Fixed Income

Highlights The years since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis have been dominated by the major central banks emptying their toolkits to fight off deflationary pressures and sustain even modest nominal growth rates. Extraordinary policy measues like quantitative easing, negative interest rates and "forward guidance" were all intended to be signals to expect nothing but stimulative monetary policy, even if there were brief pickups in growth or realized inflation rates. This helped suppress both bond yields and volatility, forcing investors to take on more risk to generate acceptable returns in fixed income markets. Now, however, there are signs that the world economy may finally be becoming a bit more "normal" after the years of malaise. While growth can hardly be described as booming, there are a growing number of countries that appear to have passed the worst phase of the excess capacity/deflation pressures that dominated the post-crisis era. This is creating more two-way risk with regards to central bank decisions than we have seen for some time. In this Special Report, we update one of our favorite tools to assess the potential for monetary policy changes, the BCA Central Bank Monitors. We present them in a chartbook format with a focus on the relationship to government bond yields. Feature An Overview Of The BCA Central Bank Monitors The BCA Central Bank Monitors are composite indicators that are designed to measure the cyclical growth and inflation pressures that can influence future central bank policy decisions. We created Monitors for the major developed economies: the U.S., Euro Area, Japan, the U.K., Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The list of data series used to construct the Monitors is not the same for each country, but the components generally measure the same things (i.e. manufacturing cycles, domestic demand pressures, commodity prices, labor market conditions, exchange rates, etc) Right now, the Monitors are rising in a coordinated fashion for the first time since 2011 (Chart 1 on Page 1). What is different in 2017 is that there is much less spare capacity in the developed economies than there was six years ago. For central bankers who still adhere to the Phillips curve tradeoff of unemployment versus inflation, tight labor markets alongside highly accommodative policy settings pose a problem. In the rest of this report, we show the individual Central Bank Monitors, along with measures of spare capacity and inflation for each country. We also show the correlations between the Monitors and changes in government bond yields, both before and after the 2008 Crisis. Correlations have shifted in the post-crisis era, but there are still some reliable relationships that can provide signals for bond investors. The broad conclusions: Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) are the ideal country overweight in a world where all other developed economy central banks are witnessing rising cyclical pressures, while bonds in the U.K., Australia and New Zealand are likely to struggle as central banks in those regions become increasingly hawkish (Chart 2). Chart 1More Central Banks Are Under Pressure To Tighten Chart 2Tightening Pressures (Ex-Japan) ##br##Can Push Bond Yields Higher The Fed Monitor Is Pointing To Additional U.S. Rate Hikes Our Fed Monitor has just recently pushed above the zero line, indicating the need for the Fed to tighten policy (Chart 3A). The Fed already began raising the funds rate back in late 2015, but this was the beginning of normalizing the crisis-era policy settings rather than a move to offset improving U.S. cyclical conditions. The latter is now indeed happening, and it is perhaps no surprise that the Fed has just delivered 50bps of rate hikes in a span of three months. Chart 3AU.S.: Fed Monitor Chart 3BNo Spare Capacity In The U.S. Chart 3CThe Fed Monitor Is Most Correlated To ##br##Shorter Maturity U.S. Treasuries We still see the Fed pursuing a relatively gradual process of raising rates further in 2017, but in line with the current FOMC projections of another 50bps of tightening before year-end. Measures like the output gap and the unemployment gap (unemployment relative to the level consistent with stable inflation) show no spare capacity in the U.S. economy (Chart 3B). At the same time, core inflation continues to only grind higher and inflation expectations are also drifting up towards the Fed's 2% target. This can hardly be qualified as an "overheating" economy that needs a sharp tightening of monetary conditions, particularly with the still-expensive U.S. dollar not providing any stimulus. The correlations between our Fed Monitor and the year-over-year changes in U.S. Treasury yields (Chart 3C) have been extremely low since the 2008 Crisis - unsurprising with the Fed keeping the funds rate near zero for most of that period while also buying large amounts of Treasuries. While the correlations appear to be shifting on the margin, we still see the Treasury curve steepening first (via rising inflation expectations), then flattening later (through tighter monetary conditions). BoE Monitor Calling For Tighter U.K. Policy Our Bank of England (BoE) Monitor is at very elevated levels (Chart 4A), driven by a combination of improving production data and high inflation. There is much more bubbling beneath the surface, however. The more domestically-focused components of the Monitor are losing some upward momentum, while the inflation elements are also starting to top out as the big post-Brexit depreciation of the Pound is losing momentum. Chart 4AU.K.: BoE Monitor Chart 4BTight Capacity In The U.K. Chart 4CGilts Are At Risk From A More Hawkish Turn From The BoE This is creating a dilemma for the BoE - respond to high U.K. inflation with tighter monetary policy, or focus on the slowdown in domestic demand and do nothing? The BoE signaled in February that the biggest concern for policy was a slump in consumer spending led by lower real income growth on the back of rising inflation. Yet at the March policy meeting, one BoE member even voted to raise rates and others raised concerns about the elevated level of U.K inflation. With even policymakers unsure about their next move, the marginal swings in U.K. growth should have an even greater impact on Gilt yields. The U.K. economy is running around full capacity and both headline and core inflation are rising (Chart 4B). Somewhat surprisingly, the correlations between changes in Gilt yields and our BoE Monitor have actually increased since the 2008 Crisis (Chart 4C). This raises a potential risk for the Gilt market if the BoE decides that the U.K. economy is not slowing as much as it is expecting. For now, we continue to recommend a neutral stance on Gilts until there is greater clarity on the state of the economy. ECB Monitor Reflects A Less Deflationary Backdrop In Europe Our European Central Bank (ECB) Monitor has recently crept above the zero line for the first time in three years (Chart 5A). This is driven mostly by the current uptrend in headline inflation in the Euro Area, but also by the steady improvement in economic growth. Chart 5AEuro Area: ECB Monitor Chart 5BExcess Capacity in Europe Dwindling Fast Chart 5CStable Correlations Between The ECB Monitor & The Front End Of The Yield Curve The Euro Area is the one economy presented in this report where no indicator (either the output gap or unemployment gap) is pointing to a lack of spare capacity (Chart 5B). All of the rise in headline Euro Area inflation can be attributable to base effects related to last year's rise in oil prices and decline in the euro. The latest ECB projections call for core inflation to return to just under 2% in 2019, suggesting that there is no hurry to begin tightening monetary policy. Yet the ECB remains in an asset purchase program which is set to expire at the end of this year, so a policy decision must be made in the next 3-6 months. We expect the ECB to begin tapering its bond buying in the first quarter of 2018, with interest rate hikes to follow after the tapering has been completed. The ECB could raise rates before tapering to try and minimize the impact on Peripheral sovereign and corporate bond yields (it is buying both), although that would likely create a greater degree of tightening than the ECB would like before full employment is reached. Given the strong correlations between our ECB Monitor and much of the Euro Area yield curve (Chart 5C), however, we anticipate moving soon to an underweight stance on Euro Area bonds after our recent downgrade to neutral. BoJ Monitor: Nothing To See Here Our BoJ Monitor has been in the "easier policy required" zone for most of the past 25 years, barring a brief blip above the zero line that heralded the rate hikes in 2006/07 (Chart 6A). Inadequate growth and excess capacity remain the biggest problem with Japan's economy, preventing any meaningful upturn in inflation beyond that caused by higher commodity prices or a weaker yen. Chart 6AJapan: BoJ Monitor Chart 6BTight Labor Market, But Still No Inflation Chart 6CLonger-Maturity JGB Yields Have No Correlation To The BoJ Monitor Even with Japan operating at full employment, with an unemployment rate at 3%, there has barely been any acceleration in wages or core inflation (Chart 6B). The only way out of this for Japan is to keep monetary policy settings as easy as possible to ensure that there is enough growth to eat away at the remaining spare capacity in the Japanese economy. That means keeping both policy rates and the yen as low as possible, and hoping that this will cause enough of a rise in inflation expectations to lower real interest rates and boost domestic demand. As an added "kicker", the BoJ is even anchoring the long end of the Japan yield curve by targeting a 0% yield level on 10-year government debt - a policy that we do not expect to change anytime soon. We see Japan as a low-beta "safe haven" government bond market in an environment where other central banks are seeing some tightening pressures and Japanese bonds have virtually no correlation to the BoJ Monitor (Chart 6C). We continue to recommend an overweight stance on Japan within an overall defensively positioned government bond portfolio with below-benchmark duration exposure. BoC Monitor: No Big Need To Tighten In Canada Our Bank of Canada (BoC) Monitor has recently moved into positive territory (Chart 7A) , primarily due to some improvement in growth and higher commodity prices. Given the close linkages between the U.S. and Canadian economies, we include some U.S. growth variables in our BoC Monitor and these are also helping boost the indicator. However, there are no signs that the Canadian economy is overheating - unless you are trying to buy a home in Toronto - with both the output gap and unemployment gap not yet in positive territory (Chart 7B). Chart 7ACanada: BoC Monitor Chart 7BStill Not Much Inflation In Canada Chart 7CThe BoC Monitor Is Highly Correlated To Shorter-Maturity Canadian Bonds The BoC is maintaining a dovish bias at the moment. Some of that has to do with the uncertainty over the U.S. economic outlook, especially with regards to the fiscal and trade policies of the Trump administration. While a boost to U.S. growth via a fiscal easing could help support Canadian exports to the U.S., any move to renegotiate trade agreements involving the two countries could end up hurting the Canadian economy. Add to that the concerns over the bubbly valuations of Canadian real estate that could be pricked by even modest rate increases, and the BoC will likely not want to contemplate any early tightening of monetary policy. The higher correlations between our BoC Monitor and the front end of the Canadian yield curve (Chart 7C) suggest that a bear flattener would be the appropriate trade if and when the BoC does contemplate a rate hike. For now, however, we see that as a low-probability event and we are maintaining a neutral stance on Canadian bonds until there is greater clarity on U.S. growth and Trump's policy agenda. RBA Monitor: Higher Because Of Growth, Not Inflation Our Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) Monitor has surged into the "tighter policy required" territory in recent months (Chart 8A), driven by higher commodity prices and stronger Asian export demand. Survey-based measures of inflation expectations are also part of the Monitor, and those have also been rising despite a lack of realized inflation in Australia (Chart 8B). The low inflation readings have been causing a bit of a problem for the RBA, given the tight labor market and that boost to Aussie demand from better Asian growth. This is especially true given the surprisingly soft readings on employment growth, consumer confidence and spending, all occurring against a persistent deceleration in core inflation. The RBA was focusing on the inflation story last year when it delivered some surprise rate cuts, and we still suspect that a lack of inflation pressure will keep the RBA on hold for at least the next few months. We are currently at a neutral stance on Australian government bonds, given these conflicting forces of better export growth but weakening domestic demand. The lack of an inflation threat could make Australia an outperformer in a world of rising bond yields. Given the surge in our RBA Monitor, however, we see some risk in looking at Aussie bonds as a potential safe haven market given upward pressures on yields in the U.S. and Europe. The correlations between Australian yields and the RBA Monitor are extremely high (Chart 8C), and have actually gone up in the post-crisis era. Chart 8AAustralia: RBA Monitor Chart 8BNo Inflation Pressures On The RBA Chart 8CAussie Bonds Across The Curve Are Highly Correlated To The RBA Monitor RBNZ Monitor: A Strong Case For A Rate Hike Our Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) Monitor is strongly in positive territory (Chart 9A), led by the components focused on commodity prices and global growth. However, there is a fairly solid structural case for an RBNZ rate hike, given the lack of any spare capacity in New Zealand and inflation on the rise (Chart 9B). Chart 9ANew Zealand: RBNZ Monitor Chart 9BFull Employment & Rising Inflation In NZ Chart 9ANZ Bonds Are Vulnerable To Current Cyclical Pressures The RBNZ has been maintaining a dovish bias of late, although it has chosen to sight more "international" risks related to geopolitics, rather than domestic economic conditions. Perhaps this is nothing more than a fear of a potential shock outcome in the upcoming French elections, although it could also be worries that tensions between the Trump White House and China (or, worse yet, North Korea) could trigger a hit to demand for New Zealand exports to Asia. In the end, we think the RBNZ will be forced to a hike off the current record low interest rates as the next policy move. While we do not include New Zealand government bonds as part of our model fixed income portfolio, we do currently have a bearish rates trade on in our list of Tactical Overlay Trades, choosing to pay 12-month NZD OIS rates. We will maintain that recommendation, but we may look to add some bearish New Zealand bond trades, as well, given the strong correlation between our RBNZ Monitor and bond yields (Chart 9C). Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com

Highlights U.S. Treasuries: The surprisingly positive response from financial markets to last week's Fed rate hike should force the Fed to quickly shift back to a hawkish bias. Maintain an underweight exposure to U.S. Treasuries, and an overall below-benchmark portfolio duration stance. Bearish Fed Trade: As a new tactical trade, go short the January 2018 fed funds futures contract to benefit from the Fed ramping up the hawkish language again. Japan: Japanese inflation remains too low for the Bank of Japan to move away from its 0% target on JGB yields anytime soon, even with signs of better Japanese growth and rising pressure on global bond yields. Upgrade low-beta Japan to above-benchmark in global hedged bond portfolios, while downgrading core Europe (Germany, France, the Netherlands) to neutral. Feature Chart of the WeekAre Central Banks OK With This? The major central banks all had a chance to send a more hawkish message to the markets in the past couple of weeks, and every one took a pass. Even the Fed, who actually hiked rates, signaled that U.S. monetary policy would not be tightened more aggressively than previously planned, which financial markets took very bullishly. With the global economy finally enjoying a synchronized upturn after several years of sluggishness, policymakers are showing no interest in hitting the brakes too hard, too soon and risking a sudden downturn in growth The current backdrop of improving economic momentum, with central banks remaining accommodative, is sustaining the strong performance of growth-sensitive assets like equities and corporate debt over government bonds. This should continue over the next 6-12 months. Inflation rates, both realized and expected, continue to rise across the developed economies alongside faster economic growth, putting upward pressure on government bond yields (Chart of the Week). Central bank dovishness is looking increasingly non-credible as long as this dynamic persists, but policymakers will likely be slow to respond without a more rapid rise in inflation. Bond yields will continue to climb higher against this backdrop, first from continued increases in inflation expectations and, later, from a shift to less restrictive monetary settings. We continue to recommend a below-benchmark duration stance, while underweighting government bonds versus corporate debt, particularly in the U.S. This week, we are making a significant portfolio shift to get even more defensive within our government bond allocation, upgrading low-beta Japan to above-benchmark while downgrading core Europe (Germany, France & the Netherlands) to neutral. The Fed Declares Victory Over "Low-flation" The market response to last week's Fed tightening was consistent with the idea of a "dovish hike", with U.S. equity and bond markets rallying while the U.S. dollar sold off and overall U.S. financial conditions actually easing. There was heightened nervousness heading into the meeting that the Fed could signal a faster or steeper trajectory for interest rates. That turned out to be a false alarm, as not much was changed from the Fed's prior guidance to markets. The range for the funds rate was raised to 0.75-1.00%, as expected, but there was virtually no change to any of the median FOMC member projections for GDP growth, inflation or interest rates out to 2019. Another 50bps of increases are expected this year, with 75bps in both 2018 and 2019 (Chart 2). This would bring the funds rate to 3% in 2019, which is the median FOMC member's assessment of where the terminal rate lies. The pricing from the U.S. Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve shows that market expectations for the funds rate are in line with the Fed's projections for this year, but lower for the next two years. Our proxy measure for the market's assessment of the terminal rate - the 5-year OIS rate, 5-years forward - sits at 2.25%, 75bps below the Fed's number. Our bias is closer to the market on this point, as we do not see a need for the funds rate, in real terms, to end this tightening cycle much above 0% against a backdrop of still very high U.S. debt levels and low U.S. productivity growth. A 0% real funds rate would be the result of the Fed successfully getting U.S. inflation expectations back to its 2% target level, with a nominal funds rate of 2%. That inflation goal has not yet been reached, however, as inflation expectations are still below levels consistent with the Fed's inflation target (Chart 3, bottom panel). Chart 2FOMC & Market Disagree Beyond This Year Chart 3Few Signs Of An Overheating U.S. Economy The FOMC has made it clear that they believe the U.S. economy is running very close to full employment. Yet the recent modest deceleration in the various measures of wage inflation (middle panel) suggests that there could still be some excess slack in the U.S. labor market - even with the recent Payrolls reports showing job growth of over 200k per month. If that pace is sustained for several months, however, the unemployment rate will likely fall further and wage pressures will intensify. In the near-term, the Fed will continue to focus on financial markets to get a sense of whether current policy settings are too restrictive or too accommodative. One recent development on this front is that the correlation between the U.S. dollar (USD) and risk assets has flipped, with a stronger USD now positively correlated to global equities and credit (Chart 4). This shift was already starting to happen before the election of Donald Trump and his pro-growth agenda last November, likely because the global economy was improving as evidenced by the accelerating trend in our global purchasing managers' index (PMI, bottom panel). We have written extensively about the Fed being stuck in a "policy loop" in the past couple of years, where a shift to a more hawkish bias would sharply drive up the USD and cause a risk-off move in global financial markets. This unwanted tightening of financial conditions would cause the Fed to back off from its hawkishness, causing the USD to soften and markets to rally. We have argued that the way to break out of this loop would likely be a rise in non-U.S. economic growth that would allow the Fed to continue slowly normalizing U.S. monetary policy without disrupting global markets. We seem to be in that period now. One implication of this is that the longer risk assets can withstand rising U.S. interest rates and a stronger USD, the more the fed funds rate and U.S. Treasury yields must rise in response to U.S. economic strength. For this reason, we continue to recommend a below-benchmark duration stance on U.S. Treasuries on a 6-12 month horizon. We also maintain our bias towards a bear-steepening of the Treasury curve through our butterfly trade, long the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2-year/10-year barbell. The curve will remain positively correlated to inflation expectations until those reach the Fed's target level, after which any additional Fed rate hikes will likely flatten the yield curve in a more typical pattern during the latter stages of a tightening cycle. It is possible, though, that because markets shrugged off the latest rate increase, the Fed could return to sending hawkish signals in the near term. To play for this possibility, our colleagues at BCA U.S. Bond Strategy recommend that investors add a tactical trade: going short the January 2018 fed funds futures contract (Chart 5). We are today adding this trade to our list of Tactical Overlay Trades (see page 12). Chart 4The Strong USD Is Not A Problem Chart 5Go Short January 2018 Fed Funds Futures We calculate that this trade will return 11bps in a scenario where the Fed lifts rates twice more before the end of the year and 37bps in a scenario where the funds rate is raised a more aggressive-than-expected three times. However, we do not expect to hold this trade until the end of the year. Rather, we expect the Fed will nudge rate expectations higher in the next month or two in response to the latest easing of financial conditions, and that these gains will be realized over a much shorter horizon. We also add a caveat that, in the present environment, it is safer to implement any "hawkish Fed trades" in either fed funds futures or the OIS market. The Eurodollar market does not provide the same potential for gains because the LIBOR / OIS spread is currently elevated and could tighten to offset the profits from rising rate expectations. Bottom Line: The surprisingly positive response from financial markets to last week's Fed rate hike could force the Fed to quickly shift back to a hawkish bias. Maintain below-benchmark exposure to U.S. Treasuries. As a new tactical trade, go short the January 2018 fed funds futures contract to benefit from the Fed ramping up the hawkish language again. Japan: A Weaker Yen Is Still The Only Way Out The Bank of Japan (BoJ) stayed on hold last week, as expected. There had been some increased speculation of late that the BoJ could start to signal a potential increase in its 0% target for the 10-year Japanese Government Bond (JGB) yield, given the rising trend in global yields and signs of better growth in Japan. At the press conference following the BoJ meeting, however, Governor Kuroda shot down that notion, saying that the current accommodative policy stance must be maintained given how far Japanese inflation is below the central bank's 2% target. It remains far too soon for the central bank to signal any shift to a less accommodative stance, as both the pace of economic growth and inflation are not only modest but lagging the current global upturn. In Chart 6, we show some Japanese growth variables relative to an aggregate of the same data for the major developed economies.1 What is clear from the chart is that Japan is benefitting from faster global growth on the industrial side, with the manufacturing PMI above 50. However, the domestic demand story is not as positive, with consumer confidence and real retail sales growth languishing. The lack of real income growth remains the biggest drag on Japanese consumers, as we show in another set of international comparisons in Chart 7. Japan's unemployment rate, currently at 3%, is below the OECD's estimate of the full employment level (consistent with stable domestic inflation pressures). This is in contrast to the other major economies, which are either at, or close to, full employment. Yet Japanese wages continue to struggle, both in nominal terms (a year-over-over growth rate of 1%) and real terms (a year-over-year growth rate of 0.4%). The current annual spring round of Japanese wage negotiations is showing that downward pressure remains powerful, with many manufacturing companies offering pay raises only half as large as those of last year.2 Chart 6Japan Is Lagging The Global Upturn Chart 7Still No Wage Growth In Japan Japan is still struggling to generate positive rates of inflation, even as price growth is accelerating in the other major economies (Chart 8). This is keeping Japanese inflation expectations, which the BoJ believes are mostly a function of the recent performance of actual inflation, subdued. As always, the only reliable source of Japanese inflation seems to be yen weakness. We continue to see this as the only way out of the low-inflation trap for Japan - keeping Japanese interest rates depressed versus the rest of the world, thus weakening the yen through increasingly unattractive interest rate differentials. The BoJ's 0% yield curve targeting framework has been successful in keeping rate differentials wide enough to soften up the yen, especially against the USD (Chart 9). Given our expectations of additional Fed rate hikes, and higher U.S. Treasury yields, over the rest of the year, the yen will likely depreciate further as long as the BoJ sticks with its current interest rate targets. A similar argument holds for the yen versus the Euro, given the increasing likelihood that the European Central Bank (ECB) will be forced to signal a less accommodative monetary policy stance later this year. Against this backdrop, JGBs are likely to outperform the major global government bond markets over the rest of 2017. We upgraded our recommended stance on JGBs from underweight to neutral last October after the BoJ introduced its yield curve targeting framework. In Chart 10, we show the relative performance of JGBs versus some other bond benchmarks, on a duration-matched and common-currency (hedged into USD) basis. We broke up the returns into two periods, from our October 11, 2016 Japan upgrade to January 31 of this year when we upgraded our U.S. corporate bond exposure and cut our overall portfolio duration stance to below-benchmark. The chart shows that JGBs were a good defensive hedge during the latter part of 2016 when global yields were rising, led by U.S. Treasuries. The more recent period, however, shows a much more negligible relative performance, both against other government bonds and corporate debt, during a period where global bond yields have generally traded sideways. Chart 8Japan Inflation Still A No-Show Chart 9A Weaker Yen Is Still Necessary Chart 10Relative Performance Of JGBs Given our views that U.S. Treasury yields will continue to move higher in the next 6-9 months, and that the performance of core European government bonds will suffer over the same period as the ECB signals a slower pace of asset purchases for next year, a return to the late 2016 relative performance of JGBs is very likely. Thus, we are upgrading Japan to an above-benchmark stance in our model portfolio this week, while downgrading core Europe (Germany, France, the Netherlands) to neutral. This is purely a move to get even more defensive in our overall country exposures, by allocating into JGBs which are low-beta to both U.S. Treasuries (where we are already below-benchmark) and core European government debt. Bottom Line: Japanese inflation remains too low for the Bank of Japan to move away from its 0% target on JGB yields anytime soon, even with signs of better Japanese growth and rising pressure on global bond yields. Upgrade Japan to above-benchmark in global hedged bond portfolios, while downgrading core Europe (Germany, France, the Netherlands) to neutral. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 The U.S., Euro Area, U.K., Canada & Australia 2 https://www.ft.com/content/0895c4ee-eb3b-11e5-888e-2eadd5fbc4a4 The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Duration & Fed Policy: The longer risk assets can withstand rising rates, the higher will be the ultimate resting place for Treasury yields. Maintain below-benchmark duration on a 6-12 month horizon and add a short fed funds futures trade to profit from increased Fed hawkishness in the near-term. Yield Curve: While the long-run trend will be for the yield curve to flatten as the Fed hiking cycle progresses, rising inflation expectations will cause the curve to steepen between now and the end of the year. Maintain a position long the 5-year bullet, short a duration-matched 2/10 barbell to profit from a steeper curve on a 6-9 month horizon. Feature Say Uncle Chart 1More Tightening To Come The Fed lifted rates last week but kept its median projected path for future rate hikes unchanged. Judging from the market's reaction, this was a more dovish outcome than was anticipated. Since last Wednesday's meeting the dollar is down 0.5%, junk spreads have tightened 10 basis points and the 2/10 yield curve has steepened 1 bp. In other words, financial conditions have continued to ease even as the Fed took another step toward more restrictive policy. All in all, money markets are now discounting only a slightly slower pace of rate hikes than the Fed's median forecast (Chart 1) and financial conditions suggest that further incremental tightening is in store. The financial conditions component of our Fed Monitor1 is above zero, meaning that financial conditions are more accommodative than the long-run average, and the Chicago Fed's Adjusted Financial Conditions Index also shows that conditions are easy relative to the strength of the economy (Chart 1, bottom panel). New York Fed President William Dudley has previously described how the Fed incorporates financial conditions into its decision making:2 Chart 2The Fed Policy Loop All else equal, if financial conditions tighten sharply, then we are likely to proceed more slowly. In contrast, if financial conditions were not to tighten at all or only very little, then - assuming the economic outlook hadn't changed significantly - we would likely have to move more quickly. In the end, we will adjust the policy stance to support financial market conditions that we deem are most consistent with our employment and inflation objectives. We have also described this process in the context of our Fed Policy Loop3 (Chart 2). In essence, the Fed will continue to nudge rate hike expectations higher until financial conditions tighten excessively. At that point - because with inflation below target the Fed still has an interest in supporting the recovery - it will quickly shift to a more dovish stance. Chart 3Short Jan 2018 Fed Funds Futures One implication of the Fed Policy Loop is that the longer risk assets can withstand rising rates, the higher will be the ultimate resting place for the fed funds rate and Treasury yields. As such, we continue to recommend a below-benchmark duration allocation on a 6-12 month horizon. Another implication is that because markets shrugged off the latest rate increase, Fed policy is likely to turn more hawkish in the very near term. We therefore recommend investors add a tactical trade: short the January 2018 fed funds futures contract (Chart 3). We calculate that this trade will return 11 bps in a scenario where the Fed lifts rates twice more before the end of the year and 37 bps in a scenario where the funds rate is raised three times. However, we do not expect to hold this trade until the end of the year. Rather, we expect the Fed will nudge rate expectations higher in the next month or two and that these gains will be realized over a much shorter horizon. We also add a caveat that, in the present environment, it is safer to implement any "hawkish Fed trades" in either fed funds futures or the overnight index swap market. The Eurodollar market does not provide the same potential for gains because the LIBOR / OIS spread is currently elevated and could tighten to offset the profits from rising fed funds rate expectations (Chart 3, bottom panel). Fed hawkishness also argues for a flatter yield curve in the very near term. While this could materialize, we continue to hold our position in the 5-year bullet over a duration-matched 2/10 barbell - a trade designed to profit from a steeper 2/10 slope. For reasons described in the next section we believe the yield curve will steepen between now and the end of the year, although the risks are tilted toward flattening in the very near term and in 2018 and beyond. What Drives The Yield Curve? In this week's report we present an overview of the main drivers of the slope of the Treasury yield curve. Specifically, we identify (i) the fed funds rate, (ii) inflation expectations, (iii) implied volatility and (iv) unit labor costs as factors that correlate strongly with the slope of the yield curve on a cyclical horizon. We review the outlook for each of these factors and conclude that the Treasury yield curve has room to steepen between now and the end of the year. Beyond that, the curve will likely resume flattening as inflationary pressures start to bite and the Fed's rate hike cycle picks up steam. Chart 4Fed Rate Hikes Flatten The Curve 1. The Fed Funds Rate Not surprisingly, the slope of the Treasury curve correlates very strongly with the level of short rates (Chart 4). Typically, short-maturity yields are much more influenced by the expected path of Fed rate hikes than long-maturity yields. As such, when the Fed is lifting rates the yield curve tends to bear-flatten - both the 2-year and 10-year Treasury yields rise, but the 2-year rises more quickly. In contrast, when the Fed is cutting rates the yield curve tends to bull-steepen - both the 2-year and 10-year Treasury yields fall, but the 2-year falls more quickly. In a typical cycle the yield curve will start to flatten as the Fed lifts rates and will eventually become completely flat when the end of the rate hike cycle is reached and the fed funds rate is at its "equilibrium" or "terminal" level. Usually, at that point in the cycle, the Fed will keep policy too tight in an effort to rein in inflation. This causes the economy to slow and the yield curve to invert, signaling the start of the next recession. A recent BCA Special Report4 speculates that if the federal government succeeds in delivering sizeable fiscal stimulus, inflationary pressures could start to build next year, leading to a more rapid pace of Fed rate hikes and a flat or inverted yield curve by the end of 2018. This would be consistent with a recession in 2019. In terms of the behavior of the yield curve, this is not far off from the Fed's own projections. At present, the median FOMC projection calls for the fed funds rate to reach its equilibrium level of 3% by the end of 2019. If this forecast plays out, it means that the 2/10 Treasury slope must flatten by roughly 117 bps between now and then. Turning back to Chart 4, we see that the Treasury curve has already flattened considerably even though the Fed has only raised rates three times. This means that either the equilibrium fed funds rate is much lower than the Fed's 3% projection and the 2/10 slope will reach zero with a much lower fed funds rate, or that the curve flattening is overdone and the curve has room to steepen before it resumes its cyclical flattening trend. As is explained below, we favor the latter interpretation. 2. Inflation Expectations The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate is also highly correlated with the slope of the yield curve (Chart 5). As long-dated inflation expectations increase the yield curve tends to steepen, and vice-versa. Interestingly, the positive correlation between long-dated inflation expectations and the slope of the Treasury curve persists even when the Fed is hiking rates. Notice that in the 1999 rate hike cycle, the yield curve did not start to flatten until the 5-year/5-year breakeven fell. Also, in the 2004-06 hike cycle, curve flattening ebbed just as the breakeven started to widen. Chart 5Rising TIPS Breakevens Steepen The Curve Charts 6 and 7 show the relationship between the 2/10 Treasury slope and the 5-year/5-year breakeven in more detail. Chart 6 shows the correlation between monthly changes in the 2/10 Treasury slope and the 5-year/5-year breakeven using all available data back to January 1999. We see that a positive correlation between the slope and the breakeven prevailed in 64% of monthly observations, while only 36% of months displayed a negative correlation. Chart 62/10 Nominal Treasury Slope Vs. TIPS Breakeven ##br##Inflation Rate 5-Year/5-Year Forward (February 1999 - Present) Chart 72/10 Nominal Treasury Slope Vs. TIPS Breakeven Inflation Rate 5-Year/5-Year ##br##Forward During Fed Tightening Cycles (June 1999 To May 2000 & June 2004 To June 2006) In Chart 7, we focus exclusively on the past two Fed tightening cycles (1999-2000 & 2004-2006). Not only does a linear regression show an even stronger correlation than was achieved with the full sample, but we also see that a positive correlation between the slope and the breakeven existed in 73% of monthly observations, while only 27% of months displayed a negative correlation. At present, core PCE inflation is still below the Fed's 2% target and different measures of inflation expectations are all well below levels that prevailed during prior rate hike cycles (Chart 8). In other words, the Fed must proceed slowly enough with rate hikes to ensure that long-dated inflation expectations continue to trend higher, which argues for a steeper yield curve until inflation and inflation expectations are more firmly anchored around the Fed's target. For the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate we think a range of 2.4% to 2.5% would signal that inflation expectations are well anchored around the Fed's target. 3. Volatility Implied interest rate volatility - as measured by the MOVE volatility index - is another factor that correlates with the yield curve on a cyclical horizon (Chart 9). In theory, higher rate volatility should coincide with a steeper yield curve, all else equal, and this is exactly the correlation we observe. Chart 8Fed Wants Inflation Expectations To Rise Chart 9Higher Vol Steepens The Curve Let's consider that there is a risk premium applied to taking a unit of duration risk (usually called the term premium) and that said risk premium is larger for longer-maturity bonds that carry more duration risk. All else equal, the risk premium applied to one unit of duration risk should be larger when rate volatility is higher. This should also coincide with a steeper yield curve, since there is more duration risk at the long-end of the curve. In a recent report,5 we concluded that the level of disagreement among forecasters about future GDP growth and T-bill rates were the two most important drivers of cyclical swings in implied rate volatility, the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index has at times also played a role (Chart 9, bottom 3 panels). Chart 10Higher Unit Labor Costs Flatten The Curve At the moment, the amount of forecaster disagreement about future GDP growth is near its lows since 1990 and T-bill forecast disagreement has, until recently, been suppressed by the zero lower bound on interest rates. All this implies that the balance of risks favors higher implied interest rate volatility in the months ahead, which will apply steepening pressure to the yield curve. 4. Unit Labor Costs Unit labor costs are the final yield curve indicator we discuss in this report. Since faster wage growth tends to coincide with Fed tightening and slowing wage growth tends to correlate with Fed easing, it makes sense for wage indicators to be inversely correlated with the slope of the yield curve. While it is broadly true that all wage indicators show a reasonable inverse correlation with the slope of the curve, unit labor costs are the best. The reason is that unit labor costs (compensation per unit produced) actually measure both wage growth (compensation per hour) and labor productivity (output per hour) (Chart 10). It turns out that the yield curve can flatten in the traditional way - a bear-flattening driven by rising wages and Fed tightening - but occasionally it can also bull-flatten if the market starts to discount a lower equilibrium (or terminal) fed funds rate. We might expect this sort of curve behavior in an environment of extremely low productivity growth, and this is exactly what has occurred during the past few years. Notice in Chart 10 that compensation per hour does not explain the curve flattening that started in 2014, but unit labor costs do because they also factor in incredibly low productivity growth. In the longer-run, we would strongly expect unit labor costs to remain in an uptrend. Wage growth is accelerating and there are structural headwinds that will prevent productivity growth from returning to the levels seen at the height of the IT revolution in the late 1990s and early 2000s. As was discussed last year in a Special Report from our Global Investment Strategy service,6 the rate of human capital accumulation is in a secular downtrend as is the share of workers in their 40s - the age cohort when people are most productive. However, there has also been a cyclical component to the productivity slowdown and it is possible that productivity growth could accelerate somewhat in the near-term as the cycle matures. The capital stock per worker correlates strongly with productivity growth (Chart 11), and while capital investment has been depressed for most of the recovery there are finally some signs that it may return (Chart 12). Chart 11Productivity Held Back By Lack Of Investment Chart 12Getting Optimistic About Capex In fact, it is even conceivable that more rapid wage growth itself might encourage firms to replace labor with capital, causing traditional measures of wage growth to accelerate relative to unit labor costs. Also, the prospect of tax reform and regulatory relief could give capital spending a boost - it has already led to a jump higher in small business optimism (Chart 12, bottom panel). Unit labor costs will likely continue to accelerate on a cyclical investment horizon, applying flattening pressure to the yield curve. But this flattening pressure would be mitigated to the extent that there is any cyclical rebound in productivity growth. Yield Curve Strategy Upon consideration of the four factors described above, we conclude that while the slope of the yield curve will likely be close to zero sometime in late 2018, curve flattening won't start in earnest until late this year or early next year when inflation expectations are higher (2.4% to 2.5% on long-dated TIPS breakevens) and core PCE inflation is firmly anchored around the Fed's 2% target. This conclusion is based on our observations that: TIPS breakevens and the slope of the curve tend to be positively correlated, even during rate hike cycles. Interest rate volatility is more likely to rise than fall. Unit labor costs are likely to remain in an uptrend on a cyclical horizon, but there is scope for them to level-off if we see a modest late-cycle rebound in productivity growth. To position for a steeper yield curve between now and the end of this year we continue to recommend that investors favor the 5-year Treasury note relative to a duration-matched position in a 2-year/10-year barbell. Long bullet/short barbell trades tend to outperform when the yield curve steepens, and our model suggests that the 5-year yield is currently very cheap relative to the 2/10 slope (Chart 13). We have been recommending this trade since December 20, 2016 and it has so far returned +2 bps even though the 2/10 slope has flattened 13 bps during that time. The strong positive carry means that not much curve steepening is required for the trade to realize strong positive gains. Chart 13The 5-Year Bullet Is Cheap On The Curve Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 For further details on our Fed Monitor please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Buy The Back-Up In Junk Spreads", dated March 14, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2015/dud150605 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Caught In A Loop", dated September 29, 2015, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see BCA Special Report, "Beware The 2019 Trump Recession", dated March 7, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Road To Higher Vol Is Paved With Uncertainty", dated February 14, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians", dated March 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights Once the Brexit starting gun is fired, the EU27's high-level guidelines and red lines will create more vulnerabilities and uncertainties for the U.K. than for the euro area. The BoE will be more boxed in than the ECB. Brexit trades have more legs. We describe four structural disruptors to economies and financial markets (on page 6). Our favourite structural investment themes are Personal Product equities, euro/yuan, and real estate in Spain, Ireland and Germany. Feature "Many in Great Britain expected a major calamity... but what happened was near enough nothing ." The citation above perfectly describes the 9 months that have elapsed since the U.K.'s June 23 2016 vote to exit the EU. In fact, it refers to the 9 months that elapsed after Britain declared war on Germany on September 3 1939 - a period of calm, militarily speaking, which became known as the 'Phoney War'.1 But outside the military sphere a lot did happen in the Phoney War. Most notably, a propaganda war ensued. On the night of September 3 1939 alone, the Royal Air Force dropped 6 million leaflets over Germany titled 'Note to the German People'. Chart of the WeekOne Big Correlated Trade: Pound/Euro And Eurostoxx600 Vs. FTSE100 Brexit Phoney War And The Markets Fast forward 77 years. The 9 months since the Brexit vote has also been a period of calm, economically speaking. Indeed, the U.K. economy has sailed along remarkably smoothly. And this has fuelled a propaganda war for those who believe that Brexit's economic impact will be near enough nothing. But outside the economic sphere, a lot has happened in the Brexit Phoney War: The pound has slumped 12% versus the euro and 17% versus the dollar. The FTSE100 has surged 16%, substantially outperforming the 8% gain in the Eurostoxx600 The U.K. 10-year gilt yield is down 40 bps when the equivalent German bund yield is up 40 bps and the equivalent U.S. Treasury yield is up 90 bps. These relative moves appear to reflect different asset class stories, but it is crucial to realise that: All of these relative moves are just one big correlated trade. The relative moves in bond yields have just tracked the expected differences in central bank policy rates two years ahead (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). This is exactly in line with the theory that a bond yield just equals the expected average interest rate over the bond's lifetime. Chart I-2Difficult Brexit = Gilt Yields Fall Vs. Bund Yields Chart I-3Difficult Brexit = Gilt Yields Fall Vs. T-Bond Yields Likewise, the moves in pound/dollar and pound/euro have also closely tracked the same expected differences in central bank policy rates (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Again, this is exactly in line with theory. Over short horizons, the biggest driver of exchange rates is fixed income cross-border portfolio flows - which always seek out the highest yield adjusted for hedging costs. Chart I-4Difficult Brexit = Pound/Euro Falls Chart I-5Difficult Brexit = Pound/Dollar Falls In turn, FTSE100 performance versus the Eurostoxx600 has near-perfectly tracked the inverse direction of pound/euro. Once more, this is exactly as theory would suggest. The FTSE100 and Eurostoxx600 are just a collection of multinational dollar-earning companies quoted in pounds and euros respectively. So when pound/euro weakens, the dollar earnings increase more in FTSE100 index terms than in Eurostoxx600 index terms, resulting in Eurostoxx600 underperformance (Chart of the Week). Now that the Brexit battle is about to begin in earnest, what will happen to these Brexit trades? Brexit Battle Begins It is not our intention here to forecast all the twists and turns of the Brexit battle. We will leave that to a later report. Instead, we just want to list the likely opening salvos. With Parliamentary approval now sealed, Theresa May is due to trigger Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty in the week commencing March 27 and thereby formally begin the Brexit battle. Expect the first EU27 response within 48 hours, probably through the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk. In this response, Tusk may also give the date for the first European Council 'Brexit' summit. This EU27 Brexit summit will take place within 8 weeks of the Article 50 trigger, and likely after the two-round French Presidential Election in April/May. At the Brexit summit, the EU27 will establish its strategy, high-level guidelines and red lines for the Brexit negotiations. The European Council will present these negotiating guidelines to the European Commission. Drawing upon its own legal and policy expertise, the Commission will then draft a mandate which sets out more technical details of each area of negotiation. Next, the Council of the EU2 must approve this draft mandate by qualified majority vote (obviously excluding the U.K.) Once approved, the European Commission can begin the detailed negotiations with the U.K., keeping within the final mandate's guidelines. But what does all this mean for investors? The preceding analysis showed that the dominant driver for all Brexit trades is the expected difference in central bank policy interest rates two years ahead. Recall that not long ago the BoE was vying with the Fed to be the first to hike rates in this cycle, while the ECB was likely to ease further. But after the Brexit vote and the resulting uncertainty about the U.K.'s position in the world, the tables have turned. The EU27's high-level negotiating guidelines and red lines are likely to create more vulnerabilities and uncertainties for the U.K. than for the euro area. And now, these vulnerabilities and uncertainties are amplified by Scotland First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, calling for a second referendum on Scottish Independence. For central bank policy, this means that the BoE will be hamstrung; whereas, absent any tail-events, the ECB can continue to back away from its extreme dovishness - a process that Draghi verbally started at the ECB Press Conference last week. Therefore, at least into the early summer, stay: Overweight U.K. gilts versus German bunds. Long euro/pound. Long FTSE100 versus Eurostoxx600 (or Eurostoxx50). Long U.K. Clothes and Apparel equities versus the market (Chart I-6). Short U.K. Real Estate equities versus the market (Chart I-7). But a word of warning for risk control. Remember that all five positions are in effect just one big correlated trade. So they will all work together, or they will all not work together! Chart I-6Difficult Brexit = U.K. Clothes And Apparel Outperforms Chart I-7Difficult Brexit = U.K. Real Estate Equities Underperform Four Disruptors The final section this week takes a wider-angle view of the world, and briefly highlights four structural disruptors to economies and financial markets in the coming years. Disruptor 1: Protectionism. Since the Great Recession, an extremely polarised distribution of economic growth has left most people's standard of living stagnant - despite seemingly decent headline economic growth and job creation (Chart I-8). Looking to find a scapegoat, economic nationalism and protectionism have resonated very strongly with voters in the U.K. and U.S. - resulting in Brexit and President Donald Trump. Other voters could follow in the same vein. But history teaches us that protectionism ends up hurting many more people than it helps. Disruptor 2: Technology. The bigger danger is that people are misdiagnosing the illness. The vast majority of middle-income job losses are not due to globalization, but due to technology. Specifically, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is replacing secure middle-income jobs and displacing workers into insecure low-income manual jobs - like bartending and waitressing - which AI cannot (yet) replace (Table I-1). And AI's impact on middle-income jobs is only in its infancy.3 The worry is that by misdiagnosing the illness as globalization and wrongly taking a protectionist medicine, the illness will intensify, rather than improve. Chart I-8Disruptor 1: Protectionism Table I-1Disruptor 2: Technology Disruptor 3: Debt super-cycles have reached exhaustion. The protectionist medicine carries a further danger. Major emerging market economies are coming to the end of structural credit booms and need to wean themselves off their credit addictions (Chart I-9). At this point of vulnerability, aggressive protectionism risks tipping these emerging economies into a sharp slowdown. Chart I-9Disruptor 3: Debt Super-Cycles Have Reached Exhaustion Disruptor 4: Equities are overvalued. Disruptors one, two and three come at a time when equities are valued to generate feeble total nominal returns over the next decade (Chart I-10). Risk premiums are extremely compressed. And if investors suddenly demand that risk premiums rise to average historical levels, it necessarily requires equity prices to adjust downwards. Chart I-10Disruptor 4: Equities Are Overvalued The long-term investment message is crystal clear. With the four disruptors in play, we strongly advise long-term investors not to follow passive (equity) index-tracking strategies. Instead, we advise long-term investors to stick to bespoke structural investment themes. Our favourite structural investment themes are Personal Product equities, euro/yuan, and real estate in Spain, Ireland and Germany. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 C N Trueman 'The Phoney War'. 2 The Council of the EU should not be confused with the European Council. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Superstar Economy: Part 2," dated January 19, 2017, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model This week's trade is to short Netherlands equities, but wait until after the election result. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Fed: The Fed will deliver another rate hike tomorrow, but we do not expect a signal that a higher trajectory for the funds rate is necessary. The Fed wants to see higher inflation expectations and will remain as accommodative as possible until that happens. Maintain a below-benchmark allocation to U.S. Treasuries within global fixed income portfolios. ECB: The ECB opened the door slightly to a less-accommodative policy stance last week, although the talk of a rate hike is premature. A 2018 taper is the more probable scenario, likely to be introduced at the September 2017 policy meeting. This will raise longer-dated European bond yields and widen spreads for both Peripheral European government debt and Euro Area corporate bonds. Reduce Euro Area IG to below-benchmark. U.S. High-Yield: U.S. junk bond spreads have widened even though default rate indicators continue to show improvement. With valuations now looking more attractive, we upgrade U.S. High-Yield from neutral to overweight. Feature Chart of the WeekStill A Positive Backdrop ##br##For U.S. Corporates After a run of smooth sailing for the markets so far in 2017, investors will have a lot of event risk to chew over this week. A slew of central bank meetings - the Fed on Wednesday followed by the Bank of England, Bank of Japan and Swiss National Bank all on Thursday - provide opportunities for policymakers to respond to the rising trends in global growth and inflation. Only the Fed is expected to make a change, though, delivering a now fully priced rate hike. Throw in the Dutch elections on Wednesday and the G20 finance ministers meeting in Germany at the end of the week and there are plenty of potentially market-moving headlines that can hit the tape. While there has been selling pressure on all global bonds during the bear phase since last July, U.S. Treasuries still remain most exposed to additional losses in the near term given the combination of improving growth, booming asset markets, a whiff of Trumpian "animal spirits" and a Fed that still appears to be playing catch-up to the overall positive U.S. macro backdrop. A bigger potential move in yields could occur if and when the European Central Bank (ECB) shifts to a less accommodative monetary stance - a taper of asset purchases first, not a rate hike, in our view - although that will likely require more evidence that medium-term Euro Area inflation expectations are sustainably moving back to the ECB's 2% target (Chart of the Week). For now, we continue to see a more negative near-term environment for U.S. Treasuries over core European debt, and a more positive environment for U.S. corporate bonds than European equivalents. As we have discussed in recent Weekly Reports, the time is coming for a shift out of core European government debt into U.S. Treasuries, although we prefer to wait for that switch until after the French elections. After the recent back-up in U.S. High-Yield spreads that has restored some value to junk bonds, however, we are upgrading our allocation to U.S. High-Yield this week to above-benchmark, while downgrading Euro Area Investment Grade corporate bonds to neutral from above-benchmark. Simply put, we prefer to take our growth-sensitive spread risk in U.S. corporates over European equivalents. Fed Vs. ECB: Dawn Of Hawkish? Some investors and financial media pundits have been asking if the Fed has fallen "behind the curve" with regards to U.S. monetary policy, especially after another solid Payrolls report and with U.S. inflation expectations holding firm despite a pullback in oil prices. In our view, being a little bit behind the curve is exactly where the Fed wants to be, allowing the economic upturn to blossom and inflation expectations to continue drifting towards the Fed's 2% target. We do not anticipate that the Fed will shift to a more aggressively hawkish stance this week, with no signal that rates will rise in 2017 more than is currently projected (three times by year-end). However, we do expect some acknowledgement of the positive macro backdrop both in the U.S. and abroad, justifying the need to move sooner by hiking now. This is especially true with the U.S. dollar still well off the 2017 peak and not providing much of a tightening in monetary conditions that could postpone a Fed rate hike. Any surprise shift higher in the Fed's interest rate projections (the "dots") would not be taken well by the Treasury market, particularly after last week's European Central Bank (ECB) meeting where a message that was merely less dovish than expected sent European bond yields sharply higher. A more hawkish shift by either central bank would be premature right now, as bond markets are not yet signaling that significantly higher real interest rates are necessary. It is important to note that most of the rise in Treasury yields since last July, and virtually all of the rise in German Bund yields, has come from rising inflation expectations rather than higher real yields (Chart 2 & Chart 3). Also, the market expectation for the real terminal policy rate - where interest rates should end up at the end of the tightening cycle - remains around 0% in the U.S. and -1% in Europe, using our proxy measure of the 5-year Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rate, 5-years forward minus the equivalent forward inflation rate from the TIPS and CPI swap markets (bottom panel of both charts). In other words, markets are only expecting a cyclical rise in interest rates in response to faster inflation, not a structural rise in interest rates because of faster potential economic growth. Chart 2Rising Inflation Explains ##br##Most Of The Rise In U.S. Yields... Chart 3...And All Of The Rise##br## In European Yields On that front, the winds are shifting in a fashion that is more bearish for Treasuries, at least in the near term. In Chart 4, we show the relationship between inflation expectations and oil prices for the U.S. and Euro Area. As can be seen in the bottom panel, the correlation between oil and expectations remains high in the Euro Area, but has fallen to zero in the U.S., where inflation expectations are increasingly influenced by domestic price pressures (i.e. rising wage growth and faster core inflation). Chart 4U.S. Inflation Now Not Just About Oil, ##br##Unlike Europe This remains a key element underpinning of our current below-benchmark call on U.S. Treasuries, particularly versus core European bonds. U.S. yields are likely to have more upside from higher inflation expectations with the Fed likely to stay as accommodative as possible by hiking rates at a slower pace than inflation is rising. At some point, monetary policy will become restrictive, particularly if the U.S. dollar bull market resumes with gusto as the Fed is delivering additional rate hikes and expectations for U.S. growth and inflation moderate, capping the current cyclical rise in Treasury yields. We are still some time away from that point, however. Bottom Line: The Fed will deliver another rate hike tomorrow, but we do not expect a signal that a higher trajectory for the funds rate is necessary. The Fed wants to see higher inflation expectations, and will remain as accommodative as possible until that happens. Maintain a below-benchmark allocation to U.S. Treasuries within global fixed income portfolios. ECB Begins The Path To Tapering The ECB last week put a relatively positive spin on the Euro Area economy, while declaring that the worst of the deflationary pressures have passed. President Draghi sounded less downbeat on the Euro Area economy than he has for some time, citing the broadening Euro Area economic upturn that was pushing down unemployment and absorbing economic slack. The ECB only slightly raised its growth forecast for 2017 and 2018, though, raising both figures by 0.1 percentage points to 1.8% and 1.7%, respectively. This would still be sufficient to remove additional slack from the economy, with the ECB currently estimating trend growth of around 1% in the Euro Area. A look at the details of those projections showed that real consumer spending is only expected to grow by 1.4% this year and next, even as the Euro Area unemployment rate is projected to fall below 9% in 2018 on the back of steady job gains. Capital spending is also expected to pick up in the next couple of years, but the projections were downgraded slightly from previous forecasts. These numbers seem a bit too cautious compared to the recent improvements seen in consumer and business confidence in the Euro Area (Chart 5), and to the more positive tone on the economy expressed in the ECB policy statement and in Draghi's press conference following the meeting. Perhaps this is simply central bank prudence at work, particularly in an environment where there is still considerable uncertainty about politics within the Euro Area and global trade in the Trumpian era. Whatever the reason, it now seems likely that growth will at least match, if not exceed, the relatively low bar set by the ECB. This is important, as the central bank is already projecting that the Euro Area will reach full employment by 2019, when the unemployment rate is projected to fall to 8.4%. The ECB expects wage pressures to rise as a result, helping boost core inflation up to 1.8% within two years (Chart 6). This would be consistent with the rising path of interest rates currently discounted in the Euro Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve where rates are now expected to start going up in the middle of next year, with the negative rate era ending in 2019 (bottom panel). Chart 5ECB Too Pessimistic On ##br##Euro Area Growth? Chart 6ECB Will Not Hike Rates Before ##br##Full Employment Is Reached The ECB knows that interest rates will have to rise if its core inflation forecast pans out, as this would almost certainly mean that headline inflation and inflation expectations would be at the ECB target of "at or just below" 2%. Yet it is still too soon to discuss that scenario, with core inflation struggling to surpass 1% and the 5-year CPI swap rate, 5-years forward at similar levels. The ECB did slightly alter its forward guidance in its policy statement to suggest that it was now much less likely that additional monetary easing would be needed to boost growth, and that it would no longer be necessary to use "all instruments" to fight deflation in Europe. This was taken as a hawkish surprise by the markets, particularly after media reports indicated that some members of the ECB discussed raising interest rates before the tapering of the ECB's asset purchases. As we discussed in our previous Weekly Report, the current backdrop in Europe looks similar in many respects to the U.S. prior to the "Taper Tantrum" episode in 2013.1 We see the ECB following a similar path to what the Fed did during the Tantrum, by signaling a tapering of asset purchases several months in advance, then raising interest rates after the taper is complete. Many clients have asked us if it is possible for the ECB to raise short-term interest rates before starting a tapering of asset purchases. This question also came up at last week's ECB meeting, and President Draghi reiterated the view that rates would be expected to "remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time, and well past the horizon of our net asset purchases." This fits with the ECB's unemployment and inflation scenarios, which do not project a return to full employment - which would justify a rate hike - until 2019. A rate hike too soon would result in an unwanted tightening in financial conditions in Europe that could threaten the current economic upturn. We do not believe that investors could neatly separate the impact of a rate hike from that of a taper. A tightening is a tightening, as can be seen in the strong correlation of our Euro Area months-to-hike measure and the term premium on 10yr German Bund yields in recent years (Chart 7).2 If the ECB were to deliver a rate hike, even a modest one of less than the typical 25bp increment, while maintaining the current pace of bond buying, it would send a contradictory message given the ECB's benign inflation outlook for the next couple of years. Clearly, the market is already a bit confused, as the months-to-hike has been rapidly declining, even as shorter-dated bond yields in core Europe stay low and the term premium on longer-dated government debt has stopped rising. We still see a taper next year as a more likely scenario, to be announced at the September 2017 ECB meeting, with a rate hike to occur within 6-12 months of the completion of the taper. This would allow the ECB to reduce the pace of monetary expansion in line with a less deflationary backdrop in Europe, while leaving the rate hike for a more traditional move when full employment is reached in 2019. In Chart 8, we present some potential tapering scenarios and what it would mean for the growth rate of the ECB's monetary base. We show the base case for this year of €60bn/month in asset purchases that ends in December (a "full-stop" with no tapering), along with alternative scenarios of a pace of tapering that reduces the bond buying to zero within six months (i.e. a €10bn/month reduction until June 2018) and with a full taper over 12 months (i.e. a €5bn/month reduction until December 2018). We also show an additional scenario where the ECB decides to extend the asset purchases into 2018 at the same current pace of €60bn/month. Chart 7A Rate Hike Before Tapering ##br##Is A Confusing Message Chart 8Taper Or Not, ECB Effect ##br##On Bund Yields Fading... The bottom panels of Chart 8 show the annual growth rate of the monetary base under the different scenarios, and how that maps into longer-term German bond yields through a widening term premium. Importantly, the growth rate of the ECB's monetary base would decelerate even if there was no taper next year, which would put upward pressure on European bond yields. Unless the ECB is willing to raise the pace of bond buying next year, which would only occur if there was an unexpected downturn in the Euro Area economy before full employment is reached, then the writing is on the wall for Euro Area government bond yields. They are moving higher. The same goes for Peripheral European debt and even Euro Area Investment Grade corporate debt, which the ECB has also been buying. A slowing pace of ECB buying will put upward pressure on both yields and spreads next year (Chart 9), although a better Euro Area economy that improves corporate profits and tax revenues will help mitigate the rise in yields. It is possible that the ECB could alter the composition of its purchases while tapering, choosing to continue to buy more shorter-dated bonds to limit the potential of an unwanted rise in the Euro. As can be seen in Chart 10, the typical indicators that correlate to the EUR/USD currency pair - the relative balance sheets of the Fed and ECB, and the 2-year interest rate differential between European and U.S. interest rates - are still pointing to an extended period of Euro weakness. It would take a combination of rate hikes in Europe and rate cuts in the U.S. to turn EUR/USD around on a sustainable basis. While the tapering announcement will likely push the Euro immediately higher, such a move will not last without a more fundamental change in relative interest rates. Chart 9...And For European ##br##Spread Product, Too Chart 10Tapering Will Not Sustainably ##br##Boost The Euro Bottom Line: The ECB opened to door slightly to a less-accommodative policy stance last week, although the talk of a rate hike is premature. A 2018 taper is the more probable scenario, likely to be introduced at the September 2017 policy meeting. This will raise longer-dated European bond yields and widen spreads for both Peripheral European government debt and Euro Area corporate bonds. Reduce Euro Area Investment Grade to below-benchmark. The Value Is Back In U.S. High-Yield One of our key themes for 2017 is that the uptrend in the U.S. High-Yield default rate is due for a pause.3 With the first quarter of the year nearly complete, all the indicators that make up our U.S. Default Rate Model are showing noticeable improvement (Chart 11). Interest coverage remains elevated A strong U.S. Manufacturing PMI points to a rebound in after-tax cash flow Lending standards have rolled over and are now just barely in "net tightening" territory An improving sales/inventory ratio portends a return to positive industrial production growth Job cut announcements have fallen back to 2011 levels on a trailing 12-month basis Chart 11Default Rate Indicators Are Showing Improvement Meantime, even though the default outlook continues to improve, junk spreads have actually widened during the past couple of weeks. The average option-adjusted spread on the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. High-Yield index has widened from a low of 344bps up to 378bps (Chart 12). Some of that spread increase is likely attributable to declining oil prices, as energy sector credits have indeed underperformed the overall index. However, the underperformance of the energy sector did start before the sharp drop in oil prices (Chart 12, bottom panel). In any event, our commodity strategists are not expecting the current decline in oil prices to persist and their estimates show that the oil market has recently shifted from an environment of excess supply to one of excess demand. U.S. crude oil inventories are poised to decline later this month and the OPEC / non-OPEC production deal negotiated by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Russia at the end of last year should be met with high compliance.4 If this view is correct, then the energy sector will not drag overall junk spreads wider in the months ahead. The combination of wider junk spreads and an improving default outlook has led to an increase in our preferred gauge of value for high-yield bonds - the default-adjusted spread (Chart 13). The default-adjusted spread is calculated by subtracting an ex-ante estimate of default losses from the average spread on the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. High-Yield index. Chart 12Energy Contributed To Junk Sell-Off Chart 13Some Value Returns To High-Yield To arrive at an estimate of default losses we use the Moody's baseline forecast for the default rate and our own forecast for the recovery rate based on the historical relationship between recoveries and defaults. With the release of February's default report, the Moody's baseline default rate forecast fell to 3.14% for the next 12 months. Based on this forecast, we estimate that the recovery rate will be 44%. Combining the default and recovery rate forecasts gives an estimate for default losses of 3.14% x (1- 0.44) = 176bps for the next 12 months. Since the average option-adjusted spread of the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. High-Yield index is currently 378bps, we calculate the default-adjusted spread to be: 378 bps - 176bps = 202bps. A default-adjusted spread of 202bps is 60bps higher than the reading of 142bps that prevailed just last week. This 60bps spread advantage makes a considerable difference in terms of projected excess returns. Chart 14 shows the relationship between 12-month excess returns and the starting default-adjusted spread. We observe a reasonably strong correlation and note that, using a linear regression, an extra 60bps of spread translates to an extra +251bps of excess return on average over a 12-month period. Chart 1412-Month Excess High-Yield Returns Vs. Ex-Ante Default-Adjusted Spread (2002 - Present) Table 1 provides more detail in terms of what excess returns have historically been associated with different levels of the default-adjusted spread. We see that when the default-adjusted is between 100 bps and 150bps, high-yield bonds earn positive excess returns 64% of the time over the following 12 months. When the default-adjusted spread is between 200bps and 250bps, high-yield earns a positive 12-month excess return 71% of the time. Table 112-Month High-Yield Excess Returns & Ex-Ante Default-Adjusted Spread Given our upbeat assessment of the trend in defaults and a wider junk spread than we have seen in a while, we think it is a good time to upgrade high-yield from neutral to overweight. The key near-term risk to this view is that the Fed will be more hawkish than we anticipate at this week's meeting. If the Fed's median forecast is revised up to four hikes in 2017, then it is possible that the recent bout of junk spread widening will have a bit further to run. However, given still-low inflation readings, the Fed would eventually be forced to back away from its hawkish rhetoric and support renewed spread tightening. In our view, the main risk to upgrading junk this week is that we are a bit too early. Bottom Line: U.S. junk bond spreads have widened even though default rate indicators continue to show improvement. With valuations now looking more attractive, we upgrade U.S. High-Yield from neutral to overweight. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Will The Hawks Walk The Talk?", dated March 7, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 2 Last week, we presented the Euro Area months-to-hike measure. We discovered that our measure was not calibrated for the current era of negative interest rates in Europe, and the months-to-hike indicated was actually signaling the "months until interest rates turned positive." We have since corrected our methodology to show the months until one full 25bp rate hike was priced in from the current negative levels, which is what is shown in Chart 7 of this report. This does not change the direction of the months-to-hike indicator, but it does bring forward to date of the first rate hike versus what was presented last week. 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Fed's Pre-Emptive Hike Will Hit Gold, Not Oil", dated March 9, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Monetary Policy: The Fed will lift rates this week, but will likely leave its median forecast for three hikes this year unchanged. With inflation still below target the Fed has an incentive to take it easy. Curve steepeners, TIPS breakeven wideners and overweight spread product positions will benefit. Duration: The growth outlook is improving and the 10-year Treasury yield could soon move higher, breaking out of its recent trading range. An already elevated economic surprise index should not be a deterrent. High-Yield: Junk spreads have widened even though default rate indicators continue to show improvement. With valuations now looking more attractive, we upgrade high-yield from neutral to overweight. Feature Chart 1How Much Hawkishness ##br##Can Markets Take? In early November, just prior to the U.S. election, money markets were still only discounting one rate hike before the end of 2017. The Fed has already raised rates once since then and the market is now almost priced for another three hikes before year-end (Chart 1). Encouragingly, financial markets digested the shift up to two 2017 rate hikes without much of a hiccup - the yield curve steepened, TIPS breakevens widened and junk spreads tightened - but the journey from two to three hikes has not gone down quite as easily (Chart 1, bottom panel). The yield curve has now started to flatten, breakevens have leveled off and junk spreads have edged wider. The worry is that a further shift in expectations - from three to four hikes in 2017 - might cause markets to choke. Fed Will Take It Slow Markets are already priced for a rate hike at this week's FOMC meeting along with no change to the Fed's median forecast for three hikes in 2017. As such, we would not expect much of a market reaction if that outcome is delivered. If the Fed were to increase its median forecast from three to four hikes in 2017, then we would anticipate at least some tightening of financial conditions. In other words, we would expect the yield curve to flatten, TIPS breakevens to narrow, the dollar to strengthen and credit spreads to widen. As we have written several times,1 with core inflation and TIPS breakevens still below target, the Fed must ensure that the economic recovery continues. It will therefore be quick to back away from any nascent hawkishness if financial conditions start to tighten. With markets already showing some signs of stress, we expect the Fed to err on the side of caution this week. This means the Fed will lift rates, but also leave the median forecast of three 2017 rate hikes unchanged. This notion that the Fed should be lifting rates, but only very slowly, is confirmed by our Fed Monitor (Chart 2). The Fed Monitor is a composite of 32 indicators that track the evolution of U.S. economic growth, inflation pressures and financial market conditions. Historically, a positive reading from the monitor has coincided with rate hikes, and vice versa. Chart 2BCA Fed Monitor Suggests A Slow Pace Of Rate Hikes The Fed Monitor just recently moved above zero, suggesting that only modestly tighter monetary policy is required. As an aside, we view the strongly positive readings from the Fed Monitor in 2011 and 2012 as anomalous and an artifact of the zero-lower-bound on interest rates. Since interest rates could not be lowered as much as would have been necessary (according to the Fed Monitor) in 2009, they also could not be raised as quickly as the monitor suggested in 2011. With the base effects from the financial crisis now out of the data, the Fed Monitor should go back to providing a useful signal about the future course of monetary policy. Chart 3BCA Fed Monitor Components We gain further insight from splitting the Fed Monitor into its three key components: growth, inflation and financial conditions (Chart 3). The growth component has accelerated strongly into positive territory but the inflation component still suggests that an easy policy stance is required. Financial conditions are also consistent with modest Fed tightening but have ticked down in recent weeks as the market has discounted a more rapid pace of hikes. Judging from the prior two cycles, an acceleration of the inflation component will be necessary for the Fed to deliver on its current expected path of rate hikes. While the Fed has sometimes started to lift rates with the inflation component below zero, that component has always surged into positive territory soon after hikes began (Chart 3, panel 2). While economic growth is accelerating, below-target inflation means that the Fed must continue to nurture the economic recovery. Investors should position for a steeper curve, wider TIPS breakevens and tighter credit spreads until inflationary pressures are more pronounced. This means at least until long-maturity TIPS breakevens reach the 2.4% to 2.5% range and core PCE inflation is firmly anchored around 2%. Bottom Line: The Fed will lift rates this week, but will likely leave its median forecast for three hikes this year unchanged. With inflation still below target the Fed has an incentive to take it easy. Curve steepeners, TIPS breakeven wideners and overweight spread product positions will benefit. Consolidation Complete? The 10-year Treasury yield has been stuck in a tight range below 2.6% since mid-December (Chart 4), but recent trends in the economic data suggest that it could be on the verge of breaking through this key resistance level. Economic surprises are positively correlated with changes in the 10-year Treasury yield and currently appear extended (Chart 4, bottom panel). While not a mean-reverting series by construction, economic surprises tend to follow a mean reverting pattern because investors revise their expectations higher as the economic data outperform. Eventually, expectations are bound to become excessive and the series will mean revert. However, we have found that economic surprises are usually first reflected in Treasury yields. In fact, changes in the 10-year Treasury yield tend to lead the economic surprise index by several weeks. This means that stagnant yields during the past few months have already foreshadowed a reversal in the surprise index. In other words, some mean reversion in economic surprises is already in the price and should not prevent yields from rising in the coming weeks. More important is that economic growth should be sustainably above trend on a 6-12 month horizon. This will continue to put upward pressure on inflation and ensure that the Fed remains in a rate hike cycle. Judging from recent data, not only is growth sustainably above trend, but it is probably even accelerating. Last week's February employment report showed that nonfarm payrolls rose by 235k, the second consecutive month of gains above 200k. The rate of change of employment growth is now threatening to reverse the downtrend that started in early 2015, and aggregate hours worked have accelerated suggesting that GDP growth will be strong in Q1 (Chart 5). Chart 410-Year Yield Facing Resistance Chart 5Labor Market Points To Stronger Growth... Financial conditions are also supportive of a further acceleration in growth. We found that the financial conditions component of our Fed Monitor provides a strong indication of near-term trends in GDP growth (Chart 6). This highlights that growth should be strong during the next few months but also that the Fed must respond to any tightening in financial conditions if it wants growth to remain robust. Chart 6...So Do Financial Conditions Bottom Line: The growth outlook is improving and the 10-year Treasury yield could soon move higher, breaking out of its recent trading range. An already elevated economic surprise index should not be a deterrent. The Value Is Back In High-Yield One of our key themes for 2017 is that the uptrend in the high-yield default rate is due for a pause.2 With the first quarter of the year nearly complete, all the indicators that make up our Default Rate Model are showing noticeable improvement (Chart 7). Chart 7Default Rate Indicators Are Showing Improvement Interest coverage remains elevated A strong Manufacturing PMI points to a rebound in after-tax cash flow Lending standards have rolled over and are now just barely in "net tightening" territory An improving sales/inventory ratio portends a return to positive industrial production growth Job cut announcements have fallen back to 2011 levels on a trailing 12-month basis Meantime, even though the default outlook continues to improve, junk spreads have actually widened during the past couple of weeks. The average option-adjusted spread on the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index has widened from a low of 344 basis points up to 378 bps (Chart 8). Some of that spread increase is likely attributable to declining oil prices, as energy sector credits have indeed underperformed the overall index. However, the underperformance of the energy sector also started before the sharp drop in oil prices (Chart 8, bottom panel). In any event, our commodity strategists are not expecting the current decline in oil prices to persist and their estimates show that the oil market has recently shifted from an environment of excess supply to one of excess demand. U.S. crude oil inventories are poised to decline later this month and the OPEC / non-OPEC production deal negotiated by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Russia at the end of last year should be met with high compliance.3 If this view is correct, then the energy sector will not drag overall junk spreads wider in the months ahead. The combination of wider junk spreads and an improving default outlook has led to an increase in our preferred gauge of value for high-yield bonds - the default-adjusted spread (Chart 9). The default-adjusted spread is calculated by subtracting an ex-ante estimate of default losses from the average spread on the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index. Chart 8Energy Contributed To Junk Sell-Off Chart 9Some Value Returns To High-Yield To arrive at an estimate of default losses we use the Moody's baseline forecast for the default rate and our own forecast for the recovery rate based on the historical relationship between recoveries and defaults. With the release of February's default report, the Moody's baseline default rate forecast fell to 3.14% for the next 12 months. Based on this forecast we estimate that the recovery rate will be 44%. Combining the default and recovery rate forecasts gives an estimate for default losses of 3.14% x (1- 0.44) = 176 bps for the next 12 months. Since the average option-adjusted spread of the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index is currently 378 bps, we calculate the default-adjusted spread to be: 378 bps - 176 bps = 202 bps. A default-adjusted spread of 202 bps is 60 bps higher than the reading of 142 bps that prevailed just last week. This 60 bps spread advantage makes a considerable difference in terms of projected excess returns. Chart 10 shows the relationship between 12-month excess returns and the starting default-adjusted spread. We observe a reasonably strong correlation and note that, using a linear regression, an extra 60 bps of spread translates to an extra +251 bps of excess return on average over a 12-month period. Chart 1012-Month Excess High-Yield Returns Vs. ##br##Ex-Ante Default-Adjusted Spread (2002 - Present) Table 1 provides more detail in terms of what excess returns have historically been associated with different levels of the default-adjusted spread. We see that when the default-adjusted is between 100 bps and 150 bps, high-yield bonds earn positive excess returns 64% of the time over the following 12 months. When the default-adjusted spread is between 200 bps and 250 bps, high-yield earns a positive 12-month excess return 71% of the time. Table 112-Month High-Yield Excess Returns & Ex-Ante Default-Adjusted Spread Given our upbeat assessment of the trend in defaults and a wider junk spread than we have seen in a while, we think it is a good time to upgrade high-yield from neutral to overweight. The key near-term risk to this view is that the Fed will be more hawkish than we anticipate at this week's meeting. If the Fed's median forecast is revised up to four hikes in 2017, then it is possible that the recent bout of junk spread widening will have a bit further to run. However, given still-low inflation readings, the Fed would eventually be forced to back away from its hawkish rhetoric and support renewed spread tightening. In our view, the main risk to upgrading junk this week is that we are a bit too early. Bottom Line: Junk spreads have widened even though default rate indicators continue to show improvement. With valuations now looking more attractive, we upgrade high-yield from neutral to overweight. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Inflation: More Fire Than Ice, But Don't Sound The Alarm", dated January 24, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Fed's Pre-Emptive Hike Will Hit Gold, Not Oil", dated March 9, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights U.S. equity valuations are historically high, based on a variety of metrics. However, relative to competing assets and global equity peers, U.S. stock valuations are not an extreme. For U.S.-based investors, our upbeat view on the U.S. dollar implies that efforts to diversify globally may come up short. The Fed will allow its Agency bond and MBS portfolios to run off starting in 2018, but it is much more uncertain whether it will ever cease the reinvestment of its Treasury holdings. Feature The S&P 500 remains near record highs, despite a modest setback last week. And the only period when stocks were more expensive was during the halcyon days of the dot-com bubble. Have stock prices outpaced fundamentals, and if so, how much of a risk does this present over the cyclical horizon? And should U.S. investors look further afield than domestic markets for a relative deal? On a historical basis, it is hard to argue that U.S. equities are anything other than expensive. A preferred valuation metric is the cyclically adjusted P/E ratio (CAPE), see Chart 1. Based on this metric, stocks are expensive, trading at their highest valuation outside of the dot-com bubble. However, valuing equities is a complicated issue, and the CAPE is not without its weaknesses. Examining a broad array of valuation indicators provides a slightly different message; U.S. stocks are expensive in absolute terms based on historic relationships, but are less stretched relative to both other asset classes and other equity indexes. Expensive, But... Our BCA valuation index captures the message from a broad range of metrics in one gauge (Chart 2). The valuation index was constructed using 11 different measures in an attempt to approach valuation from multiple angles. Decomposing the index into its three major components - earnings, balance sheet metrics and yield - show that stocks prices are well into expensive territory in absolute terms based on traditional fundamentals: Chart 1(Part I) U.S. Stocks Are Expensive ##br##Relative To History Chart 2(Part II) U.S. Stocks Are Expensive Relative ##br##To History Earnings Group: There are five inputs to the earnings component of our valuation indicator, including trailing price/earnings ratio, price/sales, market cap as a share of GDP. The second panel of Chart 2 shows that the aggregate of the Earnings Group indicators sits at historical highs, excluding the tech bubble. Balance Sheet Metrics: This component includes measure of the market value of equities relative to corporate net worth, both using market value (replacement cost) and historical cost. This measure of valuation has the same profile as the Earnings Group. Yield Group: The yield group compares the price of stocks to interest rates, nominal and real, government and corporate. Of the three groups, it is this Yield Group that gives a less expensive reading on equities (bottom panel of Chart 2). Overall, the Valuation Indicator is already well into "overvalued territory". There is only one episode since 1970 when the indicator has reached a significantly more extreme reading (the dot-com bubble). ...Not So On A Relative Basis Stocks are expensive on an absolute basis, but are far more appealing in relative terms. The current earnings yield on stocks is well above the real corporate bond yield and corporate bond spreads are historically very tight, despite the erosion in balance sheet health (our corporate health monitor has been deteriorating for several months). And compared to housing returns, stocks look downright cheap (Chart 3). Within the U.S., we expect stocks to be the biggest beneficiary of investment flows in the next year or two, in part because equity market value is the most appealing. Meanwhile, relative to global peers, U.S. equities valuations have been climbing since 2009 (Charts 4 and Chart 5). This eight-year rise in valuations now leaves U.S. P/Es at the higher end of the historical range relative to G10 ex-U.S. equities. U.S. stocks are especially expensive relative to Japanese equities. In any case, standard valuation measures have always been lower in Japan, with the exception of price-forward earnings. As our Bank Credit Analyst monthly publication points out, Japanese companies generally have a much higher interest coverage ratio compared to Corporate America. Nonetheless, they tend to come up short in terms of profitability. Operating margins in the U.S. have typically been double that of Japan. Japan's return-on-equity (RoE) has been dismal because of low levels of corporate leverage and loads of low-yielding cash sitting on balance sheets. Nonetheless, the valuation gap is at an extreme, with Japanese equities appearing to be a screaming value relative to U.S. stocks. Chart 3Stocks Look Less Expensive Relative To Competing Assets Chart 4(Part I) U.S. Outperformance Phase Can Continue Chart 5(Part II) U.S. Outperformance Phase Can Continue A similar, albeit less extreme, valuation case can be made for European stocks relative to the U.S. Eurozone stocks have also almost always traded at a discount to U.S. equities and this continues to be the case. Stocks have gotten even more expensive, more quickly, in the U.S. over the past year. But relative valuations are not near historic extremes. Tack on the fact that BCA's view is that the dollar will continue to appreciate over the next six-twelve months. For U.S.-based investors, the coming rise in the domestic currency implies that efforts to diversify globally may come up short, despite better value in major foreign markets. It is important to note that BCA does not view valuation measures as market timing tools. They are only useful at extremes. The bottom line is that U.S. equities are certainly far from cheap, but are not so expensive in relative terms to warrant an allocation change on this basis. We believe that equity returns should outperform Treasuries, cash and high-quality corporate bonds over the next 1-2 years as the bond bear market plays out. The Fed's Balance Sheet: What's Next? Recently we have received a number of client questions about the Fed's balance sheet and how it will evolve during the next few years. In response, we reprint below work from our U.S. Bond Strategy team, who recently addressed the topic in detail. The Fed's Stated Plan The most up-to-date guidance we have received about the Fed's balance sheet plans comes from Janet Yellen's recent Congressional testimony: "The FOMC has annunciated that its longer run goal is to shrink our balance sheet to levels consistent with the efficient and effective implementation of monetary policy. And while our system evolves and I can't put a number on that, I would anticipate a balance sheet that's substantially smaller than at the current time. In addition, we would like our balance sheet to again be primarily Treasury securities, whereas as you pointed out, we have substantial holdings of mortgage-backed securities." From this, and similar statements from other Fed officials, we conclude that the Fed will allow its balance sheet to shrink once the fed funds rate is somewhere in the range of 1% to 1.5%. Surveys also show that the median primary dealer expects the Fed will change its balance sheet policy when the target fed funds rate is 1.38%. As such, and under reasonable assumptions for the pace of rate hikes, we think it is very likely that the Fed will start to let its balance sheet shrink sometime in 2018. MBS First, Treasuries Maybe Later Yellen's statement to Congress also makes clear that the Fed would be more comfortable with a balance sheet that consists entirely of Treasury securities. For this reason, the central bank will start by simply ceasing the reinvestment of its Agency bond and MBS portfolios. At least initially, the Fed will continue to reinvest the proceeds from its maturing Treasury portfolio. Yellen also left open the possibility that reinvestment could be "tapered" rather than just halted altogether. While this is possible, and in fact 70% of primary dealers think that reinvestments will be phased out over time while only 14% think they will be ceased all at once, it seems to us like a needless complication. We expect that reinvestments of Agency bonds and MBS will end all at once sometime in 2018. As for the Fed's holdings of Treasury securities, it is much less clear whether the Fed will allow these balances to run down. In a Report in 2014,1 we describe in detail the differences between the Fed's pre-crisis mode of operation, when bank reserves were scarce, and the Fed's current mode of operation with large bank reserve balances. As of now, the Fed has stated that it intends to eventually drain bank reserves from the system and return to its pre-crisis mode of operation, but there are several possible advantages to running a system with an outsized Fed balance sheet and large bank reserve balances. None other than Ben Bernanke pointed out a few of those reasons in a blog post last fall.2 In our view, the most compelling is that regulatory changes have increased private sector demand for safe, short-maturity, liquid assets in recent years. If the Treasury department is unwilling to supply T-bills in sufficient numbers, then the Fed can supply safe, short-maturity, liquid assets to the market by purchasing long-maturity Treasury securities and replacing them with bank reserves. Chart 6Reserves Can Be Drained Fairly Quickly Of course, we take the Fed at its word when it says that it would like to eventually drain excess bank reserves from the system. But even in that case, the steady growth of currency in circulation means that bank reserves will decline over time even if the Fed keeps the asset side of its balance sheet flat. For example, Chart 6 shows what would happen to bank reserves if the amount of currency in circulation grows at a conservative 5% per year pace, and if the Fed decides to allow its Agency bond and MBS portfolios to run off at the beginning of next year while keeping its Treasury portfolio flat. We assume that MBS runs off the Fed's balance sheet at a pace of $15 billion per month, slightly below the recent pace of MBS reinvestment. During the past three years, the Fed has reinvested between $20bn and $40bn MBS each month with an average monthly reinvestment of $32bn. In this scenario, outstanding bank reserves would decline to zero by the end of 2025. At that point the Fed would have to start adding to its Treasury holdings just to keep pace with the amount of currency in circulation. Bottom Line: While it is very likely that the Fed will allow its Agency bond and MBS portfolios to run off starting in 2018, it is much more uncertain whether it will ever cease the reinvestment of its Treasury holdings. If the Fed does allow its Treasury holdings to run down as well, it will have to start buying Treasuries again before 2025. Lenka Martinek, Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report "Cleaning Up After The 100-Year Flood", dated June 10, 2014, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 2 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2016/09/02/should-the-fed-keep-its-balance-sheet-large/

Highlights Eurostoxx50 versus S&P500 boils down to a simple choice: Banco Santander, BNP Paribas and ING; or Apple, Microsoft and Google? Right now, we would rather own the three tech stocks than the three banks - which necessarily means underweighting the Eurostoxx50 versus the S&P500. Eurostoxx50 performance relative to the FTSE100 boils down to the inverse direction of euro/pound. Right now, we expect euro/pound to strengthen - which necessarily means underweighting the Eurostoxx50 versus the FTSE100. Stay overweight Spanish Bonos versus French OATs as a structural position. Feature Which would you rather own: Banco Santander, BNP Paribas and ING; or Apple, Microsoft and Google?1 Surprising as it may seem, the all-important allocation decision between the Eurostoxx50 and the S&P500 boils down to this simple choice. The Chart of the Week should leave no doubt that everything else is largely irrelevant. Chart of the WeekEurostoxx50 Vs. S&P500 = Santander, BNP & ING Vs. Apple, Microsoft & Google Right now, we would rather own the top three U.S. tech stocks rather than the top three euro area banks - which necessarily means underweighting the Eurostoxx50 versus the S&P500. The Fallacy Of Division For Equities The fallacy of division is a logical fallacy. It occurs when somebody falsely infers that what is true for the whole is also true for the parts that make up the whole. As a simple example, somebody might infer that because their computer screen appears purple, the pixels that make up the screen are also purple. In fact, the pixels are not purple. They are either red or blue. The fallacy of division is that the property of the whole - purpleness - does not translate to the property of the constituent parts - redness or blueness. As investment strategists, we hear a common fallacy of division. Since global equities are a play on the global economy, it might seem that national equity markets - like Ireland's ISEQ or Denmark's OMX - are plays on their national economies. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. The property of the equity market as a global aggregate does not translate to the property of equity markets as national parts. The equity markets in Ireland and Denmark are each dominated by one stock which accounts for almost a quarter of national market capitalization - in Ireland, Ryanair, the pan-European budget airline, and in Denmark, Novo Nordisk, the global pharmaceutical company. Therefore, the relative performance of Ireland's ISEQ has almost no connection with Ireland's economy; rather, it is a just a play on airlines. And given budget airlines' sensitivity to fuel costs, Ireland's ISEQ is counterintuitively an inverse play on the oil price (Chart I-2). Likewise, the relative performance of Denmark's OMX has no connection with Denmark's economy; it is just a strong play on global pharma (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Ireland = Short Oil Chart I-3Denmark = Long Pharma In a similar vein, the relative performance of Switzerland's SME is also a play on global pharma - via Novartis and Roche (Chart I-4); Norway's OBX is a play on global energy - via Statoil (Chart I-5); and Italy's MIB and Spain's IBEX are plays on banks (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). We could continue, but you get our drift... Chart I-4Switzerland = Long Pharma / Short Oil Chart I-5Norway = Long Oil Chart I-6Italy = Long Banks Chart I-7Spain = Long Banks But what about a regional index like the Eurostoxx50 or Eurostoxx600: surely, with the broader exposure, there must be a strong connection with the euro area economy? Unfortunately not - at least, not when it comes to relative performance. Consider that for the past few years, the euro area economy has actually outperformed the U.S. economy2 (Chart I-8). Yet the Eurostoxx50 has substantially underperformed the S&P500 (Chart I-9). What's going on? The answer is that the Eurostoxx50 has a major 15% weighting to banks and a minor 7% weighting to tech. The S&P500 is the mirror image; a minor 7% weighting to banks and a major 22% weighting to tech. Chart I-8The Euro Area Economy ##br##Has Outperformed... Chart I-9...But The Eurostoxx50##br## Has Underperformed For the Eurostoxx50 the distinguishing property is 'bank'; for the S&P500 it is 'tech'. And as we saw earlier, these distinguishing properties are captured by just three large euro area banks and three large U.S tech stocks. So index relative performance simply boils down to whether the three euro area banks outperform the three U.S. tech stocks, or vice-versa. Everything else is largely irrelevant. Equities' Connection With Economies Is Often Counterintuitive When it comes to the FTSE100, it turns out that it is not more bank or tech than the Eurostoxx50. Major sector weightings across the two indexes are broadly similar. Hence, relative performance is more connected to relative economic performance. But there is a catch - the connection is not as intuitive as you might first think. You see, both major indexes are made up of dollar-earning multinational companies. Yet the index value and earnings are quoted in pounds and euros respectively. If the home currency appreciates, index earnings - translated from dollars into home currency - go down, depressing index relative performance with it. And the opposite happens if the home currency depreciates. So the counterintuitive thing is that a relatively strengthening home economy does not result in index outperformance. Quite the opposite, it normally means a relatively more hawkish central bank, and an appreciating currency (Chart I-10). Thereby it causes index underperformance. Hence, Eurostoxx50 performance relative to the FTSE100 boils down to the inverse direction of euro/pound. Once again, Chart I-11 should leave readers in no doubt. Chart I-10A Relatively More Hawkish Central Bank =##br## A Stronger Currency Chart I-11A Stronger Currency = ##br##Equity Index Underperformance Which neatly brings us to today's ECB meeting. The ECB is a tunnel-vision 2% inflation-targeting central bank. Any upgrade to its inflation forecast, as seems likely, would imply less need for its extreme and experimental monetary easing. Once digested by the market, this would support the euro. Meanwhile, on the other side of the Channel, the U.K. Government is preparing to trigger Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty and start its formal divorce from the EU within a couple of weeks. Expect the EU's immediate response to cast long shadows across Theresa May's vision of a future in sunlit uplands. Once digested by the market, this would further weigh down the pound. A stronger euro/pound necessarily means underweighting the Eurostoxx50 versus the FTSE100. The Fallacy Of Division For Bonds The fallacy of division also applies to euro area sovereign bonds. The aggregate euro area sovereign yield just equals the average ECB policy rate anticipated over the lifetime of the bond (Chart I-12). This is directly analogous to the relationship between the U.K. gilt yield and the anticipated path of the BoE base rate, and the relationship between the U.S. T-bond yield and the anticipated path of the Fed funds rate (Chart I-13). Chart I-12The Aggregate Euro Area Bond Yield = ##br##The Average ECB Policy Rate Expected Chart I-13The U.S. T-Bond Yield = ##br##The Average Fed Funds Rate Expected But what is true for the whole is not necessarily true for the parts that make up the whole. Individual euro area sovereign bond yields carry a second component which can override everything else. This second component is a redenomination premium as compensation for the expected loss if the bond redenominates out of euros. For example, the redenomination premium on a Spanish Bono versus a French OAT equals: The annual probability of euro breakup Multiplied by The expected undervaluation of a new peseta versus a new franc. However, the ECB's own analysis shows that Spain is now as competitive as France (Chart I-14), meaning that a new peseta ultimately should not lose value versus a new franc. So irrespective of the probability of euro breakup, the second item of the multiplication should be zero. Meaning that the redenomination premium should also be zero, rather than today's 75 bps (on 10-year Bonos over OATs). Bear in mind that Spain's housing bust and subsequent recapitalisation of its banks has followed Ireland's template - just with a two year lag. And observe that the redenomination premium on Irish 10-year bonds over OATs, which once stood at a remarkable 1100 bps, has now completely vanished. We expect Spain to continue following in the footsteps of Ireland (Chart I-15). As a structural position, stay long Spanish Bonos versus French OATs. Chart I-14Spain Has Dramatically Improved##br## Its Competitiveness Chart I-15Spain Is Following In The##br## Footsteps Of Ireland Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Listed as Alphabet. 2 On a per capita basis. Fractal Trading Model* Long tin / short copper hit its 5% profit target, while short MSCI AC World hit its 2.5% stop-loss. This week's recommendation is to short ruble / dollar. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-16 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Chart 1Keep A Close Eye On Financial Conditions The market's rate hike expectations moved sharply higher during the past two weeks as a string of Fed speeches, including one by Chair Yellen, all but confirmed a March rate hike. The market is now priced for 75 basis points of hikes during the next 12 months, compared to 50 bps at the end of January. At least so far, broad indicators of financial conditions have not tightened in response to this re-rating of the Fed (Chart 1). However, there are some preliminary indications that the reflation trade is fraying at the edges. The trade-weighted dollar has appreciated +0.2% since the end of January, the 2/10 Treasury slope has flattened 9 bps and the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate has declined 1 bp. The Fed is currently testing the markets with hawkish rhetoric but, with inflation and TIPS breakevens still below target, will ultimately support the reflation trade if it comes under threat. In this environment investors with 6-12 month investment horizons should maintain below-benchmark duration, remain overweight spread product and continue to position for a steeper curve and wider TIPS breakevens. Feature Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade: Overweight Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 48 basis points in February. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 6 bps on the month and, at 112 bps, it remains well below its historical average (134 bps). Our research1 shows that when core PCE inflation is between 1.5% and 2%2 investment grade corporate bonds produce an average monthly excess return of close to zero. A 90% confidence interval places monthly excess returns between -19 bps and +17 bps with inflation in this range and excess returns do not turn decisively negative until core PCE is above 2%. Given the Fed's desire to nurture a continued recovery in inflation, we are not worried about significant spread widening until inflation is sustainably above 2%. In the meantime we expect corporate bond excess returns to be low, but positive. While supportive monetary policy should ensure excess returns consistent with carry, investors should not bank on further spread compression as corporate spreads have already discounted a substantial improvement in leverage (Chart 2). Energy related sectors still appear cheap after adjusting for differences in credit rating and duration (Table 3), and our commodity strategists expect oil prices to remain firm even in the face of a stronger U.S. dollar. This week we upgrade the Wireless and Packaging sectors from underweight to neutral and downgrade the Consumer Cyclical Services sector from neutral to underweight. The former two sectors now appear cheap on our model, while the latter has become expensive. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation*Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Neutral Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 112 basis points in February. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 25 bps on the month and, at 349 bps, it is currently 170 bps below its historical average. One of our key investment themes3 for this year is that the uptrend in defaults is likely to reverse (Chart 3), mostly due to recovery in the energy sector. However, still-poor corporate health and tightening monetary policy will lead to a resumption of the uptrend in 2018 and beyond. Despite the positive outlook for defaults, we retain only a neutral allocation to High-Yield because of very tight valuations. The index option-adjusted spread is now within a hair of the average level of 340 bps that prevailed during the 2004 - 2006 Fed tightening cycle, when indicators of corporate balance sheet health were in much better shape. In fact, the index spread is now only 116 bps wider than its all-time low of 233 bps, reached in 2007. Our preferred measure of High-Yield valuation is the default-adjusted spread - the average spread of the junk index less our forecast of 12-month default losses. At present, the default-adjusted spread is 142 bps. Historically, a default-adjusted spread between 100 bps and 150 bps is consistent with positive excess returns during the subsequent 12 months 64% of the time. It is only when the default-adjusted spread falls below 100 bps that positive excess returns become unlikely. Junk has provided positive excess returns over a 12-month horizon only 13% of the time when the starting default-adjusted spread is between 50 bps and 100 bps. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 3 basis points in February. The conventional 30-year MBS yield fell 5 bps on the month, driven by a 7 bps decline in the rate component. The compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) increased by 1 bp, as did the option-adjusted spread. MBS spreads remain extremely tight relative both to history and Aaa-rated credit, although they have begun to widen somewhat relative to credit in recent weeks (Chart 4). More distressing is that the nominal MBS spread appears too tight relative to interest rate volatility (bottom panel). As we noted in a recent report,4 the long-run trend in interest rate volatility tends to be driven by uncertainty about the macroeconomic and political environment. In fact, rate volatility can be modeled using forecaster disagreement about GDP growth and T-bill rates. While the Fed's policy of forward guidance and a fed funds rate pinned at zero limited the amount of forecaster disagreement in recent years, this disagreement will re-emerge the further the fed funds rate moves off its lower bound. Another medium-term risk for MBS comes from the Fed ending the reinvestment of its MBS portfolio. As we described in a recent Special Report,5 the Fed is likely to allow its MBS portfolio to shrink at some point in 2018, putting further upward pressure on MBS spreads. Government Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The government-related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 30 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +51 bps. The high-beta Sovereign and Foreign Agency sectors outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 90 bps and 59 bps, respectively. Meanwhile, the low-beta Domestic Agency and Supranational sectors each outperformed by 4 bps. Local Authorities returned 24 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries. Sovereigns have outperformed Baa-rated corporate bonds year-to-date, a trend consistent with the rise in commodity prices and a trade-weighted dollar that has weakened by 1.5% (Chart 5). However, the dollar has started to appreciate in recent weeks and probably has further upside in the medium-term, especially if the Fed maintains its hawkish posture. Historically, it has been very rare for Sovereigns to outperform U.S. corporate bonds when the dollar is appreciating. After adjusting for credit rating and duration, the Foreign Agency and Local Authority sectors continue to appear cheap relative to U.S. corporate credit. In contrast, Sovereigns, Supranationals and Domestic Agencies all appear expensive. We continue to recommend overweight allocations to Foreign Agencies and Local Authorities, alongside underweight allocations to the rest of the government-related index. In a television interview last month Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin confirmed that GSE reform is still a priority for the new administration but that tax reform is much higher on the agenda. This means that agency spreads will likely remain insulated from any "reform risk" until next year at the earliest. Municipal Bonds: Neutral Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 13 basis points in February (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio has fallen 4% since the end of January and remains firmly anchored below its post-crisis average. The decline in the average M/T yield ratio was concentrated in short maturities, while ratios at the long-end of the curve actually rose (Chart 6). Accelerating fund flows and falling issuance will continue to support yield ratios in the near term. In fact, our tactical yield ratio model - based on issuance, fund flows and ratings migration - shows that yield ratios are presently very close to fair value. Although the average M/T yield ratio still appears expensive if we include the global economic policy uncertainty index as an additional explanatory variable.6 One risk to Munis is that yield ratios have already discounted a substantial reduction in state and local government net borrowing in Q1 (panel 3). While we expect this improvement will materialize in the next few quarters, net borrowing is biased upward beyond this year based on the lagged relationship between corporate sector and state and local government health.7 Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve has bear-flattened since the end of January as the market revised its Fed rate hike expectations sharply higher. Both the 2/10 and 5/30 Treasury slopes have flattened by 9 basis points since January 31. As such, our recommended position long the 5-year bullet and short the 2/10 barbell - designed to profit from a steeper yield curve - has returned -26 bps since the end of January, although it has returned close to 0 bps since it was initiated on December 20.8 As was stated on the front page of this report, the Fed's increasingly hawkish rhetoric has already caused the uptrend in TIPS breakevens to pause and the nominal Treasury slope to flatten (Chart 7). With inflation still below target these trends are not sustainable from the point of view of Fed policymakers. If the trend of decreasing TIPS breakevens and a flattening curve persists, we would expect the Fed to back away from its hawkish rhetoric. This dynamic will support a steeper yield curve at least until core PCE inflation is back to the Fed's 2% target and long-dated TIPS breakevens are anchored in a range between 2.4% and 2.5% (a range that is typically consistent with core PCE inflation at 2%). The persistent attractiveness of the 5-year bullet relative to the rest of the curve makes a position long the 5-year bullet and short a duration-matched 2/10 barbell the most attractive way to position for a steeper yield curve (panel 3). The carry buffer in the 5-year helps mitigate some of the risk of curve flattening. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 18 basis points in February. The 10-year TIPS breakeven rate declined 3 bps on the month and, at 2.04%, it remains well below its pre-crisis trading range of 2.4% to 2.5%. While the catalyst for the recent softening in TIPS outperformance seems to be the hawkish re-rating of Fed rate hike expectations, the uptrend in TIPS breakevens was probably due for a pause in any case. Breakevens had become stretched relative to our TIPS Financial Model - based on the dollar, oil prices and the stock-to-bond total return ratio (Chart 8). Diffusion indexes for both PCE and CPI inflation have also shifted into negative territory, suggesting that realized inflation readings will soften during the next couple of months. On a cyclical horizon, however, the Fed will be keen to allow breakevens to rise toward levels more consistent with its inflation target and will quickly adopt a more dovish stance if breakevens fall significantly. This "Fed put" should remain in place at least until core PCE inflation is firmly anchored around 2% and long-dated TIPS breakevens return to a range between 2.4% and 2.5%. As we detailed in a recent report,9 while accelerating wage growth will ensure that inflation remains in a long-run uptrend, the impact from wages will be mitigated by deflating import prices meaning that the uptrend will be slow. We continue to expect that year-over-year core PCE inflation will not attain the Fed's 2% target until the end of this year. ABS: Maximum Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities performed in-line with the duration-equivalent Treasury index in February. Aaa-rated issues underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 2 basis points, while non-Aaa issues outperformed by 12 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened 3 bps on the month. At 50 bps, the spread remains well below its average pre-crisis level. Banks are now tightening lending standards on both auto loans and credit cards (Chart 9). While we do not think this will have much of an impact on consumer spending,10 it is usually an indication that there is growing concern about ABS collateral credit quality. While credit card charge-offs remain well below their pre-crisis levels, net losses on auto loans have in fact started to trend higher (bottom panel). We continue to recommend Aaa-rated credit cards over Aaa-rated auto loans, despite the spread advantage in autos. We will closely monitor the evolving credit quality situation, but for now continue to view consumer ABS as a very attractive alternative to other short-duration Aaa-rated spread product such as MBS and Agency bonds. The main reason being the sizeable spread advantage that has persisted in ABS for some time. At present, Aaa-rated consumer ABS offer an option-adjusted spread of 50 bps, compared to 31 bps for 30-year conventional Agency MBS and 18 bps for Agency bonds. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 34 basis points in February. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 7 bps on the month, but remains below its average pre-crisis level (Chart 10). Rising CMBS delinquency rates and tightening commercial real estate lending standards make us cautious on non-agency CMBS. This caution has only intensified now that spreads are firmly entrenched below their pre-crisis average. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 20 basis points in February. The index option-adjusted spread for Agency CMBS widened 5 bps on the month, and currently sits at 53 bps. The spread offered on Agency CMBS is similar to what is offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS (50 bps) and greater than what is offered by conventional 30-year MBS (31 bps) for a similar amount of spread volatility. We continue to recommend an overweight position in Agency CMBS. Treasury Valuation Chart 11Treasury Fair Value Models The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (which is based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) places fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.42% (Chart 11). Our 3-factor version of the model, which also incorporates the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, places fair value at 2.21%. The lower fair value results from the large spike in the uncertainty index last November, which has only been partially unwound (bottom panel). Large spikes in uncertainty that do not coincide with deterioration in other economic indicators tend to mean revert fairly quickly. So we would be inclined to view the fair value reading from our 2-factor model as more indicative of true fair value at the moment. For further details on our Treasury models please refer to the U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Model", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.49%. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Inflation: More Fire Than Ice, But Don't Sound The Alarm", dated January 24, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Year-over-year core PCE inflation is currently 1.74%. 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Road To Higher Vol Is Paved With Uncertainty", dated February 14, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "The Way Forward For The Fed's Balance Sheet", dated February 28, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 For further details on the model please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 For further details on the linkage between corporate sector health and state & local government health please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Trading The Municipal Credit Cycle", dated October 18, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Inflation: More Fire Than Ice, But Don't Sound The Alarm", dated January 24, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Odds Of March", dated February 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon) Current Recommendation

Highlights Assessing Our Tilts: Our decision to upgrade corporate spread product versus government debt in the U.S., and to reduce overall recommended duration exposure, at the end of January has been performing well. Maintain these tilts, with both soft and hard economic data pointing to a broadening global economic upturn and the Fed prepared to hike rates next week. Fed Vs ECB: Cyclical comparisons of the Euro Area today to the U.S. in the months prior to the Fed's 2013 "Taper Tantrum" show that the Euro Area is closer to full employment, with headline inflation at target, compared to the U.S. four years ago. The ECB may be facing its own tantrum pressures later in 2017. U.K.: Gilts have already priced in a significantly weaker U.K. economic outlook, especially with regards to consumer spending, yet inflation expectations are only now starting to peak. Raise U.K. bond exposure to neutral, from underweight. More clarity on the Brexit negotiations status is necessary to develop a firmer conviction on Gilts with yields already at rich levels. Feature Chart of the WeekAre Central Banks Getting ##br##Behind The Curve? A whiff of central bank hawkishness has quickly swept over the major bond markets. In the U.S., a series of Fed speeches, coming after a string of improving economic data amid booming asset markets, has turned a March Fed rate hike from a long-shot to a virtual certainty in little more than a week. In Europe, another round of stronger inflation data is emboldening some of the hawks at the European Central Bank (ECB) to more openly question if some tapering of the central bank's asset purchases will be necessary next year. Even in the U.K., the Bank of England (BoE) is letting its latest round of Gilt quantitative easing (QE) expire, although the BoE is not close to considering a rate hike, as we discuss later in this Weekly Report. Chart 2A Supportive Backdrop ##br##For Taking Credit Risk A move by the Fed next week now seems like a done deal, and the new question for investors is: how many more times the Fed will lift rates in 2017? The market is now pricing in "only" 75bps of hikes over the next year, even as the S&P 500 sits close to its all-time high and U.S. jobless claims hit a 43-year low last week (Chart 1). We still see three hikes - the Fed's current projection - to be the most that the Fed will deliver in 2017. Yet the fact that equity & credit markets have taken the rising odds of a March rate increase in stride might nudge the Fed towards even more hikes this year than currently forecast. Bond markets around the world will likely not take a shift higher in the Fed "dots" very well, although in the U.S. the immediate upside for yields remains tempered by the persistent short positioning in the U.S. Treasury market. We still expect Treasury yields to rise over the next 6-9 months, though, driven by additional increases in inflation expectations rather than a sharp repricing of the expected path of the funds rate. The biggest risk looming for global bonds, however, would come from any signal by the ECB that a taper is in the cards next year. That would likely result in wider term premiums and bear-steepening of yield curves in the major developed government bond markets. It would be a surprise if the ECB started preparing the markets for a less accommodative policy stance at this week's meeting, although questions about a taper will certainly be posed to ECB President Draghi by reporters after the meeting. Evaluating Our Recommendations As Global Growth Improves Back on January 31st, we shifted to a more pro-growth stance in our fixed income portfolio recommendations, moving our duration tilt back to below-benchmark, while downgrading government debt and upgrading corporate bond exposure.1 The key to that shift was a growing body of evidence pointing to a broadening global economic upturn. The latest round of global purchasing managers' indices (PMIs) released last week confirmed that the business cycle dynamics continue to accelerate to the upside (Chart 2). This will maintain upward pressure on bond yields and downward pressure on credit spreads. Our portfolio recommendations have generally done well since we made our shift. In Chart 3, we show the excess returns (on a currency-hedged basis) for the individual government debt markets versus the overall Barclays Global Treasury Index since the end of January. Our underweight positions in the U.S., Spain and Australia (up to February 21st, when we upgraded Aussie debt to neutral) performed well, as did our overweights in core Europe (Germany & France). Our worst performing tilts were our below-benchmark stances on Italy, which benefitted greatly from some diminished pressures on French government debt last week, and U.K. Gilts, which we discuss later in this report. In Chart 4, we show the excess returns (on a currency-hedged basis) for the major spread product markets, since January 31. Our decisions to upgrade U.S. investment grade (IG) to above-benchmark, and U.S. high-yield (HY) to neutral, have done well as U.S. corporate spreads continue to tighten in response to improving U.S. economic growth. Our relative exposures between the U.S. and Euro Area remain our biggest tilts between countries. Specifically, we remain overweight core Euro Area government debt versus U.S. Treasuries, while we are neutral U.S. HY and underweight Euro Area equivalents. On IG corporate debt, we are above-benchmark on both sides of the Atlantic. Our marginal preference, however, is for U.S. IG given the shifting changes in relative balance sheet health in the U.S. (improving, but from relatively poor levels) versus Europe (stable, but at relatively strong levels) suggested by our Corporate Health Monitors. On a currency-hedged and duration-matched basis, our relative U.S. vs Euro Area tilts have done well since our major allocation shift on January 31 (Chart 5), with Treasuries underperforming, U.S. HY outperforming and both U.S. and European IG performing similarly. Chart 3Our Recent Country Allocation Performance Chart 4Our Recent Spread Product Allocation Performance Chart 5Our Europe Vs U.S. Tilts Have Done Well Of Late Bottom Line: Our decision to upgrade corporate spread product risk versus government debt in the U.S., and to reduce overall recommended duration exposure, at the end of January has been performing well. Maintain these tilts, with both soft and hard economic data pointing to a broadening global economic upturn and the Fed prepared to hike rates next week. The Timing Of A Potential "Bund Tantrum" Looking ahead, timing a potential turn in our U.S. versus Europe tilts will likely remain the biggest call we make this year. With the Fed now set to raise rates again next week, and the ECB likely to deflect any talk of a taper to after the upcoming French elections (at the earliest), the bias will remain toward Treasury market underperformance in the near term. Yet the marginal pressures on inflation in both the U.S. and Euro Area suggest that a turning point in U.S./Core Europe bond spreads could arrive sooner than many expect. While realized inflation rates are moving higher in both regions, the underlying price pressures have a different look. In the U.S., headline inflation (using the Fed's preferred measure, the change in the personal consumption expenditure, or PCE, deflator) has risen to 1.89%, a mere 15bps above core PCE inflation with both measures now sitting just below the Fed's 2% target. Yet the breadth of the rise in core inflation has rolled over, according to our diffusion index (Chart 6). This suggests that the recent acceleration in core inflation, which we believe the Fed is most focused on, may take a pause in the next few months. The opposite is true in the Euro Area, where headline HICP inflation (the ECB's target measure) has soared to 1.9%, right at the ECB target of "at or just below" 2%. The gap between headline and core HICP inflation has been widening, though, as there has been very little follow through from the acceleration in headline inflation, largely driven by base effects related to previous rises in energy prices and declines in the euro, into core prices. Our Euro Area headline inflation diffusion index is moving higher, highlighting that the increase in headline HICP inflation is becoming more broadly based (Chart 7). Chart 6A Narrowing Increase In U.S. Inflation Chart 7A Broadening Increase In Euro Area Inflation The cyclical uptrend in Euro Area growth and inflation is also fairly broad-based at the country level, with the individual country PMIs and headline HICP inflation rates all in solid uptrends for the major countries in the region (Chart 8). At the same time, core inflation rates remain well contained. Various ECB members have pointed to the benign core inflation readings as a reason to stay the course on extraordinarily accommodative monetary policy settings. Yet with unemployment rapidly falling in many parts of the Euro Area, it is becoming increasingly difficult to get a consensus view on maintaining the status quo on ECB policy. Already, the German Bundesbank has been quite vocal in questioning the need for the ECB to maintain the current pace of its asset purchase program, and that pressure will only grow with German inflation now above 2%. So how close is the ECB to a potential asset purchase taper? Some clues emerge when comparing Europe now to the U.S. around the time of the Fed's 2013 "Taper Tantrum." In Chart 9, we show "cycle-on-cycle" comparisons for both the Euro Area and U.S. All series in the chart are lined up to the peak in our Months-To-Hike indicator, which measures the number of months to the first rate hike of the next interest rate cycle, as discounted in the Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve. That indicator peaked in the U.S. in late 2012, several months before Ben Bernanke's infamous speech in May 2013 that signaled the Fed's QE appetite was beginning to wane. Chart 8A Consistent Upturn##br## In Europe Chart 9Less Spare Capacity In Europe Now Vs ##br##Pre-Taper Tantrum U.S. In the Euro Area, the Months-To-Hike indicator peaked in July of last year right around the time of the U.K. Brexit vote. Interestingly, the indicator remains much higher than it ever was in the U.S. during the QE era, indicating how the market believes that the ECB will have to maintain zero (or lower) interest rates for longer. Yet, by some measures, the ECB is closer to reaching its policy goals then the Fed was in 2012/13. In the 2nd panel of Chart 9, we show the "unemployment gap" - the difference between the unemployment rate and the rate consistent with inflation stability - for the U.S. and Euro Area. Note that there is far less spare capacity in labor markets today in Europe than there was in the U.S. when the Fed raised the topic of a QE taper to the markets. The U.S. unemployment rate was a full three percentage points above the full employment level in 2012, while Euro Area unemployment is now only one percentage point above full employment. In the bottom two panels of Chart 9, we show the gap between headline and core inflation in both the U.S. and Euro Area, relative to the 2% inflation targets that both the Fed and ECB aim to hit. U.S. inflation was in the vicinity of the Fed's target around the time of the Taper Tantrum. While Euro Area headline inflation is similarly close to the ECB's 2% target today, core inflation is much further away from 2% than U.S. core inflation was four years ago. If the ECB focuses on headline rather than core inflation, then Europe could be getting close to its own Taper Tantrum. Yet the relatively calmer readings on Euro Area core inflation suggest that the ECB does not have to make a rush to judgement on its asset purchase program, especially given the uncertainties presented by the upcoming French elections in April & May. We are still maintaining our overweight stance on core European government debt versus U.S. Treasuries, but we are growing increasingly worried that a turning point may be on the horizon. As can be seen in the additional cycle-on-cycle comparisons in Chart 10, the benchmark 10-year German Bund is tracing out a similar path to that of the 10-year U.S. Treasury around the time of the Fed Taper Tantrum. If the ECB focuses on the tightening labor market and accelerating pace of headline inflation in the Euro Area, a "Bund Tantrum" could become the big story for global bond markets later this year. Bottom Line: Cyclical comparisons of the Euro Area today to the U.S. in the months prior to the Fed's 2013 "Taper Tantrum" show that the Euro Area is closer to full employment, with headline inflation at target, compared to the U.S. four years ago. The ECB may be facing its own tantrum pressures later in 2017. Gilt(y) Optimism? The British economy has surprised to the upside in the last few months. Policy uncertainty has collapsed, while inflation expectations have marched higher and business optimism has stabilized. Most surprising against this backdrop, Gilt returns, on a currency hedged basis, have beaten most of their developed market fixed income peers (Chart 11). Chart 10A Bund Taper On The Horizon? Chart 11Gilts Should Have Underperformed This outperformance cannot be linked to factors such as the usual safe-haven status of Gilts, with no signs of major financial stresses in the Euro Area that would cause money to flow into Gilts (Chart 12). Indeed, the opposite has been happening as foreigners have been net sellers of Gilts in recent months. A better explanation might come from what has become a bond-bullish linkage between the British currency, inflation, real wages and consumption. In all likelihood, investors have already incorporated most of the impact of a weak Pound on U.K. inflation expectations and Gilt yields. Yet higher expected prices continue to erode household purchasing power, leading to weaker consumer spending (Chart 13). This dynamic is bullish for bonds. Chart 12Can't Blame The Safe Haven Status This Time Chart 13Consumers Will Feel The Pinch Already, this backdrop has become widely accepted. The Bloomberg survey of economists' forecasts is calling for U.K. consumer spending growth to decelerate to 1.6% on a year-over-year basis in 2017, down from 2.8% in 2016. The BoE adopted a more dovish stance at last month's Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting, citing the downside risks to consumption from high currency-driven inflation at a time of persistent spare capacity in labor markets and modest wage increases.2 This threat to U.K. growth from a more sluggish consumer should continue, at least in the short term. BCA's U.K. real average weekly earnings model is clearly pointing towards additional declines in inflation-adjusted wages (Chart 14). This should restrain consumption growth, especially as other factors boosting spending are likely to fade. For example, the gains to disposable income growth from falling interest rates are likely done for this cycle, with mortgage rates having little room to decline further from the current 2.5% level (Chart 15). Also, consumer credit is now expanding 10% year-over-year - a pace that is most likely unsustainable with household debt still at high levels relative to income and the savings rate having fallen close to pre-recession levels (Chart 16). As a result, U.K. consumers are unlikely to continue stretching their financial situation to support spending. Chart 14Real Wages Will Constrain Consumption Chart 15Little Room For Lower Mortgage Rates Chart 16Structural Limits On Consumer Credit Growth Additionally, the housing market could dent consumer confidence in the near term. Since the beginning of 2014, all measures of house price inflation have rolled over, while mortgage approvals have moved sideways (Chart 17). Signs of increased weakness are appearing and could force households to revise their spending habits downward. There are also potential risks coming from the business side, despite some more positive data of late. BCA's U.K. capex indicator, composed of several survey measures, points to a cyclical improvement in capital spending in the next few quarters. At the same time, net lending to non-financial institutions is growing at a robust rate (Chart 18), suggesting that credit availability is not an impairment for U.K. businesses. Chart 17Housing: From Tailwind To Headwind? Chart 18Some Optimism Is Warranted... However, the situation remains very fragile. The upcoming Brexit negotiations will keep animal spirits well contained. Firms have become more risk averse and less willing to take balance sheet risks according to the Deloitte CFO survey (Chart 19). Until the details on the U.K.'s future economic links to Europe are resolved, corporate decision-makers will be dissuaded from making long-term investments in productivity-enhancing capital such as plant and machinery. In turn, the continued lack of productivity gains will further depress U.K. corporate profitability (Chart 19, bottom panels). This uncertain environment will mean suppressed hiring intentions, greater slack in the economy and decreasing inflationary pressure. Consequently, the BoE should remain patient. The accommodative policy measures introduced last August after the Brexit vote have been working so far. Rock bottom real yields and highly expansionary money supply growth have spurred domestically generated inflation. While the BoE's latest Gilt QE program is expiring, there is no rush to hike rates until core inflation has reached the 2% threshold or until headline inflation tops out at 2.7% in Q1 2018, as the BoE predicts.3 As such, the probability of a rate hike this year, which has collapsed from 55% to 17% since January, will fall even further, to the benefit of Gilts (Chart 20). Chart 19...But The Brexit-Induced Stalemate ##br##Effects Still Prevail Chart 20More Time Needed ##br##For The BoE This week, we are upgrading our recommended stance on Gilts from below-benchmark to neutral. We have maintained an underweight posture since October 18th of last year, primarily driven by our expectation that rising U.K. inflation would put upward pressure on Gilt yields. Now that the main force driving inflation higher - the exchange rate - is bottoming out and possibly set to reverse, we have to change tack. On that note, our colleagues at BCA Geopolitical Strategy have recently laid out a very compelling bullish case for the Pound.4 They disagree with the assessment that further volatility in the currency is warranted because of the Brexit process. They oppose the market narrative that: Europeans will seek to punish the U.K. severely for Brexit, to set an example to their own Euroskeptics; Exiting the common market is negative for the country's economy in the short-term; Remaining legal uncertainties about Brexit could derail the process. In their view, two events that occurred in January - the U.K. Supreme Court decision that the U.K. parliament must have a say in triggering Article 50 and Prime Minister May's "Brexit means exit" speech - have reduced political uncertainty regarding Brexit. The first because parliament would ultimately be bound by the popular referendum. The second because the main cause of European consternation - the U.K. asking for special treatment with respect to the common market - was taken off the table. Thus, going forward, Europe will exact a price, but it will not be severe. And the negative economic repercussions of leaving will only be fully registered in the coming years. If our colleagues are right, an overweight position in Gilts could be tempting, as a stronger Pound would decrease inflation expectations, pushing nominal yields lower. This case is even stronger given the economic uncertainties we've laid out above. Despite their convincing arguments, we prefer to take a cautious approach, while waiting to see on what ground the Brexit negotiations will start. Moreover, Gilt valuations now seem rich, with spreads versus U.S. Treasuries at historic lows. Thus, we are only upgrading to a neutral allocation to Gilts for now. In our model portfolio (shown on Page 16), we are funding the increased Gilt allocations by equally reducing the U.S. and German exposure, given the upward pressure on yields in those markets described earlier in this Weekly Report. Bottom Line: The U.K. economy has surprised to the upside and inflation expectations have reacted in line with the domestic currency weakness. There is now a greater chance that both of those trends will reverse, to the benefit of Gilts. Raise U.K. bond exposure to neutral, from underweight. More clarity on the Brexit negotiations status is necessary to develop a firmer conviction on Gilts, especially with yield already at rich levels. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Jean-Laurent Gagnon, Editor/Strategist jeang@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "The Global Growth Upturn Has Legs: Reduce Duration, Upgrade Credit Exposure", dated January 31, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 2 The BoE lowered its estimate of the full-employment level of the U.K. unemployment rate, consistent with accelerating wage growth, from 5% to 4.5% at the February MPC meeting. 3 Please see "Inflation Report", February 2017, Bank Of England, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/inflationreport/2017/feb.aspx 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The "What Can You Do For Me" World?", dated January 25, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns