Gov Sovereigns/Treasurys

Mr. X and his daughter, Ms. X, are long-time BCA clients who visit our office toward the end of each year to discuss the economic and financial market outlook. This report is an edited transcript of our recent conversation. Mr. X: I have been eagerly looking forward to this meeting given the recent turbulence in financial markets. Our investments have done poorly in the past year and, with hindsight, I wish I had followed my instincts to significantly cut our equity exposure at the end of 2017, although we did follow your advice to move to a neutral stance in mid-2018. I remain greatly troubled by economic and political developments in many countries. I have long believed in open and free markets and healthy political discourse, and this all seems under challenge. As always, there is much to talk about. Ms. X: Let me add that I also am pleased to have this opportunity to talk through the key issues that will influence our investment strategy over the coming year. As I am sure you remember, I was more optimistic than my father about the outlook when we met a year ago but things have not worked out as well as I had hoped. In retrospect, I should have paid more attention to your view that markets and policy were on a collision course as that turned out to be a very accurate prediction. When I joined the family firm in early 2017, I persuaded my father that we should have a relatively high equity exposure and that was the correct stance. However, this success led us to maintain too much equity exposure in 2018, and my father has done well to resist the temptation to say “I told you so.” So, we are left with a debate similar to last year: Should we move now to an underweight in risk assets or hold off on the hope that prices will reach new highs in the coming year? I am still not convinced that we have seen the peak in risk asset prices as there is no recession on the horizon and equity valuations are much improved, following recent price declines. I will be very interested to hear your views. BCA: Our central theme for 2018 that markets and policy would collide did turn out to be appropriate and, importantly, the story has yet to fully play out. The monetary policy tightening cycle is still at a relatively early stage in the U.S. and has not even begun in many other regions. Yet, although it was a tough year for most equity markets, the conditions for a major bear market are not yet in place. One important change to our view, compared to a year ago, is that we have pushed back the timing of the next U.S. recession. This leaves a window for risk assets to show renewed strength. It remains to be seen whether prices will reach new peaks, but we believe it would be premature to shift to an underweight stance on equities. For the moment, we are sticking with our neutral weighting for risk assets, but may well recommend boosting exposure if prices suffer further near-term weakness. We will need more clarity about the timing of a recession before we consider aggressively cutting exposure. Mr. X: I can see we will have a lively discussion because I do not share your optimism. My list of concerns is long and I hope we have time to get through them all. But first, let’s briefly review your predictions from last year. BCA: That is always interesting to do, although sometimes rather humbling. A year ago, our key conclusions were that: The environment of easy money, low inflation and healthy profit growth that has been so bullish for risk assets will start to change during the coming year. Financial conditions, especially in the U.S., will gradually tighten as decent growth leads to building inflationary pressures, encouraging central banks to withdraw stimulus. With U.S. equities at an overvalued extreme and investor sentiment overly optimistic, this will set the scene for an eventual collision between policy and the markets.  The conditions underpinning the bull market will erode only slowly which means that risk asset prices should continue to rise for at least the next six months. However, long-run investors should start shifting to a neutral exposure. Given our economic and policy views, there is a good chance that we will move to an underweight position in risk assets during the second half of 2018. The U.S. economy is already operating above potential and thus does not need any boost from easier fiscal policy. Any major tax cuts risk overheating the economy, encouraging the Federal Reserve to hike interest rates and boosting the probability of a recession in 2019. This is at odds with the popular view that tax cuts will be good for the equity market. A U.S. move to scrap NAFTA would add to downside risks. For the second year in a row, the IMF forecasts of economic growth for the coming year are likely to prove too pessimistic. The end of fiscal austerity has allowed the Euro Area economy to gather steam and this should be sustained in 2018. However, the slow progress in negotiating a Brexit deal with the EU poses a threat to the U.K. economy. China’s economy is saddled with excessive debt and excess capacity in a number of areas. Any other economy would have collapsed by now, but the government has enough control over banking and other sectors to prevent a crisis. Growth should hold above 6% in the next year or two, although much will depend on how aggressively President Xi pursues painful reforms. The market is too optimistic in assuming that the Fed will not raise interest rates by as much as indicated in their “dots” projections. There is a good chance that the U.S. yield curve will become flat or inverted by late 2018. Bonds are not an attractive investment at current yields. Only Greece and Portugal have real 10-year government bond yields above their historical average. Corporate bonds should outperform governments, but a tightening in financial conditions will put these at risk in the second half of 2018. The Euro Area and Japanese equity markets should outperform the U.S. over the next year reflecting their better valuations and more favorable financial conditions. Developed markets should outperform the emerging market index. Historically, the U.S. equity market has led recessions by between 3 and 12 months. If, as we fear, a U.S. recession starts in the second half of 2019, then the stock market would be at risk from the middle of 2018. The improving trend in capital spending should favor industrial stocks. Our other two overweight sectors are energy and financials. The oil price will be well supported by strong demand and output restraint by OPEC and Russia. The Brent price should average $65 a barrel over the coming year, with risks to the upside. We expect base metals prices to trade broadly sideways but will remain highly dependent on developments in China. Modest positions in gold are warranted. Relative economic and policy trends will favor a firm dollar in 2018. Unlike at the start of 2017, investors are significantly short the dollar which is bullish from a contrary perspective. Sterling is quite cheap but Brexit poses downside risks. The key market-relevant geopolitical events to monitor will be fiscal policy and mid-term elections in the U.S., and reform policies in China. With the former, the Democrats have a good chance of winning back control of the House of Representatives, creating a scenario of complete policy gridlock. A balanced portfolio is likely to generate average returns of only 3.3% a year in nominal terms over the next decade. This compares to average returns of around 10% a year between 1982 and 2017. As already noted, the broad theme that policy tightening – especially in the U.S. – would become a problem for asset markets during the year was supported by events. However, the exact timing was hard to predict. The indexes for non-U.S. developed equity markets and emerging markets peaked in late-January 2018, and have since dropped by around 18% and 24%, respectively (Chart 1). On the other hand, the U.S. market, after an early 2018 sell-off, hit a new peak in September, before falling anew in the past couple of months. The MSCI All-Country World index currently is about 6% below end-2017 levels in local-currency terms. Chart 1Our 'Collision Course' Theme For 2018 Played Out Our 'Collision Course' Theme For 2018 Played Out Our 'Collision Course' Theme For 2018 Played Out We started the year recommending an overweight in developed equity markets but, as you noted, shifted that to a neutral position mid-year. A year ago, we thought we might move to an underweight stance in the second half of 2018 but decided against this because U.S. fiscal stimulus boosted corporate earnings and extended the economic cycle. Our call that emerging markets would underperform was on target. Although it was U.S. financial conditions that tightened the most, Wall Street was supported by the large cut in the corporate tax rate while the combination of higher bond yields and dollar strength was a major problem for many indebted emerging markets. Overall, it was not a good year for financial markets (Table 1). Table 1Market Performance OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence As far as the overall macro environment was concerned, we were correct in predicting that the IMF was too pessimistic on economic growth. A year ago, the IMF forecast that the advanced economies would expand by 2% in 2018 and that has since been revised up to 2.4% (Table 2). This offset a slight downgrading to the performance of emerging economies. The U.S., Europe and Japan all grew faster than previously expected. Not surprisingly, inflation also was higher than forecast, although in the G7, it has remained close to the 2% level targeted by most central banks. Table 2IMF Economic Forecasts OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Despite widespread fears to the contrary, the data have supported our view that Chinese growth would hold above a 6% pace in 2018. Nevertheless, a slowdown currently is underway and downside risks remain very much in place in terms of excessive credit and trade pressures. Another difficult year lies ahead for the Chinese authorities and we will no doubt return to this topic later. As far as our other key forecasts are concerned, we were correct in our views that oil prices and the U.S. dollar would rise and that the market would be forced to revise up its predictions of Fed rate hikes. Of course, oil has recently given back its earlier gains, but we assume that is a temporary setback. On the sector front, our macro views led us to favor industrials, financials and energy, but that did not work out well as concerns about trade took a toll on cyclical sectors. Overall, there were no major macro surprises in 2018, and it seems clear that we have yet to resolve the key questions and issues that we discussed a year ago. At that time, we were concerned about the development of late-cycle pressures that ultimately would undermine asset prices. That story has yet to fully play out. It is hard to put precise timing on when the U.S. economy will peak and, thus, when asset prices will be at maximum risk. Nevertheless, our base case is that there likely will be a renewed and probably final run-up in asset prices before the next recession. Late-Cycle Challenges Mr. X: This seems like déjà-vu all over again. Since we last met, the cycle is one year older and, as you just said, the underlying challenges facing economies and markets have not really changed. If anything, things are even worse: Global debt levels are higher, inflation pressures more evident, Fed policy is moving closer to restrictive territory and protectionist policies have ratcheted up. If it was right to be cautious six months ago, then surely we should be even more cautious now. Ms. X: Oh dear, it does seem like a repeat of last year’s discussion because, once again, I am more optimistic than my father. Obviously, there are structural problems in a number of countries and, at some point, the global economy will suffer another recession. But timing is everything, and I attach very low odds to a downturn in the coming year. Meanwhile, I see many pockets of value in the equity market. Rather than cut equity positions, I am inclined to look for buying opportunities. BCA: We sympathize with your different perspectives because the outlook is complex and we also have lively debates about the view. The global equity index currently is a little below where it was when we met last year, but there has been tremendous intra-period volatility. That pattern seems likely to be repeated in 2019. In other words, it will be important to be flexible about your investment strategy. You both make good points. It is true that there are several worrying problems regarding the economic outlook, including excessive debt, protectionism and building inflation risks. At the same time, the classic conditions for an equity bear market are not yet in place, and may not be for some time. This leaves us in the rather uncomfortable position of sitting on the fence with regard to risk asset exposure. We are very open to raising exposure should markets weaken further in the months ahead, but also are keeping careful watch for signs that the economic cycle is close to peaking. In other words, it would be a mistake to lock in a 12-month strategy right now. Mr. X: I would like to challenge the consensus view, shared by my daughter, that the next recession will not occur before 2020, and might even be much later. The main rationale seems to be that the policy environment remains accommodative and there are none of the usual imbalances that occur ahead of recessions. Of course, U.S. fiscal policy has given a big boost to growth in the past year, but I assume the effects will wear off sharply in 2019. More importantly, there is huge uncertainty about the level of interest rates that will trigger economic problems. It certainly has not taken much in the way of Fed rate hikes to rattle financial markets. Thus, monetary policy may become restrictive much sooner than generally believed. I also strongly dispute the idea that there are no major financial imbalances. If running U.S. federal deficits of $1 trillion in the midst of an economic boom is not an imbalance, then I don’t know what is! At the same time, the U.S. corporate sector has issued large amounts of low-quality debt, and high-risk products such as junk-bond collateralized debt obligations have made an unwelcome reappearance. It seems that the memories of 2007-09 have faded. It is totally normal for long periods of extremely easy money to be accompanied by growing leverage and increasingly speculative financial activities, and I don’t see why this period should be any different. And often, the objects of speculation are not discovered until financial conditions become restrictive. Finally, there are huge risks associated with rising protectionism, the Chinese economy appears to be struggling, Italy’s banks are a mess, and the Brexit fiasco poses a threat to the U.K. economy. Starting with the U.S., please go ahead and convince me why a recession is more than a year away. BCA: It is natural for you to worry that a recession is right around the corner. The current U.S. economic expansion will become the longest on record if it makes it to July 2019, at which point it will surpass the 1990s expansion. Economists have a long and sad history of failing to forecast recessions. Therefore, a great deal of humility is warranted when it comes to predicting the evolution of the business cycle. The Great Recession was one of the deepest downturns on record and the recovery has been fairly sluggish by historic standards. Thus, it has taken much longer than usual for the U.S. economy to return to full employment. Looking out, there are many possible risks that could trip up the U.S. economy but, for the moment, we see no signs of recession on the horizon (Chart 2). For example, the leading economic indicator is still in an uptrend, the yield curve has not inverted and our monetary indicators are not contracting. Our proprietary recession indicator also suggests that the risk is currently low, although recent stock market weakness implies some deterioration. Chart 2Few U.S Recession 'Red Flags' Few U.S Recession 'Red Flags' Few U.S Recession 'Red Flags' The buildup in corporate debt is a cause for concern and we are not buyers of corporate bonds at current yields. However, the impact of rising yields on the economy is likely to be manageable. The interest coverage ratio for the economy as a whole – defined as the profits corporations generate for every dollar of interest paid – is still above its historic average (Chart 3). Corporate bonds are also generally held by non-leveraged investors such as pension funds, insurance companies, and ETFs. The impact of defaults on the economy tends to be more severe when leveraged institutions are the ones that suffer the greatest losses. Chart 3Interest Costs Not Yet A Headwind Interest Costs Not Yet A Headwind Interest Costs Not Yet A Headwind We share your worries about the long-term fiscal outlook. However, large budget deficits do not currently imperil the economy. The U.S. private sector is running a financial surplus, meaning that it earns more than it spends (Chart 4). Not only does this make the economy more resilient, it also provides the government with additional savings with which to finance its budget deficit. If anything, the highly accommodative stance of fiscal policy has pushed up the neutral rate of interest, giving the Fed greater scope to raise rates before monetary policy enters restrictive territory. The impetus of fiscal policy on the economy will be smaller in 2019 than it was in 2018, but it will still be positive (Chart 5). Chart 4The U.S. Private Sector Is Helping To Finance The Fiscal Deficit The U.S. Private Sector Is Helping To Finance The Fiscal Deficit The U.S. Private Sector Is Helping To Finance The Fiscal Deficit Chart 5U.S. Fiscal Policy Still Stimulative In 2019 U.S. Fiscal Policy Still Stimulative In 2019 U.S. Fiscal Policy Still Stimulative In 2019 The risks to growth are more daunting outside the U.S. As you point out, Italy is struggling to contain borrowing costs, a dark cloud hangs over the Brexit negotiations, and China and most other emerging markets have seen growth slow meaningfully. The U.S., however, is a relatively closed economy – it is not as dependent on trade as most other countries. Its financial system is reasonably resilient thanks to the capital its banks have raised over the past decade. In addition, Dodd-Frank and other legislation have made it more difficult for financial institutions to engage in reckless risk-taking. Mr. X: I would never take a benign view of the ability and willingness of financial institutions to engage in reckless behavior, but maybe I am too cynical. Even if you are right that debt does not pose an immediate threat to the market, surely it will become a huge problem in the next downturn. If the U.S. federal deficit is $1 trillion when the economy is strong, it is bound to reach unimaginable levels in a recession. And, to make matters worse, the Federal Reserve may not have much scope to lower interest rates if they peak at a historically low level in the next year or so. What options will policymakers have to respond to the next cyclical downturn? Is there a limit to how much quantitative easing central banks can do? BCA: The Fed is aware of the challenges it faces if the next recession begins when interest rates are still quite low. Raising rates rapidly in order to have more “ammunition” for counteracting the downturn would hardly be the best course of action as this would only bring forward the onset of the recession. A better strategy is to let the economy overheat a bit so that inflation rises. This would allow the Fed to push real rates further into negative territory if the recession turns out to be severe. There is no real limit on how much quantitative easing the Fed can undertake. The FOMC will undoubtedly turn to asset purchases and forward guidance again during the next economic downturn. Now that the Fed has crossed the Rubicon into unorthodox monetary policy without generating high inflation, policymakers are likely to try even more exotic policies, such as price-level targeting. The private sector tends to try to save more during recessions. Thus, even though the fiscal deficit would widen during the next downturn, there should be plenty of buyers for government debt. However, once the next recovery begins, the Fed may feel increasing political pressure to keep rates low in order to allow the government to maintain its desired level of spending and taxes. The Fed guards its independence fiercely, but in a world of increasingly political populism, that independence may begin to erode. This will not happen quickly, but to the extent that it does occur, higher inflation is likely to be the outcome. Ms. X: I would like to explore the U.S.-China dynamic a bit more because I see that as one of the main challenges to my more optimistic view. I worry that President Trump will continue to take a hard line on China trade because it plays well with his base and has broad support in Congress. And I equally worry that President Xi will not want to be seen giving in to U.S. bullying. How do you see this playing out? BCA: Investors hoping that U.S. President Donald Trump and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping will reach a deal to end the trade war on the sidelines of the forthcoming G20 leaders' summit in Buenos Aires are likely to be disappointed. President Trump's fiscal policy is completely inconsistent with his trade agenda. Fiscal stimulus in a full-employment economy will suck in imports. It also forces the Fed to raise rates more aggressively than it otherwise would, leading to a stronger dollar. The result will be a larger U.S. trade deficit. Trump will not be able to blame Canada or Mexico for a deteriorating trade position because he just signed a trade agreement with them. The new USMCA agreement is remarkably similar to NAFTA, with the notable exception that it contains a clause barring Canada and Mexico from negotiating bilateral trade deals with China. This means Trump needs a patsy who will take the blame for America's burgeoning trade deficit and China will fill that role. For his part, President Xi knows full well that he will still be China’s leader when Trump is long gone. Giving in to Trump’s demands would hurt him politically. All this means that the trade war will persist. Mr. X: I see a trade war as a major threat to the economy, but it is not the only thing that could derail the economic expansion. Let’s explore that issue in more detail. The Economic Outlook Mr. X: You have shown in previous research that housing is often a very good leading indicator of the U.S. economy, largely because it is very sensitive to changes in the monetary environment. Are you not concerned about the marked deterioration in recent U.S. housing data? BCA: Recent trends in housing have indeed been disappointing, with residential investment acting as a drag on growth for three consecutive quarters. The weakness has been broad-based with sales, the rate of price appreciation of home prices, and builder confidence all declining (Chart 6). Even though the level of housing affordability is decent by historical standards, there has been a fall in the percentage of those who believe that it is a good time to buy a home. Chart 6Recent Softness In U.S. Housing Recent Softness In U.S. Housing Recent Softness In U.S. Housing There are a few possible explanations for the weakness. First, the 2007-09 housing implosion likely had a profound and lasting impact on the perceived attractiveness of home ownership. The homeownership rate for people under 45 has remained extremely low by historical standards. Secondly, increased oversight and tighter regulations have curbed mortgage supply. Finally, the interest rate sensitivity of the sector may have increased with the result that even modest increases in the mortgage rate have outsized effects. That, in turn, could be partly explained by recent tax changes that capped the deduction on state and local property taxes, while lowering the limit on the tax deductibility of mortgage interest. The trend in housing is definitely a concern, but the odds of a further major contraction seem low. Unlike in 2006, the home vacancy rate stands near record levels and the same is true for the inventory of homes. The pace of housebuilding is below the level implied by demographic trends and consumer fundamentals are reasonably healthy. The key to the U.S. economy lies with business investment and consumer spending and these areas are well supported for the moment. Consumers are benefiting from continued strong growth in employment and a long overdue pickup in wages. Meanwhile, the ratio of net worth-to-income has surpased the previous peak and the ratio of debt servicing-to-income is low (Chart 7). Last year, we expressed some concern that the depressed saving rate might dampen spending, but the rate has since been revised substantially higher. Based on its historical relationship with U.S. household net worth, there is room for the saving rate to fall, fueling more spending. Real consumer spending has grown by 3% over the past year and there is a good chance of maintaining that pace during most of 2019. Chart 7U.S. Consumer Fundamentals Are Healthy U.S. Consumer Fundamentals Are Healthy U.S. Consumer Fundamentals Are Healthy Turning to capital spending, the cut in corporate taxes was obviously good for cash flow, and surveys show a high level of business confidence. Moreover, many years of business caution toward spending has pushed up the average age of the nonresidential capital stock to the highest level since 1963 (Chart 8). Higher wages should also incentivize firms to invest in more machinery. Absent some new shock to confidence, business investment should stay firm during the next year. Chart 8An Aging Capital Stock An Aging Capital Stock An Aging Capital Stock Overall, we expect the pace of U.S. economic growth to slow from its recent strong level, but it should hold above trend, currently estimated to be around 2%. As discussed earlier, that means capacity pressures will intensify, causing inflation to move higher. Ms. X: I share the view that the U.S. economy will continue to grow at a healthy pace, but I am less sure about the rest of the world. BCA: You are right to be concerned. We expected U.S. and global growth to diverge in 2018, but not by as much as occurred. Several factors have weighed on CEO confidence outside of the U.S., including trade wars, a strong dollar, higher oil prices, emerging market turbulence, the return of Italian debt woes, and a slowdown in the Chinese economy. The stress has shown up in the global manufacturing PMI, although the latter is still at a reasonably high level (Chart 9). Global export growth is moderating and the weakness appears to be concentrated in capex. Capital goods imports for the major economies, business investment, and the production of investment-related goods have all decelerated this year. Chart 9Global Manufacturing Slowdown Global Manufacturing Slowdown Global Manufacturing Slowdown Our favorite global leading indicators are also flashing yellow (Chart 10). BCA’s global leading economic indicator has broken below the boom/bust line and its diffusion index suggests further downside. The global ZEW composite and the BCA boom/bust indicator are both holding below zero. Chart 10Global Growth Leading Indicators Global Growth Leading Indicators Global Growth Leading Indicators Current trends in the leading indicators shown in Chart 11 imply that the growth divergence between the U.S. and the rest of the world will remain a key theme well into 2019. Among the advanced economies, Europe and Japan are quite vulnerable to the global soft patch in trade and capital spending. Chart 11Global Economic Divergence Will Continue Global Economic Divergence Will Continue Global Economic Divergence Will Continue The loss of momentum in the Euro Area economy, while expected, has been quite pronounced. Part of this is due to the dissipation of the 2016/17 economic boost related to improved health in parts of the European banking system that sparked a temporary surge in credit growth. The tightening in Italian financial conditions following the government’s budget standoff with the EU has weighed on overall Euro Area growth. Softer Chinese demand for European exports, uncertainties related to U.S. trade policy and the torturous Brexit negotiations, have not helped the situation. Real GDP growth decelerated to close to a trend pace by the third quarter of 2018. The manufacturing PMI has fallen from a peak of 60.6 in December 2017 to 51.5, mirroring a 1% decline in the OECD’s leading economic indicator for the region. Not all the economic news has been bleak. Both consumer and industrial confidence remain at elevated levels according to the European Commission (EC) surveys, consistent with a resumption of above-trend growth. Even though exports have weakened substantially from the booming pace in 2017, the EC survey on firms’ export order books remains at robust levels (Chart 12). Importantly for the Euro Area, the bank credit impulse has moved higher.The German economy should also benefit from a rebound in vehicle production which plunged earlier this year following the introduction of new emission standards. Chart 12Europe: Slowing, But No Disaster Europe: Slowing, But No Disaster Europe: Slowing, But No Disaster We interpret the 2018 Euro Area slowdown as a reversion-to-the-mean rather than the start of an extended period of sub-trend growth. Real GDP growth should fluctuate slightly above trend pace through 2019. Given that the Euro Area’s output gap is almost closed, the ECB will not deviate from its plan to end its asset purchase program by year end. Gradual rate hikes should begin late in 2019, assuming that inflation is closer to target by then. In contrast, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) is unlikely to change policy anytime soon. The good news is that wages have finally begun to grow at about a 2% pace, although it required extreme labor shortages. Yet, core inflation is barely positive and long-term inflation expectations are a long way from the 2% target. The inflation situation will have to improve significantly before the BoJ can consider adjusting or removing the Yield Curve Control policy. This is especially the case since the economy has hit a bit of an air pocket and the government intends to raise the VAT in 2019. Japan’s industrial production has stalled and we expect the export picture to get worse before it gets better. We do not anticipate any significant economic slack to develop, but even a sustained growth slowdown could partially reverse the gains that have been made on the inflation front. Ms. X: We can’t talk about the global economy without discussing China. You have noted in the past how the authorities are walking a tightrope between trying to unwind the credit bubble and restructure the economy on the one hand, and prevent a destabilizing economic and financial crisis on the other. Thus far, they have not fallen off the tightrope, but there has been limited progress in resolving the country’s imbalances. And now the authorities appear to be stimulating growth again, risking an even bigger buildup of credit. Can it all hold together for another year? BCA: That’s a very good question. Thus far, there is not much evidence that stimulus efforts are working. Credit growth is still weak and leading economic indicators have not turned around (Chart 13). There is thus a case for more aggressive reflation, but the authorities also remain keen to wean the economy off its addiction to debt. Chart 13China: No Sign Of Reacceleration China: Credit Impulse Remains Weak China: Credit Impulse Remains Weak Waves of stimulus have caused total debt to soar from 140% of GDP in 2008 to about 260% of GDP at present (Chart 14). As is usually the case, rapid increases in leverage have been associated with a misallocation of capital. Since most of the new credit has been used to finance fixed-asset investment, the result has been overcapacity in a number of areas. For example, the fact that 15%-to-20% of apartments are sitting vacant is a reflection of overbuilding. Meanwhile, the rate of return on assets in the state-owned corporate sector has fallen below borrowing costs. Chart 14China: Debt Still Rising China: Debt Still Rising China: Debt Still Rising Chinese exports are holding up well so far, but this might only represent front-running ahead of the implementation of higher tariffs. Judging from the steep drop in the export component of both the official and private-sector Chinese manufacturing PMI, exports are likely to come under increasing pressure over the next few quarters as the headwinds from higher tariffs fully manifest themselves (Chart 15). Chart 15Chinese Exports About To Suffer Chinese Exports About To Suffer Chinese Exports About To Suffer The most likely outcome is that the authorities will adjust the policy dials just enough to stabilize growth sometime in the first half of 2019. The bottoming in China’s broad money impulse offers a ray of hope (Chart 16). Still, it is a tentative signal at best and it will take some time before this recent easing in monetary policy shows up in our credit impulse measure and, later, economic growth. A modest firming in Chinese growth in the second half of 2019 would provide a somewhat stronger demand backdrop for commodities and emerging economies that sell goods to China. Chart 16A Ray Of Hope From Broad Money bca.bca_mp_2018_12_01_c16 bca.bca_mp_2018_12_01_c16 Ms. X: If you are correct about a stabilization in the Chinese economy next year, this presumably would be good news for emerging economies, especially if the Fed goes on hold. EM assets have been terribly beaten down and I am looking for an opportunity to buy. BCA: Fed rate hikes might have been the catalyst for the past year’s pain in EM assets, but it is not the underlying problem. As we highlighted at last year’s meeting, the troubles for emerging markets run much deeper. Our long-held caution on emerging economies and markets is rooted in concern about deteriorating fundamentals. Excessive debt is a ticking time bomb for many of these countries; EM dollar-denominated debt is now as high as it was in the late 1990s as a share of both GDP and exports (Chart 17). Moreover, the declining long-term growth potential for emerging economies as a group makes it more difficult for them to service the debt. The structural downtrend in EM labor force and productivity growth underscores that trend GDP growth has collapsed over the past three decades (Chart 17, bottom panel). Chart 17EM Debt A Problem Given Slowing Supply-Side... EM Debt A Problem Given Slowing Supply-Side... EM Debt A Problem Given Slowing Supply-Side... Decelerating global growth has exposed these poor fundamentals. EM sovereign spreads have moved wider in conjunction with falling PMIs and slowing industrial production and export growth. And it certainly does not help that the Fed is tightening dollar-based liquidity conditions. EM equities usually fall when U.S. financial conditions tighten (Chart 18). Chart 18...And Tightening Financial Conditions ...And Tightening Financial Conditions ...And Tightening Financial Conditions Chart 19 highlights the most vulnerable economies in terms of foreign currency funding requirements, and foreign debt-servicing obligations relative to total exports. Turkey stands out as the most vulnerable, along with Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Chile, and Colombia. In contrast, Emerging Asia appears to be in better shape relative to the crisis period of the late 1990s. Chart 19Spot The Outliers OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence The backdrop for EM assets is likely to get worse in the near term, given our view that the Fed will continue to tighten and China will be cautious about stimulating more aggressively. Our base case outlook sees some relief in the second half of 2019, but it is more of a “muddle-through” scenario than a V-shaped economic recovery. Mr. X: Perhaps EM assets could enjoy a bounce next year if the Chinese economy stabilizes, but the poor macro fundamentals you mentioned suggest that it would be a trade rather than a buy-and-hold proposition. I am inclined to avoid the whole asset class in 2019. Bond Market Prospects Ms. X: Let’s turn to fixed income now. I was bearish on bonds in 2018, but yields have risen quite a bit, at least in the United States. The Fed has lifted the fed funds rate by 100 basis points over the past year and I don’t see a lot of upside for inflation. So perhaps yields have peaked and will move sideways in 2019, which would be good for stocks in my view. BCA: Higher yields have indeed improved bond value recently. Nonetheless, they are not cheap enough to buy at this point (Chart 20). The real 10-year Treasury yield, at close to 1%, is still depressed by pre-Lehman standards. Long-term real yields in Germany and Japan remain in negative territory at close to the lowest levels ever recorded. Chart 20Real Yields Still Very Depressed Real Yields Still Very Depressed Real Yields Still Very Depressed We called the bottom in global nominal bond yields in 2016. Our research at the time showed that the cyclical and structural factors that had depressed yields were at an inflection point, and were shifting in a less bond-bullish direction. Perhaps most important among the structural factors, population aging and a downward trend in underlying productivity growth resulted in lower equilibrium bond yields over the past couple of decades. Looking ahead, productivity growth could stage a mild rebound in line with the upturn in the growth rate of the capital stock (Chart 21). As for demographics, the age structure of the world population is transitioning from a period in which aging added to the global pool of savings to one in which aging is beginning to drain that pool as people retire and begin to consume their nest eggs (Chart 22). The household saving rates in the major advanced economies should trend lower in the coming years, placing upward pressure on equilibrium global bond yields. Chart 21Productivity Still Has Some Upside Productivity Still Has Some Upside Productivity Still Has Some Upside Chart 22Demographics Past The Inflection Point Demographics Past The Inflection Point Demographics Past The Inflection Point Cyclical factors are also turning against bonds. U.S. inflation has returned to target and the Fed is normalizing short-term interest rates. The market currently is priced for only one more rate hike after December 2018 in this cycle, but we see rates rising more than that. Treasury yields will follow as market expectations adjust. Long-term inflation expectations are still too low in the U.S. and most of the other major economies to be consistent with central banks’ meeting their inflation targets over the medium term. As actual inflation edges higher, long-term expectations built into bond yields will move up. The term premium portion of long-term bond yields is also too low. This is the premium that investors demand to hold longer-term bonds. Our estimates suggest that the term premium is still negative in the advanced economies outside of the U.S., which is not sustainable over the medium term (Chart 23). Chart 23Term Premia Are Too Low Term Premia Are Too Low Term Premia Are Too Low We expect term premia to rise for two main reasons. First, investors have viewed government bonds as a good hedge for their equity holdings because bond prices have tended to rise when stock prices fell. Investors have been willing to pay a premium to hold long-term bonds to benefit from this hedging effect. But the correlation is now beginning to change as inflation and inflation expectations gradually adjust higher and output gaps close. As the hedging benefit wanes, the term premium should rise back into positive territory. Second, central bank bond purchases and forward guidance have depressed yields as well as interest-rate volatility. The latter helped to depress term premia in the bond market. This effect, too, is beginning to unwind. The Fed is letting its balance sheet shrink by about $50 billion per month. The Bank of England has kept its holdings of gilts and corporate bonds constant for over a year, while the ECB is about to end asset purchases. The Bank of Japan continues to buy assets, but at a much reduced pace. All this means that the private sector is being forced to absorb a net increase in government bonds for the first time since 2014 (Chart 24). Chart 25 shows that bond yields in the major countries will continue to trend higher as the rapid expansion of central bank balance sheets becomes a thing of the past. Chart 24Private Sector To Absorb More Bonds OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Chart 25QE Unwind Will Weigh On Bond Prices QE Unwind Will Weigh On Bond Prices QE Unwind Will Weigh On Bond Prices Ms. X: I’m not a fan of bonds at these levels, but that sounds overly bearish to me, especially given the recent plunge in oil prices. BCA: Lower oil prices will indeed help to hold down core inflation to the extent that energy prices leak into non-energy prices in the near term. Nonetheless, in the U.S., this effect will be overwhelmed by an overheated economy. From a long-term perspective, we believe that investors still have an overly benign view of the outlook for yields. The market expects that the 10-year Treasury yield in ten years will only be slightly above today’s spot yield, which itself is still very depressed by historical standards (Chart 26). And that also is the case in the other major bond markets. Chart 26Forward Yields Are Too Low Forward Yields Are Too Low Forward Yields Are Too Low Of course, it will not be a straight line up for yields – there will be plenty of volatility. We expect the 10-year Treasury yield to peak sometime in 2019 or early 2020 in the 3.5%-to-4% range, before the next recession sends yields temporarily lower. Duration should be kept short at least until the middle of 2019, with an emphasis on TIPS relative to conventional Treasury bonds. We will likely downgrade TIPS versus conventionals once long-term inflation expectations move into our target range, which should occur sometime during 2019. The ECB and Japan will not be in a position to raise interest rates for some time, but the bear phase in U.S. Treasurys will drag up European and Japanese bond yields (at the very long end of the curve for the latter). Total returns are likely to be negative in all of the major bond markets in 2019. Real 10-year yields in all of the advanced economies are still well below their long-term average, except for Greece, Italy and Portugal (Chart 27). Chart 27Valuation Ranking Of Developed Bond Markets OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Within global bond portfolios, we recommend being underweight bond markets where central banks are in a position to raise short-term interest rates (the U.S. and Canada), and overweight those that are not (Japan and Australia). The first ECB rate hike is unlikely before the end of 2019. However, the imminent end of the asset purchase program argues for no more than a benchmark allocation to core European bond markets within global fixed-income portfolios, especially since real 10-year yields in parts of continental Europe are the furthest below their long-term average. We are overweight gilts at the moment, but foresee shifting to underweight in 2019, depending on how Brexit plays out. Ms. X: What about corporate bonds? I know that total returns for corporates will be poor if government bond yields are rising. But you recommended overweighting corporate bonds relative to Treasurys last year. Given your view that the next U.S. recession is more than a year away, it seems reasonable to assume they will outperform government bonds. BCA: We were overweight corporates in the first half of 2018, but took profits in June and shifted to neutral at the same time that we downgraded our equity allocation. Spreads had tightened to levels that did not compensate investors for the risks. Recent spread widening has returned some value to U.S. corporates. The 12-month breakeven spreads for A-rated and Baa-rated corporate bonds are almost back up to their 50th percentile relative to history (Chart 28). Still, these levels are not attractive enough to justify buying based on valuation alone. As for high-yield, any rise in the default rate would quickly overwhelm the yield pickup in this space. Chart 28Corporate Bond Yields Still Have Upside Corporate Bond Yields Still Have Upside Corporate Bond Yields Still Have Upside It is possible that some of the spread widening observed in October and November will reverse, but corporates offer a poor risk/reward tradeoff, even if the default rate stays low. Corporate profit growth is bound to decelerate in 2019. This would not be a disaster for equities, but slowing profit growth is more dangerous for corporate bond excess returns because the starting point for leverage is already elevated. As discussed above, at a macro level, the aggregate interest coverage ratio for the U.S. corporate sector is decent by historical standards. However, this includes mega-cap companies that have little debt and a lot of cash. Our bottom-up research suggests that interest coverage ratios for firms in the Bloomberg Barclays corporate bond index will likely drop close to multi-decade lows during the next recession, sparking a wave of downgrade activity and fallen angels. Seeing this coming, investors may require more yield padding to compensate for these risks as profit growth slows. Our next move will likely be to downgrade corporate bonds to underweight. We are watching the yield curve, bank lending standards, profit growth, and monetary indicators for signs to further trim exposure. You should already be moving up in quality within your corporate bond allocation. Mr. X: We have already shifted to underweight corporate bonds in our fixed income portfolio. Even considering the cheapening that has occurred over the past couple of months, spread levels still make no sense in terms of providing compensation for credit risk. Equity Market Outlook Ms. X: While we all seem to agree that corporate bonds are not very attractive, I believe that enough value has been restored to equities that we should upgrade our allocation, especially if the next recession is two years away. And I know that stocks sometimes have a powerful blow-off phase before the end of a bull market. Mr. X: This is where I vehemently disagree with my daughter. The recent sell-off resembles a bloodbath in parts of the global market. It has confirmed my worst fears, especially related to the high-flying tech stocks that I believe were in a bubble. Hopes for a blow-off phase are wishful thinking. I’m wondering if the sell-off represents the beginning of an extended bear market. BCA: Some value has indeed been restored. However, the U.S. market is far from cheap relative to corporate fundamentals. The trailing and 12-month forward price-earnings ratios (PER) of 20 and 16, respectively, are still far above their historical averages, especially if one leaves out the tech bubble period of the late 1990s. And the same is true for other metrics such as price-to-sales and price-to-book value (Chart 29). BCA’s composite valuation indicator, based on 8 different valuation measures, is only a little below the threshold of overvaluation at +1 standard deviation because low interest rates still favor equities on a relative yield basis. Chart 29U.S. Equities Are Not Cheap U.S. Equities Are Not Cheap U.S. Equities Are Not Cheap It is true that equities can reward investors handsomely in the final stage of a bull market. Chart 30 presents cumulative returns to the S&P 500 in the last nine bull markets. The returns are broken down by quintile. The greatest returns, unsurprisingly, generally occur in the first part of the bull market (quintile 1). But total returns in the last 20% of the bull phase (quintile 5) have been solid and have beaten the middle quartiles. Chart 30Late-Cycle Blow-Offs Can Be Rewarding OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Of course, the tricky part is determining where we are in the bull market. We have long viewed financial markets through the lens of money and credit. This includes a framework that involves the Fed policy cycle. The historical track record for risk assets is very clear; they tend to perform well when the fed funds rate is below neutral, whether rates are rising or falling. Risk assets tend to underperform cash when the fed funds rate is above neutral (Table 3). Table 3Stocks Do Well When The Fed Funds Rate Is Below Neutral OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence We believe the fed funds rate is still in easy territory. This suggests that it is too early to shift to underweight on risk assets. We may even want to upgrade to overweight if stocks become cheap enough, as long as Fed policy is not restrictive. That said, there is huge uncertainty about the exact level of rates that constitutes “neutral” (or R-star in the Fed’s lingo). Even the Fed is unsure. This means that we must watch for signs that the fed funds rate has crossed the line into restrictive territory as the FOMC tightens over the coming year. An inversion of the 3-month T-bill/10-year yield curve slope would be a powerful signal that policy has become tight, although the lead time of an inverted curve and declining risk asset prices has been quite variable historically. Finally, it is also important to watch U.S. profit margins. Some of our research over the past couple of years focused on the late-cycle dynamics of previous long expansions, such as the 1960s, 1980s and 1990s. We found that risk assets came under pressure once U.S. profit margins peaked. Returns were often negative from the peak in margins to the subsequent recession. Mr. X: U.S. profit margins must be close to peak levels. I’ve seen all sorts of anecdotal examples of rising cost pressures, not only in the labor market. BCA: We expected to see some margin pressure to appear by now. S&P 500 EPS growth will likely top out in the next couple of quarters, if only because the third quarter’s 26% year-over-year pace is simply not sustainable. But it is impressive that our margin proxies are not yet flagging an imminent margin squeeze, despite the pickup in wage growth (Chart 31). Chart 31U.S. Margin Indicators Still Upbeat U.S. Margin Indicators Still Upbeat U.S. Margin Indicators Still Upbeat Margins according to the National Accounts (NIPA) data peaked in 2014 and have since diverged sharply with S&P 500 operating margins. It is difficult to fully explain the divergence. The NIPA margin is considered to be a better measure of underlying U.S. corporate profitability because it includes all companies (not just 500), and it is less subject to accounting trickery. That said, even the NIPA measure of margins firmed a little in 2018, along with the proxies we follow that correlate with the S&P 500 measure. The bottom line is that the macro variables that feed into our top-down U.S. EPS model point to a continuing high level of margins and fairly robust top-line growth, at least for the near term. For 2019, we assumed slower GDP growth and incorporated some decline in margins into our projection just to err on the conservative side. Nonetheless, our EPS model still projects a respectable 8% growth rate at the end of 2019 (Chart 32). The dollar will only be a minor headwind to earnings growth unless it surges by another 10% or more. Chart 32EPS Growth Forecasts EPS Growth Forecasts EPS Growth Forecasts The risks to EPS growth probably are to the downside relative to our forecast, but the point is that U.S. earnings will likely remain supportive for the market unless economic growth is much weaker than we expect. None of this means that investors should be aggressively overweight stocks now. We trimmed our equity recommendation to benchmark in mid-2018 for several reasons. At the time, value was quite poor and bottom-up earnings expectations were too high, especially on a five-year horizon. Also, sentiment measures suggested that investors were overly complacent. As you know, we are always reluctant to chase markets into highly overvalued territory, especially when a lot of good news has been discounted. As we have noted, we are open to temporarily shifting back to overweight in equities and other risk assets. The extension of the economic expansion gives more time for earnings to grow. The risks facing the market have not eased much but, given our base-case macro view, we would be inclined to upgrade equities if there is another meaningful correction. Of course, our profit, monetary and economic indicators would have to remain supportive to justify an upgrade. Mr. X: But you are bearish on bonds. We saw in October that the equity market is vulnerable to higher yields. BCA: It certainly won’t be smooth sailing through 2019 as interest rates normalize. Until recently, higher bond yields reflected stronger growth without any associated fears that inflation was a growing problem. The ‘Fed Put’ was seen as a key backstop for the equity bull market. But now that the U.S. labor market is showing signs of overheating, the bond sell-off has become less benign for stocks because the Fed will be less inclined to ease up at the first sign of trouble in the equity market. How stocks react in 2019 to the upward trend in yields depends a lot on the evolution of actual inflation and long-term inflation expectations. If core PCE inflation hovers close to or just above 2% for a while, then the Fed Put should still be in place. However, it would get ugly for both bonds and stocks if inflation moves beyond 2.5%. Our base case is that this negative dynamic won’t occur until early 2020, but obviously the timing is uncertain. One key indicator to watch is long-term inflation expectations, such as the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate (Chart 33). It is close to 2% at the moment. If it shifts up into the 2.3%-2.5% range, it would confirm that inflation expectations have returned to a level that is consistent with the Fed meeting its 2% inflation target on a sustained basis. This would be a signal to the Fed that it is must become more aggressive in calming growth, with obvious negative consequences for risk assets. Chart 33Watch For A Return To 2.3%-2.5% Range Watch For A Return To 2.3%-2.5% Range Watch For A Return To 2.3%-2.5% Range Mr. X: I am skeptical that the U.S. corporate sector can pull off an 8% earnings gain in 2019. What about the other major markets? Won’t they get hit hard if global growth continues to slow as you suggest? BCA: Yes, that is correct. It is not surprising that EPS growth has already peaked in the Euro Area and Japan. The profit situation is going to deteriorate quickly in the coming quarters. Industrial production growth in both economies has already dropped close to zero, and we use this as a proxy for top-line growth in our EPS models. Nominal GDP growth has decelerated sharply in both economies in absolute terms and relative to the aggregate wage bill. These trends suggest that profit margins are coming under significant downward pressure. Even when we build in a modest growth pickup and slight rebound in margins in 2019, EPS growth falls close to zero by year-end according to our models. Both the Euro Area and Japanese equity markets are cheap relative to the U.S., based on our composite valuation indicators (Chart 34). However, neither is above the threshold of undervaluation (+1 standard deviation) that would justify overweight positions on valuation alone. We think the U.S. market will outperform the other two at least in the first half of 2019 in local and, especially, common-currency terms. Chart 34Valuation Of Nonfinancial Equity Markets Relative To The U.S. OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Ms. X: It makes sense that U.S. profit growth will outperform the other major developed countries in 2019. I would like to circle back to emerging market assets. I understand that many emerging economies have deep structural problems. But you admitted that the Chinese authorities will eventually stimulate enough to stabilize growth, providing a bounce in EM growth and asset prices next year. These assets seem cheap enough to me to warrant buying now in anticipation of that rally. As we all know, reversals from oversold levels can happen in a blink of an eye and I don’t want to miss it. BCA: We are looking for an opportunity to buy as well, but are wary of getting in too early. First, valuation has improved but is not good enough on its own to justify buying now. EM stocks are only moderately undervalued based on our EM composite valuation indicator and the cyclically-adjusted P/E ratio (Chart 35). EM currencies are not particularly cheap either, outside of Argentina, Turkey and Mexico (Charts 36A and 36B). Valuation should only play a role in investment strategy when it is at an extreme, and this is not the case for most EM countries. Chart 35EM Stocks Are Not At Capitulation Levels... bca.bca_mp_2018_12_01_c35 bca.bca_mp_2018_12_01_c35   Chart 36A…And Neither Are EM Currencies ...And Neither Are EM Currencies ...And Neither Are EM Currencies Chart 36B…And Neither Are EM Currencies ...And Neither Are EM Currencies ...And Neither Are EM Currencies Second, corporate earnings growth has plenty of downside potential in the near term. Annual growth in EM nonfinancial EBITDA, currently near 10%, is likely to turn negative next year, based on our China credit and fiscal impulse indicator (Chart 37). And, as we emphasized earlier, China is not yet pressing hard on the gas pedal. Chart 37EM Earnings Growth: Lots Of Downside EM Earnings Growth: Lots Of Downside EM Earnings Growth: Lots Of Downside Third, it will take time for more aggressive Chinese policy stimulus, if it does occur, to show up in EM stocks and commodity prices. Trend changes in money growth and our credit and fiscal impulse preceded the trough in EM stocks and commodity prices in 2015, and again at the top in stocks and commodities in 2017 (Chart 38). However, even if these two indicators bottom today, it could take several months before the sell-off in EM financial markets and commodity prices abates. Chart 38Chinese Money And Credit Leads EM And Commodities Chinese Money And Credit Leads EM And Commodities Chinese Money And Credit Leads EM And Commodities Finally, if Chinese stimulus comes largely via easier monetary policy rather than fiscal stimulus, then the outcome will be a weaker RMB. We expect the RMB to drift lower in any event, because rate differentials vis-à-vis the U.S. will move against the Chinese currency next year. A weaker RMB would add to the near-term headwinds facing EM assets. The bottom line is that the downside risks remain high enough that you should resist the temptation to bottom-fish until there are concrete signs that the Chinese authorities are getting serious about boosting the economy. We are also watching for signs outside of China that the global growth slowdown is ending. This includes our global leading economic indicator and data that are highly sensitive to global growth, such as German manufacturing foreign orders. Mr. X: Emerging market assets would have to become a lot cheaper for me to consider buying. Debt levels are just too high to be sustained, and stronger Chinese growth would only provide a short-term boost. I’m not sure I would even want to buy developed market risk assets based solely on some Chinese policy stimulus. BCA: Yes, we agree with your assessment that buying EM in 2019 would be a trade rather than a buy-and-hold strategy. Still, the combination of continued solid U.S. growth and a modest upturn in the Chinese economy would alleviate a lot of investors’ global growth concerns. The result could be a meaningful rally in pro-cyclical assets that you should not miss. We are defensively positioned at the moment, but we could see becoming more aggressive in 2019 on signs that China is stimulating more firmly and/or our global leading indicators begin to show some signs of life. Besides upgrading our overall equity allocation back to overweight, we would dip our toes in the EM space again. At the same time, we will likely upgrade the more cyclical DM equity markets, such as the Euro Area and Japan, while downgrading the defensive U.S. equity market to underweight. We are currently defensively positioned in terms of equity sectors, but it would make sense to shift cyclicals to overweight at the same time. Exact timing is always difficult, but we expect to become more aggressive around the middle of 2019. We also think the time is approaching to favor long-suffering value stocks over growth stocks. The relative performance of growth-over-value according to standard measures has become a sector call over the past decade: tech or financials. The sector skew complicates this issue, especially since tech stocks have already cracked. But we have found that stocks that are cheap within equity sectors tend to outperform expensive (or growth) stocks once the fed funds rate moves into restrictive territory. This is likely to occur in the latter half of 2019. Value should then have its day in the sun. Currencies: Mr. X: We don’t usually hedge our international equity exposure, so the direction of the dollar matters a lot to us. As you predicted a year ago, the U.S. dollar reigned supreme in 2018. Your economic views suggest another good year in 2019, but won’t this become a problem for the economy? President Trump’s desire to lower the U.S. trade deficit suggests that the Administration would like the dollar to drop and we could get some anti-dollar rhetoric from the White House. Also, it seems that the consensus is strongly bullish on the dollar which is always a concern. BCA: The outlook for the dollar is much trickier than it was at the end of 2017. As you highlighted, traders are already very long the dollar, implying that the hurdle for the greenback to surprise positively is much higher now. However, a key driver for the dollar is the global growth backdrop. If the latter is poor in the first half of 2019 as we expect, it will keep a bid under the greenback. Interest rates should also remain supportive for the dollar. As we argued earlier, current market expectations – only one more Fed hike after the December meeting – are too sanguine. If the Fed increases rates by more than currently discounted, the dollar’s fair value will rise, especially if global growth continues to lag that of the U.S. Since the dollar’s 2018 rally was largely a correction of its previous undervaluation, the currency has upside potential in the first half of the year (Chart 39). Chart 39U.S. Dollar Not Yet Overvalued U.S. Dollar Not Yet Overvalued U.S. Dollar Not Yet Overvalued A stronger dollar will dampen foreign demand for U.S.-produced goods and will boost U.S. imports. However, do not forget that a rising dollar benefits U.S. consumers via its impact on import prices. Since the consumer sector represents 68% of GDP, and that 69% of household consumption is geared toward the (largely domestic) service sector, a strong dollar will not be as negative for aggregate demand and employment as many commentators fear, unless it were to surge by at least another 10%. In the end, the dollar will be more important for the distribution of U.S. growth than its overall level. Where the strong dollar is likely to cause tremors is in the political arena. You are correct to point out that there is a large inconsistency between the White House’s desires to shore up growth, while simultaneously curtailing the trade deficit, especially if the dollar appreciates further. As long as the Fed focuses on its dual mandate and tries to contain inflationary pressures, the executive branch of the U.S. government can do little to push the dollar down. Currency intervention cannot have a permanent effect unless it is accompanied by shifts in relative macro fundamentals. For example, foreign exchange intervention by the Japanese Ministry of Finance in the late 1990s merely had a temporary impact on the yen. The yen only weakened on a sustained basis once interest rate differentials moved against Japan. This problem underpins our view that the Sino-U.S. relationship is unlikely to improve meaningfully next year. China will remain an easy target to blame for the U.S.’s large trade deficit. What ultimately will signal a top in the dollar is better global growth, which is unlikely until the second half of 2019. At that point, expected returns outside the U.S. will improve, causing money to leave the U.S., pushing the dollar down. Mr. X: While 2017 was a stellar year for the euro, 2018 proved a much more challenging environment. Will 2019 be more like 2017 or 2018? BCA: We often think of the euro as the anti-dollar; buying EUR/USD is the simplest, most liquid vehicle for betting against the dollar, and vice versa. Our bullish dollar stance is therefore synonymous with a negative take on the euro. Also, the activity gap between the U.S. and the Euro Area continues to move in a euro-bearish fashion (Chart 40). Finally, since the Great Financial Crisis, EUR/USD has lagged the differential between European and U.S. core inflation by roughly six months. Today, this inflation spread still points toward a weaker euro. Chart 40Relative LEI's Moving Against Euro Relative LEI's Moving Against Euro Relative LEI's Moving Against Euro It is important to remember that when Chinese economic activity weakens, European growth deteriorates relative to the U.S. Thus, our view that global growth will continue to sputter in the first half of 2019 implies that the monetary policy divergence between the Fed and the ECB has not yet reached a climax. Consequently, we expect EUR/USD to trade below 1.1 in the first half of 2019. By that point, the common currency will be trading at a meaningful discount to its fair value, which will allow it to find a floor (Chart 41). Chart 41Euro Heading Below Fair Value Before Bottoming Euro Heading Below Fair Value Before Bottoming Euro Heading Below Fair Value Before Bottoming Mr. X: The Bank of Japan has debased the yen, with a balance sheet larger than Japan’s GDP. This cannot end well. I am very bearish on the currency. BCA: The BoJ’s monetary policy is definitely a challenge for the yen. The Japanese central bank rightfully understands that Japan’s inability to generate any meaningful inflation – despite an economy that is at full employment – is the consequence of a well-established deflationary mindset. The BoJ wants to shock inflation expectations upward by keeping real rates at very accommodative levels well after growth has picked up. This means that the BoJ will remain a laggard as global central banks move away from accommodative policies. The yen will continue to depreciate versus the dollar as U.S. yields rise on a cyclical horizon. That being said, the yen still has a place within investors’ portfolios. First, the yen is unlikely to collapse despite the BoJ’s heavy debt monetization. The JPY is one of the cheapest currencies in the world, with its real effective exchange rate hovering at a three-decade low (Chart 42). Additionally, Japan still sports a current account surplus of 3.7% of GDP, hardly the sign of an overstimulated and inflationary economy where demand is running amok. Instead, thanks to decades of current account surpluses, Japan has accumulated a positive net international investment position of 60% of GDP. This means that Japan runs a constant and large positive income balance, a feature historically associated with strong currencies. Chart 42The Yen Is Very Cheap The Yen Is Very Cheap The Yen Is Very Cheap Japan’s large net international investment position also contributes to the yen’s defensive behavior as Japanese investors pull money back to safety at home when global growth deteriorates. Hence, the yen could rebound, especially against the euro, the commodity currencies, and EM currencies if there is a further global growth scare in the near term. Owning some yen can therefore stabilize portfolio returns during tough times. As we discussed earlier, we would avoid the EM asset class, including currency exposure, until global growth firms. Commodities: Ms. X: Once again, you made a good call on the energy price outlook a year ago, with prices moving higher for most of the year. But the recent weakness in oil seemed to come out of nowhere, and I must admit to being confused about where we go next. What are your latest thoughts on oil prices for the coming year? BCA: The fundamentals lined up in a very straightforward way at the end of 2017. The coalition we have dubbed OPEC 2.0 – the OPEC and non-OPEC producer group led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – outlined a clear strategy to reduce the global oil inventory overhang. The producers that had the capacity to increase supply maintained strict production discipline which, to some analysts, was still surprising even after the cohesiveness shown by the group in 2017. Outside that core group output continued to fall, especially in Venezuela, which remains a high-risk producing province. The oil market was balanced and prices were slowly moving higher as we entered the second quarter of this year, when President Trump announced the U.S. would re-impose oil export sanctions against Iran beginning early November. The oft-repeated goal of the sanctions was to reduce Iranian exports to zero. To compensate for the lost Iranian exports, President Trump pressured OPEC, led by KSA, to significantly increase production, which they did. However, as we approached the November deadline, the Trump Administration granted the eight largest importers of Iranian oil 180-day waivers on the sanctions. This restored much of the oil that would have been lost. Suddenly, the market found itself oversupplied and prices fell. As we move toward the December 6 meeting of OPEC 2.0 in Vienna, we are expecting a production cut from the coalition of as much as 1.4mm b/d to offset these waivers. The coalition wishes to keep global oil inventories from once again over-filling and dragging prices even lower in 2019. On the demand side, consumption continues to hold up both in the developed and emerging world, although we have somewhat lowered our expectations for growth next year. We are mindful of persistent concerns over the strength of demand – particularly in EM – in 2019. Thus, on the supply side and the demand side, the level of uncertainty in the oil markets is higher than it was at the start of 2018. Nonetheless, our base-case outlook is on the optimistic side for oil prices in 2019, with Brent crude oil averaging around $82/bbl, and WTI trading $6/bbl below that level (Chart 43). Chart 43Oil Prices To Rebound In 2019 Oil Prices To Rebound In 2019 Oil Prices To Rebound In 2019 Ms. X: I am skeptical that oil prices will rebound as much as you expect. First, oil demand is likely to falter if your view that global growth will continue slowing into early 2019 proves correct. Second, U.S. shale production is rising briskly, with pipeline bottlenecks finally starting to ease. Third, President Trump seems to have gone from taking credit for high equity prices to taking credit for low oil prices. Trump has taken a lot flack for supporting Saudi Arabia following the killing of The Washington Post journalist in Turkey. Would the Saudis really be willing to lose Trump’s support by cutting production at this politically sensitive time? BCA: Faltering demand growth remains a concern. However, note that in our forecasts we do expect global oil consumption growth to slow down to 1.46mm b/d next year, somewhat lower than the 1.6mm b/d growth we expect this year.  In terms of the U.S. shale sector, production levels over the short term can be somewhat insensitive to changes in spot and forward prices, given the hedging activity of producers. Over the medium to longer term, however, lower spot and forward prices will disincentivize drilling by all but the most efficient producers with the best, lowest-cost acreage. If another price collapse were to occur – and were to persist, as the earlier price collapse did – we would expect a production loss of between 5% and 10% from the U.S. shales.  Regarding KSA, the Kingdom needs close to $83/bbl to balance its budget this year and next, according to the IMF’s most recent estimates. If prices remain lower for longer, KSA’s official reserves will continue to fall, as its sovereign wealth fund continues to be tapped to fill budget gaps. President Trump’s insistence on higher production from KSA and the rest of OPEC is a non-starter – it would doom those economies to recession, and stifle further investment going forward. The U.S. would also suffer down the road, as the lack of investment significantly tightens global supply. So, net, if production cuts are not forthcoming from OPEC at its Vienna meeting we – and the market – will be downgrading our oil forecast. Ms. X: Does your optimism regarding energy extend to other commodities? The combination of a strong dollar and a China slowdown did a lot of damage to industrial commodities in 2018. Given your view that China’s economy should stabilize in 2019, are we close to a bottom in base metals? BCA: It is too soon to begin building positions in base metals because the trade war is going to get worse before it gets better. Exposure to base metals should be near benchmark at best entering 2019, although we will be looking to upgrade along with other risk assets if Chinese policy stimulus ramps up. Over the medium term, the outlook for base metals hinges on how successfully China pulls off its pivot toward consumer- and services-led growth, away from heavy industrial-led development. China accounts for roughly half of global demand for these base metals. Commodity demand from businesses providing consumer goods and services is lower than that of heavy industrial export-oriented firms. But demand for commodities used in consumer products – e.g., copper, zinc and nickel, which go into stainless-steel consumer appliances such as washers and dryers – will remain steady, and could increase if the transition away from heavy industrial-led growth is successful. Gasoline and jet fuel demand will also benefit, as EM consumers’ demand for leisure activities such as tourism increases with rising incomes. China is also going to be a large producer and consumer of electric vehicles, as it attempts to reduce its dependence on imported oil. Although timing the production ramp-up is difficult, in the long term these trends will be supportive for nickel and copper. Mr. X: You know I can’t let you get away without asking about gold. The price of bullion is down about 5% since the end of 2017, but that is no worse than the global equity market and it did provide a hedge against economic, financial or political shocks. The world seems just as risky as it did a year ago, so I am inclined to hold on to our gold positions, currently close to 10% of our portfolio. That is above your recommended level, but keeping a solid position in gold is one area where my daughter and I have close agreement regarding investment strategy. BCA: Gold did perform well during the risk asset corrections we had in 2018, and during the political crises as well. The price is not too far away from where we recommended going long gold as a portfolio hedge at the end of 2017 ($1230.3/oz). We continue to expect gold to perform well as a hedge. When other risk assets are trading lower, gold holds value relative to equities and tends to outperform bonds (Chart 44). Likewise, when other risk assets are rising, gold participates, but does not do as well as equities. It is this convexity – outperforming on the downside but participating on the upside with other risk assets – that continues to support our belief that gold has a role as a portfolio hedge. However, having 10% of your portfolio in gold is more than we would recommend – we favor an allocation of around 5%. Chart 44Hold Some Gold As A Hedge OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Geopolitics Ms. X: I’m glad that the three of us agree at least on one thing – hold some gold! Let’s return to the geopolitical situation for a moment. Last year, you correctly forecast that divergent domestic policies in the U.S. and China – stimulus in the former and lack thereof in the latter – would be the most investment-relevant geopolitical issue. At the time, I found this an odd thing to highlight, given the risks of protectionism, populism, and North Korea. Do you still think that domestic policies will dominate in 2019? BCA: Yes, policy divergence between the U.S. and China will also dominate in 2019, especially if it continues to buoy the U.S. economy at the expense of the rest of the world. Of course, Beijing may decide to do more stimulus to offset its weakening economy and the impact of the trade tariffs. A headline rate cut, cuts to bank reserve requirements, and a boost to local government infrastructure spending are all in play. In the context of faltering housing and capex figures in the U.S., the narrative over the next quarter or two could be that the policy divergence is over, that Chinese policymakers have “blinked.” We are pushing back against this narrative on a structural basis. We have already broadly outlined our view that China will not be pressing hard to boost demand growth. Many of its recent policy efforts have focused on rebalancing the economy away from debt-driven investment (Chart 45). The problem for the rest of the world is that raw materials and capital goods comprise 85% of Chinese imports. As such, efforts to boost domestic consumption will have limited impact on the rest of the world, especially as emerging markets are highly leveraged to “old China.” Chart 45Rebalancing Of The Chinese Economy Rebalancing Of The Chinese Economy Rebalancing Of The Chinese Economy Meanwhile, the Trump-Democrat gridlock could yield surprising results in 2019. President Trump is becoming singularly focused on winning re-election in 2020. As such, he fears the “stimulus cliff” looming over the election year. Democrats, eager to show that they are not merely the party of “the Resistance,” have already signaled that an infrastructure deal is their top priority. With fiscal conservatives in the House all but neutered by the midterm elections, a coalition between Trump and likely House Speaker Nancy Pelosi could emerge by late 2019, ushering in even more fiscal stimulus. While the net new federal spending will not be as grandiose as the headline figures, it will be something. There will also be regular spending increases in the wake of this year’s bipartisan removal of spending caps. We place solid odds that the current policy divergence narrative continues well into 2019, with bullish consequences for the U.S. dollar and bearish outcomes for EM assets, at least in the first half of the year. Mr. X: Your geopolitical team has consistently been alarmist on the U.S.-China trade war, a view that bore out throughout 2018. You already stated that you think trade tensions will persist in 2019. Where is this heading? BCA: Nowhere good. Rising geopolitical tensions in the Sino-American relationship has been our premier geopolitical risk since 2012. The Trump administration has begun tying geopolitical and strategic matters in with the trade talks. No longer is the White House merely asking for a narrowing of the trade deficit, improved intellectual property protections, and the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade. Now, everything from surface-to-air missiles in the South China Sea to Beijing’s “Belt and Road” project are on the list of U.S. demands. Trade negotiations are a “two-level game,” whereby policymakers negotiate in parallel with their foreign counterparts and domestic constituents. While Chinese economic agents may accept U.S. economic demands, it is not clear to us that its military and intelligence apparatus will accept U.S. geopolitical demands. And Xi Jinping himself is highly attuned to China’s geopolitical position, calling for national rejuvenation above all. We would therefore downplay any optimistic news from the G20 summit between Presidents Trump and Xi. President Trump could freeze tariffs at current rates and allow for a more serious negotiating round throughout 2019. But unless China is willing to kowtow to America, a fundamental deal will remain elusive in the end. For Trump, a failure to agree is still a win domestically, as the median American voter is not asking for a resolution of the trade war with China (Chart 46). Chart 46Americans Favor Being Tough On China OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Ms. X: Could trade tensions spill into rising military friction? BCA: Absolutely. Minor military skirmishes will likely continue and could even escalate. We believe that there is a structural bull market in “war.” Investors should position themselves by being long global defense stocks. Mr. X: That is not encouraging. What about North Korea and Iran? Could they become geopolitical risks in 2019? BCA: Our answer to the North Korea question remains the same as 12 months ago: we have seen the peak in the U.S.’ display of a “credible military threat.” But Iran could re-emerge as a risk mid-year. We argued in last year’s discussion that President Trump was more interested in playing domestic politics than actually ratcheting up tensions with Iran. However, in early 2018 we raised our alarm level, particularly when staffing decisions in the White House involved several noted Iran hawks joining the foreign policy team. This was a mistake. Our initial call was correct, as President Trump ultimately offered six-month exemptions to eight importers of Iranian crude. That said, those exemptions will expire in the spring. The White House may, at that point, ratchet up tensions with Iran. This time, we will believe it when we see it. Intensifying tensions with Iran ahead of the U.S. summer vacation season, and at a time when crude oil markets are likely to be finely balanced, seems like folly, especially with primary elections a mere 6-to-8 months away. What does President Trump want more: to win re-election or to punish Iran? We think the answer is obvious, especially given that very few voters seem to view Iran as the country’s greatest threat (Chart 47). Chart 47Americans Don’t See Iran As A Major Threat OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Ms. X: Let’s turn to Europe. You have tended to dismiss Euroskeptics as a minor threat, which has largely been correct. But don’t you think that, with Brexit upon us and Chancellor Angela Merkel in the twilight, populism in continental Europe will finally have its day? BCA: Let’s first wait to see how Brexit turns out! The next few months will be critical. Uncertainty is high, with considerable risks remaining. We do not think that Prime Minister May has the votes in the House of Commons to push through any version of soft Brexit that she has envisioned thus far. If the vote on the U.K.-EU exit deal falls through, a new election could be possible. This will require an extension of the exit process under Article 50 and a prolonged period of uncertainty. The probability of a no-deal Brexit is lower than 10%. It is simply not in the interest of anyone involved, save for a smattering of the hardest of hard Brexit adherents in the U.K. Conservative Party. Put simply, if the EU-U.K. deal falls through in the House of Commons, or even if PM May is replaced by a hard-Brexit Tory, the most likely outcome is an extension of the negotiation process. This can be easily done and we suspect that all EU member states would be in favor of such an extension given the cost to business sentiment and trade that would result from a no-deal Brexit. It is not clear that Brexit has emboldened Euroskeptics. In fact, most populist parties in the EU have chosen to tone down their Euroskepticism and emphasize their anti-immigrant agenda since the Brexit referendum. In part, this decision has to do with how messy the Brexit process has become. If the U.K. is struggling to unravel the sinews that tie it to Europe, how is any other country going to fare any better? The problem for Euroskeptic populists is that establishment parties are wise to the preferences of the European median voter. For example, we now have Friedrich Merz, a German candidate for the head of the Christian Democratic Union – essentially Merkel’s successor – who is both an ardent Europhile and a hardliner on immigration. This is not revolutionary. Merz simply read the polls correctly and realized that, with 83% of Germans supporting the euro, the rise of the anti-establishment Alternative for Germany (AfD) is more about immigration than about the EU. As such, we continue to stress that populism in Europe is overstated. In fact, we expect that Germany and France will redouble their efforts to reform European institutions in 2019. The European parliamentary elections in May will elicit much handwringing by the media due to a likely solid showing by Euroskeptics, even though the election is meaningless. Afterwards, we expect to see significant efforts to complete the banking union, reform the European Stability Mechanism, and even introduce a nascent Euro Area budget. But these reforms will not be for everyone. Euroskeptics in Central and Eastern Europe will be left on the outside looking in. Brussels may also be emboldened to take a hard line on Italy if institutional reforms convince the markets that the core Euro Area is sheltered from contagion. In other words, the fruits of integration will be reserved for those who play by the Franco-German rules. And that could, ironically, set the stage for the unraveling of the European Union as we know it. Over the long haul, a much tighter, more integrated, core could emerge centered on the Euro Area, with the rest of the EU becoming stillborn. The year 2019 will be a vital one for Europe. We are sensing an urgency in Berlin and Paris that has not existed throughout the crisis, largely due to Merkel’s own failings as a leader. We remain optimistic that the Euro Area will survive. However, there will be fireworks. Finally, a word about Japan. The coming year will see the peak of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s career. He is promoting the first-ever revision to Japan’s post-war constitution in order to countenance the armed forces. If he succeeds, he will have a big national security success to couple with his largely effective “Abenomics” economic agenda – after that, it will all be downhill. If he fails, he will become a lame duck. This means that political uncertainty will rise in 2019, after six years of unusual tranquility. Conclusions Mr. X: This is a good place to conclude our discussion. We have covered a lot of ground and your views have reinforced my belief that 2019 could be even more turbulent for financial markets than the past has been. I accept your opinion that a major global economic downturn is not around the corner, but with valuations still stretched, I feel that it makes good sense to focus on capital preservation. I may lose out on the proverbial “blow-off” rally, but so be it – I have been in this business long enough to know that it is much better to leave the party while the music is still playing! Ms. X: I agree with my father that the risks surrounding the outlook have risen as we have entered the late stages of this business-cycle expansion. Yet, if global growth does temporarily stabilize and corporate earnings continue to expand, I fear that being out of the market will be very painful. The era of hyper-easy money may be ending, but interest rates globally are still nowhere near restrictive territory. This tells me that the final stages of this bull market could be very rewarding. A turbulent market is not only one where prices go down – they can also go up a lot! BCA: The debate you are having is one we ourselves have had on numerous occasions. There is always a trade-off between maximizing short-term returns and taking a longer-term approach. Valuations are the ultimate guidepost for long-term returns. While most assets have cheapened over the past year, prices are still fairly elevated. Table 4 shows our baseline calculations of what a balanced portfolio will earn over the coming decade. We estimate that such a portfolio will deliver average annual returns of 4.9% over the next ten years, or 2.8% after adjusting for inflation. That is an improvement over our inflation-adjusted estimate of 1.3% from last year, but still well below the 6.6% real return that a balanced portfolio earned between 1982 and 2018. Table 410-Year Asset Return Projections OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Our return calculations for equities assume that profit margins decline modestly over the period and that multiples mean revert to their historical average. These assumptions may turn out to be too pessimistic if underlying changes in the economy keep corporate profits elevated as a share of GDP. Structurally lower real interest rates may also justify higher P/E multiples, although this would be largely offset by the prospect of slower economic growth, which will translate into slower earnings growth. In terms of the outlook for the coming year, a lot hinges on our view that monetary policy in the main economies stays accommodative. This seems like a safe assumption in the Euro Area and Japan, where rates are near historic lows, as well as in China, where the government is actively loosening monetary conditions. It is not such a straightforward conclusion for the U.S., where the Fed is on track to keep raising rates. If it turns out that the neutral interest rate is not far above where rates are already, we could see a broad-based slowdown of the U.S. economy that ripples through to the rest of the world. And even if U.S. monetary policy does remain accommodative, many things could still upset the apple cart, including a full-out trade war, debt crises in Italy or China, or a debilitating spike in oil prices. As the title of our outlook implies, 2019 is likely to be a year of increased turbulence. Ms. X: As always, you have left us with much to think about. My father has looked forward to these discussions every year and now that I am able to join him, I understand why. Before we conclude, it would be helpful to have a recap of your key views. BCA: That would be our pleasure. The key points are as follows: The collision between policy and markets that we discussed last year finally came to a head in October. Rather than falling as they normally do when stocks plunge, U.S. bond yields rose as investors reassessed the willingness of the Fed to pause hiking rates even in the face of softer growth. Likewise, hopes that China would move swiftly to stimulate its economy were dashed as it became increasingly clear that the authorities were placing a high emphasis on their reform agenda of deleveraging and capacity reduction. The ongoing Brexit saga and the stalemate between the populist Italian government and the EU have increased uncertainty in Europe at a time when the region was already beginning to slow. We expect the tensions between policy and markets to be an ongoing theme in 2019. With the U.S. unemployment rate at a 48-year low, it will take a significant slowdown for the Fed to stop hiking rates. Despite the deterioration in economic data over the past month, real final domestic demand is still tracking to expand by 3% in the fourth quarter, well above estimates of the sustainable pace of economic growth. Ultimately, the Fed will deliver more hikes next year than discounted in the markets. This will push up the dollar and keep the upward trend in Treasury yields intact. The dollar should peak midway next year. China will also become more aggressive in stimulating its economy, which will boost global growth. However, until both of these things happen, emerging markets will remain under pressure. For the time being, we continue to favor developed market equities over their EM peers. We also prefer defensive equity sectors such as health care and consumer staples over cyclical sectors such as industrials and materials. Within the developed market universe, the U.S. will outperform Europe and Japan for the next few quarters, especially in dollar terms. A stabilization in global growth could ignite a blow-off rally in global equities. If the Fed is raising rates in response to falling unemployment, this is unlikely to derail the stock market. However, once supply-side constraints begin to fully bite in early 2020 and inflation rises well above the Fed’s target of 2%, stocks will begin to buckle. This means that a window exists next year where stocks will outperform bonds. We would maintain a benchmark allocation to stocks for now, but increase exposure if global bourses were to fall significantly from current levels without a corresponding deteriorating in the economic outlook. Corporate credit will underperform stocks as government bond yields rise. A major increase in spreads is unlikely as long as the economy is still expanding, but spreads could still widen modestly given their low starting point. U.S. shale companies have been the marginal producers in the global oil sector. With breakeven costs in shale close to $50/bbl, crude prices are unlikely to rise much from current levels over the long term. However, over the next 12 months, we expect production cuts in Saudi Arabia will push prices up, with Brent crude averaging around $82/bbl in 2019. A balanced portfolio is likely to generate average returns of only 2.8% a year in real terms over the next decade. This compares to average returns of around 6.6% a year between 1982 and 2018. We would like to take this opportunity to wish you and all of our clients a very peaceful, healthy and prosperous New Year. The Editors November 26, 2018 ​​​​​​

Highlights Credit: Credit spreads are widening due to the combination of weakening global growth and perceptions of restrictive Fed policy. Investors should monitor the indicators of global growth and Fed policy outlined in this report to call the peak in spreads. Duration: Financial conditions have not yet tightened enough for the Fed to take a significant dovish turn. Meanwhile, the housing market indicators with the best track records at signaling restrictive monetary policy remain benign. Maintain below-benchmark duration. MBS: Negative excess MBS returns during the past two months are the result of wider option-adjusted spreads, but continued easing in bank lending standards should prevent OAS from widening dramatically. Maintain a neutral allocation to MBS for now, but look to upgrade at the expense of corporate bonds as the credit cycle progresses. Feature The sell-off in credit markets continues to worsen. The average spread of the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index is now above 400 bps and the investment grade spread is at its widest level in two years (Chart 1). Chart 1Risk Off In Credit Markets Risk Off In Credit Markets Risk Off In Credit Markets Just like when credit markets sold off in 2014/15, the catalyst for wider spreads is the combination of weakening global economic growth and tight Fed policy. While indicators of global economic growth are sending negative signals, the Fed continues to focus on the sturdier domestic economy. Once again, the end result is a stronger dollar and a sell-off in risk assets.1 In the midst of a downturn, the relevant investment question becomes when to step back into the market. In this case, the question is: How should we go about calling the peak in credit spreads? In this week’s report we identify several catalysts that could signal a peak in credit spreads in the coming months. The catalysts fall into two categories: Signals of rebounding global growth Signals of Fed capitulation We consider each category in turn. Catalyst 1: Global Growth Rebound Chart 2 shows three indicators of global growth that investors should watch closely in the current environment. All three indicators are highly levered to global demand, signaled the peak in credit spreads in early 2016, and most importantly, are updated daily making it possible to track them in real time. Chart 2Signals Of Rebounding Global Growth Signals Of Rebounding Global Growth Signals Of Rebounding Global Growth The first indicator is the CRB Raw Industrials index (Chart 2, panel 2). This index troughed several weeks before the early-2016 peak in credit spreads. It is also currently in an uptrend, albeit a very modest one. The second indicator is the BCA Market-Based China Growth Indicator (Chart 2, panel 3). This indicator was created by our China Investment Strategy team as a broad proxy of investor expectations for Chinese growth.2 It includes 17 different market prices, spanning equity, commodity, fixed income and currency markets. Just like the CRB Raw Industrials index, it also signaled the early-2016 peak in credit spreads and is currently in a shallow uptrend. The third indicator is the price of Global Industrials stocks (Chart 2, bottom panel). These stocks also bottomed in early-2016, and they are currently trending down. On balance, we do not see sufficient evidence from these three indicators to call the peak in credit spreads. Global industrial stocks are collapsing, while the Raw Industrials and China Growth indexes have only put in tentative bottoms. Further, our assessment of economic trends suggests that these indicators may have more near-term downside. Weakness in global demand has largely been a function of slowing growth in China (Chart 3). The Chinese Manufacturing PMI has already collapsed to the 50 boom/bust line and we are still waiting to see the full impact of tariffs in the economic data. It’s true that Chinese policymakers have begun to ease monetary policy: interest rates are lower (Chart 3, panel 3) and the trade-weighted RMB has depreciated (Chart 3, bottom panel). But so far, easier monetary conditions have not passed through to the money and credit growth indicators that tend to lead Chinese economic activity. Our China Investment Strategy team’s Li Keqiang Leading Indicator is an index designed to lead the Li Keqiang index – a widely followed indicator of Chinese economic activity. The leading index is primarily composed of money and credit growth data, and it remains well below the zero line, pointing to further economic weakness ahead (Chart 3, panel 2). Chart 3Keep An Eye On China Keep An Eye On China Keep An Eye On China Catalyst 2: Fed Capitulation If global demand does not improve, then eventually financial conditions will tighten so much that the Fed will downgrade its assessment of future U.S. economic growth and adopt a more dovish policy stance. This is what happened in early 2016, and the Fed’s capitulation signaled the peak in credit spreads at that time (Chart 4). Chart 4Signals Of Fed Capitulation Signals Of Fed Capitulation Signals Of Fed Capitulation Our 12-month Fed Funds discounter tracks the market’s expectation for changes in the fed funds rate during the next 12 months. The discounter plunged sharply in early 2016 from a peak of 75 bps to a trough of 4 bps, signaling the peak in credit spreads (Chart 4, panel 2). At present, the discounter has fallen somewhat during the past few weeks, but hardly by enough to signal capitulation from the Fed on its “gradual” rate hike cycle. The minutes from the November FOMC meeting will be released this week and we will read closely to get a sense for how the Fed is thinking about the current state of financial conditions. However, at this point we view a December rate hike as a done deal. If credit spreads continue to widen between now and the December 19 FOMC meeting, then Chairman Powell’s post-meeting press conference will become critical for markets. Another useful indicator for the perceived stance of monetary policy is the price of gold (Chart 4, panel 3). In prior research we discussed why a higher gold price correlates with perceptions of easier monetary policy, and vice-versa.3 So it should not be surprising that gold rose sharply as the Fed capitulated in early 2016, signaling the peak in credit spreads. Gold has been range-bound during the past few weeks, but a significant upside break-out would signal a potential buying opportunity in credit. Finally, the trade-weighted U.S. dollar will likely be another useful indicator for calling the peak in credit spreads (Chart 4, bottom panel). The dollar is not a pure indicator of the stance of Fed policy like our 12-month discounter or the gold price. Rather, the dollar’s value is determined jointly by the outlooks for the U.S. economy and the rest of the world. However, a peak in the dollar would signal that either the Fed has become more dovish, or that non-U.S. growth has recovered significantly. Credit spreads would benefit in either case. The dollar did in fact roll over prior to the peak in credit spreads in early 2016, and we expect it would do the same again. Thus far we have focused on what to monitor to call the peak in credit spreads. One of the catalysts is an easing of Fed policy that would obviously be accompanied by lower Treasury yields. Therefore, it is worth thinking about how the outlook for credit spreads influences our portfolio duration call, and vice-versa. Chart 5 provides a useful illustration to help us think about the relationship. The chart shows our 12-month Fed Funds Discounter, our BCA Fed Monitor and each its three components lined up with the 2014/15 period. Specifically, this year’s trough in the dollar is lined up with the 2014 dollar trough, denoted in the chart by a vertical line. Chart 5BCA Fed Monitor: Today Vs. 2014/2015 BCA Fed Monitor: Today Vs. 2014/2015 BCA Fed Monitor: Today Vs. 2014/2015 The first key takeaway is that the market expects roughly the same number of rate hikes during the next 12 months as it did this far into the 2014/15 episode of dollar strength (Chart 5, top panel). However, our Fed Monitor is currently well above the zero line, suggesting that further rate hikes are warranted. This far into the 2014/15 dollar uptrend, our Fed Monitor had already dipped below zero (Chart 5, panel 2). The reason for today’s higher Fed Monitor is that U.S. economic growth and inflation are both on much firmer footing than during 2014/15 (Chart 5, panels 3 & 4). In fact, financial conditions have tightened more severely than at a similar stage of the 2014/15 episode, but the impact on the overall Monitor has been offset by stronger economic growth and inflation. What does this all mean? It very likely means that the Fed will need to see tighter financial conditions (i.e. wider credit spreads) before taking a significant dovish turn. In other words, the near-term path of least resistance for credit spreads is probably wider, while Treasury yields may remain close to current levels. Bottom Line: Credit spreads are widening due to the combination of weakening global growth and perceptions of restrictive Fed policy. Investors should monitor the indicators of global growth and Fed policy outlined in this report to call the peak in spreads. Housing Update In prior research we stressed the importance of housing as the most important channel through which monetary policy impacts the real economy.4 This makes the U.S. housing market critical for the portfolio duration call. If the housing market has peaked for the cycle, then it likely means that monetary policy has become overly restrictive and that interest rates have also peaked. Chart 6 shows the three most important indicators of the housing market in this regard. Residential investment as a share of potential GDP, the 12-month moving average in single family housing starts and the 12-month moving average in new home sales. At the moment, only residential investment has flattened off, while the other two indicators have maintained their uptrends. While there’s no denying that the housing data have softened in recent months, the bigger picture suggests it is too soon to sound the alarm. Chart 6Housing: The Three Most Important Indicators Housing: The Three Most Important Indicators Housing: The Three Most Important Indicators Rising rates have taken most of the blame for weaker housing data, best exemplified by these comments from the National Association of Realtors’ Chief Economist Lawrence Yun that accompanied last week’s release of October’s existing home sales data: Rising interest rates and increasing home prices continue to suppress the rate of first-time homebuyers. Home sales could further decline before stabilizing. The Federal Reserve should, therefore, re-evaluate its monetary policy of tightening credit, especially in light of softening inflationary pressures to help ease the financial burden on potential first-time buyers and assure a slump in the market causes no lasting damage to the economy.5 There are certainly structural impediments to first-time homeownership, most notably the lack of supply at the low-end of the market. The most recent annual report from the Joint Center For Housing Studies noted that of 88 metropolitan areas with available data, “virtually all” had more homes for sale in the top third of the market by price than in the bottom third.6 However, we do not see the level of interest rates as the major problem for first-time homebuyers or indeed the overall market. In fact, it is very difficult to see how the level of interest rates could be a large drag on the housing market when the household mortgage debt service ratio is as low as it has been since 1980 (Chart 6, bottom panel). So what exactly is going on with housing? It is likely that the recent slow-down in housing activity is not function of the level of mortgage rates, but of the recent sharp increase in mortgage rates. Chart 7 shows that there have been three periods since the financial crisis when mortgage rates jumped sharply: 2013, late-2016 and 2018. All three episodes were followed by a contraction in residential investment about six months later. The recent contraction fits this pattern nicely, which suggests that it should reverse if mortgage rates simply flatten-off for a time. Chart 7The Culprit: Large Rate Spikes The Culprit: Large Rate Spikes The Culprit: Large Rate Spikes Bottom Line: The housing market indicators with the best track records at signaling restrictive monetary policy remain benign, suggesting it is too soon to fret about the end of the Fed’s rate hike cycle. We suspect that recent housing weakness is a function of the large jump in mortgage rates, and that housing activity will recover once mortgage rates moderate their uptrend. Agency MBS On Upgrade Watch Agency MBS have underperformed duration-matched Treasuries so far this year. While they have outperformed corporate credit, they have also lagged other Aaa-rated securitizations (Chart 8). As the cycle progresses, we think Agency MBS spreads will remain relatively tight even after the credit cycle turns and corporate bond defaults rise. We maintain a neutral allocation to MBS for now, but will likely upgrade the sector when it comes time to downgrade corporate bonds from neutral to underweight. Chart 8Agency MBS: Outperforming Corporate Credit But Lagging Other Aaa-Rated Securitizations Agency MBS: Outperforming Corporate Credit But Lagging Other Aaa-Rated Securitizations Agency MBS: Outperforming Corporate Credit But Lagging Other Aaa-Rated Securitizations We like to model excess MBS returns using the following formula: Monthly Excess Returns = a * (1-month lag in OAS) - b * (change in OAS) + c * (change in yields) - d * (squared change in yields) In the above formula, the change in yields proxies for mortgage refinancing risk. Refinancings tend to increase when yields fall and decline when they rise. The squared change in yields proxies for extension risk, and the lagged OAS approximates the carry in the security. The final risk factor is the change in MBS OAS itself.7 Chart 9 shows a performance attribution of monthly MBS excess returns to each of the risk factors listed above. The model coefficients are estimated using only 2018 data, and the November figures are month-to-date. The message from Chart 9 is that while the squared change in yields was a drag on returns early in the year, widening OAS has been the reason for negative excess returns during the past two months. Refinancing risk has been muted all year, and this will likely continue as the Fed tightens policy. Chart 9Agency MBS Performance Attribution A Checklist For Peak Credit Spreads A Checklist For Peak Credit Spreads While a wider OAS has dragged down MBS returns during the past two months, we do not see this becoming a long-term issue for the sector. The OAS tends to widen when banks are tightening lending standards on residential mortgage loans, and at present, lending standards are already quite restrictive compared to history. The median FICO score for new mortgages is a lofty 758 (Chart 10). This suggests that the most likely way forward is continued gradual easing in bank mortgage lending standards (Chart 10, bottom panel). Chart 10Lending Standards Will Continue To Ease Lending Standards Will Continue To Ease Lending Standards Will Continue To Ease Bottom Line: Negative excess MBS returns during the past two months are the result of wider option-adjusted spreads, but continued easing in bank lending standards should prevent OAS from widening dramatically. Maintain a neutral allocation to MBS for now, but look to upgrade at the expense of corporate bonds as the credit cycle progresses.   Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “An Oasis Of Prosperity?”, dated August 21, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Trade Is Not China’s Only Problem”, dated November 21, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A Signal From Gold?”, dated May 1, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “More Than One Reason To Own Steepeners”, dated September 25, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 https://www.nar.realtor/newsroom/existing-home-sales-increase-for-the-first-time-in-six-months 6 http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/state-nations-housing-2018 7 For further details on the model please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “On The MOVE”, dated February 13, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation

Mr. X and his daughter, Ms. X, are long-time BCA clients who visit our office toward the end of each year to discuss the economic and financial market outlook. This report is an edited transcript of our recent conversation. Mr. X: I have been eagerly looking forward to this meeting given the recent turbulence in financial markets. Our investments have done poorly in the past year and, with hindsight, I wish I had followed my instincts to significantly cut our equity exposure at the end of 2017, although we did follow your advice to move to a neutral stance in mid-2018. I remain greatly troubled by economic and political developments in many countries. I have long believed in open and free markets and healthy political discourse, and this all seems under challenge. As always, there is much to talk about. Ms. X: Let me add that I also am pleased to have this opportunity to talk through the key issues that will influence our investment strategy over the coming year. As I am sure you remember, I was more optimistic than my father about the outlook when we met a year ago but things have not worked out as well as I had hoped. In retrospect, I should have paid more attention to your view that markets and policy were on a collision course as that turned out to be a very accurate prediction. When I joined the family firm in early 2017, I persuaded my father that we should have a relatively high equity exposure and that was the correct stance. However, this success led us to maintain too much equity exposure in 2018, and my father has done well to resist the temptation to say “I told you so.” So, we are left with a debate similar to last year: Should we move now to an underweight in risk assets or hold off on the hope that prices will reach new highs in the coming year? I am still not convinced that we have seen the peak in risk asset prices as there is no recession on the horizon and equity valuations are much improved, following recent price declines. I will be very interested to hear your views. BCA: Our central theme for 2018 that markets and policy would collide did turn out to be appropriate and, importantly, the story has yet to fully play out. The monetary policy tightening cycle is still at a relatively early stage in the U.S. and has not even begun in many other regions. Yet, although it was a tough year for most equity markets, the conditions for a major bear market are not yet in place. One important change to our view, compared to a year ago, is that we have pushed back the timing of the next U.S. recession. This leaves a window for risk assets to show renewed strength. It remains to be seen whether prices will reach new peaks, but we believe it would be premature to shift to an underweight stance on equities. For the moment, we are sticking with our neutral weighting for risk assets, but may well recommend boosting exposure if prices suffer further near-term weakness. We will need more clarity about the timing of a recession before we consider aggressively cutting exposure. Mr. X: I can see we will have a lively discussion because I do not share your optimism. My list of concerns is long and I hope we have time to get through them all. But first, let’s briefly review your predictions from last year. BCA: That is always interesting to do, although sometimes rather humbling. A year ago, our key conclusions were that: The environment of easy money, low inflation and healthy profit growth that has been so bullish for risk assets will start to change during the coming year. Financial conditions, especially in the U.S., will gradually tighten as decent growth leads to building inflationary pressures, encouraging central banks to withdraw stimulus. With U.S. equities at an overvalued extreme and investor sentiment overly optimistic, this will set the scene for an eventual collision between policy and the markets.  The conditions underpinning the bull market will erode only slowly which means that risk asset prices should continue to rise for at least the next six months. However, long-run investors should start shifting to a neutral exposure. Given our economic and policy views, there is a good chance that we will move to an underweight position in risk assets during the second half of 2018. The U.S. economy is already operating above potential and thus does not need any boost from easier fiscal policy. Any major tax cuts risk overheating the economy, encouraging the Federal Reserve to hike interest rates and boosting the probability of a recession in 2019. This is at odds with the popular view that tax cuts will be good for the equity market. A U.S. move to scrap NAFTA would add to downside risks. For the second year in a row, the IMF forecasts of economic growth for the coming year are likely to prove too pessimistic. The end of fiscal austerity has allowed the Euro Area economy to gather steam and this should be sustained in 2018. However, the slow progress in negotiating a Brexit deal with the EU poses a threat to the U.K. economy. China’s economy is saddled with excessive debt and excess capacity in a number of areas. Any other economy would have collapsed by now, but the government has enough control over banking and other sectors to prevent a crisis. Growth should hold above 6% in the next year or two, although much will depend on how aggressively President Xi pursues painful reforms. The market is too optimistic in assuming that the Fed will not raise interest rates by as much as indicated in their “dots” projections. There is a good chance that the U.S. yield curve will become flat or inverted by late 2018. Bonds are not an attractive investment at current yields. Only Greece and Portugal have real 10-year government bond yields above their historical average. Corporate bonds should outperform governments, but a tightening in financial conditions will put these at risk in the second half of 2018. The Euro Area and Japanese equity markets should outperform the U.S. over the next year reflecting their better valuations and more favorable financial conditions. Developed markets should outperform the emerging market index. Historically, the U.S. equity market has led recessions by between 3 and 12 months. If, as we fear, a U.S. recession starts in the second half of 2019, then the stock market would be at risk from the middle of 2018. The improving trend in capital spending should favor industrial stocks. Our other two overweight sectors are energy and financials. The oil price will be well supported by strong demand and output restraint by OPEC and Russia. The Brent price should average $65 a barrel over the coming year, with risks to the upside. We expect base metals prices to trade broadly sideways but will remain highly dependent on developments in China. Modest positions in gold are warranted. Relative economic and policy trends will favor a firm dollar in 2018. Unlike at the start of 2017, investors are significantly short the dollar which is bullish from a contrary perspective. Sterling is quite cheap but Brexit poses downside risks. The key market-relevant geopolitical events to monitor will be fiscal policy and mid-term elections in the U.S., and reform policies in China. With the former, the Democrats have a good chance of winning back control of the House of Representatives, creating a scenario of complete policy gridlock. A balanced portfolio is likely to generate average returns of only 3.3% a year in nominal terms over the next decade. This compares to average returns of around 10% a year between 1982 and 2017. As already noted, the broad theme that policy tightening – especially in the U.S. – would become a problem for asset markets during the year was supported by events. However, the exact timing was hard to predict. The indexes for non-U.S. developed equity markets and emerging markets peaked in late-January 2018, and have since dropped by around 18% and 24%, respectively (Chart 1). On the other hand, the U.S. market, after an early 2018 sell-off, hit a new peak in September, before falling anew in the past couple of months. The MSCI All-Country World index currently is about 6% below end-2017 levels in local-currency terms. Chart 1Our 'Collision Course' Theme For 2018 Played Out Our 'Collision Course' Theme For 2018 Played Out Our 'Collision Course' Theme For 2018 Played Out We started the year recommending an overweight in developed equity markets but, as you noted, shifted that to a neutral position mid-year. A year ago, we thought we might move to an underweight stance in the second half of 2018 but decided against this because U.S. fiscal stimulus boosted corporate earnings and extended the economic cycle. Our call that emerging markets would underperform was on target. Although it was U.S. financial conditions that tightened the most, Wall Street was supported by the large cut in the corporate tax rate while the combination of higher bond yields and dollar strength was a major problem for many indebted emerging markets. Overall, it was not a good year for financial markets (Table 1). Table 1Market Performance OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence As far as the overall macro environment was concerned, we were correct in predicting that the IMF was too pessimistic on economic growth. A year ago, the IMF forecast that the advanced economies would expand by 2% in 2018 and that has since been revised up to 2.4% (Table 2). This offset a slight downgrading to the performance of emerging economies. The U.S., Europe and Japan all grew faster than previously expected. Not surprisingly, inflation also was higher than forecast, although in the G7, it has remained close to the 2% level targeted by most central banks. Table 2IMF Economic Forecasts OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Despite widespread fears to the contrary, the data have supported our view that Chinese growth would hold above a 6% pace in 2018. Nevertheless, a slowdown currently is underway and downside risks remain very much in place in terms of excessive credit and trade pressures. Another difficult year lies ahead for the Chinese authorities and we will no doubt return to this topic later. As far as our other key forecasts are concerned, we were correct in our views that oil prices and the U.S. dollar would rise and that the market would be forced to revise up its predictions of Fed rate hikes. Of course, oil has recently given back its earlier gains, but we assume that is a temporary setback. On the sector front, our macro views led us to favor industrials, financials and energy, but that did not work out well as concerns about trade took a toll on cyclical sectors. Overall, there were no major macro surprises in 2018, and it seems clear that we have yet to resolve the key questions and issues that we discussed a year ago. At that time, we were concerned about the development of late-cycle pressures that ultimately would undermine asset prices. That story has yet to fully play out. It is hard to put precise timing on when the U.S. economy will peak and, thus, when asset prices will be at maximum risk. Nevertheless, our base case is that there likely will be a renewed and probably final run-up in asset prices before the next recession. Late-Cycle Challenges Mr. X: This seems like déjà-vu all over again. Since we last met, the cycle is one year older and, as you just said, the underlying challenges facing economies and markets have not really changed. If anything, things are even worse: Global debt levels are higher, inflation pressures more evident, Fed policy is moving closer to restrictive territory and protectionist policies have ratcheted up. If it was right to be cautious six months ago, then surely we should be even more cautious now. Ms. X: Oh dear, it does seem like a repeat of last year’s discussion because, once again, I am more optimistic than my father. Obviously, there are structural problems in a number of countries and, at some point, the global economy will suffer another recession. But timing is everything, and I attach very low odds to a downturn in the coming year. Meanwhile, I see many pockets of value in the equity market. Rather than cut equity positions, I am inclined to look for buying opportunities. BCA: We sympathize with your different perspectives because the outlook is complex and we also have lively debates about the view. The global equity index currently is a little below where it was when we met last year, but there has been tremendous intra-period volatility. That pattern seems likely to be repeated in 2019. In other words, it will be important to be flexible about your investment strategy. You both make good points. It is true that there are several worrying problems regarding the economic outlook, including excessive debt, protectionism and building inflation risks. At the same time, the classic conditions for an equity bear market are not yet in place, and may not be for some time. This leaves us in the rather uncomfortable position of sitting on the fence with regard to risk asset exposure. We are very open to raising exposure should markets weaken further in the months ahead, but also are keeping careful watch for signs that the economic cycle is close to peaking. In other words, it would be a mistake to lock in a 12-month strategy right now. Mr. X: I would like to challenge the consensus view, shared by my daughter, that the next recession will not occur before 2020, and might even be much later. The main rationale seems to be that the policy environment remains accommodative and there are none of the usual imbalances that occur ahead of recessions. Of course, U.S. fiscal policy has given a big boost to growth in the past year, but I assume the effects will wear off sharply in 2019. More importantly, there is huge uncertainty about the level of interest rates that will trigger economic problems. It certainly has not taken much in the way of Fed rate hikes to rattle financial markets. Thus, monetary policy may become restrictive much sooner than generally believed. I also strongly dispute the idea that there are no major financial imbalances. If running U.S. federal deficits of $1 trillion in the midst of an economic boom is not an imbalance, then I don’t know what is! At the same time, the U.S. corporate sector has issued large amounts of low-quality debt, and high-risk products such as junk-bond collateralized debt obligations have made an unwelcome reappearance. It seems that the memories of 2007-09 have faded. It is totally normal for long periods of extremely easy money to be accompanied by growing leverage and increasingly speculative financial activities, and I don’t see why this period should be any different. And often, the objects of speculation are not discovered until financial conditions become restrictive. Finally, there are huge risks associated with rising protectionism, the Chinese economy appears to be struggling, Italy’s banks are a mess, and the Brexit fiasco poses a threat to the U.K. economy. Starting with the U.S., please go ahead and convince me why a recession is more than a year away. BCA: It is natural for you to worry that a recession is right around the corner. The current U.S. economic expansion will become the longest on record if it makes it to July 2019, at which point it will surpass the 1990s expansion. Economists have a long and sad history of failing to forecast recessions. Therefore, a great deal of humility is warranted when it comes to predicting the evolution of the business cycle. The Great Recession was one of the deepest downturns on record and the recovery has been fairly sluggish by historic standards. Thus, it has taken much longer than usual for the U.S. economy to return to full employment. Looking out, there are many possible risks that could trip up the U.S. economy but, for the moment, we see no signs of recession on the horizon (Chart 2). For example, the leading economic indicator is still in an uptrend, the yield curve has not inverted and our monetary indicators are not contracting. Our proprietary recession indicator also suggests that the risk is currently low, although recent stock market weakness implies some deterioration. Chart 2Few U.S Recession 'Red Flags' Few U.S Recession 'Red Flags' Few U.S Recession 'Red Flags' The buildup in corporate debt is a cause for concern and we are not buyers of corporate bonds at current yields. However, the impact of rising yields on the economy is likely to be manageable. The interest coverage ratio for the economy as a whole – defined as the profits corporations generate for every dollar of interest paid – is still above its historic average (Chart 3). Corporate bonds are also generally held by non-leveraged investors such as pension funds, insurance companies, and ETFs. The impact of defaults on the economy tends to be more severe when leveraged institutions are the ones that suffer the greatest losses. Chart 3Interest Costs Not Yet A Headwind Interest Costs Not Yet A Headwind Interest Costs Not Yet A Headwind We share your worries about the long-term fiscal outlook. However, large budget deficits do not currently imperil the economy. The U.S. private sector is running a financial surplus, meaning that it earns more than it spends (Chart 4). Not only does this make the economy more resilient, it also provides the government with additional savings with which to finance its budget deficit. If anything, the highly accommodative stance of fiscal policy has pushed up the neutral rate of interest, giving the Fed greater scope to raise rates before monetary policy enters restrictive territory. The impetus of fiscal policy on the economy will be smaller in 2019 than it was in 2018, but it will still be positive (Chart 5). Chart 4The U.S. Private Sector Is Helping To Finance The Fiscal Deficit The U.S. Private Sector Is Helping To Finance The Fiscal Deficit The U.S. Private Sector Is Helping To Finance The Fiscal Deficit Chart 5U.S. Fiscal Policy Still Stimulative In 2019 U.S. Fiscal Policy Still Stimulative In 2019 U.S. Fiscal Policy Still Stimulative In 2019 The risks to growth are more daunting outside the U.S. As you point out, Italy is struggling to contain borrowing costs, a dark cloud hangs over the Brexit negotiations, and China and most other emerging markets have seen growth slow meaningfully. The U.S., however, is a relatively closed economy – it is not as dependent on trade as most other countries. Its financial system is reasonably resilient thanks to the capital its banks have raised over the past decade. In addition, Dodd-Frank and other legislation have made it more difficult for financial institutions to engage in reckless risk-taking. Mr. X: I would never take a benign view of the ability and willingness of financial institutions to engage in reckless behavior, but maybe I am too cynical. Even if you are right that debt does not pose an immediate threat to the market, surely it will become a huge problem in the next downturn. If the U.S. federal deficit is $1 trillion when the economy is strong, it is bound to reach unimaginable levels in a recession. And, to make matters worse, the Federal Reserve may not have much scope to lower interest rates if they peak at a historically low level in the next year or so. What options will policymakers have to respond to the next cyclical downturn? Is there a limit to how much quantitative easing central banks can do? BCA: The Fed is aware of the challenges it faces if the next recession begins when interest rates are still quite low. Raising rates rapidly in order to have more “ammunition” for counteracting the downturn would hardly be the best course of action as this would only bring forward the onset of the recession. A better strategy is to let the economy overheat a bit so that inflation rises. This would allow the Fed to push real rates further into negative territory if the recession turns out to be severe. There is no real limit on how much quantitative easing the Fed can undertake. The FOMC will undoubtedly turn to asset purchases and forward guidance again during the next economic downturn. Now that the Fed has crossed the Rubicon into unorthodox monetary policy without generating high inflation, policymakers are likely to try even more exotic policies, such as price-level targeting. The private sector tends to try to save more during recessions. Thus, even though the fiscal deficit would widen during the next downturn, there should be plenty of buyers for government debt. However, once the next recovery begins, the Fed may feel increasing political pressure to keep rates low in order to allow the government to maintain its desired level of spending and taxes. The Fed guards its independence fiercely, but in a world of increasingly political populism, that independence may begin to erode. This will not happen quickly, but to the extent that it does occur, higher inflation is likely to be the outcome. Ms. X: I would like to explore the U.S.-China dynamic a bit more because I see that as one of the main challenges to my more optimistic view. I worry that President Trump will continue to take a hard line on China trade because it plays well with his base and has broad support in Congress. And I equally worry that President Xi will not want to be seen giving in to U.S. bullying. How do you see this playing out? BCA: Investors hoping that U.S. President Donald Trump and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping will reach a deal to end the trade war on the sidelines of the forthcoming G20 leaders' summit in Buenos Aires are likely to be disappointed. President Trump's fiscal policy is completely inconsistent with his trade agenda. Fiscal stimulus in a full-employment economy will suck in imports. It also forces the Fed to raise rates more aggressively than it otherwise would, leading to a stronger dollar. The result will be a larger U.S. trade deficit. Trump will not be able to blame Canada or Mexico for a deteriorating trade position because he just signed a trade agreement with them. The new USMCA agreement is remarkably similar to NAFTA, with the notable exception that it contains a clause barring Canada and Mexico from negotiating bilateral trade deals with China. This means Trump needs a patsy who will take the blame for America's burgeoning trade deficit and China will fill that role. For his part, President Xi knows full well that he will still be China’s leader when Trump is long gone. Giving in to Trump’s demands would hurt him politically. All this means that the trade war will persist. Mr. X: I see a trade war as a major threat to the economy, but it is not the only thing that could derail the economic expansion. Let’s explore that issue in more detail. The Economic Outlook Mr. X: You have shown in previous research that housing is often a very good leading indicator of the U.S. economy, largely because it is very sensitive to changes in the monetary environment. Are you not concerned about the marked deterioration in recent U.S. housing data? BCA: Recent trends in housing have indeed been disappointing, with residential investment acting as a drag on growth for three consecutive quarters. The weakness has been broad-based with sales, the rate of price appreciation of home prices, and builder confidence all declining (Chart 6). Even though the level of housing affordability is decent by historical standards, there has been a fall in the percentage of those who believe that it is a good time to buy a home. Chart 6Recent Softness In U.S. Housing Recent Softness In U.S. Housing Recent Softness In U.S. Housing There are a few possible explanations for the weakness. First, the 2007-09 housing implosion likely had a profound and lasting impact on the perceived attractiveness of home ownership. The homeownership rate for people under 45 has remained extremely low by historical standards. Secondly, increased oversight and tighter regulations have curbed mortgage supply. Finally, the interest rate sensitivity of the sector may have increased with the result that even modest increases in the mortgage rate have outsized effects. That, in turn, could be partly explained by recent tax changes that capped the deduction on state and local property taxes, while lowering the limit on the tax deductibility of mortgage interest. The trend in housing is definitely a concern, but the odds of a further major contraction seem low. Unlike in 2006, the home vacancy rate stands near record levels and the same is true for the inventory of homes. The pace of housebuilding is below the level implied by demographic trends and consumer fundamentals are reasonably healthy. The key to the U.S. economy lies with business investment and consumer spending and these areas are well supported for the moment. Consumers are benefiting from continued strong growth in employment and a long overdue pickup in wages. Meanwhile, the ratio of net worth-to-income has surpased the previous peak and the ratio of debt servicing-to-income is low (Chart 7). Last year, we expressed some concern that the depressed saving rate might dampen spending, but the rate has since been revised substantially higher. Based on its historical relationship with U.S. household net worth, there is room for the saving rate to fall, fueling more spending. Real consumer spending has grown by 3% over the past year and there is a good chance of maintaining that pace during most of 2019. Chart 7U.S. Consumer Fundamentals Are Healthy U.S. Consumer Fundamentals Are Healthy U.S. Consumer Fundamentals Are Healthy Turning to capital spending, the cut in corporate taxes was obviously good for cash flow, and surveys show a high level of business confidence. Moreover, many years of business caution toward spending has pushed up the average age of the nonresidential capital stock to the highest level since 1963 (Chart 8). Higher wages should also incentivize firms to invest in more machinery. Absent some new shock to confidence, business investment should stay firm during the next year. Chart 8An Aging Capital Stock An Aging Capital Stock An Aging Capital Stock Overall, we expect the pace of U.S. economic growth to slow from its recent strong level, but it should hold above trend, currently estimated to be around 2%. As discussed earlier, that means capacity pressures will intensify, causing inflation to move higher. Ms. X: I share the view that the U.S. economy will continue to grow at a healthy pace, but I am less sure about the rest of the world. BCA: You are right to be concerned. We expected U.S. and global growth to diverge in 2018, but not by as much as occurred. Several factors have weighed on CEO confidence outside of the U.S., including trade wars, a strong dollar, higher oil prices, emerging market turbulence, the return of Italian debt woes, and a slowdown in the Chinese economy. The stress has shown up in the global manufacturing PMI, although the latter is still at a reasonably high level (Chart 9). Global export growth is moderating and the weakness appears to be concentrated in capex. Capital goods imports for the major economies, business investment, and the production of investment-related goods have all decelerated this year. Chart 9Global Manufacturing Slowdown Global Manufacturing Slowdown Global Manufacturing Slowdown Our favorite global leading indicators are also flashing yellow (Chart 10). BCA’s global leading economic indicator has broken below the boom/bust line and its diffusion index suggests further downside. The global ZEW composite and the BCA boom/bust indicator are both holding below zero. Chart 10Global Growth Leading Indicators Global Growth Leading Indicators Global Growth Leading Indicators Current trends in the leading indicators shown in Chart 11 imply that the growth divergence between the U.S. and the rest of the world will remain a key theme well into 2019. Among the advanced economies, Europe and Japan are quite vulnerable to the global soft patch in trade and capital spending. Chart 11Global Economic Divergence Will Continue Global Economic Divergence Will Continue Global Economic Divergence Will Continue The loss of momentum in the Euro Area economy, while expected, has been quite pronounced. Part of this is due to the dissipation of the 2016/17 economic boost related to improved health in parts of the European banking system that sparked a temporary surge in credit growth. The tightening in Italian financial conditions following the government’s budget standoff with the EU has weighed on overall Euro Area growth. Softer Chinese demand for European exports, uncertainties related to U.S. trade policy and the torturous Brexit negotiations, have not helped the situation. Real GDP growth decelerated to close to a trend pace by the third quarter of 2018. The manufacturing PMI has fallen from a peak of 60.6 in December 2017 to 51.5, mirroring a 1% decline in the OECD’s leading economic indicator for the region. Not all the economic news has been bleak. Both consumer and industrial confidence remain at elevated levels according to the European Commission (EC) surveys, consistent with a resumption of above-trend growth. Even though exports have weakened substantially from the booming pace in 2017, the EC survey on firms’ export order books remains at robust levels (Chart 12). Importantly for the Euro Area, the bank credit impulse has moved higher.The German economy should also benefit from a rebound in vehicle production which plunged earlier this year following the introduction of new emission standards. Chart 12Europe: Slowing, But No Disaster Europe: Slowing, But No Disaster Europe: Slowing, But No Disaster We interpret the 2018 Euro Area slowdown as a reversion-to-the-mean rather than the start of an extended period of sub-trend growth. Real GDP growth should fluctuate slightly above trend pace through 2019. Given that the Euro Area’s output gap is almost closed, the ECB will not deviate from its plan to end its asset purchase program by year end. Gradual rate hikes should begin late in 2019, assuming that inflation is closer to target by then. In contrast, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) is unlikely to change policy anytime soon. The good news is that wages have finally begun to grow at about a 2% pace, although it required extreme labor shortages. Yet, core inflation is barely positive and long-term inflation expectations are a long way from the 2% target. The inflation situation will have to improve significantly before the BoJ can consider adjusting or removing the Yield Curve Control policy. This is especially the case since the economy has hit a bit of an air pocket and the government intends to raise the VAT in 2019. Japan’s industrial production has stalled and we expect the export picture to get worse before it gets better. We do not anticipate any significant economic slack to develop, but even a sustained growth slowdown could partially reverse the gains that have been made on the inflation front. Ms. X: We can’t talk about the global economy without discussing China. You have noted in the past how the authorities are walking a tightrope between trying to unwind the credit bubble and restructure the economy on the one hand, and prevent a destabilizing economic and financial crisis on the other. Thus far, they have not fallen off the tightrope, but there has been limited progress in resolving the country’s imbalances. And now the authorities appear to be stimulating growth again, risking an even bigger buildup of credit. Can it all hold together for another year? BCA: That’s a very good question. Thus far, there is not much evidence that stimulus efforts are working. Credit growth is still weak and leading economic indicators have not turned around (Chart 13). There is thus a case for more aggressive reflation, but the authorities also remain keen to wean the economy off its addiction to debt. Chart 13China: No Sign Of Reacceleration China: Credit Impulse Remains Weak China: Credit Impulse Remains Weak Waves of stimulus have caused total debt to soar from 140% of GDP in 2008 to about 260% of GDP at present (Chart 14). As is usually the case, rapid increases in leverage have been associated with a misallocation of capital. Since most of the new credit has been used to finance fixed-asset investment, the result has been overcapacity in a number of areas. For example, the fact that 15%-to-20% of apartments are sitting vacant is a reflection of overbuilding. Meanwhile, the rate of return on assets in the state-owned corporate sector has fallen below borrowing costs. Chart 14China: Debt Still Rising China: Debt Still Rising China: Debt Still Rising Chinese exports are holding up well so far, but this might only represent front-running ahead of the implementation of higher tariffs. Judging from the steep drop in the export component of both the official and private-sector Chinese manufacturing PMI, exports are likely to come under increasing pressure over the next few quarters as the headwinds from higher tariffs fully manifest themselves (Chart 15). Chart 15Chinese Exports About To Suffer Chinese Exports About To Suffer Chinese Exports About To Suffer The most likely outcome is that the authorities will adjust the policy dials just enough to stabilize growth sometime in the first half of 2019. The bottoming in China’s broad money impulse offers a ray of hope (Chart 16). Still, it is a tentative signal at best and it will take some time before this recent easing in monetary policy shows up in our credit impulse measure and, later, economic growth. A modest firming in Chinese growth in the second half of 2019 would provide a somewhat stronger demand backdrop for commodities and emerging economies that sell goods to China. Chart 16A Ray Of Hope From Broad Money bca.bca_mp_2018_12_01_c16 bca.bca_mp_2018_12_01_c16 Ms. X: If you are correct about a stabilization in the Chinese economy next year, this presumably would be good news for emerging economies, especially if the Fed goes on hold. EM assets have been terribly beaten down and I am looking for an opportunity to buy. BCA: Fed rate hikes might have been the catalyst for the past year’s pain in EM assets, but it is not the underlying problem. As we highlighted at last year’s meeting, the troubles for emerging markets run much deeper. Our long-held caution on emerging economies and markets is rooted in concern about deteriorating fundamentals. Excessive debt is a ticking time bomb for many of these countries; EM dollar-denominated debt is now as high as it was in the late 1990s as a share of both GDP and exports (Chart 17). Moreover, the declining long-term growth potential for emerging economies as a group makes it more difficult for them to service the debt. The structural downtrend in EM labor force and productivity growth underscores that trend GDP growth has collapsed over the past three decades (Chart 17, bottom panel). Chart 17EM Debt A Problem Given Slowing Supply-Side... EM Debt A Problem Given Slowing Supply-Side... EM Debt A Problem Given Slowing Supply-Side... Decelerating global growth has exposed these poor fundamentals. EM sovereign spreads have moved wider in conjunction with falling PMIs and slowing industrial production and export growth. And it certainly does not help that the Fed is tightening dollar-based liquidity conditions. EM equities usually fall when U.S. financial conditions tighten (Chart 18). Chart 18...And Tightening Financial Conditions ...And Tightening Financial Conditions ...And Tightening Financial Conditions Chart 19 highlights the most vulnerable economies in terms of foreign currency funding requirements, and foreign debt-servicing obligations relative to total exports. Turkey stands out as the most vulnerable, along with Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Chile, and Colombia. In contrast, Emerging Asia appears to be in better shape relative to the crisis period of the late 1990s. Chart 19Spot The Outliers OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence The backdrop for EM assets is likely to get worse in the near term, given our view that the Fed will continue to tighten and China will be cautious about stimulating more aggressively. Our base case outlook sees some relief in the second half of 2019, but it is more of a “muddle-through” scenario than a V-shaped economic recovery. Mr. X: Perhaps EM assets could enjoy a bounce next year if the Chinese economy stabilizes, but the poor macro fundamentals you mentioned suggest that it would be a trade rather than a buy-and-hold proposition. I am inclined to avoid the whole asset class in 2019. Bond Market Prospects Ms. X: Let’s turn to fixed income now. I was bearish on bonds in 2018, but yields have risen quite a bit, at least in the United States. The Fed has lifted the fed funds rate by 100 basis points over the past year and I don’t see a lot of upside for inflation. So perhaps yields have peaked and will move sideways in 2019, which would be good for stocks in my view. BCA: Higher yields have indeed improved bond value recently. Nonetheless, they are not cheap enough to buy at this point (Chart 20). The real 10-year Treasury yield, at close to 1%, is still depressed by pre-Lehman standards. Long-term real yields in Germany and Japan remain in negative territory at close to the lowest levels ever recorded. Chart 20Real Yields Still Very Depressed Real Yields Still Very Depressed Real Yields Still Very Depressed We called the bottom in global nominal bond yields in 2016. Our research at the time showed that the cyclical and structural factors that had depressed yields were at an inflection point, and were shifting in a less bond-bullish direction. Perhaps most important among the structural factors, population aging and a downward trend in underlying productivity growth resulted in lower equilibrium bond yields over the past couple of decades. Looking ahead, productivity growth could stage a mild rebound in line with the upturn in the growth rate of the capital stock (Chart 21). As for demographics, the age structure of the world population is transitioning from a period in which aging added to the global pool of savings to one in which aging is beginning to drain that pool as people retire and begin to consume their nest eggs (Chart 22). The household saving rates in the major advanced economies should trend lower in the coming years, placing upward pressure on equilibrium global bond yields. Chart 21Productivity Still Has Some Upside Productivity Still Has Some Upside Productivity Still Has Some Upside Chart 22Demographics Past The Inflection Point Demographics Past The Inflection Point Demographics Past The Inflection Point Cyclical factors are also turning against bonds. U.S. inflation has returned to target and the Fed is normalizing short-term interest rates. The market currently is priced for only one more rate hike after December 2018 in this cycle, but we see rates rising more than that. Treasury yields will follow as market expectations adjust. Long-term inflation expectations are still too low in the U.S. and most of the other major economies to be consistent with central banks’ meeting their inflation targets over the medium term. As actual inflation edges higher, long-term expectations built into bond yields will move up. The term premium portion of long-term bond yields is also too low. This is the premium that investors demand to hold longer-term bonds. Our estimates suggest that the term premium is still negative in the advanced economies outside of the U.S., which is not sustainable over the medium term (Chart 23). Chart 23Term Premia Are Too Low Term Premia Are Too Low Term Premia Are Too Low We expect term premia to rise for two main reasons. First, investors have viewed government bonds as a good hedge for their equity holdings because bond prices have tended to rise when stock prices fell. Investors have been willing to pay a premium to hold long-term bonds to benefit from this hedging effect. But the correlation is now beginning to change as inflation and inflation expectations gradually adjust higher and output gaps close. As the hedging benefit wanes, the term premium should rise back into positive territory. Second, central bank bond purchases and forward guidance have depressed yields as well as interest-rate volatility. The latter helped to depress term premia in the bond market. This effect, too, is beginning to unwind. The Fed is letting its balance sheet shrink by about $50 billion per month. The Bank of England has kept its holdings of gilts and corporate bonds constant for over a year, while the ECB is about to end asset purchases. The Bank of Japan continues to buy assets, but at a much reduced pace. All this means that the private sector is being forced to absorb a net increase in government bonds for the first time since 2014 (Chart 24). Chart 25 shows that bond yields in the major countries will continue to trend higher as the rapid expansion of central bank balance sheets becomes a thing of the past. Chart 24Private Sector To Absorb More Bonds OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Chart 25QE Unwind Will Weigh On Bond Prices QE Unwind Will Weigh On Bond Prices QE Unwind Will Weigh On Bond Prices Ms. X: I’m not a fan of bonds at these levels, but that sounds overly bearish to me, especially given the recent plunge in oil prices. BCA: Lower oil prices will indeed help to hold down core inflation to the extent that energy prices leak into non-energy prices in the near term. Nonetheless, in the U.S., this effect will be overwhelmed by an overheated economy. From a long-term perspective, we believe that investors still have an overly benign view of the outlook for yields. The market expects that the 10-year Treasury yield in ten years will only be slightly above today’s spot yield, which itself is still very depressed by historical standards (Chart 26). And that also is the case in the other major bond markets. Chart 26Forward Yields Are Too Low Forward Yields Are Too Low Forward Yields Are Too Low Of course, it will not be a straight line up for yields – there will be plenty of volatility. We expect the 10-year Treasury yield to peak sometime in 2019 or early 2020 in the 3.5%-to-4% range, before the next recession sends yields temporarily lower. Duration should be kept short at least until the middle of 2019, with an emphasis on TIPS relative to conventional Treasury bonds. We will likely downgrade TIPS versus conventionals once long-term inflation expectations move into our target range, which should occur sometime during 2019. The ECB and Japan will not be in a position to raise interest rates for some time, but the bear phase in U.S. Treasurys will drag up European and Japanese bond yields (at the very long end of the curve for the latter). Total returns are likely to be negative in all of the major bond markets in 2019. Real 10-year yields in all of the advanced economies are still well below their long-term average, except for Greece, Italy and Portugal (Chart 27). Chart 27Valuation Ranking Of Developed Bond Markets OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Within global bond portfolios, we recommend being underweight bond markets where central banks are in a position to raise short-term interest rates (the U.S. and Canada), and overweight those that are not (Japan and Australia). The first ECB rate hike is unlikely before the end of 2019. However, the imminent end of the asset purchase program argues for no more than a benchmark allocation to core European bond markets within global fixed-income portfolios, especially since real 10-year yields in parts of continental Europe are the furthest below their long-term average. We are overweight gilts at the moment, but foresee shifting to underweight in 2019, depending on how Brexit plays out. Ms. X: What about corporate bonds? I know that total returns for corporates will be poor if government bond yields are rising. But you recommended overweighting corporate bonds relative to Treasurys last year. Given your view that the next U.S. recession is more than a year away, it seems reasonable to assume they will outperform government bonds. BCA: We were overweight corporates in the first half of 2018, but took profits in June and shifted to neutral at the same time that we downgraded our equity allocation. Spreads had tightened to levels that did not compensate investors for the risks. Recent spread widening has returned some value to U.S. corporates. The 12-month breakeven spreads for A-rated and Baa-rated corporate bonds are almost back up to their 50th percentile relative to history (Chart 28). Still, these levels are not attractive enough to justify buying based on valuation alone. As for high-yield, any rise in the default rate would quickly overwhelm the yield pickup in this space. Chart 28Corporate Bond Yields Still Have Upside Corporate Bond Yields Still Have Upside Corporate Bond Yields Still Have Upside It is possible that some of the spread widening observed in October and November will reverse, but corporates offer a poor risk/reward tradeoff, even if the default rate stays low. Corporate profit growth is bound to decelerate in 2019. This would not be a disaster for equities, but slowing profit growth is more dangerous for corporate bond excess returns because the starting point for leverage is already elevated. As discussed above, at a macro level, the aggregate interest coverage ratio for the U.S. corporate sector is decent by historical standards. However, this includes mega-cap companies that have little debt and a lot of cash. Our bottom-up research suggests that interest coverage ratios for firms in the Bloomberg Barclays corporate bond index will likely drop close to multi-decade lows during the next recession, sparking a wave of downgrade activity and fallen angels. Seeing this coming, investors may require more yield padding to compensate for these risks as profit growth slows. Our next move will likely be to downgrade corporate bonds to underweight. We are watching the yield curve, bank lending standards, profit growth, and monetary indicators for signs to further trim exposure. You should already be moving up in quality within your corporate bond allocation. Mr. X: We have already shifted to underweight corporate bonds in our fixed income portfolio. Even considering the cheapening that has occurred over the past couple of months, spread levels still make no sense in terms of providing compensation for credit risk. Equity Market Outlook Ms. X: While we all seem to agree that corporate bonds are not very attractive, I believe that enough value has been restored to equities that we should upgrade our allocation, especially if the next recession is two years away. And I know that stocks sometimes have a powerful blow-off phase before the end of a bull market. Mr. X: This is where I vehemently disagree with my daughter. The recent sell-off resembles a bloodbath in parts of the global market. It has confirmed my worst fears, especially related to the high-flying tech stocks that I believe were in a bubble. Hopes for a blow-off phase are wishful thinking. I’m wondering if the sell-off represents the beginning of an extended bear market. BCA: Some value has indeed been restored. However, the U.S. market is far from cheap relative to corporate fundamentals. The trailing and 12-month forward price-earnings ratios (PER) of 20 and 16, respectively, are still far above their historical averages, especially if one leaves out the tech bubble period of the late 1990s. And the same is true for other metrics such as price-to-sales and price-to-book value (Chart 29). BCA’s composite valuation indicator, based on 8 different valuation measures, is only a little below the threshold of overvaluation at +1 standard deviation because low interest rates still favor equities on a relative yield basis. Chart 29U.S. Equities Are Not Cheap U.S. Equities Are Not Cheap U.S. Equities Are Not Cheap It is true that equities can reward investors handsomely in the final stage of a bull market. Chart 30 presents cumulative returns to the S&P 500 in the last nine bull markets. The returns are broken down by quintile. The greatest returns, unsurprisingly, generally occur in the first part of the bull market (quintile 1). But total returns in the last 20% of the bull phase (quintile 5) have been solid and have beaten the middle quartiles. Chart 30Late-Cycle Blow-Offs Can Be Rewarding OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Of course, the tricky part is determining where we are in the bull market. We have long viewed financial markets through the lens of money and credit. This includes a framework that involves the Fed policy cycle. The historical track record for risk assets is very clear; they tend to perform well when the fed funds rate is below neutral, whether rates are rising or falling. Risk assets tend to underperform cash when the fed funds rate is above neutral (Table 3). Table 3Stocks Do Well When The Fed Funds Rate Is Below Neutral OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence We believe the fed funds rate is still in easy territory. This suggests that it is too early to shift to underweight on risk assets. We may even want to upgrade to overweight if stocks become cheap enough, as long as Fed policy is not restrictive. That said, there is huge uncertainty about the exact level of rates that constitutes “neutral” (or R-star in the Fed’s lingo). Even the Fed is unsure. This means that we must watch for signs that the fed funds rate has crossed the line into restrictive territory as the FOMC tightens over the coming year. An inversion of the 3-month T-bill/10-year yield curve slope would be a powerful signal that policy has become tight, although the lead time of an inverted curve and declining risk asset prices has been quite variable historically. Finally, it is also important to watch U.S. profit margins. Some of our research over the past couple of years focused on the late-cycle dynamics of previous long expansions, such as the 1960s, 1980s and 1990s. We found that risk assets came under pressure once U.S. profit margins peaked. Returns were often negative from the peak in margins to the subsequent recession. Mr. X: U.S. profit margins must be close to peak levels. I’ve seen all sorts of anecdotal examples of rising cost pressures, not only in the labor market. BCA: We expected to see some margin pressure to appear by now. S&P 500 EPS growth will likely top out in the next couple of quarters, if only because the third quarter’s 26% year-over-year pace is simply not sustainable. But it is impressive that our margin proxies are not yet flagging an imminent margin squeeze, despite the pickup in wage growth (Chart 31). Chart 31U.S. Margin Indicators Still Upbeat U.S. Margin Indicators Still Upbeat U.S. Margin Indicators Still Upbeat Margins according to the National Accounts (NIPA) data peaked in 2014 and have since diverged sharply with S&P 500 operating margins. It is difficult to fully explain the divergence. The NIPA margin is considered to be a better measure of underlying U.S. corporate profitability because it includes all companies (not just 500), and it is less subject to accounting trickery. That said, even the NIPA measure of margins firmed a little in 2018, along with the proxies we follow that correlate with the S&P 500 measure. The bottom line is that the macro variables that feed into our top-down U.S. EPS model point to a continuing high level of margins and fairly robust top-line growth, at least for the near term. For 2019, we assumed slower GDP growth and incorporated some decline in margins into our projection just to err on the conservative side. Nonetheless, our EPS model still projects a respectable 8% growth rate at the end of 2019 (Chart 32). The dollar will only be a minor headwind to earnings growth unless it surges by another 10% or more. Chart 32EPS Growth Forecasts EPS Growth Forecasts EPS Growth Forecasts The risks to EPS growth probably are to the downside relative to our forecast, but the point is that U.S. earnings will likely remain supportive for the market unless economic growth is much weaker than we expect. None of this means that investors should be aggressively overweight stocks now. We trimmed our equity recommendation to benchmark in mid-2018 for several reasons. At the time, value was quite poor and bottom-up earnings expectations were too high, especially on a five-year horizon. Also, sentiment measures suggested that investors were overly complacent. As you know, we are always reluctant to chase markets into highly overvalued territory, especially when a lot of good news has been discounted. As we have noted, we are open to temporarily shifting back to overweight in equities and other risk assets. The extension of the economic expansion gives more time for earnings to grow. The risks facing the market have not eased much but, given our base-case macro view, we would be inclined to upgrade equities if there is another meaningful correction. Of course, our profit, monetary and economic indicators would have to remain supportive to justify an upgrade. Mr. X: But you are bearish on bonds. We saw in October that the equity market is vulnerable to higher yields. BCA: It certainly won’t be smooth sailing through 2019 as interest rates normalize. Until recently, higher bond yields reflected stronger growth without any associated fears that inflation was a growing problem. The ‘Fed Put’ was seen as a key backstop for the equity bull market. But now that the U.S. labor market is showing signs of overheating, the bond sell-off has become less benign for stocks because the Fed will be less inclined to ease up at the first sign of trouble in the equity market. How stocks react in 2019 to the upward trend in yields depends a lot on the evolution of actual inflation and long-term inflation expectations. If core PCE inflation hovers close to or just above 2% for a while, then the Fed Put should still be in place. However, it would get ugly for both bonds and stocks if inflation moves beyond 2.5%. Our base case is that this negative dynamic won’t occur until early 2020, but obviously the timing is uncertain. One key indicator to watch is long-term inflation expectations, such as the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate (Chart 33). It is close to 2% at the moment. If it shifts up into the 2.3%-2.5% range, it would confirm that inflation expectations have returned to a level that is consistent with the Fed meeting its 2% inflation target on a sustained basis. This would be a signal to the Fed that it is must become more aggressive in calming growth, with obvious negative consequences for risk assets. Chart 33Watch For A Return To 2.3%-2.5% Range Watch For A Return To 2.3%-2.5% Range Watch For A Return To 2.3%-2.5% Range Mr. X: I am skeptical that the U.S. corporate sector can pull off an 8% earnings gain in 2019. What about the other major markets? Won’t they get hit hard if global growth continues to slow as you suggest? BCA: Yes, that is correct. It is not surprising that EPS growth has already peaked in the Euro Area and Japan. The profit situation is going to deteriorate quickly in the coming quarters. Industrial production growth in both economies has already dropped close to zero, and we use this as a proxy for top-line growth in our EPS models. Nominal GDP growth has decelerated sharply in both economies in absolute terms and relative to the aggregate wage bill. These trends suggest that profit margins are coming under significant downward pressure. Even when we build in a modest growth pickup and slight rebound in margins in 2019, EPS growth falls close to zero by year-end according to our models. Both the Euro Area and Japanese equity markets are cheap relative to the U.S., based on our composite valuation indicators (Chart 34). However, neither is above the threshold of undervaluation (+1 standard deviation) that would justify overweight positions on valuation alone. We think the U.S. market will outperform the other two at least in the first half of 2019 in local and, especially, common-currency terms. Chart 34Valuation Of Nonfinancial Equity Markets Relative To The U.S. OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Ms. X: It makes sense that U.S. profit growth will outperform the other major developed countries in 2019. I would like to circle back to emerging market assets. I understand that many emerging economies have deep structural problems. But you admitted that the Chinese authorities will eventually stimulate enough to stabilize growth, providing a bounce in EM growth and asset prices next year. These assets seem cheap enough to me to warrant buying now in anticipation of that rally. As we all know, reversals from oversold levels can happen in a blink of an eye and I don’t want to miss it. BCA: We are looking for an opportunity to buy as well, but are wary of getting in too early. First, valuation has improved but is not good enough on its own to justify buying now. EM stocks are only moderately undervalued based on our EM composite valuation indicator and the cyclically-adjusted P/E ratio (Chart 35). EM currencies are not particularly cheap either, outside of Argentina, Turkey and Mexico (Charts 36A and 36B). Valuation should only play a role in investment strategy when it is at an extreme, and this is not the case for most EM countries. Chart 35EM Stocks Are Not At Capitulation Levels... bca.bca_mp_2018_12_01_c35 bca.bca_mp_2018_12_01_c35   Chart 36A…And Neither Are EM Currencies ...And Neither Are EM Currencies ...And Neither Are EM Currencies Chart 36B…And Neither Are EM Currencies ...And Neither Are EM Currencies ...And Neither Are EM Currencies Second, corporate earnings growth has plenty of downside potential in the near term. Annual growth in EM nonfinancial EBITDA, currently near 10%, is likely to turn negative next year, based on our China credit and fiscal impulse indicator (Chart 37). And, as we emphasized earlier, China is not yet pressing hard on the gas pedal. Chart 37EM Earnings Growth: Lots Of Downside EM Earnings Growth: Lots Of Downside EM Earnings Growth: Lots Of Downside Third, it will take time for more aggressive Chinese policy stimulus, if it does occur, to show up in EM stocks and commodity prices. Trend changes in money growth and our credit and fiscal impulse preceded the trough in EM stocks and commodity prices in 2015, and again at the top in stocks and commodities in 2017 (Chart 38). However, even if these two indicators bottom today, it could take several months before the sell-off in EM financial markets and commodity prices abates. Chart 38Chinese Money And Credit Leads EM And Commodities Chinese Money And Credit Leads EM And Commodities Chinese Money And Credit Leads EM And Commodities Finally, if Chinese stimulus comes largely via easier monetary policy rather than fiscal stimulus, then the outcome will be a weaker RMB. We expect the RMB to drift lower in any event, because rate differentials vis-à-vis the U.S. will move against the Chinese currency next year. A weaker RMB would add to the near-term headwinds facing EM assets. The bottom line is that the downside risks remain high enough that you should resist the temptation to bottom-fish until there are concrete signs that the Chinese authorities are getting serious about boosting the economy. We are also watching for signs outside of China that the global growth slowdown is ending. This includes our global leading economic indicator and data that are highly sensitive to global growth, such as German manufacturing foreign orders. Mr. X: Emerging market assets would have to become a lot cheaper for me to consider buying. Debt levels are just too high to be sustained, and stronger Chinese growth would only provide a short-term boost. I’m not sure I would even want to buy developed market risk assets based solely on some Chinese policy stimulus. BCA: Yes, we agree with your assessment that buying EM in 2019 would be a trade rather than a buy-and-hold strategy. Still, the combination of continued solid U.S. growth and a modest upturn in the Chinese economy would alleviate a lot of investors’ global growth concerns. The result could be a meaningful rally in pro-cyclical assets that you should not miss. We are defensively positioned at the moment, but we could see becoming more aggressive in 2019 on signs that China is stimulating more firmly and/or our global leading indicators begin to show some signs of life. Besides upgrading our overall equity allocation back to overweight, we would dip our toes in the EM space again. At the same time, we will likely upgrade the more cyclical DM equity markets, such as the Euro Area and Japan, while downgrading the defensive U.S. equity market to underweight. We are currently defensively positioned in terms of equity sectors, but it would make sense to shift cyclicals to overweight at the same time. Exact timing is always difficult, but we expect to become more aggressive around the middle of 2019. We also think the time is approaching to favor long-suffering value stocks over growth stocks. The relative performance of growth-over-value according to standard measures has become a sector call over the past decade: tech or financials. The sector skew complicates this issue, especially since tech stocks have already cracked. But we have found that stocks that are cheap within equity sectors tend to outperform expensive (or growth) stocks once the fed funds rate moves into restrictive territory. This is likely to occur in the latter half of 2019. Value should then have its day in the sun. Currencies: Mr. X: We don’t usually hedge our international equity exposure, so the direction of the dollar matters a lot to us. As you predicted a year ago, the U.S. dollar reigned supreme in 2018. Your economic views suggest another good year in 2019, but won’t this become a problem for the economy? President Trump’s desire to lower the U.S. trade deficit suggests that the Administration would like the dollar to drop and we could get some anti-dollar rhetoric from the White House. Also, it seems that the consensus is strongly bullish on the dollar which is always a concern. BCA: The outlook for the dollar is much trickier than it was at the end of 2017. As you highlighted, traders are already very long the dollar, implying that the hurdle for the greenback to surprise positively is much higher now. However, a key driver for the dollar is the global growth backdrop. If the latter is poor in the first half of 2019 as we expect, it will keep a bid under the greenback. Interest rates should also remain supportive for the dollar. As we argued earlier, current market expectations – only one more Fed hike after the December meeting – are too sanguine. If the Fed increases rates by more than currently discounted, the dollar’s fair value will rise, especially if global growth continues to lag that of the U.S. Since the dollar’s 2018 rally was largely a correction of its previous undervaluation, the currency has upside potential in the first half of the year (Chart 39). Chart 39U.S. Dollar Not Yet Overvalued U.S. Dollar Not Yet Overvalued U.S. Dollar Not Yet Overvalued A stronger dollar will dampen foreign demand for U.S.-produced goods and will boost U.S. imports. However, do not forget that a rising dollar benefits U.S. consumers via its impact on import prices. Since the consumer sector represents 68% of GDP, and that 69% of household consumption is geared toward the (largely domestic) service sector, a strong dollar will not be as negative for aggregate demand and employment as many commentators fear, unless it were to surge by at least another 10%. In the end, the dollar will be more important for the distribution of U.S. growth than its overall level. Where the strong dollar is likely to cause tremors is in the political arena. You are correct to point out that there is a large inconsistency between the White House’s desires to shore up growth, while simultaneously curtailing the trade deficit, especially if the dollar appreciates further. As long as the Fed focuses on its dual mandate and tries to contain inflationary pressures, the executive branch of the U.S. government can do little to push the dollar down. Currency intervention cannot have a permanent effect unless it is accompanied by shifts in relative macro fundamentals. For example, foreign exchange intervention by the Japanese Ministry of Finance in the late 1990s merely had a temporary impact on the yen. The yen only weakened on a sustained basis once interest rate differentials moved against Japan. This problem underpins our view that the Sino-U.S. relationship is unlikely to improve meaningfully next year. China will remain an easy target to blame for the U.S.’s large trade deficit. What ultimately will signal a top in the dollar is better global growth, which is unlikely until the second half of 2019. At that point, expected returns outside the U.S. will improve, causing money to leave the U.S., pushing the dollar down. Mr. X: While 2017 was a stellar year for the euro, 2018 proved a much more challenging environment. Will 2019 be more like 2017 or 2018? BCA: We often think of the euro as the anti-dollar; buying EUR/USD is the simplest, most liquid vehicle for betting against the dollar, and vice versa. Our bullish dollar stance is therefore synonymous with a negative take on the euro. Also, the activity gap between the U.S. and the Euro Area continues to move in a euro-bearish fashion (Chart 40). Finally, since the Great Financial Crisis, EUR/USD has lagged the differential between European and U.S. core inflation by roughly six months. Today, this inflation spread still points toward a weaker euro. Chart 40Relative LEI's Moving Against Euro Relative LEI's Moving Against Euro Relative LEI's Moving Against Euro It is important to remember that when Chinese economic activity weakens, European growth deteriorates relative to the U.S. Thus, our view that global growth will continue to sputter in the first half of 2019 implies that the monetary policy divergence between the Fed and the ECB has not yet reached a climax. Consequently, we expect EUR/USD to trade below 1.1 in the first half of 2019. By that point, the common currency will be trading at a meaningful discount to its fair value, which will allow it to find a floor (Chart 41). Chart 41Euro Heading Below Fair Value Before Bottoming Euro Heading Below Fair Value Before Bottoming Euro Heading Below Fair Value Before Bottoming Mr. X: The Bank of Japan has debased the yen, with a balance sheet larger than Japan’s GDP. This cannot end well. I am very bearish on the currency. BCA: The BoJ’s monetary policy is definitely a challenge for the yen. The Japanese central bank rightfully understands that Japan’s inability to generate any meaningful inflation – despite an economy that is at full employment – is the consequence of a well-established deflationary mindset. The BoJ wants to shock inflation expectations upward by keeping real rates at very accommodative levels well after growth has picked up. This means that the BoJ will remain a laggard as global central banks move away from accommodative policies. The yen will continue to depreciate versus the dollar as U.S. yields rise on a cyclical horizon. That being said, the yen still has a place within investors’ portfolios. First, the yen is unlikely to collapse despite the BoJ’s heavy debt monetization. The JPY is one of the cheapest currencies in the world, with its real effective exchange rate hovering at a three-decade low (Chart 42). Additionally, Japan still sports a current account surplus of 3.7% of GDP, hardly the sign of an overstimulated and inflationary economy where demand is running amok. Instead, thanks to decades of current account surpluses, Japan has accumulated a positive net international investment position of 60% of GDP. This means that Japan runs a constant and large positive income balance, a feature historically associated with strong currencies. Chart 42The Yen Is Very Cheap The Yen Is Very Cheap The Yen Is Very Cheap Japan’s large net international investment position also contributes to the yen’s defensive behavior as Japanese investors pull money back to safety at home when global growth deteriorates. Hence, the yen could rebound, especially against the euro, the commodity currencies, and EM currencies if there is a further global growth scare in the near term. Owning some yen can therefore stabilize portfolio returns during tough times. As we discussed earlier, we would avoid the EM asset class, including currency exposure, until global growth firms. Commodities: Ms. X: Once again, you made a good call on the energy price outlook a year ago, with prices moving higher for most of the year. But the recent weakness in oil seemed to come out of nowhere, and I must admit to being confused about where we go next. What are your latest thoughts on oil prices for the coming year? BCA: The fundamentals lined up in a very straightforward way at the end of 2017. The coalition we have dubbed OPEC 2.0 – the OPEC and non-OPEC producer group led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – outlined a clear strategy to reduce the global oil inventory overhang. The producers that had the capacity to increase supply maintained strict production discipline which, to some analysts, was still surprising even after the cohesiveness shown by the group in 2017. Outside that core group output continued to fall, especially in Venezuela, which remains a high-risk producing province. The oil market was balanced and prices were slowly moving higher as we entered the second quarter of this year, when President Trump announced the U.S. would re-impose oil export sanctions against Iran beginning early November. The oft-repeated goal of the sanctions was to reduce Iranian exports to zero. To compensate for the lost Iranian exports, President Trump pressured OPEC, led by KSA, to significantly increase production, which they did. However, as we approached the November deadline, the Trump Administration granted the eight largest importers of Iranian oil 180-day waivers on the sanctions. This restored much of the oil that would have been lost. Suddenly, the market found itself oversupplied and prices fell. As we move toward the December 6 meeting of OPEC 2.0 in Vienna, we are expecting a production cut from the coalition of as much as 1.4mm b/d to offset these waivers. The coalition wishes to keep global oil inventories from once again over-filling and dragging prices even lower in 2019. On the demand side, consumption continues to hold up both in the developed and emerging world, although we have somewhat lowered our expectations for growth next year. We are mindful of persistent concerns over the strength of demand – particularly in EM – in 2019. Thus, on the supply side and the demand side, the level of uncertainty in the oil markets is higher than it was at the start of 2018. Nonetheless, our base-case outlook is on the optimistic side for oil prices in 2019, with Brent crude oil averaging around $82/bbl, and WTI trading $6/bbl below that level (Chart 43). Chart 43Oil Prices To Rebound In 2019 Oil Prices To Rebound In 2019 Oil Prices To Rebound In 2019 Ms. X: I am skeptical that oil prices will rebound as much as you expect. First, oil demand is likely to falter if your view that global growth will continue slowing into early 2019 proves correct. Second, U.S. shale production is rising briskly, with pipeline bottlenecks finally starting to ease. Third, President Trump seems to have gone from taking credit for high equity prices to taking credit for low oil prices. Trump has taken a lot flack for supporting Saudi Arabia following the killing of The Washington Post journalist in Turkey. Would the Saudis really be willing to lose Trump’s support by cutting production at this politically sensitive time? BCA: Faltering demand growth remains a concern. However, note that in our forecasts we do expect global oil consumption growth to slow down to 1.46mm b/d next year, somewhat lower than the 1.6mm b/d growth we expect this year.  In terms of the U.S. shale sector, production levels over the short term can be somewhat insensitive to changes in spot and forward prices, given the hedging activity of producers. Over the medium to longer term, however, lower spot and forward prices will disincentivize drilling by all but the most efficient producers with the best, lowest-cost acreage. If another price collapse were to occur – and were to persist, as the earlier price collapse did – we would expect a production loss of between 5% and 10% from the U.S. shales.  Regarding KSA, the Kingdom needs close to $83/bbl to balance its budget this year and next, according to the IMF’s most recent estimates. If prices remain lower for longer, KSA’s official reserves will continue to fall, as its sovereign wealth fund continues to be tapped to fill budget gaps. President Trump’s insistence on higher production from KSA and the rest of OPEC is a non-starter – it would doom those economies to recession, and stifle further investment going forward. The U.S. would also suffer down the road, as the lack of investment significantly tightens global supply. So, net, if production cuts are not forthcoming from OPEC at its Vienna meeting we – and the market – will be downgrading our oil forecast. Ms. X: Does your optimism regarding energy extend to other commodities? The combination of a strong dollar and a China slowdown did a lot of damage to industrial commodities in 2018. Given your view that China’s economy should stabilize in 2019, are we close to a bottom in base metals? BCA: It is too soon to begin building positions in base metals because the trade war is going to get worse before it gets better. Exposure to base metals should be near benchmark at best entering 2019, although we will be looking to upgrade along with other risk assets if Chinese policy stimulus ramps up. Over the medium term, the outlook for base metals hinges on how successfully China pulls off its pivot toward consumer- and services-led growth, away from heavy industrial-led development. China accounts for roughly half of global demand for these base metals. Commodity demand from businesses providing consumer goods and services is lower than that of heavy industrial export-oriented firms. But demand for commodities used in consumer products – e.g., copper, zinc and nickel, which go into stainless-steel consumer appliances such as washers and dryers – will remain steady, and could increase if the transition away from heavy industrial-led growth is successful. Gasoline and jet fuel demand will also benefit, as EM consumers’ demand for leisure activities such as tourism increases with rising incomes. China is also going to be a large producer and consumer of electric vehicles, as it attempts to reduce its dependence on imported oil. Although timing the production ramp-up is difficult, in the long term these trends will be supportive for nickel and copper. Mr. X: You know I can’t let you get away without asking about gold. The price of bullion is down about 5% since the end of 2017, but that is no worse than the global equity market and it did provide a hedge against economic, financial or political shocks. The world seems just as risky as it did a year ago, so I am inclined to hold on to our gold positions, currently close to 10% of our portfolio. That is above your recommended level, but keeping a solid position in gold is one area where my daughter and I have close agreement regarding investment strategy. BCA: Gold did perform well during the risk asset corrections we had in 2018, and during the political crises as well. The price is not too far away from where we recommended going long gold as a portfolio hedge at the end of 2017 ($1230.3/oz). We continue to expect gold to perform well as a hedge. When other risk assets are trading lower, gold holds value relative to equities and tends to outperform bonds (Chart 44). Likewise, when other risk assets are rising, gold participates, but does not do as well as equities. It is this convexity – outperforming on the downside but participating on the upside with other risk assets – that continues to support our belief that gold has a role as a portfolio hedge. However, having 10% of your portfolio in gold is more than we would recommend – we favor an allocation of around 5%. Chart 44Hold Some Gold As A Hedge OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Geopolitics Ms. X: I’m glad that the three of us agree at least on one thing – hold some gold! Let’s return to the geopolitical situation for a moment. Last year, you correctly forecast that divergent domestic policies in the U.S. and China – stimulus in the former and lack thereof in the latter – would be the most investment-relevant geopolitical issue. At the time, I found this an odd thing to highlight, given the risks of protectionism, populism, and North Korea. Do you still think that domestic policies will dominate in 2019? BCA: Yes, policy divergence between the U.S. and China will also dominate in 2019, especially if it continues to buoy the U.S. economy at the expense of the rest of the world. Of course, Beijing may decide to do more stimulus to offset its weakening economy and the impact of the trade tariffs. A headline rate cut, cuts to bank reserve requirements, and a boost to local government infrastructure spending are all in play. In the context of faltering housing and capex figures in the U.S., the narrative over the next quarter or two could be that the policy divergence is over, that Chinese policymakers have “blinked.” We are pushing back against this narrative on a structural basis. We have already broadly outlined our view that China will not be pressing hard to boost demand growth. Many of its recent policy efforts have focused on rebalancing the economy away from debt-driven investment (Chart 45). The problem for the rest of the world is that raw materials and capital goods comprise 85% of Chinese imports. As such, efforts to boost domestic consumption will have limited impact on the rest of the world, especially as emerging markets are highly leveraged to “old China.” Chart 45Rebalancing Of The Chinese Economy Rebalancing Of The Chinese Economy Rebalancing Of The Chinese Economy Meanwhile, the Trump-Democrat gridlock could yield surprising results in 2019. President Trump is becoming singularly focused on winning re-election in 2020. As such, he fears the “stimulus cliff” looming over the election year. Democrats, eager to show that they are not merely the party of “the Resistance,” have already signaled that an infrastructure deal is their top priority. With fiscal conservatives in the House all but neutered by the midterm elections, a coalition between Trump and likely House Speaker Nancy Pelosi could emerge by late 2019, ushering in even more fiscal stimulus. While the net new federal spending will not be as grandiose as the headline figures, it will be something. There will also be regular spending increases in the wake of this year’s bipartisan removal of spending caps. We place solid odds that the current policy divergence narrative continues well into 2019, with bullish consequences for the U.S. dollar and bearish outcomes for EM assets, at least in the first half of the year. Mr. X: Your geopolitical team has consistently been alarmist on the U.S.-China trade war, a view that bore out throughout 2018. You already stated that you think trade tensions will persist in 2019. Where is this heading? BCA: Nowhere good. Rising geopolitical tensions in the Sino-American relationship has been our premier geopolitical risk since 2012. The Trump administration has begun tying geopolitical and strategic matters in with the trade talks. No longer is the White House merely asking for a narrowing of the trade deficit, improved intellectual property protections, and the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade. Now, everything from surface-to-air missiles in the South China Sea to Beijing’s “Belt and Road” project are on the list of U.S. demands. Trade negotiations are a “two-level game,” whereby policymakers negotiate in parallel with their foreign counterparts and domestic constituents. While Chinese economic agents may accept U.S. economic demands, it is not clear to us that its military and intelligence apparatus will accept U.S. geopolitical demands. And Xi Jinping himself is highly attuned to China’s geopolitical position, calling for national rejuvenation above all. We would therefore downplay any optimistic news from the G20 summit between Presidents Trump and Xi. President Trump could freeze tariffs at current rates and allow for a more serious negotiating round throughout 2019. But unless China is willing to kowtow to America, a fundamental deal will remain elusive in the end. For Trump, a failure to agree is still a win domestically, as the median American voter is not asking for a resolution of the trade war with China (Chart 46). Chart 46Americans Favor Being Tough On China OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Ms. X: Could trade tensions spill into rising military friction? BCA: Absolutely. Minor military skirmishes will likely continue and could even escalate. We believe that there is a structural bull market in “war.” Investors should position themselves by being long global defense stocks. Mr. X: That is not encouraging. What about North Korea and Iran? Could they become geopolitical risks in 2019? BCA: Our answer to the North Korea question remains the same as 12 months ago: we have seen the peak in the U.S.’ display of a “credible military threat.” But Iran could re-emerge as a risk mid-year. We argued in last year’s discussion that President Trump was more interested in playing domestic politics than actually ratcheting up tensions with Iran. However, in early 2018 we raised our alarm level, particularly when staffing decisions in the White House involved several noted Iran hawks joining the foreign policy team. This was a mistake. Our initial call was correct, as President Trump ultimately offered six-month exemptions to eight importers of Iranian crude. That said, those exemptions will expire in the spring. The White House may, at that point, ratchet up tensions with Iran. This time, we will believe it when we see it. Intensifying tensions with Iran ahead of the U.S. summer vacation season, and at a time when crude oil markets are likely to be finely balanced, seems like folly, especially with primary elections a mere 6-to-8 months away. What does President Trump want more: to win re-election or to punish Iran? We think the answer is obvious, especially given that very few voters seem to view Iran as the country’s greatest threat (Chart 47). Chart 47Americans Don’t See Iran As A Major Threat OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Ms. X: Let’s turn to Europe. You have tended to dismiss Euroskeptics as a minor threat, which has largely been correct. But don’t you think that, with Brexit upon us and Chancellor Angela Merkel in the twilight, populism in continental Europe will finally have its day? BCA: Let’s first wait to see how Brexit turns out! The next few months will be critical. Uncertainty is high, with considerable risks remaining. We do not think that Prime Minister May has the votes in the House of Commons to push through any version of soft Brexit that she has envisioned thus far. If the vote on the U.K.-EU exit deal falls through, a new election could be possible. This will require an extension of the exit process under Article 50 and a prolonged period of uncertainty. The probability of a no-deal Brexit is lower than 10%. It is simply not in the interest of anyone involved, save for a smattering of the hardest of hard Brexit adherents in the U.K. Conservative Party. Put simply, if the EU-U.K. deal falls through in the House of Commons, or even if PM May is replaced by a hard-Brexit Tory, the most likely outcome is an extension of the negotiation process. This can be easily done and we suspect that all EU member states would be in favor of such an extension given the cost to business sentiment and trade that would result from a no-deal Brexit. It is not clear that Brexit has emboldened Euroskeptics. In fact, most populist parties in the EU have chosen to tone down their Euroskepticism and emphasize their anti-immigrant agenda since the Brexit referendum. In part, this decision has to do with how messy the Brexit process has become. If the U.K. is struggling to unravel the sinews that tie it to Europe, how is any other country going to fare any better? The problem for Euroskeptic populists is that establishment parties are wise to the preferences of the European median voter. For example, we now have Friedrich Merz, a German candidate for the head of the Christian Democratic Union – essentially Merkel’s successor – who is both an ardent Europhile and a hardliner on immigration. This is not revolutionary. Merz simply read the polls correctly and realized that, with 83% of Germans supporting the euro, the rise of the anti-establishment Alternative for Germany (AfD) is more about immigration than about the EU. As such, we continue to stress that populism in Europe is overstated. In fact, we expect that Germany and France will redouble their efforts to reform European institutions in 2019. The European parliamentary elections in May will elicit much handwringing by the media due to a likely solid showing by Euroskeptics, even though the election is meaningless. Afterwards, we expect to see significant efforts to complete the banking union, reform the European Stability Mechanism, and even introduce a nascent Euro Area budget. But these reforms will not be for everyone. Euroskeptics in Central and Eastern Europe will be left on the outside looking in. Brussels may also be emboldened to take a hard line on Italy if institutional reforms convince the markets that the core Euro Area is sheltered from contagion. In other words, the fruits of integration will be reserved for those who play by the Franco-German rules. And that could, ironically, set the stage for the unraveling of the European Union as we know it. Over the long haul, a much tighter, more integrated, core could emerge centered on the Euro Area, with the rest of the EU becoming stillborn. The year 2019 will be a vital one for Europe. We are sensing an urgency in Berlin and Paris that has not existed throughout the crisis, largely due to Merkel’s own failings as a leader. We remain optimistic that the Euro Area will survive. However, there will be fireworks. Finally, a word about Japan. The coming year will see the peak of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s career. He is promoting the first-ever revision to Japan’s post-war constitution in order to countenance the armed forces. If he succeeds, he will have a big national security success to couple with his largely effective “Abenomics” economic agenda – after that, it will all be downhill. If he fails, he will become a lame duck. This means that political uncertainty will rise in 2019, after six years of unusual tranquility. Conclusions Mr. X: This is a good place to conclude our discussion. We have covered a lot of ground and your views have reinforced my belief that 2019 could be even more turbulent for financial markets than the past has been. I accept your opinion that a major global economic downturn is not around the corner, but with valuations still stretched, I feel that it makes good sense to focus on capital preservation. I may lose out on the proverbial “blow-off” rally, but so be it – I have been in this business long enough to know that it is much better to leave the party while the music is still playing! Ms. X: I agree with my father that the risks surrounding the outlook have risen as we have entered the late stages of this business-cycle expansion. Yet, if global growth does temporarily stabilize and corporate earnings continue to expand, I fear that being out of the market will be very painful. The era of hyper-easy money may be ending, but interest rates globally are still nowhere near restrictive territory. This tells me that the final stages of this bull market could be very rewarding. A turbulent market is not only one where prices go down – they can also go up a lot! BCA: The debate you are having is one we ourselves have had on numerous occasions. There is always a trade-off between maximizing short-term returns and taking a longer-term approach. Valuations are the ultimate guidepost for long-term returns. While most assets have cheapened over the past year, prices are still fairly elevated. Table 4 shows our baseline calculations of what a balanced portfolio will earn over the coming decade. We estimate that such a portfolio will deliver average annual returns of 4.9% over the next ten years, or 2.8% after adjusting for inflation. That is an improvement over our inflation-adjusted estimate of 1.3% from last year, but still well below the 6.6% real return that a balanced portfolio earned between 1982 and 2018. Table 410-Year Asset Return Projections OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Our return calculations for equities assume that profit margins decline modestly over the period and that multiples mean revert to their historical average. These assumptions may turn out to be too pessimistic if underlying changes in the economy keep corporate profits elevated as a share of GDP. Structurally lower real interest rates may also justify higher P/E multiples, although this would be largely offset by the prospect of slower economic growth, which will translate into slower earnings growth. In terms of the outlook for the coming year, a lot hinges on our view that monetary policy in the main economies stays accommodative. This seems like a safe assumption in the Euro Area and Japan, where rates are near historic lows, as well as in China, where the government is actively loosening monetary conditions. It is not such a straightforward conclusion for the U.S., where the Fed is on track to keep raising rates. If it turns out that the neutral interest rate is not far above where rates are already, we could see a broad-based slowdown of the U.S. economy that ripples through to the rest of the world. And even if U.S. monetary policy does remain accommodative, many things could still upset the apple cart, including a full-out trade war, debt crises in Italy or China, or a debilitating spike in oil prices. As the title of our outlook implies, 2019 is likely to be a year of increased turbulence. Ms. X: As always, you have left us with much to think about. My father has looked forward to these discussions every year and now that I am able to join him, I understand why. Before we conclude, it would be helpful to have a recap of your key views. BCA: That would be our pleasure. The key points are as follows: The collision between policy and markets that we discussed last year finally came to a head in October. Rather than falling as they normally do when stocks plunge, U.S. bond yields rose as investors reassessed the willingness of the Fed to pause hiking rates even in the face of softer growth. Likewise, hopes that China would move swiftly to stimulate its economy were dashed as it became increasingly clear that the authorities were placing a high emphasis on their reform agenda of deleveraging and capacity reduction. The ongoing Brexit saga and the stalemate between the populist Italian government and the EU have increased uncertainty in Europe at a time when the region was already beginning to slow. We expect the tensions between policy and markets to be an ongoing theme in 2019. With the U.S. unemployment rate at a 48-year low, it will take a significant slowdown for the Fed to stop hiking rates. Despite the deterioration in economic data over the past month, real final domestic demand is still tracking to expand by 3% in the fourth quarter, well above estimates of the sustainable pace of economic growth. Ultimately, the Fed will deliver more hikes next year than discounted in the markets. This will push up the dollar and keep the upward trend in Treasury yields intact. The dollar should peak midway next year. China will also become more aggressive in stimulating its economy, which will boost global growth. However, until both of these things happen, emerging markets will remain under pressure. For the time being, we continue to favor developed market equities over their EM peers. We also prefer defensive equity sectors such as health care and consumer staples over cyclical sectors such as industrials and materials. Within the developed market universe, the U.S. will outperform Europe and Japan for the next few quarters, especially in dollar terms. A stabilization in global growth could ignite a blow-off rally in global equities. If the Fed is raising rates in response to falling unemployment, this is unlikely to derail the stock market. However, once supply-side constraints begin to fully bite in early 2020 and inflation rises well above the Fed’s target of 2%, stocks will begin to buckle. This means that a window exists next year where stocks will outperform bonds. We would maintain a benchmark allocation to stocks for now, but increase exposure if global bourses were to fall significantly from current levels without a corresponding deteriorating in the economic outlook. Corporate credit will underperform stocks as government bond yields rise. A major increase in spreads is unlikely as long as the economy is still expanding, but spreads could still widen modestly given their low starting point. U.S. shale companies have been the marginal producers in the global oil sector. With breakeven costs in shale close to $50/bbl, crude prices are unlikely to rise much from current levels over the long term. However, over the next 12 months, we expect production cuts in Saudi Arabia will push prices up, with Brent crude averaging around $82/bbl in 2019. A balanced portfolio is likely to generate average returns of only 2.8% a year in real terms over the next decade. This compares to average returns of around 6.6% a year between 1982 and 2018. We would like to take this opportunity to wish you and all of our clients a very peaceful, healthy and prosperous New Year. The Editors November 26, 2018 ​​​​​​

Highlights The relative performance of developed market (DM) versus emerging market (EM) equities just corresponds to the relative performance of healthcare versus financials. On a six month horizon, DM will underperform EM. Within Europe, overweight Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic, but steer clear of energy-heavy Russia. Wait for the 10-year BTP yield to move closer to 3 percent before buying Italian assets, either in absolute or relative terms. Buy the pound on any sharp sell-offs during the Brexit psychodrama. Our medium-term expected value of pound/euro equals 1.18. Chart of the WeekDeveloped Vs. Emerging Markets = Healthcare Vs. Financials Developed Vs. Emerging Markets = Healthcare Vs. Financials Developed Vs. Emerging Markets = Healthcare Vs. Financials Feature They say that to capture the Zeitgeist at any moment, all you need to do is name the top five companies in the world. So here are the top five companies in the developed equity markets (DM): Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Facebook (Table I-1). Table I-1Developed Markets: Top 5 Companies DM Versus EM, And Two European Psychodramas DM Versus EM, And Two European Psychodramas These five names do perfectly capture the spirit of our time and should not surprise you. Now look at the top five companies in the emerging equity markets (EM): Tencent, Taiwan Semiconductor, Samsung Electronics, Alibaba, and Naspers (Table I-2). Table I-2Emerging Markets: Top 5 Companies DM Versus EM, And Two European Psychodramas DM Versus EM, And Two European Psychodramas What may surprise you is that technology titans dominate in EM markets too. In fact, the technology sector's weighting in EM, at 25 percent, is even larger than in DM, at 19 percent. If technology looms even larger in EM than in DM, what is the defining sector difference between the two regions? The answer is that emerging markets have almost no healthcare stocks, and an offsetting substantial overweighting to financials (Table I-3). Table I-3Developed Markets Versus Emerging Markets: Sector Weights DM Versus EM, And Two European Psychodramas DM Versus EM, And Two European Psychodramas Developed Vs. Emerging Markets = Healthcare Vs. Financials The following is a very different way of looking at the DM versus EM investment decision and, as such, may differ from the BCA house view. As we have demonstrated time and time again on these pages, an equity market's dominant sector skew is of critical importance to investors (Chart I-2). This is because equity sector skews almost always drive regional and country relative performance. Crucially, this fundamental truth applies at the highest level too: the relative performance of DM versus EM. The Chart of the Week should leave you in absolutely no doubt that the relative performance of DM versus EM just corresponds to the relative performance of healthcare versus financials. Chart I-2Developed Versus Emerging Markets: Sector Weight Differences DM Versus EM, And Two European Psychodramas DM Versus EM, And Two European Psychodramas Nevertheless, this striking observation raises a fascinating question: what is the direction of causality? Does healthcare versus financials drive DM versus EM, or in fact does DM versus EM drive healthcare versus financials? The answer is sometimes the former, and at other times the latter. For example, a major slump in emerging economies would undoubtedly drag down global equities. In the ensuing synchronized bear market, the more defensive healthcare sector would almost certainly outperform the financials, and under these circumstances the direction of causality would clearly be from DM versus EM to global sector performance. On the other hand, absent a major bear market, if a reappraisal of sector relative valuations and growth prospects caused a rotation in sector leadership, the causality would run in the other direction: from global sector performance to DM versus EM. Such a reappraisal of sector relative valuations and growth prospects appears to be underway at the moment, and is likely to persist for the next few months. This is because the very sharp down-oscillation in global credit growth which occurred from February through September has now clearly flipped into an up-oscillation. For investors, these oscillations in global credit growth provide excellent tactical opportunities because the oscillations are very regular and therefore predictable; and the cyclical versus defensive sector performance closely tracks the oscillations. So after healthcare's strong outperformance versus financials from February through September, sector relative performance has now flipped into a reverse configuration (Chart I-3). Chart I-3An Up-Oscillation In Global Credit Growth Technically Favours Financials An Up-Oscillation In Global Credit Growth Technically Favours Financials An Up-Oscillation In Global Credit Growth Technically Favours Financials To be clear, this is likely a tactical opportunity lasting no more than six months or so. Nevertheless, from a DM versus EM perspective, it would imply a countertrend move within a structural trend - in which the outperformance of DM versus EM temporarily ends, or even flips into an underperformance (Chart I-4). Chart I-4An Up-Oscillation In Global Credit Growth Technically Favours EM An Up-Oscillation In Global Credit Growth Technically Favours EM An Up-Oscillation In Global Credit Growth Technically Favours EM For European equity investors, the important implication is that developed Europe versus emerging Europe closely tracks broad DM versus broad EM (Chart I-5). Of course, 'emerging Europe' is a misnomer because Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and even Russia are developed economies and markets. Nevertheless, as they fall within the MSCI EM index, they tend to move with EM. Chart I-5Developed Europe Vs. Emerging Europe = Developed Markets Vs. Emerging Markets Developed Europe Vs. Emerging Europe = Developed Markets Vs. Emerging Markets Developed Europe Vs. Emerging Europe = Developed Markets Vs. Emerging Markets The upshot is that on a tactical horizon, emerging Europe is likely to outperform developed Europe. However, given our high conviction view that non-energy commodities will continue to outperform energy, focus on Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic and steer clear of energy-heavy Russia. European Psychodrama 1: Italy Vs. The EU In the low-level game of chicken between Italy and the EU Commission over Italy's 2019 budget, the bond market will determine who swerves first. If the 10-year BTP yield rises and stays well above 4 percent, the weakened capital position of Italian banks from lower bond prices combined with deteriorating funding conditions will weigh on bank lending and economic growth. This will put pressure on the Italian government to swerve first and concede ground to the EU's demands. That said, it is hard to know the exact level of yields at which the government would reach its pain threshold. On the other hand, if the 10-year BTP yield falls and stays well below 3 percent, the bond market's insouciance would embolden the Italian government. Moreover, this apparent vote of confidence would be based on sound economics. Italy likely has a very high fiscal multiplier, meaning that a modest increase in its budget deficit to 2.4 percent would more than pay for itself through higher economic growth. Under these circumstances the EU would be under pressure to swerve first and give Italy some room for manoeuvre. The long-term investment opportunity is the Italy versus Spain sovereign 10-year yield spread. At 200 bps, the spread is at its all-time widest, and incongruous with the vanishing gap between the non-performing loans ratios in Italy and Spain. Nevertheless, our recommendation is to wait for the 10-year BTP yield to move closer to 3 percent before buying Italian assets, either in absolute or relative terms (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Remain Neutral Italian Assets Until The 10-Year BTP Yield Moves Closer To 3 Percent Remain Neutral Italian Assets Until The 10-Year BTP Yield Moves Closer To 3 Percent Remain Neutral Italian Assets Until The 10-Year BTP Yield Moves Closer To 3 Percent European Psychodrama 2: Brexit In the psychodrama called Brexit, every new plot twist and turn has the potential to move the pound up or down by a few cents in a day. The next such major twist is the passage of the withdrawal bill through the U.K. parliament in early December. The ultra Brexiteer Conservative MPs and Northern Ireland Unionists will almost certainly vote against the agreement that Theresa May has forged with Brussels. This is because the agreement conjures up the Brexiteers' worst nightmare: a potentially indefinite customs union with the EU27, making it impossible for the U.K. to strike free trade deals with the rest of the world. Hence, for Theresa May to get her agreement through parliament, she will require the support of a substantial number of Labour MPs. But the substantial numbers just aren't there. The upshot is that she is likely to lose the vote, at which point the pound will tumble. For medium-term investors, this would be the moment to buy the pound, and we now explain why. On a six month horizon, the crucial question is: what will happen when the Article 50 process for the U.K. to leave the EU expires at 11pm on March 29, 2019? There are only three possibilities: 1. The U.K. doesn't leave the EU. At this advanced stage on the timeline, not leaving the EU on March 29 2019 effectively means an extension of the Article 50 process. This would require the U.K. to apply for an extension, and for the EU27 to agree to it. But realistically, the EU27 would only agree to it to facilitate a general election and/or a second referendum which could reverse Brexit. Probability = 45%. With the parliamentary arithmetic pointing to a rejection of May's Brexit deal as it stands, an amendment to the withdrawal bill forcing a second referendum, or a lost vote of no confidence in the government could lead to this outcome. Pound/euro = 1.20, because of the realistic prospect of reversing Brexit (Chart I-7). Chart I-7British Public Opinion On Brexit Is Shifting Long Emerging Markets Vs. Developed Markets Long Emerging Markets Vs. Developed Markets 2. The U.K. enters a transition period to leave the EU with a negotiated agreement. Theresa May's proposed withdrawal deal, or a variation of it, is approved by the U.K parliament (and the EU27) Probability = 45%. Appropriate amendments to the withdrawal agreement might sufficiently reduce the parliamentary rebellion. Pound/euro = 1.20 because the removal of the 'no deal' outcome would liberate the BoE to hike interest rates. 3. The U.K. crashes out of the EU with 'no deal'. Probability = 10%. This outcome would be the result of a gridlock in the U.K. parliament, with no majority formed for any Brexit strategy. Unlikely, but not impossible. Pound/euro = 1.00 because the U.K. economy would face months of severe disruption and uncertainty. Based on these three possible outcomes on March 29 2019, our expected value of pound/euro equals 1.18. Meaning that any sharp sell-off during the ongoing psychodrama constitutes a medium-term buying opportunity. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* Supporting the thesis in the main body of this report, the 130-day fractal dimension of EM versus DM recently hit its lower bound, suggesting an oversold extreme and a likely countertrend move. For a short-term trade, position for a 2.5% profit with a symmetrical stop-loss. In other trades, long Portugal / short Hungary hit its stop-loss and is closed, leaving four open trades. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-8 Long Emerging Markets Vs. Developed Markets Long Emerging Markets Vs. Developed Markets The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Global Yields: Global bond yields appear to be settling into a new trading range, with the downside limited by tight labor markets but the upside capped by slowing global growth momentum. 2014/15 Redux?: The domestic U.S. economy is much stronger today compared to the 2014/15 period when slowing global growth and a rapidly rising U.S. dollar prompted selloffs in global credit markets and, eventually, a dovish shift by the Fed. U.S. financial conditions need to tighten more before the Fed can signal a pause. New Zealand: The RBNZ will continue to maintain a dovish policy stance over at least the next year, amid softening economic growth and underwhelming domestic inflation. Stay long 5-year New Zealand government bonds versus both U.S. Treasuries (hedged into USD) and German sovereign debt (hedged into EUR). Feature Dear Client, There will be no Global Fixed Income Strategy report published next Tuesday, November 27th. Instead, you will be receiving a Special Report this Thursday, November 22nd. The report - authored by BCA's Chief Emerging Markets strategist, Arthur Budaghyan - will discuss the outlook for Emerging Market hard currency debt. Best regards, Rob Robis Chief Strategist On the surface, it appears that uncertainty is increasing in global fixed income markets. Government bond yields have dipped over the past couple of weeks, most notably in the U.S. where the benchmark 10-year Treasury yield is back down to 3.05% as we go to press. Corporate credit spreads have also been drifting wider, especially in the U.S. where there is growing concern that economic momentum has peaked, at least temporarily. The problem for bond markets is that while global growth momentum has clearly slowed, it has not been by enough to alleviate inflation pressures coming from tight labor markets. This story is clearly most visible in the U.S., but also in the majority of major developed market economies. Central bankers are sticking to their guns and focusing on their belief in the Phillips Curve model to forecast inflation. Until there are signs that more turbulent financial markets are feeding into actual weaker economic growth, bond yields will not be able to fall by enough to help bail out flailing equities and corporate credit. There are now 83% of OECD countries with an unemployment rate below the estimated full employment NAIRU. As expected with such a backdrop, our Central Bank Monitors are calling for tighter monetary policy across the developed economies. This is also showing up in an unusual divergence between rising global real bond yields and falling global leading economic indicators (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekYields Are Less Responsive To Slowing Growth Yields Are Less Responsive To Slowing Growth Yields Are Less Responsive To Slowing Growth By most conventional measures, monetary policy settings are not restrictive across the major economies. Actual policy interest rates remain below conventional measures of equilibrium like a Taylor Rule, while government bond yields - adjusted for inflation expectations - are less than trend real GDP growth (Chart 2). Those gaps are smallest in the U.S., where the Fed has been raising interest rates for the past three years, but remain wide in other countries. Chart 2Global Interest Rates Are Still Below Equilibrium Levels The Bond Market Is Not Your Friend The Bond Market Is Not Your Friend If global growth is merely shifting from above-trend (falling unemployment) to trend (stable unemployment), then central bankers will not be able to move back to a more dovish posture that could trigger a major fall in bond yields. Trading ranges are more likely to result in such an environment, where yields struggle to break higher because of shaky risk assets but cannot break lower because of low unemployment. We are likely in one of those ranges now, measured by a 3-3.25% range on the 10-year U.S. Treasury. Without a friendly boost from falling bond yields, we continue to recommend a cautious stance on global spread product, while maintaining an overall below-benchmark stance on global duration exposure. Will It Be 2014/15 All Over Again? Watch The USD & China Two months ago, we published a comparison of the current macro backdrop to that of the 2014/15 period.1 Back then, the Fed was forced to alter its plans to deliver a series of rate hikes after the end of its quantitative easing program, thanks to a sharply rising U.S. dollar that triggered major financial market selloffs and, eventually, slower U.S. growth. We concluded that such an outcome could occur again in the next few months, but it would take a much larger tightening of financial conditions to get the Fed to stand down this time given tighter U.S. labor markets and stronger U.S. inflation pressures. The way we presented that comparison between today and four years ago was though "cycle-on-cycle" charts, showing financial and economic data today overlapped with data from that 2014/15 period. The two episodes were indexed to the trough in the U.S. dollar in May 2014 and February 2018. This week, we update a few of those charts, but also add a few new indicators to assess if there has been enough financial and economic damage to trigger a shift to a more dovish Fed. U.S. Economy: The domestic U.S. economy appears healthier today versus the 2014/15 period, judging by the more robust readings from the NFIB Small Business Optimism index and the high level of job openings from the JOLTS data (Chart 3). Yet there are similarities seen in the latest decline in the Conference Board survey of U.S. CEO confidence, and the sharp fall in the ISM Manufacturing New Orders index. We suspect that this divergence in business optimism reflects U.S.-China trade tensions, which should have a greater impact on larger corporations that sell globally compared to smaller companies with a more domestic customer base. Chart 3U.S. Growth Today Vs. 2014/15: Stronger Domestic Economy U.S. Growth Today Vs. 2014/15: Stronger Domestic Economy U.S. Growth Today Vs. 2014/15: Stronger Domestic Economy U.S. Inflation: U.S. core CPI inflation is much faster now than at the similar point in the 2014/15 cycle, as is the growth in Average Hourly Earnings (Chart 4). This is due to the much lower unemployment rate today in the U.S., which is putting more upward pressure on domestically-generated prices and wages. Yet while the ISM Prices Paid index is also at a higher level today than 2014/15, the upward momentum has peaked and the latest decline in commodity prices is following an ominously similar path to four years ago (bottom panel). Chart 4U.S. Inflation Today Vs. 2014/15: Faster Core/Wage Inflation U.S. Inflation Today Vs. 2014/15: Faster Core/Wage Inflation U.S. Inflation Today Vs. 2014/15: Faster Core/Wage Inflation Emerging Markets (EM): EM economic growth has been decelerating at a similar pace to 2014/15, with the aggregate EM (ex-China) PMI produced by our EM strategists now sitting right at the boom/bust 50 line (Chart 5). China's economic growth appears to be holding up better today when looking at the more elevated Li Keqiang index. A possible reason for that is the much larger and faster easing of Chinese monetary conditions today compared to 2014/15, thanks to the sharp weakening of the yuan. Chart 5EM Growth Today Vs. 2014/15: China Drag Is Smaller (For Now) EM Growth Today Vs. 2014/15: China Drag Is Smaller (For Now) EM Growth Today Vs. 2014/15: China Drag Is Smaller (For Now) Global Financial Markets: Here, the current cycle is sticking very close to the 2014/15 script when looking at the rising U.S. trade-weighted dollar, widening spreads for U.S. investment grade (IG) corporate bonds and EM USD-denominated sovereign debt, and the tightening of U.S. financial conditions (Chart 6). Although it should be noted that the trade-weighted dollar would have to rise another 10% from current levels, and U.S. IG spreads would have to widen another 60bps, to generate similar moves compared to 2014/15. Chart 6Financial Markets Today Vs. 2014/15: Following A Similar Script Financial Markets Today Vs. 2014/15: Following A Similar Script Financial Markets Today Vs. 2014/15: Following A Similar Script U.S. Treasury Yields: Nominal U.S. Treasury yields are at much higher levels today than four years ago, an obvious consequence of the Fed's tightening cycle and more elevated U.S. inflation expectations (Chart 7). Yet the amount of tightening discounted over the next 12-months in the U.S. Overnight Index Swap (OIS) is similar to 2014/15, as is our estimate of the market-implied level of the terminal real fed funds rate (around 0.5%).2 One major difference: there is a large net short position in the Treasury market today, while positioning was fairly neutral during 2014/15 (bottom panel). Chart 7U.S. Treasuries Today Vs. 2014/15: Higher Yields But Similar Fed Pricing U.S. Treasuries Today Vs. 2014/15: Higher Yields But Similar Fed Pricing U.S. Treasuries Today Vs. 2014/15: Higher Yields But Similar Fed Pricing Summing it all up, the broader range of evidence we present here confirms our conclusion from two months ago. There needs to be a much larger tightening of U.S. financial conditions before the Fed can signal a pause on its planned rate hikes, because of a much healthier domestic U.S. economy and a more entrenched acceleration of inflation (especially wage growth). If China's economy can continue to outperform the 2014/15 path - still a big "if" given U.S.-China trade uncertainties and with Chinese policymakers less willing to reflate the domestic credit bubble to boost growth - then the odds of U.S. growth converging down to non-U.S. growth will be reduced. We will continue to monitor these charts and relationships in future Weekly Reports but, for now, we see nothing yet to change our bearish views on U.S. Treasuries and our cautious view on U.S. corporate credit. Bottom Line: The domestic U.S. economy is much stronger today compared to the 2014/15 period when slowing global growth and a rapidly rising U.S. dollar prompted selloffs in global credit markets and, eventually, a dovish shift by the Fed. U.S. financial conditions need to tighten more before the Fed can signal a pause. New Zealand Update: Fade The Recent Bump In Yields We have been structurally positive on New Zealand (NZ) government bonds for some time, dating back to mid-2017. Our view was based on an assessment that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) would be unable to make any upward change in policy rates due to sub-par economic growth and inflation that would struggle to meet the RBNZ's target of 2% (the midpoint of the 1-3% target band). So far, that scenario has fully played out, and NZ government bonds have significantly outperformed their global peers as a result (Chart 8). Chart 8Sticking With Our Successful Long NZ Trades Sticking With Our Successful Long NZ Trades Sticking With Our Successful Long NZ Trades Our preferred trades, which are part of our Tactical Overlay shown on page 14, have been yield spread trades for NZ government bonds versus U.S. and German equivalents.3 Specifically, we have been recommending long positions in 5-year NZ bonds vs. 5-year U.S. Treasuries and 5-year German government debt. The trades have performed well, but have given back some of the gains in recent weeks. This has mostly come via a surge in NZ yields (+29bps higher since the recent low on September 7th) that has driven yield spreads wider versus the U.S. and Germany (+23bps and +34bps, respectively, since September 7th). These increases are likely to prove unsustainable, given the sluggish momentum in NZ growth and inflation. The latest read on year-over-year real GDP growth came in at below-potential pace of 2.8% in the 2nd quarter of 2018. The manufacturing and services purchasing managers' indices (PMIs) have both fallen sharply throughout 2018, although the latest data points suggest some stabilization above the 50 level on the PMIs (Chart 9). Similar trends can be seen in the RBNZ surveys of business confidence and capacity utilization, which both remain near the post-2008 lows but may also be stabilizing. Chart 9Sub-Par Growth In New Zealand Sub-Par Growth In New Zealand Sub-Par Growth In New Zealand In the November Monetary Policy Statement (MPS) that was released after the RBNZ meeting earlier this month, a cautious view on growth was outlined.4 The pickup in Q2 GDP growth was dismissed as driven by temporary factors, and policymakers expressed concern that deteriorating business confidence could be signaling a more prolonged period of slowing domestic demand. The central bank did also highlight growth risks coming from slowing exports if U.S.-China trade tensions intensify. It is difficult to find an obvious trigger for faster NZ growth at the moment. Both consumer spending and residential investment were fueled by rising immigration and population growth from 2013 to 2017, but those trends have since begun to reverse. The RBNZ projects net monthly immigration to NZ to slow to levels last seen in 2014 and in line with the current growth rate of consumer spending around 3% (Chart 10). Business investment growth has already stalled (middle panel), while the RBNZ'S Business Outlook surveys indicate a negative outlook for export growth (bottom panel). Chart 10Where Will NZ Growth Come From? Where Will NZ Growth Come From? Where Will NZ Growth Come From? Against this sluggish growth backdrop, the RBNZ must continue to run an accommodative monetary policy to support growth. This can be done given the persistent undershooting of NZ inflation versus the RBNZ target. Headline CPI inflation did accelerate to 1.9% in Q3, but core inflation at 1.2% continued to languish near the bottom end of the RBNZ target range. The gap between the two inflation measures can be attributed to previous increases in global energy prices, which caused a blip up in the tradeables portion of the NZ CPI (Chart 11). Yet the recent decline in oil prices, combined with a bounce in the NZ dollar, suggests that the bump in tradeables inflation is likely to reverse in Q4 (middle panel). Non-tradeables inflation, which is driven by domestic factors such as wage growth, has remained stable at just over 2%, even with the NZ unemployment rate at a 10-year low of 4.5% that is below the OECD's NAIRU estimate. Chart 11Stubbornly Low NZ Inflation Stubbornly Low NZ Inflation Stubbornly Low NZ Inflation With an obvious trigger from higher inflation, the RBNZ will be forced to maintain a highly accommodative policy stance. This is especially true given the RBNZ's mandate, which now includes maximizing sustainable employment alongside keeping inflation between 1-3%. We think that means the RBNZ is more likely to tolerate a move to the upper end of that inflation band if the growth outlook was less certain, as is currently the case. Our RBNZ Monitor sits close to the zero line, indicating no pressure to either hike or cut interest rates. In the November MPS, the RBNZ stuck to its forecast that the Official Cash Rate (OCR) would remain unchanged at 1.75% until mid-2020, consistent with the signal from our RBNZ Monitor. The market is differing on this, with the NZ OIS curve currently discounting almost one full 25bp rate hike by the end of 2019, and a faster pace of hikes after that (Chart 12). Chart 12Market-Priced RBNZ Hikes Will Not Happen Market-Priced RBNZ Hikes Will Not Happen Market-Priced RBNZ Hikes Will Not Happen We continue to recommending fading any pricing of RBNZ rate hikes over the next 6-12 months. Given our still bearish views on U.S. Treasuries, we are maintaining our recommended long NZ 5-year/short U.S. 5-year position (on a currency-hedged basis into U.S. dollars). We have been running our long NZ/short Germany position on an UN-hedged basis - atypical for the Global Fixed Income Strategy service, where our views are almost always currency-hedged into U.S. dollars - since the trade's inception last year, based on a currency view that was more bearish on the euro than the New Zealand dollar. The NZD/EUR cross instead fell substantially, which more than fully eroded the gains on the bond side of the trade until the recent 7.5% pop in that exchange rate. After that move, the return on our unhedged trade is nearly back to flat. We are using that as an opportunity to switch our NZ/Germany trade to a more typical currency-hedged basis, moving the exposure into euros from New Zealand dollars. Bottom Line: The RBNZ will continue to maintain a dovish policy stance over at least the next year, amid softening economic growth and underwhelming domestic inflation. Stay long 5-year New Zealand government bonds versus both U.S. Treasuries (hedged into USD) and German sovereign debt (hedged into EUR). Robert Robis, CFA, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "EM Contagion? Or Just QT On The Q.T.?", dated September 11th 2018, available at gfis.bcarsearch.com. 2 This is calculated by subtracting the 5-year U.S. CPI swap rate, 5-years forward, from the 5-year U.S. OIS rate, 5-years forward. 3 We freely admit that a position held for over one full year should not be described as "tactical", as the name of our overlay portfolio suggests. Yet we have seen no reason to close these trades early given our market views on NZ. 4 The full Monetary Policy Statement can be found here: https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/-/media/ReserveBank/Files/Publications/Monetary%20policy%20statements/2018/mpsnov2018.pdf Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index The Bond Market Is Not Your Friend The Bond Market Is Not Your Friend Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Duration: The waning impact from fiscal stimulus and the drag from weak foreign economic activity will cause U.S. growth to slow as we enter 2019. But with market-implied rate hike expectations still depressed, we are inclined to maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. Yield Curve: Over the course of the year the sweet spot on the Treasury curve has shifted from the 5-year/7-year maturity point to the 2-year. The 2-year note offers the best combination of risk and reward of any point on the Treasury curve. This is true in both absolute and duration-neutral terms. Spread Product: Investors looking for attractive alternatives to Treasury debt at the short-end of the curve should consider Agency CMBS and Local Authority debt. Those sectors offer attractive spread pick-up and low risk of capital loss. Feature So far this year the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index has returned -2.2% in absolute terms and -3.7% versus cash (Chart 1). If the year ended today, it would go into the books as the worst year for excess Treasury returns since 2009. Chart 1A Year To Forget A Year To Forget A Year To Forget Taking stock of this poor bond market performance makes us wonder what might prompt a reversal of fortunes. Our golden rule of bond investing tells us that if the economic outlook worsens enough for the market to discount a slower pace of Fed rate hikes, then bond market performance will improve.1 But with the market priced for only 63 bps of rate hikes during the next 12 months, we are reluctant to make that bet today. That being said, it also seems likely that U.S. GDP growth will slow as we head into the New Year. At the very least, the intensity of the bond market sell-off should diminish as well. Peak Growth There are two reasons why we think U.S. growth will soften during the next few quarters. The first is that global economic growth (excluding the U.S.) has already slowed. In past reports we demonstrated that weak foreign economic growth tends to pull down the U.S., rather than strong U.S. growth pulling up the rest of the world.2 While recent U.S. data show only tentative signs of contagion from the rest of the world, we also see no evidence of moderation in the global growth slowdown.3 The Global Manufacturing PMI fell to 52.1 in October, a far cry from its early-2018 peak above 54 (Chart 2). The percentage of countries with PMIs above the 50 boom/bust line also fell to 74% in October, down from its 2018 high of 95%. Chart 2The Global Growth Slowdown Continues... The Global Growth Slowdown Continues... The Global Growth Slowdown Continues... Considering the major economic blocs, the global growth slowdown continues to be driven by Europe and China (Chart 3). The Eurozone aggregate PMI remains above 50, but is falling rapidly. Meanwhile, the Chinese PMI is threatening to break below 50, and will probably do so during the next few months. The full slate of U.S. import tariffs have still not been implemented, and in the background, leading indicators of Chinese economic activity remain soft (Chart 4). Chart 3...Driven By Europe And China ...Driven By Europe And China ...Driven By Europe And China Chart 4Chinese Economy Keeps Slowing Chinese Economy Keeps Slowing Chinese Economy Keeps Slowing The second reason why U.S. growth is likely to slow during the next few quarters is the waning impact from fiscal stimulus. With the Democrats taking control of the House following last week's midterm elections, any hopes for another round of tax cuts should be quickly dashed. There is probably room for compromise between the two parties on infrastructure spending, but it will take some time (possibly the better part of two years) for them to reach an agreement. Meanwhile, the IMF estimates that fiscal policy will shift from adding 1% to GDP growth in 2018 to only 0.4% next year (Chart 5). Chart 5Less Boost From Fiscal In 2019 Less Boost From Fiscal In 2019 Less Boost From Fiscal In 2019 Bottom Line: The waning impact from fiscal stimulus and the drag from weak foreign economic activity will cause U.S. growth to slow as we enter 2019, but at this point it is not clear whether growth will slow sufficiently for the Fed to deviate from its +25 bps per quarter rate hike pace. With the market only priced for 63 bps of rate hikes during the next year, below-benchmark portfolio duration remains warranted. We prefer to position for slowing U.S. growth by taking less credit risk, maintaining only a neutral allocation to spread product with an up-in-quality bias. The Increasing Attractiveness Of Shorter Maturities Chart 1 shows a fairly consistent bearish trend in the bond market: at no point in 2018 were Treasury index returns in the black. But this doesn't mean that nothing has changed in the Treasury market this year, far from it. In fact, this year's bear-flattening of the yield curve has shifted the sweet spot for Treasury investors from the 5-year/7-year maturity point to the 2-year maturity point (Chart 6). This is true both in absolute and duration-neutral terms. Chart 6Par Coupon Treasury Curve The Sweet Spot On The Yield Curve The Sweet Spot On The Yield Curve Absolute Returns As can be seen in Chart 6, at the beginning of the year the steepest part of the Treasury curve ended at around the 5-year/7-year maturity point. Today, the curve flattens off considerably after the 2-year maturity point. This change in shape has important implications for the amount of return investors can earn from rolling down the yield curve. Table 1 shows expected 12-month returns for 2-year, 5-year and 10-year Treasury notes in three different scenarios. A scenario where the yield curve is unchanged during the next year, one where all yields rise by the average of historical 12-month yield increases, and one where all yields decrease by the average of historical 12-month yield declines. Table 1Bullish And Bearish Scenarios At Different Points Of The Curve The Sweet Spot On The Yield Curve The Sweet Spot On The Yield Curve In the unchanged yield curve scenario, expected returns are equal to "carry" which is simply the sum of the coupon income from the note (yield pick-up) and the capital gains earned from rolling down the curve (roll-down). It is in the roll-down component where the changing shape of the yield curve is most apparent. At the beginning of the year, an investor in the 5-year Treasury note could expect to earn 40 basis points of roll-down on a 12-month investment horizon, whereas an investor in the 2-year note would only earn 13 bps. But today, there is 21 bps of roll-down embedded in the 2-year note and only 6 bps in the 5-year. The end result is that we would actually expect the 2-year note to outperform the 5-year note in an unchanged yield curve environment, and only deliver 15 bps less return than the 10-year note. Charts 7A and 7B show that this sort of attractiveness in the 2-year note is quite rare. The 2-year does not usually offer more carry than the 5-year or 10-year, and periods when it does tend to coincide with an inverted yield curve. Since an inverted yield curve is a reliable predictor of recession, it usually makes sense to extend duration and favor long maturity Treasuries in those environments. This is because yields are likely to fall as the Fed cuts rates to fight the recession. But in the current environment, if recession is avoided during the next 12 months - as is our expectation - and Treasury yields continue to drift higher, a strategy of favoring the 2-year note will pay off handsomely. Chart 7AMore Carry In The 2-Year Note I More Carry In The 2-Year Note I More Carry In The 2-Year Note I Chart 7BMore Carry In The 2-Year Note II More Carry In The 2-Year Note II More Carry In The 2-Year Note II This is further elucidated by the bull and bear cases shown in Table 1. In the bearish scenario where each point on the yield curve rises by its historical 12-month average (the average is calculated only for periods when yields actually increased), the 2-year note still has a positive expected return. More importantly, the 2-year note offers an expected return that is 215 bps greater than the expected return from the 5-year note. At the beginning of the year, the 2-year note only offered 161 bps more expected return than the 5-year note in the bearish bond scenario. Similarly, in the bullish bond scenario, the 2-year note is only expected to lag the 5-year note by 228 bps. At the beginning of the year, the 2-year would have been expected to lag the 5-year by 297 bps in the bullish bond scenario. In other words, from an absolute return perspective the 2-year Treasury note is the most attractive part of the yield curve. The 2-year will outperform other maturities by more than usual in a rising yield scenario and underperform by less than usual in a falling yield scenario. This alluring combination of risk and reward looks even more enticing when coupled with our preference for keeping portfolio duration low. In Duration-Neutral Terms We do not typically look at expected total returns for specific maturity points. Rather, we prefer to separate the portfolio duration call from the yield curve positioning call. In other words, we communicate our view on the level of rates through our portfolio duration recommendation and then consider which parts of the yield curve look most attractive in duration-neutral terms. To do this, we look at butterfly spreads. Chart 8 shows that the 2/5/10 butterfly spread - the spread between the 5-year bullet and a duration-matched 2/10 barbell - has turned negative. This is unusual outside of environments where the 2/10 slope is inverted. In fact, our fair value model for the 2/5/10 butterfly spread is based on the slope of the 2/10 Treasury curve and it currently flags the 5-year bullet as expensive (Chart 8, bottom panel).4 Chart 8The 5-Year Bullet Is Expensive... The 5-Year Bullet Is Expensive... The 5-Year Bullet Is Expensive... In contrast, the 2-year bullet is the cheapest it has been since 2005 relative to the 1/5 barbell (Chart 9). This means that the 1/5 slope would have to flatten dramatically for returns in the 1/5 barbell to overcome the carry advantage in the 2-year note. For this reason we closed our prior yield curve position - long the 7-year bullet and short the 1/20 barbell - in last week's report, and entered a position long the 2-year bullet and short the 1/5 barbell. Chart 9...But The 2-Year Bullet Is Cheap ...But The 2-Year Bullet Is Cheap ...But The 2-Year Bullet Is Cheap Bottom Line: Over the course of the year the sweet spot on the Treasury curve has shifted from the 5-year/7-year maturity point to the 2-year. The 2-year note offers the best combination of risk and reward of any point on the Treasury curve. This is true in both absolute and duration-neutral terms. Short Maturity Spread Product Given that the sweet spot on the yield curve has shifted from the 5-year/7-year maturity point to the 2-year maturity point, we thought we should also examine which spread products offer attractive opportunities to earn extra compensation at the short-end of the curve, as an alternative to simply buying the 2-year Treasury note. Table 2 shows the spread per unit of duration offered by different high-quality (Aaa/Aa rated), low maturity (1-3 year) spread products. We exclude non-Agency CMBS and Agency MBS because the spread volatility in those sectors makes them riskier than their credit ratings imply. Table 21-3 Year Maturity Aaa/Aa-Rated Spread Products The Sweet Spot On The Yield Curve The Sweet Spot On The Yield Curve Auto loan ABS and Aa-rated corporate bonds offer the most spread pick-up per unit of duration, but we see some potential for spread widening in both sectors. Corporate spreads could widen as profit growth falls below the rate of debt growth during the next few quarters and consumer ABS spreads might also have upside. The consumer credit delinquency rate is rising, and banks are tightening standards lending standards (Chart 10). Chart 10Some Upside In Consumer ABS Spreads The Sweet Spot On The Yield Curve The Sweet Spot On The Yield Curve Agency CMBS and Foreign Agencies both offer 17 bps of spread per unit of duration. Of those two sectors we prefer Agency CMBS, which look very attractive on our Bond Map.5 Foreign Agencies also look attractive on our Map, but could struggle as the U.S. dollar appreciates making dollar debt more difficult for foreign borrowers to service. Of all the sectors listed in Table 2, the 15 bps spread per unit of duration offered by Local Authority debt looks most alluring. Largely composed of taxable municipal issues, Local Authority debt is insulated from weakness abroad and still offers a reasonably attractive spread pick-up. Bottom Line: Investors looking for attractive alternatives to Treasury debt at the short-end of the curve should consider Agency CMBS and Local Authority debt. Those sectors offer attractive spread pick-up and low risk of capital loss. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing", dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "An Oasis Of Prosperity?", dated August 21, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 While U.S. data remain very strong, the low contribution of nonresidential investment spending to overall GDP growth in Q3 could be a sign of contagion from the rest of the world. For further details please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "What Kind Of Correction Is This?", dated October 30, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 For further details on our butterfly spread models, please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies", dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "Toxic Combination", dated November 6, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights Falling Oil Prices & Bond Yields: Murky trends in global growth data, at a time of tight labor markets and gently rising inflation, are preventing a full recovery of risk assets after the October correction. A new concern is the falling price of oil, although this looks more corrective than a true change in trend. For now, maintain a cautious stance within global fixed income portfolios - neutral on corporate credit, below-benchmark on duration exposure. ECB Corporate Bond Purchases: The ECB is set to end the new buying phase of its Asset Purchase Program next month. This suggests that the best days in this cycle for European corporate credit are behind us, as the ECB will not treat its corporate bond purchases any differently than its government bond purchases. Both are going to stop. Remain underweight euro area corporate debt, both investment grade & high-yield. Feature Are Falling Oil Prices Telling Us Something About Global Growth? Thus far in November, global financial markets have reversed some of the steep losses incurred during the "Red October" correction. This has occurred for U.S. equities (the S&P 500 fell -8% last month but has risen +4% so far this month), U.S. corporate bonds (high-yield spreads widened +71bps last month and have tightened -19bps this month) and emerging market hard currency debt (USD-denominated sovereign spreads widened +27bps last month and have tightened -9bps this month). One market that has not rebounded, however, is oil. The benchmark Brent oil price fell -11% in October, but has fallen another -7% in November. This has been enough to nearly wipe out the entire +20% run-up seen in August and September. Global government bond yields have been very sensitive to swings in oil markets in recent years. Such a large decline in the oil price as has been seen of late would typically result in sharp drop in government bond yields, driven by falling inflation expectations. That correlation has been holding up in the major economies outside the U.S., where nominal yields and inflation expectations are lower than the levels seen before the October peak in oil prices. Nominal U.S. Treasury yields, by contrast, remain resilient, despite the fall in TIPS breakevens (Chart of the Week). This is because real Treasury yields have been climbing higher as investors acquiesce to the steady hawkish message from the Fed by making upward revisions to the expected path of U.S. policy rates. Chart of the WeekShifting Correlations Shifting Correlations Shifting Correlations The biggest impediment holding back a full recovery of the October losses for global risk assets is uncertainty over the global growth outlook. While the U.S. economy continues to churn along at an above-trend pace, there are signs that tighter monetary policy is starting to have an impact. Both housing and capital spending have cooled, although not yet by enough to pose a terminal threat to the current long business cycle expansion. The outlook for growth outside the U.S. is far more muddled, adding to investor confusion. China has seen a clear growth deceleration throughout 2018, but the recent reads from imports and the Li Keqiang index suggest that growth may be stabilizing or even modestly re-accelerating (Chart 2). Our China strategists are not convinced that this is anything more than a ramping up of imports and production in advance of the full imposition of U.S. trade tariffs, especially with Chinese policymakers reluctant to deploy significant fiscal or monetary stimulus to boost growth. Chart 2Mixed Messages On Growth Mixed Messages On Growth Mixed Messages On Growth A similar mixed read is evident in overall global trade data. World import growth has also slowed throughout 2018, but has shown some stabilization of late (second panel). A similar pattern can be seen in capital goods imports within the major developed economies. Our global leading economic indicator (LEI) continues to contract, but the pace of the decline has been moderating and our global LEI diffusion index - which measures the number of countries with a rising LEI versus those with a falling LEI - may be bottoming out (third panel). There are also large, and growing, divergences within the major developed economies. The manufacturing purchasing managers' indices (PMIs) for the euro area and the U.K. have been falling steadily since the start of the year, but the PMIs have recently ticked up in the U.S. and Japan (Chart 3). A similar pattern can be seen in the OECD LEIs, which have retreated from the latest cyclical peaks by far more in the U.K. (-1.6%) and euro area (-1.2%) than in the U.S. (-0.3%) and Japan (-0.6%). Chart 3Diverging Growth, Diverging Bond Yields Diverging Growth, Diverging Bond Yields Diverging Growth, Diverging Bond Yields With such mixed messages from the macro data, investors understandably lack conviction. The backdrop does not look soft enough yet to threaten global profit growth and justify sharply lower equity prices and wider corporate bond spreads. Yet the growth divergences between the U.S. and the rest of the world are intensifying, creating a backdrop of rising U.S. real interest rates and a stronger U.S. dollar. That combination is typically toxic for emerging markets, but the impact of that would be muted this time if China were to indeed see a genuine growth reacceleration. This macro backdrop lines up with our current major fixed income investment recommendations. We suggest only a neutral allocation to global corporate bonds given the uncertainty over growth, but favoring the U.S. over Europe and emerging markets given the clearer evidence of a strong U.S. economy. At the same time, we continue to recommend below-benchmark overall portfolio duration exposure, but with regional allocations favoring countries where central banks will have difficulty raising interest rates (Japan, Australia, core Europe, the U.K.) versus nations where policymakers are likely to tighten monetary policy (U.S., Canada). However, the latest dip in oil should not be ignored. A more sustained breakdown of oil prices could force us to downgrade corporate bonds and raise duration exposure - if it were a sign that global growth was slowing and inflation expectations had peaked. The current pullback in oil has occurred alongside a decelerating trend in global economic data surprises, after speculators had ramped up long positions in oil and prices were stretched relative to the 200-day moving average (Chart 4). This suggests that the latest move has been corrective, and not a change in trend, although the burden of proof now falls on the evolution of global growth, both in absolute terms and relative to investor expectations. Chart 4Oil Correction Or Growth Scare? Oil Correction Or Growth Scare? Oil Correction Or Growth Scare? Bottom Line: Murky trends in global growth data, at a time of tight labor markets and gently rising inflation, are preventing a full recovery of risk assets after the October correction. A new concern is the falling price of oil, although this looks more corrective than a true change in trend. For now, maintain a cautious stance within global fixed income portfolios - neutral on corporate credit, below-benchmark on duration exposure. European Corporates Are About To Lose A Major Buyer Last week, we published a Special Report discussing the ECB's options at next month's critical monetary policy meeting.1 One of our conclusions was that the central bank will deliver on its commitment to end the new purchases phase of its Asset Purchase Program (APP) at year-end. The bulk of the assets in the APP are government bonds, but the ECB has also been buying corporate debt in the APP since June 2016. The ECB is set to end those purchases at the end of December, to the likely detriment of euro area corporate bond returns. The Corporate Sector Purchase Program (CSPP), as it is formally known, has been a targeted tool used by the ECB to ease financial conditions for euro area companies. This has occurred through three main channels: tighter corporate bond spreads, greater access for companies to issue debt in the corporate primary market, and increased bank lending to non-financial corporations. The CSPP was intended to complement the ECB's other monetary stimulus measures, like negative interest rates and the buying of government debt. The first CSPP purchases were made on June 8, 2016. The euro area corporate bond market responded as expected, with investment grade spreads tightening from 128bps to 86bps by the end of 2017. There were spillovers into high-yield bonds, as well, with spreads falling -129bps over the same period (Chart 5). Since then, however, spreads have steadily widened and European corporates have underperformed their U.S. equivalents. This suggests that some of the relative performance of euro area credit may have simply reflected the relative strength of the euro area economy compared to the U.S. The greater acceleration of euro area growth in 2017 helped euro area corporates outperform U.S. equivalents, while the opposite has held true in 2018. Chart 5ECB Buying Does Not Control European Credit Spreads ECB Buying Does Not Control European Credit Spreads ECB Buying Does Not Control European Credit Spreads The CSPP has operated with a defined set of rules governing the purchases. Bank debt was excluded, as were bonds rated below investment grade. Only debt issued by corporations established in the euro area were eligible for the CSPP, although bonds from euro-based companies with parents who were not based in the euro area were also eligible. The latest update on the holdings data from the ECB shows that there are just under 1,200 bonds in the CSPP portfolio. Yet despite the ECB's best efforts to maintain some degree of portfolio diversification, the impact of the CSPP on euro area corporate bond markets was fairly consistent across countries and sectors (Chart 6). Italy is the notable diverging country this year, as the rising risk premiums on all Italian financial assets have pushed corporate bond yields and spreads well above the levels seen in core Europe, even with the ECB owning some Italian names in the CSPP. Chart 6Spread Convergence During CSPP Spread Convergence During CSPP Spread Convergence During CSPP There was also convergence of yields and spreads among credit tiers during the first eighteen months of the CSPP, with valuations on BBB-rated debt falling towards the levels on AA-rated and A-rated bonds (Chart 7). That convergence has gone into reverse in 2018, with BBB-rated spreads widening by +55bps year-to-date (this compares to a smaller +25bps increase in U.S. BBB-rated corporate spreads). A surge in the available supply of BBB-rated euro area bonds is a likely factor in that spread widening, as evidenced by the sharp rise in the market capitalization of the BBB segment of the Bloomberg Barclays euro area corporate bond index (top panel). Chart 7A Worsening Supply/Demand Balance For European BBBs? A Worsening Supply/Demand Balance For European BBBs? A Worsening Supply/Demand Balance For European BBBs? More broadly, the CSPP has helped the ECB's goal of boosting the ability of European companies to issue debt in primary bond markets. Traditionally, European firms have used bank loans as their main source of borrowed funds, with only the largest firms being able to issue debt in credit markets. That has changed during the CSPP era. According to data from the ECB, gross debt issuance by euro area non-financial companies (NFCs) has risen by €104bn since the start of the CSPP, taking issuance back to levels not seen since 2014 (Chart 8). The bulk of the issuance has been in shorter-maturity bonds, but there has been a notable increase in the issuance of longer-dated debt since the CSPP began. Chart 8Bank Funding Versus Bond Funding Bank Funding Versus Bond Funding Bank Funding Versus Bond Funding The ECB's role as a marginal buyer of bonds in the primary, or newly-issued, market has helped boost that gross issuance figure. The share of bonds that the ECB owns in the CSPP that was issued in the primary market has gone from 6% soon after the CSPP started to the current 18% (Chart 9). The growth in euro area non-financial corporate debt went from 6% to over 10% during the peak of the CSPP buying between mid-2016 and end-2017, but has since decelerated to 7%. At the same time, the annual growth in loans to NFCs, which was essentially zero during the first eighteen months of the CSPP, has accelerated to 2% over the course of 2018. Chart 9More Bank Loans, Less Debt Issuance More Bank Loans, Less Debt Issuance More Bank Loans, Less Debt Issuance In other words, euro area companies had been substituting bank financing for bond financing in the CSPP "era", but have since shifted back towards bank loans in 2018. That shift in financing was most notable among CSPP-eligible companies, particularly those smaller firms that had not be able to issue debt in the primary market pre-CSPP, according to an ECB analysis conducted earlier this year.2 From the point of view of the investible euro area corporate bond market, however, even larger companies that have done that shift in bank financing to bond financing have seen no noticeable increase in aggregate corporate leverage. In Chart 10, we show our bottom-up version of our Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) for the euro area. This indicator is designed to measure the aggregate financial health of euro area companies using financial ratios incorporating actual data from individual companies. We separated out the list of companies used in that CHM that are currently held in the CSPP portfolio and created a "CSPP-only" version of the CHM (the blue lines in all panels). All issuers that were eligible for inclusion in the CSPP, but whose bonds were not actually purchased by the ECB, are used to create a "non-CSPP" CHM (the black dotted lines). Chart 10No Fundamental Changes From CSPP No Fundamental Changes From CSPP No Fundamental Changes From CSPP As can be seen in the chart, there is no material difference in any of the ratios for bonds within or outside the CSPP. The one notable exception is short-term liquidity, where the ratios were much lower for names purchased by the ECB than for those that were not. This lends credence to the idea that the CSPP most helped firms that were more liquidity-constrained, likely smaller companies. The biggest change in any of the ratios has been in interest coverage, but that has been for both CSPP and non-CSPP issuers, suggesting a common factor outside of ECB buying - zero/negative ECB policy rates, ECB purchases of government bonds that helped reduce all European borrowing rates - has been the main driver of lowering interest costs. Looking ahead, the ECB is likely to stop the net new purchases of its CSPP program when it does the same for the full APP next month. All of which is occurring for the same reason - the euro area economy is deemed by the central bank to no longer need the support of large-scale asset purchases given a full employment labor market and gently rising inflation. As we discussed in our Special Report last week, the ECB has other options available to them if there is a reduction in euro area banks' capacity or willingness to lend, such as introducing a new Targeted Long-Term Refinancing Operation (TLTRO). Continuing with unconventional measures involving direct ECB involvement in financial markets, like buying corporate debt, is no longer necessary. Our euro area CHM suggests that there are no major problems with European corporate health that require a wider credit risk premium. We still have our reservations, however, about recommending significant euro area corporate bond exposure while the ECB is set to end its asset purchase program. New buyers will certainly come in to replace the lost demand from the elimination of CSPP purchases, but private investors will likely require higher yields and spreads than the central bank - especially if the current period of slowing euro area growth were to continue. Bottom Line: The ECB is set to end the new buying phase of its Asset Purchase Program next month. This suggests that the best days for European corporate debt for the current cycle are behind us, as the ECB will not treat its corporate bond purchases any different than its government bond purchases. Both are going to stop. Remain underweight euro area corporate debt, both investment grade and high-yield. Robert Robis, CFA, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy/Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Evaluating The ECB's Options In December", dated November 6th 2018, available at gfis.bcareserach.com and fes.bcaresearch.com. 2 The ECB report on its CSPP program was published in the March 2018 edition of the ECB Economic Bulletin, which can be found here. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/html/eb201804.en.html Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Stubbornly Resilient Bond Yields Stubbornly Resilient Bond Yields Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights The End Of APP?: Economic growth in the euro area has lost momentum, but it is not clear that an extended period of below-trend growth is unfolding. With most measures of spare capacity showing a lack of it, the ECB must still move forward with its plans to begin removing policy accommodation. Policy Choices: If the ECB downgrades its growth and inflation forecasts next month, delaying the end of the APP into 2019 is unlikely, as is altering the country weightings within the APP portfolio. More plausible options include pushing out forward guidance on future rate hikes, extending the maturity of the existing bond holdings, or introducing a new TLTRO to support lending. Impact On European Bonds & The Euro: The ECB is most likely to take a less hawkish slant in December, but will not signal any rapid move to begin hiking rates. This outcome will be bearish for the euro, but only neutral at best for overvalued European government bonds. Feature For the European Central Bank (ECB), the countdown is on to the December policy meeting, when a final decision will have to be made on the end of the Asset Purchase Program (APP). The central bank has been signaling throughout 2018 that net new APP bond purchases will stop at the end of the year, with a potential interest rate increase coming in September 2019 at the earliest. That decision on APP, however, will be conditional on the ECB remaining confident in its forecast that inflation will sustainably return to the target of "just below" 2%. Slumping European economic growth in 2018 means that the ECB's forecasts may prove to be too optimistic. This is especially true given the risks to growth and financial stability stemming from Italy's fiscal policy debate with the European Union, softening Chinese demand for European exports, and the uncertainties related to U.S. trade protectionism and the final U.K.-E.U. Brexit deal. Some pundits are even suggesting that the ECB may be forced to extend the APP program beyond December - or look for other ways to prevent a tightening of monetary conditions - even with headline inflation and wage growth having picked up across most countries. Against this increasingly muddled backdrop, what can the ECB credibly announce in December? In this Special Report, jointly published by BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy and Foreign Exchange Strategy services, we discuss the state of the euro area economy and then consider the ECB's next potential policy moves, with ramifications for European bond yields and the euro. Our conclusion is that there are a few policy tools available to the ECB in case of a prolonged slump in growth, without having to bring on the operational difficulties from extending the APP beyond December. Such a "dovish" shift would be bearish for the euro but neutral, at best, for European government bonds which remain deeply overvalued. ECB Policy Dilemma: Slowing Growth Vs. Accelerating Inflation At last month's monetary policy meeting, ECB President Mario Draghi noted that the slowing economy was merely returning to trend (or potential) growth from an unsustainably fast pace in 2017 that was fueled by strong export demand. Looking at the broad swath of euro area economic data, Draghi's relatively optimistic assessment is not far off the mark. The euro zone has seen a clear loss of economic growth momentum since the start of the year (Chart 1). The initial read on real GDP for the third quarter, released last week, showed a deceleration to a below-potential quarterly growth pace of 1.7%. The manufacturing purchasing managers index (PMI) has fallen from a peak of 61 in December 2017 to 52 in October, mirroring a -1% decline in the OECD's leading economic indicator for the region. Chart 1A European Growth Slump, Not Yet A Downtrend A European Growth Slump, Not Yet A Downtrend A European Growth Slump, Not Yet A Downtrend Yet not all the economic news has been that weak. Both consumer and business confidence remain at elevated levels according to the European Commission (EC) surveys, consistent with above-trend real GDP growth (bottom two panels). Even though exports have weakened substantially from the booming pace in 2017 - largely due to China's slowing growth - the EC survey on firms' export order books remains at robust levels and overall export growth has rebounded of late (Chart 2). The current conditions component of the euro area ZEW index has also ticked higher (top panel), as has the bank credit impulse (bottom panel). Chart 2Not All The Economic News Is Bad Not All The Economic News Is Bad Not All The Economic News Is Bad The bigger issue for the ECB is that the recent cooling of growth comes at a time when, by almost all measures, there is little economic slack in the euro area. Capacity utilization is running at an 11-year high of 84%, while the output gap is effectively closed according to estimates from the IMF (Chart 3). Chart 3No Spare Capacity In Europe No Spare Capacity In Europe No Spare Capacity In Europe With that gap projected to turn positive in 2019, core inflation in the euro zone should be expected to drift higher. Yet core inflation now remains stuck around 1%, well below the headline inflation figure of 2% that has been heavily influenced by past increases in energy prices (bottom panel). The labor market is sending signals that the current period of low euro area inflation may be turning around. The unemployment rate for the entire region fell to a 10-year low of 8.1% in September, well below both the ECB's latest 2018 forecast and the OECD's estimate of the full employment NAIRU (Chart 4). This tightening labor market is a broad-based phenomenon across the euro area, with nearly 80% of countries in the region having an unemployment rate below NAIRU (middle panel).1 The last two times there was such a broad-based decline in unemployment in the region, in 2001-02 and 2006-07, a significant tightening of monetary policy was required as measured by a simple Taylor Rule. Chart 4Broad-Based Labor Market Strength Broad-Based Labor Market Strength Broad-Based Labor Market Strength Already, the tightening labor market is starting to put upward pressure on labor costs. The annual growth in wages & salaries accelerated to just over 2% in the second quarter of 2018. Similar to the fall in unemployment rates, the faster wage growth has also been widely seen throughout the region, with nearly three-quarters of euro area countries showing faster wage growth from one year ago (bottom panel). The mix of slowing growth momentum with some inflationary pressures can be seen in our ECB Monitor, which measures the cyclical pressures to tighten or ease monetary policy in the euro area. The Monitor had been signaling a need for tighter policy for most of the past two years, but has now fallen back to levels consistent with no change in policy (Chart 5). When breaking down the Monitor into its inflation and growth components, the latter has fallen the most. The inflation components remain in the "tight money required" zone above the zero line. Chart 5Our ECB Monitor Says 'Do Nothing' Our ECB Monitor Says 'Do Nothing' Our ECB Monitor Says 'Do Nothing' Looking across the balance of the euro area data, President Draghi's assessment that the recent economic weakness is not the beginning of a sustained move to below-trend growth is justified. Given the broad evidence pointing to a lack of excess capacity across the euro area economy, it will take a much bigger growth slump before the ECB can shift to a more dovish policy bias. The critical series to monitor will be business confidence, capital spending and export orders. All are at risk of downshifting due to slowing global trade activity and sluggish Chinese demand. BCA's China experts continue to have doubts that the Chinese government will undertake any typical initiatives to stimulate demand, like interest rate cuts or fiscal spending, given worries about high domestic debt levels. Without the impetus from strong Chinese import demand boosting euro area exports, the current tightness of euro area labor markets, and uptrend in wage growth, may be at risk of a reversal, as we discussed in a recent Special Report.2 Bottom Line: Economic growth in the euro area has lost momentum, but it is not clear that an extended period of below-trend growth is unfolding. With most measures of spare capacity showing a lack of it, the ECB must still move forward with its plans to begin removing policy accommodation. What Tools Are Available For The ECB? Net-net, when looking at the broad balance of growth and inflation data at the moment, there is not yet enough evidence to suggest that the ECB needs to back away from its current plans to end net new APP purchases in December. That does not mean that the ECB would not consider changes to its total mix of monetary policy measures. The ECB has treated the APP, which began in 2015, as a "deflation fighting tool" during a period when there was excess capacity and very low inflation in the euro area. That is no longer the case, so it will be difficult for the ECB Governing Council to argue in December that new APP purchases are still necessary. It would take a substantial downward adjustment to the ECB growth and inflation forecasts, with a subsequent upward revision to the expectations for the unemployment rate, for the ECB to reconsider the plans to stop new bond purchases at year-end. Yet the ECB has also made it clear that interest rate hikes will not happen soon after the APP purchases end. Going back over the entire 20-year history of the ECB, there have only been three tightening episodes through rate hikes: 1999-2000, 2003-07 and 2011. In all three cases, what prompted the rate hikes was a period of broad-based increases in euro zone inflation that followed a period of equally broad-based euro zone economic growth. This can be seen in Chart 6, which shows "diffusion indices", or breadth across countries, for euro area real GDP and inflation. A higher number means that a greater percentage of individual nations is experiencing faster growth or inflation, and vice versa. During those three previous tightening cycles, the diffusion indices all reached elevated levels for growth and, more importantly, inflation. With more countries enjoying the upturn, the ECB could be more confident in seeing the need for interest rate increases to cool off demand to prevent an inflation overshoot. Chart 6No Need For ECB Rate Hikes Anytime Soon No Need For ECB Rate Hikes Anytime Soon No Need For ECB Rate Hikes Anytime Soon At the moment, the diffusion indices are quite low, suggesting that few countries are witnessing accelerating growth or inflation. This means that there is no pressure for the ECB to move up its current dovish guidance to the markets about the timing of the first rate hike in late 2019. That also means that there is a risk that the ECB is forced to consider options for providing additional monetary accommodation if there was a large enough downgrade to its growth and inflation forecasts. If the ECB were to indeed lower its growth forecasts in December and consider additional easing options, there are only four plausible options at their disposal: 1) Extending the APP purchases beyond December, either at the current pace of €15bn/month or a slower pace between €5-10bn/month Extending the APP into 2019 is the least likely choice because the ECB is already close to some of the self-imposed constraints on its government bond holdings. The ECB has set a limit of owning no more than 33% of an individual country's allowable government bonds, with maturities of between 1-31 years. Right now, the ECB owns about 31% of all eligible German government debt (Chart 7), and would breach that 33% level sometime in the first half of 2019 if the current pace of buying was maintained without any increase in German bond issuance (i.e. smaller budget surpluses).3 A similar outcome would also occur for smaller bond markets, like the Netherlands and Finland (bottom panel). Chart 7ECB Will Hit Country Issuer Limits If Current APP Is Maintained ECB Will Hit Country Issuer Limits If Current APP Is Maintained ECB Will Hit Country Issuer Limits If Current APP Is Maintained Of course, this is a self-imposed rule by the ECB that can easily be changed. That already occurred back in 2016 when the ECB allowed the purchase of bonds below the deposit rate as part of its APP operations. This meant that the ECB would buy bonds with negative yields, essentially guaranteeing a loss assuming that the bonds were held to maturity. Yet given how much emphasis the ECB has placed on abiding by the issuer limits, we think the ECB would consider other policy choices before raising them. 2) Changing the composition of the APP portfolio Changing the mix of bonds within the APP portfolio is a more likely option, but even this has its limits. The ECB could choose to buy more corporate bonds or covered bonds, but those are less liquid markets where there is arguably more evidence that ECB buying has impacted market functionality. The ECB may be reluctant to take on more credit risk in its bond portfolio, as well. At the country level, the ECB could choose to move away from using its Capital Key weightings to determine the allocation of its bond purchases by country. In the current heated political atmosphere in Europe, however, with the populist Italian government in a very public battle with the E.U. over its 2019 budget, the ECB will not want to be seen as favoring any country more than another by buying more government bonds in places like Italy or Spain over Germany and France. That can already be seen in how bond purchases have been allocated in 2018, with purchases sticking closer to the Capital Key weightings in Italy and France from the larger weightings seen in 2017 (Charts 8 & 9). Chart 8The ECB Capital Key ... The ECB Capital Key... The ECB Capital Key... Chart 9... Is Not Always Adhered To ...Is Not Always Adhered Too ...Is Not Always Adhered Too A more likely reallocation of bond holdings could occur within each country by adjusting the maturities held within the ECB's portfolio. Following the template of the Fed's 2012 "Operation Twist", the ECB could aim to sell shorter-dated bonds in exchange for longer-maturity debt, thereby exacting a flattening influence on government yield curves. There is scope for that in Germany, where the weighted-average-maturity (WAM) of the ECB's bond holdings has decline by 18 months since peaking in late 2015 (Chart 10). Large declines in WAW have also occurred for Spanish, Italian and Portuguese bonds owned by the ECB, if policymakers were willing to take on more duration risk in the Periphery. Chart 10The ECB Has Room To Extend Its APP Maturities The ECB Has Room To Extend Its APP Maturities The ECB Has Room To Extend Its APP Maturities 3) Extend forward guidance on the first rate hike The easiest option for the ECB in the event of a downgrade of its growth/inflation projections is to simply extend the forward guidance on the timing of the first interest rate hike. Right now, our Months-to-Hike indicators, which measure the time until a full rate hike is discounted in the European Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve, are discounting a hike of 10bps by November 2019 and a hike of 25bps by May 2020 (Chart 11). The ECB could easily signal that any rate hike, of any size, would not occur before the latter half of 2020 if an additional easing move was required. This would mostly likely result in lower bond yields and a weaker euro, all else equal, helping easy monetary conditions in the euro area. Chart 11Extending Forward Guidance Is An Option Extending Forward Guidance Is An Option Extending Forward Guidance Is An Option 4) Introduce a new Targeted Long-Term Lending Operation (TLTRO) One final intriguing option for an ECB policy ease would be the introduction of another TLTRO. The last such targeted lending program occurred in 2016, but the first wave of the much larger program that began in 2014 has already started to run off the ECB's balance sheet. This is the most effective way to get European banks to extend credit to borrowers at lower interest rates, since the banks would be able to fund that borrowing via the TLTRO at a rate lower than market rates. President Draghi did note last month that some members of the Governing Council brought up the idea of a new TLTRO at the ECB's policy meeting, and some well-known investment banks have recently discussed the implications of a new operation. In our view, a new TLTRO is the most effective way for the ECB to provide stimulus via lower private borrowing rates. It would also help offset any negative ramifications of the reduction of the ECB's balance sheet from the expiration of prior TLTROs. This would likely only happen, though, if there was evidence that the credit channel was impaired in the euro area. The previous TLTROs occurred after a period when banks were tightening credit standards, corporate borrowing rates and credit spreads were widening, European bank stocks were falling and European bank lending standards were becoming more restrictive (Chart 12). Chart 12A New TLTRO? Watch Lending Standards A New TLTRO? Watch Lending Standards A New TLTRO? Watch Lending Standards Today, bank stocks are falling and corporate bond yields/spreads are low but slowly rising, while European banks are actually easing lending standards according to the ECB's Q3 Bank Lending Survey. If the latter were to flip into the "tightening standards" zone, without any rebound in European bank shares or decline in corporate borrowing rates, the ECB could be tempted to go down the TLTRO route once again. Bottom Line: If the ECB downgrades its growth and inflation forecasts next month, delaying the end of the APP into 2019 is unlikely, as is altering the country weightings within the APP portfolio. More plausible options include pushing out forward guidance on future rate hikes, extending the maturity of the existing bond holdings, or introducing a new TLTRO to support lending. Likely ECB Options & Investment Implications In our view, the most realistic outcomes for the December ECB meeting can be boiled down to two decisions, conditional on how the ECB's economic forecasts are presented: 1) Unchanged growth & inflation forecasts: The ECB will signal the end of new APP bond purchases at the end of December, while maintaining the current forward guidance on rate hikes that no move will occur until at least September 2019. 2) Downgraded growth & inflation forecasts: The ECB will signal the end of new APP bond purchases at the end of December, but will also push out forward guidance on the first rate hike to at least sometime in mid-2020. In the latter scenario, the ECB could also consider two other options: extending maturities within its German bond holdings, or announcing a new TLTRO. We think that the ECB will wait to see how financial markets absorb the end of new APP buying before considering any move on maturity extension. At the same time, the ECB would signal that a TLTRO is a possibility if lending standards deteriorate and borrowing rates climb higher. While the ECB has talked a lot about how they will continue to reinvest the proceeds of maturing bonds in its portfolio, similar to what the Federal Reserve did after it ended its QE buying, the bigger impact on bond yields will come from a worsening of the supply/demand balance for European bonds. The ECB has been buying amounts greater than the entire net bond issuance of all euro area governments since the APP started in 2015, which has created a scarcity of risk-free sovereign debt for private investors. The result: extremely low bond yields, with a negative term premium (Chart 13). Reduced ECB buying will result in more bonds that have to be purchased by private investors, and a less negative term premium, going forward. Chart 13Bund Term Premium Unwind? Bund Term Premium Unwind? Bund Term Premium Unwind? How high euro area bond yields eventually go will then be determined by more traditional factors, like inflation expectations and the expected path of ECB rate hikes. Going back to the ECB's previous tightening cycles over its existence, actual rate hikes did now occur before inflation expectations - as measured by 5-year CPI swaps, 5-years forward - rose above 2% (Chart 14). Those inflation expectations are now 32bps below that level, and the ECB will not begin to shift to less dovish forward guidance unless the markets begin to discount more stable inflation close to the ECB's "near 2%" target. Chart 14Not Enough Inflation (Yet) To Justify Rate Hikes Not Enough Inflation (Yet) To Justify Rate Hikes Not Enough Inflation (Yet) To Justify Rate Hikes Dovish guidance on future ECB rate hikes will continue to widen the U.S.-Europe interest rate differentials that have helped weaken the euro versus the U.S. dollar in 2018 (Chart 15). This will continue to put downward pressure on EUR/USD cross, particularly with neutral momentum and positioning indicators suggesting that the euro is not yet oversold (bottom panel). Chart 15Likely ECB Actions Are Euro-Bearish Likely ECB Actions Are Euro-Bearish Likely ECB Actions Are Euro-Bearish Bottom Line: The ECB is most likely to take a less hawkish slant in December, but will not signal any rapid move to begin hiking rates. This outcome will be bearish for the euro, but only neutral at best for overvalued European government bonds. Robert Robis, CFA, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Since not every country in the euro area is also part of the OECD, we could only use 14 of the 19 countries in the euro area in the indicator shown in the middle panel of Chart 5. 2 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy/Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Will Rising Wages Cause An Imminent Change In Policy Direction In Europe And Japan?, dated October 6th 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com and gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 The ECB does allow the purchase of both federal government bonds, as well as the debt of government agencies and supranationals, as part of its APP. For our projections, we have assumed that of the €15bn in net new bonds that the ECB buys each month, 82% are debt issued by government-related entities (i.e. 18% goes to credit instruments like corporate bonds and covered bonds), with 10% of those government purchases going to supras. From that reduced number, we assume anywhere from 10-30% of purchases go to agencies, depending on the country. For the sake of simplicity, we also assume a pace of net government bond issuance in line with that seen over the past year, rather than make specific assumptions on changes in individual country budget deficits.

Highlights Chart 12015 Repeat? 2015 Repeat? 2015 Repeat?   Credit spreads widened as Treasury yields rose in October, bringing to mind the experience of 2015 when tight monetary policy and flagging global growth combined to cause a large drawdown in spread product excess returns. Chart 1 shows the familiar pattern. The market's rate hike expectations held constant throughout most of 2015. Meanwhile, falling commodity prices signaled weakness in global demand. Eventually, the combination of tight money and slowing growth was too much for the market to bear. Junk sold off in late-2015 and didn't recover until after the Fed scaled back its rate hike plans. It's hard to ignore today's similar set-up. Commodity prices are once again falling and the Fed appears committed to lifting rates. Unless global demand rebounds, we could be in for a repeat of late-2015's ugly price performance. The best way to position U.S. bond portfolios for this risk is to maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration, and to scale back exposure to credit risk. We advocate nothing more than a neutral allocation to spread product, with an up-in-quality bias. Feature Investment Grade: Neutral Investment grade corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 82 basis points in October, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -98 bps. The index option-adjusted spread widened 12 bps on the month, and currently sits at 117 bps. Recent spread widening has returned some value to the corporate bond space. The 12-month breakeven spread for Baa-rated corporate bonds is back up to its 36th percentile relative to history, while the same spread for A-rated securities is at its 18th percentile (Chart 2). Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Though spreads are somewhat more attractive, caution remains warranted in the corporate bond space. Corporate profit growth has only just managed to keep pace with debt growth during the past few quarters (bottom panel). In other words, even a mild deceleration in profits will be enough for leverage to resume its uptrend (panel 4). As we observed in last week's report, Q3's sharp decline in non-residential investment spending might signal that weak foreign growth is finally starting to weigh on profits.1 The possibility of rising leverage in the coming quarters leads us to recommend an up-in-quality bias within our neutral allocation to corporate bonds. To pick up extra spread we prefer a strategy of favoring long-maturity credits over short maturities. In last week's report we showed that the long-end of the credit curve outperforms (in excess return terms) when Treasury yields rise. High-Yield: Neutral High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 159 basis points in October, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +161 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread widened 55 bps on the month, and currently sits at 363 bps. Our measure of the excess spread available in the High-Yield index after accounting for default losses is currently 259 bps, above the long-run mean of 247 bps (Chart 3). This tells us that if default losses are in line with our expectations during the next 12 months and junk spreads remain constant, we should expect high-yield returns of 259 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries. If we assume that spreads tighten enough to bring our default-adjusted spread back to its long-run average, we would expect an excess return of 306 bps. Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview The main reason for continued caution on junk bonds is that the default loss expectation embedded in our excess spread calculation is extremely low relative to history (panel 4). Our assumption, derived from the Moody's baseline default rate forecast and our own forecast of the recovery rate, calls for default losses of 1.04% during the next 12 months. Default losses have rarely come in below that level. Further, the recent trend in job cut announcements makes it even more likely that default losses surprise to the upside during the next 12 months. Job cut announcements are highly correlated with the default rate, and while they remain low relative to history, they have clearly formed a trough this year (bottom panel). Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Toxic Combination Toxic Combination   Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* Toxic Combination Toxic Combination MBS: Neutral Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 37 basis points in October, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -44 bps. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility MBS spread increased 2 bps on the month. A 4 bps widening of the option-adjusted spread (OAS) was partially offset by a 2 bps decline in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost). The OAS has widened in recent months, though it remains tight compared to its average pre-crisis level (Chart 4). The overall nominal MBS spread remains very low, but for good reason (panel 4). Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview The two most important drivers of MBS excess returns are: (i) mortgage refinancing activity and (ii) bank lending standards. Refi activity is already depressed and will stay muted as interest rates rise. Bank lending standards eased in Q2 for the 17th consecutive quarter, but remain tight relative to history. In response to a special question from the Fed's July Senior Loan Officer Survey, respondents noted that mortgage lending standards are in the tighter end of the range since 2005. This suggests that further gradual easing is likely going forward. With lending standards easing and refi activity low, the macro environment is consistent with tight MBS spreads. We maintain only a neutral allocation to the sector for now, but will look to upgrade when it comes time to further pare exposure to corporate credit risk. Government-Related: Underweight The Government-Related index underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 55 basis points in October, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -16 bps. Sovereign debt underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 184 bps, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -118 bps. Foreign Agencies underperformed by 94 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -60 bps. Local Authorities underperformed by 28 bps, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +63 bps. Supranationals underperformed Treasuries by 3 bps, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +13 bps. Domestic Agency bonds underperformed by 4 bps, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +5 bps. Sovereign debt has underperformed this year, but spreads remain expensive compared to U.S. corporate credit. In a recent report we looked at USD-denominated Emerging Market Sovereign debt by country and found that only a few nations offer excess spread compared to equivalently-rated U.S. corporates.2 Those countries being Argentina, Turkey, Lebanon and Ukraine at the low-end of the credit spectrum and Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE at the upper-end. We continue to view the Local Authority sector as very attractive. Not only does the sector offer elevated spreads (Chart 5), but it is dominated by taxable municipal securities which are insulated from weak foreign growth and U.S. dollar strength. Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Municipal Bonds: Overweight Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 47 basis points in October, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +105 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio rose 1% in October, and currently sits at 87% (Chart 6). This is about one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean and only slightly above the average of 81% that was observed in the late stages of the previous cycle, between mid-2006 and mid-2007. Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview But despite the low yield ratio, we see tax-exempt municipal yields as quite attractive, especially at the long-end of the curve. For example, we observe that a 5-year Aa-rated municipal bond carries a yield of 2.55% versus a yield of 3.62% for a comparable corporate bond index. This implies that an investor with an effective tax rate of 30% should be indifferent between the two bonds. Moving further out the curve, the breakeven tax rate falls to 23% at the 10-year maturity point and is even lower at the 20-year maturity point. Further, unlike the corporate sector, state & local government balance sheets are relatively insulated from weakening foreign economic growth and a rising U.S. dollar. While our Municipal Health Monitor has bounced in recent quarters, it remains below zero, consistent with ratings upgrades outpacing downgrades (bottom panel). Treasury Curve: Favor The 7-Year Bullet Over The 1/20 Barbell The Treasury curve bear-steepened in October. The 2/10 slope steepened 4 bps and the 5/30 slope steepened 16 bps. As a result of the large curve steepening, our position long the 7-year bullet and short the 1/20 barbell returned +67 bps on the month, and is now up +107 bps since inception. However, the curve steepening also means that steepener trades focused on the belly (5-7 year) of the curve are no longer attractive according to our models (see Tables 4 & 5). The 7-year bullet is now fairly valued relative to the 1/20 barbell, meaning that the butterfly spread is priced for an unchanged 1/20 slope during the next six months (Chart 7). Our baseline macro assessment is that the yield curve slope will remain near current levels during that timeframe. As such, we close our position long the 7-year bullet and short the 1/20 barbell. Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Absent attractive value, the only reason to focus curve exposure on the 5-7 year maturity point is as a hedge against an unexpected pause in Fed rate hikes. In prior research we showed that the belly of the curve performs best when the 12-month discounter falls.3 But with our discounter priced for only 61 bps of rate hikes for the next 12 months, this risk may not be worth hedging. Instead, we prefer to go long the 2-year bullet and short a duration-matched 1/5 barbell. This trade is attractively priced on our model (bottom panel) and should outperform in a rising yield environment. The 1/5 slope tends to steepen when our 12-month discounter rises, and vice-versa. TIPS: Overweight TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 61 basis points in October, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +76 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 9 bps on the month and currently sits at 2.06%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate also fell 9 bps on the month and currently sits at 2.21%. Both the 10-year and the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates remain below the 2.3% to 2.5% range that has historically been consistent with inflation expectations that are well-anchored around the Fed's 2% target. We think it is only a matter of time before inflation expectations adjust higher into that range, and we therefore maintain an overweight position in TIPS versus nominal Treasuries. The catalyst for wider TIPS breakevens will be persistent inflation readings near the Fed's 2% target. Trimmed mean inflation has only just returned to the Fed's 2% target (Chart 8), but will probably remain close to that level for the next six months. While base effects will pose a higher hurdle for year-over-year inflation during this time, pipeline inflation pressures are also building, as evidenced by the prices paid component of the ISM Manufacturing survey (panel 4).4 Chart 8Inflation Compensation Inflation Compensation Inflation Compensation ABS: Neutral Asset-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 6 basis points in October, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +23 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened 5 bps on the month and now stands at 38 bps, 4 bps above its pre-crisis low. The excess return Bond Map on page 15 shows that consumer ABS offer attractive return potential compared to both Supranationals and Domestic Agencies, but carry a substantially higher risk of losses. Agency CMBS appear much more attractive than consumer ABS on a risk/reward basis, offering approximately the same expected return with less risk. From a credit quality perspective, the consumer credit delinquency rate remains low by historical standards but has clearly put in a bottom (Chart 9). The household interest coverage ratio has been rising for 10 consecutive quarters, suggesting that the delinquency rate will continue to increase. Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview We remain neutral on consumer ABS for now, but prefer Local Authorities, Municipal Bonds and Agency-backed CMBS when it comes to high-quality spread product. If consumer credit delinquencies continue to rise without a commensurate increase in ABS spreads, then our next move will likely be a reduction to underweight. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 47 basis points in October, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +120 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 10 bps on the month and currently sits at 94 bps (Chart 10). Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview A typical negative environment for CMBS is characterized by tightening bank lending standards on commercial real estate loans as well as falling demand. The Fed's Q2 Senior Loan Officer Survey showed that both lending standards and demand are close to unchanged. In other words, the macro picture for CMBS is decidedly mixed. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 31 basis points in October, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +23 bps. The index option-adjusted spread widened 7 bps on the month and currently sits at 51 bps. The Bond Maps on page 15 show that Agency CMBS offer high potential return compared to other low risk spread products. An overweight allocation to this sector continues to make sense. The BCA Bond Maps The following page presents excess return and total return Bond Maps that we use to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the U.S. fixed income market. The Maps employ volatility-adjusted breakeven spread/yield analysis to show how likely it is that a given sector will earn/lose money during the subsequent 12 months. The Maps do not impose any macroeconomic view. The Excess Return Bond Map The horizontal axis of the excess return Bond Map shows the number of days of average spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps versus a position in duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of average spread widening and are therefore less likely to see losses. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average spread tightening required for each sector to earn 100 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of spread tightening and are therefore more likely to earn 100 bps in excess of Treasuries. The Total Return Bond Map The horizontal axis of the total return Bond Map shows the number of days of average yield increase required for each sector to lose 5% in total return terms. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of yield increases and are therefore less likely to lose 5%. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average yield decline required for each sector to earn 5% in total return terms. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of yield decline and are therefore more likely to earn 5%. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of November 2, 2018) Toxic Combination Toxic Combination   Chart 12Total Return Bond Map (As Of November 2, 2018) Toxic Combination Toxic Combination   Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation (As Of September 28, 2018) Toxic Combination Toxic Combination   Table 5Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Toxic Combination Toxic Combination Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "What Kind Of Correction Is This?", dated October 30, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Oil Supply Shock Is A Risk For Junk", dated October 9, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "More Than One Reason To Own Steepeners", dated September 25, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 For details on our base effects indicator for PCE inflation, please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Powell Doctrine Emerges", dated September 4, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)