Geopolitics

Highlights When we flagged the increasing likelihood of higher volatility a few weeks ago, we did not expect the Trump Administration's granting of waivers on sanctions against Iranian oil exports, which ultimately led to the oil-price meltdown.1 Neither, it seems, did the market, as the surge in Brent and WTI implied volatilities attests (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekOil-Price Volatility Surges As Markets Process Conflicting News Oil-Price Volatility Surges As Markets Process Conflicting News Oil-Price Volatility Surges As Markets Process Conflicting News In one fell swoop, the Trump Administration's volte-face on Iran oil-export sanctions transformed the threat of an oil-price spike to $100/bbl in 1Q19 into a price rout. Whether that persists depends on how OPEC 2.0 responds to sharply higher short-term supply. Our updated supply - demand balances and price forecast are highly conditional on our expectation OPEC 2.0 will reduce output in response to the 1mm+ b/d or so of oil put back into the market early next year because of waivers. Inventories globally are at risk of swelling once again, if OPEC 2.0 does not cut output. OPEC 2.0's interests will conflict with the Trump Administration's agenda. Going into OPEC 2.0's December 6 meeting in Vienna, we lowered our 2019 Brent expectation $82/bbl, and continue to expect WTI to trade $6/bbl below that. We expect volatility to persist. Energy: Overweight. Natgas futures raced above $4.00/MMBtu on the NYMEX as the U.S. heating season kicked off with inventories of 3.2 TCF - 16% below their five-year average, and the lowest since 2005, according to EIA data. Base Metals: Neutral. China's benchmark copper treatment and refining charges are expected to remain on either side of $82.25/MT next year, as concentrate supply tightens slightly, Metal Bulletin's Fastmarkets reported. Precious Metals: Neutral. The Fed is on course to lift the fed funds range 25bp to 2.25% - 2.50% at its December meeting, which will keep gold under pressure. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA's latest ending stocks estimates for the 2018/19 crop year came in below trade expectations for corn and wheat - at 1.74 billion and 949mm bushels, respectively, vs. expectations of 1.78 billion and 969mm, according to agriculture.com. Soybean estimates came in at 955mm vs. an expected 906mm bushels. Feature Brent and WTI crude oil prices air-dropped from a high of $86.10/bbl in early October to a Wednesday low of $65.01/bbl as we went to press. This was a 24% drop in a little more than a month, reflecting the difficulty markets experienced recalibrating supply - demand balances in the wake of the Trump Administration's volte-face on Iranian export sanctions, which took effect last week. Over the past weeks, markets appear to be pricing the return of more than 1mm b/d of Iranian exports in 1Q19, on the back of these waivers for importers of Iranian crude. The full extent of the additional volumes that will be allowed back on the market still is unknown. Lacking certain information, market participants have to assume the waivers will dramatically expand short-term supplies, which already had been boosted by OPEC 2.0 and U.S. producers, in the lead-up to sanctions (Table 1).2 The sell-off on the back of the waivers did, however, dissipate some of the risk premium we identified in prices in October, and brought price more in line with actual balances (Chart 2).3 Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d) (Base Case Balances) All Fall Down: Vertigo In The Oil Market ... Lowering 2019 Brent Forecast To $82/bbl All Fall Down: Vertigo In The Oil Market ... Lowering 2019 Brent Forecast To $82/bbl Chart 2Oil Risk Premium Dissipates All Fall Down: Vertigo In The Oil Market ... Lowering 2019 Brent Forecast To $82/bbl All Fall Down: Vertigo In The Oil Market ... Lowering 2019 Brent Forecast To $82/bbl Prior to the granting of waivers, markets were girding for sanctions-induced losses of as much as 1.7mm b/d. Now markets could see a far lower supply loss of 500k b/d in Iranian exports. This lower loss of exports from Iran reduced expected prices by $10/bbl in 1H19, vs. our previous expectation of $85/bbl for 1H19 using our ensemble forecast (Chart 3). For market participants hedging or trading based on the expectation of higher losses of Iranian exports, the granting of waivers creates even more "new-found" and unanticipated supply. In a simulation with the waivers extended to end-2019, average 2019 Brent prices fall to $75/bbl vs. $82/bbl using our current assumptions. Chart 3OPEC 2.0 Production Hike Pushes Price Spike To 2Q19 OPEC 2.0 Production Hike Pushes Price Spike To 2Q19 OPEC 2.0 Production Hike Pushes Price Spike To 2Q19 In our estimation, "finding" this much supply via waivers amounts to a supply shock. This was compounded by surging U.S. crude and liquids production, which is boosting oil and product exports from America. Uncertain Balances, Volatile Prices Waivers are not the only factor contributing to price volatility. Fears of weaker global demand come up repeatedly - particularly as regards Asia in general, and China in particular.4 Those fears are not showing up in actual demand. In our balances estimates, we expect demand growth of 1.46mm b/d next year, down slightly from our previous estimate, given realized oil consumption remains strong (Chart 4 and Table 1). Supporting data - e.g., EM import volumes - continue to indicate incomes are holding up. Chart 4Demand Expected To Hold; Supply Highly Conditional On OPEC 2.0 Demand Expected To Hold; Supply Highly Conditional On OPEC 2.0 Demand Expected To Hold; Supply Highly Conditional On OPEC 2.0 On the supply side, references to an apparent disagreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia - the leaders of OPEC 2.0 - over the need to cut 1mm b/d of production next year, to keep inventories from once again swelling as they did in 2014 - 2016, compounding risks.5 While it appears KSA has carried the day on the need to cut production, that could change at OPEC 2.0's December meeting in Vienna. Output from OPEC 2.0's weakest member states - i.e., Libya and Nigeria - remains strong. Even Venezuela's rate of decline slowed some. Therefore, even without the waivers, KSA and its Gulf Arab allies would have had to reduce output to make room for these states, which are desperately trying to rebuild war-torn infrastructure. In addition to the OPEC 2.0 output surge, U.S. production has been unexpectedly strong, as have U.S. crude and refined product exports (Chart 5). The EIA - in an adjustment that surprised its analysts - revised its U.S. production estimate for October by 400k b/d vs. September's estimate to 11.4mm b/d. Production in the Big 4 shale plays - Permian, Eagle Ford, Bakken, Niobrara - is proving to be even stronger as well (Chart 6). U.S. shale output will be just under 8mm b/d by December, months ahead of schedule. The infrastructure buildout in the Permian will no doubt absorb this production and the subsequent growth in shale output by ~1.35mm b/d next year easily. Chart 5U.S. Production, Exports Surge All Fall Down: Vertigo In The Oil Market ... Lowering 2019 Brent Forecast To $82/bbl All Fall Down: Vertigo In The Oil Market ... Lowering 2019 Brent Forecast To $82/bbl Chart 6U.S. Shale Production Will Surge U.S. Shale Production Will Surge U.S. Shale Production Will Surge U.S. producers do not have an interest in managing their production. OPEC 2.0 does, however. We expect KSA and its Gulf Arab allies to reduce production in December and keep it low until the recently formed overhang brought on by the waivers to Iranian sanctions clears. This means OECD inventory levels will once again be a key variable for OPEC 2.0 in its production management decisions (Chart 7). Chart 7Once Again, OECD Stocks Are OPEC 2.0's Policy Variable Once Again, OECD Stocks Are OPEC 2.0's Policy Variable Once Again, OECD Stocks Are OPEC 2.0's Policy Variable We assume KSA will mobilize 800k to 1mm b/d of cuts in the coalition's production at least through 1H19. KSA already has said it will reduce exports by 500k b/d in Dec18, and that could be extended to Jun19. We also expect the rest of the Gulf Arab producers to follow suit, and cut back on the production increases they brought on line at President Trump's urging. By 2H19, the waivers will have expired, but U.S. shale output will be surging and newly built pipelines will be filling. We have been carrying lower 2H19 OPEC 2.0, particularly KSA, production estimates in anticipation of this increased production and exports from the U.S. (Table 1). OPEC 2.0 + 1? President Trump apparently wants to continue to have a say in OPEC 2.0's policy deliberations, as he obviously did in the run-up to U.S. mid-term elections earlier this year. In response to persistent messaging from President Trump, KSA, Russia and their allies surged production ~ 750k b/d in July - November over their 1H18 output, in preparation for the U.S. sanctions against Iran. In addition to pushing for higher production, the U.S. has taken a more activist approach to boosting oil production among U.S. allies, possibly ahead of another attempt to impose sanctions on Iran when the current waivers expire next year in June, assuming the 180-day wind-down begins in January. For example, the U.S. has taken a more active role in re-starting exports of oil from Iraq's semi-autonomous Kurdish province - some 400k b/d, which would flow to Turkey and on to Western consumers. Without higher production from Iraq and others in OPEC 2.0, the Iran waivers almost surely will have to be extended when they expire. As we have shown in our research, Brent prices mostly likely would push toward $100/bbl without a substantial increase in spare capacity within OPEC 2.0.6 President Trump gives every impression he and his administration now share our assessment, as the FT noted: "US president Donald Trump said this week he was 'driving' oil prices down and that he had granted waivers to some of Iran's customers as he did not want to see '$100 a barrel or $150 a barrel' crude."7 BCA's Geopolitical Strategy notes the waivers also send two very important messages to KSA: "First, the U.S. cares about its domestic economic stability. Second, the U.S. does not care about Saudi domestic economic stability. Our commodity strategists believe that Saudi fiscal breakeven oil price is around $85. As such, the U.S. decision to slow-roll the sanctions against Iran will be received with chagrin in Riyadh, especially as the latter will now have to shoulder both lower oil prices and the American request for higher output."8 Forecasting supply-demand fundamentals and, therefore, prices in this environment is extremely difficult, as it involves reconciling conflicting goals between the Trump Administration and OPEC 2.0. If President Trump prevails and KSA increases output - against its own best interests, given it requires higher prices to fund its budget - then prices will be lower for longer, once again. We are inclined to believe President Trump's alarm bells start sounding when oil prices are approaching the $85/bbl level. This also is the price level KSA needs to fund its fiscal obligations. For this reason, we expect KSA and its Gulf allies to reduce output in the near term until the waivers-induced overhang clears. Depending on how quickly they act, this could be done in fairly short order. Bottom Line: Volatility likely will persist as global markets absorb an unexpected supply surge resulting from the Trump Administration's last-minute volte-face on Iranian export sanctions, which is compounded by the supply ramp undertaken by OPEC 2.0 ahead of sanctions being imposed, and surging U.S. production gains. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Risk Premium In Oil Prices Rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity," published on October 25, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the OPEC - non-OPEC producer coalition formed at the end of the price collapse of 2014 - 16 to get control over global output and bring down swollen crude oil and refined product inventories. The coalition meets December 6 in Vienna to consider formalizing the union as a production-management cartel. 3 Our price-decomposition model's residual term is our proxy for the risk premium in oil prices. This is the red bar in Chart 2. Please see discussion in "Risk Premium In Oil Prices rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity," which is cited above. 4 Please see "Asia's weakening economies, record supply threaten to create oil glut," published November 14, 2018, by uk.reuters.com. 5 Please see "OPEC and Russia Prepare for Clash Over Oil Output Cuts," published online by the Wall Street Journal November 9, 2018. 6 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Reports "Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl," published on September 20, 2018, and "Risks From Unplanned Oil-Outage Rising; OPEC 2.0's Spare Capacity Is Suspect," published September 27, 2018. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see "Iraq close to deal to restart oil exports from Kirkuk," published by the Financial Times November 9, 2018. 8 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report "Insights From The Road - Constraints And Investing," published on November 14, 2018. It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table All Fall Down: Vertigo In The Oil Market ... Lowering 2019 Brent Forecast To $82/bbl All Fall Down: Vertigo In The Oil Market ... Lowering 2019 Brent Forecast To $82/bbl Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017 All Fall Down: Vertigo In The Oil Market ... Lowering 2019 Brent Forecast To $82/bbl All Fall Down: Vertigo In The Oil Market ... Lowering 2019 Brent Forecast To $82/bbl

Highlights So What? The Trump administration is focusing on re-election in 2020, which could push the recession call into 2021. Why? The midterms were investment-relevant, just not in the way most of our clients thought. We are downgrading our alarmism on Iran; Trump is aware of his constraints. But investor optimism regarding the trade war may be overdone. China has contained its capital outflows, which suggests Beijing will be comfortable with more CNY/USD downside. A new GPS mega-theme: Bifurcated Capitalism! Watch carefully for any upcoming trade action on semiconductors. Feature There is no better feeling than hearing from our clients that we got a call wrong because we misjudged the constraints of the Trump administration by focusing too much on its preferences. Why? Because it means that clients are keeping us honest by employing our most important method: constraints over preferences. This is one of the takeaways from a quarter filled with meetings with our clients in the Midwest, Toronto, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Frankfurt, Berlin, Auckland, Melbourne, Sydney, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and sunny Marbella, Spain! In this report, we discuss several pieces of insight from our clients. Midterms Are Investment Relevant Generally speaking, few of our clients agreed with our assessment that the midterm elections were not investment-relevant. The further away from the U.S. we traveled, the greater the sense among investors that equity markets influence U.S. politics: both the upcoming takeover of the House of Representatives by the Democratic Party and the odds of trade war intensification. We strongly disagree with this assessment. Both periods of equity market turbulence this year were preceded by a rising U.S. 10-year yield, not any particularly damning trade war chatter (Chart 1). In fact, the intensification of the trade war this summer occurred amidst a fairly buoyant S&P 500! Meanwhile, the odds of a Democratic takeover of the House were priced in well before the October equity decline began. Chart 1Yields, Not Trade, Matter For Stocks Yields, Not Trade, Matter For Stocks Yields, Not Trade, Matter For Stocks Generally speaking, even midterms that produce gridlock have led to a relief rally (Chart 2). This time could be the same, especially because the likely next Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, has signalled that the main policy goal for 2019 would be infrastructure spending. In her "victory" speech following the election, Pelosi mentioned infrastructure numerous times (impeachment, zero times). Chart 2Stocks Are Indifferent To Midterm Results Stocks Are Indifferent To Midterm Results Stocks Are Indifferent To Midterm Results Democratic Representative Peter DeFazio, likely head of the House of Representatives committee overseeing transportation, has already signalled that he will ask for "real money, real investment."1 DeFazio has previously proposed a $500bn infrastructure plan, backed by issuance of 30-year Treasuries and raising fuel taxes. He has rejected the February 2017 Trump proposal, which largely relied on raising private money for the job. Would President Trump go with such a plan? Maybe. In early 2018, he stunned lawmakers by saying that he supported hiking the federal gasoline tax by 25 cents a gallon (the federal 18.4 cent-a-gallon gasoline tax has not been hiked since 1993). He has since confirmed that "everything is on the table" to achieve an infrastructure deal. Several clients from around the world pointed out that both Democrats and President Trump have an incentive to make a deal. President Trump wants to avoid the deeply negative fiscal thrust awaiting him in 2020 (Chart 3). Given the House takeover by the Democrats, it is tough to imagine that new tax cuts are the means for Trump to avoid the "stimulus cliff." As such, another round of stimulative fiscal spending may be the only way for him to avoid a late-2020 recession (although the latter is currently the BCA House View). Chart 3Can Trump And Pelosi Reverse... Can Trump And Pelosi Reverse... Can Trump And Pelosi Reverse... Democrats, on the other hand, have an incentive to ditch "Resistance" and embrace policy-making. Yes, hastening the recession in 2020 would be the Machiavellian play, but President Trump would be able to blame Democrats for the downturn - since they will necessarily have had to participate in planning an infrastructure bill only to sink it. They also learned the lesson from the January 2018 government shutdown, which backfired at the polls and forced Senate Democrats to come to an agreement quickly on a two-year stimulative budget deal. What about the GOP fiscal conservatives? They don't necessarily need to come on board. The House is held by Democrats. And the Democrats in the Senate would only need 15-18 GOP Senators to support a profligate infrastructure plan. Given that infrastructure is popular, that the president will be pushing it, and that the GOP-controlled Senate agreed with the budget bill in January, we think that even more Republican Senators can go along with an infrastructure plan. Another big takeaway from the midterms is that the GOP suffered deep losses in the Midwest. President Trump's party lost ten out of twelve races in the region (Table 1). The two most representative contests were the loss of Republican Wisconsin Governor and one-time rising presidential star Scott Walker, and the victory of the left-wing and über-protectionist Democratic Senator Sherrod Brown of Ohio. Table 1Massive Republican Losses Across The Midwest Insights From The Road - Constraints And Investing Insights From The Road - Constraints And Investing Senator Brown won his contest comfortably by 6.4% in a state that Trump carried by 8.13%. The appeal of Brown to the very blue-collar voters that Trump himself won is obvious. On trade, there is no daylight between the left-wing Brown and President Trump. Meanwhile, Walker, an establishment Republican who built his reputation on busting public-sector unions, could not replicate Trump's success in Wisconsin. Several of our clients suggested that the GOP performance in the Midwest was poor because of the aggressive trade rhetoric. But that makes little sense. Republicans did not run Trump-style populists in the Midwest, to their obvious detriment. Democrats have always claimed to be for "fair trade" rather than "free trade." And we know, empirically, that Trump saw a key swing of turnout in 2016 in these states, largely thanks to his protectionist rhetoric (Chart 4). Chart 4Trump Owes The Midwest The Presidency Trump Owes The Midwest The Presidency Trump Owes The Midwest The Presidency President Trump cannot take Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin lightly. His performance in 2016 was extraordinary, but also tight. The Democrats will win these states if Trump does not grow voter turnout and support, according to demographic projections - and they lost them by less than a percentage point of white voters (Map 1). As such, we think that Democrats will talk tough on trade and try to reclaim their union and blue-collar voters, while President Trump has to double down on an aggressive trade posture towards China. Map 1Can 'White Hype' Work In 2020? Trump's Margins Are Small Insights From The Road - Constraints And Investing Insights From The Road - Constraints And Investing The midterms are investment relevant after all, but not in the way some might think. The Democratic takeover of the House, and the resultant gridlock, will potentially avert the "stimulus cliff" in 2020. This ought to support short-term inflation expectations and thus allow the Fed to stay-the-course. For markets, this could be unsettling given the correlation between yields and downturns in 2018. For the dollar, this should be supportive. The odds of an infrastructure deal are good, above 50%, with the key risk being a Democratic House focused on impeaching Trump. Such a bill would augur even higher levels of fiscal spending through 2020, possibly prolonging the business cycle, and setting up an even wider budget deficit when the next recession hits (Chart 5). Chart 5Pro-Cyclical Policy Has To Continue Pro-Cyclical Policy Has To Continue Pro-Cyclical Policy Has To Continue Meanwhile, the shellacking in the Midwest ought to embolden the president to go even harder against China on trade. Rather than the upcoming Xi-Trump meeting in Buenos Aires, the key bellwether of this thesis is whether Trump signals afterwards that he will implement the tariff rate hike on January 1, 2019 (and whether he announces a third round of tariffs). Bottom Line: Go long building products and construction material stocks. Stay short China-exposed S&P 500 companies. The 10-year yield may end the year even closer to 3.5% when the market realizes that the odds of an infrastructure deal are higher than previously thought. The political path of least resistance in the U.S. continues to point towards greater profligacy. Trump Is Aware Of His Constraints In The Middle East Throughout 2018, we have flagged U.S.-Iran tensions as the risk for 2019. In early October, we went long Brent / short S&P 500 as a hedge against this risk, a trade that we closed for a 6% gain last week. During our meetings with clients this quarter, however, several astute observers pointed out that in our own analyses we have stressed the geopolitical and political constraints to President Trump. First, we have argued that the original 2015 nuclear deal signed by President Obama had a deep geopolitical logic, allowing the U.S. to pivot to Asia and stare down China by geopolitically deleveraging the U.S. from the Middle East. If President Trump undermined the détente with Iran, he would be opening up a two-front conflict with both China and Iran, diluting his administration's focus and capabilities. Second, we noted that a rise in oil prices could precipitate an early recession and push up gasoline prices in 2019, a probable death knell for any president's re-election prospects. Our clients were right to ask: Why would President Trump face down these constraints, given the high cost that he would incur? We did not have a very good answer to this question. It is difficult to understand President Trump's preferences for raising tensions against Iran beyond the fact that he promised to do so in his campaign, appears to want to undermine all of President Obama's policies, and turned to Iran hawks to head his foreign policy. Are these preferences worth the risk of a recession in 2019? Or worth the risk of triggering yet another military conflict in the Middle East over a country that only 7% of Americans consider is the 'greatest enemy' (Chart 6)? Chart 6Americans Don't Perceive Iran As 'The Greatest Enemy' Insights From The Road - Constraints And Investing Insights From The Road - Constraints And Investing Given that the administration has offered exemptions to the oil embargo to eight key importers, it now appears that President Trump is well aware of his geopolitical and domestic constraints. The combined imports of Iranian oil by these eight states is ~1.4mm b/d. While we do not have the detail of the volumes that will be allowed under the waivers, it is likely that these Iranian sales will recover some of the ~1mm b/d of exports lost already (Chart 7). Chart 7Waivers Will Restore Iranian Exports For 180 Days Insights From The Road - Constraints And Investing Insights From The Road - Constraints And Investing What does this mean for investors? On one hand, it means that the risk of oil prices spiking north of $100 per barrel have substantively decreased. On the other hand, however, it also means that the Trump administration agrees with BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy view that oil markets remain tight and that OPEC 2.0's spare capacity may be a constraint to future production increases. Bottom Line: The risks of an oil-price-shock-induced 2019 recession have fallen. However, oil prices may yet surge in 2019 to the $85-95 level (Brent) on the back of supply risks in Venezuela and Iran, especially if Saudi Arabia and Russia prove unable to expand production much beyond their current levels. Most of our clients in the Middle East shared the skepticism of our commodity strategists that Saudi Arabia would be able to increase production much higher than current levels in 2019. However, the view was not unanimous. Risks Of Saudi Arabia Going Rogue Have Declined Clients in the Middle East were convinced that the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi would have no impact on Saudi oil production decisions. However, the insight from the region is that the incident has probably ended the "blank cheque" that the Trump administration initially gave Riyadh on foreign policy. For global investors, this may not have a major impact. But it may have been at least part of the administration's reasoning behind giving embargo exemptions to such a large number of economies. The incident has likely forced Saudi Arabia to adjust its calculus on three issues: Qatar: The Saudi-Qatari split never made much sense in the first place. It was initially endorsed by President Trump, who may not have understood the strategic value of Qatar to the United States. Defense Secretary James Mattis almost immediately responded by reaffirming the U.S. commitment to the Persian Gulf country which hosts one of the most strategic U.S. air bases in the world. Yemen: The U.S. has now openly called on Saudi Arabia to end its military operations in Yemen. We would expect Riyadh to acquiesce to the request. Iran: With the U.S. giving major importers of Iranian oil exemptions, the message is twofold. First, the U.S. cares about its domestic economic stability. Second, the U.S. does not care about Saudi domestic economic stability. Our commodity strategists believe that Saudi fiscal breakeven oil price is around $85. As such, the U.S. decision to slow-roll the sanctions against Iran will be received with chagrin in Riyadh, especially as the latter will now have to shoulder both lower oil prices and the American request for higher output. Could Saudi Arabia break with the U.S.? Not a chance. The U.S. is the Saudis' security guarantor. As such, it is up to Saudi Arabia to acquiesce to American foreign policy goals, not the other way around. While we think that President Trump ultimately succumbed to geopolitical and political constraints when he decided to take the "phoney war" approach to Iran, he may have been nudged in that direction by Khashoggi's tragic murder. Bottom Line: A major risk for investors in 2019 was that the Trump administration would treat Saudi preferences for a major confrontation with Iran as its own interests. Such a strategy would have destabilized the global oil markets and potentially have unwound the 2015 U.S.-Iran détente that has allowed the U.S. to focus on China. However, the death of Khashoggi has marginally hurt President Trump domestically - given that it makes him look soft on Saudi Arabia, an unpopular stance in the U.S. Moreover, the administration has come to grips with the risks of a dire oil shock should Iran retaliate. The shift in U.S. policy vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia will therefore refocus the Trump administration on its own priorities, not that of its ally in the Middle East. Trade War Is All About CNY/USD In The Short Term... Clients in Australia and New Zealand are the most sophisticated Western investors when it comes to China. The level of macro understanding of the Chinese economy and the markets in these two countries is unparalleled (outside of China itself, of course). We therefore always appreciate the insights we pick up from our clients Down Under. And they are convinced that the massive capital outflow from China has clearly ceased. The flow of Chinese capital into Auckland, Melbourne, and Sydney real estate has definitely slowed, and anecdotal evidence appears to be showing up in the price data (Chart 8). Separately, this intel has been confirmed by clients from British Columbia and California. Chart 8Pacific Rim Home Prices Rolling Over Pacific Rim Home Prices Rolling Over Pacific Rim Home Prices Rolling Over The reality is that China has successfully closed its capital account. How else can we explain that a 4.7% CNY/USD depreciation in 2015 precipitated a $483 billion outflow of forex reserves, whereas a 10.1% depreciation this year has not had a major impact (Chart 9)? Chart 9On Balance, China Is Experiencing Modest Outflows Insights From The Road - Constraints And Investing Insights From The Road - Constraints And Investing To be fair, forex reserves declined by $34bn in October, but that is still a far cry from the panic in 2015. Our other indicators suggest that the impact on capital seepage is muted this time around, largely due to the official crackdown on various forms of capital outflows: Quarterly data (Chart 10) reflecting the change in foreign exchange reserves minus the sum of the current account balance and FDI, indicate that while net inflows have remained negative, they are still a far cry from 2015 levels. Chart 10Far Cry From 2016 Crisis Far Cry From 2016 Crisis Far Cry From 2016 Crisis Import data (Chart 11) no longer show the massive deviation between Chinese national statistics and IMF figures. Imports from Hong Kong (Chart 12), specifically, are now down to normal levels, with the fake invoicing problem having quieted down for now. Chart 11No More Confusion Regarding Imports No More Confusion Regarding Imports No More Confusion Regarding Imports Chart 12Fake Invoicing Has Been Curbed Fake Invoicing Has Been Curbed Fake Invoicing Has Been Curbed Growth rate of foreign reserves (Chart 13) is not clearly contracting yet, and has been positive this year. Chart 13Severe FX Reserve Drawdown Has Ended Severe FX Reserve Drawdown Has Ended Severe FX Reserve Drawdown Has Ended Chinese foreign borrowing (Chart 14) is down from stratospheric levels, which limits the volume of potential outflows. Chart 14China's Foreign Lending Has Eased China's Foreign Lending Has Eased China's Foreign Lending Has Eased And the orgy of M&A and investment deals in the U.S. (Chart 15) has ended. Chart 15M&A Deals Have Eased Insights From The Road - Constraints And Investing Insights From The Road - Constraints And Investing Bottom Line: Anecdotal and official data suggest that capital outflows are in check despite their recent uptick. This could embolden Chinese leaders to continue using CNY/USD depreciation as their primary weapon against President Trump's tariffs, especially if the global backdrop is not collapsing. An increase of the 10% tariff rate to 25% on January 1 could, therefore, precipitate further weakness in the CNY/USD. The announcement of a third round of tariffs covering the remainder of Chinese imports could do the same. This would be negative for global risk assets, particularly EM equities and currencies. ... In the Long Term, Bifurcated Capitalism Our annual pilgrimage to Oceania included our traditional meeting with The Smartest Man In Oceania The Bloke From Down Under.2 He shares our belief that the long-term result of the broader Sino-American geopolitical conflict will be a form of Bifurcated Capitalism. His exact words were that "countries may soon have to choose between being in the Amazon or Alibaba camp," a great real-world implication of our mega-theme. Australian and New Zealand clients are particularly sensitive to the idea that the world may soon be split into spheres of influence because both countries are so high-beta to China, while obviously retaining their membership card in the West. Our suspicion is that both will be fine as they export mainly a high-grade and diversified range of commodities to China. Short of war, it is unlikely that the U.S. will one day demand that New Zealand stop its dairy exports to China, or that Australia stop iron ore and LNG exports. Countries exporting semiconductors to China, on the other hand, could face a choice between enforcing a future embargo or incurring the wrath of their closest military ally. The Bloke From Down Under has pointed out that, given China's dependency on semiconductor technology, a U.S. embargo of this critical tech could be comparable to the U.S. oil embargo against Japan that precipitated the latter's attack on Pearl Harbor. Chart 16China Accounts For 60% Of Global Semiconductor Demand Insights From The Road - Constraints And Investing Insights From The Road - Constraints And Investing The global semiconductor market reached $354 billion in 2016, with China accounting for 60% of total consumption (Chart 16). Despite the country's insatiable appetite for semiconductors, no Chinese firm is among the world's top 20 makers. This is why Beijing's "Made in China 2025" plan has focused so much on semiconductor capability (Chart 17). The goal is for China to become self-sufficient in semiconductors, gaining 35% share of the global design market. Chart 17China's High-Tech Protectionism Insights From The Road - Constraints And Investing Insights From The Road - Constraints And Investing A key feature of Bifurcated Capitalism will be impairment of investment in high-tech that has dual-use applications in military. Semiconductors obviously make that list. Another key feature would be investment restrictions in such high-tech sectors, particularly the kind of investments and M&A deals that China has been looking for in the U.S. this decade. Further, clients in California are very concerned about the U.S.'s proposed export controls, which would cut off access to China and wreak havoc on the industry. The Trump administration has already signalled that it will restrict Chinese inbound investment. Congress passed, with a large bipartisan majority, an expanded review system, the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA). The law has expanded the purview of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), a secretive interagency panel nominally under control of the Treasury Department that can block inbound investment on national security grounds. CFIUS, at its core, has always been an entity focused on China. While the Treasury Department initially signalled it would take as much as 18 months to adopt the new FIRRMA rules, Secretary Mnuchin has accelerated the process. The procedure now will expand review from only large-stake takeovers to joint ventures and smaller investments by foreigners, particularly in technology deemed critical for national security reasons. This oversight began on November 10 and will allow CFIUS to block foreigners from taking a stake in a business making sensitive technology even if it gives the foreign investors merely a board seat. Countries of "special concern" will inherently receive heightened scrutiny, and a country's history of compliance with U.S. law, as well as cybersecurity and American citizens' privacy, will be considerations. A new interagency process led by the Commerce Department will focus on refurbishing export controls so as to protect "emerging and foundational technologies." Such impediments to capital flows are likely to become endemic and expand beyond the U.S. We may be seeing the first steps in the Bifurcated Capitalism concept that one day comes to dominate the global economy. Entire countries and sectors may become off-limits to Western investors and vice-versa for Chinese market participants. At the very least, companies whose revenue growth is currently slated to come from expansion in overseas markets may see those expectations falter. At its most pessimistic, however, Bifurcated Capitalism may precipitate geopolitical conflict if it denies China or the U.S. critical technology or commodities. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see David Shepardson, "Democrats to push for big infrastructure bill with 'real money' in 2019," Reuters, dated November 7, 2018, available at reuters.com. 2 At the time of publication, the said investor was unable to secure the permission of his wife for the "The Smartest Man" moniker. Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights Gold's performance during the "Red October" equities sell-off, coupled with that of the most widely followed gold ratios (copper- and oil-to-gold), indicates investors and commodity traders are not pricing in a sharp contraction in global growth. These ratios are, however, picking up divergent trends in EM and DM growth (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekGold Ratios Lead Divergence Of Global Bond Yields Gold Ratios Lead Divergence Of Global Bond Yields Gold Ratios Lead Divergence Of Global Bond Yields In the oil markets, the Trump Administration appears to have blinked on its Iran oil-export sanctions. On Monday, the U.S. granted waivers to eight "jurisdictions" - China, India, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Italy, Greece and Taiwan - allowing them to continue to import Iranian oil for 180 days (Chart 2).1 The higher-than-expected number of waivers indicates the Trump Administration is aligned with our view that the global oil market is extremely tight, despite the recent production increases from OPEC 2.0 and the U.S.2 The U.S. State Department, in particular, apparently did not want to test the ability of OPEC spare capacity - mostly held by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) - to cover the combined losses of Iranian exports, Venezuela's collapse, and unplanned random production outages. No detail of volumes that will be allowed under these waivers was available as we went to press. Chart 2Waivers Will Restore Iranian Exports For 180 Days Gold Ratios Wave Off "Red October" ... Iran Export Waivers Highlight Tight Market Gold Ratios Wave Off "Red October" ... Iran Export Waivers Highlight Tight Market Energy: Overweight. Iran's exports are reportedly down ~ 1mm b/d from April's pre-sanction levels of ~ 2.5mm b/d. We assume Iran's exports will fall 1.25mm b/d. Base Metals: Neutral. Close to 45k MT of copper was delivered to LME warehouses last week, according to Metal Bulletin's Fastmarkets. This was the largest delivery into LME-approved warehouses since April 7, 1989. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold is trading close to fair value, while the most widely followed gold ratios - copper- and oil-to-gold - indicate global demand is holding up. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA's crop report shows the corn harvest accelerated at the start of November, reaching 76% vs. 68% a year ago. Feature Gold Ratios Suggest Continued Growth Gold is trading mostly in line with our fair-value model, based on estimates using the broad trade-weighted USD and U.S. real rates (Chart 3).3 Safe-haven demand - e.g., buying prompted by the fear of a global slowdown or a deepening of the global equity rout dubbed "Red October" in the press - does not appear to be driving gold's price away from fair value. Neither is rising volatility in the equity markets. Chart 3Gold Trading Close To Fair Value Gold Trading Close To Fair Value Gold Trading Close To Fair Value This assessment also is supported by the behavior of the widely followed gold ratios - copper-to-gold and oil-to-gold - which have become useful leading indicators of global bond yields and DM equity levels following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). From 1995 up to the GFC, the gold ratios tracked changes in the nominal yields of 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds fairly closely. During this period, bond yields led the ratios as they expanded and contracted with global growth, as seen in Chart 4. Post-GFC, this relationship has reversed, and the gold ratios now lead global bond yields. Chart 4Gold Ratios Followed Global 10-Year Yields Pre-GFC Gold Ratios Followed Global 10-Year Yields Pre-GFC Gold Ratios Followed Global 10-Year Yields Pre-GFC To understand this better, we construct two variables to isolate the common growth-related and idiosyncratic factors driving these ratios over the long term, particularly following the GFC.4 The common factor is labeled growth vs. safe-haven in the accompanying charts. It consistently tracks changes in global bond yields and DM equities, which also follow global GDP growth closely. If investors were fleeing economically sensitive assets and buying the safe haven of gold, the correlation between these variables would fall. As it happens, the strong correlation held up well following the "Red October" equities rout, indicating investors have not become overly risk-averse or fearful global growth is taking a downturn. When regressing our proxy for global 10-year yields and the U.S. 10-year yields on the growth vs. safe-haven factor, we found this factor explains a significantly larger part of the variation in global yields than U.S. bond yields alone (Chart 5).5 This common factor also is highly correlated with DM equity variability (Chart 6). Chart 5Gold Ratios' Common Factor Correlates With 10-Year Global Yields ... Gold Ratios" Common Factor Correlates With 10-Year Global Yields... Gold Ratios" Common Factor Correlates With 10-Year Global Yields... Chart 6... And DM Equities ... And DM Equities ... And DM Equities The second, or idiosyncratic, factor we constructed, captures the fundamental drivers that impact each of the gold ratios through supply-demand fundamentals in the copper and oil markets, and EM vs. DM economic performance. The latter is proxied using EM equity returns relative to DM returns.6 This analysis shows oil outperforms copper in periods of rising DM and slowing EM economic growth (Chart 7). Our analysis also indicates this idiosyncratic factor explains the divergence of the gold ratios seen in 2018: Copper demand is heavily influenced by EM demand, particularly China, which accounts for ~ 50% of global copper demand, but less than 15% of global oil demand. Oil demand - some 100mm b/d - is much more affected by the evolution of global GDP. Chart 7Relative DM Outperformance Drives Idiosyncratic Factors Relative DM Outperformance Drives Idiosyncratic Factors Relative DM Outperformance Drives Idiosyncratic Factors At the moment, this idiosyncratic factor is driving both ratios apart because of: Relative economic underperformance of EM vs. DM, which favors oil over copper; and Persistent fears of escalating Sino-U.S. trade tensions, which are weighing on copper. Price-supportive supply-shocks in the oil market (sanctions on Iranian oil exports, falling Venezuelan production) and still-strong demand continue to drive oil prices. These dynamics likely will remain in place for the foreseeable future (1H19), which will favor oil over copper. Gold Ratios As Leading Indicators To round out our analysis, we looked at causal relationships between the performance of financial assets - EM and DM stocks and bonds - and the gold ratios.7 From 1995 to 2008, the causality ran from stocks and bond yields to our growth vs. safe-haven factor for the gold ratios. However, since 2009, causality has gone from the common factor to bond yields (Table 1). Table 1Granger-Causality Results Gold Ratios Wave Off "Red October" ... Iran Export Waivers Highlight Tight Market Gold Ratios Wave Off "Red October" ... Iran Export Waivers Highlight Tight Market In our view, this suggests that the widely traded industrial commodities - copper and oil being the premier examples of such commodities - convey important economic information on the state of the global economy, as a result of their respective price-formation processes.8 It also suggests that in the post-GFC world, commodity markets assumed a larger role in discounting the impacts on the real economy of the numerous monetary experiments of central banks in the post-GFC era. Bottom Line: Our analysis of the factors driving the copper- and oil-to-gold ratios supports our view that demand for cyclical commodities - mainly oil and metals - is still strong. The behavior of our idiosyncratic factor leads us to favor oil over copper due to the rising EM vs. DM divergence, and the price-supportive supply dynamics in the oil market.   Waivers On U.S. Sanctions Roil Oil Markets A week ago, we cautioned clients to "expect more volatility" on the back of news leaks the Trump administration was considering granting waivers to importers of Iranian crude oil, just before the sanctions kicked in this week. We certainly got it. Since hitting $86.1/bbl in early October, Brent crude oil prices have fallen $15.4/bbl (18%), as markets attempt to price in how much Iranian oil is covered by the sanctions and when importers can expect to see it arrive. On Monday, the U.S. granted waivers to eight "jurisdictions" - China, India, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Italy, Greece and Taiwan - allowing them to continue to import Iranian oil for 180 days. This was a higher-than-expected number of waivers than we - and, given the volatility in prices - the market was expecting. This pushed down the elevated risk premium, which had been supporting prices over the past few months.9 The combined imports of these eight states is ~1.4mm b/d, according to Bloomberg estimates. The loss of these volumes in a market that was progressively tightening as OPEC 2.0 brought more of its spare capacity on line - while the USD continued to strengthen - likely would have driven the local-currency cost of fuel steadily higher (Chart 8). Because they are a de facto supply increase - albeit temporary, based on Trump Administration statements - they also will restrain price hikes in EM generally, barring an unplanned outage in 1H19 (Chart 9). Chart 8Waivers Will Contain Oil Price Rises In Local-Currency Terms Waivers Will Contain Oil Price Rises In Local-Currency Terms Waivers Will Contain Oil Price Rises In Local-Currency Terms \ Chart 9Oil Prices Rises In EM Economies Oil Prices Rises In EM Economies Oil Prices Rises In EM Economies No detail of volumes that will be allowed under these waivers was available as we went to press. Although it is obvious Iranian sales will recover some of the ~ 1mm b/d of exports lost in the run-up to the re-imposition of sanctions, it is not clear how much will be recovered. We believe the 180-day effective period for the waivers most likely was sought by KSA and Russia to give them time to bring on additional capacity to cover Iranian export losses. Markets will find out just how much spare capacity these states have in 1H19. By 2H19, additional production out of the U.S. from the Permian Basin will hit the market, as transportation bottlenecks are alleviated. This will allow U.S. exports to increase as well. However, it's not clear how much of this can get to export markets, given most of the dredging work needed to accommodate very large crude carriers (VLCCs) in the U.S. Gulf Coast has yet to be done. This could explain why the WTI - Cushing vs. WTI - Midland differentials are narrowing, while WTI spreads vs. Brent remain wide (Chart 10). Chart 10WTI Spreads Diverge WTI Spreads Diverge WTI Spreads Diverge It is important to note the market still is exposed to greater-than-expected declines in Venezuela's production, and to any unplanned outage anywhere in the world. OPEC spare capacity is 1.3mm b/d, according to the EIA and IEA, and most of that is in KSA. Russia probably has another 200k b/d or so it can bring on line. These production increases both are undertaking are cutting deeply into spare capacity, as the Paris-based International Energy Agency noted in its October 2018 Oil Market Report: Looking ahead, more supply might be forthcoming. Saudi Arabia has stated it already raised output to 10.7 mb/d in October, although at the cost of reducing spare capacity to 1.3 mb/d. Russia has also signaled it could increase production further if the market needs more oil. Their anticipated response, along with continued growth from the US, might be enough to meet demand in the fourth quarter. However, spare capacity would fall to extremely low levels as a percentage of global demand, leaving the oil market vulnerable to major disruptions elsewhere (p. 17). Bottom Line: We expected continued crude-oil price volatility, as markets sort out the U.S. waivers on Iranian oil imports. The supply side of the market remains tight, and spare capacity is being eroded by production increases. We believe OPEC 2.0 will use the 180 days contained in the waivers to mobilize additional production. How much of this becomes available is yet to be determined. Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "As U.S. starts oil sanctions against Iran, major buyers get waivers," published by reuters.com November 5, 2018. 2 OPEC 2.0 is a name we coined for the producer coalition led by KSA and Russia. Please see "Risk Premium In Oil Prices Rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity" for our most recent supply-demand balances and price assessments, published October 25 by Commodity & Energy Strategy, and is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 We use the USD broad trade-weighted index (TWIB) and U.S. inflation-adjusted real rates as explanatory variables in these models. As Chart 3 indicates, actual gold prices are in line with these variables. 4 The first factor accounts for ~ 80% of the variation in the gold ratios. The second idiosyncratic factor, which captures (1) supply-demand fundamentals in the oil and copper markets, and (2) divergences in global growth using EM vs. DM equities as proxies, accounts for the remaining ~ 20% of the variation. 5 Throughout this report, we proxy global yield by summing the yield on the 10-year German Bunds, Japanese Government Bonds and U.S. Treasurys. Please see BCA Research European Investment Strategy Weekly Report titled "The 'Rule Of 4' For Equities And Bonds," dated August 2, 2018. Available at eis.bcaresearch.com. The adjusted R2 in the global yield model is 0.94 compared to 0.88 for the U.S. Treasury model. 6 Using MSCI Emerging Market Index and MSCI Word Index price index. 7 To conduct this analysis, we use a statistical technique developed by the 2003 Nobel laureate, Clive Granger. The eponymous Granger-causality test is used to see whether one variable (i.e., time series) can be said to precede the other in terms of occurrence in time. This test measures information in the variables, particularly the effect of information from the preceding variable on the following variable. Please see Granger, C.W.J. (1980). "Testing for Causality, Personal Viewpoint,"Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2 (pp. 329 - 352). 8 This assessment is consistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis, the literature on which is countably infinite at this point. Sewell notes: "A market is said to be efficient with respect to an information set if the price 'fully reflects' that information set (Fama, 1970), i.e. if the price would be unaffected by revealing the information set to all market participants (Malkiel, 1992). The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) asserts that financial markets are efficient." The EMH has been debated and tested for decades. Please see Sewell, Martin (2011). "History of the Efficient Market Hypothesis," Research Note RN/11/04, published by University College London (UCL) Department of Computer Science. 9 Please see BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Risk Premium In Oil Prices Rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity," published October 25, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Gold Ratios Wave Off "Red October" ... Iran Export Waivers Highlight Tight Market Gold Ratios Wave Off "Red October" ... Iran Export Waivers Highlight Tight Market Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017 Gold Ratios Wave Off "Red October" ... Iran Export Waivers Highlight Tight Market Gold Ratios Wave Off "Red October" ... Iran Export Waivers Highlight Tight Market

Highlights So What? Donald Trump's reelection depends on the timing of the next recession. Why? The midterm elections will not determine Trump's reelection chances. Rather, the timing of the next recession will. BCA's House View expects it by 2020. Otherwise, President Trump is favored to win. Trump may be downgrading "maximum pressure" on Iran, reducing the risk of a 2019 recession. Trade war with China, gridlock, and budget deficits are the most investment-relevant outcomes of U.S. politics in 2018-20. Feature The preliminary results of the U.S. midterm elections are in, with the Democrats gaining the House and failing to gain the Senate, as expected. Our view remains that the implications for investors are minimal. The policy status quo is now locked in - a gridlocked government is unlikely to produce a major change in economic policy over the next two years. While the election is to some extent a rebuke to Trump, this report argues that he remains the favored candidate for the 2020 presidential election - unless a recession occurs. A Preliminary Look At The Midterms First, the preliminary takeaways from the midterms, as the results come in: The Democrats took the House of Representatives, with a preliminary net gain of 27 seats, resulting in a 51%-plus majority, and this is projected to rise to 34 seats as we go to press Wednesday morning. This is above the average for midterm election gains by the opposition party, especially given that Republicans have held the advantage in electoral districting. Performance in the Midwest, other swing states, and suburban areas poses a threat to Trump and Republicans in 2020. Republicans held the Senate, with a net gain of at least two seats, for a 51%-plus majority. Democrats were defending 10 seats in states that Trump won in 2016. While Democrats did well in the Midwest, these candidates had the advantage of incumbency. On the state level, the Democrats gained a net seven governorships, two of them in key Midwestern states. The gubernatorial races were partly cyclical, as the Republicans had hit a historic high-water mark in governors' seats and were bound to fall back a bit. However, the Democratic victory in Michigan and Wisconsin, key Midwestern Trump states, is a very positive sign for the Democrats, since they were not incumbents in either state and had to unseat incumbent Governor Scott Walker in Wisconsin. (Their victory in Maine could also help them in the electoral college in 2020.) The governors' races also suggest that moderate Democrats are more appealing to voters than activist Democrats. Candidate Andrew Gillum's loss in Florida is a disappointment for the progressive wing of the Democratic Party.1 With the House alone, Democrats will not be able to push major legislation through. In the current partisan environment it will be nigh-impossible to reach the 60 votes needed to end debate in the Senate ("cloture"), and even then House Democrats will face a presidential veto. They will not be able to repeal Trump's tax cuts, re-regulate the economy, abandon the trade wars, resurrect Obamacare, or revive the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal. Like the Republicans after 2010, they will be trapped in the position of controlling only one half of one of the three constitutional branches. The most they can do is hold hearings and bring forth witnesses in an attempt to tarnish Trump's 2020 reelection chances. They may eventually bring impeachment articles against him, but without two-thirds of the Senate they cannot remove him from office (unless the GOP grassroots abandons him, giving senators permission to do so). U.S. equities generally move upward after midterm elections - including midterms that produce gridlock (Chart 1A & Chart 1B). However, the October selloff could drag into November. More worryingly, as Chart 1B shows, the post-election rally tends to peter out only six months after a gridlock midterm, unlike midterms that reinforce the ruling party. Chart 1AMidterm U.S. Elections Tend To Be Bullish... Midterm U.S. Elections Tend To Be Bullish... Midterm U.S. Elections Tend To Be Bullish... Chart 1B... But Markets Lose Steam Six Months Post-Gridlock ... But Markets Lose Steam Six Months Post-Gridlock ... But Markets Lose Steam Six Months Post-Gridlock However, the 2018 midterms could be mildly positive for the markets, as they do not portend any major new policies or uncertainty. Trump's proposed additional tax cuts would have threatened higher inflation and more Fed rate hikes, whereas House Democrats will not be able to raise taxes or cut spending alone. Bipartisan entitlement reform seems unlikely in 2018-20 given the acrimony of the two parties and structural factors such as inequality and populism. An outstanding question is health care, which Republicans left unresolved after failing to repeal Obamacare, and which exit polls show was a driving factor behind Democratic victories. Separately, as an additional marginal positive for risk assets, the Trump administration has reportedly granted eight waivers to countries that import Iranian oil. We have signaled that Trump's "maximum pressure" doctrine poses a key risk for markets due to the danger of an Iran-induced oil price shock. A shift toward more lax enforcement reduces the tail-risk of a recession in 2019 (Chart 2). Of course, the waivers will expire in 180 days and may be a mere ploy to ensure smooth markets ahead of the midterm election, so the jury is still out on this issue. Chart 2Rapid Increases In Oil Prices Tend To Precede Recessions The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast This brings us to the main focus of this report: what do the midterms suggest about the 2020 election? Bottom Line: The midterm elections have produced a gridlocked Congress. Trump can continue with his foreign policy, most of his trade policy, his deregulatory decrees, and his appointment of court judges with limited interference from House Democrats. The only thing the Democrats can prevent him from doing is cutting taxes further. He tends to agree with Democrats on the need for more spending! While the U.S. market could rally on the back of this result, we do not see U.S. politics being a critical catalyst for markets going forward. On balance, a gridlocked result brings less uncertainty than would otherwise be the case, which is positive for markets in the short term. The Midterms And The 2020 Election There is a weak relationship at best between an opposition party's gains in the midterms and its performance in the presidential election two years later. Given that the president's party almost always loses the midterms - and yet that incumbent presidents tend to be reelected - the midterm has little diagnostic value for the presidential vote, as can be seen in recent elections (Chart 3A & Chart 3B). Chart 3AMidterm Has Little Predictive Power For Presidential Popular Vote ... The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast Chart 3B... Nor For Presidential Electoral College Vote The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast Nevertheless, historian Allan Lichtman has shown that since 1860, a midterm loss is marginally negative for a president's reelection chances.2 And for Republicans in recent years, losses in midterm elections are very weakly correlated with Republican losses of seats in the electoral college two years later (Chart 4). Chart 4Republican Midterm Loss Could Foreshadow Electoral College Losses The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast Still, this midterm election does not give any reason to believe that Trump's reelection chances have been damaged any more than Ronald Reagan's were after 1982, or Bill Clinton's after 1994, or Barack Obama's after 2010. All three of these presidents went on to a second term. A midterm loss simply does not stack the odds against reelection. Why are midterm elections of limited consequence for the president? They are fundamentally different from presidential elections. For instance, "the buck stops here" applies to the president alone, whereas in the midterms voters often seek to keep the president in check by voting against his party in Congress.3 Despite the consensus media narrative, the president is not that unpopular. Trump's approval rating today is about the same as that of Clinton and Obama at this stage in their first term (Chart 5). This week's midterm was not a wave of "resistance" to Trump so much as a run-of-the-mill midterm in which the president's party lost seats. Its outcome should not be overstated. Bottom Line: There is not much correlation between midterms and presidential elections. The best historians view it as a marginal negative for the incumbent. This result is not a mortal wound for Trump. Chart 5President Trump Is Hardly Losing The Popularity Contest The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast 2020: The Recession Call Is The Election Call The incumbent party has lost the White House every single time that a recession occurred during the campaign proper (Chart 6).4 The incumbent party has lost 50%-60% of the time if recession occurred in the calendar year before the election or in the first half of the election year. Chart 6A 2020 Recession Is Trump's Biggest Threat A 2020 Recession Is Trump's Biggest Threat A 2020 Recession Is Trump's Biggest Threat This is a problem for President Trump because the current economic expansion is long in the tooth. In July 2019, it will become the longest running economic expansion in U.S. history, following the 1991-2001 expansion. The 2020 election will occur sixteen months after the record is broken, which means that averting a recession over this entire period will be remarkable. BCA's House View holds that 2020 is the most likely year for a recession to occur. The economy is at full employment, inflation is trending upwards, and the Fed's interest rate hikes will become restrictive sometime in 2019. The yield curve could invert in the second half of 2019 - and inversion tends to precede recession by anywhere from 5-to-16 months (Table 1). No wonder Trump has called the Fed his "biggest threat."5 Table 1Inverted Yield Curve Is An Ominous Sign The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The risks to this 2020 recession call are probably skewed toward 2021 instead of 2019. The still-positive U.S. fiscal thrust in 2019 and possibly 2020 and the Trump administration's newly flexible approach to Iran sanctions, if maintained, reduce the tail-risk of a recession in 2019. If there is not a recession by 2020, Trump is the favored candidate to win. First, incumbents win 69% of all U.S. presidential elections. Second, incumbents win 80% of the time when the economy is not in recession, and 76% of the time when real annual per capita GDP growth over the course of the term exceeds the average of the previous two terms, which will likely be the case in 2020 unless there is a recession (Chart 7). Chart 7Relative Economic Performance Could Give Trump Firepower Relative Economic Performance Could Give Trump Firepower Relative Economic Performance Could Give Trump Firepower The above probabilities are drawn from the aforementioned Professor Allan Lichtman, at American University in Washington D.C., who has accurately predicted the outcome of every presidential election since 1984 (except the disputed 2000 election). Lichtman views presidential elections as a referendum on the party that controls the White House. He presents "13 Keys to the Presidency," which are true or false statements based on historically derived indicators of presidential performance. If six or more of the 13 keys are false, the incumbent will lose. On our own reading of Lichtman's keys, Trump is currently lined up to lose a maximum of four keys - two shy of the six needed to unseat him (Table 2). This is a generous reading for the Democrats: Trump's party has lost seats in the midterm election relative to 2014; his term has seen sustained social unrest; he is tainted by major scandal; and he is lacking in charisma. Yet on a stricter reading Trump only has one key against him (the midterm). Table 2Lichtman's Thirteen Keys To The White House* The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast What would it take to push Trump over the edge? Aside from a recession (which would trigger one or both of the economic keys against him), he would need to see two-to-four of the following factors take shape: a serious foreign policy or military failure, a charismatic Democratic opponent in 2020, a significant challenge to his nomination within the Republican Party, or a robust third party candidacy emerge. In our view, none of these developments are on the horizon yet, though they are probable enough. For instance, it is easy to see Trump's audacious foreign policy on China, Iran, and North Korea leading to a failure that counts against him. Thus, as things currently stand, Trump is the candidate to beat as long as the economy holds up. What about impeachment and removal from office prior to 2020? As long as Trump remains popular among Republican voters he will prevent the Senate from turning against him (Chart 8). What could cause public opinion to change? Clear, irrefutable, accessible, "smoking gun" evidence of personal wrongdoing that affected Trump's campaigns or duties in office. Nixon was not brought down until the Watergate tapes became public - and that required a Supreme Court order. Only then did Republican opinion turn against him and expose him to impeachment and removal - prompting him to resign. Chart 8Trump Cannot Be Removed From Office The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast All that being said, Trump tends to trail his likeliest 2020 adversaries in one-on-one opinion polling. Given our recession call, we would not dispute online betting markets giving Trump a less-than-50% chance of reelection at present (Chart 9). The Democratic selection process has hardly begun: e.g. Joe Biden could have health problems, and Michelle Obama, Oprah Winfrey, or other surprise candidates could decide to run. The world will be a different place in 2020. Bottom Line: The recession call is the election call. If BCA is right about a recession by 2020, then Trump will lose. If we are wrong, then Trump is favored to win. Chart 9A Strong Opponent Has Yet To Emerge The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast Is It Even Possible For Trump To Win Again? Election Scenarios Is it demographically possible for Trump to win? Yes. In 2016 BCA dubbed Trump's electoral strategy "White Hype," based on his apparent attempt to increase the support and turnout of white voters, primarily in "Rust Belt" battleground states. While Republican policy wonks might have envisioned a "big tent" Republican Party for the future, demographic trends in 2016 suggested that this strategy was premature. Indeed, drawing from a major demographic study by the Center for American Progress and other Washington think tanks,6 we found that a big increase in white turnout and support was the only 2016 election scenario in which a victory in both the popular vote and electoral college vote was possible. In other words, while "Minority Outreach" have worked as a GOP strategy in the future, Donald Trump's team was mathematically correct in realizing that only White Hype would work in the actual election at hand. This strategy did not win Trump the popular vote, but it did secure him the requisite electoral college seats, notably from the formerly blue of Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. Comparing the 2016 results with our pre-election projections confirms this point: Trump won the very swing states where he increased white GOP support and lost the swing states where he did not. Pennsylvania is the notable exception, but he won there by increasing white turnout instead of white GOP support.7 Can Trump do this again? Yes, but not easily. Map 1 depicts the 2016 election results with red and blue states, plus the percentage swing in white party support that would have been necessary to turn the state to the opposite party (white support for the GOP is the independent variable). In Michigan, a 0.3% shift in the white vote away from Republicans would have deprived Trump of victory; in Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, a 0.8% shift would have done the same; in Florida, a 1.5% change would have done so. Map 1The 'White Hype' Strategy Narrowly Worked In 2016 The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast Critically, the country's demographics have changed significantly since 2016 - to Trump's detriment. The white eligible voting population in swing states will have fallen sharply from 81% of the population to 76% of the population by 2020 (Chart 10). Chart 10Demographic Shift Does Not Favor Trump The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast Thus, to determine whether Trump still has a pathway to victory, we looked at eight scenarios, drawing on the updated Center for American Progress study. The assumptions behind the scenarios in Table 3 are as follows: Status Quo - This replicates the 2016 result and projects it forward with 2020 demographics. 2016 Sans Third Party - Replicates the 2016 result but normalizes the third party vote, which was elevated that year. Minority Revolt - In this scenario, Hispanics, Asians, and other minorities turn out in large numbers to support Democrats, even with white non-college educated voters supporting Republicans at a decent rate. The Kanye West Strategy - Trump performs a miracle and generates a swing of minority voters in favor of Republicans. Blue Collar Democrats - White non-college-educated support returns to 2012 norms, meaning back to Democrats. Romney's Ghost - White college-educated support returns to 2012 levels. White Hype - White non-college-educated support swings to Republicans. Obama versus Trump - White college-educated voters ally with minorities in opposition to a surge in white non-college-educated voters for Republicans. Table 3Assumptions For Key Electoral Scenarios In 2020 The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The results show that Trump's best chance at remaining in the White House is still White Hype, as it is still the only scenario in which Trump can statistically win a victory in the popular vote (Chart 11). Another pathway to victory is the "2016 Sans Third Party" scenario. But this scenario still calls for White Hype, since a third party challenger is out of his hands (Chart 12).8 Chart 11'White Hype' May Be Only Way To Secure Both Popular And Electoral College Vote... The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast   Chart 12... Although Moving To The Center Could Still Yield Electoral College Vote The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast However, the data show that Trump cannot win merely by replicating his white turnout and support from 2016, due to demographic changes wiping away the thin margins in key swing states. He needs some additional increases in support. These increases will ultimately have to be culled from his record in office - which reinforces the all-important question of the timing of recession, but also raises the question of whether Trump will move to the center to woo the median voter. In the "Kanye West" and "Romney's Ghost" scenarios, Trump wins the electoral college by broadening his appeal to minorities and college-educated white voters. This may sound far-fetched, but President Clinton reinvented himself after the "Republican Revolution" of 1994 by compromising with Republicans in Congress. The slim margins in the Midwest suggest that the probability of Trump shifting to the middle is not as low as one might think. Especially if there is no recession. Independents remain the largest voting block - and they have not lost much steam, if any, since 2016. Moreover, the number of independents who lean Republican is in an uptrend (Chart 13). Without a recession, or a failure on Lichtman's keys, Trump will likely broaden his base. Chart 13Trump Shows Promise Among Independents Trump Shows Promise Among Independents Trump Shows Promise Among Independents Bottom Line: Trump needs to increase white turnout and GOP support beyond 2016 levels in order to win 2020. Demographics will not allow a simple repeat of his 2016 performance. However, he may be able to generate the requisite turnout and support by moving to the center, courting college-educated whites and even minorities. His success will depend on his record in office. Investment Implications What are the implications of the above findings for 2018-20 and beyond? The Rust Belt states of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin will become pseudo-apocalyptic battlegrounds in 2020. The Democrats must aim to take back all three to win the White House, as they cannot win with just two alone.9 They are likely to focus on these states because they are erstwhile blue states and the vote margin is so slim that the slightest factors could shift the balance - meaning that Democrats could win here without a general pro-Democratic shift in opinion that hurts Trump in other key swing states such as Florida, North Carolina, or Arizona. The "Blue Collar Democrat" scenario, for instance, merely requires that white non-college-educated voters return to their 2012 level of support for Democrats. Joe Biden is the logical candidate, health permitting, as he is from Pennsylvania and was literally on the ballot in 2012! Moreover, these states are the easiest to flip to the Democratic side via the woman vote. In Michigan, a 0.5% swing of women to the Democrats would have turned the state blue again; in Pennsylvania that number is 1.6% and in Wisconsin it is 1.7% (Table 4). These are the lowest of any state. Women from the Midwest or with a base in the Midwest - such as Michelle Obama or Oprah Winfrey - would also be logical candidates. Table 4Women Voters May Hold The Balance The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The Democrats could also pursue a separate or complementary strategy by courting African American turnout and support, especially in Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina. But it is more difficult to flip these states than the Midwestern ones. With the Rust Belt as the fulcrum of his electoral strategy and reelection, Trump has a major incentive to maintain economic nationalism over the coming two years. Trump may be more pragmatic in the use of tariffs, and will certainly engage in talks with China and others, but he ultimately must remain "tough" on trade. He has fewer constraints in pursuing trade war with China than with Europe. For the same Rust Belt reason, the Democrats, if they get into the Oval Office, will not be overly kind to the "butchers of Beijing," as President Clinton called the Chinese leadership in the 1992 presidential campaign (after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident). Hence we are structurally bearish U.S.-China relations and related assets. Interestingly, if Trump moves to the middle, and tones down "white nationalism" in pursuit of college-educated whites and minorities, then he would have an incentive to dampen the flames of social division ahead of 2020. The key is that in an environment without recession, Trump has the option of courting voters on the basis of his economic and policy performance alone. Whereas if he is seen fanning social divisions, it could backfire, as Democrats could benefit from a sense of national crisis and instability in a presidential election. Either way, culture wars, controversial rhetoric, identity politics, unrest, and violence will continue in the United States as the fringes of the political spectrum use identity politics and wedge issues to rile up voters.The question is how the leading parties and their candidates handle it. What about after 2020? Are there any conclusions that can be drawn regardless of which party controls the White House? The two biggest policy certainties are that fiscal spending will go up and that generational conflict will rise. On fiscal spending, Trump was a game changer by removing fiscal hawkishness from the Republican agenda. Democrats are not proposing fiscal responsibility either. The most likely areas of bipartisan legislation in 2018-20 are health care and infrastructure - returning House Speaker Nancy Pelosi mentioned infrastructure several times in her election-night speech - which would add to the deficit. The deficit is already set to widen sharply, judging by the fact that it has been widening at a time when unemployment is falling. This aberration has only occurred during the economic boom of the 1950s and the inflation and subsequent stagflation beginning in the late 1960s (Chart 14). The current outlook implies a return of the stagflationary scenario. In the late 1960s, the World War I generation was retiring, lifting the dependent-to-worker ratio and increasing consumption relative to savings. Today, as Peter Berezin of BCA's Global Investment Strategy has shown, the Baby Boomers are retiring with a similar impact. Chart 14The Deficit Is Blowing Out Even Without A Recession The Deficit Is Blowing Out Even Without A Recession The Deficit Is Blowing Out Even Without A Recession Trump made an appeal to elderly voters in the midterms by warning that unfettered immigration and Democratic entitlement expansions would take away from existing senior benefits. By contrast, Democrats will argue that Republicans want to cut benefits for all to pay for tax cuts for the rich, and will try to activate Millennial voters on a range of progressive issues that antagonize older voters. The result is that policy debates will focus more on generational differences. Mammoth budget deficits - not to mention trade war - will be good for inflation, good for gold, and a headwind for U.S. government bonds and the USD as long as the environment is not recessionary. The greatest policy uncertainties are health care and immigration. These are the two major outstanding policy issues that Republicans and Democrats will vie over in 2018 and beyond. While President Trump could achieve something with the Democrats on either of these issues with some painful compromises, it is too soon to have a high conviction on the outcome. But assuming that over the coming years some immigration restrictions come into play and that some kind of public health care option becomes more widely available, there are two more reasons to expect inflation to trend upward on a secular basis. Also on a secular basis, defense stocks stand to benefit from geopolitical multipolarity, especially U.S.-China antagonism. Tech stocks stand to suffer due to the trade war and an increasingly bipartisan consensus that this sector needs to be regulated.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com   1 Furthermore, victories on the state level, if built upon in the 2020 election, could give the Democrats an advantage in gerrymandering, i.e. electoral redistricting, which is an important political process in the United States. 2 Please see Allan J. Lichtman, Predicting The Next President: The Keys To The White House 2016 (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016). 3 Please see Joseph Bafumi, Robert S. Erikson, and Christopher Wlezien, "Balancing, Generic Polls and Midterm Congressional Elections," The Journal of Politics 72:3 (2010), pp. 705-19. 4 Please see footnote 2 above. 5 Please see Sylvan Lane, “Trump says Fed is his ‘biggest threat,’ blasting own appointees,” The Hill, October 16, 2018, available at thehill.com. 6 Please see Rob Griffin, Ruy Teixeira, and William H. Frey, "America's Electoral Future: Demographic Shifts and the Future of the Trump Coalition," Center for American Progress, dated April 14, 2018, available at www.americanprogress.org. 7 In several cases, he did not have to lift white support by as much as we projected because minority support for the Democrats dropped off after Obama left the stage. 8 Interestingly, however, this scenario would result in an electoral college tie! Since the House would then vote on a state delegation basis, it would likely hand Trump the victory (and Pence would also win the Senate). 9 However, if they win Pennsylvania plus one electoral vote in Maine, they can win the electoral college with either Michigan or Wisconsin.

Highlights So What? The bull market in defense stocks is global and only beginning. We construct a BCA Global Defense Index to give investors exposure to this theme. Why? Multipolarity will drive uncertainty and conflict, spurring arms demand to Cold War heights. Contemporary geopolitical hotspots require expensive and modern technology. Cold War-era weapon systems are long in the tooth and in need of replacement. Also... We close our long Energy / short S&P 500 portfolio hedge for a gain. Feature It is somewhat of a cliché to tell clients that one of our highest conviction calls is to be overweight defense stocks. We are, after all, geopolitical investment strategists! Our decision to go long S&P 500 aerospace and defense stocks / short MSCI ACW is up 14% since initiation in December 2016. In this report, we build on previous work focusing on U.S. defense stocks and expand our analysis to global plays. GPS' Mega-Theme: Multipolarity Is Good For War International affairs are characterized by an anarchic governance structure. In the absence of a global government, the vacuum of power is filled by powerful states. These states behave like bullies in the schoolyard. When a single, powerful bully dominates the lunch break, all other kids fall in line or suffer the bully's wrath. When two bullies split the yard into warring camps, proxy fights may emerge on the sidelines, but generally an equilibrium is preserved. Formal political science theory and history teach us that the further we are from a hegemonic global structure where one country (the hegemon) dominates and bullies all others, the closer we are to anarchy. The "offensive realism" school of International Relations theory further splits multipolarity into two types: Balanced multipolarity is characterized by a number of roughly equally powerful states, similar to the distribution of power of continental Europe during the "Concert of Europe" era in the nineteenth century. Unbalanced multipolarity is closest to contemporary geopolitics. In The Tragedy Of Great Power Politics, John Mearsheimer reviewed 200 years of European history and concluded that unbalanced multipolarity is by far the most volatile geopolitical system (Table 1).1 Table 1Global System Structure And War "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! A multipolar ordering of global power, therefore, produces the highest level of disorder (Chart 1). This finding is theoretically elegant, but normatively disturbing. Every country gets a voice and an opportunity to defend its sovereignty. But the international order is normatively ignorant and desires a bully or hegemon. Chart 1Multipolarity Produces Disorder Multipolarity Produces Disorder Multipolarity Produces Disorder Over the past fifty years, there have been three identifiable periods in the global arms market (Chart 2): Chart 2Further Upside In The 'War Bull Market' Further Upside In The 'War Bull Market' Further Upside In The 'War Bull Market' Cold War Arms Race - 1961-1982: The arms trade grew by a whopping 177% during this period, with an average annual growth rate of 5.5%; Disarmament - 1982-2002: Arms trade shrunk by 61% and average annual growth rate was -3.9%; Multipolarity - 2002-present: What started with the U.S. defense buildup following 9/11 has evolved into a truly global response to emerging multipolarity. The arms trade grew by 73% from 2002 to 2017, with an average annual growth rate of 3.4%. Bottom Line: In 2017, the total arms trade was 68% of its peak in 1982, signifying that we have more room to go in this recent "War Bull Market." Given that unbalanced multipolarity produces a higher volume of conflict than a bipolar system, we would expect the current phase to be more fruitful for the global arms race than even the Cold War era. The Pillars Of An Arms Bull Market Chart 3Global Defense Spending... Global Defense Spending... Global Defense Spending... In this report, we focus on the global arms trade, which is different from global defense spending (Chart 3). This is because global defense spending includes non-investible transactions, such as spending on salaries, buildings, health care, and pensions. The global arms trade was once 20% of global defense spending, but is now only 1.9% (Chart 4). Chart 4...Is Different From The Global Arms Trade ...Is Different From The Global Arms Trade ...Is Different From The Global Arms Trade The reason is that salaries and pensions now dominate defense budgets. In the U.S., they make up 42% of all expenditure. They are higher in much of the developed world (66% in Italy, for example). Moreover, many countries that in 1960 did not have an armaments industry have become quite adept at satisfying demand via domestic production. We nonetheless would expect the global arms trade to bounce off of its lows today. There are three main reasons. Evolving Conflict Zones: Asia And Europe The primary reason to expect a brisk pickup in the global arms race is that the global conflict zones are evolving. Multipolarity is causing shifting geopolitical equilibriums. We expect both East Asia and Europe - largely dormant as hotspots since the end of the Cold War - to catch up with the Middle East as zones of tensions. Periods of rising conflict tend to coincide with the rise in the global arms trade (Chart 5). Chart 5Rising Conflict Coincides With Escalating Arms Trade Rising Conflict Coincides With Escalating Arms Trade Rising Conflict Coincides With Escalating Arms Trade East Asia is our primary concern. Sino-American tensions have been brewing for decades, well before the trade war initiated by the Trump administration. Recently, the trade war has begun to spill into strategic areas (Table 2), creating a vicious feedback loop that could spark an accident or outright military conflict. Table 2Trade War Spills Into Strategic Areas "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! The South China Sea is the premier geographic location of U.S.-China strategic friction. It is a hub for international trade, a vital supply route for all major Asian economies, and the premier focus of China's attempt to rewrite global rules (Diagram 1). We update our list of clashes in this area in Appendix A. Diagram 1South China Sea As Traffic Roundabout "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! China has used its growing economic heft in the region to bully its neighbors into acquiescing to its geopolitical posture (Chart 6). It has used economic sanctions, trade boycotts, and tourism bans to get its way with the neighborhood. China's East Asia neighbors - including Japan - will look to balance their growing dependence on the Chinese economy with a desire to maintain sovereignty. One way to do so will be to rearm and present a formidable challenge to Beijing's regional hegemony. This means that not only the South China Sea but also China's entire periphery is at risk of friction, and this is true regardless of any U.S. interest in Asia. Chart 6China Uses Its Economic Might To Bully China Uses Its Economic Might To Bully China Uses Its Economic Might To Bully Europe is also growing as a potential source of global arms demand. Since the end of the Cold War, Europe has seen a decline in defense spending. One reason is the NATO alliance, which has allowed Europeans to pass the buck to the U.S. This has not only been the case with the safely cocooned Western European states. Poland, intimately familiar with the built-in geopolitical risks of its neighborhood, reduced its defense spending once it joined NATO. President Trump has made awakening Europe from its stupor a key pillar of his trans-Atlantic policy. A combination of Trump's pestering and concerns that the U.S. is trending towards isolationism with an evolving threat matrix that now includes terrorism, migration, and Russia should be enough to spur Europeans to meet their commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defense (Chart 7). Chart 7Europeans Will Be Swayed To Meet Defense Commitments... "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! If NATO member states and Japan were to respond to their evolving threats and commit to spending 2% of GDP on defense, the impact on global arms demand would be significant. The extra spending would be roughly $145 billion, a 14% increase from current levels (Chart 8). Chart 8...Raising Global Arms Demand "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! What about the Middle East? In the short term, we are concerned that President Trump's "maximum pressure" policy could lead to kinetic action against Iran. In the medium and long term, we expect some form of an equilibrium to emerge in the Middle East that would keep regional demand for weapons stable at current elevated levels. Saudi Arabia has been the primary importer of weapons, with 13% of total demand since 2002. Saudi purchases have accelerated as the U.S. has geopolitically deleveraged out of the region (Chart 9 and Chart 10). Chart 9As The U.S. Military Deleverages... As The U.S. Military Deleverages... As The U.S. Military Deleverages... Chart 10...The Saudi Arabian Military Leverages ...The Saudi Arabian Military Leverages ...The Saudi Arabian Military Leverages Evolving Technological Demands The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq at the beginning of this century was probably the last large-scale mechanized conflict involving large formations of main battle tanks (MBT). The evolving threat matrixes in East Asia and Europe are likely to create a growing demand for naval, air superiority, and drone/autonomous technology. In East Asia, the two main risk theaters are the South and East China Seas. In Europe, the Mediterranean, the Baltic, and the Black Seas are increasingly becoming a risk vector due to the instability of North African and Middle East countries, as well as Russian assertiveness. This is good news for the arms industry as aircraft and ships are some of the most lucrative exports given the high level of technological sophistication that goes into developing them (Chart 11). A war fought in the trenches and jungles by soldiers and insurgents is unlikely to be very profitable, other than for small arms manufacturers. But tensions between sovereign nations across large distances and bodies of water will be highly lucrative for major defense manufacturers that specialize in anti-access/area-denial systems.2 Chart 11Aircraft And Ships Are Most Lucrative "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! Furthermore, capital depreciation is advanced for the most sophisticated (and thus expensive) military technology that was introduced at the tail-end of the Cold War expansionary phase. The U.S. aircraft carrier fleet, for example, is mostly made up of Nimitz-class carriers, which have served for the past 43 years on average (Chart 12). Chart 12Capital Depreciation Is Advanced "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! Our back-of-the-envelope calculations show that the cyclicality in U.S. aircraft carriers is apparent across the major defense systems. Looking at 40 countries and their respective aircraft and MBTs, the bulk of these weapons is beyond the average age of the previous generation when it was retired (Chart 13). Part of the reason for the extended life cycle is better technology, but we suspect the main reason is that these major weapon systems were developed at the height of the Cold War and have not been updated since then. Chart 13Weapons Are Beyond Retirement Age, Need Updating "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! Population Aging The demographic trends of population aging and low birth rates have wide-ranging macroeconomic implications. But they will also impact the defense industry by encouraging automation. There are benefits to automation in the military sphere beyond simply replacing a shrinking pool of able-bodied youth. First, the likely geopolitical hotspots of this century - East Asian seas, the Persian Gulf, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean - are conducive to high-tech warfare. These bodies of water will be patrolled by drones and plied by autonomous surface vessels while hypersonic missiles deny access to the enemy. Second, by shifting the burden of fighting wars from humans to robots, policymakers will face lower constraints to conflict. This development will not only encourage policymakers to develop autonomous weapon systems, but might also increase the frequency with which they are used, destroyed, and thus re-ordered, shortening the hardware life-cycle and thus increasing the sales volume. Bottom Line: Global multipolarity has seen the U.S. geopolitically deleverage from the Middle East, threaten Europe with abandonment, and put pressure on China in East Asia. These are trends that we believe are here to stay irrespective of President Trump's success or failure in the 2020 election. They are all bullish for defense spending and arms trade. In addition, evolving technological demands and global demographic trends will buoy the arms trade. We expect this era of unbalanced multipolarity to be even more lucrative for global defense contractors. The U.S.: Remain Overweight Anastasios Avgeriou, BCA's chief U.S. equity strategist, recommends that investors remain overweight the pure-play BCA defense index and add exposure to it on any meaningful pullbacks while keeping it as a structural overweight within the GICS1 S&P industrials index. In the U.S., defense spending and investment have bottomed and will continue to accelerate. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) continues to project that defense outlays will jump further next year (middle panel, Chart 14). We expect that this breakneck pace is actually sustainable, mainly because any fiscal compromise with Democrats on discretionary, non-defense spending would require acquiescence on GOP spending priorities, such as defense. Defense outlays will therefore continue to expand into the 2020s. Chart 14Upbeat Defense Outlays... Upbeat Defense Outlays... Upbeat Defense Outlays... Such a buoyant demand backdrop is music to the ears of defense contractor CEOs and represents a boost to defense equity revenue growth prospects. Defense contractors enjoy high operating leverage. No wonder M&A activity is robust: at least four large deals have been announced in the past year that are underpinning both takeout premia and relative share prices (bottom panel, Chart 15). Chart 15...And A Flurry Of M&A Is A Boon For Defense ...And A Flurry Of M&A Is A Boon For Defense ...And A Flurry Of M&A Is A Boon For Defense A closer look at operating metrics corroborates the view that defense goods manufacturers are firing on all cylinders. New orders recently jumped to fresh all-time highs and the industry's shipments-to-inventories ratio is rising, on track to surpass the 2008 peak. Unfilled orders are also running at a high rate, signaling that factories will keep on humming at least for the next few quarters (Chart 16). Chart 16Firming Operating Metrics Firming Operating Metrics Firming Operating Metrics Importantly, the industry is not standing still and is making significant investments. U.S. defense capex as reported in the financial statements of constituent firms is growing at roughly 20% annually, or twice as fast as overall capex (Chart 17). Defense ROE is running near 30%, again roughly double the rate of the broad market (Chart 18). Chart 17Industry Is Not Standing Still Industry Is Not Standing Still Industry Is Not Standing Still Chart 18Healthy Balance Sheet With High ROE... Healthy Balance Sheet With High ROE... Healthy Balance Sheet With High ROE... Valuations are on the expensive side and in overshoot territory (Chart 19). This is clearly a risk to the overall view. However, if our structural thesis pans out, then defense stocks in the U.S. will grow into their pricey valuations as happened in the back half of the 1960s. Chart 19...But Valuations Are Expensive ...But Valuations Are Expensive ...But Valuations Are Expensive Bottom Line: The secular advance in pure-play defense stocks remains in place. BCA's U.S. Equity Strategy recommends an above-benchmark allocation. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the BCA defense index are: LMT, LLC, NOC, GD, and RTN. Global Stocks: Be Discerning Beyond the U.S., which global defense stocks are appealing? We believe that there are several market and structural factors to consider. We have ranked national defense sectors by market and structural factors in Tables 3 and 4. Further, Appendix B lists all the non-U.S. weapon manufacturers that we examined, as well as market performance by country. Table 3Russian Defense Sector Attractive On Market Factors "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! Table 4European Companies Rank Highly On Structural Factors "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! Momentum - We like stocks from equity markets that have momentum behind them, i.e. whose stock are above their 200-day moving average. Relative valuation - We like defense sectors that are at a discount relative to the U.S. plays. Performance since Trump - For any country that has outperformed the U.S. aerospace and defense sector since the inauguration of President Trump on January 20, the market believes in its competitiveness vis-à-vis the largest exporter. Geographical diversity - We have ranked country defense sectors by how diverse their sources of revenue are. The higher the figure, the more geographically diverse the revenue pool. Russian and Indian defense plays score very low on this variable as they depend solely on one source: themselves. Exposure to arms trade - We have ranked country defense sectors by how exposed their contractors are to defense as opposed to civilian production. Most companies have major civilian outlays. To fully capture our multipolarity theme, we have ranked companies based on how fully focused they are on producing and selling weapons. Share of global arms market - We recommend that clients buy defense companies in countries that already have a high share of the global arms market. Decisions on purchasing weapons often involve path dependency due to the need to acquire compatible systems. Defense spending - We penalize countries that are already spending 2% of GDP on defense. Their companies will see little boost to domestic demand. It is the other, under-spending countries that will significantly increase their outlays over the next decade. Russian companies score high on market factors. They have good momentum, are attractively valued relative to the U.S. aerospace and defense sector, and are structurally supported. Israel, Canada, Australia, and Brazil are also attractive. All of these are made up of only one stock. On structural factors alone, we like German, British, Italian, and Swedish defense companies. They are geographically diversified, have a respectable share of the global arms trade, and have both reason and room to increase domestic spending. French companies are also structurally attractive, although France may have less need to increase defense outlays. Putting it all together, we are creating a BCA Global Defense Basket. We would include the following global tickers in that basket: A:ASBX, F:AIRS, F:CSF, F:SGM, F:AM@F, C:CAE, D:RHM, D:TKA, I:LDO, I:FCTI, ULE, COB and W:SAAB. Clients may want to include in the basket the five U.S. tickers recommended by BCA's U.S. Equity Strategy: LMT, LLL, NOC, GD, and RTN. We recommend that investors buy this basket, in absolute terms, as a structural investment. Housekeeping We are closing two of our hedges today. First, we are closing long Brent / Short S&P 500 for a gain of 6% and our long U.S. energy / short U.S. information technology for a loss of 1.63%. We initiated the two tactical trades on October 3, which means we timed the market correction perfectly. However, concerns over a supply glut in the oil market meant that the "long" part of our trade did not work out. Furthermore, there have been leaks from the White House to the media that the U.S. may award exceptions to the oil embargo to several critical importers. This would suggest that the Trump administration is beginning to see the risks of its aggressive maximum pressure strategy toward Iran and therefore may be trying to backtrack from it. We still think that the odds of an oil spike due to geopolitics in 2019 are high, but they do appear to be declining, at least for the time being. As such, we are closing the two trades for a net gain. We will continue to monitor the Iran embargo carefully as we expect that geopolitical risks will again be understated in the future, offering investors another opportunity to be long energy. Jesse Anak Kuri, Consulting Editor jesse.anakkuri@mail.mcgill.ca 1 Please see John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy Of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001). 2 Anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) is a strategy of preventing an adversary from occupying or transiting a geographic area. Defense systems that perform A2/AD functions in the modern era tend to be expensive and technologically sophisticated. They include anti-ship missiles, sophisticated radars, attack submarines, and air-superiority fighter jets. Appendix A Notable Clashes In The South China Sea (2010-18) "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! Notable Clashes In The South China Sea (2010-18) (Continued) "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! Notable Clashes In The South China Sea (2010-18) (Continued) "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! Appendix B Appendix B Chart 20British Defense Stocks British Defense Stocks British Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 21French Defense Stocks French Defense Stocks French Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 22German Defense Stocks German Defense Stocks German Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 23Italian Defense Stocks Italian Defense Stocks Italian Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 24Swedish Defense Stocks Swedish Defense Stocks Swedish Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 25Norwegian Defense Stocks Norwegian Defense Stocks Norwegian Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 26Canadian Defense Stocks Canadian Defense Stocks Canadian Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 27Australian Defense Stocks Australian Defense Stocks Australian Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 28Korean Defense Stocks Korean Defense Stocks Korean Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 29Japanese Defense Stocks Japanese Defense Stocks Japanese Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 30Singaporean Defense Stocks Singaporean Defense Stocks Singaporean Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 31Israeli Defense Stocks Israeli Defense Stocks Israeli Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 32Russian Defense Stocks Russian Defense Stocks Russian Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 33Brazilian Defense Stocks Brazilian Defense Stocks Brazilian Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 34Indian Defense Stocks Indian Defense Stocks Indian Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 35Turkish Defense Stocks Turkish Defense Stocks Turkish Defense Stocks Appendix B Table 1Key Aerospace And Defense Companies "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! Appendix B Table 1Key Aerospace And Defense Companies, Continued "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks! "War! What Is It Good For? - Absolutely Noth...." Actually, Global Defense Stocks!

Highlights So What? Chancellor Angela Merkel's decision to step down as party chairperson is positive for European political evolution and thus not a risk to the market. Why? The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is unlikely to turn Euroskeptic, the median German voter is not. Europhile Green Party is surging, throwing shade at the narrative that Germans are souring on Europe. New elections are unlikely in the next 12 months, neither main centrist party would benefit. Chancellor Merkel's stabilizing role in the Euro Area crisis is overstated. Infusion of new blood is precisely what Germany, and Europe, needs. Also... 2019 will be a big year for Europe with multiple decisions to be taken on governance reforms. New leadership in Berlin is exactly what the doctor ordered. Feature German Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) suffered a deep loss in the Hesse election on October 28. Germany's main centrist parties - the center-right CDU and center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) - suffered deep losses in Hesse, mirroring the results in Bavaria from October 14 (Chart 1). The results have prompted Angela Merkel to confirm that she will not stand for re-election as chair of the CDU at the Hamburg party convention and that she will not seek any political posts after her current term as chancellor ends in 2021. Chart 1Winners And Losers In Bavaria And Hesse Merkel's Done. Now What? Merkel's Done. Now What? In this Client Note, we examine what Chancellor Merkel's decision means for Germany and Europe. Are Euroskeptics Taking Over Germany? The most important question for global investors is whether Merkel's fall from grace is related to a growing trend of populism in Europe. In part, yes. However, Merkel's problem is deeper. Merkel-fatigue in Germany has deeper roots than her decision on immigration in 2015. Polling suggests that Merkel recovered from that crisis and reached a 70% approval rating in mid-2017, only to see a precipitous decline since (Chart 2). Chart 2Merkel's Political Capital Is Spent Merkel's Political Capital Is Spent Merkel's Political Capital Is Spent That said, German Euroskeptic sentiment is not on the rise (Chart 3). In fact, Germans support the currency union at one of the highest clips in Europe. Furthermore, Germans continue to "feel" European (Chart 4). Chart 3Germans Are Europhile... Germans Are Europhile... Germans Are Europhile... Chart 4...And Feel Quite European ...And Feel Quite European ...And Feel Quite European In the last two Lander elections in Bavaria and Hesse, the right-wing, Euroskeptic party Alternative for Germany (AfD) underperformed its national polling. Its support in opinion polls, at 16%, appears to be limited by the number of Germans who identify as Euroskeptic, similarly around 14%. In fact, it was the Green Party that surprised in both Bavaria and Hesse, gaining 8.9% and 8.7% respectively. Bottom Line: The short answer is no, Germany is not being taken over by Euroskeptics. True, the 2015 migration crisis has given the AfD a tailwind, allowing it to become entrenched in the political system. Yet just as impressive is the rise of the Europhile Green party (Chart 5). Chart 5Grand Coalition Parties Would Be Crazy To Call A New Election Grand Coalition Parties Would Be Crazy To Call A New Election Grand Coalition Parties Would Be Crazy To Call A New Election OK, But Will The CDU Move To The Right? The previous question was purposely hyperbolic. The more nuanced question is whether the CDU will swing to the right in the face of AfD's rise? The answer depends on the issue. The two key issues are immigration and EU integration. On immigration, it is simply good politics for Germany's center-right party to steal from the AfD platform. The only downside of adopting a right-leaning immigrant policy is that it will make forming coalitions with the surging Green Party more difficult. It was immigration policy that ultimately prevented the so-called Jamaica Coalition - the CDU, the Green Party, and the pro-business and mildly Euroskeptic Free Democratic Party (FDP) - from becoming a fully-fledged ruling coalition in November 2017. This forced Merkel to re-establish the uninspiring Grand Coalition with the SPD.1 On European integration, it is possible that the CDU will adopt more Euroskeptic rhetoric, but such a move could backfire. First, data suggests that Germans continue to support the euro at a high clip. Second, AfD has already captured the "hard Euroskeptic" voters, whereas FDP has captured "soft Euroskeptics." It is unclear if the CDU has any chance of getting any of those voters back by crowding the "Euroskeptic corner." In fact, data from Bavaria and Hesse indicate that the CDU has been losing voters equally to the Green Party and the AfD. From the perspective of the Median Voter Theory, the CDU has a clear path forward. By remaining Europhile and pro-EU, it can ensure that it does not abandon the 83% of Germans who continue to support the currency union. The German median voter clearly does not want to abandon European institutions. But by ditching Merkel's liberal, pro-immigrant policy, the CDU can ensure that it withstands the AfD's attack on its right flank. Bottom Line: Germany's main center-right party has the luxury of picking its battles with the right-wing AfD. We suspect that the CDU will adopt some of the AfD's anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy, but retain its centrism on other issues. Who Will Replace Merkel As The Head Of The CDU? After months of speculation, Chancellor Merkel has confirmed that she will not pursue the CDU chairmanship at the upcoming December 7-8 party conference in Hamburg. Instead, Germany's ruling party will select a new chairperson, one who will be groomed as Merkel's successor for the 2021 election. The process for selecting the CDU chairperson is largely closed and dominated by party elites. The Federal Executive Board of the CDU - which is made up of the chairperson and 39 other members - sits down with the CDU parliamentary faction to approve the candidates, ensuring that a rogue candidate cannot stage a surprise in the delegate vote. It is highly likely that Merkel will be able to hand-pick a successor. Table 1 is our attempt to collate the likeliest candidates to replace Merkel as the head of the CDU. The list includes only one Euroskeptic candidate - former party whip Friedrich Merz who has not sat in the Bundestag since 2009 - and quite a few outright Europhiles. Merkel's preferred candidate is Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer - often referred to by German media by her acronym AKK - a centrist who is to the left of Merkel on economic policy, EU matters, and social issues. Table 1Potential Merkel Successors Merkel's Done. Now What? Merkel's Done. Now What? Given the short period of time between now and the Hamburg conference, it is highly unlikely that a surprise candidate - such as the Euroskeptic Merz - will emerge victorious. Merkel, for instance, spent months grooming the party rank-and-file prior to her nomination. Bottom Line: Merkel's successor is likely to be hand-picked. Will Merkel Survive Until 2021? Merkel's chances of staying in power until the end of the current government's term will increase if her favored successor - Kramp-Karrenbauer - emerges victorious in December. A win for an outsider, or someone highly critical of Merkel (such as Jens Spahn, who has disagreed with Merkel on immigration), might hasten Merkel's demise. How would such an outcome play out? If Merkel resigns, the Bundestag would have to elect a new chancellor with a simple majority. Given that the CDU currently governs in a coalition with the SPD, the latter party would have to support the election of a new chancellor. Kramp-Karrenbauer would be acceptable to the SPD, but one of the more contentious candidates may not. A new election would require the chancellor - Merkel or her successor - to lose a confidence vote that he or she has called. However, this is a controversial matter constitutionally as the government must claim that it has reached a legislative impasse on a particular issue. (Chancellor Gerhard Schroder argued in 2005 that his economic agenda was stalled.) The other question is why would either of the ruling parties want new elections at this point? Both centrist parties are tanking in the polls, as both Bavarian and Hesse elections signal and as overall polling indicates (see Chart 5). As such, we suspect that a new election will not take place over the next 12 months, at the very least. Bottom Line: Early elections are not easy to arrange and neither of the two ruling parties want one at the moment. Merkel has at least one more year in power. Investment Implications: Does Any Of This Matter? Chancellor Merkel has lost all of her political capital: that much is clear. As such, her decision to begin the process of finding a successor is a positive development, one that political leaders rarely take willingly. Given the election of a Europhile Emanuel Macron in France in 2017, Berlin needs to find a comparable partner that can carry on reforms. Otherwise, Germany risks wasting the window of opportunity afforded by the Macron presidency to make critical changes to Euro Area governance. On the agenda over the next year or two are several important issues. First, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is supposed to be granted new powers, evolving it into a kind of European replacement for the IMF. Some argue - including the ESM's leadership - that this expanded role will necessitate a greater injection of capital, for which obviously Berlin must be on board. Second, the stalled Banking Union project requires Berlin's intimate involvement. A deposit insurance union would go a long way toward stabilizing the Euro Area amid future financial crises. Under Merkel, Berlin has been reticent to greenlight such developments. Third, Berlin must agree with EU peers on several important positions after the European Parliament elections in May 2019. These will include staffing the European Commission. According to press reports this summer, Merkel was focused on ensuring that the next president of the European Commission would be a German. To get her way, Chancellor Merkel supposedly indicated that she would not fight to get a German to replace Mario Draghi, whose term at the ECB is set to expire in October 2019. A change at the top in Berlin, particularly if a Euroskeptic takes over the CDU, may signal a reversal of this strategy. That said, what Berlin wants is not necessarily what Berlin will get, no matter who is in charge. Finally, there is the philosophical question of whether Merkel has been a factor of stability for Europe over the past decade. We believe the answer is no. Not for any normative reason but rather because she has been an intently domestic chancellor. Investors have been overstating Merkel's role as the "anchor" of Euro Area stability. She has, in fact, dithered multiple times throughout the crisis. In 2011, for example, Merkel delayed the decision on whether to set up a permanent Euro Area fiscal backstop mechanism due to the upcoming Lander elections in Rhineland-Palatinate and Baden Württemberg. Such delays and hesitations have cost Europe considerable momentum throughout the crisis and since. As such, we believe that Chancellor Merkel's decision presents considerable upside for European politics and limited downside. Infusion of new blood in Berlin is the only way for Europe to restart the stalled governance reforms. However, much will depend on whether the CDU takes a significant turn towards a "softer Euroskeptic" position or maintains its traditional pro-European outlook. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 1 The name references the colors of the three parties (black for CDU, green for the Green Party, and yellow for the FDP).