Fixed Income

Highlights U.S. Treasuries: U.S. Treasury yields are too low relative to the strength of global economic growth and the rising trend in U.S. inflation expectations. Maintain below-benchmark duration exposure in the U.S., stay underweight Treasuries versus global bond benchmarks, and continue to favor TIPS over nominals. Canada: The Canadian economic data is moving from strength to strength, and now price and wage inflation data is moving higher. The Bank of Canada will hike rates next week with additional increases likely in 2018. Remain underweight Canadian government bonds and stay long inflation protection (both through linkers and CPI swaps). 2017 Model Portfolio Performance Wrap-Up: We closed the books on the first full calendar year of our model bond portfolio with a total return of 3.75%. This was a small -13bps of underperformance versus our custom benchmark, coming entirely from underweight positions on longer-dated developed market government bonds that offset the asset allocation gains from overweights to corporate debt. Feature Chart of the WeekGlobal Bond Yields Are Too Low Global Bond Yields Are Too Low Global Bond Yields Are Too Low 2018 has started much as 2017 ended, with growth-sensitive assets rallying alongside robust economic data. Most major global equity markets are already up 2-3% after the first week of the year, with the U.S. NASDAQ, Japanese Nikkei and Italian MIB indices advancing over 4%. Global credit markets are also off to a strong start, with spreads for U.S. High-Yield corporate debt and EM hard currency corporate debt tighter by -17bps and -8bps, respectively. Even commodity markets have joined the party, with the benchmark Brent oil price hitting the highest level in nearly three years. The pro-growth, pro-risk backdrop is keeping upward pressure on global government bond yields. This is occurring primarily through the inflation expectations component of yields, which are rising in all developed economies (even Japan). Real yields, which are not rising despite the strength of the broad-based global growth upturn (Chart of the Week), have been drifting lower, providing some offset to rising inflation expectations. The primary trend for global yields remains upward, however - especially if growth remains solid and inflation expectations continue to push higher, giving central banks like the U.S. Federal Reserve the confidence to continue hiking interest rates. We continue to favor below-benchmark duration exposure, and overweight corporate bond allocations versus government debt, for global fixed income investors over the next 6-9 months. U.S. Treasuries: Still More Reasons To Sell Than Buy U.S. Treasury market participants have a lot to things to be nervous about at the moment. Likely future Fed rate hikes, the weakening U.S. dollar, rising oil prices, ongoing U.S. labor market strength, persistently booming economic growth, the never-ending equity bull market, the potential impact of the Trump fiscal stimulus, the Fed starting its balance sheet runoff - all factors that should force bond investors to expect yields to rise. Yet longer-dated Treasury yields continue to trade too low relative to the bond-bearish fundamentals. The current benchmark 10-year Treasury yield at 2.48% remains well below the fair value from our 2-factor regression model, which is now up to 2.94% (Chart 2). That valuation gap of 46bps is close to the widest levels seen in July 2016 and September 2017, which were both episodes that proved to be excellent entry points for bearish Treasury positions. The two inputs into our Treasury yield model are the global manufacturing PMI and bullish sentiment towards the U.S. dollar (USD). The PMI is included as an indicator of global growth and currently sits at 54.5 - the highest level in nearly seven years - led by strong readings in almost every major economy (Chart 3). This has been the primary driver of the fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield since global growth bottomed out and began to accelerate in mid-2016. Chart 210-Year Treasuries Are##BR##Overvalued On Our Model 10-year Treasuries Are Overvalued On Our Model 10-year Treasuries Are Overvalued On Our Model Chart 3Global Growth##BR##Is Booming Global Growth Is Booming Global Growth Is Booming Sentiment towards the USD is the second input to our Treasury model. It is included as a weakening greenback represents an easing of monetary conditions that could trigger a need for more Fed rate hikes that can push the Treasury curve higher from the short-end (and vice versa for a rallying USD). At the same time, a depreciating USD can drive U.S. inflation higher through higher costs of imported goods & services, which can raise bond yields through higher inflation expectations or greater Fed tightening expectations (again, the opposite holds true for a strengthening USD). Right now, both the strong PMI and weak sentiment towards the dollar are boosting the fair value of the 10-year Treasury yield. The fall in value of the greenback is particularly unusual, as it is flying in the face of widening interest rate differentials between the U.S. and the rest of the world (Chart 4, top panel). This is clearly a function of the fact that global growth is rapidly improving - especially in Europe - but very few central banks have yet to respond to that growth with interest rate hikes that match what the Fed has been delivering. So while actual interest rate differentials remain USD-supportive, expectations of some eventual tighter monetary policy outside the U.S. that could narrow those interest rate gaps are triggering speculative inflows into non-USD currencies. With the trade-weighted USD now 5% below levels of a year ago, this should lead to higher headline inflation in the U.S. in the next few months (middle panel). Combined with the continued strength in global oil prices, that means that the two biggest factors that weighed on realized U.S. inflation- the USD rally and oil price collapse of 2014/15 - are now both acting to boost inflation expectations (bottom panel). Throw in the growing body of evidence that a tight U.S. labor market that is putting gentle upward pressure on wage growth, and U.S. inflation expectations - which still remain 40-50bps below levels consistent with the Fed's inflation target - should continue to move higher in the next six months. Rising longer-term inflation expectations would typically result in bear-steepening pressures on the Treasury yield curve. That is not happening at the moment, however, with the 2-year/10-year Treasury curve still at a relatively flat 53bps at the time this report went to press. The flatness of the Treasury curve has worried investors, and even some Fed officials, given the well-known leading relationship between the yield curve and U.S. economic growth. It is too early to draw any conclusions between the shape of the curve and future U.S. economic growth, however, for several reasons: As mentioned above, inflation expectations are still well below levels consistent with the Fed's 2% inflation target on the PCE deflator (which translates to 2.5% on the CPI index used to price TIPS and CPI swaps). Both the European Central Bank (ECB) and Bank of Japan (BoJ) are still buying bonds through their asset purchase programs, although at a slower pace than previous years. This continues to depress local bond yields in Europe and Japan with spillover effects into the U.S. Treasury market - even as the Fed begins the slow runoff of Treasuries from its massive balance sheet. Data on mutual fund and ETF flows shows that there has been significant and sustained buying of bond funds by U.S. retail investors over the past couple of months. There has also been net selling of equity funds, however, suggesting that U.S. retail investors are rebalancing as the equity markets surge higher. Investor positioning in the U.S. Treasury market is very short at the moment, with the J.P. Morgan survey of "active" bond manager duration exposure at an all-time low and the net positioning on Treasury futures now slightly favoring shorts (Chart 5). It makes little sense to interpret a flattening Treasury curve as a signal that the bond market believes that the Fed was making a policy mistake if professional bond investors were running massive duration underweight positions that would benefit if bond yields rise. Chart 4Upside Pressure On U.S. Inflation##BR##From Oil & The USD Upside Pressure on U.S. Inflation from Oil & The USD Upside Pressure on U.S. Inflation from Oil & The USD Chart 5Big Duration Underweight##BR##Among U.S. Bond Managers Big Duration Underweight Among U.S. Bond Managers Big Duration Underweight Among U.S. Bond Managers All these factors muddy the economic signal provided by the Treasury curve at the moment. Nonetheless, we remain of the view that the Fed would not continue on its rate hiking path without U.S. inflation expectations moving sustainably back to levels consistent with the Fed's inflation target. In other words, the Treasury curve must bearishly steepen first through rising inflation expectations before bearishly flattening later through actual Fed rate hikes. The latter will dampen future U.S. growth expectations and eventually result in a cyclical peak in longer-dated Treasury yields, but from levels closer to 3% on the 10-year after inflation expectations "fully" normalize. Bottom Line: U.S. Treasury yields are too low relative to the strength of global economic growth and the rising trend in inflation expectations. Maintain below-benchmark duration exposure in the U.S., stay underweight Treasuries versus global bond benchmarks, and continue to favor TIPS over nominals. The Bank Of Canada Keeps On Playing Catch-Up The Canadian economic story continues to be the best within the developed world. The year-over-year growth rate for real GDP accelerated to over 3% late last year, primarily on the back of robust consumer spending (Chart 6). Even the lagging parts of the economy, like business investment and government spending, began to perk up last year. The momentum remained powerful at the end of 2017, with the unemployment rate in December hitting a 40-year low. The economic boom forced the Bank of Canada (BoC) to begin lifting interest rates last year, with two 25bp hikes occurring in July and September that unwound the easing from 2015. The rapid pace of growth has absorbed spare capacity much faster than the BoC originally projected. More hikes will be required if the current pace of growth is maintained, particularly with the BoC estimating that the neutral policy rate is around 3% and the current Overnight Rate is only at 1%. The Canadian consumer has been enjoying a powerful shopping spree. Real consumer spending growth is at 4% on a year-over-year basis - the highest level since early 2008 (Chart 7). This is led by a powerful surge in spending on consumer durables, where annual growth has surged to 10% (middle panel). Consumer confidence is booming and Canadian workers are enjoying the fastest pace of income growth since 2014 (bottom panel). Chart 6Robust Canadian Growth,##BR##Led By The Consumer Robust Canadian Growth, Led By The Consumer Robust Canadian Growth, Led By The Consumer Chart 7Canadian Consumers Are##BR##Confidently Spending Canadian Consumers Are Confidently Spending Canadian Consumers Are Confidently Spending Surprisingly, the powerful surge in consumer spending has occurred alongside some cooling of the overheated Canadian housing market. The growth rates of existing home sales and prices have both decelerated massively from the pace of the boom years in 2012-16 (Chart 8). The performance of house prices in the three biggest Canadian cities is now a mixed bag, with Vancouver prices reaccelerating, prices in Toronto decelerating and prices in Montreal growing only modestly (middle panel). Regulatory actions to limit the speculative buying of Canadian real estate by foreigners has helped dampen the surge in house prices in some markets. Although the bigger macro-prudential measures designed to tighten mortgage finance rules and reduce the amount of leverage in Canadian housing transactions has likely had a bigger effect. Canadian banks must now conduct stress tests to check if borrowers are able to pay off their mortgages if Canadian interest rates continue to rise. This represents a reduction in the marginal supply of riskier mortgage lending that will help restrain house price inflation in Canada's major cities. In addition, the supply of Canadian homes is growing with new home-building activity, both for single and multiple units, having picked up and overall residential investment growth now up nearly 5% on a year-over-year basis (bottom panel). With signs that the Canadian housing market has stopped rapidly inflating, the BoC can focus its interest rate policy on domestic growth and inflation considerations without worrying about pricking the housing bubble. On that front, the latest edition of the BoC's Business Outlook Survey, released yesterday, provided plenty of reasons to tighten monetary policy further. The overall survey indicator surged back to the peak seen last summer just before the BoC delivered its first rate hike (Chart 9). Capital spending intentions also rebounded back to the 2017 peaks, which bodes well for future gains in investment spending (second panel). Chart 8Canadian Housing Looking##BR##A Bit Less Frothy Canadian Housing Looking A Bit Less Frothy Canadian Housing Looking A Bit Less Frothy Chart 9BoC Business Outlook Survey Signaling##BR##Tightening Capacity Constraints BoC Business Outlook Survey Signaling Tightening Capacity Constraints BoC Business Outlook Survey Signaling Tightening Capacity Constraints The most interesting parts of the Business Outlook Survey were the capacity utilization measures. A greater share of companies were reporting labor shortages (third panel), with the highest percentage of firms reported difficulties in meeting unexpected increases in demand since 2007 (bottom panel). This suggests that the recent surge in employment, wage growth and price inflation are all sustainable. Headline and core CPI inflation are up to 2.1% and 1.8%, respectively, as of November. This is around the midpoint of the BoC's 1-3% target range (Chart 10). The Bank of Canada forecasts that CPI inflation will continue to rise and remain near 2% target in 2018, but all the risks are to the upside. The unemployment rate is now down to 5.7%, the lowest level since 1976 and well below the OECD's estimate of the NAIRU level at 6.5%. Average hourly earnings growth has surged in response, rising to just under 3% on a year-over-year basis since the trough in early 2017. The Phillips Curve appears to be alive and well in Canada. Canadian interest rate markets have already responded aggressively to the stronger growth and inflation data. Our interest rate discounters now show that the money markets are now expecting 61bps of BoC rate hikes over the next six months and 91bps over the next twelve months (Chart 11). With a 25bp hike at next week's BoC meeting now priced with almost full certainty, the current market pricing suggests at least one more hike will happen by June and nearly three more hikes by year-end. That would be even more hikes than we expect from the Fed in 2018, which is important for the Canadian dollar (CAD). The CAD has appreciated 16% since it bottomed out in early 2016, occurring alongside the rise in global oil prices over the same period (second panel). The price of Canada's Western Select grade of crude oil has lagged the move in other oil benchmarks massively over the past several months, due to a lack of pipeline capacity getting oil out of Alberta that has created a supply glut. This may limit the degree to which additional gains in global energy prices benefit the Canadian dollar from a terms-of-trade perspective. This will not prevent the BoC from delivering additional rate hikes, however - especially if that merely matches the 75bps of Fed rate hikes that the FOMC is projecting, and which we expect, over the rest of the year. In terms of investment strategy, the combination of robust Canadian economic growth and rising inflation pressures leads us to continue recommending an underweight stance on Canadian government bonds, as we have maintained since July 11, 2017. This week, we are introducing two new tactical trades that should benefit as Canadian inflation moves higher and the BoC tightens more aggressively in response (Chart 12): Chart 10The Canadian Phillips Curve Is Not Dead The Canadian Phillips Curve Is Not Dead The Canadian Phillips Curve Is Not Dead Chart 11The Market Now Expects A Lot From The BoC The Market Now Expects A Lot From The BoC The Market Now Expects A Lot From The BoC Chart 12Two New Tactical Trades In Canada Two New Tactical Trades In Canada Two New Tactical Trades In Canada Short the June 2018 Canada Bankers' Acceptance futures contact vs. the December 2018 contract (middle panel). The market is now discounting the likely maximum amount of tightening that the BoC can deliver by year-end, while there are only little more than two hikes priced by June. Assuming that the BoC hikes next week, that means that there is only one more hike expected by June. With three more BoC meetings scheduled between next week and June, that provides plenty of opportunities for hawkish surprises from the BoC before then. In other words, this trade is a way to play for the BoC being forced to front-load more rate hikes into the first half of 2018 versus the latter half. Long 10yr inflation expectations through linkers versus nominal government bonds, or using CPI swaps (bottom panel). Given the pickup in domestic inflation pressures currently underway, plus the rise in global inflation coming from the surge in commodity prices, there is room for Canadian market-based inflation expectations to rise from the current level of 1.7%. Bottom Line: The Canadian economic data is moving from strength to strength, and now price and wage inflation data is moving higher. The Bank of Canada will likely hike rates next week with additional increases likely in 2018. Remain underweight Canadian government bonds. 2017 GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Performance: A Brief Review The turn of the year marked the end of the first full calendar year for the Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) model bond portfolio. This now allows us to report the performance of the portfolio on the same basis as our clients. In the future, we will publish quarterly reviews of the portfolio returns after the end of each quarter in a calendar year (in April, July, October and January). The GFIS model portfolio returned 3.45% in 2017. This underperformed our custom performance benchmark (a blend of the Barclays Global Aggregate Index with global high-yield corporate debt) by -13bps (Chart 13). That underperformance can be entirely attributed to our government bond duration allocations, which lagged the benchmark by -46bps. Our recommended credit positions were a positive contributor, generating 33bps of outperformance primarily through overweights to U.S. Investment Grade and High-Yield corporate bonds. The detailed breakdown of the 2017 returns is presented in Table 1. In terms of the government bond portion of the portfolio, the underperformance can be isolated completely to the longest maturity bucket (10+ years). The combined performance of that bucket for all countries lagged that of the benchmark by -52bps. Given our expectation that global yield curves would bear-steepen in the latter half of 2017, it is no surprise that the bulk of our underperformance came by having too little exposure at the long-end. Also, having too much exposure in Japanese government bonds offering no yield also represented a major drag on the income component of the model portfolio's returns (Chart 14). Chart 13GFIS Model Bond Portfolio##BR##2017 Return Breakdown GFIS Model Bond Portfolio 2017 Return Breakdown GFIS Model Bond Portfolio 2017 Return Breakdown Table 1GFIS Model Bond Portfolio##BR##2017 Return Breakdown Let The Good Times Roll Let The Good Times Roll In terms of our credit allocations, favoring U.S. corporate exposure vs. non-U.S. corporates was the right call, generally speaking (Chart 15). However, we did not have enough portfolio weight in that trade to offset the drag on the overall yield from the Japan government bond overweight. Chart 14GFIS Model Portfolio Government Bond Performance Attribution By Country Let The Good Times Roll Let The Good Times Roll Chart 15GFIS Model Portfolio Spread Product Performance Attribution Let The Good Times Roll Let The Good Times Roll Looking ahead, the new model bond portfolio allocation for 2018 that we discussed in our final report of 2017 should offer a better chance of outperforming the benchmark.1 Specifically, we dialed down the Japan overweight, increased the U.S. Investment Grade corporate bond overweight, and reduced the curve steepening exposure in Euro Area governments. This not only boosted the overall yield of the portfolio, but also moderated the overall portfolio duration underweight. This portfolio will do well in the first half of 2018 if our base case of an inflation-driven rise in global government bond yields, led primarily by the U.S. where corporate debt is also expected to outperform Treasuries, comes to fruition. Bottom Line: We closed the books on the first full calendar year of our model bond portfolio with a total return of 3.75%. This was a small -13bps underperformance of versus our custom benchmark, coming entirely from underweight positions on longer-dated developed market government bonds that offset the asset allocation gains from overweights to corporate debt. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Our Model Bond Allocation In 2018: A Tale Of Two Halves", dated December 19th 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Let The Good Times Roll Let The Good Times Roll Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Upbeat economic reports for December set the stage for a solid 2018. The FOMC minutes acknowledged the flatter curve and only a minority of members discounted the signal from the curve. A majority thought that a tighter labor market would lead to higher inflation. The Citi Economic Surprise Index is peaking, but risk assets should hold up as the Index rolls over. Feature The first week of 2018 brought more good news for risk assets. U.S. stocks beat bonds, oil prices rose, and credit spreads narrowed amid a solid set of economic data. Several high-profile U.S. companies announced share buybacks, and/or one-time bonuses or wage increases linked to the tax cut plan passed by Congress at the end of 2017. Moreover, there were hints of further economic stimulus as lawmakers from both sides of the aisle discussed relaxing the sequester rules that would lift federal spending this year. Markets shrugged off a fresh round of saber rattling between the U.S. and North Korea. Gold prices nudged higher and the U.S. dollar fell despite the upbeat economic news. December's reports on manufacturing and service sector ISM, vehicle sales and the labor market, along with November's numbers on construction spending, trade and factory orders, all lifted estimates for Q4 GDP and boosted the prospects for corporate earnings in Q4 2017 and beyond. Chart 1 shows that the elevated ISM figures provide a favorable backdrop for earnings and sales in 2018. Moreover, Chart 2 indicates that IP, a proxy for S&P 500 sales, is poised to advance in 2018 and provide a lift to corporate profits. We will preview the S&P 500's Q4 2017 earnings reports in next week's U.S. Investment Strategy. Chart 1Favorable Macro Backdrop For Earnings And Sales Favorable Macro Backdrop For Earnings And Sales Favorable Macro Backdrop For Earnings And Sales Chart 2ISM Components Suggest IP Poised To Accelerate ISM Components Suggest IP Poised To Accelerate ISM Components Suggest IP Poised To Accelerate The Atlanta Fed GDP Now estimate stood at 2.7% on January 5, while the New York Fed's Nowcast for Q4 GDP was a healthy 4% (Chart 3). Both soundings are well above the FOMC's assessment of the economy's long-term potential growth rate (1.8%) and puts GDP growth in 2017 above the Fed's forecast. The implication is that the output gap pushed deeper into positive territory as 2017 ended, setting the stage for higher inflation in 2018. The December 2017 jobs report, released last Friday, January 5, does not change BCA's outlook for the U.S. economy or the Fed. The U.S. economy added a lower than expected 148,000 new jobs in December, which left the unemployment rate unchanged at 4.1%. Despite the softer than anticipated data, the 3-month average of payrolls growth is still a very healthy 204,000. The monthly increase in wages quickened to 0.3% m/m in December, up from 0.1% m/m last month. However, annual wage inflation remains modest at just 2.5% (Chart 4). Chart 3U.S. Economic Growth Well##BR##Ahead Of Potential In Q4 U.S. Economic Growth Well Ahead Of Potential In Q4 U.S. Economic Growth Well Ahead Of Potential In Q4 Chart 4Labor Market Still Tightening Despite##BR##Soft December Report Labor Market Still Tightening Despite Soft December Report Labor Market Still Tightening Despite Soft December Report The indications for Q4 GDP growth are solid. Aggregate hours worked rose 2.5% at an annualized rate in Q4 2017. Assuming modest growth in productivity, the payrolls data are consistent with over 3% GDP growth in Q4. There is nothing in the December payroll data to suggest that the underlying trajectory in the U.S. economy has changed. The economy continues to grow above trend. Wage gains are modest at the moment, but should accelerate as the labor market keeps tightening with above-trend GDP growth. This upbeat economic outlook is also supported the December 2017 non-manufacturing ISM survey, also released last Friday. While the overall index fell from 57.4 to 55.9, it is still consistent with solid GDP growth. Moreover, the employment index rose from 55.3 to 56.3, which signals firm job gains, and the prices paid index held steady at a fairly elevated level of 60.8. Bottom Line: It's been solid start to 2018 and it's steady as she goes for the U.S. economy and the Fed. FOMC Minutes: A Rubric BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy service expects that the 2/10 yield curve will languish between 0 and 50 bps in 2018. The curve will steepen from 51 bps at the end of 2017 through mid-year 2018, and then flatten into year-end (Chart 5). Which asset classes would benefit if our curve call is accurate? BCA's "The Bucket List"1 explains our view of the curve in 2018 and details the past performance of various U.S. assets in differing yield curve environments. Chart 5A Flat Yield Curve Is OK For Most Risk Assets A Flat Yield Curve Is OK For Most Risk Assets A Flat Yield Curve Is OK For Most Risk Assets BCA expects that the yield curve will first steepen in 2018, then become flatter, ultimately spending most of the year between 0 and 50 bps. A flat curve is the ideal environment for the S&P 500 and the stock-to-bond ratio. However, small cap stocks struggle when the curve is flat; BCA's view is that small caps will outperform large caps in 2018. A flat yield curve raises the risk of a sell-off in high yield, but provides a favorable grounding for oil, which is in line with BCA's fundamental view. BCA expects EPS growth will be positive this year; earnings growth is higher 75% of the time when the curve is flat. The yield curve's slope was a focus of debate at the FOMC's December 12-13, 2017 meeting. Participants cited several reasons for the flat curve2: recent increases in the target range for the federal funds rate; reductions in investors' estimates of the longer-run, neutral real interest rate; lower longer-term inflation expectations; lower term premiums Fed economists recently updated their quantitative assessments of the FOMC's minutes. The note provides a guide (Table 1 in the Fed paper3 and Tables 1 and 2 below) to the number of quantitative descriptors in the minutes (one, a couple, a few, etc.). We use this rubric to assess the committee's latest views on the yield curve and inflation. Table 1FOMC Assessment Of The Yield Curve Solid Start Solid Start Table 2FOMC Assessment Of Inflation Solid Start Solid Start In short, the FOMC acknowledged the flatter curve and only a minority of members discounted the signal from the curve. Moreover, a majority thought that a tighter labor market would lead to higher inflation. Only one participant held the view that secular trends were muting inflation. Bottom Line: BCA expects the Fed to deliver 3 to 4 rate hikes in 2018, which is still not fully priced in by the market. Investors should maintain below-benchmark duration in fixed income portfolios. Asset allocators should remain overweight stocks versus bonds. Growth is strong and the yield curve is not inverted yet. Therefore, it is still early to de-risk portfolios. Is Economic Surprise Peaking? The Citigroup (Citi) Economic Surprise Index is elevated relative to its recent history, but it may have further to run. Economic prospects were cheery following the 2016 presidential election and the economic data exceeded those lofty projections, aided by a warmer than usual winter. However, the temperate conditions borrowed activity from the spring, which was cooler and wetter than normal, and the combination of lofty expectations and seasonal distortions sent the Citi Economic Surprise Index spiraling lower through mid-year 2017. Since its bottom in June 2017 at -78.6%, the index climbed for 135 days before its peak in late December 2017 (Chart 6, panel 1). On average since 2010, the Citi Index moved from trough-to-peak in 96 days, which means the recent run-up was much longer than usual. However, that phenomenon may have been due to the raised economic expectations and variable weather patterns at the start of 2017. Chart 6Economic Surprise Index Has Surged, But Expectations Remain Muted Economic Surprise Index Has Surged, But Expectations Remain Muted Economic Surprise Index Has Surged, But Expectations Remain Muted At 80.7%, the Index has been above zero for 68 days (Chart 6, panel 1). It typically takes 46 days for it to climb from zero to its zenith. Table 3 shows the performance of financial markets and other assets after the Index moves from zero to the peak. The most recent episode (October through December 2017) matched historical averages across most asset classes, although the underperformance of small caps versus large ran counter to the past as the Surprise Index climbed from zero. Table 3Risk Assets Perform Well As Surprise Index Climbs Solid Start Solid Start Since 2010, the Index has stayed above 40 for an average of 51 days (Chart 6, panel 1). The Index has been over 40 since November 16, 2017, or 35 days. This suggests that it can remain elevated for another month or so before it again moves lower. However, the Index is mean reverting and investors wonder what will happen to risk assets after economic surprise rolls over. Table 4 and Chart 7 shows the performance of key financial markets and commodities when the Citi Index returned to zero from 40-plus. There have been six such intervals since 2010. On average, gold and oil perform well as the surprise index dips to zero. Stocks and credit outperform Treasuries during these episodes, and small caps beat large caps. Rising economic surprise (Table 3) is a more favorable environment for stocks, credit and oil than when the surprise index is rolling over. However, the performance of gold and small caps is better after the Citi Surprise Index peaks (Table 4). Table 4Risk Assets Hold Up When Citi Surprise Index Rolls Over Solid Start Solid Start Chart 7U.S. Assets As Economic Surprise Rolls Over U.S. Assets As Economic Surprise Rolls Over U.S. Assets As Economic Surprise Rolls Over Nonetheless, muted economic expectations will limit the downside in the Index in the coming months. Panel 3 of Chart 6 shows that the outlook for both hard and soft economic data remained muted through the end of November 2017, especially when compared with the significant improvement in economic prospects in late 2016 and early 2017. Bottom Line: Risk assets outperformed as the Citi Economic Surprise Index climbed in the second half of 2017. The Index can stay near recent peaks for several more months thanks to subdued economic forecasts, but it will roll over eventually. However, the elevated level of the Index suggests that there are near-term risks for equities and credit because a lot of good economic news is already priced in. Still, we recommend that investors ride out the volatility given our view that stocks will outperform bonds in the next 6-12 months. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "The Bucket List", published December 18, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20171213.htm 3 https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/the-fomc-meeting-minutes-an-update-of-counting-words-20170803.htm

Highlights Should the U.S. 10-year T-bond yield approach 3% it would be a red flag, and a trigger to downgrade equities. Equity investors should stay overweight defensive-heavy Switzerland and Denmark. Contrary to what the consensus is expecting, global growth will lose steam in the first half of 2018. EUR/USD will continue to trend higher through 2018 as long-term interest rate differentials converge further. The multi-year prognosis for GBP/USD is higher. U.K. parliamentary arithmetic simply does not support a hard Brexit. Furthermore, a hard Brexit would require either a North/South or East/West hard border in Ireland, which will be politically impossible to deliver. Feature A happy and prosperous 2018 to you all! In this first report of the year, we describe some investment outcomes in 2017 that at first glance seemed odd or unexpected; but that on deeper reflection provide valuable insights for 2018. Some of these insights deviate substantially from the BCA house view. Bonds Became More Risky Than Equities The first oddity of 2017 concerns the 'drawdowns' suffered by bonds and equities. A drawdown is defined as an investment's peak to trough decline. In 2017, the odd thing was that the drawdowns suffered by government bonds - a supposedly safe asset-class - were equal to or worse than those suffered by equities - a supposedly risky asset-class (Chart of the Week, Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart of the WeekBonds Suffered Worse Drawdowns Than Equities Bonds Suffered Worse Drawdowns Than Equities Bonds Suffered Worse Drawdowns Than Equities Chart I-2Bonds Suffered Worse Drawdowns Than Equities Bonds Suffered Worse Drawdowns Than Equities Bonds Suffered Worse Drawdowns Than Equities Chart I-3Bonds Suffered Worse Drawdowns Than Equities Bonds Suffered Worse Drawdowns Than Equities Bonds Suffered Worse Drawdowns Than Equities Contrary to classical theory, empirical evidence now proves that investors do not define an investment's risk in terms of its volatility, the fluctuations of its return around a mean. Instead, investors define risk as the ratio of large and sudden drawdowns versus potential gains. This unattractive asymmetry in an investment's return is technically known as negative skew. And it is as compensation for this negative skew that investors demand an excess return, the so-called 'risk premium'. Significantly, at low bond yields, the mathematics of bond returns necessarily means that their negative skew increases. The risk of large and sudden drawdowns rises while the prospect for price gains diminishes. But if bond risk becomes 'equity-like', it follows that equities' prospective long-term return should become 'bond-like'. Meaning, equities should no longer offer a meaningful risk premium over bonds. Is this the case? According to my colleague Martin Barnes, BCA Chief Economist, the answer appears to be yes - at least in certain major markets. In BCA's Outlook 2018, Martin projects that from current valuations U.S. equities are set to deliver a total nominal return of 2.6% a year to 2028 - almost indistinguishable from the 2.5% a year that a U.S. 10-year T-bond will deliver over the same period. But the mathematics of bond pricing tells us that the negative skew on bond returns fully disappears when a yield approaches 3%. At which point the risk of bonds once again declines to become 'bond-like', and the required return on equities should once again rise to become 'equity-like'. This higher required return would necessarily require today's equity prices to drop, perhaps substantially. Admittedly in Europe there is a bigger gap between the expected returns from equities and bonds than there is in the U.S. The trouble is that global capital markets move together and a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Hence, one lesson for 2018 is that investors should downgrade equities to neutral should the U.S. 10-year T-bond yield approach 3%. In this event, investors should redeploy the funds into U.S. T-bonds, because any substantial adjustment in risk-asset prices would trigger supportive flows into haven bonds, reversing the spike in yields. Euro/Dollar Hit A 3-Year High EUR/USD ended 2017 touching 1.21, a 3-year high. At first glance, this might seem odd given that the ECB has committed to maintaining its zero and negative interest rate policy for at least another year while the Federal Reserve has already hiked interest rates five times. But EUR/USD is not tracking short-term rate differentials. It is tracking long-term rate differentials, and EUR/USD at a 3-year high is fully consistent with the 30-year T-bond/German bund yield spread converging to its narrowest for several years (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Further Convergence In Long-Term Interest Rate Differentials Will Support EUR/USD Further Convergence In Long-Term Interest Rate Differentials Will Support EUR/USD Further Convergence In Long-Term Interest Rate Differentials Will Support EUR/USD Where will this yield spread go from here? Let's consider both sides of the spread. On the ECB side, policy is at the realistic limit of ultra-looseness, so policy rate expectations cannot go significantly lower, but they can go higher. On the Federal Reserve side, long-term policy rate expectations are not far from our upper bound of the 'high 2s' at which risk-assets become vulnerable to a sell-off, perhaps substantial. So these interest rate expectations cannot go sustainably higher, but they can go lower. Considering this strong asymmetry, the most likely outcome is that the 30-year T-bond/German bund yield spread will continue to converge. The upshot is that EUR/USD will continue to trend higher through 2018. No Connection Between Economic Outperformance And Stock Market Outperformance Chart I-5The Eurostoxx50 Underperformed Even Though##br## The Euro Area Economy Outperformed The Eurostoxx50 Underperformed Even Though The Euro Area Economy Outperformed The Eurostoxx50 Underperformed Even Though The Euro Area Economy Outperformed 2017 proved that there is no positive correlation between relative economic performance and relative equity market performance. For example, the euro area was one of the best performing developed economies, yet the Eurostoxx50 was one of the worst performing stock market indexes (Chart I-5). This seems odd, until you realise that major stock market indexes are dominated by multinational rather than domestic stocks. And that when stock markets have vastly different sector weightings, the sector effect completely swamps the domestic economy effect. Therefore the first decision for international equity investors should never be which regions to own. The first decision should always be which sectors to own, and above all whether to tilt to cyclicals or defensives. The regional and country allocation then just drops out automatically. At the moment, our mini-cycle framework for global growth suggests tilting to defensives rather than to cyclicals. Global growth experiences remarkably consistent - and therefore predictable - 'mini-cycles', with half-cycle lengths averaging 8 months. As the current mini-upswing started last May we can infer that it is likely to end at some point in early 2018 (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). So one surprise could be that global growth will lose steam in the first half of 2018 rather than in the second half - contrary to what the consensus is expecting. Chart I-6The Current Mini-Upswing##br## Is Long In The Tooth The Current Mini-Upswing Is Long In The Tooth The Current Mini-Upswing Is Long In The Tooth Chart I-7China Has Driven The Global 6-Month##br## Credit Impulse Higher China Has Driven The Global 6-Month Credit Impulse Higher China Has Driven The Global 6-Month Credit Impulse Higher We will provide further ammunition for our mini-cycle thesis in next week's report. In the meantime, we will leave you with one ramification of paring back equity exposure to cyclicals and redeploying to defensives. Stay overweight defensive-heavy Switzerland and Denmark. Realpolitik Will Prevent A Hard Brexit For the FTSE100, the paradox is that its relative performance is negatively correlated with relative economic performance. When the U.K. economy outperforms, the FTSE100 underperforms. And vice-versa (Chart I-8). Chart I-8FTSE 100 Relative Performance Is The Inverse ##br##Of U.K. Economic Relative Performance FTSE 100 Relative Performance Is The Inverse Of U.K. Economic Relative Performance FTSE 100 Relative Performance Is The Inverse Of U.K. Economic Relative Performance The simple explanation is that FTSE100 multinational sales and profits tend to be denominated in dollars and euros, whereas the FTSE100 index is denominated in pounds. The upshot is that an outperforming U.K. economy weighs on the U.K. stock market because a strengthening pound diminishes the FTSE100's multi-currency profits in pound terms. And vice-versa. Compared to a year ago, investors can be more optimistic about the long-term prospects for the U.K. economy and the pound (and therefore expect long-term underperformance from the FTSE100). This is because after the unexpectedly disastrous 2017 election for Theresa May, the parliamentary arithmetic simply does not support a hard Brexit. Furthermore, a hard Brexit would require either a North/South or East/West hard border in Ireland, which will be politically impossible to deliver. The constraints that come from this realpolitik means that Brexit's endpoint will retain much of the current trading relationship with the EU, albeit the journey to that eventual destination is likely to be a wild roller coaster ride. Therefore, the multi-year prognosis for GBP/USD is higher. But investors who want to optimize their timing into 'cable' can wait for one of the inevitable roller coaster dips in 2018. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* We are delighted to say that three of our recent trades quickly hit their profit targets: short bitcoin 29%, long silver 4.5% and long NZD/USD 3%. Against this, short Nikkei/long Eurostoxx50 hit its 3% stop-loss. This week's trade recommendation is to go short palladium. Set a profit target of 6% with a symmetrical stop-loss. This leaves us with three open trades. Chart I-9 Short Palladium Short Palladium For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Global bourses celebrated solid earnings growth and the passage of U.S. tax cuts heading into year-end. The direct effect of the tax cuts will likely boost U.S. real GDP growth in 2018 by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points. It could be more, depending on the impact on animal spirits in the business sector and any fresh infrastructure spending. The good news on global growth continue to roll in. Real GDP growth is accelerating in the major advanced economies, driven in part by a surge in capital spending. Nonetheless, record low volatility and a flat yield curve in the U.S. highlight our major theme for 2018; policy is on a collision course with risk assets because output gaps are closing and monetary policy is moving away from "pedal to the metal" stimulus. We expect inflation to finally begin moving higher in the U.S. and some of the other advanced economies. This will challenge the consensus view that "inflation is dead forever", and that central banks will respond quickly to any turbulence in financial markets with an easier policy stance. The S&P 500 would suffer only a 3-5% correction if the VIX were to simply mean-revert. But the pain would likely be more intense if there is a complete unwinding of 'low-vol' trading strategies. We will be watching inflation expectations and our S&P Scorecard for signs to de-risk. Government yield curves should bear steepen, before flattening again later in 2018. Stay below benchmark in duration for now and favor bonds in Japan, Italy, the U.K. and Australia versus the U.S. and Canada (currency hedged). Interest rate differentials in the first half of the year should modestly benefit the U.S. dollar versus the other major currencies. Investors should remain exposed to oil and related assets, and bet on rising inflation expectations in the major bond markets. The intensity of forthcoming Chinese reforms will have to be monitored carefully for signs they have reached an economic 'pain threshold'. We do not view China as a risk to DM risk assets, but even a soft landing scenario could be painful for base metals and the EM complex. Bitcoin is not a systemic threat to global financial markets. Feature Chart I-1Policy Collision Course? Policy Collision Course? Policy Collision Course? Global bourses celebrated solid earnings growth and the passage of U.S. tax cuts heading into year-end. Ominously, though, a flatter U.S. yield curve and extraordinarily low measures of volatility hover like dark clouds over the equity bull market (Chart I-1). The flatter curve could be a sign that the Fed is at risk of tightening too far, which seems incompatible with depressed asset market volatility. This combination underscores the major theme of the BCA Outlook 2018 that was sent to clients in November; policy is on a collision course with risk assets because output gaps are closing and monetary policy is moving away from "pedal to the metal" stimulus. Analysts are debating how much of the decline in volatility is due to technical factors and how much can be pinned on the macro backdrop. For us, they are two sides of the same coin. Betting that volatility will remain depressed has reportedly become a yield play, via technical trading strategies and ETFs. Trading models encourage more risk taking as volatility declines, such that lower volatility enters a self-reinforcing feedback loop. The danger is that this virtuous circle turns vicious. On the macro front, many investors appear to believe that the structure of the advanced economies has changed in a fundamental and permanent way. Deflationary forces, such as Uber, Amazon and robotics are so strong that inflation cannot rise even if labor becomes very scarce. If true, this implies that central banks will proceed slowly in tightening, and that the peak in rates is not far away. Moreover, below-target inflation allows central banks to respond to any economic weakness or unwanted tightening in financial conditions by adopting a more accommodative policy stance. In other words, investors appear to believe in the "Fed Put". Implied volatility is a mean-reverting series. It can remain at depressed levels for extended periods, especially when global growth is robust and synchronized. Nonetheless, we believe that the "outdated Phillips curve" and the "Fed Put" consensus views will be challenged later in 2018, leading to an unwinding of low-vol yield plays. For now, though, it is too early to scale back on risk assets. Global Growth Shifts Up A Gear... The good news on global growth continue to roll in. Easy financial conditions and the end of fiscal austerity provide a supportive growth backdrop. A measure of fiscal thrust for the G20 advanced economies shifted from a headwind to a slight tailwind in 2016 (Chart I-2). Our short-term models for real GDP growth in the major countries continue to rise, in line with extremely elevated purchasing managers' survey data (Chart I-3). The major exception is the U.K., where our GDP growth model is rolling over as the Brexit negotiations take a toll. Chart I-2Fiscal Austerity Is Over Fiscal Austerity Is Over Fiscal Austerity Is Over Chart I-3GDP Growth Models Are Upbeat GDP Growth Models Are Upbeat GDP Growth Models Are Upbeat Much of the acceleration in our GDP models is driven by the capital spending components. Animal spirits appear to be taking off and it is a theme across most of the advanced economies. G3 capital goods orders pulled back a bit in late 2017, but this is more likely due to noise in the data than to a peak in the capex cycle (Chart I-4). Industrial production, the PMI diffusion index and advanced-economy capital goods imports confirm strong underlying momentum in investment spending. Chart I-4Capital Spending Helping To Drive Growth Capital Spending Helping To Drive Growth Capital Spending Helping To Drive Growth In the U.S., tax cuts will give business outlays and overall U.S. GDP growth a modest lift in 2018. The House and Senate hammered out a compromise on tax cuts that is similar to the original Senate version. The new legislation will cut individual taxes by about $680 billion over ten years, trim small business taxes by just under $400 billion, and reduce corporate taxes by roughly the same amount (including the offsetting tax on currently untaxed foreign profits). The direct effect of the tax cuts will likely boost U.S. real GDP growth in 2018 by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points. However, much depends on the ability that the tax changes and immediate capital expensing to further lift animal spirits in the business sector and bring forward investment spending. Any infrastructure program would also augment the fiscal stimulus. The total impact is difficult to estimate given the lack of details, but it is clearly growth-positive. ...But The U.S. Yield Curve Flattens... Bond investors are unimpressed so far with the upbeat global economic data. It appears that long-term yields are almost impervious as long as inflation is stuck at low levels. In the U.S., a rising 2-year yield and a range-trading 10-year yield have resulted in a substantial flattening of the 2/10 yield slope (although some of the flattening has unwound as we go to press). Investors view a flattening yield curve with trepidation because it smells of a Fed policy mistake. It appears that the bond market is discounting that the Fed can only deliver another few rate hikes before the economy starts to struggle, at which point inflation will still be below target according to market expectations. We would not be as dismissive of an inverted yield curve as Fed Chair Yellen was during her December press conference. There are indeed reasons for the curve to be structurally flatter today than in the past, suggesting that it will invert more easily. Nonetheless, the fact that the yield curve has called all of the last seven recessions is impressive (with one false positive). The good news is that, in the seven episodes in which the curve correctly called a recession, the signal was confirmed by warning signs from our Global Leading Economic Indicator and our monetary conditions index. At the moment, these confirming indicators are not even flashing yellow.1 Our fixed-income strategists believe that the curve is more likely to steepen than invert over the next six months. If inflation edges higher as we expect, then long-term yields will finally break out to the upside and the curve will steepen until the Fed's tightening cycle is further advanced. If we are wrong and inflation remains stuck near current levels or declines, then the FOMC will have to revise the 'dot plot' lower and the curve will bull-steepen. In other words, we do not think the FOMC will make a policy mistake by sticking to the dot plot if inflation remains quiescent. Rising inflation is a larger risk for stocks and bonds than a policy mistake. A clear uptrend in inflation would shake investors' confidence in the "Fed Put" and thereby trigger an unwinding of the low-vol investment strategies. A sharp selloff at the long end of the curve in the major markets would send a chill through the investment world because it would suggest that the Phillips curve is not dead, and that central banks might have fallen behind the curve. ...As Inflation Languishes For now there is little evidence of building inflation pressure in either the CPI or the Fed's preferred measure, the core PCE price index. The latter edged up a little in October to 1.4% year-over-year, but the November core CPI rate slipped slightly to 1.7%. For perspective, core CPI inflation of 2.4-2.5% is consistent with the Fed's 2% target for the core PCE index. The Fed has made no progress in returning inflation to target since the FOMC started the tightening cycle. A risk to our view is that the expected inflation upturn takes longer to materialize. The annual core CPI inflation rate fell from 2.3 in January 2017 to 1.7 in November, a total decline of 0.55 percentage points. The drop was mostly accounted for by negative contributions from rent of shelter (-0.31), medical care services (-0.13) and wireless telephone services (-0.1). These categories are not closely related to the amount of slack in the economy, and thus might continue to depress the headline inflation rate in the coming months even as the labor market tightens further. Recent regulatory changes, for example, suggest that there is more downside potential in health care services inflation. We have highlighted in past research that it is not unusual for inflation to respond to a tight labor market with an extended lag, especially at the end of extremely long expansion phases. Chart I-5 updates the four indicators that heralded inflection points in inflation at the end of the 1980s and 1990s. All four leading inflation indicators are on the rise, as is the New York Fed's Underlying Inflation Indicator (not shown). Importantly, economic slack is disappearing at the global level. The OECD as a group will be operating above potential in 2018 for the first time since the Great Recession (Chart I-6). Finally, oil prices have further upside potential. Higher energy prices will add to headline inflation and boost inflation expectations in the U.S. and the other major economies. Chart I-5U.S. Inflation: Indicators Point Up U.S. Inflation: Indicators Point Up U.S. Inflation: Indicators Point Up Chart I-6Vanishing Economic Slack Vanishing Economic Slack Vanishing Economic Slack The bottom line is that we are sticking with the view that U.S. inflation will grind higher in the coming months, allowing the FOMC to deliver the three rate hikes implied by the 'dot plot' for 2018. In December, the FOMC revised up its economic growth forecast to 2.5% in 2018, up from 2.1%. The projections for 2019 and 2020 were also revised higher. Growth is seen remaining above the 1.8% trend rate for the next three years. The FOMC expects that the jobless rate will dip to 3.9% in 2018 and 2019, before ticking up to 4.0% in 2020. With the estimate for long-run unemployment unchanged at 4.6%, this means that the labor market is expected to shift even further into 'excess demand' territory. If anything, these forecasts look too conservative. It is unreasonable to expect the unemployment rate to stabilize in 2019 and tick up in 2020 if the economy is growing above-trend. This forecast highlights the risk that the FOMC will suddenly feel 'behind the curve' if inflation re-bounds more quickly than expected, at a time when the labor market is so deep in 'excess demand' territory. The consensus among investors would also be caught off guard in this scenario, resulting in a rise in bond volatility from rock-bottom levels. How Vulnerable Are Stocks? How large a correction in risk assets should we expect? One way to gauge this risk is to estimate the historical 'beta' of risk asset prices to mean-reversions in the VIX. The VIX is currently a long way below its median. Major spikes to well above the median are associated with recessions and/or financial crises. However, as a starting point, we are interested in the downside potential for risk asset prices if the VIX simply moves back to the median. Table I-1 presents data corresponding to periods since 1990 when the VIX mean-reverted from a low level over a short period of time. We chose periods in which the VIX surged at least to its median level (17.2) from a starting point that was below 13. The choice of 13 as the lower threshold is arbitrary, but this level filters out insignificant noise in the data and still provides a reasonable number of episodes to analyze.2 Table I-1Episodes Of VIX 'Mean Reversion' January 2018 January 2018 The episodes are presented in ascending order with respect to the starting point for the 12-month forward P/E ratio. This was done to see whether the valuation starting point matters for the size of the equity correction. The "VIX Beta" column shows the ratio of the percent decline in the S&P 500 to the change in the VIX. The average beta over the 15 episodes suggests that stocks fall by almost a half of a percent for every one percent increase in the VIX. Today, the VIX would have to rise by about 7½% to reach the median value, implying that the S&P 500 would correct by roughly 3½%. Investment- and speculative-grade corporate bonds would underperform Treasurys by 22 and 46 basis points, respectively, in this scenario. Interestingly, the equity market reaction to a given jump in the VIX does not appear to intensify when stocks are expensive heading into the shock. The implication is that a shock that simply returns the VIX to "normal" would not be devastating for risk assets. The shock would have to be worse. Chart I-7Market Reaction To 1994 Fed Shock Market Reaction To 1994 Fed Stock Market Reaction To 1994 Fed Stock The episodes of VIX "mean reversion" shown in Table I-1 are a mixture of those caused by financial crises and by monetary tightening (and sometimes both). The U.S. 1994 bond market blood bath is a good example of a pure monetary policy shock. It was partly responsible for the "tequila crisis", but that did not occur until late that year. Chart I-7 highlights that the U.S. equity market reacted more violently to Fed rate hikes in 1994 than the average VIX beta would suggest. The VIX jumped by about 14% early in the year, coinciding with a 9% correction in the S&P 500. Investors had misread the Fed's intension in late 1993, expecting little in the way of rate hikes over the subsequent year. A dramatic re-rating of the Fed outlook caused a violent bond selloff that unnerved equity investors. We are not expecting a replay of the 1994 bond market turmoil because the Fed is far more transparent today. Nonetheless, the equity correction could be quite painful to the extent that the VIX overshoots the median as the large volume of low-volatility trades are unwound. A 10% equity correction in the U.S. this year would not be a surprise given the late stage of the bull market and current market positioning. Yield Curves To Bear Steepen Upward pressure on inflation, bond yields and volatility will not only come from the U.S. We expect inflation to edge higher in the Eurozone, Canada, and even Japan, given tight labor markets and diminished levels of global spare capacity. The European economy has been a star performer this year and this should continue through 2018. Even the periphery countries are participating. The key driving factors include the end of the fiscal squeeze in the periphery and the recapitalization of troubled banks. The latter has opened the door to bank lending, the weakness of which has been a major growth headwind in this expansion. Taken at face value, recent survey data are consistent with about 3% GDP growth (Chart I-3). We would dis-count that a bit, but even continued 2.0-2.5% GDP growth in the euro area would compare well to the 1% potential growth rate. This means that the output gap is shrinking and the labor market will continue tightening. Despite impressive economic momentum, the ECB is sticking to the policy path it laid out in October. Starting in January, asset purchases will continue at a reduced rate of €30bn per month until September 2018 or beyond. Meanwhile, interest rates will remain steady "for an extended period of time, and well past the horizon of the net asset purchases." If asset purchases come to an end next September, then the first rate hike may not come until 2019 Q1 at the earliest. Thus, rate hikes are a long way off, but the deceleration of growth in the Eurozone monetary base will likely place upward pressure on the long end of the bund curve (shown inverted in Chart I-8). Chart I-8ECB Tapering Will Be Bond-Bearish ECB Tapering Will Be Bond-Bearish ECB Tapering Will Be Bond-Bearish Canada is another economy with ultra-low interest rates and rapidly diminishing labor market slack. The Bank of Canada will be forced to follow the Fed in hiking rates in the coming quarters. In Japan, strong PMI and capital goods orders are hopeful signs that domestic capital spending is picking up, consistent with our upbeat real GDP model (Chart I-3). Recent data on industrial production and retail sales were weak, but this was likely due to heavy storm activity; we expect those readings to bounce back. Nonetheless, it is still not clear that the Japanese economy has moved away from a complete dependency on the global growth engine. We would like to see stronger wage gains to signal that the economy is finally transitioning to a more self-reinforcing stage. It is hopeful that various measures of core inflation are slightly positive, but this is tentative at best. That said, the BoJ may be forced to alter its current "yield curve control" strategy by modestly lifting the target on longer-term JGB yields later in 2018, in response to pressures from robust growth and rising global bond yields. Thus, the pressure for higher bond yields should rotate away from the U.S. in the latter half of 2018 towards Europe, Canada and possibly Japan. This could eventually see the U.S. dollar head lower, but we still foresee a window in the first half of 2018 in which the dollar will appreciate on the back of widening interest rate differentials. We are less bullish than we were in mid-2017, expecting only about a 5% dollar appreciation. China: Long-Term Gain Or Short-Term Pain? The Chinese cyclical outlook remains a key risk to our upbeat view on risk assets. Significant structural reforms are on the way, now that President Xi has amassed significant political support for his reform agenda. These include deleveraging in the financial sector, a more intense anti-corruption campaign focused on the shadow-banking sector, and an ongoing restructuring in the industrial sector. The reforms will likely be positive for long-term growth, but only to the extent that they are accompanied by economic reforms. This month's Special Report, beginning on page 19, highlights that 2018 will be pivotal for China's long-term investment outlook. In the short term, reforms could be a net negative for growth depending on how deftly the authorities handle the monetary and fiscal policy dials. We witnessed this tension between growth and reform in the early years of President Xi's term, when the drive to curtail excessive credit growth and overcapacity caused an abrupt slowdown in 2015. Managing the tradeoff means that China's economy will evolve in a series of growth mini cycles. China is in the down-phase of a mini cycle at the moment, as highlighted by the Li Keqiang Index (LKI; Chart I-9). The LKI is a good proxy for the business cycle. BCA's China Strategy service recently combined the data with the best leading properties for the LKI into a single indicator.3 This indicator suggests that the LKI will end up retracing about 50% of its late 2015 to early 2017 rise before the current slowdown is complete. The good news is that broad money growth, which is a part of the LKI leading indicator, has re-accelerated in recent months. This suggests that the current economic slowdown phase will not be protracted, consistent with our 'soft landing' view. The intensity of forthcoming reforms will have to be monitored carefully for signs they have reached an economic pain threshold. We will be watching our LKI leading indicator and a basket of relevant equity sectors for warning signs. We do not view China as a risk to DM risk assets, but even a soft landing scenario could be painful for base metals and the EM complex (Chart I-10). Chart I-9China: Where Is The Bottom? China: Where Is the Bottom? China: Where Is the Bottom? Chart I-10Metals At Risk Of China Soft Landing Metals At Risk Of China Soft Landing Metals At Risk Of China Soft Landing Equity Country Allocation For now we continue to recommend overweight positions in stocks versus bonds and cash within balanced portfolios. We also still prefer Japanese stocks to the U.S., reflecting our expectation for rising bond yields in the latter and an earnings outlook that favors the former. Chart I-11 updates our earnings-per-share growth forecast for the U.S., Japan and the Eurozone. We expect U.S. EPS growth to decelerate more quickly in 2018 than in Japan, since the U.S. is further ahead in the earning cycle and is more exposed to wage and margin pressure. European earnings growth will also be solid in 2018, but this year's euro appreciation will be a headwind for Q4 2017 and Q1 2018 earnings. European and Japanese stocks are also a little on the cheap side versus the U.S., although not by enough to justify overweight positions on valuation grounds alone. We have extended our valuation work to a broader range of countries, shown in Chart I-12. All are expressed relative to the U.S. market. These metric exclude the Financials sector, and adjust for both differing sector weights and structural shifts in relative valuation. Mexico is the only one that is more than one standard deviation cheap relative to the U.S. Nonetheless, our EM team is reluctant to recommend this market given uncertainty regarding the NAFTA negotiations. Russia is not as cheap, but is in the early stages of recovery. Our EM team is overweight. Chart I-11Top-Down EPS Projection Top-Down EPS Projection Top-Down EPS Projection Chart I-12Valuation Ranking Of Nonfinancial Equity Markets Relative To The U.S. January 2018 January 2018 A Note On Bitcoin Finally, we have received a lot of client questions regarding bitcoin. The incredible surge in the price of the cryptocurrency dwarfs previous asset price bubbles by a wide margin (Chart I-13). As is usually the case with bubble, supporters argue that "this time is different." We doubt it. Chart I-13Bitcoin Bubble Dwarfs All The Rest January 2018 January 2018 BCA's Technology Sector Strategy weighed into this debate in a recent Special Report.4 In theory, blockchain technology, including cyber currencies, can be used as a highly secure, low cost, means of transfer value from one person to the next without an intermediary. However, the report highlights that bitcoin is highly subject to fraud and manipulation because it is unregulated. Liquidity and accurate market quotes are questionable on the "fly by night" exchanges. Its use as a medium of exchange is very limited, and governments are bound to regulate it because cryptocurrencies are a tool for money laundering, tax evasion and other criminal activities. Another fact to keep in mind is that, although the supply of new bitcoins is restricted, the creation of other cryptocurrencies is unlimited. Would the bursting of the bitcoin bubble represent a risk to the economy? The market cap of all cryptocurrencies is estimated to be roughly US$400 billion (US$250 billion for bitcoin alone). This is tiny compared to global GDP or the market cap of the main asset classes such as stocks and bonds. The amount of leverage associated with bitcoin is unknown, but it is hard to see that it would be large enough to generate a significant wealth effect on spending and/or a marked impact on overall credit conditions. The links to other financial markets appear limited. Investment Conclusions Our recommended asset allocation is "steady as she goes" as we move into 2018. The policy and corporate earnings backdrop will remain supportive of risk assets at least for the first half of the year. In the U.S., the recently passed tax reform package will boost after-tax corporate cash flows by roughly 3-5%. Cyclical stocks should outperform defensives in the near term. Nonetheless, we expect 2018 to be a transition year. Stretched valuations and extremely low volatility imply that risk assets are vulnerable to the consensus macro view that central banks will not be able to reach their inflation targets even in the long term. The consensus could be in for a rude awakening. We expect equity markets to begin discounting the next U.S. recession sometime in early 2019, but markets will be vulnerable in 2018 to a bond bear phase and escalating uncertainty regarding the economic outlook. If risk assets have indeed entered the late innings, then we must watch closely for signs to de-risk. One item to watch is the 10-year U.S. CPI swap rate; a shift above 2.3% would be consistent with the Fed's 2% target for the PCE measure of inflation. This would be a signal that the FOMC will have to step-up the pace of rate hikes and aggressively slow economic growth. We will also use our S&P Scorecard Indicator to help time the exit from our overweight equity position (Chart I-14). The Scorecard is based on seven indicators that have a good track record of heralding equity bear markets.5 These include measures of monetary conditions, financial conditions, value, momentum, and economic activity. The more of these indicators in "bullish" territory, the higher the score. Currently, four of the indicators are flashing a bullish signal (financial conditions, U.S. unemployment claims, ISM new orders minus inventories, and momentum). We demonstrated in previous research that a Scorecard reading of three or above was historically associated with positive equity total returns in the subsequent months. A drop below three this year would signal the time to de-risk. Our thoughts on the risks facing equities carry over to the corporate bonds space. Our Global Fixed Income Strategy service notes that uncertainty about future growth has the potential to increase interest rate volatility that can also push corporate credit spreads wider (Chart I-15).6 Elevated leverage in the corporate sector adds to the risk of a re-rating of implied volatility. For now, however, investors should continue to favor corporate bonds relative to governments for the (albeit modest) yield pickup. Chart I-14Watch Our Scorecard To Time The Exit Watch Our Scorecard To Time The Exit Watch Our Scorecard To Time The Exit Chart I-15Higher Uncertainty & ##br##Vol To Hit Corporate Bonds Higher Uncertainty & Vol To Hit Corporate Bonds Higher Uncertainty & Vol To Hit Corporate Bonds Overall bond portfolio duration should be kept short of benchmark. We may recommend taking profits and switching to benchmark duration after global yields have increased and are beginning to negatively affect risk assets. While yields are rising, investors should favor bonds in Japan, Italy, the U.K. and Australia within fixed-income portfolios (on a currency-hedged basis). Underweight the U.S. and Canada. German and French bonds should be close to benchmark. Yield curves should steepen, before flattening later in the year. Interest rate differentials in the first half of the year should modestly benefit the U.S. dollar versus the other major currencies. Finally, investors should remain exposed to oil and related assets, and bet on rising inflation expectations in the major bond markets. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst December 28, 2017 Next Report: January 25, 2018 1 Please see BCA Global ETF Strategy service, "A Guide to Spotting And Weathering Bear Markets," August 16, 2017, available at etf.bcaresearch.com 2 Note that we are not saying that a rise in the VIX "causes" stocks to correct. Rather, we are assuming that a shock occurs that causes stocks to correct and the VIX to rise simultaneously. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle," November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see BCA Technology Sector Strategy Special Report, "Cyber Currencies: Actual Currencies Or Just Speculative Assets?" December 12, 2017, available at tech.bcaresearch.com 5 Market Timing: Holy Grail Or Fool's Gold? The Bank Credit Analyst, May 26, 2016. 6 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy service, "Our Model Bond Portfolio Allocation In 2018: A Tail Of Two Halves," December 19, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com II. A Long View Of China 2018 is a pivotal year for China, as it will set the trajectory for President Xi Jinping's second term ... and he may not step down in 2022. Poverty, inequality, and middle-class angst are structural and persistent threats to China's political stability. The new wave of the anti-corruption campaign is part of Xi's attempt to improve governance and mitigate political risks. Yet without institutional checks and balances, Xi's governance agenda will fail. Without pro-market reforms, investors will face a China that is both more authoritarian and less productive. Hearts rectified, persons were cultivated; persons cultivated, families were regulated; families regulated, states were rightly governed; states rightly governed, the whole world was made tranquil and happy. - Confucius, The Great Learning Comparisons of modern Chinese politics with Confucian notions of political order have become cliché. Nevertheless, there is a distinctly Confucian element to Chinese President Xi Jinping's strategy. Xi's sweeping anti-corruption campaign, which will enter "phase two" in 2018, is essentially an attempt to rectify the hearts and regulate the families of Communist Party officials and civil servants. The same could be said for his use of censorship and strict ideological controls to ensure that the general public remains in line with the regime. Yet Xi is also using positive measures - like pollution curbs, social welfare, and other reforms - to win over hearts and minds. His purpose is ultimately the preservation of the Chinese state - namely, the prevention of a Soviet-style collapse. Only if the regime is stable at home can Xi hope to enhance the state's international security and erode American hegemony in East Asia. This would, from Beijing's vantage, make the whole world more tranquil and happy. Thus, for investors seeking a better understanding of China in the long run, it is necessary to look at what is happening to its governance as well as to its macroeconomic fundamentals and foreign relations.1 China's greatest vulnerability over the long run is its political system. Because Xi Jinping's willingness to relinquish power is now uncertain, his governance and reform agenda in his second term will have an outsized impact on China's long-run investment outlook. The Danger From Within From 1978-2008, the Communist Party's legitimacy rested on its ability to deliver rising incomes. Since the Great Recession, however, China has entered a "New Normal" of declining potential GDP growth as the society ages and productivity growth converges toward the emerging market average (Chart II-1). In this context, Chinese policymakers are deathly afraid of getting caught in the "middle income trap," a loose concept used to explain why some middle-income economies get bogged down in slower growth rates that prevent them from reaching high-income status (Chart II-2).2 Chart II-1The New Normal The New Normal The New Normal Chart II-2Will China Get Caught In The Middle-Income Trap? January 2018 January 2018 Such a negative economic outcome would likely prompt a wave of popular discontent, which, in turn, could eventually jeopardize Communist Party rule. The quid pro quo between the Chinese government and its population is that the former delivers rising incomes in exchange for the latter's compliance with authoritarian rule. The party is not blind to the fate of other authoritarian states whose growth trajectory stalled. The threat of popular unrest in China may seem remote today. The Communist Party is rallying around its leader, Xi Jinping; the economy rebounded from the turmoil of 2015 and its cyclical slowdown in recent months is so far benign; consumer sentiment is extremely buoyant; and the global economic backdrop is bright (Chart II-3). Yet these positive political and economic developments are cyclical, whereas the underlying political risks are structural and persistent. China has made massive gains in lifting its population out of poverty, but it is still home to 559 million people, around 40% of the population, living on less than $6 per day, the living standard of Uzbekistan. It will be harder to continue improving these workers' quality of life as trend growth slows and the prospects for export-oriented manufacturing dry up. This is why the Xi administration has recently renewed its attention to poverty alleviation. The government is on target in lifting rural incomes, but behind target in lifting urban incomes, and urban-dwellers are now the majority of the nation (Chart II-4). The plight of China's 200-250 million urban migrants, in particular, poses the risk of social discontent. Chart II-3China's Slowdown So Far Benign China's Slowdown So Far Benign China's Slowdown So Far Benign Chart II-4Urban Income Targets At Risk Urban Income Targets At Risk Urban Income Targets At Risk Moreover, while China knows how to alleviate poverty, it has less experiencing coping with the greatest threat to the regime: the rapid growth of the middle class, with its high expectations, demands for meritocracy and social mobility, and potential for unrest if those expectations are spoiled (Chart II-5). Democracy is not necessarily a condition for reaching high-income status, but all of Asia's high-income countries are democracies. A higher level of wealth encourages household autonomy vis-à-vis the state. Today, China has reached the $8,000 GDP per capita range that often accompanies the overthrow of authoritarian regimes.3 The Chinese are above the level of income at which the Taiwanese replaced their military dictatorship in 1987; China's poorest provinces are now above South Korea's level in that same year, when it too cast off the yoke of authoritarianism (Chart II-6). Chart II-5The Communist Party's Greatest Challenge The Communist Party's Greatest Challenge The Communist Party's Greatest Challenge Chart II-6China's Development Beyond Point At Which Taiwan And Korea Overthrew Dictatorship January 2018 January 2018 This is not an argument for democracy in China. We are agnostic about whether China will become democratic in our lifetime. We are making a far more humble point: that political risk will mount as wealth is accumulated by the country's growing middle class. Several emerging markets - including Thailand, Malaysia, Turkey and Brazil - have witnessed substantial political tumult after their middle class reached half of the population and stalled (Chart II-7). China is approaching this point and will eventually face similar challenges. Chart II-7Middle Class Growth Troubles Other EMs Middle Class Growth Troubles Other EMs Middle Class Growth Troubles Other EMs The comparison reveals that an inflection point exists for a society where the country's political establishment faces difficulties in negotiating the growing demands of a wealthier population. As political scientists have shown empirically, the very norms of society evolve as wealth erodes the pull of Malthusian and traditional cultural variables.4 Political transformation can follow this process, often quite unexpectedly and radically.5 Clearly the Chinese public shows no sign of large-scale, revolutionary sentiment at the moment. And political opposition does not necessarily result in regime change. Nevertheless, it is empirically false that the Chinese people are naturally opposed to democracy or representative government. After all, Sun Yat Sen founded a Republic of China in 1912, well before many western democratic transformations! And more to the point, the best survey evidence shows that the Chinese are culturally most similar to their East Asian neighbors (as well as, surprisingly, the Baltic and eastern European states): this is not a neighborhood that inherently eschews democracy. Remarkably, recent surveys suggest that China's millennial generation, while not wildly enthusiastic about democracy, is nevertheless more enthusiastic than its peers in the western world's liberal democracies (Chart II-8)! Chart II-8Chinese People Not Less Fond Of Democracy Than Others January 2018 January 2018 China is also home to one of the most reliable predictors of political change: inequality. China's economic boom is coincident with the rise of extreme inequalities in income, wealth, region, and social status. True, judging by average household wealth, everyone appears to be a winner; but the average is misleading because it is pulled upward by very high net worth individuals - and China has created 528 billionaires in the past decade alone. A better measure is the mean-to-median wealth ratio, as it demonstrates the gap that opens up between the average and the typical household. As Chart II-9 demonstrates, China is witnessing a sharp increase in inequality relative to its neighbors and peers. More standard measures of inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, also show very high readings in China. And this trend has combined with social immobility: China has a very high degree of generational earnings elasticity, which is a measure of the responsiveness of one's income to one's parent's income. If elasticity is high, then social outcomes are largely predetermined by family and social mobility is low. On this measure, China is an extreme outlier - comparable to the U.S. and the U.K., which, while very different economies, have suffered recent political shocks as a result of this very predicament (Chart II-10). Chart II-9Inequality: A Severe Problem In China Inequality: A Severe Problem In China Inequality: A Severe Problem In China Chart II-10China An Outlier In Inequality And Social Immobility January 2018 January 2018 "China does not have voters" unlike the U.S. and U.K., is the instant reply. Yet that statement entails that China has no pressure valve for releasing pent-up frustrations. Any political shock may be more, not less, destabilizing. In the U.S. and the U.K., voters could release their frustrations by electing an anti-establishment president or abrogating a trade relationship with Europe. In China, the only option may be to demand an "exit" from the political system altogether. Note that there is already substantial evidence of social unrest in China over the past decade. From 2003 to 2007, China faced a worrisome increase in "mass incidents," at which point the National Bureau of Statistics stopped keeping track. The longer data on "public incidents" suggests that the level of unrest remains elevated, despite improvements under the Xi administration (Chart II-11). Broader measures tell a similar story of a country facing severe tensions under the surface. For instance, China's public security spending outstrips its national defense spending (Chart II-12). Chart II-11Chinese Social Unrest Is Real Chinese Social Unrest Is Real Chinese Social Unrest Is Real Chart II-12China Spends More On ##br##Domestic Security Than Defense January 2018 January 2018 In essence, Chinese political risk is understated. This conclusion may seem counterintuitive, given Xi's remarkable consolidation of power. But is ultimately structural factors, not individual leaders, that will carry the day. The Communist Party is in a good position now, but its leaders are all-too-aware of the volcanic frustrations that could be unleashed should they fail to deliver the "China Dream." This is why so much depends upon Xi's policy agenda in the second half of his term. To that question we will now turn. Bottom Line: The Communist Party is at a cyclical high point of above-trend economic growth and political consolidation under a strongman leader. However, political risk is understated: poverty, inequality, and middle-class angst are structural and persistent and the long-term potential growth rate is slowing. If we assume that China is not unique in its historical trajectory, then we can conclude that it is approaching one of the most politically volatile periods in its development. Chart II-13Xi's Anti-Corruption Campaign Xi's Anti-Corruption Campaign Xi's Anti-Corruption Campaign The Governance And Reform Agenda Since coming to office in 2012-13, President Xi has spearheaded an extraordinary anti-corruption campaign and purge of the Communist Party (Chart II-13). The campaign has understandably drawn comparisons to Chairman Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution (1966-76). Yet these are not entirely fair, as Xi has tried to improve governance as well as eradicate his enemies. As Xi prepares for his "re-election" in March 2018, he has declared that he will expand the anti-corruption campaign further in his second term in office: details are scant, but the gist is that the campaign will branch out from the ruling party to the entire state bureaucracy, on a permanent basis, in the form of a new National Supervision Commission.6 There are three ways in which this agenda could prove positive for China's long-term outlook. First, the regime clearly hopes to convince the public that it is addressing the most burning social grievances. Corruption persistently ranks at the top of the list, insofar as public opinion can be known (Chart II-14). Public opinion is hard to measure, but it is clear that consumer sentiment is soaring in the wake of the October party congress (see Chart II-3 above). It is also worth noting that the Chinese public's optimism perked up in Xi's first year in office, when the policy agenda on offer was substantially the same and the economy had just experienced a sharp drop in growth rates (Chart II-15). Reassuring the public over corruption will improve trust in the regime. Second, the anti-corruption campaign feeds into Xi's broader economic reform agenda. Productivity growth is harder to generate as a country's industrialization process matures. With the bulk of the big increases in labor, capital, and land supply now complete in China, the need to improve total factor productivity becomes more pressing (Chart II-16). Unlike the early stages of growth, this requires reaching the hard-to-get economic conditions, such as property rights, human capital, financial deepening, entrepreneurship, innovation, education, technology, and social welfare. Chart II-14Chinese Public Grievances January 2018 January 2018 Chart II-15Anti-Corruption Is Popular January 2018 January 2018 Chart II-16Productivity Requires Institutional Change Productivity Requires Institutional Change Productivity Requires Institutional Change On this count, the Xi administration's anti-corruption campaign has been a net positive. The most widely accepted corruption indicators suggest that it has made a notable improvement to the country's governance. Yet the country remains far below its competitors in the absolute rankings, notably its most similar neighbor Taiwan (Chart II-17 A&B). The institutionalization of the campaign could thus further improve the institutional framework and business environment. Chart II-17AAnti-Corruption Campaign Is A Plus... January 2018 January 2018 Chart II-17B...But There's A Long Way To Go January 2018 January 2018 Third, the anti-corruption campaign can serve as a central government tool in enforcing other economic reforms. Pro-productivity reforms are harder to execute in the context of slowing growth because political resistance increases among established actors fighting to preserve their existing advantages. If the ruling party is to break through these vested interests, it needs a powerful set of tools. Recently, the central government in Beijing has been able to implement policy more effectively on the local level by paving the way through corruption probes that remove personnel and sharpen compliance. Case in point: the use of anti-corruption officials this year gave teeth to environmental inspection teams tasked with trimming overcapacity in the industrial sector (Chart II-18). And there are already clear signs that this method will be replicated as financial regulators tackle the shadow banking sector.7 Chart II-18Reforms Cut Steel Capacity, ##br##Reduced Need For Scrap Reforms Cut Steel Capacity, Reduced Need For Scrap Reforms Cut Steel Capacity, Reduced Need For Scrap These last examples - financial and environmental regulatory tightening - are policy priorities in 2018. The coercive aspect of the corruption probes should ensure that they are more effective than they would otherwise be. And reining in asset bubbles and reducing pollution are clear long-term positives for the regime. Ideally, then, Xi's anti-corruption campaign will deliver three substantial improvements to China's long-term outlook: greater public trust in the government, higher total factor productivity, and reduced systemic risks. The administration hopes that it can mitigate its governance deficit while improving economic sustainability. In this way it can buy both public support and precious time to continue adjusting to the new normal. The danger is that these policies will combine to increase downside risks to growth in the short term.8 Bottom Line: Xi's anti-corruption campaign is being expanded and institutionalized to cover the entire Chinese administrative state. This is a consequential campaign that will take up a large part of Xi's second term. It is the administration's major attempt to mitigate the socio-political challenges that await China as it rises up the income ladder. Absolute Power Corrupts Absolutely? The problem, however, is that Xi may merely use the anti-corruption campaign to accrue more power into his hands. As is clear from the above, Xi's governance agenda is far from impartial and professional. The anti-corruption campaign is being used not only to punish corrupt officials but also to achieve various other goals. Xi has even publicly linked the campaign to the downfall of his political rivals.9 In essence, the campaign highlights the core contradiction of the Xi administration: can Xi genuinely improve China's governance by means of the centralization and personalization of power? Chart II-19China's Governance Still Falls Far Behind January 2018 January 2018 Over the long haul, the fundamental problem is the absence of checks and balances, i.e. accountability, from Xi's agenda. For instance, the National Supervision Commission will be granted immense powers to investigate and punish malefactors within the state - but who will inspect the inspectors? Xi's other governance reforms suffer the same problem. His attempt to create "rule of law" is lacking the critical ingredients of judicial independence and oversight. The courts are not likely to be able to bring cases against the party, central government, or powerful state-owned firms, and they will not be able to repeal government decisions. Thus, as many commentators have noted, Xi's notion of rule of law is more accurately described as "rule by law": the reformed legal system will in all probability remain an instrument in the hands of the Communist Party. Likewise, Xi's attempt to grant the People's Bank of China greater powers of oversight in order to combat systemic financial risk suffers from the fact that the central bank is not independent, and will remain subordinate to the State Council, and hence to the Politburo Standing Committee. This is not even to mention the lamentable fact that Xi's campaign for better governance has so far coincided with extensive repression of civil society, which does not mesh well with the desire to improve human capital and innovation.10 Thus it is of immense importance whether Xi sets up relatively durable anti-corruption, legal, and financial institutions that will maintain their legitimate functions beyond his term and political purposes. Otherwise, his actions will simply illustrate why China's governance indicators lag so far behind its peers in absolute terms. Corruption perceptions may improve further, but there will be virtually no progress in areas like "voice and accountability," "political stability and absence of violence," "rule of law," and "regulatory quality," each of which touches on the Communist Party's weak spots in various ways (Chart II-19). Analysis of the Communist Party's shifting leadership characteristics reinforces a pessimistic view of the long run if Xi misses his current opportunity.11 The party's top leadership increasingly consists of career politicians from the poor, heavily populated interior provinces - i.e. the home base of the party. Their educational backgrounds are less scientific, i.e. more susceptible to party ideology. (Indeed, Xi Jinping's top young protégé, Chen Miner, is a propaganda chief.) And their work experience largely consists of ruling China's provinces, where they earned their spurs by crushing rebellions and redistributing funds to placate various interest groups (Chart II-20). While one should be careful in drawing conclusions from such general statistics, the contrast with the leadership that oversaw China's boldest reforms in the 1990s is plain. Chart II-20China's Leaders Becoming More 'Communist' Over Time January 2018 January 2018 Bottom Line: Xi's reform agenda is contradictory in its attempt to create better governance through centralizing and personalizing power. Unless he creates checks and balances in his reform of China's institutions, he is likely to fall short of long-lasting improvements. The character profiles of China's political elite do not suggest that the party will become more likely to pursue pro-market reforms in Xi's wake. Xi Jinping's Choice Xi is the pivotal player because of his rare consolidation of power, and 2018 is the pivotal year. It is pivotal because it will establish the policy trajectory of Xi's second term - which may or may not extend into additional terms after 2022. So far, the world has gained a few key takeaways from Xi's policy blueprint, which he delivered at the nineteenth National Party Congress on October 18: Xi has consolidated power: He and his faction reign supreme both within the Communist Party and the broader Chinese state; Xi's policy agenda is broadly continuous: Xi's speech built on his administration's stated aims in the first five years as well as the inherited long-term aims of previous administrations; China is coming out of its shell: In the international realm, Xi sees China "moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind"; The 2022 succession is in doubt: Xi refrained from promoting a successor to the Politburo Standing Committee, the unwritten norm since 1992. Markets have not reacted overly negatively to these developments (Chart II-21), as the latter do not pose an immediate threat to the global rally in risk assets. The reasons are several: Chart II-21Market Not Too Worried About ##br##Party Congress Outcomes Market Not Too Worried About Party Congress Outcomes Market Not Too Worried About Party Congress Outcomes Maoism is overrated: While the Communist Party constitution now treats Xi Jinping as the sole peer of the disastrous ruler Mao Zedong, the market does not buy the Maoist rhetoric. Instead, it sees policy continuity, yet with more effective central leadership, which is a plus. Reforms are making gradual progress: Xi is treading carefully, but is still publicly committed to a reform agenda of rebalancing China's economic model toward consumption and services, improving governance and productivity, and maintaining trade openness. Whatever the shortcomings of the first five years, this agenda is at least reformist in intention. China's tactic of "seeking progress while maintaining stability" is certainly more reassuring than "progress at any cost" or "no progress at all"! Trump and Xi are getting along so far: Xi's promises to move China toward center stage threaten to increase geopolitical tensions with the United States in the long run, yet markets are not overly alarmed. China is imposing sanctions on North Korea to help resolve the nuclear missile standoff, negotiating a "Code of Conduct" in the South China Sea, and promoting the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which will marginally add to global development and growth. Trump is hurling threatening words rather than concrete tariffs. 2022 is a long way away: Markets are unconcerned with Xi's decision not to put a clear successor on the Politburo Standing Committee, even though it implies that Xi will not step down at the end of his term in five years. Investors are implicitly approving Xi's strongman behavior while blissfully ignoring the implication that the peaceful transition of power in China could become less secure. Are investors right to be so sanguine? Cyclically, BCA's China Investment Strategy is overweight Chinese investible equities relative to EM and global stocks. Geopolitical Strategy also recommends that clients follow this view and overweight China relative to EM. Beyond this 6-12 month period, it depends on how Xi uses his political capital. If Xi is serious about governance and economic reform, then long-term investors should tolerate the other political risks, and the volatility of reforms, and overweight China within their EM portfolio. After all, China's two greatest pro-market reformers, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, were also heavy-handed authoritarians who crushed domestic dissent, clashed with the United States from time to time, and hesitated to relinquish control to their successors. However, if Xi is not serious, then investors with a long time horizon should downgrade China/EM assets - as not only China but the world will have a serious problem on its hands. For Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin always reaffirmed China's pro-market orientation and desire to integrate into the global economic order. If Xi turns his back on this orientation, while imprisoning his rivals for corruption, concentrating power exclusively in his own person, and contesting U.S. leadership in the Asia Pacific, then the long-run outlook for China and the region should darken rather quickly. Domestic institutions will decay and trade and foreign investment will suffer. How and when will investors know the difference? As mentioned, we think 2018 is critical. Xi is flush with political capital and has a positive global economic backdrop. If he does not frontload serious efforts this year then it will become harder to gain traction as time goes by.12 If he demurs, the Chinese political system will not afford another opportunity like this for years to come. The country will approach the 2020s with additional layers of bureaucracy loyal to Xi, but no significant macro adjustments to its governance or productivity. It is not clear how long China's growth rate is sustainable without pro-productivity reforms. It is also not clear that the world will wait five years before responding to a China that, without a new reform push, will appear unabashedly mercantilist, neo-communist, and revisionist. Bottom Line: The long-run investment outlook for China hinges on Xi Jinping's willingness to use his immense personal authority and concentration of power for the purposes of good governance and market-oriented economic reform. Without concrete progress, investors will have to decide whether they want to invest in a China that is becoming less economically vibrant as well as more authoritarian. We think this would be a bad bet. Matt Gertken Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy Marko Papic Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist Geopolitical Strategy 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Chinese policymakers are expressly concerned about the middle-income trap. Please see the World Bank and China's Development Research Center of the State Council, "China 2030: Building A Modern, Harmonious, And Creative Society," 2013, available at www.worldbank.org. Liu He, who is perhaps Xi Jinping's top economic adviser, had a hand in drafting this report and is now a member of the Politburo and shortlisted to take charge of the newly established Financial Stability and Development Commission at the People's Bank of China. 3 Please see Indermit S. Gill and Homi Kharas, "The Middle-Income Trap Turns Ten," World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 7403 (August, 2015), available at www.worldbank.org 4 Please see Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: the Human Development Sequence (Cambridge: CUP, 2005). 5 For example, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Arab Spring, as well as the downfall of communist regimes writ large, were completely unanticipated. 6 Specifically, Xi is creating a National Supervision Commission that will group a range of existing anti-graft watchdogs under its roof at the local, provincial, and central levels of administration, while coordinating with the Communist Party's top anti-graft watchdog. More details are likely to be revealed at the March legislative session, but what matters is that the initiative is a significant attempt to institutionalize the anti-corruption campaign. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China's Party Congress Ends ... So What?" dated November 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 China has recently drafted top anti-graft officials, such as Zhou Liang, from the powerful Central Discipline and Inspection Commission and placed them in the China Banking Regulatory Commission, which is in charge of overseeing banks. Authorities have already imposed fines in nearly 3,000 cases in 2017 affecting various kinds of banks, including state-owned banks. On the broader use of anti-corruption teams for economic policy, please see Barry Naughton, "The General Secretary's Extended Reach: Xi Jinping Combines Economics And Politics," China Leadership Monitor 54 (Fall 2017), available at www.hoover.org. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Three Questions For 2018," dated December 13, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see Gao Shan et al, "China's President Xi Jinping Hits Out at 'Political Conspiracies' in Keynote Speech," Radio Free Asia, January 3, 2017, available at www.rfa.org 10 Xi has cranked up the state's propaganda organs, censorship of the media, public surveillance, and broader ideological and security controls (including an aggressive push for "cyber-sovereignty") to warn the public that there is no alternative to Communist Party rule. This tendency has raised alarms among civil rights defenders, lawyers, NGOs, and the western world to the effect that China's governance is actually regressing despite nominal improvement in standard indicators. This is the opposite of Confucius's bottom-up notion of order. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Xi faces politically sensitive deadlines in the 2020-22 period: the economic targets in the thirteenth Five Year Plan; the hundredth anniversary of the Communist Party in 2021; and Xi's possible retirement at the twentieth National Party Congress in 2022. At that point he will need to focus on demonstrating the Communist Party's all-around excellence and make careful preparations either to step down or cling to power. III. Indicators And Reference Charts Global equity indexes remained on a tear heading into year-end on the back of robust earnings growth in the major countries and U.S. tax cuts. There are some dark clouds hanging over this rally, as discussed in the Overview section. The technicals are stretched, but none of our fundamental indicators are warning of a market top. Implied equity volatility is very low, which can be interpreted in a contrary fashion. Investor sentiment is frothy and our Speculation Indicator is very elevated. Moreover, our equity valuation indicator has finally reached one standard deviation, which is our threshold of overvaluation. Valuation does not tell us anything about timing, but it does highlight the downside risks. Our monetary indicator also deteriorated a little more in December, although not by enough on its own to justify downgrading risk assets. On a positive note, earnings surprises and the net revisions ratio are not sending any warning signs for profit growth (although net revisions have edged lower recently). Moreover, our new Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) continued on its bullish equity signal in November for the fifth consecutive month. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicators are also bullish on stocks in the U.S., Europe and Japan. These indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. The small dip in the Japanese WTP in December is a little worrying, but we need to see more weakness to confirm that flows no longer favor Japanese equities. In contrast, Europe's WTP rose sharply in December, suggesting that investors are allocating more to their European equity holdings. We are overweight both Europe and (especially) Japan relative to the U.S. (currency hedged). U.S. Treasury valuation is still very close to neutral, even following December's backup in yields. There is plenty of upside potential for yields before they hit "inexpensive" territory. Similarly, our technical bond indicator suggests that technical factors will not be headwind to a further bond selloff in 2018. Little has change for the dollar. The technicals are neutral. Value is expensive based on PPP, but less so by other valuation metrics. We see modest upside for the greenback in 2018. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart II-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations Chart II-10U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart II-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart II-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart II-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart II-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart II-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart II-16U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart II-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart II-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart II-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart II-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart II-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart II-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart II-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart II-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart II-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart II-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart II-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart II-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart II-29U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart II-30U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook Chart II-31U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart II-32U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market Chart II-33U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption Chart II-34U.S. Housing U.S. Housing U.S. Housing Chart II-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart II-36U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions Chart II-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart II-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China

Dear Client, This is our final publication for the year. We will be back on January 5th. On behalf of the entire Global Investment Strategy team, I would like to wish you a Merry Christmas, Happy Holidays, and a Prosperous New Year! Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Global bonds have sold off in recent days, but the spread between long-term and short-term Treasury yields remains well below where it was at the start of the year. A flatter Treasury yield curve suggests that the ongoing U.S. business-cycle expansion is getting long in the tooth. Nevertheless, three factors dilute the potentially bearish message from the curve. First, the yield curve has flattened largely because short-term rate expectations have risen thanks to better economic data. Second, both the 10-year/2-year and 10-year/3-month spreads are still above levels that have foreshadowed poor returns for risk assets in the past. This is particularly true for equities. Third, a structurally low term premium has distorted the signal from the yield curve. The U.S. yield curve is likely to steepen over the next six months, before flattening again in the lead-up to a recession in late-2019. We reveal the One Number that will kill bitcoin. Feature A Harbinger Of Recession? The U.S. yield curve has steepened in recent days, but is still much flatter than it was at the start of the year. The 10-year/3-month spread currently stands at 113 bps, down 84 bps year-to-date. The 10-year/2-year spread has fallen from 125 bps to 62 bps. Numerous academic studies have highlighted the importance of the yield curve as a leading indicator of recessions.1 In fact, every U.S. recession over the past 50 years has been preceded by an inverted yield curve (Chart 1). Chart 1An Inverted Yield Curve Has Often Been A Harbinger Of A Recession An Inverted Yield Curve Has Often Been A Harbinger Of A Recession An Inverted Yield Curve Has Often Been A Harbinger Of A Recession The converse has generally been true as well: Most inversions in the yield curve have coincided with a recession. The only two exceptions were in 1967 - when credit conditions tightened and industrial production decelerated, but the U.S. still managed to avoid succumbing to a recession - and in 1998, when the yield curve briefly inverted during the LTCM crisis. Considering that recessions and equity bear markets typically overlap (Chart 2), it is not surprising that investors have begun to fret about what a flatter yield curve may mean for their portfolios. Chart 2Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Don't Worry... Yet Chart 3U.S. Growth Expectations Revised Higher U.S. Growth Expectations Revised Higher U.S. Growth Expectations Revised Higher We would not be as dismissive of a flatter yield curve as Fed Chair Yellen was during her December press conference. Policymakers and investors alike have been too quick to downplay the signal from the yield curve in the past. In 2006, they blamed the "global savings glut" for dragging down long-term yields. In 2000, they argued that the federal government's budget surplus was reducing the supply of long-term bonds. In both cases, the bond market turned out to be seeing something more ominous than they were. That said, there are three reasons why we would discount some of the more bearish interpretations of what a flatter yield curve is telling us. First, the flattening of the yield curve has occurred mainly because of an increase in short-term rate expectations, rather than a decrease in long-term bond yields. The increase in rate expectations has been largely driven by stronger growth data. The economic surprise index has surged far into positive territory and analysts are now scrambling to revise up their 2018 and 2019 U.S. GDP growth projections (Chart 3). The Fed now sees growth of 2.5% in 2018 and an unemployment rate of 3.9% by the end of next year. Back in September, the Fed expected growth of 2.1% and an unemployment rate of 4.1%. Second, our research suggests that the slope of the yield curve only becomes worrisome for the economy when it falls to extremely low levels. This conclusion is reinforced by the New York Fed's Yield Curve Recession Model, which uses the difference between 10-year and 3-month Treasury rates to estimate the probability of a U.S. recession twelve months ahead.2 The model's current recession probability stands at a modest 11% (Chart 4). The last three recessions all began when the implied probability was over 25%. Chart 4NY Fed's Yield Curve Model Suggests That The Probability Of A Recession Is Still Quite Low NY Fed's Yield Curve Model Suggests That The Probability Of A Recession Is Still Quite Low NY Fed's Yield Curve Model Suggests That The Probability Of A Recession Is Still Quite Low Third, the slope of the yield curve is weighed down by a structurally low term premium. The term premium measures the additional return investors can expect to receive by locking in their money in a 10-year Treasury note instead of rolling over a short-term Treasury bill for an entire decade. Historically, the term premium has been positive. Over the past few years, however, it has often been negative - meaning that investors have been willing to pay a premium to take on duration risk. Many commentators have attributed this peculiar state of affairs to central bank asset purchases, which they claim have artificially depressed long-term bond yields. There is some truth to this, but we think there is an even more important reason: Bonds today provide a good hedge against bad economic news. When fears of an economic slowdown mount, equities tend to sell off, while bond prices rise. This differs from the circumstances that existed in the 1970s and 1980s, when bad economic news usually meant higher inflation. To the extent that long-term bonds now serve as insurance policies against recessions, investors are more willing to accept the lower yields that they offer. Empirically, one can see this in the shift of the correlation between equity returns and bond yields. It was strongly negative up until the mid-1990s. Now it is strongly positive (Chart 5). A low term premium implies that the slope of the yield curve should be structurally flatter. That is exactly what we see today. Chart 6 shows that the 10-year/3-month spread would be well above its long-term average if the term premium were removed from the picture. This implies that investors have little to fear from the shape of today's yield curve, at least over the next six-to-twelve months. Chart 5Bond Prices Now Tend To Rise When Equity Prices Go Down Bond Prices Now Tend to Rise When Equity Prices Go Down Bond Prices Now Tend to Rise When Equity Prices Go Down Chart 6Stripping Out The Term Premium,##BR##The Yield Curve Is Not So Flat Stripping Out The Term Premium, The Yield Curve Is Not So Flat Stripping Out The Term Premium, The Yield Curve Is Not So Flat Rising Odds Of A Recession In Late-2019 Beyond then, things start to get dicey. The Fed's end-2018 unemployment rate projection of 3.9% is 0.7 percentage points below its long-term estimate of the unemployment rate. This means that at some point in the future, the Fed will need to lift interest rates above their "neutral" level in order to push the unemployment rate up to its equilibrium level. That's a risky gambit. There has never been a case in the post-war era where the unemployment rate has risen by more than one-third of a percentage point without a recession ensuing (Chart 7). Modern economies are subject to feedback loops. Once economic conditions begin to deteriorate, households cut back on spending. This leads to less hiring and even less spending. Bad economic news begets worse news. Chart 7Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Implications For Equities And Credit A flatter Treasury yield curve suggests that the U.S. business cycle is entering the home stretch. Nevertheless, as we pointed out two weeks ago, the 7th-to-8th innings of business-cycle expansions are often the juiciest for equity investors (Table 1).3 Table 1Too Soon To Get Out Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Chart 8 shows that the term spread today is still at levels that have signaled positive equity returns in the past. In fact, today's term spread is close to levels that prevailed in the second half of the 1990s, a period that coincided with the greatest bull market in American history. This message is echoed by our forthcoming MacroQuant model, which continues to flag upside risks for stocks over the next 6-to-12 months (Chart 9). Chart 8Current Term Spread Is Still Pointing##BR##To Positive Equity Returns Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Chart 9MacroQuant Still Positive##BR##On The Stock Market Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Globally, we favor euro area and Japanese equities (in local-currency terms) in the developed market sphere due to our expectation that the euro and yen will depreciate somewhat next year. Both the euro area and Japan also have greater exposure to cyclical sectors. This fits with our bias towards owning cyclicals over defensive stocks. Today's term spread is a bit more worrying for corporate credit. As our bond strategists have noted, a flatter yield curve is consistent with lower, though still positive, monthly excess returns for high-yield bonds (Chart 10).4 Again, the second half of the 1990s provides a potentially useful template: Despite a sizzling stock market, high-yield spreads actually widened as corporations loaded up on debt (Chart 11). The deterioration in our Corporate Health Monitor over the past five years suggests that a similar dynamic may be afoot (Chart 12). Chart 10Junk Monthly Excess Returns##BR##And The Yield Curve Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Chart 11Second Half Of 1990s: When High-Yield Spreads##BR##Rose With Stock Prices Second Half Of 1990s: When High-Yield Spreads Rose With Stock Prices Second Half Of 1990s: When High-Yield Spreads Rose With Stock Prices Chart 12Corporate Health Has##BR##Been Deteriorating Corporate Health Has Been Deteriorating Corporate Health Has Been Deteriorating Yield Curve Should Steepen Over The Coming Months Of course, much depends on what happens to the yield curve going forward. We suspect that it will flatten again towards the end of next year. However, it is likely to steepen over the next six months. U.S. GDP growth will remain above trend next year, as wages start to rise more briskly and firms boost capital spending to meet rising demand for their products. Fiscal policy should also help. Tax cuts will lift growth by 0.2%-to-0.3% in 2018. Higher disaster relief efforts following the hurricanes and a pending agreement to raise caps on discretionary spending will also translate into increased federal government spending. Investors have largely overlooked this source of fiscal stimulus, but increased spending will contribute almost as much to growth next year as lower taxes. Unfortunately, all this additional growth, coming at a time when the output gap is all but closed, is likely to stoke inflationary pressures. Our Pipeline Inflation Pressure Index has risen sharply since early 2016, while the ISM prices paid index has shot up. The New York Fed's Underlying Inflation Gauge has accelerated to an 11-year high of 3% (Chart 13). Historically, rising inflation expectations have led to a steeper yield curve (Chart 14). The implication is that investors should favor inflation-linked securities over government bonds. Chart 13U.S. Inflation Pressure Are Building U.S. Inflation Pressure Are Building U.S. Inflation Pressure Are Building Chart 14Rising Inflation Expectations Lead To A Steeper Yield Curve Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve The One Number That Will Kill Bitcoin In a normal world, most reasonable people would regard a flatter yield curve and continued weak inflation readings as evidence that fiat money was, if anything, doing too good a job as a store of value. However, nothing is normal or reasonable about bitcoin.5 Chart 15Governments Will Want Their Cut:##BR##U.S. Seigniorage Revenue Governments Will Want Their Cut: U.S. Seigniorage Revenue Governments Will Want Their Cut: U.S. Seigniorage Revenue No one knows when the bitcoin bubble will burst. Only a tiny fraction of the public owns the virtual currency. The value of all bitcoin in circulation represents 0.35% of global GDP. At its peak in 1996, the value of all pyramid scheme assets in Albania amounted to almost half of GDP. Never underestimate the lure of easy money. While we do not know where the price of bitcoin will be ten months from now, we do have a good guess of where it will be ten years from today. And that price is zero, or thereabouts. When the U.S. Treasury issues a $100 bill, it gains the ability to buy $100 of goods and services with it. The government's cost is whatever it pays to print the bill, which is next to nothing. This so-called "seigniorage revenue" is set to reach $100 billion this year (Chart 15). That is the number that will kill bitcoin. There is no way the U.S. government will forsake this revenue in order to make room for bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. Not when there are entitlements to pay and gaping budget deficits to finance. A variety of other countries have a love-hate relationship with bitcoin, partly because of their "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" attitude towards the dollar. But that will change when they see their tax bases eroding as more commerce gets done in the anonymous world of cryptocurrencies. Bitcoin's days are numbered. The only question is who will be holding the bag when the party ends. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Jonathan H. Wright, "The Yield Curve And Predicting Recessions," FEDs Working Paper No. 2006-7, May 3, 2006; Michael Owyang, "Is the Yield Curve Signaling a Recession?"Federal Reserve Bank Of St. Louis, March 24, 2016; and Arturo Estrella and Mishkin, Frederic S., "The Yield Curve as a Predictor of U.S. Recessions," Federal Reserve Bank Of New York, (2:7), June 1996. 2 Please see "The Yield Curve As A Leading Indicator: Probability of U.S. Recession Charts," Federal Reserve Bank Of New York. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "When To Get Out," dated December 8, 2017. 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy, "Proactive, Reactive Or Right?" dated December 12, 2017. 5 Please see European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Bitcoins And Fractals," dated December 21, 2017; Technology Sector Strategy Special Report, "Cyber Currencies: Actual Currencies Or Just Speculative Assets?" dated December 12, 2017; Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Bitcoin's Macro Impact," dated September 15, 2017; and Technology Sector Strategy Special Report, "Blockchain And Cryptocurrencies," dated May 5, 2017. Tactical Global Asset Allocation Recommendations Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

This will be the last U.S. Bond Strategy report of the year. The next publication will be on January 9 with our Portfolio Allocation Summary for January 2018. Until then we extend our best wishes for a wonderful holiday and a Happy New Year. Highlights Duration: Rising core inflation will cause the nominal 10-year Treasury yield to increase, driven mostly by the inflation component. We target a range of 2.80% to 3.25% for the nominal 10-year Treasury yield by the time that core inflation is back close to the Fed's target, likely sometime in the middle of 2018. Yield Curve: The yield curve will steepen modestly during the next six months as inflation recovers and the Fed lifts rates only gradually. This mild steepening will transition to flattening once long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates have recovered to pre-crisis levels. Credit Cycle: Our indicators suggest that we are moving into the late stages of the credit cycle, but for now we retain an overweight cyclical stance on corporate bonds. A shift to a more restrictive monetary policy, tightening C&I bank lending standards and/or a continued uptrend in gross corporate leverage are the main catalysts we will be monitoring to gauge the end of the cycle. Feature Chart 1Fed Sees Stronger Growth In 2018 Fed Sees Stronger Growth In 2018 Fed Sees Stronger Growth In 2018 As was widely anticipated, the Fed delivered the fifth rate hike of the cycle last week, bringing the target range for the fed funds rate up to 1.25% to 1.5%. What's more, neither the Summary of Economic Projections nor Janet Yellen's final post-meeting press conference gave much indication that the Fed is worried enough about inflation to deviate from its current pace of tightening. To wit, the Fed did not alter its median projections for inflation or the near-term pace of rate hikes. As in September, the Fed still expects core PCE inflation to rise from its current 1.45% to 1.9% by the end of 2018. It also still expects to lift rates three more times next year. However, the Fed did respond to recent strong growth and employment data by revising its projection for GDP growth higher and its projection for the unemployment rate lower (Chart 1). It also revised the post-meeting statement to indicate that it now believes the economy has reached full employment. In other words, the Fed believes there is no longer any slack in the labor market. This dichotomy between stronger growth and a tight labor market on the one hand and low inflation on the other gets to the heart of the first big challenge that incoming Fed Chairman Jay Powell will face next year. Specifically, how much faith should the Fed have in its framework for forecasting inflation? Chart 2 shows that Janet Yellen's Phillips Curve model of core inflation does not explain this year's decline.1 It also shows that inflation is close to 0.5% below fair value, almost the largest deviation since 1995 (Chart 2, panel 2). It is this deviation that prompted Chair Yellen to say the following at last week's press conference: [W]e've had an undershoot of inflation for a number of years. We absolutely recognize that. I think until this year [the] undershoot was understandable. In other words, until this year the Fed's model did a good job of explaining low inflation. But now that a large residual has opened up between inflation and the Fed's model, it is reasonable for both the market and the Fed to question whether the underlying relationship between inflation and economic growth has changed. The market has already rendered its verdict in the affirmative. The compensation for inflation priced into the 10-year Treasury yield is only 1.88%. Historically, a level between 2.4% and 2.5% suggests the market has faith in the Fed's 2% inflation target. Further, the yield curve has been flattening dramatically. The 2/10 Treasury slope is down to 51 bps, and the fed funds/10-year slope is down to 94 bps. In other words, the bond market is discounting that the Fed can only deliver another 3-4 rate hikes before the economy starts to struggle, at which point inflation will still be below target. The recent revisions to the Fed's own economic projections also suggest that the perceived relationship between economic growth and inflation has weakened. The Fed revised its projection for GDP growth higher and its projection for the unemployment rate lower, but left its projections for inflation and the fed funds rate unchanged. This can only mean that the Fed views the relationship between economic growth and inflation as having weakened since September. So how much longer can the Powell Fed tighten policy without inflation actually trending higher? This is the single biggest question for bond markets and we detailed the three possible answers in last week's report.2 The most likely scenario is that the Fed's Phillips Curve model starts to work again next year. Core inflation trends higher and this eases the flattening pressure on the yield curve allowing the Fed to continue tightening. In support of this outcome, pipeline inflation measures have hooked up in recent weeks, suggesting that core inflation is about to bottom (Chart 3). Chart 2The Fed's Inflation Model The Fed's Inflation Model The Fed's Inflation Model Chart 3Pipeline Inflation Measures Pipeline Inflation Measures Pipeline Inflation Measures However, in the scenario where inflation does not move higher, the next most likely outcome is that risk assets sell off in the next couple months. This would lead to a tightening of financial conditions and would cause the Fed to react by adopting a more dovish policy stance. We showed in last week's report that risk off episodes in junk spreads become more frequent once the 2/10 Treasury slope breaks below 50 bps. It is also possible that the Fed proactively adopts a more dovish policy stance without having its hand forced by tighter financial conditions, but this now seems like the least likely outcome. Implications For Treasury Yields In the most likely scenario where core inflation trends higher during the next six months, Treasury yields will rise driven mostly by the inflation component (Chart 4). A return to the range of 2.4% to 2.5% on the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate would put between 52 bps and 62 bps of upward pressure on the nominal 10-year Treasury yield. This means that even if the real 10-year yield remains flat we should see the nominal 10-year yield in a range between 2.87% and 2.97% by the time that core inflation gets back to the Fed's target. But even a flat real 10-year yield seems like a fairly conservative assumption. We can think of the real 10-year yield as being driven by three main factors: (i) the fed funds rate itself, (ii) expectations for future changes in the fed funds rate and (iii) a term premium. In Chart 5 we show that a simple model based on these three factors does a good job explaining the fluctuations in the real 10-year Treasury yield.3 Chart 4Market Not Priced For Rising Inflation Market Not Priced For Rising Inflation Market Not Priced For Rising Inflation Chart 5A Simple Model Of The Real 10-Year Treasury Yield A Simple Model Of The Real 10-Year Treasury Yield A Simple Model Of The Real 10-Year Treasury Yield The model works better prior to the Great Recession because we deliberately chose pre-crisis coefficients for our three independent variables. Chart 6 shows the coefficients for the three variables estimated over rolling 5-year intervals, and the dashed horizontal lines show the coefficients we chose for our model. It is clear from Chart 6 that the zero-lower bound caused the estimated coefficient on the fed funds rate to decrease and the estimated coefficient on the 12-month discounter to increase. We expect both will converge slowly back toward pre-crisis levels now that the fed funds rate is well off the zero bound. Chart 6Controlling For The Zero Lower Bound Controlling For The Zero Lower Bound Controlling For The Zero Lower Bound The key conclusion from this modeling exercise is that, even with fairly conservative assumptions, it is difficult to craft a reasonable scenario where the real 10-year Treasury yield declines during the next 12 months. The forecast in Chart 5 assumes that the Fed lifts rates three times next year - consistent with its median projections - but also that rate hike expectations fall so that by the end of 2018 the market only expects one further rate hike during the next 12 months. Finally, we assume that implied interest rate volatility stays flat at historically low levels. Even in that relatively benign scenario our model suggests that the real 10-year Treasury yield would drift higher during the next 12 months. This leads us to project a range of 2.80% to 3.25% for the nominal 10-year Treasury yield by the time that core inflation moves back close to the Fed's 2% target. Implications For The Yield Curve The slope of the yield curve during the next 6-12 months will depend both on how quickly core inflation rises and how quickly the Fed tightens policy. Table 1 shows different scenarios for the fed funds rate, the 2-year/fed funds slope - which can be thought of as the expected number of rate hikes during the next two years - and the 10-year Treasury yield. For example, if core inflation rises back close to the Fed's target by next June and the Fed has only delivered one or two more rate hikes during that time period, then it is very likely that the yield curve will have steepened, at least modestly. If the Fed gets three or four hikes off before inflation gets back to target, then it is much more likely that the yield curve will have flattened. We think a modest curve steepening is the most likely outcome for the next six months. This is premised on the view that core inflation will start to trend higher in the coming months, and will approach the Fed's target by the middle of next year. During that timeframe the Fed will only deliver one or two rate hikes, consistent with its median projection for three hikes in 2018. Once core inflation is back closer to target and the compensation for inflation priced into long-dated Treasury yields is back to its pre-crisis 2.4% to 2.5% range, then aggressive curve flattening becomes much more likely. Table 1Scenarios For The Number Of Fed Rate Hikes By The Time That Inflation Returns To Target Ill Placed Trust? Ill Placed Trust? Bottom Line: The Fed is playing a dangerous game by continuing to signal a gradual pace of rate hikes in the face of inflation data that have not kept pace with its projections. Ultimately we think the Fed's models will be proven correct during the next six months and core inflation will resume its gradual cyclical uptrend. Rising core inflation will cause the nominal 10-year Treasury yield to increase, driven mostly by the inflation component. We target a range of 2.80% to 3.25% for the nominal 10-year Treasury yield by the time that core inflation is back close to the Fed's target, likely sometime in the middle of 2018. The yield curve will steepen modestly during the next six months as inflation recovers and the Fed lifts rates only gradually. This mild steepening will transition to flattening once long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates have recovered to pre-crisis levels. Credit Cycle Update: Favorable For Now, But Will Turn In 2018 The U.S. Financial Accounts (formerly Flow of Funds) were released this month. This gives us the opportunity to update our Corporate Health Monitor (CHM), as well as our other indicators of non-financial corporate sector leverage. Recall that historically three conditions must be met before the credit cycle turns and a sustained period of corporate spread widening kicks in. They are: Corporate balance sheet health must be deteriorating Monetary policy must be restrictive Bank lending standards must be tightening Chart 7 provides a snapshot of the current state of affairs for these three criteria. Chart 7Credit Cycle Indicators Credit Cycle Indicators Credit Cycle Indicators Chart 8Corporate Health Monitor Corporate Health Monitor Corporate Health Monitor Corporate Balance Sheet Health The CHM is our number one indicator of non-financial corporate sector balance sheet health (Chart 7, panel 2). It has been signaling "deteriorating health" since 2015, but ticked down in the third quarter and has been moving slowly back toward "improving health" territory since the beginning of the year. It is worth mentioning that in order to get a leading signal from our CHM we use de-trended versions of the Monitor's underlying components. The six financial ratios that we combine to calculate the CHM are shown in their not de-trended forms in Chart 8. We also show a not de-trended version of the overall Monitor in the second panel of Chart 7. Notice that while the traditional (de-trended) CHM has been signaling "deteriorating corporate health" since 2015, the not de-trended version remains in "improving health" territory. Box: Corporate Health Monitor Components The BCA Corporate Health Monitor is a normalized composite of six financial ratios, calculated for the non-financial corporate sector as a whole. These six ratios are defined as follows: Profit Margins: After-tax cash flow as a percent of corporate sales Return on Capital: After-tax earnings plus interest expense, as a percent of capital stock Debt Coverage: After-tax cash flow less capital expenditures, as a percent of all interest bearing debt Interest Coverage: EBITDA (Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation & amortization) divided by the sum of interest expense and dividends Leverage: Total debt as a percent of market value of equity Liquidity: Working Capital, excluding inventories, as a percent of market value of assets The unusual length of the current recovery has caused the not de-trended and de-trended versions of the CHM to diverge by much more than in prior cycles. While this almost certainly means that the negative signal from our traditional (de-trended) Monitor came too early this cycle, we should also expect the negative signal from the not de-trended version of our model to arrive too late. So while the truth lies somewhere in between the de-trended and not de-trended versions, we are fairly confident in saying that the condition of "deteriorating corporate health" has already been met for this cycle. Restrictive Monetary Policy Panels 3 and 4 of Chart 7 show two different indicators for the stance of monetary policy. The first is the real effective fed funds rate relative to the Laubach-Williams (2003) estimate of its equilibrium level. According to this measure, monetary policy moved into restrictive territory following last week's rate hike. However, a much simpler indicator for the stance of monetary policy is the slope of the yield curve. While the slope of the yield curve is not flashing red just yet, it has been rapidly flattening and is approaching levels that signaled a restrictive stance of monetary policy in prior cycles. In last week's report we showed that monthly excess returns to high-yield bonds have averaged only 12 bps when the slope of the 2/10 Treasury curve is between 0 bps and 50 bps, and that monthly excess returns have been negative 48% of the time in those periods.4 Tightening Bank Lending Standards The Federal Reserve's most recent Senior Loan Officer Survey showed that banks continue to modestly ease standards on commercial & industrial (C&I) loans (Chart 7, bottom panel). We traditionally view this third condition as more of a confirming indicator of the turn in the credit cycle. That is, tighter bank lending standards are typically preceded by deteriorating corporate health and restrictive monetary policy. An Additional Measure Of Corporate Sector Leverage In addition to the components of our CHM, we also track a measure of gross leverage for the non-financial corporate sector, calculated as total debt divided by EBITD (Chart 9). Historically, the trend in corporate bond spreads has followed the trend in gross leverage, or at the very least, deviations in direction between spreads and leverage have tended not to last very long. Chart 9Rising Gross Leverage Is A Risk For Spreads Rising Gross Leverage Is A Risk For Spreads Rising Gross Leverage Is A Risk For Spreads Our measure of gross leverage ticked higher in Q3, EBITD grew at an annualized rate of 4.1% but this was not enough to offset the 5.4% annualized increase in corporate debt. Overall, gross leverage has been roughly flat this year even though corporate spreads have tightened. Going forward, our leading indicators are still consistent with mid-single digit profit growth. If that view pans out then the pace of debt accumulation will need to fall in order for leverage to decline. We will be watching this measure of leverage closely during the next couple of quarters, if leverage continues to increase then we will be quicker to call the end of the credit cycle. Bottom Line: Our indicators suggest that we are moving into the late stages of the credit cycle, but for now we retain an overweight cyclical stance on corporate bonds. A shift to a more restrictive monetary policy, tightening C&I bank lending standards and/or a continued uptrend in gross corporate leverage are the main catalysts we will be monitoring to gauge the end of the cycle. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 The Phillips Curve model of inflation shown in Chart 2 is re-created from Janet Yellen's September 2015 speech: https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Proactive, Reactive Or Right?", dated December 12, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 We use our 12-month fed funds discounter to measure rate hike expectations and the MOVE implied volatility index as a proxy for the term premium. 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Proactive, Reactive Or Right?", dated December 12, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights 2018 Model Bond Portfolio Positioning: Translating our 2018 key global fixed income views into recommended positioning within our model bond portfolio comes up with the following: target a moderate level of portfolio risk, with below-benchmark duration and overweights on corporate credit versus government debt. These allocations will shift later in the year as central banks shift to a more restrictive monetary policy stance and growth expectations for 2018 become more uncertain. Country Allocations: Divergences in likely central bank policy moves in 2018 will lead to more cross-country bond market investment opportunities. In our model portfolio, we are maintaining underweight positions in the U.S., Canada and the Euro Area, keeping a moderate overweight in low-beta Japan, and adding small overweights in the U.K. and Australia (where rate hikes are unlikely). Spread Product: Slower bond buying by central banks will result in a more volatile bond backdrop later in 2018, which will impact credit spreads. Stay overweight in the first half of the year, however, until higher inflation forces the hand of central banks. Feature Two weeks ago, we published our "Key Views" report, outlining the main fixed income investment implications deriving from the 2018 BCA Outlook.1 In this, our final report of 2017, we translate those Key Views into direct allocations in the Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) model bond portfolio. As we always remind our clients, our model portfolio is intended as a vehicle to communicate our opinions on the relative attractiveness and trade-offs between fixed income countries and sectors. That is to say, the portfolio not only includes our traditional individual country and sector recommendations, but attaches actual weightings to those views within a fully invested hypothetical bond portfolio. The main takeaway from our Key Views is that bond market performance, and ideal asset allocation, is likely to look very different as the year progresses (Table 1). The first half of the year will see continued strong global growth and slowly rising inflation, but with central banks only slowing shifting to a less accommodative policy stance. This will create an environment where global bond yields will rise but with credit markets outperforming government bonds. The story will play out differently in the latter half, however, as worries over global growth expectations for 2018 will create more market volatility - albeit with lower cross-asset correlations as central banks act in a less-coordinated fashion than in recent years. Table 1A Pro-Risk Recommended Portfolio In H1/2018, Looking To Get Defensive Later In The Year Our Model Bond Portfolio Allocation In 2018: A Tale Of Two Halves Our Model Bond Portfolio Allocation In 2018: A Tale Of Two Halves Top-Down Bond Portfolio Implications Of Our Key Views The main predictions for 2018 in our Key Views report from December 5th were the following: A more bearish backdrop for bonds, led by the U.S.: Faster global growth, with rebounding inflation expectations, will trigger tighter overall global monetary policy. This will be led by Fed rate hikes and, later in 2018, ECB tapering. Global bond yields will rise in response, primarily due to higher inflation expectations. Growth & policy divergences will create cross-market bond investment opportunities: Global growth in 2018 will become less synchronized compared to 2016 & 2017, as will individual country monetary policies. Government bonds in the U.S. and Canada, where rate hikes will happen, will underperform, while bonds in the U.K. and Australia, where rates will likely be held steady, will outperform. The most dovish central banks will be forced to turn less dovish: The ECB and BoJ will both slow the pace of their asset purchases in 2018, in response to strong domestic economies and rising inflation. This will lead to bear-steepening of yield curves in Europe, mostly in the latter half of 2018. The BoJ could raise its target on JGB yields, but only modestly, in response to an overall higher level of global bond yields. The low market volatility backdrop will end through higher bond volatility: Incremental tightening by central banks, in response to faster inflation, will raise the volatility of global interest rates. This will eventually weigh on global growth expectations over the course of 2018, and create a more volatile backdrop for risk assets in the latter half of the year. The first step in translating these themes into allocations into our model bond portfolio is to determining the ideal top-down asset allocation parameters for the start of the 2018: Maintain a moderate overall level of portfolio risk. Both bond yields (Chart 1) and credit spreads (Chart 2) are at the low end of their historical ranges since 2000. This suggests that bond market returns will be much lower than in recent years, simply because initial valuations are not cheap. Coming at a time when bond volatility is also at historically depressed levels, and with central banks starting to slowly take away the monetary punch bowl, keeping overall portfolio risk at modest levels is prudent. Within the GFIS model bond portfolio, that means keeping our tracking error versus our custom benchmark performance index well below our maximum target level of 100bps (Chart 3). Chart 1Historical Range Of Bond Yields For Various Fixed Income Markets, 2000-2017 Our Model Bond Portfolio Allocation In 2018: A Tale Of Two Halves Our Model Bond Portfolio Allocation In 2018: A Tale Of Two Halves Chart 2Historical Range Of Global Credit Spreads, 2000-2017 Our Model Bond Portfolio Allocation In 2018: A Tale Of Two Halves Our Model Bond Portfolio Allocation In 2018: A Tale Of Two Halves Maintain a below-benchmark overall portfolio duration. The combination of solid global growth, rising inflation and a slower pace of bond buying by the major central banks all suggest that bond yields will move higher in 2018. We will continue to target a recommended portfolio duration that is one year short versus our benchmark index (Chart 4). Chart 3Maintain Moderate Overall Portfolio Risk Maintain Moderate Overall Portfolio Risk Maintain Moderate Overall Portfolio Risk Chart 4Stay Cautious On Duration Risk Stay Cautious On Duration Risk Stay Cautious On Duration Risk Maintain an overweight stance on corporate credit over government bonds, focusing on the U.S. Although spreads are tight in so many asset classes, the global growth and monetary backdrop remains supportive for the outperformance of credit over government bonds. We recommended focusing on U.S. corporate credit, both Investment Grade (IG) and High-Yield (HY), where growth momentum remains solid and Fed policy is not yet restrictive. After setting those broad portfolio parameters, our recommendations get more interesting in terms of country allocations. Bond yields within the developed markets have become highly correlated to inflation expectations in the past few years (Chart 5). This is no surprise given how strongly central banks have tied their monetary policy decisions to their own inflation forecasts, and to market-based and survey-based inflation expectations. Inflation is likely to move higher next year alongside tight global labor markets and higher oil prices. If the bullish views on oil from BCA's commodity strategists comes to fruition, this implies that both market-based inflation expectations can rise and yield curves can bear-steepen. The key to the latter will be how fast central banks respond to faster rates of inflation. Yield curve steepness remains highly correlated to the level of REAL interest rates. Curves steepen when real interest rates decline and vice versa. Lower real rates can happen in two ways - bullishly, if central banks cut policy rates faster than inflation is falling; or bearishly, if central banks do not hike rates as fast as inflation is rising. We see the latter as being the likely story in 2018, which will lead to steeper government bond yield curves but through higher yields and rising inflation expectations. In Chart 6, where we plot the level of real central bank policy rates (deflated by 10-year CPI swaps as a measure of inflation expectations) vs. the 2-year/10-year bond yield curves. If global inflation expectations merely follow the path implied by our bullish oil forecast (Brent crude average $65/bbl in 2018), and central banks did not respond with rate hikes, then this would generate lower real interest rates (the "x" in each panel of the chart) and steepening pressure on yield curves. Chart 5Bond Yields In 2018 Will Be Driven More##BR##By Inflation Expectations Bond Yields In 2018 Will Be Driven More By Inflation Expectations Bond Yields In 2018 Will Be Driven More By Inflation Expectations Chart 6Steepening Pressure On Yield Curves##BR##From Inflation In 2018 Steepening Pressure On Yield Curves From Inflation In 2018 Steepening Pressure On Yield Curves From Inflation In 2018 We don't see all central banks responding the same way to an oil-driven move higher in inflation. Lower unemployment rates, and other measures of diminished economic slack, will be needed to give policymakers confidence that their economies can tolerate higher interest rates. Judging central banks along these lines will create more interesting country bond allocation decisions in 2018 (Chart 7). Specifically, we see a greater likelihood that the Fed and Bank of Canada (BoC) can actually raise interest rates next year. It will be much harder for the Bank of England (BoE) to raise rates given sluggish domestic economic growth, lingering Brexit uncertainty and the fact that market-based inflation expectations have already peaked. The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) will also be unable to hike rates next year given the lack of core inflation pressures and with an unemployment rate that is still much higher than previous cyclical troughs. This leads us to add moderate portfolio overweights in the U.K. and Australia to the government bond portion of our model bond portfolio, while maintaining our current underweight stances for the U.S. and Canada (Chart 8). The ECB and Bank of Japan (BoJ) will be nowhere near a point where interest rate hikes would be considered, although the decisions those banks make with their asset purchase programs will be a bigger issue for their bond markets in 2018. Chart 7Tight Labor Markets Will##BR##Influence Bond Returns Tight Labor Markets Will Influence Bond Returns Tight Labor Markets Will Influence Bond Returns Chart 8Monetary Policy Divergences##BR##Will Drive Country Allocation Monetary Policy Divergences Will Drive Country Allocation Monetary Policy Divergences Will Drive Country Allocation Bottom Line: Translating our 2018 key global fixed income views into recommended positioning within our model bond portfolio comes up with the following: target a moderate level of portfolio risk, with below-benchmark duration and overweights on corporate credit versus government debt. These allocations will shift later in the year as central banks shift to a more restrictive monetary policy stance and growth expectations for 2018 become more uncertain. The Asset Allocation Implications Of Slower Central Bank Asset Purchases The big risk factor for global bonds in 2018 will be how markets respond to less buying from the Fed, ECB and BoJ. As the growth rate of the expansion of the major balance sheets slows, bond yields have the potential to rise through two channels: higher term premia on longer maturity bonds and the market pulling forward the expected future path of interest rates. This will become a major issue for Euro Area bond markets in the 2nd half of 2018, as the ECB will be forced by strong domestic growth and rising inflation pressures to announce a full taper of its asset purchase program by the end of 2018. This will come on top of a slower pace of buying by the BoJ (who is now targeting a price target on bond yields rather than a quantity target), and the Fed allowing some run off of its massive balance sheet. The result is that the growth rate of the major developed market central bank balance sheets is likely to slow to a low single-digit pace in 2018 (Chart 9), creating upside potential for global yields. The case for significant underweights in Euro Area fixed income will be much stronger later next year when the ECB will be forced to prepare the market for a taper. But in the first half of 2018, the impact of the ECB's purchases will continue to dampen Euro Area bond yields. At the same time, Japanese yields will remain pegged near 0% by BoJ buying. In terms of our model bond portfolio, we are maintaining an overweight stance on low-beta Japan given our views on rising global bond yields, while keeping aggregate Euro Area bond weightings close to neutral (and looking to go more aggressively underweight later in the year as the ECB taper talk ramps up). Bond markets that are less propped up by ultra-accommodative central banks will create a more volatile market backdrop for global fixed income as the year progresses. That is hardly a provocative statement, of course, given the starting point of utterly low realized bond market volatility (Chart 10). As discussed earlier, our views for 2018 lead us to recommend a more moderate portfolio risk level in 2018. The potential for higher central-bank driven market volatility fits with that expectation. Chart 9Global Yields Will Rise As##BR##Central Banks Buy Fewer Bonds Global Yields Will Rise As Central Banks Buy Fewer Bonds Global Yields Will Rise As Central Banks Buy Fewer Bonds Chart 10The Low Bond Vol Regime##BR##Looks Stretched The Low Bond Vol Regime Looks Stretched The Low Bond Vol Regime Looks Stretched A slower pace of central bank bond buying also has another implication for portfolio construction. With the wave of central bank liquidity becoming a less dominant factor, cross-asset correlations should diminish. We can see that by looking at the average correlation between sectors within our model bond portfolio benchmark index (Chart 11). We have found that the correlation is itself highly correlated to the breadth of global economic growth, as measured by our leading economic indicator diffusion index (top panel). But the average correlation is also linked to the growth rate of central bank balance sheets (bottom panel), which is a by-product of massive asset purchases reducing global macroeconomic risks and forcing investors to plow into similar asset classes to chase acceptable returns. Slightly less coordinated global growth, and less active central banks, should result in lower market correlations in 2018. At the same time, as central banks shift to a less accommodative stance - especially in the U.S. - the uncertainty about future growth has the potential to increase interest rate volatility that can also push corporate credit spreads wider (Chart 12). This will likely lead us to cut our recommended overweight allocations to U.S. IG and HY corporate debt in our model portfolio later in 2018. To begin the year, however, we are keeping an overweight stance until the Fed is forced to signal a shift to a more hawkish stance because of rising U.S. inflation. Chart 11Expect Lower Global Bond##BR##Correlations In 2018 Expect Lower Global Bond Correlations In 2018 Expect Lower Global Bond Correlations In 2018 Chart 12The Link Between U.S. Growth,##BR##Bond Vol & Credit Spreads The Link Between U.S. Growth, Bond Vol & Credit Spreads The Link Between U.S. Growth, Bond Vol & Credit Spreads Bottom Line: Slower bond buying by central banks will result in a more volatile bond backdrop later in 2018, which will impact credit spreads. Stay overweight in the first half of the year, however, until higher inflation forces the hand of central banks. Summing It All Up Chart 13Aiming For Moderate Carry##BR##In Our Model Portfolio Aiming For Moderate Carry In Our Model Portfolio Aiming For Moderate Carry In Our Model Portfolio On Page 12, we show our model bond portfolio allocations after making some changes to reflect our key views for 2018. We are doing some tweaks to our existing recommendations: modestly increasing our overweight U.S. IG corporates allocation at the expense of U.S. Treasuries; reducing our underweight in the Euro Area by reducing the large Italy underweight; adding exposure to the U.K. and Australia; while cutting our large overweight in Japan. The latter was there as a desire to get more defensive on the portfolio's duration stance, but having such a large allocation has left our portfolio with no yield advantage versus the custom benchmark index (Chart 13). With the changes we are making this week, the model bond portfolio will have a yield that is 12bps over that of our custom index. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "2018 Key Views: BCA's Outlook & What It Means For Global Fixed Income Markets", dated December 5th 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Our Model Bond Portfolio Allocation In 2018: A Tale Of Two Halves Our Model Bond Portfolio Allocation In 2018: A Tale Of Two Halves Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights BCA expects the 2/10 curve to steepen in 1H in 2018, then flatten in 2H. U.S. equities, the stock-to-bond ratio and oil thrive when the curve is flat. Small caps struggle. Record household net worth matters more for household saving than for consumption. Feature Wrangling over the GOP's tax plan and the Federal Open Market Committee's final meeting of 2017 provided the backdrop for financial markets last week. The dollar was the big loser, as investors doubted the ability of the Republican leadership in Congress to find the votes needed to pass the bill. BCA's view remains that Congress will pass a tax cut package by the end of Q1 2018. Even though inflation missed the Fed's forecast in 2017 (Chart 1), the FOMC left its inflation and interest projections unchanged for the next two years given its outlook for stronger growth and lower unemployment. Inflation will reach the 2% target by the end of 2019. As a consequence, the Fed expects to lift interest rates three more times in 2018 and another two times in 2019 (Chart 2). Chart 1Persistent Inflation Shortfall Persistent Inflation Shortfall Persistent Inflation Shortfall Chart 2The FOMC's Latest Forecasts The FOMC's Latest Forecasts The FOMC's Latest Forecasts The economy is now expected to grow 2.5% in 2018, up from the Fed's previous forecast of 2.1%. Growth is seen remaining above the 1.8% trend rate for three years. The Fed nudged its forecasts for the unemployment rate down by 0.2% for the next three years, based on the higher growth projections. The jobless rate is now expected to dip to 3.9% in 2018 and 2019, before ticking up to 4.0% in 2020. If anything, these forecasts look too conservative. Importantly, the Fed left its estimate for long-run unemployment unchanged at 4.6%. Therefore, the labor market is expected to tighten further beyond full employment. Consequently, wage gains should accelerate and allow inflation to return to the Fed's 2% target in 2019. We don't have any major disagreements with the Fed's interest rate forecasts for 2018, but inflation must turn higher. The Fed has raised rates five times over the last two years, but CPI inflation has made no progress toward the 2% objective. However, the New York Fed's Underlying Inflation Gauge continues to move steadily higher (Chart 1, panel 1). Nevertheless, the real Fed funds moved closer to its neutral level and the yield curve has continued to flatten (panel 3). Bottom Line: BCA expects the yield curve to steepen in the first half of 2018, driven either by rising inflation or a more dovish Fed. However, a flat curve is not the death knoll for risk assets. The yield curve will not invert until inflation has recovered to the Fed's target. This means that a period of modest curve steepening is likely, driven either by rising inflation or a more dovish Fed. Powell Versus The Market BCA's view is that the current paths of inflation and the yield curve are unsustainable. If the Fed continues to hike rates, but inflation fails to rise, then the yield curve will invert in the coming months. The inversion would signal that bond investors anticipate a recession and the Fed has not achieved its inflation target. Such an obvious policy error will not be permitted to occur, which leaves three possible outcomes for Fed policy and the Treasury curve during the next six months.1 1) The Fed Is Right In this scenario, inflation would rebound in the coming months, pushing up the compensation for inflation protection embedded in long-dated bond yields. This would cause an increase in long-maturity nominal yields and probably impart a steepening bias to the yield curve, depending on how quickly the Fed lifts rates. BCA's Outlook for 2018 makes a case why inflation will likely bottom in the coming months. Therefore, we view the "Fed is Right" scenario as the most probable outcome.2 2) The Fed Is Proactive In another scenario, the Fed recognizes there is a risk of tightening the yield curve into inversion - and the economy into recession - if inflation stays low. Therefore, the Fed may proactively adopt a more dovish policy stance to prevent the yield curve from inverting. The yield curve would also steepen, but this time it would be a bull-steepener where short-maturity yields fall more than long-maturity yields. This outcome would be the least likely of our three scenarios. The Fed will cling to its forecast that inflation will climb, given that economic growth is accelerating. If inflation fails to respond, then risky assets will eventually sell-off. 3) The Fed Is Reactive The Fed has a strong track record of reacting to tighter financial conditions and risk-off periods in equities and credit markets. If the yield curve continues to flatten, then we will soon see credit spreads widen and equities sell-off. At that stage, the Fed would almost certainly respond by signaling a slower pace of rate hikes. This would steepen the curve and ease pressures on risky assets. We view this development as more likely than the one where the Fed is proactive. Trouble With The Curve BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy team expects that the 2/10 yield curve will languish between 0 and 50 bps in 2018. The curve will steepen from 53 bps in mid-December 2017 through mid-year 2018, and then flatten into year-end. Which asset classes would benefit if BCA's curve call is accurate? Charts 3 through 7 show how several key financial markets have performed in previous yield curve environments. Chart 3A shows that the S&P 500 performs best when the curve is flat (between 0 and 50 bps), with average annualized returns of 22% and median annualized returns of 21%. Moreover, S&P 500 returns are negative less than 5% of the time when the curve is flat, but are negative 25% of the time when the curve is very steep (+100 to +150 bps) (Chart 3B). In general, Chart 3A demonstrates that returns diminish as the curve climbs. Chart 3AS&P 500 Total Return & Yield Curve##BR##(1988- Present) The Bucket List The Bucket List Chart 3BPercent Of Months With Negative##BR##S&P 500 Returns (1988- Present) The Bucket List The Bucket List A flat slope of the 2/10 curve is also the sweet spot for the stock-to-bond ratio (Chart 4A). Treasuries outperform stocks only in 5% of months when the 2/10 Treasury curve is flat (Chart 4B). As with stocks, the performance of the stock-to-bond ratio deteriorates as the curve steepens. The stock-to-bond ratio declines more than a third of the time when the curve is very steep. A 2/10 slope of +100 to +150 bps is the worst backdrop for the stock-to-bond ratio. Stocks underperform bonds 40% of the time in this situation. Chart 4AStock-To-Bond Total Return & Yield Curve##BR##(1988 - Present) The Bucket List The Bucket List Chart 4BPercent Of Months With Negative##BR##Stock-To-Bond Total Return (1988 - Present) The Bucket List The Bucket List However, a flat curve is a poor setting for small-cap excess performance (Chart 5A). Small caps underperform large caps nearly 80% of the time when the curve is flat (Chart 5B). The average underperformance is 600 bps. Moreover, a flat curve is the most unhealthy climate for small-cap excess returns, even poorer than when the curve inverts. A precipitous curve is the best environment for small caps, with small caps outperforming large by 400 bps on average. Small caps beat large caps 60% of the time when the curve is between 100 and 150 bps. Chart 5AS&P Small/Large TOTAL Return & Yield Curve##BR##(1988- Present) The Bucket List The Bucket List Chart 5BPercent Of Months With Negative##BR##S&P Small/Large Total Return (1988- Present) The Bucket List The Bucket List Our U.S. Bond Strategy colleagues note that the flatter the curve, the higher the risk of a sell-off in high-yields relative to Treasuries.3 Junk bonds underperform Treasuries 48% of the time when the curve is flat, which we expect in 2018 (not shown). The implication for investors is that the first half of 2018 will be the best period for junk bond returns. Investment-grade corporates have a similar return profile relative to the curve. Oil performs best when the 2/10 curve is inverted (Chart 6A). However, WTI oil returns an annualized 10-15% when the curve is between 0 and 100 bps. Plus, oil is higher 75% of the time when the curve is between 50 and 100 bps, which is the environment we expect in the first half of next year (Chart 6B). Chart 6AWTI Crude Oil Price Return & Yield Curve##BR##(1988- Present) The Bucket List The Bucket List Chart 6BPercent Of Months With Negative##BR##WTI Crude Oil Price Return (1988- Present) The Bucket List The Bucket List Forward earnings per share perform well with a flat curve, but earnings growth is optimal when the curve is inverted. The steeper the curve, the bigger the headwind for EPS. Since 1988, earnings growth has been positive when the curve inverts and is positive 95% of the time when the curve is flat. Chart 7 provides the historical context for a flat yield curve (0 to 50 bps) in terms of the performance of stocks, Treasury bonds, the stock-to-bond ratio, small caps and oil. The Appendix (see page 13) also includes three other charts that provide a perspective on asset class performance when the curve is moderately steep (50 to 100 bps), steep (100 to 150bps) and above 150 bps. Chart 7Stocks, Treasuries, Small Caps And Oil When The Curve Is Flat Stocks, Treasuries, Small Caps And Oil When The Curve Is Flat Stocks, Treasuries, Small Caps And Oil When The Curve Is Flat Bottom Line: BCA expects that the yield curve will first steepen in 2018, then become flatter, ultimately spending most of the year between 0 and 50 bps. A flat curve is the ideal environment for the S&P 500 and the stock-to-bond ratio. However, small cap stocks struggle when the curve is flat; BCA's view is that small caps will outperform large caps in 2018. A flat yield curve raises the risk of a sell-off in high yield, but provides a favorable grounding for oil, which is in line with BCA's fundamental view. BCA expects EPS growth will be positive next year; earnings growth is higher 75% of the time when the curve is flat. Household Net Worth Loses Influence Chart 8The Consumer Is In Good Shape The Consumer Is In Good Shape The Consumer Is In Good Shape U.S. consumer health has improved markedly since early this year, driving BCA's Consumer Health Indicator into positive territory (Chart 8). These elevated readings should bolster household consumption well into 2018. The improvement supports BCA's view of a stronger U.S. economy alongside a global synchronized recovery, at least over the next 12 months. Real consumer spending is underpinned by advances in real disposable income stemming from increasingly healthy labor market. Moreover, household net worth has continued to soar to an all-time high in 2017Q3 as equity markets remain frothy and house prices stable. However, net worth's direct influence on overall household consumption is not as significant as before the Great Recession. During the housing bubble in the early 2000s, U.S. households leveraged their spending through extensive mortgage refinancing and mortgage equity withdrawal. Real estate was the principal holding on most households' balance sheets. However, as the Great Recession unfolded, household net worth suffered with a collapse in both house prices and equity markets. By 2009, U.S. households were tapped out and grossly over-indebted. Deleveraging is now over, U.S. households have re-fortified their balance sheets and consumer spending is back in line with income growth. In the long term, inflation-adjusted disposable income is more highly correlated with inflation-adjusted consumer spending growth than real household net worth (Chart 9). Positive momentum should continue to support further real consumer spending over the next few quarters, given that unemployment is at a 17-year low and consumer confidence is at a 17-year high, and also given elevated consumers' expectations of real income gains over the next year or two. Chart 9Consumer Spending More Correlated With Income Than Net Worth The Bucket List The Bucket List Household net worth matters more for household saving than for consumption. Chart 10 shows the inverse relationship between net worth and the saving rate. Empirical research has demonstrated the risk that the structural decline (since the mid-1990s) in personal savings has on consumer spending and the overall economy. An often cited conclusion drawn by the investment community is that a lower savings rate raises the risk of consumer retrenchment.4 Chart 10Low Savings Rate, Record High Household Net Worth And Rising Income Expectations Low Savings Rate, Record High Household Net Worth And Rising Income Expectations Low Savings Rate, Record High Household Net Worth And Rising Income Expectations Even though the personal savings rate can be considered a contrarian measure for consumer spending, like many measures from the BEA national accounts (NIPA), it is subject to regular revisions. Over the long-term, according to the BEA, the level of the savings rate is often revised upwards but the trend over the last 45 years remains unchanged. There was a downtrend path to revisions in the mid-2000s housing bubble, but there has been a subtle uptrend since 2008 (Chart 11). Even so, in the long run, BCA views the low personal savings rate as a potential headwind for consumer spending as it cannot sustainably remain at its recovery low of 3.2%. However, rising income expectations and a sturdy labor market are offsets to depressed savings and will ensure that the economic expansion remains sustainable and, therefore, less vulnerable to volatile saving patterns. Does record high net worth alter the risks to the FOMC's goals of price stability and sustainable economic growth? In a recent research paper, the Federal Reserve of St-Louis looked at the most exuberant peaks in the ratio of household net worth to income in 1999 and 2006, which occurred before collapses in asset prices and recessions. Although caution is prescribed as household net worth keeps making new highs, the report noted that the composition of households' balance sheet is less alarming today than prior peaks, as equities and real estate relative to household income or total assets are more reasonable. Debt levels are also much more tame today than in 2006. With more immune balance sheets, households may be less vulnerable to unexpected shocks in the future (Chart 12).5 BCA's view is that financial vulnerabilities from the household sector are well contained. Outside of subprime auto loans, household borrowing is increasing modestly at an annual pace of 3.6%, in stark contrast with a 12.9% rate in the early-to-mid 2000s. Broad measures of household solvency, such as the household debt-to-income ratio, is within the range of the past few years and back to pre-recession levels. Furthermore, liquidity buffers (liquid assets to liabilities) are almost as high as the levels that preceded the equity market boom/bust in 1999-2000 (Chart 13). Chart 11Savings Rate Level Often Revised Upwards Savings Rate Level Often Revised Upwards Savings Rate Level Often Revised Upwards Chart 12Household Sector Balance Sheet Composition Household Sector Balance Sheet Composition Household Sector Balance Sheet Composition Chart 13Household Sector Buffers Are Solid Household Sector Buffers Are Solid Household Sector Buffers Are Solid BCA expects the Fed to remain vigilant about financial stability.6 Policymakers will take comfort that household liquidity and solvency ratios have improved dramatically in the past nine years, aided by the cumulative gains in housing and financial assets. Bottom Line: The outlook for the U.S. consumer is bright as incomes continue to improve amid tight labor market conditions. However, record household net worth is more relevant today for savings than for consumption. The Fed should remain committed to gradual rate hikes, but the central bank's quandary will be to determine the optimal pace to foster maximum employment and price stability. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Jizel Georges, Senior Analyst jizelg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Proactive, Reactive Or Right?," published on December 12, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's "2018 Outlook Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course ," published December 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "Proactive, Reactive Or Right?," published on December 12, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 4 "Should The Decline In The Personal Savings Rate Be A Cause For Concern?", Alan C. Garner, The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2006Q2; and "The Decline in the U.S. Personal Savings Rate: Is It Real and Is It A Puzzle?", Massimo Guidolin and Elizabeth A. La Jeunesse, The Federal Reserve Bank of St-Louis, November/December 2007. 5 "Household Wealth Is At A Post-WW II High: Should We Celebrate or Worry?", William R. Emmons and Lowell R. Ricketts, Federal Reserve Bank of St-Louis, In the Balance, Perspectives on Household Balance Sheets, May 2017. 6 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Powell's In Power," published on November 6, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. Appendix Chart 14U.S. Financial Markets When The 2/10 Curve Is Between 50 And 100 Bps U.S. Financial Markets When The 2/10 Curve Is Between 50 And 100 Bps U.S. Financial Markets When The 2/10 Curve Is Between 50 And 100 Bps Chart 15U.S. Financial Markets When The 2/10 Curve Is Between 100 And 150 Bps U.S. Financial Markets When The 2/10 Curve Is Between 100 And 150 Bps U.S. Financial Markets When The 2/10 Curve Is Between 100 And 150 Bps Chart 16U.S. Financial Markets When The 2/10 Curve Is Steeper Than 150 Bps U.S. Financial Markets When The 2/10 Curve Is Steeper Than 150 Bps U.S. Financial Markets When The 2/10 Curve Is Steeper Than 150 Bps

Recommended Allocation Quarterly - December 2017 Quarterly - December 2017 Highlights We are late cycle. Strong growth could turn in 2018 from a positive for risk assets into a negative. More risk-averse investors may thus want to turn cautious. But the last year of a bull run can be profitable, and we don't expect a recession until late 2019. For now, therefore, our recommendations remain pro-risk and pro-cyclical. We may turn more defensive in 2H 2018 if the Fed tightens above equilibrium. We expect inflation to pick up in 2018, which will lead the Fed to hike maybe four times. This will push long rates to 3%, and strengthen the U.S. dollar. Equities should outperform bonds in this environment. We prefer euro zone and Japanese equities over U.S., and remain underweight EM. Late-cycle sectors such as Financials and Industrials, should do well. We also favor corporate bonds and private equity. Feature Overview Fin de cycle Global economic growth in 2017 was robust for the first time since the Global Financial Crisis (Chart 1). Forecasts for 2018 put growth slightly lower, but are likely to be revised up. However, as the year rolls on, the strong economic momentum may turn from being a positive for risk assets into a negative. U.S. output is now above potential, according to IMF estimates. As Chart 2 shows, historically recessions - and consequently equity bear markets - have usually come within a year or two of the output gap turning positive. With the economy operating above capacity, inflation pressures force the Fed to tighten monetary policy, which eventually causes a slowdown. Chart 1Growth Finally On A Firm Footing Global Growth Has Accelerated Growth Finally On A Firm Footing Global Growth Has Accelerated Growth Finally On A Firm Footing Global Growth Has Accelerated Chart 2Recessions Follow Output Gap Closing Recessions Follow Output Gap Closing Recessions Follow Output Gap Closing That is exactly how BCA sees the next couple of years panning out, leading to a recession perhaps in the second half of 2019. U.S. inflation was soft in 2017, but underlying inflation pressures are picking up, with core CPI inflation having bottomed, and small companies saying they are raising prices (Chart 3). Add to that wage pressures (with unemployment heading below 4% in 2018), tax cuts (which might boost growth by 0.2-0.3% points in their first year) and a higher oil price (we expect Brent to average $67 a barrel during the year), and core PCE inflation is likely to rise to 2%, in line with the Fed's expectations. This means the market is too sanguine about the risk of monetary tightening in the U.S. It has priced in less than two rates hikes in 2018, compared to the Fed's three dots, and almost nothing after that (Chart 4). If inflation picks up as we expect, four rate hikes in 2018 could be on the cards. Chart 3Inflation Pressures Picking Up Inflation Pressures Picking Up Inflation Pressures Picking Up Chart 4Market Still Underpricing Fed Hikes Market Still Underpricing Fed Hikes Market Still Underpricing Fed Hikes The consequences of this are that bond yields are likely to rise. Despite a significant market repricing since September of Fed behavior, long-term rates have not risen much, leading to a flattening yield curve (Chart 5). The market has essentially priced in that inflation will not rebound and that, consequently, the Fed will be making a policy mistake by hiking further. If, therefore, we are correct that inflation does reach 2%, the yield curve would be likely to steepen over the next six months, with the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield reaching 3% by mid-year. Other developed economies, however, have less urgency to tighten monetary policy and we, therefore, see the U.S. dollar appreciating. The only other major economy with a positive output gap currently is Germany (Chart 6). However, the ECB will continue to set policy for the weaker members of the euro area, and output gaps in France (-1.8% of GDP), Italy (-1.6%) and Spain (-0.7%) remain significantly negative. In the absence of inflation pressures, the ECB won't raise rates until late 2019. Japan, too, continues to struggle to bring inflation up the BOJ's 2% target and the Yield Curve Control policy will therefore stay in place, meaning that a rise in global rates will weaken the yen. Chart 5Is Fed Making A Policy Mistake? Is Fed Making A Policy Mistake? Is Fed Making A Policy Mistake? Chart 6Still A Lot Of Negative Output Gaps Quarterly - December 2017 Quarterly - December 2017 This sort of late-cycle environment is a tricky one for investors. The catalysts for strong performance in equities that we foresaw a few months ago - U.S. tax cuts and upside surprises in earnings - have now largely played out. Global earnings will probably rise next year by around 10-12%, in line with analysts' forecasts. With multiples likely to slip a little as the Fed tightens, high single-digit performance is the best that investors should expect from equities. The macro environment which we expect, would be more negative for bonds than positive for equities. That argues for the stock-to-bond ratio to continue to rise until closer to the next recession (Chart 7). And, for now, none of the recession indicators we have been consistently monitoring over the past months is flashing a warning signal (Chart 8). Chart 7Stock-To-Bond Ratio Likely To Rise Further Stock-To-Bond Ratio Likely To Rise Further Stock-To-Bond Ratio Likely To Rise Further Chart 8Recession Warning Signals Still Not Flashing Recession Warning Signals Still Not Flashing Recession Warning Signals Still Not Flashing More risk-averse investors might chose to reduce their exposure to risk assets now, given how close we are to the end of the cycle. But this would be at the risk of leaving some money on the table, since the last year of a bull run can often be the most profitable (remember 1999?). We, therefore, maintain our recommendation for pro-cyclical and pro-risk tilts: overweight equities versus bonds, overweight credit, overweight higher-beta equity markets and sectors, and a preference towards riskier alternative assets. We may move towards a more defensive stance in mid to late 2018, when we see clearer signs that the Fed has tightened above equilibrium or that the risk of recession is rising. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com What Our Clients Are Asking What Will Be The Impact Of The U.S. Tax Cuts? It is not a done deal, but it still seems likely (notwithstanding the Democratic victory in Alabama) that the U.S. House and Senate will agree a joint tax bill to pass before the end of the year. Since the two current bills have only minor differences, it is possible to make some estimates of the macro and sector impacts of the tax reform. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the cuts will reduce government revenue by $1.4 trillion over 10 years - or $1 trillion (5% of GDP) once positive effects on growth are accounted for. The Treasury argues that tax reform (plus deregulation and infrastructure development) will push GDP growth to 2.9% and therefore government revenues will increase by $300 billion. BCA's estimate is that GDP growth will be boosted by 0.2-0.3% in 2018 and 2019.1 For businesses, the key tax changes are: 1) a reduction in the headline corporate rate from 35% to 21%; 2) immediate expensing of capital investment; 3) a limit to deduction of interest expenses to 30% of taxable income; 4) a move to a territorial tax system from a worldwide one, with a 10% tax on repatriation of past profits held overseas; 5) curbs for some deductions, such as R&D, domestic production and tax-loss carry-forwards. Corporate tax cuts will give a one-off boost to earnings, since the effective tax rate is currently over 25% (Chart 9, panel 1), with telecoms, utilities and industrials likely to be the biggest beneficiaries. This is not fully priced into stocks, since companies with high tax rates have seen their stock prices rise only moderately (Chart 9, panel 2). BCA's sector strategists expect that capex will especially be boosted: they estimate that the one-year depreciation increases net present value by 14% (Table 1).2 This should be positive for the Industrials sector (supplying the capital goods) and for Financials (which will see increased demand for loans). We are overweight both. Chart 9Tax Cuts Should Boost Earnings Tax Cuts Should Boost Earnings Tax Cuts Should Boost Earnings Table 1 Quarterly - December 2017 Quarterly - December 2017 Is Bitcoin A Bubble, And What Happens When It Bursts? The recent surge in prices (Chart 10) of virtual currencies has pushed Bitcoin and aggregate cryptocurrency market cap to $275 billion and $500 billion respectively. The recent violent run-up certainly bears a close resemblance to classic bubbles, but the impact of a sharp correction should be minimal on the real economy and traditional capital markets. As mentioned above, the market cap of cryptocurrencies has reached $500 billion. Globally, there is about $6 trillion in currency3 outstanding, so the value of virtual currencies is now 8% that of traditional fiat currency. Additionally, an estimated 1000 people own about 40% of the world's total bitcoin, for an average of about $105 million per person. At the moment, the macro impact has been constrained by the fact that most people are buying bitcoins as a store of value (Chart 11) or vehicle for speculation, rather than as a medium of exchange. However, when the public begins to regard them as legitimate substitutes for traditional fiat currencies, their impact will be felt on the real economy. Chart 10A Classic Bubble A Classic Bubble A Classic Bubble Chart 11Bitcoin Trading Volume By Top Three Currencies Quarterly - December 2017 Quarterly - December 2017 That would raise the issue of regulation. The U.S. government generates close to $70 billion per year as "seigniorage revenue." Governments across the world have no intention of losing this revenue, and would most likely introduce their own competitors to bitcoin. Until then, the biggest potential impact of these private currencies might be to spur inflation in the fiat currencies in which their prices are measured. That would be bad for government bonds, but potentially good for stocks. A further risk - and a similarity with the real estate bubble of 2007 - is the use of leverage. The news of a Tokyo-based exchange (BitFyler) offering up to 15x leverage for the purchase of bitcoins has spooked investors. However, the U.S. housing market is valued at $29.6 trillion, almost 60 times that of cryptocurrencies. Finally, the 19th century free banking era in the U.S., which at one point saw 8000 different currencies in circulation, experienced multiple banking crises. A world with myriad private currencies all competing with one another would be similarly unstable. Why Did The U.S. Dollar Weaken In 2017, And Where Will It Go In 2018? Chart 12Positioning And Relative Rates Supportive For USD Positioning And Relative Rates Supportive For USD Positioning And Relative Rates Supportive For USD We were wrong to be bullish on U.S. dollar at the start of 2017. We think the dollar weakness during most of the year can be attributed to the fact that investors were massively long the dollar at the end of 2016 (Chart 12, panel 2), which made the market particularly vulnerable to surprises. Several surprises did come: inflation softened in the U.S. but strengthened in the euro area. There were also positive geopolitical surprises in Europe - for example the victory of Emmanuel Macron in the French presidential election - while the failure to repeal Obamacare in the U.S. raised investors' concerns on the administration's ability to undertake fiscal stimulus. As a result, the U.S. dollar depreciated against euro despite widening interest rate differentials (Chart 12 panel 4) in 2017. Chart 13late Cycle Outperformance late Cycle Outperformance late Cycle Outperformance Since investors are now aggressively short the dollar, the hurdle for the greenback to deliver positive surprises is much lower than a year ago. Since the Senate passed the Republican tax bill in early December, we have already seen some recovery in the dollar (Chart 12, panel 1). As the labor market continues to firm, with GDP running above potential, U.S. inflation should finally start to pick up in 2018, which will allow the Fed to hike rates, possibly as many as four times during the year. This will contrast with the macro situation overseas: Japan and Europe are likely to continue loose monetary policy to maintain the momentum in their economies. All this should be supportive of the dollar. Are Convertible Bonds Attractive Over The Next 12 Months? With valuations for traditional assets expensive and investors' thirst for yield continuing, the market is in need of alternative sources of return. Convertible bonds offer a hybrid credit/equity exposure, giving investors the option to participate in rising equity markets but with less risk. An allocation to convertibles could prove attractive for the following reasons: Convertible bonds typically outperform high-yield debt in the late stages of bull markets, because of their relatively lower exposure to credit spreads. Junk spreads have a history of starting to widen before equity bear markets begin. Fifty percent of the convertibles index comprises issuance from small-cap and mid-cap firms. Although equity valuations are expensive, prices should continue to rise as long as inflation stays low. Additionally, our U.S. Investment Strategy service thinks that small-cap equities will outperform large caps in the coming months, partly because the likely cuts in U.S. corporate taxes will disproportionately benefit smaller companies. Convertible bonds do appear somewhat cheap relative to equities (Chart 13, panel 3) but, on balance, there is not a strong valuation case for the asset class. Equities appear fairly valued relative to junk bonds, and convertibles are trading at an elevated investment premium. However, valuation is not likely to be a significant headwind to the typical late-cycle outperformance of convertibles versus high yield. biggest near-term risk for convertibles relative to high yield stems from the technology sector, which makes up 35% of the convertibles index. Technology convertible bonds have strongly outperformed their high-yield counterparts in recent months (Chart 13, panel 4), and are possibly due for a period of underperformance. We recommend investors stay cautious on technology convertibles. Other Than U.S. Tips, What Other Inflation-Linked Bonds Do You Like? Our research shows that inflation-linked bonds (ILBs) are a good inflation hedge in a rising inflationary environment.4 With our house view of rising inflation in 2018, we have been overweight U.S. Tips over nominal Treasury bonds as the U.S. is the most liquid market for inflation-linked bonds, with a market cap of over US$ 1.2 trillion. Outside the U.S., we favor ILBs in Japan and Australia, while we suggest investors to avoid ILBs in the U.K. and Germany (even though the U.K. linkers' market is the second largest after the U.S.), for the following two key reasons: First, even though inflation is below target in Japan, Australia and the euro area, while above target in the U.K., in all of these markets, inflation has bottomed, as shown in Chart 14. Second, our breakeven fair-value models, which are based on trade-weighted currencies, the Brent oil price in local currencies, and stock-to-bond total-return ratios, indicate that ILBs are undervalued in Japan and Australia, while overvalued in the U.K. and Germany, as shown in Chart 15. Chart 14Inflation Dynamics Inflation Dynamics Inflation Dynamics Chart 15Where to Buy Inflation? Quarterly - December 2017 Quarterly - December 2017 The shorter duration (in real terms) of ILBs are an added bonus which fits well with our overall underweight duration positioning in the government bond universe. Global Economy Overview: Growth in developed economies remains strong and there is little in the data to suggest it will slow. This is likely to push up inflation and interest rates, especially in the U.S., over the next six to 12 months. Prospects for emerging markets, however, are less encouraging given that China is likely to slow moderately as it pushes ahead with reforms. U.S.: U.S. growth momentum remains very strong. GDP growth in the past two quarters has come in over 3%, and NowCasts for Q4 point to 2.9-3.9%. The Citigroup Economic Surprise Index (Chart 16, panel 1) has surged since June, and the Manufacturing ISM is at 53.9 and the Non-Manufacturing at 57.4 (panel 2). The worst that can be said is that momentum will be unable to continue at this rate but, with business confidence high, wage growth likely to pick up in 2018, and some positive impacts from tax cuts, no significant slowdown is in sight. Euro Area: Given its stronger cyclicality and ties to the global trade cycle, euro zone growth has surprised on the upside even more strongly than in the U.S. The Manufacturing PMI reached 60.6 in December (its highest level since 2000), and GDP growth in Q3 accelerated to 2.6% QoQ annualized. The euro's strength in 2017 seems to have done little to dent growth, and even weaker members of the euro zone such as Italy have seen improving GDP growth (1.7% in Q3). With the ECB reining back monetary easing only slightly, and banking problems shelved for now, growth should remain resilient in early 2018. Japan: Retail sales saw some weakness in October (-0.2% YoY), probably because of bad weather, but elsewhere data looks robust. Q3 GDP came in at 1.3% QoQ annualized and export growth remains strong at 14% YoY. There are even some signs of life in the domestic economy, with wages finally picking up a little (+0.9% YoY), driven by labor shortages among part-time workers, and consumer confidence at a four-year high. Inflation has been slow to rise, but at least core core inflation (the Bank of Japan's favorite measure) is now in positive territory at +0.2%. Emerging Markets: Chinese credit and monetary series, historically good lead indicators for the real economy, continue to decline (M2 growth in October of 8.8% was the lowest since data started in 1996). But, for now, economic growth has held up, with the Manufacturing and Non-Manufacturing PMIs both stably above 50 (Chart 17, panel 3). Key will be how much the government's moves to deleverage the financial system and implement structural reform in 2018 will slow growth. Elsewhere in emerging markets, economic growth remains sluggish, with GDP growth in Brazil barely rebounding to 1.4% YoY, Russia to 1.8%, and India slowing to 6.3% (down from over 9% in early 2016). Chart 16Growth Momentum Very Strong Growth Momentum Very Strong Growth Momentum Very Strong Chart 17Will China And EM Slow in 2018? Will China And EM Slow in 2018? Will China And EM Slow in 2018? Interest rates: We expect U.S. inflation to pick up in 2018, as the lagged effects of 2017's stronger growth and the weak dollar start to come through, amid higher oil prices and rising wages. We, along with the Fed, expect core PCE inflation to rise to 2% during the year. This means the Fed is likely to raise rates four times, compared to market expectations of twice. Consequently, we see the 10-year Treasury yield over 3% by mid-year. In the euro zone, the still-large output gap means inflation is less likely to surprise on the upside, allowing the ECB to keep negative rates until well into 2019. The Bank of Japan is unlikely to alter its Yield Curve Control, given the signal this would send to the market when inflation expectations are still well below its 2% target (Chart 17, panel 4). Chart 18Equities: Priced for Perfection Equities: Priced for Perfection Equities: Priced for Perfection Global Equities Still Cautiously Optimistic: Our pro-cyclical equity positioning in 2017 worked very well in terms of country allocation (overweight euro zone and Japan in the DM universe) and global sector allocation (favoring cyclicals vs defensives). The two calls that did not pan out were underweight EM equities vs. DM equities, which was partially offset by our positive stance on China within the EM universe, and the overweight of Energy, which was the worst performing sector of the year. The stellar equity performance in 2017 was largely driven by strong earnings growth. Margins improved in both DM and EM; earnings grew in all sectors, and analysts remained upbeat (Chart 18). Another important contributor to 2017 performance was the extraordinary performance of the Tech sector, especially in China: globally, tech returned 41.9%, outperforming the MSCI all country index by 18.9%. GAA's philosophy is to take risk where it is mostly likely be rewarded. In July, we took profits in our Tech overweight and used the funds to upgrade Financials to overweight from neutral. Then in October we started to reduce tracking risk by scaling down our active country bets, closing our overweight in the U.S. to reduce the underweight in EM. BCA's house view is for synchronized global growth to continue in 2018, but a possible recession in late 2019. We are a little concerned that equity markets are priced for perfection, given that our earnings model indicates a deceleration in the coming months mostly due to a base effect. As such, our combination of "close to shore" country allocation and "pro-cyclical" sector allocation is appropriate for the next 9-12 months. Country Allocation: Still Favor DM Over EM Chart 19China: From Tailwind to Headwind for EM ? China: From Tailwind to Headwind for EM ? China: From Tailwind to Headwind for EM ? Our longstanding call of underweight EM vs. DM since December 2013 was gradually reduced in scale, first in March 2016 (to -5 percentage points from -9) and then in October 2017 (further to -2 points). Going forward, investors should continue to maintain this slight underweight position in EM vs. DM. First, our positive stance on China proved to be timely as shown in Chart 19, panel 4, with China outperforming EM by 54.1% since March 2016, and by 18.8% in 2017. Back then our positive stance on China was supported by attractive valuations (bottom panel) and our view that Chinese politics would be supportive for global growth in the run up to the 19th Party Congress. Now BCA's Geopolitical Strategists think that "China politics are shifting from a tailwind to a headwind for global growth and EM assets".5 In addition, Chinese equities are no longer valued at a discount to the EM average (bottom panel). Second, BCA's currency view is for continued strength in the USD, especially against emerging market currencies. This does not bode well for EM/DM performance in US dollar terms (Chart 19, panel 1). Third, EM money growth leads profit growth by about three months (Chart 19, panel 2). The rolling over in money growth indicates that the currently strong earnings growth may lose steam going forward, while relative valuation is in the fair-value zone (Chart 19, panel 3). Sector Allocation: Stay Overweight Energy Our pro-cyclical sector positioning has worked well in aggregate as the market-cap-weighted cyclical index significantly outperformed the defensive index in 2017. This positioning is also in line with BCA's house view of synchronized global growth and higher inflation expectations, which translates into two major sector themes: capex recovery and rising interest rates. (Please see detailed sector positioning on page 24.) Within the cyclical space, however, the Energy sector did not perform as expected in 2017 (Chart 20). It returned only 3.4%, underperforming the global aggregate by 19.6%. For the next 9-12 months, we recommend investors to stay overweight this underdog of 2017. Chart 20Energy Stocks Lagging Oil Price Energy Stocks Lagging Oil Price Energy Stocks Lagging Oil Price First, the energy sector is a major beneficiary from a capex recovery. There are already signs of a recovery in basic resources investment in the U.S.6 Second, the energy sector's relative return lagged oil price performance in 2017. Given the generally close correlation between earnings and the oil price, and between analyst earnings revisions and OECD oil inventory growth, earnings in the sector should outpace the broad market. Third, based on price-to-cash earnings, the energy sector is still trading at about a 30% discount to the broad market, and offers a much higher dividend yield (about 1.2 points higher) than the broad market. Even though these discounts are in line with historical averages, they are still supportive of an overweight. Government Bonds Maintain Slight Underweight Duration. One important theme for 2018 will be a resumption of the cyclical uptrend in inflation.7 The implications are that both nominal bond yields and break-even inflation rates will be higher in 2018. We have been underweight duration in government bonds since July 2016. Now with the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield at 2.35%, much lower than its fair value of 2.81%, there is considerable upside risk for global bond yields from current low levels. Investors should continue to underweight duration in global government bonds Maintain Overweight Tips Vs. Treasuries. The base-case forecast from our U.S. bond strategists is that the Tips breakeven rate will rise to 2.4-2.5% as U.S. core PCE reaches the Fed's 2% target, probably sometime in the middle of 2018. Compared to the current level of 1.87%, 10-yr Tips would have upside of 33-38 bps, an important source of return in the low-return fixed-income space (Chart 21, bottom panel). In terms of relative value, Tips are now slightly cheaper than nominal bonds, also supportive of the overweight stance. Underweight Canadian Government Bonds. BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy has taken profits in their short Canada vs. U.S. and U.K. tactical position, as the market has become too aggressive in pricing in more rate hikes in Canada. Strategically, however, the underweight of Canada (Chart 22) in a hedged global portfolio is still appropriate because: 1) the output gap has closed in Canada, according to Bank of Canada estimates, and so any additional growth will translate into higher inflation; and 2) the rising CAD will not deter the BoC from more rate hikes if the oil prices remain strong. Chart 21U.S. Bond Yields Have Further To Rise U.S. Bond Yields Have Further To Rise U.S. Bond Yields Have Further To Rise Chart 22Strategic Underweight Canadian Bonds Strategic Underweight Canadian Bonds Strategic Underweight Canadian Bonds Corporate Bonds Our overweights through most of 2017 on spread product worked well: U.S. investment grade (IG) bonds returned around 290 bps over Treasuries in the year to end-November, and high-yield bonds almost 600 bps. Returns over the next 12 months are unlikely to be as attractive. Spreads (Chart 24) are now close to historic lows: the U.S. IG bond spread, at 90 bps, is only about 30 bps above its all-time record. High-yield valuations look a little more attractive: based on our model of probable defaults over the next 12 months, the default-adjusted spread over U.S. Treasuries is likely to be around 240 bps (Chart 25). In both cases, however, investors should expect little further spread contraction, meaning that credit is now no more than a carry trade. However, in an environment where rates remain fairly low and investors continue to stretch for yield, that pick-up will remain attractive in the absence of a significant turn-down in the economic cycle. The key to watch is the shape of the yield curve. An inverted yield curve in history has been an excellent indictor of the end of the credit cycle. We expect the yield curve to steepen somewhat in H1 2018, before flattening again and then inverting late in the year. Spread product is likely, therefore, to produce decent returns until that point. Thereafter, however, the deterioration of U.S. corporate health over the past three years (Chart 23) could mean a sharp sell-off in corporate bonds. This might be exacerbated by the recent popularity of open-ended mutual funds and ETFs: a small widening of spreads could be magnified by a panicked sell-off in such funds. Chart 23Rising Leverage May Worsen Sell-Off Rising Leverage May Worsen Sell-Off Rising Leverage May Worsen Sell-Off Chart 24Credit Spreads Close To Record Lows Credit Spreads Close To Record Lows Credit Spreads Close To Record Lows Chart 25But Default - Adjusted, Junk Still Looks Attractive But Default - Adjusted, Junk Still Looks Attractive But Default - Adjusted, Junk Still Looks Attractive Commodities Energy: Bullish Energy prices performed strongly in H2 2017, and we expect bullish sentiment to continue. OPEC 2.0 is likely to maintain production discipline, and will maintain its promised 1.8mm b/d production cuts through the end of 2018. Our estimates for global demand growth are higher than those of other forecasters. This, along with potential unplanned production outages in Iraq, Libya and Venezuela (together accounting for 7.4mm b/d of production at present), drives our above-consensus price forecast of $67 a barrel for Brent crude during 2018. Industrial Metals: Neutral Since China accounts for more than 50% of world base-metal consumption, prices will continue to be highly dependent on developments there. (Chart 26, panel 4). Since the government is trying to accelerate environmental and supply-side reforms, domestic production capacity for base metals will shrink, which will be a positive for global metals prices. However, a focus on deleveraging in the financial sector and restructuring certain industries could slow Chinese GDP growth, reducing base-metal demand. Precious Metals: Neutral Gold has risen by 12% in 2017, supported by an uncertain geopolitical environment coupled with low interest rates. We believe that geopolitical uncertainties will persist and may even intensify, and that inflation may rise in the U.S., which would be positives for gold (Chart 26, panel 3). Based on BCA's view that stock market could be at risk from the middle of 2018,8 a moderate gold holding is warranted as a safe-haven asset. However, rising interest rate and a potentially stronger U.S. dollar are likely to limit the upside for gold. Currencies USD: The currency is down over 6% on a trade-weighted basis over the past 12 months (Chart 27). Looking into 2018, the USD is likely to perform well in the first half. U.S. inflation should gather steam in the first two to three quarters, and the Fed will be able at least to follow its dot plot - something interest rate markets are not ready for. As investors remain short the USD, upside risk to U.S. interest rates should result in a higher dollar. Chart 26Bullish Oil, Neutral Metals Bullish Oil, Neutral Metals Bullish Oil, Neutral Metals Chart 27Dollar Likely To Appreciate Dollar Likely To Appreciate Dollar Likely To Appreciate EM/JPY: Carry trades are a key mechanism for redistributing global liquidity, and they have recently begun to lose steam. A crucial reason for this has been the policy tightening in China which has been the key driver of growth in EM economies. Additionally, Japanese flows have been chasing momentum into EM assets. Further tightening in EM could reverse the flows and initiate a flight to safety, favoring the yen relative to EM currencies. CHF: The currency continues to trade at a 5% premium to its PPP fair value against the euro. However, after considering Switzerland's net international investment position at 130% of GDP, the trade-weighted CHF trades in line with fair value. The CHF will continue to behave as a risk-off currency, and so long as global volatility remains well contained, EUR/CHF will experience appreciating pressure. GBP: Sterling continues to look cheap, trading at an 18% discount to PPP against the USD. However, Brexit remains a key problem. If future immigration is limited, the U.K. will see lower trend growth relative to its neighbors, forcing its equilibrium real neutral rate downward. Consequently, it will be more difficult to finance the current account deficit of 5% of GDP. Until negotiations with the EU come closer to completion, the pound will continue to offer limited reward and plenty of volatility. Alternatives Chart 28Favor Private Equity and Farmland Favor Private Equity and Farmland Favor Private Equity and Farmland Alternative assets under management (AUM) have reached a record $7.7 trillion in 2017. Lower fees and a broader range of investment types have helped attract more capital. Private equity remains the most popular choice,9 driven by its strong performance and transparency. Many investors have also shifted part of their allocations toward potentially higher-return private debt programs. Return Enhancers: Favor Private Equity Vs. Hedge Funds In 2017 so far, private equity has returned 12.1%, whereas hedge funds have managed only a 5.9% return (Chart 28). We expect private-equity fund-raising to continue into 2018, but with a larger focus on niche strategies with more favorable valuations. Additionally, deploying capital gradually not only provides for vintage-year diversification, but also creates opportunities for investors to benefit from potential market corrections. We continue to favor private equity over hedge funds outside of recessions. During a recession, we recommend investors take shelter in hedge funds with a macro mandate. Inflation Hedges: Favor Direct Real Estate Vs. Commodity Futures In 2017 to date, direct real estate has returned 5.1%, whereas commodity futures are down over 3.7%. Direct real estate as an asset class continues to provide valuable diversification, lower volatility, steady yields and an illiquidity premium. However, a slowdown in U.S. commercial real estate (CRE) has made us more cautious on the overall asset class. With regards to the commodity complex, the long-term transition of the global economy to a more renewables-focused energy base will continue the structural decline in commodity demand. We continue to stress the structural and long-term nature of our negative recommendation on commodities. Volatility Dampeners: Favor Farmland & Timberland Vs. Structured Products In 2017 to date, farmland and timberland have returned 3.2% and 2.1% respectively, whereas structured products are up 3.7%. Farmland continues to outperform timberland. The slow U.S. housing recovery has added downward pressure to timberland returns. Investors can reduce the volatility of a traditional multi-asset portfolio with inclusion of farm and timber assets. For structured products, low spreads in an environment of tightening commercial real estate lending standards and falling CRE loan demand, warrant an underweight. Risks To Our View We think upside and downside risks to our central scenario for 2018 - slowing but robust economic growth, and continuing moderate outperformance of risk assets - are roughly evenly balanced. On the negative side, perhaps the biggest risk is China, where the slowdown already suggested in the monetary data (Chart 29) could be exacerbated if the government pushes ahead aggressively with structural reforms. Geopolitical risks, which the market over-emphasized in 2017, seem under-estimated now.10 U.S. trade policy, Italian elections, and North Korea all have potential to derail markets. Also, when the U.S. yield curve is as flat as it is currently, small risks can be blown up into big sell-offs. This is particularly so given over-stretched valuations for almost all asset classes. Chart 29China Monetary Conditions Suggest A Slowdown China Monetary Conditions Suggest A Slowdown China Monetary Conditions Suggest A Slowdown Table 2How Will Trump Try To Influence The Fed? Quarterly - December 2017 Quarterly - December 2017 The most likely positive surprise could come from a dovish Fed. New Fed chair Jay Powell is something of an unknown quantity, and the White House could use the three remaining Fed vacancies to push the Fed to keep rates low, so as not to offset the positive effect of the tax cuts. Without these new appointees, the Fed would have a slightly more hawkish bias in 2018 (Table 2). The intellectual argument for hiking only slowly would be, as Janet Yellen said last month: "It can be quite dangerous to allow inflation to drift down and not to achieve over time a central bank's inflation target." The Fed has missed its 2% target for five years. It is possible to imagine a situation where the Fed increasingly makes excuses to keep monetary policy easy (encouraged, for example, by a short-lived sell-off in markets or a slowdown in China) and this causes a late-cycle blow-out, similar to 1999. 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "When To Get Out," dated December 8, 2017 available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Insight Report, "Tax Cuts Are Here - Sector Implications," dated December 12, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 CBNK Survey: Monetary Base, Currency in Circulation. Source: IMF - International Financial Statistics. 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Two Virtuous Dollar Circles," dated October 28, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Party Congress Ends ... So What?" dated November 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "High-Conviction Calls," dated November 27, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Outlook 2018 - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course," dated 20 November 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Outlook 2018 - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course," dated November 20, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 9 Source: BNY Mellon - The Race For Assets; Alternative Investments Surge Ahead. 10 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "From Overstated To Understated Risks," dated November 22, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. GAA Asset Allocation