Inflation/Deflation

Highlights Monetary Policy: Last week’s numerous central bank meetings across the world confirmed that the overall direction for global monetary policy is shifting in a more hawkish direction. The main reason: growing fears that elevated inflation will persist for much longer than expected, even with global growth having lost some momentum. Country Allocation: The relative degrees of central banker hawkishness support our current government bond country allocation strategy. Stay underweight the US, UK, Canada, New Zealand and Norway where markets are discounting a path for future policy rates over the next two years that is too flat. Remain overweight countries where there is less need for a more aggressive tightening response: the euro area (both the core and periphery), Australia, Sweden and Japan. Still The Only Game In Town Last week was a busy one for global bond markets, with no fewer than 14 central banks within both the developed markets (DM) and emerging markets (EM) holding policy meetings. The results were eventful: Within EM, Brazil and Hungary lifted policy rates. Norway followed suit to become the first G-10 central bank to hike during the COVID era. The Fed teed up a formal announcement on tapering asset purchases at the next FOMC meeting in November. The Bank of England (BoE) gave strong hints that rate hikes could come sooner than expected, perhaps even before year-end. Chart of the WeekMonetary Policy Backdrop Turning More Bond-Bearish Monetary Policy Backdrop Turning More Bond-Bearish Monetary Policy Backdrop Turning More Bond-Bearish Global bond yields in the developed markets took notice of the change in central bank guidance, especially from the Fed and BoE. The benchmark 10-year US Treasury yield rose from a pre-FOMC low of 1.30% to an intraday high of 1.57% yesterday – a level last seen late June. Longer-dated yields in the UK also rose significantly, with the 30-year Gilt yield rising from a pre-BoE meeting low of 1.11% to an intraday high of 1.40% yesterday – also the highest level since June. The pull on yields extended to other countries, as well, with 10-year yields in Germany, Canada and Australia climbing to three-month highs. The overall message from all of those policy meetings was one of an incremental shift toward less accommodative policies, even as the pace of global economic growth has slowed in recent months. Policymakers are growing more concerned that higher inflation could linger for longer (Chart of the Week). At the same time, loose policy settings have fueled a boom in asset markets that supports growth through easy financial conditions, but also raises future stability risks that worry the central banks. The number of countries seeing actual rate hikes is growing. Our Global Monetary Policy Tightening Indicator shows that just over one-quarter of G-10 and EM central banks have lifted rates over the past three months (Chart 2). All but one (Norway) are in EM, where policymakers have had to act more mechanistically in response to high inflation, even with softening economic growth momentum. While the slower pace of growth is more visible in EM relative to DM, when looking at cyclical indicators like manufacturing PMIs, inflation rates are simply too high around the world for inflation-targeting central banks to ignore (Chart 3). Chart 2Our Global Monetary Policy Indicator Shows A More Hawkish Turn Our Global Monetary Policy Indicator Shows A More Hawkish Turn Our Global Monetary Policy Indicator Shows A More Hawkish Turn Chart 3Global CBs Growing More Worried About Inflation Risks Global CBs Growing More Worried About Inflation Risks Global CBs Growing More Worried About Inflation Risks Within the major DM countries, there has been a notable shift in interest rate expectations in a more hawkish direction. Interest rate markets are, for the most part, still underestimating the potential for tighter monetary policies over the next couple of years. This is the main reason why we continue to recommend an overall below-benchmark strategic stance on global duration exposure. However, the relative expected pace of rate hikes also informs our views on country allocation. In Table 1, we show expectations for the timing of the next rate hike, as well as the cumulative amount of rate increases to the end of 2024, that are currently discounted in DM overnight index swap (OIS) curves. We present the latest level for both, as well as the reading from earlier this month to see how expectations have changed. Table 1Markets Still Pricing Very Modest Tightening Cycles Marking-To-Market Our Bond Calls After "Central Bank Week" Marking-To-Market Our Bond Calls After "Central Bank Week" The so-called “liftoff date” for the first rate hike has been most notably pulled forward in the UK from January 2023 to May 2022, while other countries have seen more modest shifts in the timing of the next rate increase. More importantly, the discounted pace of rate hikes to end-2024 for all countries shown in the table has increased since early September (including Norway, factoring in last week’s tightening move by the Norges Bank). In our view, the biggest driver of relative government bond market yield movements and returns over the next 6-12 months will be the relative adjustments in the expected pace of rate hikes. On that front, the biggest shift higher in cumulative tightening has occurred in countries where we are more pessimistic on government bond performance on a relative basis to the global benchmark: the US, Canada, the UK and Norway. The smaller increases in the pace of hikes have occurred in our more preferred markets – Australia, Sweden, the euro area, and Japan. Assessing Our Two Biggest Government Bond Underweights: The US & UK For last week’s Fed meeting, a new set of economic and interest rate projections from the FOMC members (“the dots”) were presented (Chart 4). Compared to the forecasts from the June meeting, US real GDP growth expectations for 2021 were revised down (5.9% vs 7.6%) but were boosted for 2022 (3.8% vs 3.3%) and 2023 (2.5% vs 2.4%). A new forecast for 2024 was added, coming in at 2.0%. Importantly, none of those growth forecasts was below the median FOMC estimate of the longer-run real GDP growth rate of 1.8% (top panel). In other words, the Fed is not anticipating below-trend growth anytime in the next three years. Chart 4The Fed’s Rate Projections Look Too Low Marking-To-Market Our Bond Calls After "Central Bank Week" Marking-To-Market Our Bond Calls After "Central Bank Week" The same conclusion goes for the US unemployment rate (second panel), with the median FOMC projection for 2022 (3.8%), 2023 (3.5%) and 2024 (3.5%) all below the median longer-run “full employment” estimate of 4.0%. The forecasts for US inflation (third panel) reflect that persistent low level of unemployment. Headline PCE inflation is expected to end 2021 at 4.2%, to be followed by a somewhat slower pace – but still above the 2% Fed inflation target – in 2022 (2.2%), 2023 (2.2%) and 2024 (2.1%). Yet despite these forecasts that show US growth and inflation exceeding its longer-run estimates for the next few years, the FOMC is projecting a relatively slow upward path for interest rates. The median dot now calls for the Fed to hike the funds rate once in 2022 and three more times in both 2023 and 2024. This would bring the funds rate to 1.75% by the end of 2024 – still 75bps below the Fed’s estimate of the longer-run “neutral” funds rate of 2.5% (bottom panel). That projected path for the funds rate is higher than the June dots, which only called for 75bps of cumulative hikes to the end of 2023. There is a wide divergence of opinions on the future path of rates within the FOMC, but the hawks appear to be winning the internal battle (Chart 5). There is now a 9-9 split of FOMC members who are calling for a rate hike in 2022, compared to a 7-11 split back in June, while the number of those projecting a funds rate above 1% in 2023 rose from 5 to 9. Chart 5A Wide Dispersion Of FOMC Interest Rate Views For 2023/24 A Wide Dispersion Of FOMC Interest Rate Views For 2023/24 A Wide Dispersion Of FOMC Interest Rate Views For 2023/24 One area where there does appear to be a consensus is on the timing and pace of tapering. Fed Chair Powell noted at his post-FOMC press conference that an announcement on the reduction of Fed asset purchases could come as soon as the next FOMC meeting on November 6. Powell also signaled that there was general agreement on the FOMC that the taper should end by mid-2022, barring any economic setbacks. That would likely open the door to a rate hike in the latter half of next year, given the Fed’s longstanding view that lifting the funds rate should only occur after tapering is complete, to avoid sending conflicting signals about the Fed’s policy bias. It is clear that the Fed’s policy guidance has shifted incrementally in a more hawkish direction, and confirms our long-held expectation that tapering would be announced by year-end, with rate hikes to begin in late 2022. This dovetails with our recommended investment positioning in the US Treasury market for the next 12-18 months. Maintain a below-benchmark US duration exposure, with a curve-flattening bias, while staying underweight US Treasuries in global (USD-hedged) fixed income portfolios (Chart 6). Our other high-conviction underweight government bond call is in the UK. The BoE’s recent messaging has turned more hawkish in a very short period of time, justifying our decision to downgrade our recommended UK Gilt exposure to underweight last month.1 The BoE Monetary Policy Committee had already sharply upgraded its inflation forecast for the end of 2021 to just above 4% at the last policy meeting in August. That was categorized as just a temporary surge due to rising energy prices and goods prices elevated by shorter-term global supply chain bottlenecks. At last week’s meeting, however, the MPC noted that +4% UK inflation could persist into Q2 2022 because of the current surge in wholesale natural gas prices that has driven many UK gas suppliers out of business (Chart 7). Chart 6Our Recommended Strategy For US Treasuries Our Recommended Strategy For US Treasuries Our Recommended Strategy For US Treasuries Chart 7BoE Growing More Worried About Inflation BoE Growing More Worried About Inflation BoE Growing More Worried About Inflation Chart 8Our Recommended Strategy For UK Gilts Our Recommended Strategy For UK Gilts Our Recommended Strategy For UK Gilts The official view of the BoE has been like that of other central banks, that much of the current high inflation is supply driven and, hence, will not last. Yet within the MPC, there is clearly some growing nervousness about high realized inflation becoming more embedded in longer-term inflation expectations, which are moving higher. BoE Governor Andrew Bailey has noted in recent speeches that there was a growing case for interest rate hikes because of stubbornly higher inflation. Two members of the MPC even voted last week to reduce the size of the BoE’s QE program that is already set to end in just three months. The markets have begun to heed the more hawkish signals from the BoE. Our 24-month UK discounter, measuring the amount of rate hikes priced into the UK OIS curve, has jumped 24bps since September 7 (Chart 8). Over that same period, UK Gilts have underperformed the Bloomberg Barclays Global Treasury index by 108bps (on a USD-hedged and duration-matched basis). We are sticking with our underweight recommendation on UK Gilts, as there are still too few rate hikes priced into the UK curve relative to the BoE’s guidance and upside inflation risks. What About The BoJ? Same Old, Same Old Chart 9Reasons Why JGBs Will Outperform Reasons Why JGBs Will Outperform Reasons Why JGBs Will Outperform Lost amid the hawkish din from the Fed and BoE meetings last week was the Bank of Japan (BoJ) meeting. The message from policymakers in Tokyo was predictably dovish, as Japan has not seen anything resembling the high inflation that has pushed central bankers elsewhere in a more hawkish direction. Japanese growth has also not seen the same magnitude of recovery from the pandemic shock as the other major developed markets, despite suffering comparable losses during the 2020 recession (Chart 9). One of the main reasons has been that Japan’s vaccine rollouts were much slower than those of other major countries. This forced an extension of emergency lockdowns and other economic restrictions that depressed domestic demand and delayed a return to normal economic activity (second panel). COVID outbreaks even cost Japan the one-time economic windfall from hosting an Olympics, with the Tokyo Games first delayed by a year and then taking place with no fans. Japan has also not suffered any of the higher inflation rates witnessed elsewhere over the past year, despite presumably facing many of the same inflationary forces from global supply chain disruption (third panel). Both headline and core CPI inflation are now in deflation. Governor Haruhiko Kuroda stated last week that it will take longer for Japan to see inflation return back to its 2% target than other developed countries, with the official BoJ forecast calling for that level to be reached by 2023 – a forecast that appears too optimistic. We continue to view Japanese government bonds (JGBs) as a relative safe haven during the period of rising global bond yields that we expect over the next 6-12 months. The BoJ is nowhere close to seeing the conditions necessary to begin exiting its Yield Curve Control and negative interest rate policies, both of which have crushed JGB volatility and kept longer-term bond yields hovering near 0%. We continue to recommend a moderate overweight stance on Japan in global government bond portfolios, particularly on a USD-hedged basis to make the yields more attractive. The Scandinavian Policy Divergence Last week, the Norges Bank raised its benchmark interest rate from 0% to 0.25% (Chart 10), stating that a normalizing economy requires a gradual normalization in monetary policy. The bank’s decision reflects idiosyncratic factors unique to the Norwegian economy, but also some of the same broader themes that are forcing other central banks in a more hawkish direction.   As a small economy driven heavily by oil exports, both the Norwegian krone and the price of oil weigh heavily on the policy decisions of the Norges Bank. On that front, the rise in energy prices since the crisis has outpaced the appreciation in the krone (Chart 10, top panel). With this relative weakness in the krone comes higher import price inflation and increased export competitiveness, both of which mean that the Norges Bank must pull forward its path of rate hikes to compensate. As opposed to other G10 central banks, the Norges Bank clearly believes a pre-emptive move on rates is necessary to nip future inflation risk in the bud. The bank expects that increased capacity utilization and wage growth will help push up underlying inflation to approximately 1.9% by the end of 2024, with the ongoing supply chain disruptions creating additional upside risk to that forecast. Like other G10 banks, however, the Norges Bank is concerned about increasing financial imbalances. The Norwegian house price-to-disposable income ratio is now at all-time highs and the Norges Bank expects it to remain elevated to the end of its forecast horizon (Chart 10, bottom panel). With the growth in house prices substantially outpacing income growth during the pandemic, housing market vulnerabilities have increased as households have taken on greater leverage to enter the market. In contrast to the Norges Bank, the other major Scandinavian central bank, Sweden’s Riksbank, has hewed more closely to the prevailing global monetary policy orthodoxy – avoiding pre-emptive policy tightening in order to boost inflation. The central bank chose to hold its repo rate at 0% at last week’s policy meeting, even with a Swedish economy that has recovered the 2020 pandemic losses and is projected to return to pre-COVID growth rates in 2022 (Chart 11). In its decision, the Riksbank mirrored rhetoric from the Fed and ECB, citing that high inflation was driven by rising energy prices and supply logjams, both factors which are expected to subside over the coming year (Chart 11, middle panel). Both headline and core versions of the bank’s favored CPI-F (CPI with Fixed Interest Rate) measure are projected by the Riksbank to remain below target in 2022, reaching 2% only in 2024. Chart 10The Norges Bank Isn't Waiting Around... The Norges Bank Isn't Waiting Around... The Norges Bank Isn't Waiting Around... Chart 11...But The Riksbank Will Remain Patient ...But The Riksbank Will Remain Patient ...But The Riksbank Will Remain Patient Chart 12The Central Bank Story Will Further Widen The Norway-Sweden Spread The Central Bank Story Will Further Widen The Norway-Sweden Spread The Central Bank Story Will Further Widen The Norway-Sweden Spread The Riksbank is less willing than the Norges Bank to respond to temporarily higher inflation because of the former’s growing reluctance to return to negative nominal interest rates in response to an economic shock. The Riksbank would likely be more comfortable in lifting nominal rates only when real rates were significantly lower than current levels, which requires higher inflation. In contrast to the neighboring Norges Bank, the Riksbank has an additional tool which it can use to express shifts in monetary policy—the size of its balance sheet. The bank forecasts that holdings of securities will remain unchanged in 2022 (Chart 11, bottom panel), implying that purchases, net of redemptions, will be drawn down roughly to zero. However, the bank does believe that the existing stock of purchases will continue to support financial conditions. Chart 12 shows the impact of the Norges Bank’s relatively hawkish reaction function. Despite relatively similar underlying growth and inflation profiles, sovereign debt from Norway has markedly underperformed Swedish counterparts, a dynamic that has been even more obvious since the pandemic. On the currency side, the NOK/SEK cross has recovered much of the losses from 2020, and will likely rally further as Norway-Sweden rate differentials will turn even more favorable for the NOK. Relative to the global benchmark on a currency-hedged and duration-matched basis, Norwegian government debt has underperformed much more than Sweden following the pandemic. We see these tends continuing over the next 6-12 months, with the Norges Bank likely to remain far more hawkish than the Riksbank. Our bias is to favor Swedish sovereign debt over Norwegian government bonds.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Shakti Sharma Senior Analyst ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, CFA Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy/European Investment Strategy Report, "The UK Leads The Way", dated August 11, 2021, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Marking-To-Market Our Bond Calls After "Central Bank Week" Marking-To-Market Our Bond Calls After "Central Bank Week" Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Monetary Policy: It’s all but certain that tapering will begin next month and conclude by the middle of next year, but the FOMC is currently split right down the middle on whether it will be appropriate to lift rates in H2 2022. We present five factors to track to decide when the Fed will hike rates. Yield Curve: A bear-flattening of the nominal yield curve remains the most likely scenario for the next 6-12 months. Maintain a position short the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. TIPS: Investors should enter 2/10 steepeners on the inflation compensation curve and/or 2/10 flatteners on the real (TIPS) curve. The 2-year real yield, in particular, has a lot of upside during the next 6-12 months. EM Bonds: US bond investors should shift some allocation out of expensive US investment grade corporate bonds and into USD-denominated investment grade EM Sovereigns and Corporates where valuation is more compelling. Feature This past week was quite eventful for US bond investors. First, the Fed presented its September update on Wednesday, offering some hints about the timing and pace of asset purchase tapering alongside its updated economic and interest rate forecasts. Then, bonds sold off sharply on Thursday, Friday and Monday with the 10-year Treasury yield rising all the way to 1.49%. The first section of this week’s report looks at what we learned from last week’s FOMC meeting and opines on some monetary policy questions that remain unanswered. The second section updates our views on portfolio duration, the yield curve and TIPS in light of last week’s large market moves. Finally, we conclude with an update on the outlook for USD-denominated Emerging Market bonds. Powell Answers Some Small Questions, Avoids The Big One The Small Questions The start date for asset purchase tapering is the first small question that the Fed answered last week. A new sentence was added to the post-meeting statement saying that “a moderation in the pace of asset purchases may soon be warranted” and, in his press conference, Chair Powell clarified that the purpose of the new language is “to put notice out there that [tapering] could come as soon as the next meeting”. After this statement from the Fed, we expect asset purchase tapering to be announced at the next FOMC meeting on November 3rd. A delay until December is possible if September’s employment report is a massive disappointment, but the bar for delaying tapering beyond November appears high. Chair Powell also shed some light on a second small question related to the Fed’s balance sheet. Specifically, the pace of asset purchase tapering. In his press conference the Chair said that “participants generally view that, so long as the recovery remains on track, a gradual tapering process that concludes around the middle of next year is likely to be appropriate.” The information about the pace of tapering is slightly more interesting than the start date, if only because Fed policymakers have expressed a desire for net purchases to reach zero before the first interest rate increase. The fact that the Fed is planning to reach net zero purchases by the middle of next year suggests that it wants to leave the door open for a possible rate hike in the second half of 2022. This message was confirmed by the Fed’s updated interest rate projections (Chart 1). The projections revealed an even split (9 vs. 9) on the Committee between those that expect at least one 25 basis point rate increase before the end of 2022 and those that do not expect to lift rates next year. It’s also notable that, out of the 9 participants that don’t expect a rate hike in 2022, 8 anticipate lifting rates in 2023. Chart 1Rate Expectations Rate Expectations Rate Expectations Of course, as Chair Powell often points out, the Fed’s interest rate projections are contingent on the future state of the economy and will almost certainly be revised as the outlook evolves. What’s more important from a forecasting perspective is knowing how the Fed will react to different economic conditions. The Big Question With that in mind, we know that the Fed has promised not to lift rates until the labor market reaches “maximum employment”. However, as we noted in a recent report, the Fed hasn’t provided much detail on what “maximum employment” actually means.1 Powell’s comments last week didn’t add much clarity, but we can hunt for clues in the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP). In the SEP, we first notice that 13 FOMC participants expect the unemployment rate to be 3.8% - 3.9% or lower by the end of 2022 (Chart 2A). It is logical to assume that this group includes the 9 participants who expect to lift rates in 2022 and 4 additional ones. We also observe that 17 out of 18 participants anticipate an unemployment rate of 3.8% - 3.9% or lower by the end of 2023 (Chart 2B), exactly matching the number of participants who expect to lift rates by then. We can therefore infer that the Fed views an unemployment rate of roughly 3.8% as consistent with “maximum employment”. That is, FOMC participants tend to have rate hikes penciled into their forecasts once the unemployment rate is below 3.8%. Chart 2AFOMC 2022 Unemployment Rate Projection Distribution Damage Assessment Damage Assessment Chart 2BFOMC 2023 Unemployment Rate Projection Distribution Damage Assessment Damage Assessment The SEP’s inflation forecasts are less illuminating than the unemployment ones. All but 4 participants expect core PCE inflation to be above the Fed’s 2% target at the end of 2022 (Chart 3A) and no FOMC participant is forecasting below-2% core PCE at the end of 2023 (Chart 3B).2 The most we can take away from these forecasts is that 14 FOMC participants expect inflation to be above target in 2022, but five of those participants don’t see the labor market as being tight enough to lift rates by then. Chart 3AFOMC 2022 Core PCE Inflation Rate Projection Distribution Damage Assessment Damage Assessment Chart 3BFOMC 2023 Core PCE Inflation Rate Projection Distribution Damage Assessment Damage Assessment The revelation that FOMC participants view a 3.8% unemployment rate as consistent with “maximum employment” is illuminating, but it doesn’t tell the entire story. We don’t know, for example, what assumptions about labor force participation the different Fed officials are using. Our sense is that the following five criteria will ultimately determine when the Fed starts to lift interest rates: An unemployment rate in the neighborhood of 3.8%. Prime-age (25-54) labor force participation close to its pre-pandemic level (Chart 4, top panel). Accelerating wage growth (Chart 4, bottom 2 panels). Long-dated inflation expectations at or above target levels (Chart 5, top 2 panels). Non-transitory inflation at or above target levels (Chart 5, bottom panel). Bottom Line: The FOMC is currently split right down the middle on whether it will be appropriate to lift rates in 2022, but these forecasts aren’t set in stone and next year’s economic data – particularly the five factors listed above – will determine which group is correct. Chart 4Part Rate & Wage Growth Part Rate & Wage Growth Part Rate & Wage Growth Chart 5Inflation & Inflation Expectations Inflation & Inflation Expectations Inflation & Inflation Expectations Our own view is that the labor market will be sufficiently tight for the Fed to deliver its first rate hike in December 2022, and that rate hikes will proceed more quickly than what is currently priced in the yield curve. US bond investors should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. The Fallout In Bond Markets Bonds sold off sharply last Thursday and again yesterday morning. At the time of publication, the 30-year Treasury yield had risen from 1.81% on Wednesday to 2.02% (Chart 6). The 10-year Treasury yield had risen from 1.30% to 1.49% (Chart 6, panel 2). The 5-year yield is up to 0.98% from 0.85% on Wednesday (Chart 6, panel 3), and the 2-year yield is up to 0.28% from 0.24% (Chart 6, panel 4). The yield curve has also steepened since Wednesday, though the 2/10 slope remains well below its March peak (Chart 7). The trend during the past few months has been one of curve steepening out to the 5-year maturity point (Chart 7, panel 2) and flattening beyond that point (Chart 7, bottom 2 panels). Recent market action has led to some steepening beyond the 5-year maturity, but so far that steepening is minor compared to the flattening move we’ve witnessed since the spring. Chart 6Treasury Yield Trends Treasury Yield Trends Treasury Yield Trends Chart 7Treasury Curve Trends Treasury Curve Trends Treasury Curve Trends Nominal Curve We have been recommending a position short the 5-year bullet and long a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes, and we think this trade will continue to outperform. First, the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield is back above 2%, consistent with median estimates of the long-run neutral fed funds rate from the New York Fed’s Surveys of Market Participants (2%) and Primary Dealers (2.25%) (Chart 6, bottom panel). We think it will be difficult for the 5-year/5-year forward yield to rise much above these levels, which makes curve flattening more likely than steepening going forward.3 Second, we updated our work on yield curve scenarios to incorporate recent market action and some new information gleaned from last week’s SEP. In this analysis we estimate fair value levels for different parts of the yield curve as of the end of 2022 based on a scenario for the path of the fed funds rate. For example, if we assume that Fed liftoff occurs in December 2022 and rate hikes proceed at a pace of 75 bps per year (the median pace in the SEP) until the fed funds rate levels-off at 2.08% (consistent with a 2%-2.25% range for the long-run neutral fed funds rate), we calculate that the 2-year yield has 74 bps of upside between now and the end of 2022. This is slightly more than the 65 bps of upside in the 5-year yield and much more than the 37 bps of upside in the 10-year yield (Table 1). Comparing this expected change to what is already discounted in the forward curve, we see that both the 2-year and 10-year yields are expected to exceed their forwards by 6 bps. The 5-year yield is expected to exceed its forward by 16 bps. Table 1Treasury Curve Scenario Analysis Damage Assessment Damage Assessment To us, the message is clear. We want to remain short the 5-year note versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. Real & Inflation Curves Chart 8Real & Inflation Curves Real & Inflation Curves Real & Inflation Curves The increase in the 10-year nominal yield since last Wednesday was roughly evenly split between the real and inflation compensation components. Interestingly, inflation drove a greater proportion of the increase at the front-end of the curve, and the 2-year real yield actually fell. We maintain a neutral recommendation on TIPS versus nominal Treasuries, but this week we recommend taking advantage of recent market action by implementing some curve trades across the real and inflation curves. Specifically, we note that the cost of short-maturity inflation compensation remains well above the cost of long-maturity inflation compensation (Chart 8). Going forward, the cost of front-end inflation compensation will fall as inflation moderates from its current extremely high level. Meanwhile, the cost of long-maturity inflation compensation will remain sticky near the Fed’s target levels. This will lead to a steepening of the inflation curve (Chart 8, panel 2). The combination of a steeper inflation curve and a flatter nominal curve will lead to a much flatter real yield curve (Chart 8, bottom 2 panels). The 2-year real yield, in particular, has a lot of upside if inflation moderates, as we expect, and the 2-year nominal yield rises in line with the projections shown in Table 1. Bottom Line: Investors should remain short the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell on the nominal Treasury curve. Investors should also enter 2/10 steepeners on the inflation compensation curve and/or 2/10 flatteners on the real (TIPS) curve. A Quick Update On Emerging Market Bonds The collapse of Chinese real estate behemoth Evergrande dominated headlines for most of the past week, though so far there has been little contagion into USD-denominated credit markets. Unsurprisingly, the spread on Chinese corporate and quasi-sovereign bonds has widened, and there has been some passthrough into both the High-Yield EM USD Corporate & Quasi-Sovereign Index and the High-Yield EM USD Sovereign Index (Chart 9). However, investment grade EM credit spreads have been relatively unaffected by the turmoil, as have US corporate bond spreads (both IG and HY) (Chart 9, bottom 2 panels). While the Evergrande drama – and weakening Chinese economic growth in general – could weigh on USD-denominated EM bond performance in the near-term, we see an excellent buying opportunity in investment grade EM bonds on a 6-12 month horizon. Investment grade EM Sovereigns outperformed credit rating and duration-matched US corporate bonds in the early months of the recovery but have lagged during the past few months (Chart 10). The same is true for the investment grade EM Corporate and Quasi-Sovereign index (Chart 10, panel 3). This is not to say that EM bond performance has been poor – the EM Sovereign index is still up 97 bps versus duration-matched Treasuries on the year – it has simply failed to keep pace with the stellar performance of US corporate bonds. Chart 9No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion Chart 10EM Bonds Versus US Corporates EM Bonds Versus US Corporates EM Bonds Versus US Corporates But that recent stellar performance of US investment grade corporate bonds has left spreads in the sector near historically tight levels. In last week’s report we ran some scenarios for US investment grade corporate bond returns during the next 12 months and concluded that excess returns versus Treasuries are probably capped at 85 bps.4 This makes the current spread advantage in EM Sovereigns (Chart 10, panel 2) and EM Corporates & Quasi-Sovereigns (Chart 10, bottom panel) very compelling. This will be especially true if Emerging Market growth accelerates in 2022 on the back of increased Chinese stimulus and a COVID vaccination campaign that is already picking up steam.5 Bottom Line: US bond investors should shift some allocation out of expensive US investment grade corporate bonds and into USD-denominated investment grade EM Sovereigns and Corporates where valuation is more compelling.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “2022 Will Be All About Inflation”, dated September 14, 2021. 2 Chart 3B shows that 4 participants expect core PCE inflation of 1.9%-2.0% in 2023, but the SEP also reveals that the minimum forecast for core PCE in 2023 is 2.0%. In other words, all 4 participants in that range are forecasting 2.0%, not 1.9%. 3 For more details on the relationship between our 5-year/5-year forward yield target and the yield curve please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A Bump On The Road To Recovery”, dated July 27, 2021. 4  Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Expected Returns In Corporate Bonds”, dated September 21, 2021. 5 For a recent debate about the outlook for Emerging Market assets please see last Friday’s Webcast: https://www.bcaresearch.com/webcasts/detail/458 Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns

Highlights Economy – We find the leading arguments for why households’ excess savings won’t be spent to be wanting: US households do not commonly demonstrate the detached foresight that Ricardian equivalence takes as given and the trauma-will-change-behavior thesis fails to account for the absence of widespread financial trauma. Markets – Public equities account for a record portion of household wealth, but their share gains are not a sign of a budding mania: Our analysis of the Fed’s Flow of Funds data argues that much of equities’ relative share gains have been driven by structural rather than cyclical factors. Strategy – It would be premature to shift to defensive asset allocation settings if monetary policy is going to remain accommodative for another three years: The rate hike progression envisioned by FOMC participants’ dot-plot projections suggests policy won’t become tight until late 2024 at the earliest. Feature The US Investment Strategy team has been at the more bullish end of the continuum within BCA, and among the broader strategist community, since the spring of 2020. Our view was premised on the idea that the fiscal and monetary policy responses to the pandemic were (and would continue to be) so large that they would overwhelm its adverse effects on the economy and markets. That view came to pass as Congress augmented the CARES Act’s fiscal largesse with two subsequent rounds of direct payments to households earning up to $100,000 per adult and a renewed federal supplement to unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. With the expiration of the UI benefit program at the beginning of the month and the Fed poised to end asset purchases by the middle of next year, clients have begun to ask if our underlying bullish premise still applies. We believe that it does, on the grounds that policy remains on an emergency footing even though the emergency has passed. The fiscal transfers may have ended, but their full effect has yet to be felt. They will support the economy on an ongoing basis as households direct their excess pandemic savings toward consumption. No one knows for sure how much of the excess savings will be spent or when, but the arguments citing Ricardian equivalence or consumer trauma as impediments to consumption are flawed. What If Today’s Income Is Taxed Tomorrow? British classical economist David Ricardo is best known to introductory economics students for comparative advantage, but he also posited that deficit spending may fail to boost aggregate demand because taxpayers, anticipating that they will be tapped in the future to repay state loans, may increase savings to cover future taxes. Despite its theoretical appeal, empirical data in support of Ricardian equivalence is elusive. Two centuries and an ocean removed from Ricardo’s England, we submit that Americans are not known for parsimony, studied caution or a tendency to see the glass as half-empty. Although American households began to rebuild savings after the global financial crisis, an additional dollar has tended to burn a hole in their pockets ever since the baby boomers began reaching adulthood (Chart 1). Chart 1The Searing Trauma Of The Depression Weighed On Consumption Decisions The Searing Trauma Of The Depression Weighed On Consumption Decisions The Searing Trauma Of The Depression Weighed On Consumption Decisions Even if Americans were wont to consider future tax burdens, it may be rational for the households who received the fiscal transfers to assume they will largely escape them unless their relative income surges. Per the most recent adjusted gross income (AGI) distribution data (for tax year 2018), 70% of taxpayers earn $75,000 or less (Chart 2). Single taxpayers meeting that threshold (and married taxpayers earning $150,000 or less) received the full amount of the economic impact payments authorized by the CARES Act and subsequent legislation. That bottom 70% paid just 5.1% of AGI in federal taxes (Chart 3), and the current political climate points in the direction of an increasingly progressive tax system, so they may not have to worry about being called upon to cover the expanding deficit down the road. Chart 2The Income Distribution Is Top Heavy ... Post-Traumatic Bliss Post-Traumatic Bliss Chart 3…But So Is The Tax Burden Post-Traumatic Bliss Post-Traumatic Bliss The (Not So Traumatic) Economic Trauma Of COVID-19 While we are confident that Ricardian equivalence will not act as an impediment to consumption, the ultimate disposition of households’ excess pandemic savings is unknown. Our working assumption has been that half of the savings will be spent across 2021 and 2022. Though we do not have any close antecedents for what households might do with a savings windfall equivalent to 10% of a year’s GDP amassed over a thirteen-month span, we reject the notion that those who experienced COVID-19 will behave like the many shell-shocked survivors of the Great Depression who became lifelong precautionary savers. However terrible the human cost of COVID, it did not ravage American households’ financial position; as the Fed’s latest Flow of Funds report showed, their balance sheets flourished, allowing the vast majority of them to escape any sense of financial trauma. Per the Flow of Funds, American household wealth grew by nearly $6 trillion in the second quarter, extending the last five quarters’ gains to $31 trillion since financial markets cratered when the pandemic burst forth in the first quarter of 2020. The 22% annualized five-quarter gain is nearly four standard deviations above the mean and blows away 4Q03 through 4Q04’s 14% second-place mark by two full standard deviations (Chart 4, top panel). The current run sets a record even when it’s stretched to six quarters to include 1Q20, the worst quarter in series history, and the five- and six-quarter gains are also pacesetters after adjusting for inflation (Chart 4, bottom panel). Chart 4Recessions Aren't So Bad When Congress And The Fed Throw Everything They Have At Them Recessions Aren't So Bad When Congress And The Fed Throw Everything They Have At Them Recessions Aren't So Bad When Congress And The Fed Throw Everything They Have At Them Changes in household net worth lead consumption growth with a two-quarter lag (Chart 5), though the four quarters before the most recent one (the red dots with negative consumption growth) were notable outliers. 2Q21 consumption was just a little more than a percentage point below the best-fit line, however, so it is closing in on its modeled value and we expect it will overshoot it in coming quarters upon the release of pent-up demand. We do not believe that the pandemic will dampen household spending simply because the broad mass of consumers did not experience financial trauma on a scale that would alter future behavior. As household wealth and income data have shown, this recession has been a boon for most Americans. Chart 5Consumption Overshoots Are On The Way Post-Traumatic Bliss Post-Traumatic Bliss Chart 6Fiscal Shock And Awe Post-Traumatic Bliss Post-Traumatic Bliss We additionally reject the notion that households have learned a lesson that will make them want to hold more savings. The financial lesson of the pandemic seems to be that policymakers will do their utmost to shelter them from calamity. Between the economic impact payments (Chart 6, top panel) and the UI benefit supplement (Chart 6, middle panel), Congress directly sent nearly $1.5 trillion to US households to offset $300 billion of lost wages (Chart 6, bottom panel). COVID-19 inflicted terrible distress on those who lost loved ones and witnessed or experienced near fatal suffering, but it boosted the lower three quartiles of households who received transfers and the top decile of households who reveled in the financial markets’ advance. Those who experienced it will not hoard their pennies and shun debt like many of the Depression’s survivors; they are more likely to have experienced post-traumatic bliss than stress when it comes to their financial outlook. Too Much Of A Good Thing? We periodically check in on the Flow of Funds for insight into the evolution of households’ asset allocations and the share of net worth accounted for by homes. Directly owned equities and mutual funds have taken share from the other major categories throughout the pandemic run (Chart 7) and now account for a record share of household financial assets after having surpassed their 2000 highs (Chart 8, top panel). It is sensible to approach any equity milestone that invokes the dot-com bubble with some trepidation, but structural factors go a long way toward explaining the new allocation peak. The financialization of the economy has steadily advanced since the Flow of Funds data began to be compiled in 1951, promoting public equity ownership, and consolidation has supported the transfer of commercial ownership from mom-and-pop operations to corporate interests, many of which are publicly traded. Overall equity in businesses as a share of household net worth is merely in line with its ‘50s levels (Chart 8, bottom panel). Chart 7The Running Of The Bulls The Running Of The Bulls The Running Of The Bulls Chart 8From Mom And Pop To Broad And Wall From Mom And Pop To Broad And Wall From Mom And Pop To Broad And Wall Home price appreciation has picked up, but it is not out of the ordinary (Chart 9). Home equity gains have outstripped home price gains, relative to each series’ history, testifying to prudent behavior on the part of borrowers and lenders. The low aggregate mortgage loan-to-value ratio (Chart 10) suggests that slowing home price appreciation, or even an outright decline, would not be a source of economic instability. Chart 9Home Price Gains Are Not Out Of The Ordinary ... Home Price Gains Are Not Out Of The Ordinary ... Home Price Gains Are Not Out Of The Ordinary ... Chart 10... And Leverage Levels Are Not A Concern ... And Leverage Levels Are Not A Concern ... And Leverage Levels Are Not A Concern The Fed Signals That Tapering Is Near Though the FOMC did not adjust the pace of its asset purchases last week, it indicated that tapering will most likely begin after its November meeting. Chair Powell noted that the economy has made substantial further progress toward reaching the committee’s inflation goal and expressed that “many” members feel that it has made substantial progress toward achieving its full employment objective as well, going so far as to volunteer his personal view that the employment test has been “all but met.” Per the committee’s discussions, the purchases will likely end around the middle of next year if the economy progresses in line with its expectations. The committee would not be talking about reducing the accommodation it’s providing the economy if it weren’t secure in the sense that it is on solid footing. Powell expressed satisfaction with the evolution of inflation expectations (Chart 11) and although the real GDP forecast for this year was lowered in the summary of economic projections (the “dots”), next year’s forecast was raised and slightly higher inflation expectations imply that nominal GDP growth will remain quite robust. A shift in two members’ fed funds rate projections brought the median member’s liftoff date to 2022 from 2023, in line with our view. Chart 11The Fed Has Succeeded In Firming Up Inflation Expectations The Fed Has Succeeded In Firming Up Inflation Expectations The Fed Has Succeeded In Firming Up Inflation Expectations The chair reiterated that tapering – slowing the pace of accommodation – and hiking the fed funds rate – slowing the economy – are distinct actions subject to separate criteria. We see liftoff as a more significant action than tapering, but much will depend on the pace at which the committee lifts the fed funds rate. It is too soon to speculate on the pace, but we stress that the big move for financial markets will occur once the policy rate exceeds the neutral rate. If the latter is somewhere around 2%, the rate hike pace embedded in the dots suggests that it may take until the end of 2024 or early 2025 before monetary policy becomes restrictive. Investment Implications If monetary policy is not going to become tight for another three years, it is premature to shift a portfolio to more defensive settings, especially for anyone sharing our three-to-twelve-month cyclical timeframe. Growth will be robust in the near term, supported by the income boost that the lower three quartiles of taxpayers received from fiscal transfers and the way wealthier households cleaned up as financial asset prices soared. We expect that a hearty portion of the newly minted wealth will be spent, as Ricardian equivalence requires a longer attention span than Americans typically exhibit, and the pandemic was largely trauma-free for most households from a financial perspective. The clearest policy lesson that a citizen should have taken from COVID is that Congress and the Fed have his/her back in a big way. We are staying the course with our risk-friendly asset allocation recommendations.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com

Highlights Global Inflation: Most central banks, led by the Fed, have stuck to the narrative that surging inflation is a temporary phenomenon that will not require an aggressive monetary policy response. However, global supply chain disruptions are lasting for much longer than originally expected, while faster realized global inflation is feeding through into higher longer-term consumer inflation expectations, most notably in the US. This raises the risk that the 2021 inflation pickup will prove to be longer lasting, leading to higher global bond yields. Real Bond Yields: Global bond markets have made a collective bet on the “transitory” inflation narrative by driving yields on government bonds, and even the riskier parts of the corporate credit universe like US and European high-yield, below actual inflation. Markets will have to reprice those negative real bond yields higher if inflation proves to be more persistent than expected - particularly with central banks likely to respond with faster tapering and, in some cases, eventual rate hikes. Feature The month of September has often not been kind to financial markets and September 2021 is already providing many reasons for investors to be nervous. Slowing global growth momentum, uncertainty over the Delta variant, yet another US Debt Ceiling debate in D.C. and worries about excessive Chinese corporate leverage and contagion risks from the looming Evergrande default are all valid reasons for market participants to become more risk averse. On top of that, the monetary policy backdrop is threatening to become less overwhelmingly supportive for markets with the Fed set to begin tapering its asset purchases. Chart of the WeekInflation Expected To Slow But Remain Above Bond Yields Inflation Expected To Slow But Remain Above Bond Yields Inflation Expected To Slow But Remain Above Bond Yields One other source of angst that markets seem less concerned about is inflation. Markets have generally come around to the view of most major central banks, led by the Fed, that the surge in inflation seen this year has been all pandemic related - base effect comparisons to 2020 and temporary supply chain squeezes – and will not last into 2022. Yet we have seen very strong realized global inflation readings in the August data, beyond the point of maximum base effect comparisons versus a year ago, while supply squeezes and soaring shipping costs are showing no signs of slowing as we approach the fourth quarter. Global bond markets have made a collective bet that current high rates of inflation will prove to be temporary. Developed market bond yields are all trading well below actual inflation, as are riskier fixed income asset classes like US and European high-yield (Chart of the Week). While consensus expectations are calling for some rise in government bond yields in 2022, yields are expected to remain below inflation. Those persistent negative real yield expectations remain the biggest source of vulnerability for global bond markets. If inflation turns out to be “less transitory” than expected, nominal bond yields will need to move higher to reprice both real yields and the risk of more hawkish central bank responses to sustained high inflation. A Persistent Inflation Threat From Supply Chain Disruptions Chart 2A Broad-Based Surge In Global Inflation A Broad-Based Surge In Global Inflation A Broad-Based Surge In Global Inflation Our base-case view remains that global inflation will slow in 2022, but not by enough to prevent the major developed market central banks from tapering asset purchases. We expect the Fed to begin buying fewer bonds in January. Central banks that have already begun to slow the pace of quantitative easing (QE) like the Bank of Canada and Bank of England will likely continue to taper as fast, if not even faster, than the Fed. Even the ECB will likely not roll the full amount of the expiring Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP) into the existing pre-COVID asset purchase programs, resulting in a mild form of tapering next year. Our view on global inflation has been predicated on an expected shift away from more externally-driven inflation towards more sustainable domestic price pressures stemming from tightening labor markets and the closing of pandemic output gaps (Chart 2). So the mix of inflation in most developed market countries will be more “core” and less “non-core” inflation driven by higher commodity prices and global supply chain disruptions. Yet there is little sign that those non-core inflation pressures are slowing, particular in price gauges most exposed to supply chains like producer price indices (PPI). US PPI inflation climbed to 15-year high of 8.3% on a year-over-year basis in August, while annual growth in the euro area PPI hit 12.1% in July – the fastest pace in the 30-year history of that data series (Chart 3). Surging PPI inflation reflects global price pressures, with import prices expanding at double-digit rates in both the US and Europe. Some of that more externally driven price pressure stems from commodity markets. While the prices for some notable commodities like lumber and iron ore have seen significant retracements from pandemic-era highs over the past several months, more economically sensitive commodities like aluminum and natural gas have all seen very strong price increases (Chart 4). Copper and oil prices are also holding firm, although both are off 2021 highs. Chart 3No Sign Of Slowing Global Inflation At The Producer Level No Sign Of Slowing Global Inflation At The Producer Level No Sign Of Slowing Global Inflation At The Producer Level The price momentum of overall commodity price indices like the CRB Raw Industrials has clearly rolled over, but has held up much better than would be expected given signs of slowing global growth. Chart 4Commodity Markets Still More Inflationary Than Disinflationary Commodity Markets Still More Inflationary Than Disinflationary Commodity Markets Still More Inflationary Than Disinflationary The current depressed level of the China credit impulse, and the flat year-over-year change of the global PMI, would typically be associated with flat commodity prices rather than the current 34% annual growth rate (Chart 5). A lack of sustained upward pressure on the US dollar is likely helping keep commodity prices, which are priced in dollars, more elevated than expected. Even more important, however, are the low inventories for many commodities relative to firm demand (which largely explains the current surge in aluminum and natural gas prices). This mirrors a broader global economic trend towards companies running lower inventories relative to sales, which has been exacerbated by the economic uncertainties of the COVID-19 pandemic. The US overall business inventory-to-sales ratio is now at the lowest level in the history of the series (Chart 6). Chart 5Commodity Price Inflation Peaking, But Not Slowing Much Commodity Price Inflation Peaking, But Not Slowing Much Commodity Price Inflation Peaking, But Not Slowing Much Chart 6Supply Squeezes Are Likely To Persist Supply Squeezes Are Likely To Persist Supply Squeezes Are Likely To Persist Before the pandemic, firms have gotten away with running very lean inventories because of globalized supply chains that allow firms to maintain the minimum amount of inventory to meet demand. Yet “just-in-time” inventory management only works when suppliers can deliver raw materials or finished goods in a timely fashion at low cost. The pandemic has blown up that model, making it much harder to deliver products and materials from critical countries like China. Global shipping costs have exploded higher and are showing no signs of slowing (bottom panel), while supplier delivery times remain well above historical averages according to measures like the US ISM index. Those higher costs are feeding through into overall inflation measures, particularly for the components most exposed to supply chain disruption. In Chart 7, we show a breakdown of the overall CPI inflation data for the US, euro area, UK and Canada. The groupings shown in the chart are based on an analysis done by the Bank of Canada back in August to measure pandemic impacts on Canadian inflation.1 The top panel of the chart shows the contribution to overall inflation for elements most exposed to supply constraints (like autos and durable goods). The second panel of the chart shows the contribution from sectors more exposed to increased demand as economies reopen from pandemic restrictions, like dining at restaurants and travel. The remaining panels of the chart show the contributions from energy prices and all other components not covered in the top three panels. Chart 7Fed's Transitory Narrative At Risk From Lingering Supply Chain Disruption Fed's Transitory Narrative At Risk From Lingering Supply Chain Disruption Fed's Transitory Narrative At Risk From Lingering Supply Chain Disruption Chart 8High US Inflation May Not Prove To Be So Transitory High US Inflation May Not Prove To Be So Transitory High US Inflation May Not Prove To Be So Transitory The conclusion from our chart is that supply disruptions have added more to US and Canadian inflation so far in 2021, while reopening demand has been more meaningful for UK and US inflation. The pickup in euro area inflation has been mostly an energy price story, although reopening demand has started to contribute to the rising trend of overall inflation. The implication from this analysis is that persistent supply chain disruptions could become a bigger issue for future inflation – and monetary policy decisions – in the US and Canada. The acceleration of US realized inflation in 2021 has already begun to broaden out from the most volatile components, according to measures like the Dallas Fed Trimmed Mean PCE (Chart 8). Faster inflation is also feeding through into higher US consumer inflation expectations according to surveys from the New York Fed and the University of Michigan. Those increases are not deemed to be temporary, with longer-term inflation expectations now moving higher. The New York Fed’s survey shows that inflation is expected to be 4% over the next three years, two full percentage points above the Fed’s target, which must be ringing some alarm bells on the FOMC. Chart 9European Consumers Are Waking Up To Higher Inflation European Consumers Are Waking Up To Higher Inflation European Consumers Are Waking Up To Higher Inflation Consumer inflation expectations are also starting to perk up outside the US. The YouGov/Citigroup survey shows an expectation of UK inflation over the next 5-10 years of 3.5%, while the Bank of England/Kantar survey is at 3% over the next five years (Chart 9, top panel). Both are above the Bank of England’s 2% inflation target. The European Commission confidence surveys have shown a sharp increase in the net share of respondents expecting higher inflation in the coming months (bottom panel), while the Bundesbank’s August consumer survey shows that Germans now expect 3.5% inflation over the next 12 months, up from 2% back in March. Bottom Line: Supply chain disruptions are lasting for much longer than originally expected, while faster realized global inflation is feeding through into higher longer-term consumer inflation expectations, most notably in the US. This raises the risk that the 2021 inflation pickup will last much longer than expected and force a bond-bearish repricing of future interest rate expectations. Negative Real Yields – The Achilles Heel For Bond Markets It is clear that supply chain disruptions are having a more lasting effect on global inflation than investors, and policymakers, expected earlier this year. Yet while both market-based and survey-based measures of inflation expectations are moving higher, interest rate markets are still pricing in a very dovish future path for policy rates of the major developed market central banks. For example, our 24-month discounters, which measure the change in interest rates over the next two years discounted in overnight index swap (OIS) curves, show that only 71bps, 61bps and 13bps of rate hikes are expected in the US, UK and euro area, respectively, by September 2023 (Chart 10). This continues a trend that we have highlighted in recent reports – the persistence of negative real interest rate expectations in the developed markets that is also keeping real bond yields in sub-0% territory. In the US, the OIS forward curve shows that the first Fed rate hike is expected in early 2023 with a very slow pace of rate increases over the following 2-3 years (Chart 11). The funds rate is expected to level off at 1.75% and stay there through 2030. At the same time, the CPI swap forward curve has inflation falling steadily over the next couple of years, but leveling off around 2.35% for the rest of the upcoming decade. Combining those two forward projections comes up with an implied path for the real fed funds rate that is persistently negative for the next ten years, “settling” at -0.6% by the end of the decade. Chart 10Bond Markets Exposed To More Hawkish Central Banks Bond Markets Exposed To More Hawkish Central Banks Bond Markets Exposed To More Hawkish Central Banks Chart 11US Real Yields Priced For Extended Fed Dovishness US Real Yields Priced For Extended Fed Dovishness US Real Yields Priced For Extended Fed Dovishness An even more deeply negative real rate path is discounted in the euro area forward curves. The ECB is expected to begin lifting rates in 2023, eventually moving out of negative (nominal) territory in 2026 before climbing to +0.5% by 2030 (Chart 12). Euro area CPI swaps are priced for a fall in inflation back below 2% over the next two years, eventually stabilizing at 1.75% over the latter half of the next decade. The real ECB policy rate is therefore expected to settle at -1.25% by 2030. In the UK, markets are discounting much of what has been seen in the years since the 2008 financial crisis – a Bank of England that does very little with interest rates. The central bank is expected to begin lifting rates in 2023, but only a handful of rate hikes are expected in the following years with Bank Rate only climbing to 1% and settling there for most of the upcoming decade. The UK CPI swap curve is discounting relatively high inflation over the next decade, settling at 3.6% in 2030. Thus, the market is discounting a long-run real Bank of England policy rate of -2.6%. This pricing of negative real policy rates so far into the future goes a long way to explain why longer-term real government bond yields have also been consistently negative in the US, Germany, UK and elsewhere in the developed markets. That can be seen in Charts 11, 12 and 13, where we have added the 10-year inflation-linked (real) bond yield for US TIPS, French OATis and UK index-linked Gilts. In all three cases, the 10-year real yield has “gravitated” towards the realized path of the real policy rate – the nominal rate minus headline CPI inflation – over the past two decades. Chart 12Negative Real Rates Forever In Europe? Negative Real Rates Forever In Europe? Negative Real Rates Forever In Europe? Chart 13BoE Not Expected To Do Much Over The Next Decade BoE Not Expected To Do Much Over The Next Decade BoE Not Expected To Do Much Over The Next Decade Chart 14Nominal Yields Will Move Higher If Negative Real Yields Persist Nominal Yields Will Move Higher If Negative Real Yields Persist Nominal Yields Will Move Higher If Negative Real Yields Persist Persistent low government bond yields, both in nominal and inflation-adjusted terms, have resulted in lower yields across the global fixed income markets as investors have been forced to take on more risk to find acceptable yields. This has resulted in a situation where nominal yields on riskier assets like US high-yield corporate bonds and Italian government debt are trading below prevailing headline inflation rates in the US and Europe (Chart 14). Bond investors would likely only be comfortable accepting such negative real yields on the riskier parts of the fixed income universe if a) inflation was expected to decline, and/or b) real yields on risk-free government bonds were expected to stay negative for longer as central banks stay dovish. In either case, the “bet” made by investors is that the inflation surge seen this year will indeed prove to be transitory, as central banks are forecasting. If that benign outlook proves to be incorrect and inflation stays resilient for longer – potentially because of the risk of lingering supply chain disruptions described earlier in this report - nominal bond yields will have to reprice higher to account for faster realized inflation (and, most likely, rising inflation expectations). This process will start in government bond markets, as global central banks will be forced to respond to stubbornly high inflation by turning more hawkish, first with faster tapering of QE bond buying and, later, with interest rate hikes. We continue to see persistent negative real yields as the biggest source of risk in developed economy bond markets over the next couple of years. Those yields discount a benign path for both inflation and future monetary policy that is looking increasingly less likely – especially with tightening labor markets and rising consumer inflation expectations already forcing central banks, led by the Fed, to move incrementally towards less accommodative policy settings. Bottom Line: Global bond markets have made a collective bet on the “transitory” inflation narrative by driving yields on government bonds, and even the riskier parts of the corporate credit universe like US and European high-yield, below actual inflation. Markets will have to reprice those negative real bond yields higher if inflation proves to be more persistent than expected - particularly with central banks likely to respond with faster tapering and, in some cases, eventual rate hikes. Stay below-benchmark on overall global duration exposure in fixed income portfolios.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 We have attempted to match the groupings shown in the Bank of Canada analysis as much as possible for the other countries, although there are some minor differences based on how each country’s consumer price index sub-indices are defined. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index What If Higher Inflation Is Not Transitory? What If Higher Inflation Is Not Transitory? Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns