Inflation/Deflation

Highlights Q1/2021 Performance Breakdown: Our recommended model bond portfolio outperformed the custom benchmark index by +55bps during the first quarter of the year. Winners & Losers: The government bond side of the portfolio outperformed by +68bps, led overwhelmingly by our underweight to US Treasuries (+63bps). Spread product allocations underperformed by -11bps, primarily due to an overweight on UK corporates (-8bps). Portfolio Positioning For The Next Six Months: We are sticking with an overall below-benchmark portfolio duration stance, given accelerating global growth momentum, expanding vaccinations and a highly stimulative fiscal/monetary policy mix. We are maintaining a moderate overweight to global spread product versus government debt, concentrated on an overweight to US high-yield given more stretched valuations in other credit sectors. On the margin, we are making the following changes to the portfolio allocations: downgrading both UK Gilts and UK investment grade corporates to neutral, while cutting the overall allocation to EM USD credit to neutral. Feature The first quarter of 2021 saw a sharp sell-off in global bond markets on the back of rising growth expectations, fueled by US fiscal stimulus and vaccine optimism. The US was near the front of the pack, with 10-year Treasuries having their biggest first quarter sell-off since 1994. Accommodative financial conditions, fueled by a highly stimulative mix of monetary and fiscal policies and improving sentiment, have lit a fire under a global economy set to reopen from pandemic lockdowns. Going forward, we expect US growth to continue leading the way, with implications for the dollar, commodity prices, and the expected path of policy rates. With that in mind, this week we are reviewing the performance of the BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) model bond portfolio during the first quarter of 2021. We also present our recommended positioning for the portfolio for the next six months (Table 1), as well as portfolio return expectations for our base case and alternative investment scenarios. Table 1GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning For The Next Six Months GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening As a reminder to existing readers (and to new clients), the model portfolio is a part of our service that complements the usual macro analysis of global fixed income markets. The portfolio is how we communicate our opinion on the relative attractiveness between government bond and spread product sectors. We do this by applying actual percentage weightings to each of our recommendations within a fully invested hypothetical bond portfolio. Q1/2021 Model Portfolio Performance Breakdown: Steering Clear Of Duration Chart 1Q1/2021 Performance: Bearish UST Bets Pay Off Q1/2021 Performance: Bearish UST Bets Pay Off Q1/2021 Performance: Bearish UST Bets Pay Off The total return for the GFIS model portfolio (hedged into US dollars) in the first quarter was -1.83%, dramatically outperforming the custom benchmark index by +55bps (Chart 1).1 This follows modest outperformance in 2020 which was driven largely by overweights on spread product initiated after the pandemic shock to markets. In terms of the specific breakdown between the government bond and spread product allocations in our model portfolio, the former generated +68bps of outperformance versus our custom benchmark index while the latter underperformed by -11bps. Our allocations to inflation-linked bonds in the US, Canada and Europe - which were a source of outperformance in 2020 - modestly underperformed this quarter (-2bps) as global real yields finally began to pick up. Our outperformance this quarter was driven overwhelmingly by our decision to go significantly underweight US Treasuries, and to position for a bearish steepening of the Treasury curve, ahead of last November’s US presidential election (Table 2). That resulted in the US Treasury allocation generating a massive +63bps of excess return in Q1/2022 as longer-term US yields surged higher. Table 2GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Overall Return Attribution GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening The size of the US underweight was unusually large as we maintained only a neutral exposure to the other “high beta” markets that are typically positively correlated to US yield moves, Canada and Australia. Although the returns for those two government bond markets were very similar to that of US Treasuries in Q1, so the choice to stay neutral even with a bearish directional view on US yields did not impact the overall portfolio performance. Overweights to the more defensive “low beta” markets of Germany, France and Japan contributed a combined +4bps. We did see some losses on nominal government bonds in peripheral Europe (Italy: -0.6bps; Spain: -1.9bps), however, with the narrowing in spreads thrown off by a botched vaccine rollout. In spread product, underperformance came from overweights to UK investment grade corporates (-8bps), US CMBS (-4bps), and EM USD-denominated corporates (-2bps). This was despite the fact that spreads for UK corporates remained flat while US CMBS spreads actually narrowed. These losses were slightly offset by the overweight to lower-rated US high-yield (+3bps) and underweight to US agency MBS (+2bps). Our spread product losses, in total return terms, highlight the importance of considering duration risk when making a call on spread product, especially at a time when sovereign yields are rising and spreads offer little “cushion”. Duration also played a big part in nominal government bond outperformance, with a whopping +43bps of our total +55bps outperformance concentrated in just US Treasuries with a maturity greater than 10 years. In other words, overweighting overall global spread product and underweighting government bonds still generated major portfolio outperformance, even if there was a more mixed bag of returns within that credit overweight. The bar charts showing the total and relative returns for each individual government bond market and spread product sector are presented in Charts 2 & 3. Chart 2GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Government Bond Performance Attribution GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening Chart 3GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Spread Product Performance Attribution By Sector GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening Biggest Outperformers: Underweight US Treasuries with a maturity greater than 10 years (+43bps), maturity between 7 and 10 years (+11bps), and with a maturity between 5 and 7 years (+7bps) Overweight US high-yield (+3bps) Underweight US agency MBS (+2bps) Overweight Italian inflation-indexed BTPs (+2bps) Biggest Underperformers: Overweight UK investment grade corporates (-8bps) Overweight US agency CMBS (-4bps) Overweight Spanish government bonds (-2bps) Chart 4 presents the ranked benchmark index returns of the individual countries and spread product sectors in the GFIS model bond portfolio for Q1/2021. Returns are hedged into US dollars (we do not take active currency risk in this portfolio) and adjusted to reflect duration differences between each country/sector and the overall custom benchmark index for the model portfolio. We have also color coded the bars in each chart to reflect our recommended investment stance for each market during Q1 (red for underweight, dark green for overweight, gray for neutral). Chart 4Ranking The Winners & Losers From The GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Universe In Q1/2021 GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening Ideally, we would look to see more green bars on the left side of the chart where market returns are highest, and more red bars on the right side of the chart were returns are lowest. On that front, our portfolio allocations performed exceptionally well in Q1. In total return terms, the global bond market sell-off was a disaster for both government bonds and spread product. US high-yield, one of our longer-standing overweights, was the only sector to emerge unscathed, delivering a positive return of +42bps. Within our government bond allocation, the “defensive” markets—Japan (-44bps), Germany, (-261bps) and France (-371bps)—were nevertheless shaken by rising yields. On the other hand, we limited our downside by maintaining a neutral stance on the higher beta markets such as Canada (-406bps), New Zealand (-415bps), and the UK (-1389bps). Gilts sold off especially sharply as the UK outperformed global peers on COVID-19 vaccinations while inflation expectations continued to pick up. Our two underweights, US Treasuries (-426bps) and European high-yield (-426bps), were prescient. The latter market was one we chose to underweight given that spreads didn’t offer nearly enough compensation on a default-adjusted and breakeven basis. Bottom Line: Our model bond portfolio outperformed its benchmark index in the first quarter of the year by +55bps – a positive result driven by our underweight allocation to the US Treasury market and overall below-benchmark global duration stance. Future Drivers Of Portfolio Returns & Scenario Analysis Chart 5More Growth-Driven Upside For Global Yields Ahead More Growth-Driven Upside For Global Yields Ahead More Growth-Driven Upside For Global Yields Ahead Looking ahead, the performance of the model bond portfolio will continue to be driven predominantly by the future moves of global government bond yields, most notably US Treasuries. Our most favored leading indicators for global bond yields continue to signal more upside over at least the next six months (Chart 5). Our Global Duration Indicator, comprised of measures of future economic sentiment and momentum, remains at an elevated level. The ongoing climb in the global manufacturing PMI, which typically leads global real bond yields by around six months, suggests that the recent uptick in real yields can continue into the second half of 2021. We are still maintaining a bias towards bearish yield curve steepening across all the countries in the model bond portfolio. It is still far too soon to see bearish flattening of yield curves given the dovish bias of global central banks, many of which are actively targeting an overshoot of their own inflation targets. The US will be the first central bank to see any bearish flattening pressure, as the market more aggressively pulls forward the liftoff date of the next Fed tightening cycle in response to strong US growth, but that is an outcome we do not expect until well into the second half of 2021. With regards to country allocations within the government bond segment of the model bond portfolio, we continue to focus our maximum underweight on the US, while limiting exposure to the markets that are more sensitive to changes in US interest rates (Chart 6). Those “lower yield beta” markets (Germany, France and Japan) will continue to outperform the higher beta markets (Canada, Australia) over the latter half of 2021. We currently have Canada on “downgrade watch”, as economic momentum is accelerating and the housing bubble looks to be reflating, both of which will make the Bank of Canada turn more hawkish shortly after the Fed does. We are more comfortable keeping Australia at neutral, as Australian inflation is likely to remain too underwhelming for the Reserve Bank of Australia to turn less dovish and risk a surge in the Australian dollar. UK Gilts are a more difficult case, atypically acting like a lower beta market over the past few years. As we discussed in a Special Report published last month, we attribute the declining Gilt yield beta to the rolling shocks the UK has suffered over the past thirteen years – the 2008 global financial crisis, the 2012 euro area debt crisis, Brexit and, now, COVID-19 – that have hamstrung the Bank of England’s ability to try even modest interest rate hikes.2 With the impact of those shocks on UK growth now diminishing, we see the central bank under greater pressure to begin normalizing UK monetary policy over the couple of years. We downgraded our cyclical stance on UK Gilts and UK investment grade corporates to neutral from overweight in that Special Report and, this week, we are making the same reduction in UK weightings in our model bond portfolio (see the portfolio tables on pages 20-21). After that change, the overall duration of the model bond portfolio remains below that of the custom benchmark index, now by -0.75 years (Chart 7). Chart 6Low-Beta Markets Will Continue To Outperform USTs Low-Beta Markets Will Continue To Outperform USTs Low-Beta Markets Will Continue To Outperform USTs Chart 7Overall Portfolio Duration: Stay Below Benchmark Overall Portfolio Duration: Stay Below Benchmark Overall Portfolio Duration: Stay Below Benchmark We continue to see the dovish bias of global central bankers as being conducive to the outperformance of inflation-linked bonds versus nominal government debt (Chart 8). Yes, the “easy money” has been made betting on a recovery of inflation expectations from the bombed-out levels seen after the COVID-19 recession in 2020. However, within the major developed economies with inflation-linked bond markets, 10-year breakevens have already climbed beyond the pre-pandemic levels of early 2020 (Chart 9). The next targets are the previous cyclical highs seen in 2018 (and 2019 for the UK). Chart 8Dovish Central Banks Still Positive For Inflation-Linked Bonds Dovish Central Banks Still Positive For Inflation-Linked Bonds Dovish Central Banks Still Positive For Inflation-Linked Bonds Chart 9Inflation Breakevens Returning To Past Cyclical Peaks Inflation Breakevens Returning To Past Cyclical Peaks Inflation Breakevens Returning To Past Cyclical Peaks Chart 10Still A Supportive Backdrop For Global Corporates Still A Supportive Backdrop For Global Corporates Still A Supportive Backdrop For Global Corporates The 10-year US TIPS breakeven is already past that 2018 peak of 2.18%, and with the Fed showing no sign of concern about US growth and inflation accelerating, the 10-year US breakeven should end up moving into the high end of our expected 2.3-2.5% target range before the Fed begins to turn less dovish. Thus, we are maintaining a core allocation to linkers in the portfolio, focused on US TIPS and inflation-linked bonds in Italy, France and Canada. The same aggressive easing of global monetary policy that has been good for relative inflation-linked bond performance continues to benefit global corporate bonds. The annual rate of growth of the combined balance sheets of the Fed, ECB, Bank of Japan and Bank of England remains an excellent leading indicator of the excess returns of both global investment grade and high-yield corporates over the past decade (Chart 10). With the combined balance sheet now expanding at a 55% pace, corporate bonds are still likely to continue to outperform government debt over the remainder of 2021. Much of that expected return outperformance of corporates will come via carry rather than spread compression, though. Our preferred measure of the attractiveness of credit spreads, the historical percentile ranking of 12-month breakeven spreads, shows that only US high-yield spreads are above the bottom quartile of their history among the credit sectors in our model portfolio (Chart 11). Given the absence of spread cushion in those other markets, we are maintaining an overweight stance on US high-yield in the model bond portfolio – especially versus euro area high-yield where we are underweight - while staying neutral investment grade credit in the US and Europe. Chart 11US High-Yield: The Last Bastion Of Attractive Spreads GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening Within the euro area, we continue to prefer owning Italian government bonds over investment grade corporates, given the European Central Bank’s more explicit support for the former through quantitative easing (Chart 12). We expect Italian yields and spreads to converge down to Spanish levels, likely within the next 6-12 months, while there is limited downside for euro area investment grade spreads given tight valuations. Chart 12Favor Italian BTPs Over Euro Area IG Favor Italian BTPs Over Euro Area IG Favor Italian BTPs Over Euro Area IG We are not only looking at relative valuation considerations in developed market credit. Emerging market (EM) USD-denominated credit has benefited from a bullish combination of global policy stimulus, a weakening US dollar and rising commodity prices. We have positioned for that in our model portfolio through an overall overweight stance on EM USD credit, but one that favors investment grade corporates over sovereigns. Now, with the Chinese credit impulse likely to slow in the latter half of 2021 as Chinese policymakers look to rein in stimulus, a slower pace of Chinese economic growth represents a risk to EM credit (Chart 13). The same can be said for the US dollar, which is no longer depreciating with US bond yields rising and the markets questioning the Fed’s dovish forward guidance on future rate hikes (Chart 14). A strong US dollar would also be a risk to the commodity price rally that has supported EM financial assets. Chart 13Global Policy Mix Becoming Less Supportive For EM Global Policy Mix Becoming Less Supportive For EM Global Policy Mix Becoming Less Supportive For EM Chart 14A Stronger USD Is A Risk For EM Corporates Vs Sovereigns A Stronger USD Is A Risk For EM Corporates Vs Sovereigns A Stronger USD Is A Risk For EM Corporates Vs Sovereigns Chart 15A Moderate Overweight To Spread Product Vs Government Debt GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening In response to these growing risks to the bullish EM backdrop, we are downgrading our overall EM USD credit exposure in the model bond portfolio to neutral from overweight. We are maintaining our relative preference for EM investment grade corporates over sovereigns, however, within that overall neutral allocation. Summing it all up, we are sticking with a moderately overweight stance on global spread product versus government debt in the model portfolio, equal to four percentage points (Chart 15). That overweight comes entirely from the US high-yield allocation. After the changes made to our UK and EM positions, the tracking error of the portfolio, or its expected volatility versus that of the benchmark index, is quite low at 41bps (Chart 16). This is an unsurprising outcome given that the current positioning is focused so heavily on the US (Treasury underweight, high-yield overweight), with much of the other positioning close to neutral. That will change as 2021 progresses but, for now, our highest conviction views are in US fixed income. One final point – the relatively concentrated positioning leaves the portfolio “flat carry”, with a yield roughly equal to that of the benchmark index (Chart 17). Chart 16Limited Use Of Portfolio 'Tracking Error' Limited Use Of Portfolio 'Tracking Error' Limited Use Of Portfolio 'Tracking Error' Chart 17Model Portfolio Yield Close To Benchmark Model Portfolio Yield Close To Benchmark Model Portfolio Yield Close To Benchmark Scenario Analysis & Return Forecasts After making the shifts to our model bond portfolio allocations in the UK and EM, we now turn to scenario analysis to determine the return expectations for the portfolio for the next six months. On the credit side of the portfolio, we use risk-factor-based regression models to forecast future yield changes for global spread product sectors as a function of four major factors - the VIX, oil prices, the US dollar and the fed funds rate (Table 2A). For the government bond side of the portfolio, we avoid using regression models and instead use a yield-beta driven framework, taking forecasts for changes in US Treasury yields and translating those in changes in non-US bond yields by applying a historical yield beta (Table 2B). For our scenario analysis over the next six months, we use a base case scenario plus two alternate “tail risk” scenarios, based on the following descriptions and inputs: Table 2AFactor Regressions Used To Estimate Spread Product Yield Changes GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening Table 2BEstimated Government Bond Yield Betas To US Treasuries GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening Base case: Ongoing global vaccinations lead to more of the global economy reopening over the summer, with excess savings built up during the pandemic – augmented by ongoing fiscal support – starting to be spent. US economic growth will be most robust out of the major economies, given the additional boost from fiscal stimulus, while China implements actions to slow credit growth and the euro area lags on vaccinations. The Fed stands its ground and maintains no rate hikes until at least 2023, and US TIPS breakevens climb to levels consistent with the Fed’s 2% inflation mandate (2.3-2.5%). The US Treasury curve continues to bear-steepen, with the 10-year US yield rising to 2%. The VIX falls to 15, the US dollar is flat, the Brent oil price rises +5%, and the fed funds rate is unchanged at 0%. Optimistic case: A rapid pace of global vaccinations leads to booming growth led by the US but including a reopening euro area. Chinese policymakers tighten credit by less than expected. Markets begin to pull forward the timing and pace of future central bank interest rate hikes, most notably in the US but also in the other countries like Canada and the UK. Real bond yields continue to climb globally, but inflation breakevens stay elevated. The steepening trend of the US Treasury curve ends, and mild bear flattening begins with the 10-year reaching 2.2% and the 2-year yield climbing to 0.4%. The VIX stays unchanged at 18, the US dollar rises +5%, the Brent oil price climbs +2.5% and the fed funds rate stays unchanged. Pessimistic case: Setbacks on the pandemic, either from struggles with vaccine distribution or a surge in variant cases, lead to a slower pace of global growth momentum. Europe cannot reopen, China tightens credit policy faster than expected, and US households hold onto to excess savings amid lingering virus uncertainty. Diminished economic optimism leads to a pullback in global equity values and wider global credit spreads. The US Treasury curve bull flattens as longer-maturity yields fall in a risk-off move, with the 10-year yield moving back down to 1.5%. The VIX rises to 25, the US dollar falls -2.5% and the fed funds rate stays at 0%. The inputs into the scenario analysis are shown in Chart 18 (for the USD, VIX, oil and the fed funds rate), while the US Treasury yield scenarios are in Chart 19. The excess return scenarios for the model bond portfolio, using the above inputs in our simple quantitative return forecast framework, are shown in Table 3A (the scenarios for the changes in US Treasury yields are shown in Table 3B). Chart 18Risk Factor Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis Risk Factor Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis Risk Factor Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis Chart 19US Treasury Yield Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis US Treasury Yield Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis US Treasury Yield Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis Table 3AGFIS Model Bond Portfolio Scenario Analysis For The Next Six Months GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening Table 3BUS Treasury Yield Assumptions For The 6-Month Forward Scenario Analysis GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening The model bond portfolio is expected to deliver an excess return over the next six months of +46bps in the base case and +54bps in the optimistic scenario, but is only projected to underperform by -27bps in the pessimistic scenario. Bottom Line: We are sticking with an overall below-benchmark portfolio duration stance, given accelerating global growth momentum, expanding vaccinations and a highly stimulative fiscal/monetary policy mix. We are maintaining a moderate overweight to global spread product versus government debt, concentrated on an overweight to US high-yield given more stretched valuations in other credit sectors. On the margin, we are making the following changes to the portfolio allocations: downgrading both UK Gilts and UK investment grade corporates to neutral, while cutting the overall allocation to EM USD credit to neutral.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Shakti Sharma Research Associate ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The GFIS model bond portfolio custom benchmark index is the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index, but with allocations to global high-yield corporate debt replacing very high quality spread product (i.e. AA-rated). We believe this to be more indicative of the typical internal benchmark used by global multi-sector fixed income managers. 2 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy/Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Why Are UK Interest Rates Still So Low?", dated March 10, 2021, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Chart 1How Long Until Full Employment? How Long Until Full Employment? How Long Until Full Employment? It’s official. The vaccination roll-out is successfully suppressing the spread of COVID-19 throughout the United States and the associated economic re-opening is leading to a surge in activity. Not only did March’s ISM Manufacturing PMI come in at 64.7, its highest reading since 1983, but the economy also added 916 thousand jobs during the month. Interestingly, the 10-year Treasury yield was relatively stable last week despite the eye-catching economic data. This is likely because the Treasury curve already discounted a significant rebound in economic activity and last week’s data merely confirmed the market’s expectations. At present, the Treasury curve is priced for Fed liftoff in September 2022 and a total of five rate hikes by the end of 2023. By our calculations, the Fed will be ready to lift rates by the end of 2022 if monthly employment growth averages at least 410k between now and then (Chart 1). If payroll growth can somehow stay above 701k per month, then the Fed will hit its “maximum employment” target by the end of this year. While a lot of good news is already priced in the Treasury curve, the greatest near-term risk is that the data continue to beat expectations. Maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. Feature Table 1Recommended Portfolio Specification It’s A Boom! It’s A Boom! Table 2Fixed Income Sector Performance It’s A Boom! It’s A Boom! Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 29 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +98 bps. The combination of above-trend economic growth and accommodative monetary policy supports positive excess returns for spread product versus Treasuries. Though Treasury yields have risen, this does not yet pose a risk for credit spreads. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate remains below the Fed’s target range of 2.3% to 2.5%. We won’t be concerned about restrictive monetary policy pushing spreads wider until inflation expectations are well-anchored around the Fed’s target. Despite the positive macro back-drop, investment grade corporate valuations are extremely tight. The investment grade corporate index’s 12-month breakeven spread is down to its 2nd percentile (Chart 2). This means that the breakeven spread has only been tighter 2% of the time since 1995. The same measure shows that Baa-rated bonds have also only been more expensive 2% of the time (panel 3). We don’t anticipate material underperformance versus Treasuries, but we see better value outside of the investment grade corporate space.1 Specifically, we advise investors to favor tax-exempt municipal bonds over investment grade corporates with the same credit rating and duration. We also prefer USD-denominated Emerging Market Sovereign bonds over investment grade corporates with the same credit rating and duration. Finally, the supportive macro environment means we are comfortable adding credit risk to a portfolio. With that in mind, we encourage investors to pick up the additional spread offered by high-yield corporates. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* It’s A Boom! It’s A Boom! Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* It’s A Boom! It’s A Boom! High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 83 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +263 bps. In last week’s report we looked at the default expectations that are currently priced into the junk index and considered whether they are likely to be met.2 If we demand an excess spread of 100 bps and assume a 40% recovery rate on defaulted debt, then the High-Yield index embeds an expected default rate of 3.4% (Chart 3). Using a model of the speculative grade default rate that is based on gross corporate leverage (aka pre-tax profits over debt) and C&I lending standards, we can estimate a likely default rate for the next 12 months using assumptions for profit and debt growth.  The median FOMC forecast of 6.5% real GDP growth in 2021 is consistent with 31% corporate profit growth. We also assume that last year’s debt binge will be followed by relatively weak corporate debt growth in 2021. According to our model, 30% profit growth and 2% debt growth is consistent with a default rate of 3.4% for the next 12 months, exactly matching what is priced into junk spreads. Given that the Fed’s 6.5% real GDP growth forecast looks conservative given the large amount of fiscal stimulus coming down the pike, and the fact that the combination of strong economic growth and accommodative monetary policy could easily cause valuations to overshoot in the near-term, we are inclined to maintain an overweight allocation to High-Yield bonds. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 17 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +15 bps. The nominal spread between conventional 30-year MBS and equivalent-duration Treasuries tightened 12 bps in March. This spread remains wide compared to levels seen during the past few years, but it is still tight compared to the recent pace of mortgage refinancings (Chart 4). The MBS option-adjusted spread (OAS) currently sits at 19 bps. This is considerably below the 52 bps offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds, the 38 bps offered by Agency CMBS and the 27 bps offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS. All in all, the value in MBS is not appealing compared to other similarly risky sectors. The plummeting primary mortgage spread was a key reason for the elevated refi activity seen during the past year. However, the spread has now recovered back to more typical levels (bottom panel). The implication is that further increases in Treasury yields will likely be matched by higher mortgage rates, meaning that mortgage refinancings have probably peaked. The coming drop in refi activity will be positive for MBS returns, but we aren’t yet ready to turn bullish on the sector. First, as mentioned above, value is poor compared to other similarly risky sectors. Second, the gap between the nominal MBS spread and the MBA Refinance Index remains wide (panel 2) and we could still see spreads adjust higher. Government-Related: Neutral Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 45 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +66 bps (Chart 5). Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 157 bps in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +40 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 8 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +33 bps. Local Authority bonds outperformed by 81 bps in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +286 bps. Domestic Agency bonds underperformed by 2 bps, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +14 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 7 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +13 bps. We recently took a detailed look at valuation for USD-denominated Emerging Market (EM) Sovereigns.3 We found that, on an equivalent-duration basis, EM Sovereigns offer a spread advantage over investment grade US corporates. Attractive countries include: Qatar, UAE, Mexico, Russia and Colombia We prefer US corporates over EM Sovereigns in the high-yield space. Ba-rated high-yield US corporates offer a spread advantage over Ba-rated EM Sovereigns and the lower EM credit tiers are dominated by distressed credits like Turkey and Argentina. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 187 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +291 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). Municipal bond spreads have tightened dramatically during the past few months and Aaa-rated Munis now look expensive compared to Treasuries, with the exception of the short-end of the curve (Chart 6). That said, if we match the duration and credit rating between the Bloomberg Barclays Municipal bond indexes and the US Credit index, we find that both General Obligation (GO) and Revenue Munis appear attractive compared to US investment grade Credit, with the possible exception of some short-maturity GO bonds. Revenue Munis offer a before-tax yield pick-up relative to US Credit for maturities above 12 years (bottom panel). Revenue bonds in the 8-12 year maturity bucket offer an after-tax yield pick-up versus Credit for investors with an effective tax rate above 13% (panel 3). Revenue bonds in the 6-8 year maturity bucket offer an after-tax yield pick-up versus Credit for investors with an effective tax rate above 24%. GO Munis with 17+ years to maturity offer an after-tax yield pick-up relative to Credit for investors with an effective tax rate above 1%. This breakeven effective tax rate rises to 6% for the 12-17 year maturity bucket, 23% for the 8-12 year maturity bucket (panel 3) and 32% for the 6-8 year maturity bucket. All in all, municipal bond value has deteriorated markedly in recent months and we downgraded our recommended allocation from “maximum overweight” to “overweight” in January. However, investors should still prefer municipal bonds over investment grade corporate bonds with the same credit rating and duration. Treasury Curve: Buy 5-Year Bullet Versus 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury yields moved up dramatically in March, with the curve steepening out to the 10-year maturity point and flattening thereafter. The 2/10 Treasury slope steepened 28 bps to end the month at 158 bps. The 5/30 slope steepened 7 bps to end the month at 149 bps (Chart 7). As we showed in a recent report, the Treasury curve continues to trade directionally with yields out to the 10-year maturity point.4 Beyond 10 years, the curve has transitioned into a bear flattening/bull steepening regime where higher yields coincide with a flatter curve and vice-versa (bottom panel). For now, we are content to stick with our recommended steepener: long the 5-year bullet and short a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. However, we will eventually be close enough to an expected Fed liftoff date that the 5/10 slope will follow the 10/30 slope and transition into a bear-flattening/bull-steepening regime. When that happens, it will make more sense to either position for a steepener at the front-end of the curve (long 3-year bullet / short 2/5 barbell) or a flattener at the long-end of the curve (long 5/30 barbell / short 10-year bullet). We don’t yet see sufficient evidence of 5/10 bear-flattening to shift out of our current recommended position and into these new ones, and so we stay the course for now. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 155 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +341 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 22 bps on the month and it currently sits at 2.38%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 30 bps in March and it currently sits at 2.15%. Despite last month’s sharp move higher, the 5-year/5-year forward breakeven rate is still below the Fed’s target range of 2.3% to 2.5% (Chart 8). This means that the rising cost of inflation protection is not yet a concern for the Fed, and in fact, the Fed would like to encourage it to rise further still. Our recommended positions in inflation curve flatteners and real curve steepeners continued to perform well last month. The 5/10 TIPS breakeven inflation slope was relatively stable, but the 2/10 CPI swap slope flattened 8 bps (panel 4). The 2/10 real yield curve steepened 31 bps in March to reach 169 bps (bottom panel). An inverted inflation curve has been an unusual occurrence during the past few years, but we think it will be the normal state of affairs going forward. The Fed’s new strategy involves allowing inflation to rise above 2% so that it can attack its inflation target from above rather than from below. This new monetary environment is much more consistent with an inverted inflation curve than an upward sloping one, and we would resist the temptation to put on an inflation curve steepener. ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 4 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +16 bps. Aaa-rated ABS underperformed by 5 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +8 bps. Non-Aaa ABS underperformed by 2 bps, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +56 bps. The stimulus from last year’s CARES act led to a significant increase in household savings when individual checks were mailed last April. This excess savings has still not been spent and now another round of checks is poised to push the savings rate higher again (Chart 9). The large stock of household savings means that the collateral quality of consumer ABS is very high, with many households using their windfall to pay down debt (bottom panel). Investors should remain overweight consumer ABS and take advantage of strong collateral performance by moving down in credit quality. The Treasury department’s decision to let the Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility (TALF) expire at the end of 2020 does not alter our recommendation. Spreads are already well below the borrowing cost that was offered by TALF, and these tight spread levels are justified by strong household balance sheets. Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 10 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +77 bps. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS underperformed Treasuries by 23 bps in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +14 bps. Meanwhile, non-Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed by 30 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +293 bps (Chart 10). We continue to recommend an overweight allocation to Aaa-rated Non-Agency CMBS and an underweight allocation to non-Aaa CMBS. Even with the expiry of TALF, Aaa CMBS spreads are already well below the cost of borrowing through TALF and thus won’t be negatively impacted. Meanwhile, the structurally challenging environment for commercial real estate could lead to problems for lower-rated CMBS (panels 3 & 4). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 10 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +49 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread tightened 5 bps on the month and it currently sits at 38 bps (bottom panel). Though Agency CMBS spreads have completely recovered back to their pre-COVID lows, they still look attractive compared to other similarly risky spread products. Stay overweight. Appendix A: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of March 31ST, 2021) It’s A Boom! It’s A Boom! Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of March 31ST, 2021) It’s A Boom! It’s A Boom! Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 43 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 43 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) It’s A Boom! It’s A Boom! Appendix B: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of March 31st, 2021) It’s A Boom! It’s A Boom! Footnotes 1 For a look at alternatives to investment grade corporates please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Searching For Value In Spread Product”, dated January 26, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “That Uneasy Feeling”, dated March 30, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Searching For Value In Spread Product”, dated January 26, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Fed Looks Backward While Markets Look Forward”, dated March 23, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance

Highlights Global manufacturing activity will soon peak due to growing costs and China’s policy tightening. This process will allow the dollar’s rebound to continue. EUR/USD’s correction will run further. This pullback in the euro is creating an attractive buying opportunity for investors with a 12- to 24-month investment horizon. Eurozone banks will continue to trade in unison with the euro. Feature The correction in the euro has further to run. The dollar currently benefits from widening real interest differentials, but a growing list of headwinds will cause a temporary setback for the global manufacturing sector, which will fuel the greenback rally further. Nonetheless, EUR/USD will stabilize between 1.15 and 1.12, after which it will begin a new major up-leg. Consequently, investors with a 12- to 24-month investment horizon should use the current softness to allocate more funds to the common currency. A Hiccup In Global Industrial Activity Global manufacturing activity is set to decelerate on a sequential basis and the Global Manufacturing PMI will soon peak. The first problem for the global manufacturing sector is the emergence of financial headwinds. The sharp rebound in growth in the second half of 2020 and the optimism created by last year’s vaccine breakthrough as well as the rising tide of US fiscal stimulus have pushed US bond yields and oil prices up sharply. These financial market moves are creating a “growth tax” that will bite soon. Mounting US interest rates have lifted global borrowing costs while the doubling in Brent prices has increased the costs of production and created a small squeeze on oil consumers. Thus, even if the dollar remains well below its March 2020 peak, our Growth Tax Indicator (which incorporates yields, oil prices and the US dollar) warns of an imminent top in the US ISM Manufacturing and the Global Manufacturing PMI (Chart 1). Already, the BCA Global Leading Economic Indicator diffusion index has dipped below the 50% line, which usually ushers in downshifts in global growth. A deceleration in China’s economy constitutes another problem for the global manufacturing cycle. Last year’s reflation-fueled rebound in Chinese economic activity was an important catalyst to the global trade and manufacturing recovery. However, according to BCA Research’s Emerging Market Strategy service, Beijing is now tightening policy, concerned by a build-up in debt and excesses in the real estate sector. Already, the PBoC’s liquidity withdrawals are resulting in a decline of commercial bank excess reserves, which foreshadows a slowing of China’s credit impulse (Chart 2). Chart 1The Global Growth Tax Will Bite The Global Growth Tax Will Bite The Global Growth Tax Will Bite Chart 2Chinese Credit Will Slow Chinese Credit Will Slow Chinese Credit Will Slow In addition to liquidity withdrawals, Chinese policymakers are also tightening the regulatory environment to tackle excessive debt buildups and real estate speculation. The crackdown on property developers and house purchases will cause construction activity to shrink in the second half of 2021. Meanwhile, tougher rules for both non-bank lenders and the asset management divisions of banks will further harm credit creation. BCA’s Chief EM strategist, Arthur Budaghyan, notes that consumer credit is already slowing. Chinese fiscal policy is unlikely to create a counterweight to the deteriorating credit impulse. China’s fiscal impulse will be slightly negative next year. Chinese financial markets are factoring in these headwinds, and on-shore small cap equities are trying to break down while Chinese equities are significantly underperforming global benchmarks. Chart 3Deteriorating Surprises Deteriorating Surprises Deteriorating Surprises Bottom Line: The combined assault from the rising “growth tax” and China’s policy tightening is leaving its mark. Economic surprises in the US, the Eurozone, EM and China have all decelerated markedly (Chart 3), which the currency market echoes. Some of the most pro-cyclical currencies in the G-10 are suffering, with the SEK falling relative to the EUR and the NZD and AUD both experiencing varying degrees of weakness. The Euro Correction Will Run Further… Until now, the euro’s decline mostly reflects the rise in US interest rate differentials; however, the coming hiccup in the global manufacturing cycle is causing a second down leg for the euro. First, the global economic environment remains consistent with more near-term dollar upside, due to: Chart 4Commodities Are Vulnerable Commodities Are Vulnerable Commodities Are Vulnerable A commodity correction that will feed the dollar’s rebound. Aggregate speculator positioning and our Composite Technical Indicator show that commodity prices are technically overextended (Chart 4). With this backdrop, the coming deceleration in Chinese economic activity is likely to catalyze a significant pullback in natural resources, which will hurt rates of returns outside the US and therefore, flatter the dollar. The dollar’s counter-cyclicality. The expected pullback in the Global Manufacturing PMI is consistent with a stronger greenback (Chart 5). The dollar’s momentum behavior. Among G-10 FX, the dollar responds most strongly to the momentum factor (Chart 6). Thus, the likelihood is high that the dollar’s recent rebound will persist, especially because our FX team’s Dollar Capitulation Index has only recovered to neutral from oversold levels and normally peaks in overbought territory.  Chart 5The Greenback's Counter-Cyclicality The Greenback's Counter-Cyclicality The Greenback's Counter-Cyclicality Chart 6The Dollar Is A High Momentum Currency The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward Second, the euro’s specific dynamics remain negative for now. Based on our short-term valuation model, the fair value of EUR/USD has downshifted back to 1.1, which leaves the euro 7% overvalued (Chart 7). Until now, real interest rate differentials and the steepening of the US yield curve relative to Germany’s have driven the decline in the fair value estimate. However, the deceleration in global growth also hurts the euro’s fair value because the US is less exposed than the Eurozone to the global manufacturing cycle. Chart 7The Euro's Short-Term Fair Value Is At 1.1 The Euro's Short-Term Fair Value Is At 1.1 The Euro's Short-Term Fair Value Is At 1.1 Chart 8Speculators Have Not Capitulated Speculators Have Not Capitulated Speculators Have Not Capitulated The euro is also technically vulnerable, similar to commodities. Speculators are still massively net long EUR/USD and the large pool of long bets in the euro suggests that a capitulation has yet to take place (Chart 8). The euro responds very negatively to a weak Chinese economy. The Eurozone has deeper economic ties with China than the US. Exports to China account for 1.7% of the euro area’s GDP, and 2.8% of Germany’s compared to US exports to China at 0.5% of GDP. Indirect financial links are also larger. Credit to EM accounts for 45% of the Eurozone’s GDP compared to 5% for the US. Thus, the negative impact of a Chinese slowdown on EM growth has greater spillovers on European than on US ones rates of returns. A weak CNY and sagging Chinese capital markets harm the euro. The euro’s rebound from 1.064 on March 23 2020 to 1.178 did not reflect sudden inflows into European fixed-income markets. Instead, the money that previously sought higher interest rates in the US left that country for EM bonds and China’s on-shore fixed-income markets, the last major economies with attractive yields. These outflows from the US to China and EM pushed the dollar down, which arithmetically helped the euro. Thus, the recent EUR/USD correlates closely with Sino/US interest rate and with the yuan because the euro’s strength reflects the dollar demise (Chart 9). Consequently, a decelerating Chinese economy will also hurt EUR/USD via fixed-income market linkages. Finally, the euro will depreciate further if global cyclical stocks correct relative to defensive equities. Deep cyclicals (financials, consumer discretionary, energy, materials and industrials) represent 59% of the Eurozone MSCI benchmark versus 36% of the US index. Cyclical equities are exceptionally overbought and expensive relative to defensive names. They are also very levered to the global business cycle and Chinese imports. In this context, the expected deterioration in both China’s economic activity and the Global Manufacturing PMI could cause a temporary but meaningful pullback in the cyclicals-to-defensives ratio and precipitate equity outflows from Europe into the US (Chart 10). Chart 9EUR/USD And Chinese Rates EUR/USD And Chinese Rates EUR/USD And Chinese Rates Chart 10EUR/USD Will Follow Cyclicals/Defensives EUR/USD Will Follow Cyclicals/Defensives EUR/USD Will Follow Cyclicals/Defensives Bottom Line: A peak in the global manufacturing PMI will hurt the euro, especially because China will meaningfully contribute to this deceleration in global industrial activity. Thus, the euro’s pullback has further to run. An important resistance stands at 1.15. A failure to hold will invite a rapid decline to EUR/USD 1.12. Nonetheless, the euro’s depreciation constitutes nothing more than a temporary pullback. … But The Long-Term Bull Market Is Intact We recommend buying EUR/USD on its current dip because the underpinnings of its cyclical bull market are intact. Chart 11Investors Structurally Underweight Europe Investors Structurally Underweight Europe Investors Structurally Underweight Europe First, investors are positioned for a long-term economic underperformance of the euro area relative to the US. The depressed level of portfolio inflows into Europe relative to the US indicates that investors already underweight European assets (Chart 11). This pre-existing positioning limits the negative impact on the euro of the current decrease in European growth expectations (Chart 11, bottom panel). Second, as we wrote last week, European growth is set to accelerate significantly this summer. Considering the absence of ebullient investor expectations toward the euro, this process can easily create upside economic surprises later this year, especially when compared to the US. Moreover, the deceleration in Chinese and global growth will most likely be temporary, which will limit the duration of their negative impact on Europe. Third, the US stimulus measure will create negative distortions for the US dollar. The addition of another long-term stimulus package of $2 trillion to $4 trillion to the $7 trillion already spent by Washington during the crisis implies that the US government deficit will not narrow as quickly as US private savings will decline. Therefore, the US current account deficit will widen from its current level of 3.5% of GDP. As a corollary, the US twin deficit will remain large. Meanwhile, the Fed is unlikely to increase real interest rates meaningfully in the coming two years because it believes any surge in inflation this year will be temporary. Furthermore, the FOMC aims to achieve inclusive growth (i.e. an overheated labor market). This policy combination forcefully points toward greater dollar weakness. The US policy mix looks particularly dollar bearish when compared to that of the Eurozone. To begin with, the balance of payment dynamics make the euro more resilient. The euro area benefits from the underpinning of a current account surplus of 1.9% of GDP. Moreover, the European basic balance of payments stands at 1.5% of GDP compared to a 3.6% deficit for the US. Additionally, FDI into Europe are rising relative to the US. The divergence in the FDI trends will continue due to the high probability that the Biden administration will soon increase corporate taxes. Chart 12The DEM In The 70s The DEM In The 70s The DEM In The 70s The combination of faster vaccine penetration and much larger fiscal stimulus means that the US economy will overheat faster than Europe’s. Because the Fed seems willing to tolerate higher inflation readings, US CPI will rise relative to the Eurozone. In the 1970s, too-easy policy in Washington meant that the gap between US and German inflation rose. Despite the widening of interest rate and growth differentials in favor of the USD or the rise in German relative unemployment, the higher US inflation dominated currency fluctuations and the deutschemark appreciated (Chart 12). A similar scenario is afoot in the coming years, especially in light of the euro bullish relative balance of payments. Fourth, valuations constitute an additional buttress behind the long-term performance of the euro. Our FX strategy team Purchasing Power Parity model adjusts for the different composition of price indices in the US and the euro area. Based on this metric, the euro is trading at a significant 13% discount from its long-term fair value, with the latter being on an upward trend (Chart 13).  Furthermore, BCA’s Behavioral Exchange Rate Model for the trade-weighted euro is also pointing up, which historically augurs well for the common currency. Lastly, even if the ECB’s broad trade-weighted index stands near an all-time high, European financial conditions remain very easy. This bifurcation suggests that the euro is not yet a major hurdle for the continent and can enjoy more upside (Chart 14). Chart 13EUR/USD Trades Well Below Long-Term Fair Value EUR/USD Trades Well Below Long-Term Fair Value EUR/USD Trades Well Below Long-Term Fair Value Chart 14Easy European Financial ##br##Conditions Easy European Financial Conditions Easy European Financial Conditions Chart 15Make Room For the Euro! Make Room For the Euro! Make Room For the Euro! Finally, the euro will remain a beneficiary from reserve diversification away from the USD. The dollar’s status as the premier reserve currency is unchallenged. However, its share of global reserves has scope to decline while the euro’s proportion could move back to the levels enjoyed by legacy European currencies in the early 1990s (Chart 15). Large reserve holders will continue to move away from the dollar. BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy team argues that US tensions with China transcend the Trump presidency.  Meanwhile, the current administration’s relationship with Russia and Saudi Arabia will be cold. For now, their main alternative to the dollar is the euro because of its liquidity. Moreover, the NGEU stimulus program creates an embryonic mechanism to share fiscal risk within the euro area. The Eurozone is therefore finally trying to evolve away from a monetary union bereft of a fiscal union. This process points toward a lower probability of a break up, which makes the euro more attractive to reserve managers. Bottom Line: Despite potent near-term headwinds, the euro’s long-term outlook remains bright. Global investors already underweight European assets, yet balance of payment and policy dynamics point toward a higher euro. Moreover, valuations and geopolitical developments reinforce the cyclical tailwinds behind EUR/USD. Thus, investors with a 12- to 24-month investment horizon should use the current euro correction to gain exposure to the European currencies. Any move in EUR/USD below 1.15 will generate a strong buy signal. Sector Focus: European Banks And The Istanbul Shake The recent decline in euro area bank stocks coincides with the 14% increase in USD/TRY and the 17% decline in the TUR Turkish equities ETF following the sacking of Naci Ağbal, the CBRT governor. President Erdogan is prioritizing growth over economic stability because his AKP party is polling poorly ahead of the 2023 election. The Turkish economy is already overheating, and the lack of independence of the CBRT under the leadership of Şahap Kavcıoğlu promises a substantial increase in Turkish inflation, which already stands at 16%. Hence, foreign investors will flee this market, creating further downward pressures on the lira and Turkish assets. European banks have a meaningful exposure to Turkey. Turkish assets account for 3% of Spanish bank assets or 28% of Tier-1 capital. For France, this exposure amounts to 0.7% and 5% respectively, and for the UK, it reaches 0.3% and 2%. As a comparison, claims on Turkey only represent 0.3% and 0.5% of the assets and Tier-1 capital of US banks. Unsurprisingly, fluctuations in the Turkish lira have had a significant impact one the share prices of European banks in recent years, even after controlling for EPS and domestic yield fluctuations (Table 1). Table 1TRY Is Important To European Banks… The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward Nonetheless, today’s TRY fluctuations are unlikely to have the same lasting impact on European banks share prices as they did from 2017 to 2019 because European banks have already shed significant amounts of Turkish assets (Chart 16).  This does not mean that European banks are out of the woods yet. The level of European yields remains a key determinant of the profitability of Eurozone’s banks, and thus, of their share prices (Chart 17, top panel). Moreover, the euro still tightly correlates with European bank stocks as well (Chart 17, bottom panel). As a result, our view that the global manufacturing cycle will experience a temporary downshift and the consequent downside in EUR/USD both warn of further underperformance of European banks. Chart 16… But Less Than It ##br##Once Was The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward Chart 17Higher Yields And A stronger Euro, These Are Few Of My Favorite Things Higher Yields And A stronger Euro, These Are Few Of My Favorite Things Higher Yields And A stronger Euro, These Are Few Of My Favorite Things These same views also suggest that this decline in bank prices is creating a buying opportunity. Ultimately, we remain cyclically bullish on the euro and the transitory nature of the manufacturing slowdown implies that global yields will resume their ascent. The cheap valuations of European banks, which trade at 0.6-times book value, make them option-like vehicles to bet on these trends, even if the banking sectors long-term prospects are murky. Moreover, they are a play on Europe’s domestic recovery this summer. We will explore banks in greater detail in future reports.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Investment Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com

  The BCA Research Global Asset Allocation (GAA) Forum will take place online on May 18th. We have put together a great lineup of speakers to discuss issues of importance to CIOs and asset allocators. These include the latest thinking on portfolio construction, factor investing, alternatives, and ESG. Our keynote speaker will be Keith Ambachtsheer, founder of KPA Advisory and author of many books on investment management including "The Future of Pension Management: Integrating Design, Governance and Investing" (2016). His presentation will be followed by a panel discussion of top CIOs including Maxime Aucoin of CDPQ, James Davis of OPTrust, and Catherine Ulozas of the Drexel University Endowment. The event is complimentary for all GAA subscribers, who can see a full agenda and register here. Others can sign up here. We hope you can join us on May 18th for what should be a stimulating and informative day of ideas and discussion. Highlights Recommended Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Global growth will rebound later this year, fueled by an end of lockdowns and generous fiscal stimulus. Despite that, central banks will not move towards tightening until 2023 at the earliest. This remains a very positive environment for risk assets like equities, though the upside is inevitably limited given stretched valuations. We continue to recommend a risk-on position, with overweights in equities and higher-risk corporate bonds. It is unlikely that long-term rates will rise much further over the coming months. But there is a risk that they could, and so we become more wary on interest-sensitive assets. Accordingly, we cut our overweight on the IT sector to neutral, and go overweight Financials. We continue to prefer cyclical sectors, and stay overweight Industrials and Energy. Chinese growth is slowing and so we cut our recommendation on Chinese equities to underweight. Some Emerging Markets will suffer from tighter US financial conditions, so we would be selective in our positions in both EM equity and debt. We stay firmly underweight government bonds, and recommend an underweight on duration, and favor linkers. Within alternatives, we raise Private Equity to overweight. The return to normality will give PE funds a wider range of opportunities, and allow them to pick up distressed assets at attractive valuations. Overview What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation The past few months have seen a sharp rise in long-term interest rates everywhere (Chart 1). These have reflected better growth prospects, but also a greater appreciation of the risk of inflation over the next few years (Chart 2). Our main message in this Quarterly Portfolio Outlook is that we do not expect long-term rates to rise much further over the coming months, but that there is a risk that they could. This would be unlikely to undermine the positive case for risk assets overall, but it would affect asset allocation towards interest-rate sensitive assets such as growth stocks and Emerging Markets, and could have an impact on the US dollar. Chart 1Rates Are Rising Everywhere Rates Are Rising Everywhere Rates Are Rising Everywhere Chart 2...Because Of Both Growth And Inflation Expectations Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation     We accordingly keep our recommendation for an overweight on equities and riskier corporate credit on the 12-month investment horizon, but are tweaking some of our other allocation recommendations. The macro environment for the rest of the year continues to look favorable. Pent-up consumer demand will be released once lockdowns end. In the US, this should be mid-July by when, at the current rate, the US will have vaccinated enough people to achieve herd immunity (Chart 3). Excess household savings in the major developed economies have reached almost $3 trillion (Chart 4). At least a part of that will be spent when consumers can go out for entertainment and travel again. Chart 3US On Track To Hit Herd Immunity By July US On Track To Hit Herd Immunity By July US On Track To Hit Herd Immunity By July Chart 4Global Excess Savings Total Trillion Global Excess Savings Total $3 Trillion Global Excess Savings Total $3 Trillion     Fiscal stimulus remains generous, especially in the US after the passing of the $1.9 trillion package in March (with another $2 trillion dedicated towards infrastructure spending likely to be approved within the next six months). The OECD estimates that the recent US stimulus alone will boost US GDP growth by almost 3 percentage points in the first full year and have a significant knock-on effect on other economies (Chart 5). Central banks, too, remain wary of the uneven and fragile nature of the recovery and so will not move towards tightening in the next 12 months. The Fed is not signalling a rate hike before 2024 – and it is likely to be the first major central bank to raise rates. In this environment, it is not surprising that long-term rates have risen. We showed in March’s Monthly Portfolio Update that, since 1990, equities have almost always performed strongly when rates are rising. This is likely to continue unless there is either (1) an inflation scare, or (2) the Fed turns more hawkish than the market believes is appropriate. Inflation could spike temporarily over the coming months, which might spook markets (see What Our Clients Are Asking on page 9 for more discussion of this). But sustained inflation is improbable until the labor market recovers to a level where significant wage increases come through (Chart 6). This is unlikely before 2023 at the earliest. Chart 5US Fiscal Stimulus Will Help Everyone Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Chart 6Labor Market Still Well Away From Full Employment Labor Market Still Well Away From Full Employment Labor Market Still Well Away From Full Employment   BCA Research’s fixed-income strategists do not see the US 10-year Treasury yield rising much above 1.8% this year.1 Inflation expectations should settle down around the current level (shown in Chart 2, panel 2) which is consistent with the Fed achieving its 2% PCE inflation target on average over the cycle. Treasury yields are largely driven by whether the Fed turns out to be more or less hawkish than the market expects (Chart 7). The market is already pricing in the first Fed rate hike in Q3 2022 (Chart 8). We think it unlikely that the market will start to price in an earlier hike than that. Chart 7The Fed Unlikely To Hike Ahead Of What Market Expects... The Fed Unlikely To Hike Ahead Of What Market Expects... The Fed Unlikely To Hike Ahead Of What Market Expects... Chart 8...Since This Is As Early As Q3 2022 ...Since This Is As Early As Q3 2021 ...Since This Is As Early As Q3 2021 How much would a further rise in rates hurt the economy and stock market? Rates are still well below a level that would trigger problems. First, long-term rates are considerably below trend nominal GDP growth, which is around 3.5% (Chart 9). Second, short-term real rates are well below r* – hard though that is to measure at the moment given the volatility of the economy in the past 12 months (Chart 10). Finally, one of the best indicators of economic pressure is a decline in cyclical sectors (consumer spending on durables, corporate capex, and residential investment) as a percentage of GDP (Chart 11). This is because these are the most interest-rate sensitive parts of the economy. But, at the moment, consumers are so cashed up they do not need to borrow to spend. The same is true of corporates, which raised huge amounts of cash last year. The only potential problem is real estate, buoyed last year by low rates which are now reversing (Chart 12). But mortgage rates are still very low and this is not a big enough sector to derail the broader economy. Chart 9Long-Term Rates Well Below Damaging Levels... Long-Term Rates Well Below Damaging Levels... Long-Term Rates Well Below Damaging Levels... Chart 10...Such As The R-Star Fed Still Below Neutral ...Such As The R-Star Fed Still Below Neutral ...Such As The R-Star   Chart 11Interest-Rate Sensitive Sectors Are Robust... Interest-Rate Sensitive Sectors Are Robust... Interest-Rate Sensitive Sectors Are Robust... Chart 12...With The Possible Exception Of Housing ...With The Possible Exception Of Housing ...With The Possible Exception Of Housing   Chart 13Debt Levels Are High In Emerging Markets... Debt Levels Are High In Emerging Markets... Debt Levels Are High In Emerging Markets... Chart 14...Which Makes Them Vulnerable To Tightening Financial Conditions ...Which Makes Them Vulnerable To Tightening Financial Conditions ...Which Makes Them Vulnerable To Tightening Financial Conditions         This sanguine view may not apply to Emerging Markets, however. Given the amount of foreign-currency debt they have built up in the past decade (Chart 13), they are very sensitive to US financial conditions, particularly a rise in rates and an appreciation of the US dollar (Chart 14). Accordingly, we have become more cautious on the outlook for both EM equity and debt over the next 6-12 months.   Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist garry@bcaresearch.com   What Our Clients Are Asking What will happen to inflation? How can we tell if it is trending up? Chart 15Watch The Trimmed Mean Inflation Measure Watch The Trimmed Mean Inflation Measure Watch The Trimmed Mean Inflation Measure How much inflation rises will be a key driver of asset performance over the next 12-18 months. Too much inflation will push up long-term rates and undermine the case for risk assets. But the picture is likely to be complicated. US inflation will rise sharply in year-on-year terms in March and April because of the base effect (comparison with the worst period of the pandemic in 2020), pricier gasoline, rising import prices due to the weaker dollar, and supply-chain bottlenecks that are pushing up manufacturing costs. Core PCE inflation could get close to 2.5% year-on-year (Chart 15, panel 1). In the second half, too, an end to lockdowns could push up service-sector inflation – which has unsurprisingly been weak in the past nine months – as consumers rush out to restaurants and on vacation (panel 3). The Fed has signalled that it will view these as temporary effects. But they may spook the market for a while. Next year, however, it would be surprising to see strong underlying inflation unless employment makes a miraculous recovery. Payrolls would have to increase by 420,000 a month to get back to “maximum employment” by end-2022.2 Absent that, wage growth is likely to stay muted. Conventional inflation gauges may not be very useful at indicating underlying inflation pressures, in a world where consumers switch their spending depending on what is currently allowed under pandemic regulations. The Dallas Fed’s Trimmed Mean Inflation indicator (which excludes the 31% of the 178 items in the consumer basket with the highest price rises each month, and the 24% with the lowest) may be the best true measure. Research shows that historically it has been closer to trend headline PCE inflation in the long run than the core inflation measure, and predicts future inflation better (panel 4). Currently it is at 1.6% year-on-year and trending down. Investors should focus on this measure to see whether rising inflation is becoming a risk.   How can investors best protect against rising inflation? In May 2019 we released a report describing how to best to hedge against inflation.3 In that report, we analyzed every period of rising inflation dating back to the 1970s. Our conclusions were the following: The level of inflation will determine how rising inflation affects assets. When inflation goes from 1% to 2%, the macro environment is entirely different from when it goes from 5% to 6%. Thus, inflation hedging should not be thought of as a static exercise but a dynamic one (Table 1). Table 1Winners During Different Inflationary Regimes Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation As long as the annual inflation rate is below about 3%, equities tend to be the best performing asset during high inflation periods, surpassing even commodities. This is because monetary policy tends to stay accommodative and cost pressures remain benign for most companies. However, as inflation passes this threshold, things start to change. Central banks start to become restrictive as they seek to curb inflation. This rise in policy rates starts to choke off the bull market. Meanwhile cost pressures become more significant and, as a result, equities begin to suffer. It is at this time when commodities – particularly oil and industrial metals – and US TIPS become a much better asset to hold. Finally, if the central bank fails to quash inflation, inflation expectations become unanchored, creating a toxic cocktail of rising prices and poor growth. During such periods, the best strategy is to hold the most defensive securities in each asset class, such as Health Care or Utilities within the equity market, or gold within commodities.   Can the shift to renewables drive a new commodities supercycle? Chart 16The Shift To Renewables Is Likely To Be A Tailwind For Metal Prices... The Shift To Renewables Is Likely To Be A Tailwind For Metal Prices... The Shift To Renewables Is Likely To Be A Tailwind For Metal Prices... The rise in commodity prices in H2 2020 has made investors ask whether we are on the verge of a new commodities “supercycle” (Chart 16). Our Commodity & Energy strategists argue that the fundamental drivers of each commodities segment differ. Here we focus on industrial metals – particularly those pertaining to renewable energy and transport electrification. Prices of metals used in electric vehicles (EVs) have risen by an average 53% since July 2020, reflecting strong demand that is outstripping supply (Chart 16). In the short-term, metals markets are likely to be in deficit, especially as demand recovers after the pandemic. Modelling longer-term demand is tricky since it relies on assumptions for the emergence of new technologies, metals’ efficiency, recycling rates, and the share of renewables. A study by the Institute for Sustainable Futures showed that, in the most positive scenarios, demand for some metals will exceed available resources and reserves (Table 2).4 The most pessimistic scenarios – which, for example, assume no major electrification of the transport system – show demand at approximately half of available resources. It is likely that demand will lay somewhere between those scenarios. Table 2...As Future Demand Exceeds Supply Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Supply is concentrated in a handful of countries: For example, the DR Congo is responsible for more than 65% of cobalt production and 50% of the world’s reserves;5 Australia supplies almost 50% of the world’s lithium and has 22% of its reserves.6 Production bottlenecks could therefore put significant upside pressures on prices. Factoring in supply/demand dynamics, as well as an assessment of future technological advancements, we conclude that industrial metals might be posed for a bull market over the upcoming years.   How can we add alpha in the bond bear market? Chart 17Government Bond Yield Sensitivities To USTs Government Bond Yield Sensitivities To USTs Government Bond Yield Sensitivities To USTs For a portfolio benchmarked to the global Treasury index, one way to add alpha is through country allocation. BCA’s Fixed Income Strategy recommends overweighting low yield-beta countries (Germany, France, and Japan) and underweighting high yield-beta countries (Canada, Australia, and the UK).7 The yield beta is defined as the sensitivity of a country’s yield change to changes in the US 10-year Treasury yield, as shown in Chart 17. BCA’s view is that the Fed will be the first major central bank to lift interest rate, therefore investors' underweights should be concentrated in the US Treasury index. It’s worth noting, however, that yield beta is influenced by many factors, and can change over time. When applying this approach, it’s important to pay attention to key factors in each country, especially those that are critical to central bank policy decisions (Table 3). Table 3A Watch List For Bond Investors Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Global Economy Chart 18US Growth Already Looks Strong... US Growth Already Looks Strong... US Growth Already Looks Strong... Overview: Growth continues to recover from the pandemic, although the pace varies. Manufacturing has rebounded strongly, as consumers spend their fiscal handouts on computer and household equipment, but services remain very weak, especially in Europe and Japan. Successful vaccination programs and the end of lockdowns in many countries should lead to strong growth in H2, as consumers spend their accumulated savings and companies increase capex to meet this demand. Perhaps the biggest risk to growth is premature tightening in China, but the authorities there are very aware of this risk and so it is unlikely to drag much on global growth. US: Although the big upside surprises to economic growth are over (Chart 18, panel 1), the US continues to expand more strongly than other major economies, due to its relatively limited lockdowns and large fiscal stimulus (which last year and this combined reached 25% of GDP, with another $2 trillion package in the works). Fed NowCasts suggest that Q1 GDP will come in at around 5-6% quarter-on-quarter annualized, with the OECD’s full-year GDP growth forecast as high as 6.5%. Nonetheless, there is still some way to go: Consumer expenditure and capex remain weak by historical standards, and new jobless claims in March still averaged 727,000 a week. Euro Area: More stringent pandemic regulations and slow vaccine rollout mean that the European service sector has been slow to recover. The services PMI in March was still only 48.4, though manufacturing has rebounded strongly to 64.2 (Chart 19, panel 1). Fiscal stimulus is also much smaller than in the US, with the EUR750 billion approved in December to be spent mostly on infrastructure over a period of years. Growth should rebound in H2 if lockdowns end and the vaccination program accelerates. But the OECD forecasts full-year GDP growth of only 3.9%. Chart 19...But Chinese Growth Has Probably Peaked ...But Chinese Growth Has Probably Peaked ...But Chinese Growth Has Probably Peaked Japan has seen the weakest rebound among the major economies, slightly puzzlingly so given its heavy weight in manufacturing and large exposure to the Chinese economy. Industrial production still shrank 3% year-on-year in February (Chart 19, panel 2), exports were down 4.5% YoY in February, and the manufacturing PMI is barely above 50. The main culprit remains domestic consumption, with confidence very weak and wages still declining, leading to a 2.4% YoY decline in retail sales in January. The OECD full-year GDP growth forecast is just 2.4%. Emerging Markets: The Chinese authorities have been moderately tightening policy for six months and this is starting to impact growth. Both the manufacturing and services PMIs have peaked, though they remain above 50 (panel 3). The policy tightening is likely to be only moderate and so growth this year should not slow drastically. Nonetheless, there remains the risk of a policy mistake. Elsewhere, many EM central banks are struggling with the dilemma of whether to cut rates to boost growth, or raise rates to defend a weakening currency. Real policy rates range from over 2% in Indonesia to below -2% in Brazil and the Philippines. This will add to volatility in the EM universe. Interest Rates: Policy rates in developed economies will not rise any time soon. The Fed is signalling no rise until 2024 (although the futures are now pricing in the first hike in Q3 2022). Other major central banks are likely to wait even longer. A crucial question is whether long-term rates will rise further, after the jump in the US 10-year Treasury yield to a high of 1.73%, from 0.92% at the start of the year. We see only limited upside in yields over the next nine months, as underlying inflation pressures should remain weak and central banks will remain highly reluctant to bring forward the pace of monetary policy normalization.   Global Equities Chart 20Has The Equity Market Priced In All The Earnings Growth? Has The Equity Market Priced In All The Earnings Growth? Has The Equity Market Priced In All The Earnings Growth? The global equities index eked out a 4% gain in Q1 2021, completely driven by a rebound in the profit outlook, since the forward PE multiple slightly contracted by 4%. Forward EPS has now recovered to the pre-pandemic level, while both the index level and PE multiple are 52% and 43% higher than at the end of March 2020 (Chart 20). While BCA’s global earnings model points to nearly 20% earnings growth over the next 12 months and analysts are still revising up earnings forecasts, the key question in our mind is whether the equity market has priced in all the earnings growth. Equity valuations are still not cheap by historical standards despite the small contraction in PEs in Q1. In addition, the VIX index has come down to 19.6, right at its historical average since January 1990, and profit margins in both EM and DM have come under pressure. As an asset class, however, stocks are still attractively valued compared to bonds (panel 5). Given our long-held approach of taking risk where risk will most likely be rewarded, we remain overweight equities versus bonds at the asset-class level, but we are taking some risk off the table in our country and sector allocations by downgrading China to underweight (from overweight) and upgrading the UK to overweight (from neutral), and by taking profits in our Tech overweight and upgrading Financials to overweight (see next two pages). To sum up, we are overweight the US and UK, underweight Japan, the euro area, and China, while neutral on Canada, Australia, and non-China EM. Sector-wise, we are overweight Industrials, Financials, Energy, and Health Care; underweight Consumer Staples, Utilities, and Real Estate; and neutral on Tech, Consumer Discretionary, Communication Services, and Materials.   Country Allocation: Downgrade China To Underweight From Overweight Chart 21China Is Risking Overtightening China Is Risking Overtightening China Is Risking Overtightening We started to separate the overall EM into China and Other EM in the January Monthly Portfolio Update this year. We initiated China with an Overweight and “Other EM” with a Neutral weighting in the global equity portfolio. The key rationale was that Chinese growth would remain strong in H1 2021 due to its earlier stimulus, while some EM countries would benefit from Chinese growth but others were still suffering from structural issues. In Q1, China underperformed the global benchmark by 4.5%, while the other EM markets underperformed slightly. China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) indicated that Chinese policymakers will gradually pull back policy support this year. BCA’s China Investment Strategists think that fiscal thrust will be neutral in 2021 while credit expansion will be at a lower rate compared to 2020. The Chinese economy should remain strong in H1 but will slow to a benign and managed growth rate afterwards. Therefore, the risk of policy overtightening is not trivial and could threaten China’s economic growth and corporate profit outlook. The outperformance of Chinese stocks since the end of 2019 has been largely driven by multiple expansion (Chart 21, panel 1), but the slowdown in the credit impulse implies that the recent underperformance of Chinese equities has not run its course because multiple contraction will likely have to catch up and will therefore put more downward pressure on price (panels 2 and 3). We remain neutral on the non-China EM countries, implying an underweight for the overall EM universe. We use the proceeds to fund an upgrade of the UK to Overweight from Neutral because the UK index is comprised largely of globally exposed companies and because we have upgraded GBP to overweight (see page 21).   Sector Allocation: Upgrade Financials To Overweight By Downgrading Tech To Neutral Chart 22Financials And Tech: Trading Places Financials And Tech: Trading Places Financials And Tech: Trading Places One year ago, we upgraded Tech to overweight and downgraded Financials to neutral given our views on the impact of the pandemic and interest rates.8 This position has netted out an alpha of 1123 basis points in one year. BCA Research’s House View now calls for somewhat higher global interest rates and steeper yield curves (especially in the US) over the next 9-12 months. Accordingly, we are downgrading Tech to neutral and upgrading Financials to overweight. Financials have outperformed the broad market by about 20% since September 2020 after global yields bottomed in July 2020. We do not expect yields to rise significantly from the current level, nor do we expect Tech earnings growth to slow significantly (Chart 22, panel 5). So why do we make such shift between Financials and Tech? There are three key reasons: First, the Tech sector is a long-duration asset with high sensitivity to changes in the discount rate. In contrast, Financials’ earnings benefit from steepening yield curves. If history is any guide, we should see more aggressive analyst earnings revisions going forward in favor of Financials (Chart 22, panel 3). Second, the performance of Financials relative to Tech has been on a long-term structural downtrend since the Global Financial Crisis. A countertrend rebound to the neutral zone from the currently very oversold level would imply further upside (Chart 22, panel 1). Last, Financials are trading at an extremely large discount to the Tech sector (Chart 22, panel 2). In an environment where overall equity valuations are stretched by historical standards, it is prudent to rotate into an extremely cheap sector from an extremely expensive sector.   Government Bonds Chart 23Policy Mix Is Bond-Bearish Policy Mix Is Bond-Bearish Policy Mix Is Bond-Bearish Maintain Below-Benchmark Duration. Global bond yields have climbed sharply in Q1, supported by strong economic growth, mostly smooth rollout of vaccination and the Biden Administration’s very stimulative fiscal package of USD1.9 trillion. The US stimulus package changes the trajectory of the 2021 US fiscal impulse from a $0.8 trillion contraction to a $0.3 trillion expansion, according to estimates from the US Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. Going forward, the path of least resistance for global yields is still up, though the upside will be limited given the resolve of central banks to maintain accommodative monetary policies (Chart 23). Chart 24Stay Long TIPS Stay Long TIPS Stay Long TIPS Still Favor Linkers Vs. Nominal Bonds. Our overweight position in inflation-linked bonds relative to nominal bonds has panned out well so far this year, as has our positioning for a flattening inflation-protection curve. Even though inflation expectations have run up quickly, the 5 year-5 year forward inflation breakeven rate is still below 2.3-2.5%, the range that is consistent with core PCE reaching the Fed’s 2% target in a sustainable fashion (Chart 24). The US TIPS 5/10-year curve is inverted already, but our fixed income strategists are still reluctant to exit the curve-flattening position for two key reasons: 1) The Fed has indicated that it will tolerate core PCE overshooting the 2% target because it will try to hit the target from above rather than from below; and 2) the short end of the inflation expectation curve is more sensitive to actual inflation than the long end. There are signs (core producer prices, prices paid in the ISM manufacturing survey, and NFIB reported prices are all rising) that core PCE will reach 2% in the next 12 months.   Corporate Bonds Chart 25High-Yield Offers Best Value In Fixed Income Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Since the beginning of the year, investment-grade bonds have outperformed duration-matched Treasurys by 62 basis points, while high-yield bonds have outperformed duration-marched Treasurys by 232 basis points. In the current reflationary environment, we believe that the best strategy within fixed-income portfolios is to overweight low-duration assets and maximize credit exposure where the spread makes a large portion of the yield. Thus, we remain overweight high-yield bonds. We believe that high yield offers much better value than higher quality credits. Currently spreads for high-yield bonds are in the middle of their historical distribution – a stark contrast from their investment-grade counterparts, which are trading at very expensive levels (Chart 25, panel 1). Moreover, the reopening of the economy should help the more cyclical sectors of the bond market, where the lower credit qualities are concentrated. But could a rise in yields start hurting sub-investment-grade companies and increase their borrowing costs? We do not think this is likely for now. Most of the bonds in the US high-yield index mature in more than three years, which means that high-risk corporates will not have to finance themselves with higher rates yet (Chart 25, panel 2). On the other hand, we remain underweight investment-grade credit. Not only are these bonds expensive, but they offer very little upside in any scenario. On the one hand, these bonds should underperform further if raise continue to rise – a result of their high duration. On the other hand, if a severe recession were to hit, spreads would most likely widen, which will also result in underperformance.   Commodities Chart 26Limited Upside For Oil From Here Limited Upside For Oil From Here Limited Upside For Oil From Here Energy (Overweight): Despite the recent mid-March selloff, which was most likely triggered by profit taking, oil prices are still up 25% since the beginning of the year. This happened on the back of the restoration of some economic activity, the OPEC 2.0 coalition maintaining production discipline and therefore keeping supply in check, and the recovery in crude demand drawing down inventory. However, earlier forecasts of the 2021 oil demand recovery were a bit too optimistic amid continuing pandemic uncertainty. There is now, therefore, only limited upside for the oil price, at least this year. Our Commodity & Energy strategists expect the Brent crude price to average $65/bbl this year (Chart 26, panels 1 & 2). Industrial Metals (Neutral): We have previously highlighted that Chinese restocking activity in 2020 was a big factor behind the rally in industrial metals prices. As this eases, and Chinese growth slows, commodity prices might correct somewhat in the short term. However, fundamental changes in demand for alternative energy makes us ask whether we are now entering a new commodities “supercycle” for certain metals (for more analysis of this, see What Our Clients Are Asking on page 11). If history is any guide, however, the commodities bear market may have a little longer to run. Historically, commodity bear cycles lasted 17 years on average and we are only 10 years into this one (panel 3). On balance, therefore, we remain neutral on industrial metals for now. Precious Metals (Neutral): After peaking last August, the gold price has continued to tumble, down almost 19% since and 11% since the beginning of the year. We have been wary of the metal’s lofty valuation – the real price of gold remains near a historical high. The recent rise in real rates put more downside pressure on gold. However, the pullback in prices should provide investors who see gold as a long-term inflation hedge and do not buy the metal with a view to strong absolute performance over the next 12 months, with an attractive entry point. We maintain a slight overweight position to hedge against inflation and unexpected tail risks (panel 4).   Currencies US Dollar Chart 27Vaccinations will help USD and GBP in 2021 Vaccinations will help USD and GBP in 2021 Vaccinations will help USD and GBP in 2021 While we still believe that the dollar is in a major bear market, the current environment could see a significant dollar countertrend. Thanks to its gargantuan fiscal stimulus as well as its relatively fast vaccination campaign, the US is likely to grow faster than the rest of the world during 2021 (Chart 27, panel 1). This dynamic should put further upward pressure on US real rates relative to the rest of the world, helping the dollar in the process. To hedge this risk, we are upgrading the US dollar from underweight to neutral in our currency portfolio. Euro The euro should experience a temporary pullback. Economic activity in Europe, particularly in the service sector is lagging the US – a consequence of Europe’s slow vaccination campaign. This sluggishness in economic activity will translate into a worse real rate differential vis-a-vis the US, dragging the euro lower in the process. Thus, we are downgrading the euro from overweight to neutral. British Pound One currency that might perform well in this environment is the British pound. Consumer spending in the UK was particularly hard hit during the pandemic, since such a high share of it is geared towards social activities like restaurants and hotels (Chart 27, panel 2). However, thanks to Britain’s successful vaccination campaign, UK consumption is likely to experience a sharp snapback. As growth expectations improve, real rates should grind higher vis-à-vis the rest of the world, pushing the pound higher. Moreover, valuations for this currency are attractive: The pound currently trades at a 10% discount to purchasing power parity fair value. As a result, we are upgrading the GBP from neutral to overweight.   Alternatives Chart 28Turning More Positive On Private Equity Turning More Positive On Private Equity Turning More Positive On Private Equity Return Enhancers: In last October’s Quarterly Outlook, we advised investors to prepare for new opportunities in Private Equity (PE) as fund managers look to deploy record high dry power. A gradual return to normality is likely to provide PE funds with a wider range of opportunities, while still allowing them to pick up distressed assets at attractive valuations. This is illustrated by the annualized quarterly returns of PE funds in Q2 and Q3 2020, which reached 43% and 56% respectively. PE funds raised in recession and early-cycle years tend to have a higher median net IRR than those raised in the latter stages of bull markets. This suggests that returns from the 2020 and 2021 vintages should be strong. In recent years, capital flows have increasingly gone to the longer established and larger funds, which tend to have better access to the most attractive deals and therefore record the strongest returns. This trend is likely to continue. Given the time it takes to shift allocations in private assets, we increase our recommended allocation in PE to overweight. Inflation Hedges: It is not clear that inflation will come roaring back in the next couple of years. But what is certain is that market participants are concerned about this risk, which should give a boost to inflation-hedge assets. Given this backdrop, we continue to favor commodity futures (Chart 28, panel 2). In other circumstances, real estate would also have been a beneficiary in this environment. But the slowdown in commercial real estate, as many corporate tenants review whether they need expensive city-center space, makes us remain cautious on real estate. Volatility Dampeners: We continue to favor farmland and timberland over structured products, particularly mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Farmland offers attractive yields and should continue to provide the best portfolio protection in the event of any market distress (Chart 28, panel 3).   Risks To Our View The main risks to our central view are to the downside. Because global equities have risen by 55% over the past 12 months, and with the forward PE of the MSCI ACWI index at 19.5x (Chart 29), the room for price appreciation over the next 12 months is inevitably limited. There are several things that could undermine the economic recovery and equity bull market. The COVID-19 pandemic remains the greatest unknown. The vaccination rollout has been very uneven (Chart 30). New strains, especially the one first identified in Brazil, are highly contagious and people who previously had COVID-19 do not seem to have immunity against them. Behavior once COVID cases decline is also hard to predict. Will people be happy again to fly, attend events in large stadiums, and socialize in crowded bars, or will many remain wary for years? This would undermine the case for a strong rebound in consumption. Chart 29Is Perfection Priced In? Is Perfection Priced In? Is Perfection Priced In? Chart 30Vaccination Has Been Spotty Vaccination Has Been Spotty Vaccination Has Been Spotty Vaccination Has Been Spotty Vaccination Has Been Spotty Vaccination Has Been Spotty   Chart 31China Slowing Again? China Slowing Again? China Slowing Again? As often, a slowdown in China is a risk. The authorities there have signalled a pullback in stimulus, and the credit impulse has begun to slow (Chart 31). Our China strategists think the authorities will be careful not to tighten too drastically (with the fiscal thrust expected to be neutral this year), and that growth will slow only to a benign and moderate rate in the second half.9 But there is a lot of room for policy error. Finally, inflation. As we argue elsewhere in this Quarterly, it will inevitably pick up for technical reasons in March and April, and then again in late 2021 as renewed consumer demand for services (especially travel and entertainment) pushes up prices. The Fed has emphasized that these phenomena are temporary and that underlying inflation will not emerge until the economy returns to full employment. But the market might get spooked for a while when inflation jumps, pushing up long-term interest rates and triggering an equity market correction. Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Report, “The Fed Looks Backward While Markets Look Forward,” dated March 23, 2021. 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Report, “The Fed Looks Backward While Markets Look Forward,” dated March 23, 2021, 3 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Investors’ Guide To Inflation Hedging: How To Invest When Inflation Rises,” dated May 22, 2019. 4 Dominish, E., Florin, N. and Teske, S., 2019, Responsible Minerals Sourcing for Renewable Energy. Report prepared for Earthworks by the Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology Sydney. The optimistic scenario is referred to as “total metals demand” scenario, which assumed current materials intensity and market share continues into the future without recycling or efficiency improvements. This study is based on 2018 production levels and therefore expansion of future production may vary results. 5US Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2021. 6 Chile is estimated to have the largest reserve of lithium. 7 Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Report, “Harder, Better, Faster, Stronger,” dated March 16, 2021. 8 Please see Global Asset Allocation, “Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Playing The Optionality,” dated April 1, 2020. 9 Please see China Investment Strategy Report, “National People’s Congress Sets Tone For 2021 Growth,” dated March 17, 2021. GAA Asset Allocation  

In the latest Special Report we attempted to answer the question of whether this coming rebound in CPI is a paradigm shift that will push the US into a new era of consistently high (i.e. above 3%/annum) core CPI inflation, or is it a merely counter trend inflationary spike within the broader deflationary megatrend? We took a deep dive into six structural forces behind inflation that we identified. Four of those forces were pro-inflationary, while the remaining two were anti-inflationary (Table 1). We also assigned a value on our subjective strength scale for each force. Each value incorporates how quickly a particular force will come to fruition, and how strong it will be over the next 5-to-10 year period. Based on our analysis, we concluded that there are rising odds that the deflationary megatrend has run its course and has reached an inflection point of turning inflationary. Bottom Line: On a structural basis (10-years), it is likely that the deflationary trend is turning. For more details please refer to this Monday’s Special Report. From Deflation To Eventual Inflation From Deflation To Eventual Inflation

In the decade following the global financial crisis, investor concerns that the Fed’s monetary policies have artificially boosted equity market valuation have been mostly overblown. But today, it is now true that US equities are increasingly dependent on persistently low bond yields, as stocks can only avoid near bubble-like relative pricing if yields remain below trend rates of economic growth. Macroeconomic theory and the historical record both support the notion that nominal interest rates are normally in equilibrium when they are roughly equal to the trend rate of nominal income growth. A gap between interest rates and trend rates of growth was indeed justified for a few years following the global financial crisis, but in the few years prior to the pandemic, it is altogether possible that the neutral rate of interest (or “r-star”) was in fact meaningfully higher than academic estimates suggested. In a scenario where the US output gap closes quickly, inflation rises above target, and where permanent damage to the labor market from the pandemic is relatively limited, we expect the narrative of secular stagnation to be challenged and for investor expectations for the neutral rate to move closer to trend rates of economic growth. That would imply that the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield could hypothetically rise above 3%, and possibly as high as 4% or more. Such a shift would push the US equity risk premium back to 2002 levels based on current stock market pricing. This is not necessarily negative for equities, but it is also not clear what equity risk premium investors will require to contend with the myriad risks to the economic outlook that did not exist in the early 2000s. A low ERP that is technically not as low as that of the tech bubble era could thus still threaten stock prices, as T.I.N.A., “There Is No Alternative,” may not prevail. Many investors have questioned what asset allocation strategy should be pursued in a scenario where stock prices and bond yields are no longer positively correlated. While they are not likely to be without cost, options exist for investors to potentially earn positive absolute returns in a scenario where a significant shift in the interest rate outlook threatens both stock and bond prices. Chart II-1Equity Valuation Concerns Have Persisted For The Past Decade... Equity Valuation Concerns Have Persisted For The Past Decade... Equity Valuation Concerns Have Persisted For The Past Decade... For the better part of the last decade, many investors have argued that the Fed’s monetary policies have artificially boosted equity market valuation. Based on the cyclically-adjusted P/E ratio metric originated by Robert Shiller, stocks reached pre-global financial crisis (GFC) multiples in late 2014 and early 2015 (Chart II-1). Based on metrics such as the price-to-sales ratio, stocks rose to pre-GFC valuation in late 2013, and are now even more richly valued than they were at the height of the dotcom bubble. These concerns have mostly occurred in response to absolute changes in stock multiples, but equity valuation cannot be divorced from the prevailing level of interest rates. Relative to bond yields, stocks were extraordinarily cheap for many years following the GFC. Measured by one simple approach to calculating the equity risk premium, the spread between the 12-month forward earnings yield (the inverse of the forward P/E ratio) and the real 10-year Treasury yield, stocks were the cheapest following the GFC that they had been since the mid 1980s, and remain reasonably priced today (Chart II-2). Chart II-2...But Stocks Have Actually Been Cheap Versus Bonds ...But Stocks Have Actually Been Cheap Versus Bonds ...But Stocks Have Actually Been Cheap Versus Bonds The fact that stocks have appeared to be expensive for several years but quite cheap (or reasonably priced) relative to bonds underscores the fact that longer-term bond yields have been extraordinarily low following the global financial crisis. Still, equities were not dependent on low bond yields prior to the pandemic, as illustrated in Chart II-3. The chart highlights the range of 10-year Treasury yields that would be consistent with the pre-GFC equity risk premium range (measured from 2002-2007), alongside the actual 10-year yield and trend nominal GDP growth. The chart shows that for years following the financial crisis, bond yields could have risen to levels well above trend rates of economic growth and stocks would still have been priced in line with pre-crisis norms. This “normal pricing” range for the 10-year declined as the expansion continued, but remained consistent with trend growth rates and above the actual 10-year yield up until the beginning of the pandemic. Chart II-3 also highlights, however, that the circumstances changed last year. The equity risk premium briefly rose at the onset of the pandemic as stocks initially sold off sharply, but then quickly fell as stock prices recovered in response to aggressive fiscal and monetary easing. Today, it is true that US equities are increasingly dependent on persistently low bond yields, as stocks can only avoid bubble-like relative pricing if yields remain below trend rates of economic growth. Chart II-3Now, Stocks Are Increasingly Dependent On Low Bond Yields Now, Stocks Are Increasingly Dependent On Low Bond Yields Now, Stocks Are Increasingly Dependent On Low Bond Yields Prior to the pandemic, most fixed-income investors would have viewed the risk of bond yields rising to trend nominal GDP growth, let alone above it, as minimal. Global investors have come to accept the secular stagnation narrative as described by Larry Summers in November 2013, and have gravitated to academic estimates of the neutral rate of interest (“R-star”) that show a substantial gap between the natural rate and trend real growth (Chart II-4). This view has manifested itself in a decline in surveyed estimates of the long-run Fed funds rate, but at present the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield has pushed well above this survey-derived fair value range (Chart II-5). It is possible that the fiscal response to the pandemic will cause investor views about r-star to evolve even further over the coming 12-24 months, and in this report we explore the potential headwind that such an evolution could present to stock prices at some point – potentially as early as next year. Chart II-4Investors Have Accepted Secular Stagnation, And The View That R-star Is Well Below Trend Rates Of Growth Investors Have Accepted Secular Stagnation, And The View That R-star Is Well Below Trend Rates Of Growth Investors Have Accepted Secular Stagnation, And The View That R-star Is Well Below Trend Rates Of Growth Chart II-5The Market's Views About R-star May Be Shifting The Market's Views About R-star May Be Shifting The Market's Views About R-star May Be Shifting   R-star: A Brief Primer Macroeconomic theory and the historical record both support the notion that nominal interest rates are normally in equilibrium when they are roughly equal to the trend rate of nominal income growth. From the perspective of macro theory, the neutral rate of interest is determined by the supply of and demand for savings. But in practical terms, this implies that the neutral rate should normally be closely linked to the trend rate of economic growth. For example, if interest rates – and thus the cost of capital – were persistently below aggregate income growth, then demand for capital (and thus credit and likely labor demand) should increase as firms seek to profit from the gap between the interest rate and the expected rate of return from real investment. As such, the trend rate of growth acts as a good proxy for the interest rate that will balance the supply and demand for credit during normal economic circumstances. Empirically, academic estimates of r-star closely followed estimates of trend real GDP growth prior to the global financial crisis, as shown in Chart II-4 above. In addition, we noted in our January report that the stance of monetary policy, as defined by the difference between nominal GDP growth and the 10-year Treasury yield, has generally done a good job of explaining the US output gap prior to 2000. This supports the notion that monetary policy is stimulative (restrictive) when bond yields are below (above) trend growth rates. However, in the years following the GFC, investors’ estimates of r-star collapsed, as evidenced by the sharp decline in 5-year / 5-year forward Treasury yields (Chart II-6). This was followed by a decline in primary dealer and FOMC expectations for the long-term Fed funds rate, which investors took as validating their view that the neutral rate of interest has permanently declined. Chart II-6Investors Led The Fed And Others In Expecting A Lower Nominal Neutral Rate Investors Led The Fed And Others In Expecting A Lower Nominal Neutral Rate Investors Led The Fed And Others In Expecting A Lower Nominal Neutral Rate R-star And Trend Growth: Is A Gap Between The Two Really Justified? Chart II-7R-star Likely Did Decline Following The GFC (For A Time) R-star Likely Did Decline Following The GFC (For A Time) R-star Likely Did Decline Following The GFC (For A Time) It seems clear that r-star did indeed decline for a time after the GFC. The US and select European economies suffered a balance sheet recession in 2008/2009 that impacted credit demand for an extended period of time (Chart II-7), and extraordinarily low interest rates for several years did not fuel major credit excesses (at least in the household sector). But as we detailed in a Special Report last year,1 we doubt that the decline in r-star was permanent, for several reasons. The first, and most important, is that there have been at least four deeply impactful non-monetary shocks to both the US and global economies since 2008 that magnified the impact of prolonged household deleveraging and help explain the disconnect between growth and interest rates during the last economic cycle: The euro area sovereign debt crisis Premature fiscal austerity in the US, the UK, and euro area from 2010 – 2012/2014 The US dollar / oil price shock of 2014 The Trump administration’s aggressive use of tariffs beginning in 2018, impacting China but also other developed market economies. Chart II-8Recent Trends In US Private Sector Leverage Do Not Suggest R-star Is Very Low Recent Trends In US Private Sector Leverage Do Not Suggest R-star Is Very Low Recent Trends In US Private Sector Leverage Do Not Suggest R-star Is Very Low Except for the oil price shock of 2014 (which was driven by technological developments and a price war among producers), all of these non-monetary shocks were caused or exacerbated by policymakers – often for political reasons or due to regulatory failures. Second, the trend in US private sector credit growth last cycle does not suggest that r-star fell permanently. Chart II-8 underscores two points: the first is that while US household sector credit contracted for several years following the global financial crisis, it started growing again in 2013 and had largely closed the gap with income growth prior to the pandemic. The second point is that the nonfinancial corporate sector clearly leveraged itself over the course of the last expansion, arguing that interest rates have not in any way been restrictive for businesses. Third, we disagree with a common view in the marketplace that the 2018-2019 period supported the validity of low academic estimates of the neutral rate. Chart II-9 highlights that monetary policy ceased to be stimulative in 2019 according to the Laubach & Williams r-star estimate, which some investors have argued explains the late 2018 equity market selloff, the 2019 slowdown in the US housing market, the inversion of the yield curve, and the global manufacturing recession. Chart II-9Monetary Policy Ceased To Be Stimulative In 2019, According To The LW R-star Estimate Monetary Policy Ceased To Be Stimulative In 2019, According To The LW R-star Estimate Monetary Policy Ceased To Be Stimulative In 2019, According To The LW R-star Estimate But this narrative ignores other important factors that contributed to the slowdown. For example, Chart II-10 highlights that this period of economic weakness exactly coincided with the most intense phase of the Sino-US trade war, as well as a significant slowdown in Chinese credit growth. The chart highlights that the selloff in the US equity market began almost immediately after a surge in the effective tariff rates levied by the two countries against each other, and after the Chinese credit impulse fell three percentage points (from 30% to 27% of GDP). Chart II-10The 2018 Stock Market Selloff Occurred Once Sino-US Tariffs Exploded The 2018 Stock Market Selloff Occurred Once Sino-US Tariffs Exploded The 2018 Stock Market Selloff Occurred Once Sino-US Tariffs Exploded Chart II-11 highlights that interest rates did likely impact the housing market, but that it was the speed at which rates rose that was damaging rather than their level. The chart shows that the rise in mortgage rates from late 2016 to late 2018 was among the largest 2-year increases that has occurred since the early 1980s, so it is unsurprising that the growth in home sales and real residential investment slowed for a time. Additionally, Chart II-12 highlights that the rise in mortgage rates during this period did not cause a downtrend in mortgage credit growth, which only occurred in Q4 2018 in response to the impact of the sharp selloff in the equity market on household net worth. Chart II-11Mortgage Rates Rose Very Significantly From Late 2016 To Late 2018 Mortgage Rates Rose Very Significantly From Late 2016 To Late 2018 Mortgage Rates Rose Very Significantly From Late 2016 To Late 2018 Chart II-12A Record Rise In Mortgage Rates Did Not Crack The Housing Market A Record Rise In Mortgage Rates Did Not Crack The Housing Market A Record Rise In Mortgage Rates Did Not Crack The Housing Market   In short, the late 2018 / 2019 period saw a major global aggregate demand shock occur following an already-established slowdown in Chinese credit growth and a rapid rise in interest rates in the DM world. It is these factors that were likely responsible for the 2019 slowdown in economic growth, not the fact that interest rates reached levels that restricted economic activity on their own. R-star In A Post-Pandemic World Charts II-7 – II-12 above suggest that a gap between interest rates and trend rates of growth was indeed justified for a few years following the global financial crisis, but that a decline in r-star only appeared to be permanent due to persistent, non-monetary policy shocks to aggregate demand. In the few years prior to the pandemic, it is altogether possible that r-star was in fact meaningfully higher than academic estimates suggested. But that is now a counterfactual assertion, as the pandemic has transformed the outlook for interest rates and bond yields in conflicting ways. A 10% decline in the level of real output was the most intensely negative non-monetary shock to aggregate demand since the 1930s (Chart II-13), and we agree that another depression would have occurred without extraordinary government assistance. The economic damage caused by the pandemic certainly does not work in favor of a higher neutral rate, and we highlighted in Section 1 of our report that the Fed expects there to be some lingering and persistent slack in the labor market even once the pandemic is over. Chart II-13Without Major Monetary And Fiscal Policy Support, The Pandemic Would Probably Have Caused A Depression Without Major Monetary And Fiscal Policy Support, The Pandemic Would Probably Have Caused A Depression Without Major Monetary And Fiscal Policy Support, The Pandemic Would Probably Have Caused A Depression Chart II-14A Huge Increase In Government Transfers And Spending Is Underway April 2021 April 2021 On the other hand, Larry Summers, the chief proponent of the theory of secular stagnation, has argued for several years that increased fiscal spending was warranted in order to address an imbalance between private sector savings and investment. Summers himself now characterizes US fiscal policy as the “least responsible” that he has seen over the past 40 years, because of too-large government spending that risks overheating the economy (Chart II-14). Summers’ critique rests in large part on the fact that new government spending has not occurred in the form of investment (to balance out the existence of excess savings), but is instead providing transfers to households that in many cases have already accumulated significant excess savings. But the key point for investors is that the pandemic has completely shifted the narrative about fiscal spending, from “arguably insufficient for several years following the global financial crisis” to now “risking a dramatic overheating of the economy.” Some elements of Summers’ criticism of the Biden administration’s fiscal policy are justified, particularly the policy of large direct transfer payments to workers who have suffered no loss in employment or income as a result of the pandemic. Despite this, as detailed in Section 1 of our report, we are more sanguine about the risks of aggressive overheating for three reasons: it does seem likely that some portion of the spending on services that has been “missing” over the past year will never return or will be slow to return, some of the excess savings that have accumulated will not be immediately (or ever) spent, and the rise in consumer inflation expectations that has occurred over the past year has happened from an extremely low starting point and has yet to even rise above its post-GFC range. The low odds that we assign to dangerously above-target inflation over the coming 12-24 months does not, however, mean that investors’ expectations for r-star will stay low. For right or for wrong, the US government has aggressively dis-saved over the past year, in an environment where low expectations for the neutral rate were anchored by a view of excessive private sector savings and insufficient demand from governments. In a scenario where the US output gap closes quickly, inflation rises modestly above target, and where permanent damage to the labor market from the pandemic is relatively limited, it seems reasonable to conclude that the narrative of secular stagnation will be challenged and that investor expectations for the neutral rate will converge towards trend rates of economic growth. That would imply that the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield could hypothetically rise above 3%, possibly as high as 4% or more. This is not our base case view, but it will be an important possibility to monitor as the decisive end to social distancing and other pandemic control measures draws nearer. Investment Conclusions A rise in the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield does not, in and of itself, suggest that 10-year Treasury yields will rise to levels that would threaten a significant decline in stock prices. The Fed does not control the long-end of the Treasury curve, but it does exert a very strong influence on the short-end. For example, were the Fed to follow the median current projection of FOMC participants and refrain from raising interest rates until sometime after 2023, it would limit how high current 10-year Treasury yields could rise. But it is not difficult to envision plausible scenarios where the 10-year Treasury yield rises above the range consistent with the pre-GFC US equity risk premium. Chart II-15 presents three hypothetical fair value paths for the 10-year yield assuming a mid-2022 liftoff date and a 4% terminal Fed funds rate for the following three scenarios: Chart II-1510-Year Yields Could Rise Meaningfully Further If Investors Shift Their Expectations For R-star 10-Year Yields Could Rise Meaningfully Further If Investors Shift Their Expectations For R-star 10-Year Yields Could Rise Meaningfully Further If Investors Shift Their Expectations For R-star The Fed raises rates at a pace of 1% (4 hikes) per year, with a term premium of 10 basis points The Fed raises rates at a pace of 1% (4 hikes) per year, with a term premium of 50 basis points The Fed raises rates at a pace of 1.5% (6 hikes) per year, with a term premium of 50 basis points In the first scenario, based on the current US 12-month forward P/E ratio, the fair value of the 10-year Treasury yield would rise above the range consistent with a reasonable ERP in the middle of 2022, the liftoff point assumed in all three scenarios. In the second and third scenarios, the US equity ERP would already be quite low. When using the late 1999 / early 2000 bubble period as a reference point, even the scenarios shown in Chart II-15 are not very threatening to stock prices. Given current equity market pricing, the third scenario would take the US equity risk premium back to mid 2002 levels, which were still meaningfully higher than during the peak of the bubble. And that is assuming an earlier liftoff than the market currently expects, a faster pace of rate hikes than experienced during the last economic cycle, and a very meaningful increase in the market’s expectations for the neutral rate. But it is not clear what equity risk premium investors will require to contend with the myriad risks to the economic outlook that did not exist in the early 2000s. For example, equity investors are today faced with a riskier policy environment than existed 20 years ago in the US and in other developed economies that is at least partially driven by populist sentiment, potentially impacting earnings via lower operating margins or higher taxes. These or other risks existed at several points over the past decade and T.I.N.A. (“There Is No Alternative”) prevailed, but that occurred precisely because the equity risk premium was very elevated. A low ERP that is technically not as low as what prevailed during the tech bubble era could thus still threaten stock prices, raising the specter of negative absolute returns from stocks and nominal government bonds for a period of time, beginning potentially at or in the lead-up to the first Fed rate hike. Chart II-16There Are Alternatives To A Traditional 60/40 Portfolio In A Rising Rate Environment There Are Alternatives To A Traditional 60/40 Portfolio In A Rising Rate Environment There Are Alternatives To A Traditional 60/40 Portfolio In A Rising Rate Environment Many investors have questioned what asset allocation strategy should be pursued in a scenario where stock prices and bond yields are no longer positively correlated. Chart II-16 provides some perspective on the question, by comparing the total return of a 60/40 stock/bond portfolio to a strategy involving the opportunistic redeployment of cash into stocks. The strategy rule maintains a 50/50 stock/cash allocation during normal market conditions, but it then shifts the entire cash allocation into equities following a 15% selloff in the stock market. The portfolio is shifted back to a 50/50 allocation once stocks rise to a new rolling 1-year high. The chart highlights that 60/40 balanced portfolio-style returns may be achievable with cash as the diversifier without a significant reduction in the Sharpe ratio. In fact, the strategy has the effect of lowering average volatility due to prolonged periods of comparatively lower equity exposure, although this occurs at the cost of higher volatility during periods of high market stress (precisely when investors most want protection from volatility). But the bottom line for investors is that while they are not likely to be without cost, options exist for investors to potentially earn positive absolute returns in a scenario where a significant shift in the interest rate outlook threatens both stock and bond prices. As noted above, this remains a risk to our view rather than our expectation, but we will continue to monitor the potential threat posed to stock prices as the pandemic draws to a decisive close later this year. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1  2020-03-20 GIS SR “Revisiting The Neutral Rate Of Interest: A Contrarian View In A Time Of Crisis.”

Highlights Extremely accommodative fiscal policy and a rapid pace of vaccination puts the US on track to close its output gap by the end of the year. The situation is different in Europe, and the euro area economy will likely continue to underperform the US until at least the summer. Investors are now unusually more hawkish than the Fed, whose caution is driven by the expectation of some lingering and persistent slack in the labor market even once the pandemic is over. The Fed’s rate projections, coupled with the extraordinary size of the American Rescue Plan, have stoked investor concerns about a significant rise in inflation. For inflation to rise dangerously above the Fed’s target, the US would likely need to see a persistently strong and positive output gap, and/or a major upward shift in expectations among consumers and firms. We expect a meaningful recovery in inflation this year, perhaps to above-target levels even without factoring in transitory supply-chain effects, but probably not to levels that investors deem to be “out of control.” Over the coming 6 to 12 months, a comparatively sanguine perspective on inflation supports a bullish view on stocks and an overweight stance towards equities within a multi-asset portfolio. We recommend that investors maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration, and overweight US speculative over investment-grade corporate bonds. The fact that Europe may lag growth-wise for a few months could continue to impact regional equity performance as well as the trend in the dollar over the coming 0-3 months. But over a 6-12 month time horizon, we continue to favor global ex-US vs. US stocks, and expect the dollar to be lower than it is today. A Brighter Light At The End Of The Tunnel Chart I-1Even Better Than Some Optimists Would Have Predicted Even Better Than Some Optimists Would Have Predicted Even Better Than Some Optimists Would Have Predicted Over the past 4-6 weeks, the US has continued to make incredible progress in vaccinating its population against COVID-19. Chart I-1 highlights that the pace of vaccination is now well within the range required for herd immunity to be in place by the end of the third quarter. If this pace continues at an average of 2.5 million doses per day, the US will have vaccinated 90% of its population by the end of September (if it is determined that the vaccine is safe to give to children). And these calculations assume the continuation of a two-dose regime, meaning that the eventual rollout of Johnson & Johnson's Janssen vaccine – which requires only one dose and has shown to be extremely effective at preventing severe illness and death – could shorten the time to herd immunity rates of vaccination among adults even further. The situation is clearly different in Europe. The vaccination progress in several European countries is woefully behind that of the US and the UK (Chart I-2), and per capita cases in the euro area have again risen significantly above that of the US (Chart I-3). This reality motivated last week’s news that the European Union is reportedly planning on banning exports of the AstraZeneca vaccine for a period of time, as European policymakers grow increasingly concerned about the potential economic consequences of lengthened or additional pandemic control measures over the coming few months. Chart I-2Europe Is Badly Lagging The Vaccine Race… April 2021 April 2021 There was at least some positive economic news from Europe this month, as reflected by the flash manufacturing and services PMIs (Chart I-4). The euro area manufacturing PMI surpassed that of the US this month, reflecting that the prospects for goods-producing companies in Europe remain solidly linked to the strong global manufacturing cycle. Services, on the other hand, have been the weak spot in Europe, having remained below the boom/bust line since last summer (in contrast to the US). The March services PMI highlighted that this gap is now starting to narrow, although the euro area economy will likely continue to underperform the US until at least the summer. Chart I-3...And It Is Starting To Show ...And It Is Starting To Show ...And It Is Starting To Show Chart I-4Some Closure Of The Services Gap, But Still A Ways To Go Some Closure Of The Services Gap, But Still A Ways To Go Some Closure Of The Services Gap, But Still A Ways To Go   The underperformance of the European services sector over the past nine months has been due in part to more severe pandemic control measures, but also a comparatively timid fiscal policy. The IMF’s October Fiscal Monitor highlighted that the US had provided roughly eight percentage points more of GDP in above-the-line fiscal measures versus the European Union as a whole, and that was before the US December 2020 relief bill and this month’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan (ARP) act were passed. The CBO estimates that the ARP will result in about US$1 trillion in outlays in 2021, which is roughly 5% of nominal GDP. Consequently, Chart I-5 highlights that consensus expectations now suggest that the output gap will be marginally positive by the end of the year, with the Fed’s most recent forecast implying that real GDP will be more than 1% above the CBO’s estimate of potential output. Chart I-5The US Output Gap Will Likely Be Closed By The End Of This Year The US Output Gap Will Likely Be Closed By The End Of This Year The US Output Gap Will Likely Be Closed By The End Of This Year The Fed Versus The Market Despite this, the Fed held pat during this month’s FOMC meeting and did not validate market expectations of rate hikes beginning in early 2023. Chart I-6 highlights the Fed funds rate path over the coming years as implied by the OIS curve, alongside the Fed’s median projection of the Fed funds rate. This means that investors are now more hawkish than the Fed, which is the opposite of what has typically prevailed since the global financial crisis. Chart I-6The Market Is Now, Unusually, More Hawkish Than The Fed The Market Is Now, Unusually, More Hawkish Than The Fed The Market Is Now, Unusually, More Hawkish Than The Fed Fed Chair Jerome Powell implied during the March 17 press conference that some FOMC participants were unwilling to change their projections for the path of interest rates based purely on a forecast, which argues that the median dot in the Fed’s “dot plot” will shift higher in the second half of the year if participants’ growth and inflation forecasts come to fruition. But Charts I-7A and I-7B suggest that the Fed’s caution is also driven by the expectation of some lingering and persistent slack in the labor market even once the pandemic is over. Chart I-7AA Positive Output Gap Implies… April 2021 April 2021 Chart I-7B…An Unemployment Rate Below NAIRU April 2021 April 2021   The charts highlight the historical relationship between the output gap and the deviation of NAIRU from the unemployment rate, from 2000 and 2010. In both cases, the charts show that the unemployment rate would be below the CBO’s estimate of NAIRU at the end of this year (roughly 4.5%) given the CBO’s estimate for potential (i.e. full employment) GDP and the Fed's forecast for growth. However, the Fed is forecasting that the unemployment rate will essentially be at NAIRU, which is itself above the Fed’s longer-run unemployment rate projection of 4%. As such, the Fed does not see the unemployment rate falling to “full employment” levels this year, a precondition for the onset of rate normalization. Investors should note that the relationships shown in Charts I-7A and I-7B suggest that the unemployment rate will be closer to 3-3.5% at the end of this year if the Fed’s growth forecast is correct, which would constitute full employment based on the Fed’s 4% unemployment rate target. The difference between a 3-3.5% unemployment rate and the Fed’s estimate of 4.5% translates to a gap of roughly 1.5-2.5 million jobs at the end of this year, which underscores that the Fed expects either a significant shift in temporary to permanent unemployment or an influx of unemployed workers back into the labor force who don’t quickly find jobs once social distancing ends and pandemic restrictions are no longer required. Chart I-8The Full Employment Level Of GDP Has Not Been Significantly Revised The Full Employment Level Of GDP Has Not Been Significantly Revised The Full Employment Level Of GDP Has Not Been Significantly Revised There are three possible circumstances that would resolve this seeming contradiction. The first is that the Fed’s estimate for growth this year is simply too high, and that the output gap will be close to zero at the end of the year (i.e., more in line with consensus market expectations). The second is that the CBO is understating the level of GDP that is consistent with full employment, namely that potential GDP is higher than what they currently project. But Chart I-8 shows that the CBO’s current estimate for potential output at the end of this year is only 0.4% below what it had estimated prior to the pandemic, which is smaller than the positive gap implied by the Fed’s growth estimate for this year (roughly 1.2%). The third possibility is that the Fed is overestimating the extent to which the pandemic will cause permanent damage to the labor market. As we noted in our February report, even once social distancing is no longer required, it does seem likely that some portion of the spending on services that has been “missing” over the past year will never return. While it seems reasonable to expect that the gap in spending on hospitality and travel will close quickly once the health situation allows, it also seems reasonable to expect that some service areas, particularly retail, will experience a permanent loss in demand owing to durable shifts in consumer behavior that occurred during the pandemic (greater familiarity and use of online shopping, a permanent reduction of some magnitude in commuting, etc). A gap of 1.5-2.5 million jobs accounts for roughly 10-15% of pre-pandemic employment in retail trade, or 4-7% of the sum of retail trade, leisure & hospitality, and other services. It is possible that permanent job losses or significantly deferred job recovery of this size will occur, but it is far from clear that it will. Were job losses / deferred jobs recovery of this magnitude to not materialize, it would suggest that the US will reach full employment earlier than the Fed is currently projecting, and would significantly increase the odds that the Fed will begin to taper its asset purchases and/or raise interest rates at some point next year – which is earlier than investors currently expect. For Now, Dangerously Above-Target Inflation Is Unlikely Fed projections of a 0% Fed funds rate for the next 2 1/2 years, coupled with the extraordinary size of the American Rescue Plan, have understandably stoked investor concerns about a significant rise in inflation. Larry Summers’ recent interview with Bloomberg was emblematic of the concern, during which he criticized the Biden administration’s fiscal policy as the “least responsible” that the US has experienced in four decades and warned of the potential inflationary consequences of overheating the economy.1 It is true that the Federal Reserve is explicitly aiming to generate a temporary overshoot of inflation relative to its target, the Biden administration’s fiscal plan is legitimately large, and there is a tremendous pool of excess savings that could be deployed later this year once the pandemic is essentially over. Clearly, the risks of overheating must be higher than they have been in the past. But from our perspective, out-of-control inflation over the coming 12-24 months would very likely necessitate one of two things to occur, and possibly both: US consumers decide to spend an overwhelmingly large amount of the excess savings that have been accumulated. Main street expectations for consumer prices rise sharply, prompted by a public discussion about the likelihood of a shifting inflation regime. Our view is rooted in the examination of the modern-day Phillips Curve that we presented in our January report, which considers both the impact of economic/labor market slack and inflation expectations as a driver of actual inflation. The modern-day Phillips Curve posits that expectations act as the trend for inflation, and slack in the economy determines whether actual inflation is above or below that baseline. Chart I-9 highlights that the output gap worked well prior to the global financial crisis at explaining the difference between actual and exponentially-smoothed inflation, the latter acting as a long-history proxy for expectations. Pre-GFC, the chart highlights that there have been only two exceptions to the relationship that concerned the magnitude rather than the direction of inflation. Post-GFC, the relationship deviated substantially, but in a way that implied that actual inflation was too strong during the last expansion, not too weak – particularly during the early phase of the economic recovery. This likely occurred because expectations initially stayed very well anchored due to the Fed’s strong record of maintaining low and stable inflation, but ultimately declined due to a persistently negative output gap as well as in response to the 2014 collapse in oil prices (Chart I-10). Chart I-9Pre-GFC, The Output Gap Generally Explained Inflation Surprises Pre-GFC, The Output Gap Generally Explained Inflation Surprises Pre-GFC, The Output Gap Generally Explained Inflation Surprises Chart I-10Inflation Expectations Eventually Succumbed Post-GFC To Collapsing Energy Prices Inflation Expectations Eventually Succumbed Post-GFC To Collapsing Energy Prices Inflation Expectations Eventually Succumbed Post-GFC To Collapsing Energy Prices Thus, for inflation to rise dangerously above the Fed’s target, the US would likely need to see a persistently strong and positive output gap, and/or a major upward shift in expectations among consumers and firms. Chart I-11 highlights that the amount of excess savings that have accumulated as a percentage of GDP does indeed significantly exceed the magnitude of the output gap, but some of those savings have been and will be invested in financial markets (boosting valuation), some will be used to pay down debt, some will eventually be spent on international travel (boosting services imports), and some will likely be permanently held as deposits in anticipation of future tax increases. And while long-term household expectations for prices have risen since the passing of the CARES act last year, the rise has merely unwound the decline that took place following the 2014 oil price collapse (Chart I-12). Chart I-11A Huge Pool Of Savings Exists, But Not All Of It Will Be Spent A Huge Pool Of Savings Exists, But Not All Of It Will Be Spent A Huge Pool Of Savings Exists, But Not All Of It Will Be Spent Chart I-12Long-Term Consumer Inflation Expectations Have Risen From A Very Low Base Long-Term Consumer Inflation Expectations Have Risen From A Very Low Base Long-Term Consumer Inflation Expectations Have Risen From A Very Low Base   For now, this framework points to a meaningful recovery in inflation this year, perhaps to above-target levels even without factoring in transitory supply-chain effects, but probably not to levels that investors deem to be “out of control.” Investment Conclusions Over the coming 6 to 12 months, a comparatively sanguine perspective on inflation supports a bullish view on stocks and an overweight stance towards equities within a multi-asset portfolio. While the Fed is likely to shift in a hawkish direction compared with its current projections, it is highly unlikely to become meaningfully more hawkish than current market expectations unless economic growth and the recovery in the labor market is much stronger than the Fed or the market is projecting. In fact, even if the market’s expectations for the first Fed rate hike shift to mid-2022 over the coming several months, Chart I-13 highlights that the impact on the equity market is likely to be minimal unless investors shift up their expectations for the terminal Fed funds rate. The chart presents a fair value estimate for the 10-year Treasury yield based on the OIS-implied path of the Fed funds rate out to December 2024, and assumes that short rates ultimately rise to the Fed’s long-term Fed funds rate projection of 2.5%. The second fair value series assumes that the shape of the OIS curve stays the same, but shifts closer by 6 months. Chart I-13The Market’s Assumed Rate Hike Path And Terminal Rate Are Not Threatening For Stocks April 2021 April 2021 The chart underscores that the 10-year yield will rise to at most between 2-2.2% by the end of the year based on these scenarios. A shift forward in the timing of Fed rate hikes will impact the short end of the curve, but the long end will remain relatively unchanged if terminal rate expectations stay constant and the term premium on long-term bonds remains near zero. These levels would in no way be economically damaging nor threatening to stock market valuation. It is possible, however, that investor expectations for the neutral rate of interest (“r-star”) will shift higher once the pandemic is over, and we explore this risk to stocks in Section 2 of our report. For now, this remains a risk to our view rather than our expectation, but it is likely to remain an important possibility to monitor as the decisive end to social distancing and other pandemic control measures draws nearer. Within fixed income, we recommend that investors maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration even though investors are already pricing in a more hawkish path for the Fed funds rate. First, Chart I-13 highlighted that yields at the long end of the curve are likely to continue to move modestly higher this year even if the projected path for the Fed funds rate remains relatively unchanged. But more importantly, barring a substantially negative development on the health or vaccine front that prolongs the pandemic, the risk appears to be clearly to the upside in terms of the timing of the first Fed rate hike and the terminal Fed funds rate. As such, from a risk-reward perspective, a long duration stance remains unattractive. We would also recommend overweighting US speculative over investment-grade corporate bonds, as spreads are not as historically depressed for the former than the latter (Chart I-14). Finally, in terms of the dimensions of equity market performance and the dollar, we recommend that investors overweight global ex-US equities vs. the US, overweight value vs. growth, overweight cyclicals vs. defensives, and overweight small vs. large caps. We are also bearish on the dollar on a 12-month time horizon. However, there are two caveats that investors should bear in mind. First, global cyclicals versus defensives (especially in equally-weighted terms) as well as small versus large caps have already mostly normalized not just the impact of the pandemic but as well that of the 2018-2019 Trump trade war (Chart I-15). We would expect, at best, modest further gains from both positions this year. Chart I-14Speculative-Grade Corporate Bonds Are Less Expensive Than Investment-Grade Speculative-Grade Corporate Bonds Are Less Expensive Than Investment-Grade Speculative-Grade Corporate Bonds Are Less Expensive Than Investment-Grade Chart I-15Going Forward, Expect More Modest Gains From Cyclicals And Small Caps Going Forward, Expect More Modest Gains From Cyclicals And Small Caps Going Forward, Expect More Modest Gains From Cyclicals And Small Caps   Second, the fact that Europe may lag growth-wise for a few months could continue to impact regional equity performance as well as the trend in the dollar on a 0-3 month time horizon. The US dollar is typically a counter-cyclical currency, but there have been exceptions to that rule. And historically, exceptions have tended to revolve around periods when US growth has been quite strong, as is currently the case (Chart I-16). A continued counter-trend rally in the dollar is thus possible over the course of the next few months, but we would expect USD-EUR to be lower than current levels 12 months from now. Chart I-16A Short-Term Counter-Trend Dollar Move Is Possible A Short-Term Counter-Trend Dollar Move Is Possible A Short-Term Counter-Trend Dollar Move Is Possible A counter-trend dollar move could also correspond with a period of US outperformance versus global ex-US, or at a minimum, a period of flat performance when global ex-US stocks would normally outperform. Our China strategists expect that the Chinese credit impulse will decelerate later this year (Chart I-17), which would weigh on EM stocks and heighten the importance of European equities in driving global ex-US outperformance. European equity outperformance, in turn, will likely necessitate the outperformance of euro area financials. Chart I-18 highlights that euro area equity underperformance versus the US last year was mostly a tech story, but today there is little difference between the relative performance of euro area stocks overall versus indexes that exclude the broadly-defined technology sector. In both cases, the euro area index is roughly 10% below its US counterpart relative to pre-pandemic levels, which exactly matches the extent to which euro area financials have underperformed. Chart I-17A Slowing Chinese Credit Impulse Means EM Equities Will Struggle To Outperform A Slowing Chinese Credit Impulse Means EM Equities Will Struggle To Outperform A Slowing Chinese Credit Impulse Means EM Equities Will Struggle To Outperform Chart I-18Euro Area Financials Need To Outperform For Europe To Outperform Euro Area Financials Need To Outperform For Europe To Outperform Euro Area Financials Need To Outperform For Europe To Outperform   Euro area financials have demonstrated very poor fundamental performance over the past decade, but they are likely to outperform for some period once the European vaccination campaign gains enough traction to alter the disease’s transmission and hospitalization dynamics. Chart I-19 highlights that euro area bank 12-month forward earnings have further room to recover to pre-pandemic levels than for banks in the US, and Chart I-20 highlights that euro area banks trade at their deepest price-to-book discount versus their US peers since the euro area financial crisis. Chart I-19Euro Area Bank Earnings Have Catch-Up Potential Euro Area Bank Earnings Have Catch-Up Potential Euro Area Bank Earnings Have Catch-Up Potential Chart I-20Euro Area Banks Are Extremely Cheap Versus The US Euro Area Banks Are Extremely Cheap Versus The US Euro Area Banks Are Extremely Cheap Versus The US   Thus, while euro area and global ex-US equities may not outperform on the back of rising global stock prices over the coming few months, investors focused on a 6-12 month time horizon should respond by increasing their allocation to European stocks and to further reduce dollar exposure. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst March 31, 2021 Next Report: April 29, 2021 II. R-star, And The Structural Risk To Stocks In the decade following the global financial crisis, investor concerns that the Fed’s monetary policies have artificially boosted equity market valuation have been mostly overblown. But today, it is now true that US equities are increasingly dependent on persistently low bond yields, as stocks can only avoid near bubble-like relative pricing if yields remain below trend rates of economic growth. Macroeconomic theory and the historical record both support the notion that nominal interest rates are normally in equilibrium when they are roughly equal to the trend rate of nominal income growth. A gap between interest rates and trend rates of growth was indeed justified for a few years following the global financial crisis, but in the few years prior to the pandemic, it is altogether possible that the neutral rate of interest (or “r-star”) was in fact meaningfully higher than academic estimates suggested. In a scenario where the US output gap closes quickly, inflation rises above target, and where permanent damage to the labor market from the pandemic is relatively limited, we expect the narrative of secular stagnation to be challenged and for investor expectations for the neutral rate to move closer to trend rates of economic growth. That would imply that the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield could hypothetically rise above 3%, and possibly as high as 4% or more. Such a shift would push the US equity risk premium back to 2002 levels based on current stock market pricing. This is not necessarily negative for equities, but it is also not clear what equity risk premium investors will require to contend with the myriad risks to the economic outlook that did not exist in the early 2000s. A low ERP that is technically not as low as that of the tech bubble era could thus still threaten stock prices, as T.I.N.A., “There Is No Alternative,” may not prevail. Many investors have questioned what asset allocation strategy should be pursued in a scenario where stock prices and bond yields are no longer positively correlated. While they are not likely to be without cost, options exist for investors to potentially earn positive absolute returns in a scenario where a significant shift in the interest rate outlook threatens both stock and bond prices. Chart II-1Equity Valuation Concerns Have Persisted For The Past Decade... Equity Valuation Concerns Have Persisted For The Past Decade... Equity Valuation Concerns Have Persisted For The Past Decade... For the better part of the last decade, many investors have argued that the Fed’s monetary policies have artificially boosted equity market valuation. Based on the cyclically-adjusted P/E ratio metric originated by Robert Shiller, stocks reached pre-global financial crisis (GFC) multiples in late 2014 and early 2015 (Chart II-1). Based on metrics such as the price-to-sales ratio, stocks rose to pre-GFC valuation in late 2013, and are now even more richly valued than they were at the height of the dotcom bubble. These concerns have mostly occurred in response to absolute changes in stock multiples, but equity valuation cannot be divorced from the prevailing level of interest rates. Relative to bond yields, stocks were extraordinarily cheap for many years following the GFC. Measured by one simple approach to calculating the equity risk premium, the spread between the 12-month forward earnings yield (the inverse of the forward P/E ratio) and the real 10-year Treasury yield, stocks were the cheapest following the GFC that they had been since the mid 1980s, and remain reasonably priced today (Chart II-2). Chart II-2...But Stocks Have Actually Been Cheap Versus Bonds ...But Stocks Have Actually Been Cheap Versus Bonds ...But Stocks Have Actually Been Cheap Versus Bonds The fact that stocks have appeared to be expensive for several years but quite cheap (or reasonably priced) relative to bonds underscores the fact that longer-term bond yields have been extraordinarily low following the global financial crisis. Still, equities were not dependent on low bond yields prior to the pandemic, as illustrated in Chart II-3. The chart highlights the range of 10-year Treasury yields that would be consistent with the pre-GFC equity risk premium range (measured from 2002-2007), alongside the actual 10-year yield and trend nominal GDP growth. The chart shows that for years following the financial crisis, bond yields could have risen to levels well above trend rates of economic growth and stocks would still have been priced in line with pre-crisis norms. This “normal pricing” range for the 10-year declined as the expansion continued, but remained consistent with trend growth rates and above the actual 10-year yield up until the beginning of the pandemic. Chart II-3 also highlights, however, that the circumstances changed last year. The equity risk premium briefly rose at the onset of the pandemic as stocks initially sold off sharply, but then quickly fell as stock prices recovered in response to aggressive fiscal and monetary easing. Today, it is true that US equities are increasingly dependent on persistently low bond yields, as stocks can only avoid bubble-like relative pricing if yields remain below trend rates of economic growth. Chart II-3Now, Stocks Are Increasingly Dependent On Low Bond Yields Now, Stocks Are Increasingly Dependent On Low Bond Yields Now, Stocks Are Increasingly Dependent On Low Bond Yields Prior to the pandemic, most fixed-income investors would have viewed the risk of bond yields rising to trend nominal GDP growth, let alone above it, as minimal. Global investors have come to accept the secular stagnation narrative as described by Larry Summers in November 2013, and have gravitated to academic estimates of the neutral rate of interest (“R-star”) that show a substantial gap between the natural rate and trend real growth (Chart II-4). This view has manifested itself in a decline in surveyed estimates of the long-run Fed funds rate, but at present the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield has pushed well above this survey-derived fair value range (Chart II-5). It is possible that the fiscal response to the pandemic will cause investor views about r-star to evolve even further over the coming 12-24 months, and in this report we explore the potential headwind that such an evolution could present to stock prices at some point – potentially as early as next year. Chart II-4Investors Have Accepted Secular Stagnation, And The View That R-star Is Well Below Trend Rates Of Growth Investors Have Accepted Secular Stagnation, And The View That R-star Is Well Below Trend Rates Of Growth Investors Have Accepted Secular Stagnation, And The View That R-star Is Well Below Trend Rates Of Growth Chart II-5The Market's Views About R-star May Be Shifting The Market's Views About R-star May Be Shifting The Market's Views About R-star May Be Shifting   R-star: A Brief Primer Macroeconomic theory and the historical record both support the notion that nominal interest rates are normally in equilibrium when they are roughly equal to the trend rate of nominal income growth. From the perspective of macro theory, the neutral rate of interest is determined by the supply of and demand for savings. But in practical terms, this implies that the neutral rate should normally be closely linked to the trend rate of economic growth. For example, if interest rates – and thus the cost of capital – were persistently below aggregate income growth, then demand for capital (and thus credit and likely labor demand) should increase as firms seek to profit from the gap between the interest rate and the expected rate of return from real investment. As such, the trend rate of growth acts as a good proxy for the interest rate that will balance the supply and demand for credit during normal economic circumstances. Empirically, academic estimates of r-star closely followed estimates of trend real GDP growth prior to the global financial crisis, as shown in Chart II-4 above. In addition, we noted in our January report that the stance of monetary policy, as defined by the difference between nominal GDP growth and the 10-year Treasury yield, has generally done a good job of explaining the US output gap prior to 2000. This supports the notion that monetary policy is stimulative (restrictive) when bond yields are below (above) trend growth rates. However, in the years following the GFC, investors’ estimates of r-star collapsed, as evidenced by the sharp decline in 5-year / 5-year forward Treasury yields (Chart II-6). This was followed by a decline in primary dealer and FOMC expectations for the long-term Fed funds rate, which investors took as validating their view that the neutral rate of interest has permanently declined. Chart II-6Investors Led The Fed And Others In Expecting A Lower Nominal Neutral Rate Investors Led The Fed And Others In Expecting A Lower Nominal Neutral Rate Investors Led The Fed And Others In Expecting A Lower Nominal Neutral Rate R-star And Trend Growth: Is A Gap Between The Two Really Justified? Chart II-7R-star Likely Did Decline Following The GFC (For A Time) R-star Likely Did Decline Following The GFC (For A Time) R-star Likely Did Decline Following The GFC (For A Time) It seems clear that r-star did indeed decline for a time after the GFC. The US and select European economies suffered a balance sheet recession in 2008/2009 that impacted credit demand for an extended period of time (Chart II-7), and extraordinarily low interest rates for several years did not fuel major credit excesses (at least in the household sector). But as we detailed in a Special Report last year,2 we doubt that the decline in r-star was permanent, for several reasons. The first, and most important, is that there have been at least four deeply impactful non-monetary shocks to both the US and global economies since 2008 that magnified the impact of prolonged household deleveraging and help explain the disconnect between growth and interest rates during the last economic cycle: The euro area sovereign debt crisis Premature fiscal austerity in the US, the UK, and euro area from 2010 – 2012/2014 The US dollar / oil price shock of 2014 The Trump administration’s aggressive use of tariffs beginning in 2018, impacting China but also other developed market economies. Chart II-8Recent Trends In US Private Sector Leverage Do Not Suggest R-star Is Very Low Recent Trends In US Private Sector Leverage Do Not Suggest R-star Is Very Low Recent Trends In US Private Sector Leverage Do Not Suggest R-star Is Very Low Except for the oil price shock of 2014 (which was driven by technological developments and a price war among producers), all of these non-monetary shocks were caused or exacerbated by policymakers – often for political reasons or due to regulatory failures. Second, the trend in US private sector credit growth last cycle does not suggest that r-star fell permanently. Chart II-8 underscores two points: the first is that while US household sector credit contracted for several years following the global financial crisis, it started growing again in 2013 and had largely closed the gap with income growth prior to the pandemic. The second point is that the nonfinancial corporate sector clearly leveraged itself over the course of the last expansion, arguing that interest rates have not in any way been restrictive for businesses. Third, we disagree with a common view in the marketplace that the 2018-2019 period supported the validity of low academic estimates of the neutral rate. Chart II-9 highlights that monetary policy ceased to be stimulative in 2019 according to the Laubach & Williams r-star estimate, which some investors have argued explains the late 2018 equity market selloff, the 2019 slowdown in the US housing market, the inversion of the yield curve, and the global manufacturing recession. Chart II-9Monetary Policy Ceased To Be Stimulative In 2019, According To The LW R-star Estimate Monetary Policy Ceased To Be Stimulative In 2019, According To The LW R-star Estimate Monetary Policy Ceased To Be Stimulative In 2019, According To The LW R-star Estimate But this narrative ignores other important factors that contributed to the slowdown. For example, Chart II-10 highlights that this period of economic weakness exactly coincided with the most intense phase of the Sino-US trade war, as well as a significant slowdown in Chinese credit growth. The chart highlights that the selloff in the US equity market began almost immediately after a surge in the effective tariff rates levied by the two countries against each other, and after the Chinese credit impulse fell three percentage points (from 30% to 27% of GDP). Chart II-10The 2018 Stock Market Selloff Occurred Once Sino-US Tariffs Exploded The 2018 Stock Market Selloff Occurred Once Sino-US Tariffs Exploded The 2018 Stock Market Selloff Occurred Once Sino-US Tariffs Exploded Chart II-11 highlights that interest rates did likely impact the housing market, but that it was the speed at which rates rose that was damaging rather than their level. The chart shows that the rise in mortgage rates from late 2016 to late 2018 was among the largest 2-year increases that has occurred since the early 1980s, so it is unsurprising that the growth in home sales and real residential investment slowed for a time. Additionally, Chart II-12 highlights that the rise in mortgage rates during this period did not cause a downtrend in mortgage credit growth, which only occurred in Q4 2018 in response to the impact of the sharp selloff in the equity market on household net worth. Chart II-11Mortgage Rates Rose Very Significantly From Late 2016 To Late 2018 Mortgage Rates Rose Very Significantly From Late 2016 To Late 2018 Mortgage Rates Rose Very Significantly From Late 2016 To Late 2018 Chart II-12A Record Rise In Mortgage Rates Did Not Crack The Housing Market A Record Rise In Mortgage Rates Did Not Crack The Housing Market A Record Rise In Mortgage Rates Did Not Crack The Housing Market   In short, the late 2018 / 2019 period saw a major global aggregate demand shock occur following an already-established slowdown in Chinese credit growth and a rapid rise in interest rates in the DM world. It is these factors that were likely responsible for the 2019 slowdown in economic growth, not the fact that interest rates reached levels that restricted economic activity on their own. R-star In A Post-Pandemic World Charts II-7 – II-12 above suggest that a gap between interest rates and trend rates of growth was indeed justified for a few years following the global financial crisis, but that a decline in r-star only appeared to be permanent due to persistent, non-monetary policy shocks to aggregate demand. In the few years prior to the pandemic, it is altogether possible that r-star was in fact meaningfully higher than academic estimates suggested. But that is now a counterfactual assertion, as the pandemic has transformed the outlook for interest rates and bond yields in conflicting ways. A 10% decline in the level of real output was the most intensely negative non-monetary shock to aggregate demand since the 1930s (Chart II-13), and we agree that another depression would have occurred without extraordinary government assistance. The economic damage caused by the pandemic certainly does not work in favor of a higher neutral rate, and we highlighted in Section 1 of our report that the Fed expects there to be some lingering and persistent slack in the labor market even once the pandemic is over. Chart II-13Without Major Monetary And Fiscal Policy Support, The Pandemic Would Probably Have Caused A Depression Without Major Monetary And Fiscal Policy Support, The Pandemic Would Probably Have Caused A Depression Without Major Monetary And Fiscal Policy Support, The Pandemic Would Probably Have Caused A Depression Chart II-14A Huge Increase In Government Transfers And Spending Is Underway April 2021 April 2021 On the other hand, Larry Summers, the chief proponent of the theory of secular stagnation, has argued for several years that increased fiscal spending was warranted in order to address an imbalance between private sector savings and investment. Summers himself now characterizes US fiscal policy as the “least responsible” that he has seen over the past 40 years, because of too-large government spending that risks overheating the economy (Chart II-14). Summers’ critique rests in large part on the fact that new government spending has not occurred in the form of investment (to balance out the existence of excess savings), but is instead providing transfers to households that in many cases have already accumulated significant excess savings. But the key point for investors is that the pandemic has completely shifted the narrative about fiscal spending, from “arguably insufficient for several years following the global financial crisis” to now “risking a dramatic overheating of the economy.” Some elements of Summers’ criticism of the Biden administration’s fiscal policy are justified, particularly the policy of large direct transfer payments to workers who have suffered no loss in employment or income as a result of the pandemic. Despite this, as detailed in Section 1 of our report, we are more sanguine about the risks of aggressive overheating for three reasons: it does seem likely that some portion of the spending on services that has been “missing” over the past year will never return or will be slow to return, some of the excess savings that have accumulated will not be immediately (or ever) spent, and the rise in consumer inflation expectations that has occurred over the past year has happened from an extremely low starting point and has yet to even rise above its post-GFC range. The low odds that we assign to dangerously above-target inflation over the coming 12-24 months does not, however, mean that investors’ expectations for r-star will stay low. For right or for wrong, the US government has aggressively dis-saved over the past year, in an environment where low expectations for the neutral rate were anchored by a view of excessive private sector savings and insufficient demand from governments. In a scenario where the US output gap closes quickly, inflation rises modestly above target, and where permanent damage to the labor market from the pandemic is relatively limited, it seems reasonable to conclude that the narrative of secular stagnation will be challenged and that investor expectations for the neutral rate will converge towards trend rates of economic growth. That would imply that the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield could hypothetically rise above 3%, possibly as high as 4% or more. This is not our base case view, but it will be an important possibility to monitor as the decisive end to social distancing and other pandemic control measures draws nearer. Investment Conclusions A rise in the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield does not, in and of itself, suggest that 10-year Treasury yields will rise to levels that would threaten a significant decline in stock prices. The Fed does not control the long-end of the Treasury curve, but it does exert a very strong influence on the short-end. For example, were the Fed to follow the median current projection of FOMC participants and refrain from raising interest rates until sometime after 2023, it would limit how high current 10-year Treasury yields could rise. But it is not difficult to envision plausible scenarios where the 10-year Treasury yield rises above the range consistent with the pre-GFC US equity risk premium. Chart II-15 presents three hypothetical fair value paths for the 10-year yield assuming a mid-2022 liftoff date and a 4% terminal Fed funds rate for the following three scenarios: Chart II-1510-Year Yields Could Rise Meaningfully Further If Investors Shift Their Expectations For R-star 10-Year Yields Could Rise Meaningfully Further If Investors Shift Their Expectations For R-star 10-Year Yields Could Rise Meaningfully Further If Investors Shift Their Expectations For R-star The Fed raises rates at a pace of 1% (4 hikes) per year, with a term premium of 10 basis points The Fed raises rates at a pace of 1% (4 hikes) per year, with a term premium of 50 basis points The Fed raises rates at a pace of 1.5% (6 hikes) per year, with a term premium of 50 basis points In the first scenario, based on the current US 12-month forward P/E ratio, the fair value of the 10-year Treasury yield would rise above the range consistent with a reasonable ERP in the middle of 2022, the liftoff point assumed in all three scenarios. In the second and third scenarios, the US equity ERP would already be quite low. When using the late 1999 / early 2000 bubble period as a reference point, even the scenarios shown in Chart II-15 are not very threatening to stock prices. Given current equity market pricing, the third scenario would take the US equity risk premium back to mid 2002 levels, which were still meaningfully higher than during the peak of the bubble. And that is assuming an earlier liftoff than the market currently expects, a faster pace of rate hikes than experienced during the last economic cycle, and a very meaningful increase in the market’s expectations for the neutral rate. But it is not clear what equity risk premium investors will require to contend with the myriad risks to the economic outlook that did not exist in the early 2000s. For example, equity investors are today faced with a riskier policy environment than existed 20 years ago in the US and in other developed economies that is at least partially driven by populist sentiment, potentially impacting earnings via lower operating margins or higher taxes. These or other risks existed at several points over the past decade and T.I.N.A. (“There Is No Alternative”) prevailed, but that occurred precisely because the equity risk premium was very elevated. A low ERP that is technically not as low as what prevailed during the tech bubble era could thus still threaten stock prices, raising the specter of negative absolute returns from stocks and nominal government bonds for a period of time, beginning potentially at or in the lead-up to the first Fed rate hike. Chart II-16There Are Alternatives To A Traditional 60/40 Portfolio In A Rising Rate Environment There Are Alternatives To A Traditional 60/40 Portfolio In A Rising Rate Environment There Are Alternatives To A Traditional 60/40 Portfolio In A Rising Rate Environment Many investors have questioned what asset allocation strategy should be pursued in a scenario where stock prices and bond yields are no longer positively correlated. Chart II-16 provides some perspective on the question, by comparing the total return of a 60/40 stock/bond portfolio to a strategy involving the opportunistic redeployment of cash into stocks. The strategy rule maintains a 50/50 stock/cash allocation during normal market conditions, but it then shifts the entire cash allocation into equities following a 15% selloff in the stock market. The portfolio is shifted back to a 50/50 allocation once stocks rise to a new rolling 1-year high. The chart highlights that 60/40 balanced portfolio-style returns may be achievable with cash as the diversifier without a significant reduction in the Sharpe ratio. In fact, the strategy has the effect of lowering average volatility due to prolonged periods of comparatively lower equity exposure, although this occurs at the cost of higher volatility during periods of high market stress (precisely when investors most want protection from volatility). But the bottom line for investors is that while they are not likely to be without cost, options exist for investors to potentially earn positive absolute returns in a scenario where a significant shift in the interest rate outlook threatens both stock and bond prices. As noted above, this remains a risk to our view rather than our expectation, but we will continue to monitor the potential threat posed to stock prices as the pandemic draws to a decisive close later this year. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst III. Indicators And Reference Charts BCA’s equity indicators highlight that the “easy” money from expectations of an eventual end to the pandemic have already been made. Our technical, valuation, and sentiment indicators are very extended, highlighting that investors should expect positive but more modest returns from stocks over the coming 6-12 months. Our monetary indicator has aggressively retreated from its high last year, reflecting a meaningful recovery in government bond yields. The indicator remains above the boom/bust line, however, highlighting that monetary policy remains supportive for risky asset prices. Forward equity earnings already price in a complete earnings recovery, but for now there is no meaningful sign of waning forward earnings momentum. Net revisions remain very strong, and positive earnings surprises have ticked slightly lower from their strongest levels on record. Within a global equity portfolio, US stocks have recently risen versus global ex-US, reflecting a countertrend rise in the US dollar and a lagging vaccination campaign in Europe. We expect a deceleration in the Chinese credit impulse later this year, which will weigh on EM stocks and heighten the importance of European equities in driving global ex-US outperformance. European equity outperformance, in turn, will likely necessitate the outperformance of euro area financials. The US 10-Year Treasury yield has risen well above its 200-day moving average. Long-dated yields are technically stretched to the upside, but our valuation index highlights that bonds are still extremely expensive and that yields could move higher over the cyclical investment horizon. The recent bounce in the US dollar has reflected improved relative US growth expectations, but also previously oversold levels. The dollar may continue to strengthen on a 0-3 month time horizon, but we expect it to be lower in 12 months’ time than it is today. Commodity prices have recovered not just back to pre-pandemic levels, but also back to 2014 levels. This underscores that many commodity prices are extended, and may be due for a breather once the Chinese credit impulse begins to decline. US and global LEIs remain in a solid uptrend, and global manufacturing PMIs are strong. This underscores that the global demand for goods is robust, and that output is below pre-pandemic levels in most economies because of very weak services spending. The latter will recover significantly later this year, as social distancing and other pandemic control measures disappear. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings US Earnings US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations US Treasurys And Valuations US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market US Labor Market US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption US Consumption US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing US Housing US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1  “Summers Sees ‘Least Responsible’ Fiscal Policy in 40 Years,” Bloomberg News, March 20, 2021. 2  2020-03-20 GIS SR “Revisiting The Neutral Rate Of Interest: A Contrarian View In A Time Of Crisis.”

Highlights Duration: The Treasury market has moved quickly to price-in expectations of a strong economic recovery, while the Fed has been more cautious about moving its own rate forecasts. We think that the market’s expectations are well founded and that the Fed will eventually move its dots higher. Stick with below-benchmark portfolio duration. Corporate Bonds: Junk spreads already embed a significant decline in the default rate during the next 12 months, but reasonable assumptions for corporate debt growth and profit growth suggest that this outcome will be achieved. Investors should continue to favor spread product over Treasuries and continue to hold a down-in-quality bias within corporate credit. Economy: Disposable personal income fell in February compared to January, but it has risen massively since last year’s passage of the CARES act. The large pool of accumulated household savings will help drive economic growth as the pandemic recedes. Feature There is widespread anticipation that the economic recovery is about to kick into high gear. To us, this anticipation seems rather well founded. The United States’ vaccination roll-out is proceeding quickly and the federal government is pitching in with a tsunami of fiscal support. But it’s important to acknowledge that this positive outlook is still a forecast, one that has not yet been validated by hard economic data. The risk for investors is obvious. Market prices have already moved to price-in a significant amount of economic optimism and they are vulnerable in a situation where that optimism doesn’t pan out. In this week’s report we look at how much economic optimism is already discounted in both the Treasury and corporate bond markets. We conclude that the most likely scenario is one where the economic data are strong enough to validate current pricing in both markets. Investors should keep portfolio duration below-benchmark and continue to favor spread product over Treasuries, with a down-in-quality bias. Optimism In The Treasury Market The most obvious way to illustrate the economic optimism currently embedded in Treasury securities is to look at the rate hike expectations priced into the yield curve relative to the Fed’s own projections (Chart 1). The market is currently looking for four 25 basis point rate hikes by the end of 2023 while only seven out of 18 FOMC participants expect any hikes at all by then. Chart 1Market More Hawkish Than Fed Market More Hawkish Than Fed Market More Hawkish Than Fed We addressed the wide divergence between market and FOMC expectations in last week’s report.1 We noted that the main reason for the divergence is that while the market is focused on expectations for rapid economic growth the Fed is making a concerted effort to rely only on hard economic data. This sentiment was echoed by Fed Governor Lael Brainard in a speech last week:2 The focus on achieved outcomes rather than the anticipated outlook is central to the Committee’s guidance regarding both asset purchases and the policy rate. The emphasis on outcomes rather than the outlook corresponds to the shift in our monetary policy approach that suggests policy should be patient rather than preemptive at this stage in the recovery. The upshot of the Fed’s excessively cautious approach is that its interest rate projections will move toward the market’s as the hard economic data strengthen during the next 6-12 months, keeping the bond bear market intact. As evidence for this view, consider that the US Economic Surprise Index remains at an extremely high level, consistent with a rising 10-year Treasury yield (Chart 2). Further, 12-month core inflation rates are poised to jump significantly during the next two months as the weak monthly prints from March and April 2020 fall out of the 12-month sample (Chart 3). Then, pipeline pressures in both the goods and service sectors will ensure that inflation remains relatively high for the balance of the year (Chart 3, bottom panel).3   Chart 2Data Surprises Remain Positive Data Surprises Remain Positive Data Surprises Remain Positive Chart 3Inflation About To Jump Inflation About To Jump Inflation About To Jump Finally, the hard economic data still do not reflect the truly massive amount of fiscal stimulus that is about to hit the US economy. Chart 4 illustrates how large last year’s fiscal stimulus was compared to what was seen during recent recessions, and this chart does not yet incorporate the recently passed $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan (~8.7% of GDP) or the second infrastructure focused reconciliation bill that is likely to pass this fall. Our political strategists expect 2021’s second budget bill to be similar in size to the American Rescue Plan though tax hikes will also be included and, due to the infrastructure-focused nature of the bill, the spending will be more spread out over a number of years.4  Chart 4The Era Of Big Government Is Back That Uneasy Feeling That Uneasy Feeling Bottom Line: The Treasury market has moved quickly to price-in expectations of a strong economic recovery, while the Fed has been more cautious about moving its own rate forecasts. We think that the market’s expectations are well founded and that the Fed will eventually move its dots higher. Stick with below-benchmark portfolio duration.  Optimism In The Corporate Bond Market Chart 5What's Priced In Junk Spreads? What's Priced In Junk Spreads? What's Priced In Junk Spreads? The way we assess the amount of economic optimism baked into the corporate bond market is to calculate the 12-month default rate that is implied by the current High-Yield Index spread (Chart 5). We need to make a few assumptions to do this. First, we assume that investors require an excess spread of at least 100 bps from the index after subtracting 12-month default losses. In past research, we’ve noted that High-Yield has a strong track record of outperforming duration-matched Treasuries when the realized excess spread is above 100 bps. High-Yield underperforms Treasuries more often than it outperforms when the realized excess spread is below 100 bps.5 Second, we must assume a recovery rate for defaulted bonds. The 12-month recovery rate tends to fluctuate between 20% and 60%, with higher levels seen when the default rate is low and lower levels when the default rate is high (Chart 5, bottom panel). For this week’s analysis, we assume a range of recovery rates, from 20% to 50%, though we expect the recovery rate to be closer to the top-end of that range during the next 12 months, given our expectations for a rapid economic recovery. With these assumptions in mind, we calculate that the High-Yield Index is fairly priced for a default rate between 2.8% and 4.5% for the next 12 months (Chart 5, panel 2). If the default rate falls into that range, or below, then we would expect High-Yield bonds (and corporate credit more generally) to outperform a duration-matched position in Treasuries. If the default rate comes in above 4.5%, then we would expect Treasuries to beat High-Yield. To figure out whether the default rate will meet the market’s expectations, we turn to a simple model of the 12-month speculative grade default rate that is based on nonfinancial corporate sector gross leverage (aka total debt over pre-tax profits) and C&I lending standards (Chart 6). If we make forecasts for nonfinancial corporate 12-month debt growth and pre-tax profit growth, we can let the model tell us what default rate to anticipate. Chart 6Default Rate Model Default Rate Model Default Rate Model Debt Growth Expectations We expect corporate debt growth to be quite weak during the next 12 months (Chart 7). This is mainly because firms raised a huge amount of debt last spring when the Fed and federal government made it very attractive to do so. Now, we are emerging from a recession and the nonfinancial corporate sector already holds an elevated cash balance (Chart 7, bottom panel). Debt growth was also essentially zero during the past six months, and very low (or even negative) debt growth is a common occurrence right after a peak in the default rate (Chart 7, top 2 panels). It is true that the nonfinancial corporate sector’s Financing Gap – the difference between capital expenditures and retained earnings – is no longer negative (Chart 7, panel 3). But it is also not high enough to suggest that firms need to significantly add debt. Chart 7Debt Growth Will Be Slow Debt Growth Will Be Slow Debt Growth Will Be Slow For our default rate calculations, we assume that corporate debt growth will be between 0% and 8% during the next 12 months. However, our sense is that it will be closer to 0% than to 8%. Profit Growth Expectations Chart 8Profit Growth Will Surge Profit Growth Will Surge Profit Growth Will Surge Our expectation is that profit growth will surge during the next 12 months, as is the typical pattern when the economy emerges from recession. Year-over-year profit growth peaked at 62% in 2002 following the 2001 recession, and it peaked at 51% in 2010 coming out of the Global Financial Crisis (Chart 8). More specifically, if we model nonfinancial corporate sector pre-tax profit growth on real GDP and then assume 6.5% real GDP growth in 2021, in line with the Fed’s median forecast, then we get a forecast for 31% profit growth in 2021. If we use a higher real GDP growth forecast of 10%, in line with our US Political Strategy service's "maximum impact" scenario, then our model forecasts pre-tax profit growth of 40% for 2021.6 Default Rate Expectations Table 1 puts together different estimates for profit growth and debt growth and maps them to a range of 12-month default rate outcomes, as implied by our Default Rate Model. For example, profit growth of 30% and debt growth between 0% and 8% in 2021 maps to a 12-month default rate of between 3.2% and 3.8%. This falls comfortably within the range of 2.8% to 4.5% that is consistent with current market pricing. Table 1Default Rate Scenarios That Uneasy Feeling That Uneasy Feeling In fact, for our model to output a default rate range that is higher than what is priced into junk spreads, we need to assume 2021 profit growth of 20% or less. This is quite far below the estimates we made above based on reasonable forecasts for real GDP. Bottom Line: Junk spreads already embed a significant decline in the default rate during the next 12 months, but reasonable assumptions for corporate debt growth and profit growth suggest that this outcome will be achieved. Investors should continue to favor spread product over Treasuries and continue to hold a down-in-quality bias within corporate credit. Economy: Household Income Update Last week’s personal income and spending report showed that disposable household income was lower in February than in January, a decline that is entirely attributable to the fact that the $600 checks to individuals that were part of the December stimulus bill were mostly delivered in January. These “Economic Impact Payments” totaled $138 billion in January and only $8 billion in February. This drop-off of $130 billion almost exactly matches the $128 billion monthly decline seen in disposable personal income. Consumer spending also fell in February compared to January, a result that likely owes a lot to February’s bad weather conditions, particularly the winter storm that caused much of Texas to lose power. Though spending has recovered a lot from last year’s lows, it remains significantly below its pre-COVID trend (Chart 9). In contrast to spending, disposable income has skyrocketed since the pandemic started last March. Chart 10 shows that disposable personal income has increased 8% in the 12 months since COVID struck compared to the 12 months prior. Moreover, it shows that the increase is entirely attributable to fiscal relief. Chart 9Households Have Excess ##br##Savings Households Have Excess Savings Households Have Excess Savings Chart 10Disposable Personal Income Growth And Its Drivers That Uneasy Feeling That Uneasy Feeling The result of below-trend spending and a surge in income is a big jump in the savings rate. The personal savings rate was 13.6% in February, well above its average pre-COVID level (Chart 9, panel 3), as it has been since the pandemic began. This consistently elevated savings rate has led to US households building up a $1.9 trillion buffer of excess savings compared to a pre-pandemic baseline (Chart 9, bottom panel). Perhaps the biggest question for economic growth is whether households will deploy this large pool of savings as the economy re-opens or whether they will continue to hoard it. In this regard, the individual checks that were part of last year’s CARES act are the most likely to be hoarded, as these checks were distributed to all Americans making less than $99,000. The income support provisions in this month’s American Rescue Plan are much more targeted. Only individuals making below $75,000 will receive a $1,400 check and the bill also includes expanded unemployment benefits and a large amount of aid for state & local governments. All in all, we anticipate that a substantial amount of household excess savings will be spent once the vaccination effort has made enough progress that people feel safe venturing out. This will lead to strong economic growth and higher inflation in the second half of 2021.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Fed Looks Backward While Markets Look Forward”, dated March 23, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20210323b.htm 3 For more details on our outlook for core inflation in 2021 please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Limit Rate Risk, Load Up On Credit”, dated March 16, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Political Strategy Second Quarter Outlook 2021, “From Stimulus To Structural Reform”, dated March 24, 2021, available at usps.bcaresearch.com 5 For more details on this excess spread analysis please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “Trading The US Corporate Bond Market In A Time Of Crisis”, dated March 31, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 The "maximum impact" scenario assumes that the full amount of authorized outlays from the American Rescue Plan will be spent, with 60% of the outlays spent in FY2021. For more details see US Political Strategy Second Quarter Outlook 2021, “From Stimulus To Structural Reform”, dated March 24, 2021, available at usps.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

The inflation/deflation debate has been dominating the news flow and we are compelled to offer our thoughts in two-part series of Special Reports on this widely discussed, but also widely misunderstood topic. Over the past year, we have been inundated with countless questions about our outlook on inflation given the dual monetary and fiscal stimuli that have been ongoing since Covid-19 hit (Chart 1). We take this opportunity to provide detailed answers on everything inflation in this series of Special Reports. Specifically, in this first report we focus on the long-term and structural forces behind US core CPI inflation. We go in depth into the drivers behind the current deflationary trend and also examine what other variables might break that trend in the future. We also try to ignore the medium-term outlook because the inflation story is well-known as the financial media is littered with charts that slice and dice the ISM manufacturing release in every possible way showing that inflation will rebound. Hence, there is no disagreement about the medium-term path for the core CPI inflation. Chart 12020 Stimuli 2020 Stimuli 2020 Stimuli The important question that we look to answer in this Special Report is whether this rebound is a paradigm shift that will push the US into a new era of consistently high (i.e. above 3%/annum) core CPI inflation, or is it a merely counter trend inflationary spike within the broader deflationary megatrend? Laying The Groundwork Before we wrestle with the structural forces behind inflation, first we must get the question of quantitative easing (QE) and its effects on the real economy and inflation out of the way. Undoubtedly, QE is an integral part of any discussion about the real-word and/or financial asset price inflation, and while it tickles the public’s imagination with hyperinflationary fears, the reality is that those fears are largely misplaced (Chart 2). In fact, pundits have established a consensus: “QE only affects the financial economy as it increases bank reserves that can never escape in the real economy. On the other hand, fiscal stimulus affects the real economy and can cause genuine inflation.” There clearly hasn’t been any material inflation since the GFC, so the argument of “QE only affecting the financial economy” appears to be correct, but at closer look there is room for a different interpretation. What is important to understand is that QE is nothing but a tool, sometimes a signaling tool, in the Fed’s arsenal, and like any tool, it can be used in different ways. Chart 2Boogeyman? (Part I) Tinkering With Inflation: Outlook (Part I) Tinkering With Inflation: Outlook  The fact that there has not been any material real-world inflation since the housing bubble is neither because QE is structurally deflationary nor because it “cannot touch” the real economy, but because policy makers chose to use the QE tool to rescue creditors (the financial sector) rather than debtors (the real economy) during the GFC. Delving deeper in the Great Recession, the banks were largely undercapitalized with cash accounting for a tiny portion of overall assets and Treasury holdings being at historic lows (Chart 3). The rest of the assets were tied to loans and other risky securities. Once NINJA loans and other subprime loans along with the derivative CLOs/CDOs house of cards began imploding, the banking sector could not stomach the losses owing to the nonexistent cash buffer, and the entire system went into insolvency mode. This is when the Fed stepped in with QE (and the Treasury with TARP in order to recapitalize the banks) to bail out the nervous system of the US economy by boosting reserves and giving freshly printed money to the banks in exchange for their Treasurys, MBS and other risky securities. By providing support to the banking system, the Fed was counterbalancing a deflationary financial industry shutdown (the Richard Koo balance sheet type recession) rather than injecting an inflationary real economic stimulus. As a result, nearly all of the newly created money was stuck in the financial system in the form of new reserves, and as far as the real economy was concerned, no new money entered directly into the real world. This is how the consensus of “QE only affecting the financial economy” was formed, and why we did not observe a long-lasting rise in CPI despite all of the GFC-brought about stimuli. Chart 3Banks Were Well-capitalized Banks Were Well-capitalized Banks Were Well-capitalized Fast-forward to today, and the backdrop could not be more different. The banking sector was well capitalized, so doing an aggressive QE to boost reserves and to stimulate the financial sector would have only provided marginal benefits. The deflationary shock came through the real economy, not the financial economy, meaning that a real (i.e. fiscal) stimulus was needed. Once again, the QE tool comes to the rescue. This time however, QE was also used to finance Main Street stimulus programs as the Fed bought long dated Treasury (and other) securities that pushed interest rates to rock bottom levels and helped facilitate government stimulus spending. Consequently, a more meaningful fraction of QE money reached Main Street and had an effect on the real economy and was not just locked in new reserves. As a reminder, when rates fall to zero and the Fed embarks on QE, the lines between monetary and fiscal policies get blurred. When QE (instead of the foreign or private sectors) is used to facilitate government expenditures, which later on gets distributed into the real economy, QE can provide inflationary support and can reach the real economy. Chart 42008 Versus Today 2008 Versus Today 2008 Versus Today Perhaps the best way to illustrate the difference between 2008 and 2020 is by showing M2 money supply data. The spike in M2 data in 2020 dwarfs the one in 2008; in 2020 QE money reached the real economy and ended up in private sector’s bank accounts (thus contributing to M2 growth), whereas in 2008 QE money was mainly locked in bank reserves. True the money multiplier and M2 money stock velocity are still in hibernation, and were we to see a sustainable inflationary impulses both of these indicators would have to show signs of life (Chart 4). So does this mean that there are grounds for longer-term inflationary concerns since in 2020 QE actually reached the real economy? To answer this question, we now dig deeper into the secular inflation forces and split them in two camps: pro-inflationary and anti-inflationary. Pro-Inflationary Driver #1: The Buenos Aires Consensus Our view since last June has been that fiscal deficits are here to stay as far as the eye can see and the shift from the Washington to the Buenos Aires Consensus1 is a paradigm shift with staying power. The most important long-term consequence of the Buenos Aires Consensus will be higher inflation. And we are not talking just the asset price kind – which investors have enjoyed over the past decade – but of the more traditional flavor: consumer price inflation. Crudely put, as long as fiscal support remains in place (proverbial helicopter drop, Chart 5) after the pandemic is long forgotten it can serve as a meaningful catalyst for structural inflation, instead of being a one-off counterbalancing short-term boost. To reiterate just how much more powerful fiscal spending is outside of a recession, we conduct a labor market analysis and show that a large percentage of the present-day stimulus is being used to counterbalance the deflationary pandemic shock, rather than contributing to driving inflation higher. Table 1 shows our proxy for total payroll losses incurred by America households as a direct result of the pandemic. Our estimate is $501 billion from March 2020 until today. Chart 5Helicopter Checks Helicopter Checks Helicopter Checks The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget also publishes detailed statistics on the dollar flow of every pandemic stimulus program to a specific economic sector. As of today, US households received $1,400 billion, but some of the stimulus categories simply defer a payment that households still have to make in the future, instead of injecting brand-new money. After stripping those categories out, we arrive to a cleaner number of roughly $1,000 billion – that is how much new money US households received. Next, we subtract our total payroll loss proxy resulting into a net inflow of approximately $500 billion or 2.3% of 2020 US GDP. This is a respectable sum and 2.3% is significant. However, it has one major drawback. The 2.3% GDP stimulus number assumes that every single dollar was actually spent into the real economy, which we know is not true. Table 1The Counterbalancing Effect (Part I) Tinkering With Inflation: Outlook (Part I) Tinkering With Inflation: Outlook A recent New York Fed study on how American households used their stimulus money concluded that: “36.4% of the stimulus money was used to boost savings, 34.5% to paydown debt, 25.9% was spent on essentials and non-essentials, and finally the rest of the money (3.2%) was donated”. It is worth noting that this study also looked at the expected spending patterns for the new round of stimulus checks, and the results were generally the same. To obtain a more realistic number of how much of the net $500 billion inflow actually entered the economy, we multiply it by 25.9% (how much money was used on spending according to the NY Fed) and arrive at a better estimate of $130 billion or 0.6% of 2020 US GDP, which is by no means an astronomical number that will shatter into pieces the current deflationary megatrend. This empirical exercise demonstrated how a large percentage of the present-day stimulus is being used to counterbalance the deflationary pandemic shock. However, if our thesis of a Buenos Aires Consensus in which governments spend even outside of recessions pans out, then there will not be the aforementioned counterbalancing effect, and all the fiscal dollars will go straight to contributing to rising inflation until the deflationary megatrend is broken. Pro-Inflationary Driver #2: Demographics In the long run, inflation tends to oscillate alongside a country’s demographics. More specifically, it is the relative size of the three age cohorts (young, working-age, and old) that plays a key role in driving inflation. People who are in the working-age cohort are at their peak productivity, which implies that their contribution to the production of goods and services is greater than the demand for new credit they generate, meaning that they produce a deflationary pull. The opposite is true for the other two age cohorts (the young and the old). Neither one is contributing to the production of goods & services, while both still generate new credit in the economy (for example student loans), and the end result is an inflationary pull. Hence, it is the interplay between these three age cohorts that serves as a structural force behind inflation. To put some numbers behind this conceptual framework, we turn our attention to a paper “The enduring link between demography and inflation” written by Mikael Juselius and Előd Takáts. In the paper, the authors conduct rigorous cross-country analysis and find that indeed, people 30-60 years of age (the working-age cohort) exert deflationary pressure, while the other two cohorts contribute to rising inflation. Chart 6 plots the age-structure effect for the US against inflation. The authors also quantified that over the 40-year period (1970-2010) the increase in the working-age population (due to baby-boomers) has lowered inflationary pressures by almost five percentage points in the US (Chart 7). Meanwhile, by extrapolating the likely path of demographic data by 40 years (2010-2050), the authors observed a shift from deflationary to inflationary age pressure mainly due to the incoming increase in the proportion of the old cohort. Their estimate of the expected pull on inflation in the US will be approximately two and a half percent (Chart 8). Chart 6Demographics Are A Mighty Force Demographics Are A Mighty Force Demographics Are A Mighty Force Chart 7From Deflationary... (Part I) Tinkering With Inflation: Outlook (Part I) Tinkering With Inflation: Outlook Chart 8...To Inflationary (Part I) Tinkering With Inflation: Outlook (Part I) Tinkering With Inflation: Outlook Going forward, US demographics will be more inflationary than deflationary. Pro-Inflationary Driver #3: De-Globalization The “apex of globalization” or “de-globalization” is our third pro-inflationary driver. We have written about this theme extensively at BCA Research and it is the mega-theme of our sister Geopolitical Strategy (GPS) service. Odds are high that countries will continue looking inward as the US sustains its aggressive trade policy, China’s trend growth slows, and US-China strategic tensions intensify. Chart 9 shows that we are at the conclusion of a period of tranquility. Pax Americana underpinned globalization as much as Pax Britannica before it. The US is in a relative decline after decades of geopolitical stability allowed countries like China to rise to “great power” status and rivals like Russia to recover from the chaos of the 1990s. Chart 9The Tide Is Turning The Tide Is Turning The Tide Is Turning De-globalization has become the consensus since the election of Donald Trump. But Trump is not the prophet of de-globalization; he is its acolyte. And now, President Biden is continuing in Trump’s footsteps. Globalization is ending because of structural factors, not cyclical ones. And its decline was pre-written into its “source code.” Three factors stand at the center of this assessment, first outlined in a 2014 GPS Special Report, “The Apex Of Globalization – All Downhill From Here”: multipolarity, populism and protectionism. Events have since confirmed this view. The three pillars of globalization are the free movement of goods, capital, and people across national borders. We expect to see marginally less of each in the future and this should prove inflationary. Pro-Inflationary Driver #4: US Dollar Bear Market The path of least resistance is lower for the US dollar and it represents our final pro-inflationary driver. Chart 10 highlights the ebbs and flows of the trade-weighted US dollar since it floated in the early-1970s. The DXY index has moved in six-to-ten year bull and bear markets. The most recent trough was during the depths of the Great Recession, while the peak was in early-2020. If history repeats, eventually the dollar will mean revert lower in the 2020s, especially given the fiscal profligacy (Buenos Aires Consensus) of the current administration that may continue into 2024. Chart 10Time For A Downcycle? Time For A Downcycle? Time For A Downcycle? True, the US dollar remains the global reserve currency, but that exorbitant privilege is clearly fraying on the edges as the balance-of-payments dynamics are heading in the wrong direction. While the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) expects some normalization in the US budget deficit over the next 4 years since the pandemic shock will be over, looking further into the future the CBO forecasts a further reacceleration in deficit spending. Assuming a stable to grinding lower current account deficit in the next several years, the path of least resistance is lower for the currency. BCA’s US dollar model also corroborates the twin deficit message and suggests ample structural downside for the USD (Chart 11).  The apex of globalization will also hurt the greenback in a reflexive manner. In a world where all the markets are integrated, borrowers in EM nations often use the reserve currency to issue liabilities at a lower cost. This boosts the demand by EM central banks for US dollar reserves to protect domestic banking systems funded in USD. Moreover, some countries like China implement pegs (both official and unofficial) to the US dollar in order to maintain their competitiveness and export their production surpluses to the US. To do so they buy US assets. If the global economy becomes more fragmented and the Sino-US relationship continues to deteriorate structurally as we expect, then these sources of demand for the dollar will recede. Overlay the widening US current account deficit, and you have the perfect recipe for a depreciating trade-weighted US dollar. Importantly, the 1970s is an interesting period to examine in more detail. As the Nixon administration floated the greenback this aggravated the inflationary pressures (Chart 12) that were building all along the 1960s when the US adopted the Mutually Assured Destruction Doctrine along with the Cold War space race that eventually saw the US landing on the moon in 1969. Chart 11A Bearish Outlook A Bearish Outlook A Bearish Outlook Chart 12The Greenback In The 1970s The Greenback In The 1970s The Greenback In The 1970s A lower greenback is synonymous with rising commodity and import prices and given that the US is the consumer of last resort (70% PCE), the commodity/import price pendulum will swing from a deflationary to an inflationary force. Anti-Inflationary Driver #1: Technology’s Creative Destruction Schumpeter’s “creative destruction” forces dominate technology companies in general and Silicon Valley in particular, and represent our fist anti-inflationary driver. These creative destruction forces in the tech industry are inherently deflationary. As a result, tech business models have evolved to thrive during disinflationary periods. Chart 13 shows the software sector deflator derived from national accounts, and since the mid-1980s more often than not it has been mired in deflation. US semiconductor prices, computer hardware prices, and almost any tech related category from the PCE, PPI and CPI releases looks more or less the same as software, underscoring that this is a technology sector wide modus operandi. More recently, Uber Technologies and Airbnb, to name a few, continually bring existing capacity online and that adds another layer of deflation forces at work in select industries they operate in. Tack on technology infiltrating finance and soon the extremely opaque health care services industry that comprises almost 20% of US GDP or $4tn and a deflationary impulse will likely reverberate across these large segments of the US economy that have managed to sustain high pricing power over the decades. Chart 13Technological Progress Is Deflationary Technological Progress Is Deflationary Technological Progress Is Deflationary Thus, these creative destruction processes remain alive and well in tech land and will continue to exert deflationary/disinflationary pressure (of the good kind) on the US economy. Anti-Inflationary Driver #2: Income & Wealth Inequality The growing trend in income and wealth inequality is our second anti-inflationary force. We first want to focus on the issue of income inequality as it leads to wealth inequality. Income inequality refers to the distribution of wages and profits generated by the economy. It is the proverbial “share of the pie” that households from different socioeconomic brackets receive. The link with inflation comes through the marginal propensity to save statistic of those different brackets. Lower income households have nearly nonexistent propensity to save as they live paycheck to paycheck. Therefore, any additional income inflow they receive gets immediately syphoned into the real economy. In contrast, the top 10% have a high propensity to save as all of their living expenses are well covered, so any additional income they receive is stashed away into savings and does not enter the real economy. This is why following the Trump’s tax cut that benefitted the top 10% there has not been a durable spike in CPI inflation. The fact that in the US the income share of the top 10% is growing at stratospheric rates at the same as time as the bottom 90% are struggling to cover even a $400 unexpected expense needs no introduction. The exact reasons as to why that happened would require a separate Special Report, but one of the main reasons is the multi-decade suppression of unions, which does not allow employees to bargain effectively for a larger slice of corporate profits. Given that profits are an exact mirror image of labor expenses, it is not surprising that the union movement is being marginalized (Charts 14 & 15). Staying on the topic of inflation, as we already outlined, when the lower and medium socioeconomic brackets receive more income, it does not disappear in the savings accounts, but instead it is redirected into the real economy causing a healthy inflationary uptick. Chart 14No Power = No Money No Power = No Money No Power = No Money Chart 15The Tug Of War The Tug Of War The Tug Of War ​​​​​​​ Chart 16 shows the wealth share of the top 10% of American households on inverted scale. Since the 1920s, inflation and the wealth share of the top 10% has moved in opposite directions. There were two distinct periods when the wealth share of the bottom 90% rose: from the early 1930s until the early 1950s, and from the mid-1960s until the mid-1980s. Both of these periods were accompanied by rising CPI inflation. Chart 16Wealth Equality Is Inflationary Wealth Equality Is Inflationary Wealth Equality Is Inflationary At the same time, when looking at any other period outside of those golden days for the bottom 90%, US inflation was anemic. This empirical evidence further underscores the importance of income and wealth distribution in the economy, and given the current US political and economic realities, we do not expect any material changes in labor dynamics to take root. The top 10% will continue benefitting at the expense of the bottom 90%, which will keep US CPI inflation suppressed. Concluding Thoughts In this Special Report our goal was to look beyond the already known medium term inflation outlook, and present both sides of the argument about the long-term inflation trend. We took a deep dive into six structural forces behind inflation that we identified. Four of those forces were pro-inflationary, while the remaining two were anti-inflationary (Table 2). We also assigned a value on our subjective strength scale for each force. Each value incorporates how quickly a particular force will come to fruition, and how strong it will be over the next 5-to-10 year period. Based on our analysis, we conclude that there are rising odds that the deflationary megatrend has run its course and has reached an inflection point of turning inflationary. Table 2Inflation Dots (Part I) Tinkering With Inflation: Outlook (Part I) Tinkering With Inflation: Outlook In the next Special Report from our Tinkering With Inflation series, we will conduct a thought experiment and explore a world in which our forecasts prove to be accurate, and a new inflationary paradigm engulfs the US economy. Under such a backdrop what will the US equity sector winners and losers, especially given the related shift in the stock-to-bond correlation? Stay tuned.   Arseniy Urazov Research Associate ArseniyU@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Buenos Aires Consensus is our catchall term for everything that is opposite of the Washington Consensus: less globalization, fiscal stimulus as far as the eyes can see, erosion of central bank independence, and a dirigiste (as opposed to laissez-faire) approach to economics that seeks to protect “state champions,” stifles innovation, and ultimately curbs productivity growth.

Highlights Global manufacturing activity will soon peak due to growing costs and China’s policy tightening. This process will allow the dollar’s rebound to continue. EUR/USD’s correction will run further. This pullback in the euro is creating an attractive buying opportunity for investors with a 12- to 24-month investment horizon. Eurozone banks will continue to trade in unison with the euro. Feature The correction in the euro has further to run. The dollar currently benefits from widening real interest differentials, but a growing list of headwinds will cause a temporary setback for the global manufacturing sector, which will fuel the greenback rally further. Nonetheless, EUR/USD will stabilize between 1.15 and 1.12, after which it will begin a new major up-leg. Consequently, investors with a 12- to 24-month investment horizon should use the current softness to allocate more funds to the common currency. A Hiccup In Global Industrial Activity Global manufacturing activity is set to decelerate on a sequential basis and the Global Manufacturing PMI will soon peak. The first problem for the global manufacturing sector is the emergence of financial headwinds. The sharp rebound in growth in the second half of 2020 and the optimism created by last year’s vaccine breakthrough as well as the rising tide of US fiscal stimulus have pushed US bond yields and oil prices up sharply. These financial market moves are creating a “growth tax” that will bite soon. Mounting US interest rates have lifted global borrowing costs while the doubling in Brent prices has increased the costs of production and created a small squeeze on oil consumers. Thus, even if the dollar remains well below its March 2020 peak, our Growth Tax Indicator (which incorporates yields, oil prices and the US dollar) warns of an imminent top in the US ISM Manufacturing and the Global Manufacturing PMI (Chart 1). Already, the BCA Global Leading Economic Indicator diffusion index has dipped below the 50% line, which usually ushers in downshifts in global growth. A deceleration in China’s economy constitutes another problem for the global manufacturing cycle. Last year’s reflation-fueled rebound in Chinese economic activity was an important catalyst to the global trade and manufacturing recovery. However, according to BCA Research’s Emerging Market Strategy service, Beijing is now tightening policy, concerned by a build-up in debt and excesses in the real estate sector. Already, the PBoC’s liquidity withdrawals are resulting in a decline of commercial bank excess reserves, which foreshadows a slowing of China’s credit impulse (Chart 2). Chart 1The Global Growth Tax Will Bite The Global Growth Tax Will Bite The Global Growth Tax Will Bite Chart 2Chinese Credit Will Slow Chinese Credit Will Slow Chinese Credit Will Slow In addition to liquidity withdrawals, Chinese policymakers are also tightening the regulatory environment to tackle excessive debt buildups and real estate speculation. The crackdown on property developers and house purchases will cause construction activity to shrink in the second half of 2021. Meanwhile, tougher rules for both non-bank lenders and the asset management divisions of banks will further harm credit creation. BCA’s Chief EM strategist, Arthur Budaghyan, notes that consumer credit is already slowing. Chinese fiscal policy is unlikely to create a counterweight to the deteriorating credit impulse. China’s fiscal impulse will be slightly negative next year. Chinese financial markets are factoring in these headwinds, and on-shore small cap equities are trying to break down while Chinese equities are significantly underperforming global benchmarks. Chart 3Deteriorating Surprises Deteriorating Surprises Deteriorating Surprises Bottom Line: The combined assault from the rising “growth tax” and China’s policy tightening is leaving its mark. Economic surprises in the US, the Eurozone, EM and China have all decelerated markedly (Chart 3), which the currency market echoes. Some of the most pro-cyclical currencies in the G-10 are suffering, with the SEK falling relative to the EUR and the NZD and AUD both experiencing varying degrees of weakness. The Euro Correction Will Run Further… Until now, the euro’s decline mostly reflects the rise in US interest rate differentials; however, the coming hiccup in the global manufacturing cycle is causing a second down leg for the euro. First, the global economic environment remains consistent with more near-term dollar upside, due to: Chart 4Commodities Are Vulnerable Commodities Are Vulnerable Commodities Are Vulnerable A commodity correction that will feed the dollar’s rebound. Aggregate speculator positioning and our Composite Technical Indicator show that commodity prices are technically overextended (Chart 4). With this backdrop, the coming deceleration in Chinese economic activity is likely to catalyze a significant pullback in natural resources, which will hurt rates of returns outside the US and therefore, flatter the dollar. The dollar’s counter-cyclicality. The expected pullback in the Global Manufacturing PMI is consistent with a stronger greenback (Chart 5). The dollar’s momentum behavior. Among G-10 FX, the dollar responds most strongly to the momentum factor (Chart 6). Thus, the likelihood is high that the dollar’s recent rebound will persist, especially because our FX team’s Dollar Capitulation Index has only recovered to neutral from oversold levels and normally peaks in overbought territory.  Chart 5The Greenback's Counter-Cyclicality The Greenback's Counter-Cyclicality The Greenback's Counter-Cyclicality Chart 6The Dollar Is A High Momentum Currency The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward Second, the euro’s specific dynamics remain negative for now. Based on our short-term valuation model, the fair value of EUR/USD has downshifted back to 1.1, which leaves the euro 7% overvalued (Chart 7). Until now, real interest rate differentials and the steepening of the US yield curve relative to Germany’s have driven the decline in the fair value estimate. However, the deceleration in global growth also hurts the euro’s fair value because the US is less exposed than the Eurozone to the global manufacturing cycle. Chart 7The Euro's Short-Term Fair Value Is At 1.1 The Euro's Short-Term Fair Value Is At 1.1 The Euro's Short-Term Fair Value Is At 1.1 Chart 8Speculators Have Not Capitulated Speculators Have Not Capitulated Speculators Have Not Capitulated The euro is also technically vulnerable, similar to commodities. Speculators are still massively net long EUR/USD and the large pool of long bets in the euro suggests that a capitulation has yet to take place (Chart 8). The euro responds very negatively to a weak Chinese economy. The Eurozone has deeper economic ties with China than the US. Exports to China account for 1.7% of the euro area’s GDP, and 2.8% of Germany’s compared to US exports to China at 0.5% of GDP. Indirect financial links are also larger. Credit to EM accounts for 45% of the Eurozone’s GDP compared to 5% for the US. Thus, the negative impact of a Chinese slowdown on EM growth has greater spillovers on European than on US ones rates of returns. A weak CNY and sagging Chinese capital markets harm the euro. The euro’s rebound from 1.064 on March 23 2020 to 1.178 did not reflect sudden inflows into European fixed-income markets. Instead, the money that previously sought higher interest rates in the US left that country for EM bonds and China’s on-shore fixed-income markets, the last major economies with attractive yields. These outflows from the US to China and EM pushed the dollar down, which arithmetically helped the euro. Thus, the recent EUR/USD correlates closely with Sino/US interest rate and with the yuan because the euro’s strength reflects the dollar demise (Chart 9). Consequently, a decelerating Chinese economy will also hurt EUR/USD via fixed-income market linkages. Finally, the euro will depreciate further if global cyclical stocks correct relative to defensive equities. Deep cyclicals (financials, consumer discretionary, energy, materials and industrials) represent 59% of the Eurozone MSCI benchmark versus 36% of the US index. Cyclical equities are exceptionally overbought and expensive relative to defensive names. They are also very levered to the global business cycle and Chinese imports. In this context, the expected deterioration in both China’s economic activity and the Global Manufacturing PMI could cause a temporary but meaningful pullback in the cyclicals-to-defensives ratio and precipitate equity outflows from Europe into the US (Chart 10). Chart 9EUR/USD And Chinese Rates EUR/USD And Chinese Rates EUR/USD And Chinese Rates Chart 10EUR/USD Will Follow Cyclicals/Defensives EUR/USD Will Follow Cyclicals/Defensives EUR/USD Will Follow Cyclicals/Defensives Bottom Line: A peak in the global manufacturing PMI will hurt the euro, especially because China will meaningfully contribute to this deceleration in global industrial activity. Thus, the euro’s pullback has further to run. An important resistance stands at 1.15. A failure to hold will invite a rapid decline to EUR/USD 1.12. Nonetheless, the euro’s depreciation constitutes nothing more than a temporary pullback. … But The Long-Term Bull Market Is Intact We recommend buying EUR/USD on its current dip because the underpinnings of its cyclical bull market are intact. Chart 11Investors Structurally Underweight Europe Investors Structurally Underweight Europe Investors Structurally Underweight Europe First, investors are positioned for a long-term economic underperformance of the euro area relative to the US. The depressed level of portfolio inflows into Europe relative to the US indicates that investors already underweight European assets (Chart 11). This pre-existing positioning limits the negative impact on the euro of the current decrease in European growth expectations (Chart 11, bottom panel). Second, as we wrote last week, European growth is set to accelerate significantly this summer. Considering the absence of ebullient investor expectations toward the euro, this process can easily create upside economic surprises later this year, especially when compared to the US. Moreover, the deceleration in Chinese and global growth will most likely be temporary, which will limit the duration of their negative impact on Europe. Third, the US stimulus measure will create negative distortions for the US dollar. The addition of another long-term stimulus package of $2 trillion to $4 trillion to the $7 trillion already spent by Washington during the crisis implies that the US government deficit will not narrow as quickly as US private savings will decline. Therefore, the US current account deficit will widen from its current level of 3.5% of GDP. As a corollary, the US twin deficit will remain large. Meanwhile, the Fed is unlikely to increase real interest rates meaningfully in the coming two years because it believes any surge in inflation this year will be temporary. Furthermore, the FOMC aims to achieve inclusive growth (i.e. an overheated labor market). This policy combination forcefully points toward greater dollar weakness. The US policy mix looks particularly dollar bearish when compared to that of the Eurozone. To begin with, the balance of payment dynamics make the euro more resilient. The euro area benefits from the underpinning of a current account surplus of 1.9% of GDP. Moreover, the European basic balance of payments stands at 1.5% of GDP compared to a 3.6% deficit for the US. Additionally, FDI into Europe are rising relative to the US. The divergence in the FDI trends will continue due to the high probability that the Biden administration will soon increase corporate taxes. Chart 12The DEM In The 70s The DEM In The 70s The DEM In The 70s The combination of faster vaccine penetration and much larger fiscal stimulus means that the US economy will overheat faster than Europe’s. Because the Fed seems willing to tolerate higher inflation readings, US CPI will rise relative to the Eurozone. In the 1970s, too-easy policy in Washington meant that the gap between US and German inflation rose. Despite the widening of interest rate and growth differentials in favor of the USD or the rise in German relative unemployment, the higher US inflation dominated currency fluctuations and the deutschemark appreciated (Chart 12). A similar scenario is afoot in the coming years, especially in light of the euro bullish relative balance of payments. Fourth, valuations constitute an additional buttress behind the long-term performance of the euro. Our FX strategy team Purchasing Power Parity model adjusts for the different composition of price indices in the US and the euro area. Based on this metric, the euro is trading at a significant 13% discount from its long-term fair value, with the latter being on an upward trend (Chart 13).  Furthermore, BCA’s Behavioral Exchange Rate Model for the trade-weighted euro is also pointing up, which historically augurs well for the common currency. Lastly, even if the ECB’s broad trade-weighted index stands near an all-time high, European financial conditions remain very easy. This bifurcation suggests that the euro is not yet a major hurdle for the continent and can enjoy more upside (Chart 14). Chart 13EUR/USD Trades Well Below Long-Term Fair Value EUR/USD Trades Well Below Long-Term Fair Value EUR/USD Trades Well Below Long-Term Fair Value Chart 14Easy European Financial Conditions Easy European Financial Conditions Easy European Financial Conditions Chart 15Make Room For the Euro! Make Room For the Euro! Make Room For the Euro! Finally, the euro will remain a beneficiary from reserve diversification away from the USD. The dollar’s status as the premier reserve currency is unchallenged. However, its share of global reserves has scope to decline while the euro’s proportion could move back to the levels enjoyed by legacy European currencies in the early 1990s (Chart 15). Large reserve holders will continue to move away from the dollar. BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy team argues that US tensions with China transcend the Trump presidency.  Meanwhile, the current administration’s relationship with Russia and Saudi Arabia will be cold. For now, their main alternative to the dollar is the euro because of its liquidity. Moreover, the NGEU stimulus program creates an embryonic mechanism to share fiscal risk within the euro area. The Eurozone is therefore finally trying to evolve away from a monetary union bereft of a fiscal union. This process points toward a lower probability of a break up, which makes the euro more attractive to reserve managers. Bottom Line: Despite potent near-term headwinds, the euro’s long-term outlook remains bright. Global investors already underweight European assets, yet balance of payment and policy dynamics point toward a higher euro. Moreover, valuations and geopolitical developments reinforce the cyclical tailwinds behind EUR/USD. Thus, investors with a 12- to 24-month investment horizon should use the current euro correction to gain exposure to the European currencies. Any move in EUR/USD below 1.15 will generate a strong buy signal. Sector Focus: European Banks And The Istanbul Shake The recent decline in euro area bank stocks coincides with the 14% increase in USD/TRY and the 17% decline in the TUR Turkish equities ETF following the sacking of Naci Ağbal, the CBRT governor. President Erdogan is prioritizing growth over economic stability because his AKP party is polling poorly ahead of the 2023 election. The Turkish economy is already overheating, and the lack of independence of the CBRT under the leadership of Şahap Kavcıoğlu promises a substantial increase in Turkish inflation, which already stands at 16%. Hence, foreign investors will flee this market, creating further downward pressures on the lira and Turkish assets. European banks have a meaningful exposure to Turkey. Turkish assets account for 3% of Spanish bank assets or 28% of Tier-1 capital. For France, this exposure amounts to 0.7% and 5% respectively, and for the UK, it reaches 0.3% and 2%. As a comparison, claims on Turkey only represent 0.3% and 0.5% of the assets and Tier-1 capital of US banks. Unsurprisingly, fluctuations in the Turkish lira have had a significant impact one the share prices of European banks in recent years, even after controlling for EPS and domestic yield fluctuations (Table 1). Table 1TRY Is Important To European Banks… The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward Nonetheless, today’s TRY fluctuations are unlikely to have the same lasting impact on European banks share prices as they did from 2017 to 2019 because European banks have already shed significant amounts of Turkish assets (Chart 16).  This does not mean that European banks are out of the woods yet. The level of European yields remains a key determinant of the profitability of Eurozone’s banks, and thus, of their share prices (Chart 17, top panel). Moreover, the euro still tightly correlates with European bank stocks as well (Chart 17, bottom panel). As a result, our view that the global manufacturing cycle will experience a temporary downshift and the consequent downside in EUR/USD both warn of further underperformance of European banks. Chart 16… But Less Than It Once Was The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward Chart 17Higher Yields And A stronger Euro, These Are Few Of My Favorite Things Higher Yields And A stronger Euro, These Are Few Of My Favorite Things Higher Yields And A stronger Euro, These Are Few Of My Favorite Things These same views also suggest that this decline in bank prices is creating a buying opportunity. Ultimately, we remain cyclically bullish on the euro and the transitory nature of the manufacturing slowdown implies that global yields will resume their ascent. The cheap valuations of European banks, which trade at 0.6-times book value, make them option-like vehicles to bet on these trends, even if the banking sectors long-term prospects are murky. Moreover, they are a play on Europe’s domestic recovery this summer. We will explore banks in greater detail in future reports.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Investment Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Trades Currency Performance The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward Fixed Income Performance Government Bonds The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward Corporate Bonds The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward Equity Performance Major Stock Indices The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward Geographic Performance The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward Sector Performance The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward