growth will tighten resource utilization, which should begin to boost underlying inflationary pressures in Sweden (Chart I-9) Chart I-8House Prices In Sweden##br## Are Bubbly House Prices In Sweden Are Bubbly House Prices In Sweden Are Bubbly Chart I-9Resource Utilization And Inflation In Sweden Resource Utilization And Inflation In Sweden Resource Utilization And Inflation In Sweden In terms of SEK trading strategy, USD/SEK and NZD/SEK tend to be highly correlated; since the SEK has a higher beta to global growth than the kiwi (Sweden exports 45% of its GDP versus 27% for New Zealand). On a relative basis, the Swedish economy appears to have bottomed relative to that of the U.S., making the SEK/NZD an attractive way to play USD/SEK downside. Meanwhile, the carry cost is lower from being short NZD compared to being short the U.S. dollar (Chart I-10). As for EUR/SEK, the cross could consolidate at current levels before heading lower but will ultimately peak once global growth reaccelerates. Chart I-10Remain Long SEK/NZD Remain Long SEK/NZD Remain Long SEK/NZD Bottom Line: We remain long the SEK/NZD as a relative value play, but the true upside lies in the SEK/USD cross. Our bias is that SEK weakness has been driven by the market’s focus on disappointing soft data, while hard data remains relatively resilient. Once it becomes clearer that the global growth environment is not as precarious as the surveys suggest, the krona could bounce sharply. Housekeeping Our long GBP/JPY position hit 5% this week. We are tightening stops to 138 in order to protect profits. We were also stopped out of short EUR/NOK for a 2% loss. We are standing aside for now. EUR/NOK is now trading above 2008 recession levels, which is only justifiable by a prolonged growth recession, but risk management warrants patience for now. Stay tuned.   Chester Ntonifor, Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled “On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver,” dated October 11, 2019, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.S. have been soft: Retail sales contracted by 0.3% month-on-month in September. Industrial production fell by 0.4% month-on-month. Both export and import prices fell by 1.6% year-on-year in September. Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index grew to 96 in October, up from 93.2 in the previous month. NY Empire State Manufacturing Index increased to 4 in October, up from 2 in September. Building permits and housing starts both fell by 2.7% and 9.4% month-on-month in September, but the housing recovery remains intact. Initial jobless claims increased to 214K for the week ended Oct 11th. The DXY index depreciated by 0.7% this week. The latest Beige Book summarized that the U.S. economy expanded at a slight-to-modest pace. The slowdown in the manufacturing sector remains the biggest risk to the economy, while trade tensions continue to weigh on business sentiment and capex intensions. The most recent “entente” in trade discussions might represent a pivotal shift from heightened uncertainty that has prevailed throughout the summer. Report Links: On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 Preserving Capital During Riot Points - September 6, 2019 Has The Currency Landscape Shifted? - August 16, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area remain subdued: Headline inflation fell to 0.8% year-on-year in September, the slowest in nearly three years. Core inflation however, increased to 1% year-on-year. Industrial production in the euro area continued to contract, by 2.8% year-on-year in August. The ZEW sentiment in the euro area fell further to -23.5 in October, however this is well above expectations of -33. The ZEW sentiment for Germany also fell to -22.8 in October. It is worth noting that expectations continue to improve relative to the current situation. The trade balance in the euro area improved to €20.3 billion in August, up from the downward-revised €17.5 billion in July. However, this is mostly due to a contraction in imports. EUR/USD rose by 0.9% this week, in part helped by broad dollar weakness. The trade dynamics in the euro area remain worrisome: exports fell by 2.2% year-on-year in August, while imports plunged by 4.1% year-on-year. Notably, year-to-date, the EU’s trade surplus with U.S. grew to €103 billion, up from €91 billion a year earlier, while the trade deficit with China widened further to €127 billion from €116 billion. Report Links: On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan continue to disappoint: Industrial production fell by 4.7% year-on-year in August. Capacity utilization decreased by 2.9% month-on-month in August. The Japanese yen fell by 0.8% against the U.S. dollar this week. Kuroda has again emphasized that the BoJ will not hesitate to act if economic developments continue to deteriorate. On the other hand, while the Fed and the ECB are both on course to expand their balance sheets through asset purchases, it is an open question as to how much more the BoJ can do, beyond yield curve control. We remain long the yen in anticipation that it will require a “Lehman moment” for the BoJ to act aggressively. Report Links: A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Has The Currency Landscape Shifted? - August 16, 2019 Portfolio Tweaks Into Thin Summer Trading - July 5, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. have been mostly negative: The ILO unemployment rate slightly increased to 3.9% in August. Average earnings quarterly growth slowed to 3.8%, however this was above expectations of 3.7%. The Retail price index grew by 2.4% year-on-year in September, a slowdown from 2.6% in the previous month. Headline inflation was unchanged at 1.7% year-on-year in September, while core inflation jumped to 1.7% from 1.5%. Retail sales grew by 3.1% year-on-year in September, up from 2.6% in the previous month. GBP/USD surged by 3.3% this week on optimism towards the European Council Summit on Brexit. From a valuation perspective, the pound is trading at a large discount to its fair value. Should positive Brexit news continue to hit the headlines, the pound could continue to soar. We are long GBP/JPY, which is above 5% in the money. Tighten stop to 138. Report Links: A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdon: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been modest: NAB business confidence fell further to -2, while conditions improved to 1 in Q3. On the labor market front, the unemployment rate fell further to 5.2% in September. 14.7K jobs were created, consisting of 26.2K full-time jobs and a loss of 11.4K part-time jobs. AUD/USD increased by 0.4% this week. RBA minutes were released earlier this week. Interestingly, it presents a sharp debate about the effects of low rates. On the one hand, lower rates have been theoretically justified to achieve full employment and the inflation target. On the other hand, some RBA members fear that low rates could fuel already inflated house prices. The probability for another rate cut has thus decreased post RBA minutes. Report Links: A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been negative: Visitor arrivals increased by 1.8% year-on-year in August, slightly down from 2% in the previous month. Headline inflation slowed to 1.5% year-on-year in Q3. NZD/USD has been more or less flat this week. Closely tied to global growth, the New Zealand dollar has been fluctuating with the ebb and flow of the U.S.-China trade headlines. The two countries have agreed on a partial deal last week, however the details remain vague. While the kiwi is a high beta currency, it should unerperform at the crosses. We continue to play the kiwi weakness through the Aussie dollar and the Swedish Krona. Report Links: USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Where To Next For The U.S. Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been relatively strong: The unemployment rate decreased further to 5.5% in September. Moreover, average hourly wages continued to grow by 4.3% year-on-year, up from 3.8% in the previous month. Lastly, 53.7K jobs were created in September, well above expectations of 10K. Both headline and core inflation were unchanged at 1.9% year-on-year in September. The Canadian dollar has appreciated by 1% against the U.S. dollar, on the back of the positive employment data last Friday. All eyes are on the federal election this month, which could be crucial for the future of the Canadian energy sector and environment policies.  Report Links: Preserving Capital During Riot Points - September 6, 2019 Portfolio Tweaks Into Thin Summer Trading - July 5, 2019 On Gold, Oil And Cryptocurrencies - June 28, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been positive: The trade surplus (excluding precious metals) widened sharply to CHF 2.88 billion in September. Notably, Swiss exports grew by 8.2% month-on-month to CHF 20.3 billion, led by higher sales of chemical and pharmaceutical products. Swiss imports slightly dropped by 1.4% month-on-month to CHF 17.4 billion. Producer and import prices continued to fall by 2% year-on-year in September. USD/CHF fell by 1% this week. The Swiss franc will continue to fight a tug-of-war between being a defensive currency, but a tool of manipulation by the SNB. Our guestimate is that EUR/CHF 1.06 is an ultimate stress point.  Global portfolios should hold the Swiss franc as insurance, for the simple reason that the currency is a structural outperformer. Report Links: Notes On The SNB - October 4, 2019 What To Do About The Swiss Franc? - May 17, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been depressed: The trade balance shifted to a deficit of NOK 1.2 billion in September. That’s a decrease of NOK 24 billion year-on-year. The Norwegian krone has depreciated by nearly 1% against the U.S. dollar this week. Energy prices remain subdued over the past few weeks. Moreover, the Norwegian trade balance has shifted to a deficit for the first time since November 2017. Exports plunged by 19.5% year-on-year, due to lower sales of energy products, while imports jumped by 12.9% year-on-year. The message is clear – Norway continues to hold up well domestically, but dependence on petroleum exports is introducing volatility into any growth forecasts. BCA has lowered its oil price projections for 2019, which has dampened the appeal of the Norwegian Krone. Stay tuned. Report Links: A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Portfolio Tweaks Into Thin Summer Trading - July 5, 2019 On Gold, Oil And Cryptocurrencies - June 28, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been neutral: The unemployment rate was unchanged at 7.1% in September. USD/SEK fell by 1.1% this week. As the worst performing G-10 currency this year, the Swedish krona is now trading at a large discount to its fair value. Please refer to our front section this week which presents an in-depth analysis on the Swedish economy and the krona. Report Links: Where To Next For The U.S. Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 201 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades