Fixed Income

Highlights A thorough audit of our trade book highlights that our country and sector allocation recommendations have been quite profitable for investors. Of the 12 active trades in our book, 11 have generated a positive return, including one with a 32% annualized rate of return. A review of the original basis and subsequent performance of our trades suggests that investors should close 6 out of 12 of our active positions, predominantly related to resource & construction and domestic stock market themes. We will be looking for opportunities to add new trades to our book over the coming weeks and months that have broad, "big-picture" relevance. Watch this space. Feature In this week's report we conduct a thorough audit of our trade book, by revisiting the original basis and subsequent performance of all 12 of our active trades. While these trades have been initiated at different points over the past five years, they can be broadly grouped into five different themes: Core Equity Allocation & General Pro-Risk Trades (4 Trades) Reform-Oriented Trades (2 Trades) Resource & Construction Plays (2 Trades) Domestic Stock Market Trades (2 Trades) Trades Linked To Hong Kong (2 Trades) Overall, our trade book performance has been excellent. Of the 12 active trades in our book, 11 have generated a positive return, including one with a 32% annualized rate of return (since December 2015). As a result of our trade book review, we recommend that investors close six trades and maintain six over the coming 6-12 months. The closed trades predominantly fall into the resource & construction and domestic stock market categories, although we also recommend closing our long China H-share / short industrial commodity trade as well as our long Hong Kong REITs / short Hong Kong broad market trade. We present our rationale for retaining or closing each trade below. Over the coming weeks and months we will be looking for opportunities to add new trades to our book. Stay tuned. Core Equity Allocation & General Pro-Risk Trades We have four open core equity allocation and pro-risk trades: Overweight MSCI China Investable stocks versus the emerging markets benchmark, initiated on May 2, 2012 Long China H-shares / short industrial commodities, initiated on March 16, 2016 Short MSCI Taiwan / Long MSCI China Investable, initiated on February 2, 2017 and Long China onshore corporate bonds, initiated on June 22, 2017 We recommend that investors stick with three of these trades, but close the long China H-shares / short industrial commodities position for the following reasons: Chart 1Be Overweight China Vs EM In This Environment Be Overweight China Vs EM In This Environment Be Overweight China Vs EM In This Environment Overweight MSCI China Investable Stocks Versus The EM Benchmark (Maintain) This trade represents one of the most important equity allocation calls for Chinese stocks, and is one of the ways that BCA expresses a view on the Chinese economy in our House View Matrix.1 While it hasn't always been the case, we noted in a recent Special Report that Chinese stocks have become a high-beta equity market versus both the global aggregate and the emerging market benchmark, even when excluding the technology sector.2 China's high-beta nature, the fact that EM equities remain in an uptrend (Chart 1), and our view that China's ongoing slowdown is likely to be benign and controlled all suggest that investors should continue to overweight Chinese stocks vs their emerging market peers. Long China H-Shares / Short Industrial Commodities (Close) We initiated this trade in March 2016, one month after Chinese stock prices bottomed following the significant economic slowdown in 2015. At that time it was not clear to global investors that a mini-cycle upswing in the Chinese economy had begun, and this pair trade was a way of taking a limited pro-risk bet. Given our view of a benign, controlled economic slowdown in China, this hedged trade is no longer needed, especially given the uncertain impact of ongoing supply side constraints in China on global commodity prices. As such, we recommend that investors close the trade, locking in an annualized return of 15.7%. Short MSCI Taiwan / Long MSCI China Investable (Maintain) Chart 2If The TWD Declines Materially, ##br##Upgrade Taiwan (From Short) If The TWD Declines Materially, Upgrade Taiwan (From Short) If The TWD Declines Materially, Upgrade Taiwan (From Short) We initiated our short MSCI Taiwan / long MSCI China investable trade last February, when the risk of protectionist action from the Trump administration loomed large. While there have been no negative trade actions levied against Taiwan this year, macro factors, particularly the strength of the currency, continue to argue for an underweight stance within the greater China bourses (China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan). We reviewed the basis of this trade in a report last month,3 and recommended that investors stick with the call despite significantly oversold conditions (Chart 2). A material easing in pressure on Taiwan's trade-weighted exchange rate appears to be the most likely catalyst to close the trade and to upgrade Taiwan within a portfolio of greater China equities. Long China Onshore Corporate Bonds (Maintain) Chinese corporate bond yields have risen materially since late-2016, largely in response to expectations of tighter monetary policy. These expectations have been validated, with 3-month interbank rates having risen over 200bps since late-2016. We argued last summer that the phase of maximum liquidity tightening was likely over, and that quality spreads and government bond yields would probably drop over the coming three to six months. While this clearly did not occur (yields and spreads rose), the total return from this trade has remained in the black owing to the significant yield advantage of these bonds versus similarly-rated bonds in the developed world. Chart 3 highlights that Chinese 5-year corporate bond spreads are also considerably less correlated with equity prices than their investment-grade peers in the U.S. This underscores that the rise in yields and spreads over the past year has reflected expectations of tighter monetary policy, not rising default risk. Our sense is that barring a significant improvement in China's growth momentum, significant further monetary policy tightening is improbable, meaning that corporate bond yields are not likely to rise much further. As a final point, as of today's report we are changing the benchmark for this trade from a BCA calculation based on a basket of 5-year AAA and AA-rated corporate bonds to the ChinaBond Corporate Credit Bond Total Return Index. Chart 3Chinese Corporate Spreads Aren't A Risk ##br##Barometer Like In The U.S. Chinese Corporate Spreads Aren't A Risk Barometer Like In The U.S. Chinese Corporate Spreads Aren't A Risk Barometer Like In The U.S. Reform-Oriented Trades We have two open trades related to China's rebooted reform initiative, both of which were initiated on November 16, 2017: Long China investable consumer staples / short consumer discretionary stocks and Long China investable environmental and social governance (ESG) leaders / short investable broad market These trades were recently opened, and we continue to recommend that investors maintain both positions: Long China Investable Consumer Staples / Short Consumer Discretionary Stocks (Maintain) The basis for the first trade stems from the current limitations of China's investable consumer discretionary index as a clear-cut play on retail-oriented consumer spending. We argued in our November 16 Weekly Report that Chinese investable consumer staples would be a better play on Chinese consumer spending owing to the material weight of the automobiles & components industry group in the discretionary sector, which may fare poorly over the coming year due to the environmental mandate of President Xi's proposed reforms. We argued in the report that this trade would likely be driven by alpha rather than beta, and indeed Chart 4 illustrates that staples continue to rise relative to discretionary against a backdrop of a rising broad market. Long China Investable ESG leaders / Short Investable Broad Market (Maintain) In the same report we recommended that investors overweight the China investable ESG leaders index, based on the goal of favoring firms that are best positioned to deliver "sustainable" growth in an era of heightened environmental reforms. The index overweights firms with the highest MSCI ESG ratings in each sector (using a proprietary MSCI ranking scheme), and maintains similar sector weights as the investable benchmark, which limits the beta risk of the trade. Chart 5 highlights that the trade is progressing in line with our expectations, suggesting that investors stick with the position over the coming 6-12 months. Chart 4Staples Vs Discretionary Isn't A Low Beta Trade Staples Vs Discretionary Isn't A Low Beta Trade Staples Vs Discretionary Isn't A Low Beta Trade Chart 5Likely To Continue To Outperform Likely To Continue To Outperform Likely To Continue To Outperform Resource & Construction Plays We have two open trades related to the resource sector: Long China investable oil & gas stocks / short global oil & gas stocks, initiated on April 26, 2014 and Long China investable construction materials sector / short investable broad market, initiated on December 9, 2015 We recommend that investors close both of these positions, based on the following rationale: Chart 6Similar Earnings Profile, ##br##But Weaker Dividend Payouts Similar Earnings Profile, But Weaker Dividend Payouts Similar Earnings Profile, But Weaker Dividend Payouts Long China Investable Oil & Gas Stocks / Short Global Oil & Gas Stocks (Close) This trade was initiated based on the view that the valuation gap between Chinese and global oil & gas companies is unjustifiable given that the earnings off both sectors are globally driven. Indeed, Chart 6 shows that the trailing EPS profiles of both sectors in US$ terms have been broadly similar over the past few years, and yet China's oil & gas sector trades at a 40% price-to-book discount relative to its global peers. However, panel 2 of Chart 6 highlights that this discount may represent investor concerns about earnings quality and/or state-owned corporate governance. The chart shows that while the earnings ROE for Chinese oil & gas companies is higher than that of the global average, the dividend ROE (dividends per share as a percent of shareholders equity) is considerably lower. While China's oil & gas dividend ROE has recently been rising, the gap remains wide relative to global oil & gas companies, suggesting that there is no significant re-rating catalyst that is likely to emerge over the coming 6-12 months. Close for an annualized return of 1.4%. Long China Investable Construction Material Stocks / Short China Investable Broad Market (Close) The relative performance of Chinese investable construction material stocks has been positive over the past two years, with the trade having generated an 8.1% annualized return since initiation. There are two factors contributing to our view that it is time for investors to book profits on this trade. The first is that China's investable construction materials are dominated by cement companies, which may suffer in relative terms from China's rebooted reform initiative this year.4 The second is that the relative performance of construction materials stocks is closely correlated with, and led by, the growth in total real estate investment (Chart 7). Residential investment makes up a significant component of total real estate investment, and Chart 8 highlights that a significant gap between floor space sold and completed has narrowed the inventory to sales ratio over the past three years. But the ratio remains somewhat elevated relative to its history which, when coupled with the ongoing growth slowdown in China and the deceleration in total real estate investment growth, implies a poor risk/reward ratio over the coming 6-12 months. Chart 7Cement Producers Trade Off Of Real Estate Investment Cement Producers Trade Off Of Real Estate Investment Cement Producers Trade Off Of Real Estate Investment Chart 8No Clear Construction Boom Is Imminent No Clear Construction Boom Is Imminent No Clear Construction Boom Is Imminent Domestic Stock Market Trades We have two open trades related to China's domestic stock market: Long China domestic utility sector / short domestic broad market, initiated on January 22, 2014 and Long China domestic food & beverage sector / short domestic broad market, initiated on December 9, 2015 Similar to our resource & construction plays, we recommend that investors close both of our recommended domestic stock market trades: Long China Domestic Utility Sector / Short Domestic Broad Market (Close) We initiated this trade in early-2014, following a comprehensive reform plan released in late-2013 by the Chinese government. The plan called for allowing market forces to play a decisive role in allocating resources, which we argued would grant utilities more pricing power, reduce their earnings volatility associated with policy risks, and lead to a structural positive re-rating. Chart 9 illustrates that this trade gained significant ground in 2014 and early-2015, even prior to the significant melt-up in domestic stock prices that began in Q2 2015. However, the trade has underperformed significantly since the middle of last year, which has been driven by a sharp deterioration in ROE. This decline in ROE appears to have been cost-driven, as coal is an important feedstock for Chinese utility companies and has risen substantially in price over the past two years. While domestic utilities are now significantly oversold in relative terms, we recommend that investors close this trade because the original reform-oriented basis has shifted significantly. The priorities that emanated from October's Party Congress were decidedly environmental in nature, meaning that coal prices may very well remain elevated over the coming 6-12 months (due to restricted supply). This means that a recovery in ROE would rest on the need to raise utility prices, which is a low-visibility event that will be difficult to predict. Close for an annualized return of 3%. Long China Domestic Food & Beverage Sector / Short Domestic Broad Market (Close) We initiated this trade in December 2015, based on this sector's superior corporate fundamentals and undemanding valuation levels. We argued that the anti-corruption campaign since late-2012 was likely the cause of prior underperformance, given that the group is dominated by a few high-end alcohol producers. The market overacted to the high-profile crackdown, and ultimately the fundamentals of the sector did not deteriorate materially. Our view has panned out spectacularly, with the trade having earned a 32% annualized return since inception5 (Chart 10 panel 1). While the group's ROE remains significantly above that of the domestic benchmark, valuation measures suggest that investors have more than priced this in (Chart 10 panel 2). The trade has mostly played out and we would not like to overstay our welcome. In addition, panel 3 illustrates that technical conditions are extremely overbought, suggesting that investors are being presented with an excellent opportunity to exit the position. Chart 9Sidelined By A Major Hit To ROE Sidelined By A Major Hit To ROE Sidelined By A Major Hit To ROE Chart 10Time To Book Profits Time To Book Profits Time To Book Profits Trades Linked To Hong Kong We have two open trades related to Hong Kong: Long U.S. / short Hong Kong 10-Year government bonds, initiated on January 15, 2014 and Short Hong Kong property investors / long Hong Kong broad market, initiated on January 21, 2015 We recommend that investors stick with the first and close the second, based on the following perspectives: Long U.S. / Short Hong Kong 10-Year Government Bonds (Maintain) Hong Kong has an open capital account and an exchange rate pegged to the U.S. dollar, meaning that its monetary policy is directly tied to that of the U.S. Yet, Hong Kong's 10-year government bond yield is non-trivially below that of the U.S., which argues for a short stance versus similar maturity U.S. Treasurys. While it is true that the Hong Kong - U.S. 10-year yield spread does vary and can widen over a 6-12 month horizon, Chart 11 highlights that the relative total return profile of the trade (in unhedged terms) trends higher over time due to the carry advantage. Short Hong Kong REITs / Long Hong Kong Broad Market (Close) There are cross-currents facing the outlook for Hong Kong REITs vs the broad market, arguing for a neutral rather than an underweight stance. Close this trade for an annualized return of 3.6%. While the relative performance of global REITs is typically negatively correlated with bond yields, Chart 12 shows that the relationship with Hong Kong property yields has been positive and lagging (i.e. falling yields lead declining relative performance, and vice versa). Under this regime, a rise in U.S. government bond yields, as we expect, would suggest an improvement in the relative performance of Hong Kong REITs. Chart 11A Straightforward Carry Pick Up Trade A Straightforward Carry Pick Up Trade A Straightforward Carry Pick Up Trade Chart 12Rising Bond Yields Implies ##br##Positive HK REIT Performance Rising Bond Yields Implies Positive HK REIT Performance Rising Bond Yields Implies Positive HK REIT Performance Chart 13 highlights that periods of positive yield / REIT performance correlation have tended to occur when Hong Kong property prices are rising significantly relative to income, as they have been for the past several years. One interpretation of this dynamic is that when house prices are overvalued and potentially vulnerable, REIT investors react positively to an improvement in economic fundamentals (which tends to push yields up due to higher interest rate expectations). The risk of an eventual collapse of Hong Kong property prices is clear, but we cannot identify an obvious catalyst for this to occur over the coming 6-12 months. Importantly, the fact that property prices have continued to rise during a period of tighter mainland capital controls suggests that only a significant economic shock will be enough to derail the uptrend in prices, circumstances that we do not expect over the coming year. Finally, Chart 14 highlights that Hong Kong REITs are deeply discounted relative to book value when compared against the broad market. This suggests that at least some of the risks associated with the property market have already been priced in by investors. Chart 13Yields & REITs Positively Correlated ##br##When House Prices Are Overvalued Yields & REITs Positively Correlated When House Prices Are Overvalued Yields & REITs Positively Correlated When House Prices Are Overvalued Chart 14Hong Kong REITs Are Cheap Hong Kong REITs Are Cheap Hong Kong REITs Are Cheap Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com Lin Xiang, Research Analyst linx@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.bcaresearch.com/trades 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: No Longer A Low-Beta Market", dated January 11, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Taiwan: Awaiting A Re-Rating Catalyst", dated December 14, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Messages From The Market, Post-Party Congress", dated November 16, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please note that the total return from this trade had been erroneously reported for some time due a data processing error on BCA's part. The return since inception now properly sources the China CSI SWS Food & Beverage index from CHOICE. We sincerely regret the error and any confusion it may have caused. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights One of the biggest mistakes in finance is to equate risk with volatility. The correct measure of risk is the negative skew in payoff distributions. If 10-year bond yields should rise another 40 bps, equities would become riskier than bonds and elevated equity valuations would become much harder to sustain. This would be the point at which to scale back equity exposure. The corollary for bonds is that 10-year yields cannot sustainably rise more than 40bps before experiencing a tradeable reversal. Feature It is the crucial question that all investors should ask at all times. What is the relative risk of the two major asset classes - bonds and equities - and are their relative return prospects commensurate with the relative risk? Chart of the WeekBelow A 2% Yield, 10-Year Bonds Are Riskier Than Equities Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities? Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities? But first, there is an even more fundamental question: what do we mean by risk? Conventional wisdom says that the risk of an investment is captured by its volatility. Indeed, through instruments such as the VIX futures and currency volatility options, volatility has become a multi-trillion dollar asset-class in its own right. Therefore, volatility must measure the risk of an investment, right? Wrong. The Biggest Mistake In Finance As a measure of risk, volatility is clearly wrong. Volatility regards price gains in exactly the same way as it regards price losses. But investors don't mind gains, they only mind losses! Consider an investment whose price moves alternately sideways and sharply higher. The maths would say that the returns have high volatility, implying that the investment is very risky. In truth though, the investment is highly desirable and 'risk-free' - because its price never declines. At our recent New York conference, Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman warned that one of the biggest mistakes in finance is to equate risk with volatility. After decades of empirical and theoretical studies - which culminated in the 2002 Nobel Prize for Economics - Kahneman proved that investors are not concerned about the symmetrical fluctuations in investment returns. Instead, they are concerned about the asymmetry - or skew - in payoff distributions. Kahneman explained the underlying psychology. "People are limited in their ability to comprehend and evaluate extreme probabilities, so highly unlikely events are overweighted." If the payoff distribution is symmetric, the overweighting of unlikely events in the loss tail and the gain tail exactly cancels out. But if the distribution is asymmetric, the longer tail determines the perceived attractiveness of the payoff. Where the longer tail is on the gain side, the distribution is said to have positive skew (Figure I-1). The classic example is a lottery. When people play the lottery, their loss is limited to the ticket price, but their gain could be tens of millions. People perceive the positive skew as attractive because they overweight the minuscule probability of becoming a millionaire. As a result, they overpay for the lottery ticket versus its expected value. Where the longer tail is on the loss side, the distribution is said to have negative skew (Figure I-2). This is like a lottery in reverse. The gain size is relatively limited, but the loss could be very large. People perceive the negative skew as unattractive because they overweight the probability of a large loss. As a result, they demand overpayment to take it on. Figure I-1People Like Positive Skew Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities? Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities? Figure I-2People Dislike Negative Skew Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities? Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities? For investments with negative skew, this overpayment takes the form of an excess return demanded from the market - a 'risk premium' - versus investments with less negative skew. Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities? We are now in a position to tackle the question in the title. To determine whether bonds are riskier than equities or vice-versa, we must compare the skews of their return profiles.1 The important point is that for a bond, the skew of its return profile changes with its yield. At yields above 2.5%, 10-year bond returns show no skew. Worst losses broadly equal best gains. However, when yields drop below 2%, returns start to exhibit negative skew (Chart I-2). And at yields below 1%, the negative skew becomes extreme. Chart I-2Bond Risk Increases At ##br##Low Bond Yields Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities? Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities? Chart I-3Equity Risk Does Not Increase At##br## Low Bond Yields Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities? Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities? The reason is obvious. Central banks accept that there is a 'lower bound' for policy interest rates - perhaps slightly negative - below which there would be an exodus of bank deposits. The limit also marks the lower bound for bond yields. Close to this lower bound for yields, bond mathematics necessarily creates a negatively skewed return profile. Simply put, prices have little upside, but they have a lot of downside! Chart I-4A 40Bps Rise In Yields Would Make Global ##br##Bonds Riskier Than Equities A 40Bps Rise In Yields Would Make Global Bonds Riskier Than Equities A 40Bps Rise In Yields Would Make Global Bonds Riskier Than Equities Turning to equities, the empirical evidence shows that equity returns always exhibit negative skew. Worst losses are typically around 1.5 times the size of best gains (Chart I-3). But the negative skew of equity returns is largely independent of the bond yield. The upshot is that there is a crossover bond yield below which the negative skew on 10-year bonds exceeds that on equities. This crossover bond yield is around 2%. In negative skew terms, we can say that at a 10-year bond yield below 2%, 10-year bonds are riskier than equities. And at a yield above 2%, equities are riskier than 10-year bonds (Chart of the Week). So in negative skew terms, 10-year bonds are riskier investments than equities in Europe and in Japan. But equities are riskier investments than 10-year bonds in the United States. Still, given that developed financial markets tend to move en masse, the relationship that is most significant is the aggregate one. At a global level, 10-year bond yields are 40bps below the crossover yield at which equities become riskier than bonds (Chart I-4). QE Distorted The Relative Valuation Of Equities Versus Bonds Which segues us neatly to today's ECB monetary policy meeting. Many people, worried about the end of QE, point out that the $10 trillion of bonds that the 'big four'2 central banks have bought is not far short of the size of the euro area economy. However, in the context of a global fixed income market of $220 trillion,3 $10 trillion of buying is small change. For the $220 trillion global bond and bank loan complex, the much more significant driver of yields has been the expected path of policy interest rates. As ECB Chief Economist Peter Praet put it, serial QE has been nothing more than "a signalling channel which reinforces the credibility of forward guidance on (ultra-low) policy rates." Chart I-5A Promise To Keep The Policy Rate Ultra-Low ##br##Pulls Down Bond Yields A Promise To Keep The Policy Rate Ultra-Low Pulls Down Bond Yields A Promise To Keep The Policy Rate Ultra-Low Pulls Down Bond Yields Central bankers know that QE depressed bond yields by signalling an extended period of ultra-low interest rates (Chart I-5). They also know that if the prospective return on bonds drops, so must the prospective return on competing investments such as equities. Thereby, the absolute valuations of bonds and equities both rise. However, one largely overlooked impact of QE - even by central bankers - has been the effect on the relative valuation of equities versus bonds. To repeat, when 10-year bond yields drop below 2%, their return distribution becomes more negatively skewed than that for equities. But if bonds become riskier investments, the 'risk premium' (excess return) on equities must disappear. Meaning equity valuations and prices get a second boost, compressing the prospective 10-year equity return to become 'bond-like'. Is this the case? Unlike for 10-year bonds, we do not know the 10-year prospective return from equities with certainty. However, we can get a good estimate from today's starting valuation. But which valuation metric to use? We are cautious of using profit based metrics as these will be flattered by the advanced position in the business cycle as well as the structural uptrend in profit margins. Instead, at an aggregate level, world equity market capitalisation to world GDP has been an excellent predictor of the prospective 10-year return on world equities. Today, this valuation metric is at the same level as in 2000 and 2007, and implies a prospective return of less than 2% a year (Chart I-6). Chart I-6World Equity Market Cap To GDP Implies A Feeble Prospective 10-Year Return World Equity Market Cap To GDP Implies A Feeble Prospective 10-Year Return World Equity Market Cap To GDP Implies A Feeble Prospective 10-Year Return Nevertheless, while the global 10-year bond yield stays below 2%, this is a sustainable valuation for equities. Effectively, equities and bonds are offering broadly similar negative skews, and therefore should offer broadly similar prospective returns. However, if 10-year bond yields should rise another 40 bps, equities would become riskier than bonds and elevated equity valuations would become much harder to sustain. Though not there yet, this would be the point when we would scale back equity exposure. The corollary for bonds is that 10-year yields cannot sustainably rise more than 40bps before experiencing a tradeable reversal. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 One simple way to quantify this skew is to find an extended period of time in which the price ended where it started, and then to calculate the period's worst 3-month loss as a multiple of the best 3-month gain. We define skew = -ln(worst 3-month loss / best 3-month gain) using log returns for 3-month loss and 3-month gain. 2 The Federal Reserve, ECB, Bank of Japan and Bank of England. 3 Source: The Institute of International Finance (IIF) https://www.iif.com/publication/global-debt-monitor/global-debt-monitor-june-2017. Fractal Trading Model* This week's trade is to position for an underperformance of the Japanese energy sector (led by JXTG Holdings And Inpex) versus the overall Japanese market. This is a longer trade than normal with a maximum duration of 26 weeks. Set a profit-target at 8% with a symmetrical stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-7 Short Japan Oil & Gas Short Japan Oil & Gas The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Duration: The modest bond-bullish message from our technical indicators does not yet outweigh the bond-bearish forces we expect to prevail on a 6-12 month horizon. Maintain below-benchmark duration. 10-Year Yield: The 10-year Treasury yield has risen a lot, but still has considerable upside on a 6-12 month horizon. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is still 35 bps below its fair value range, and it is difficult to craft a realistic scenario where a higher cost of inflation protection is offset by lower real yields. Risk Premiums & Treasury Returns: Despite the recent increases in short-dated Treasury yields, Treasuries with 1-2 years remaining until maturity still do not offer adequate compensation for the likely future path of rate hikes. Negative risk premiums in 1-year and 2-year hold-to-maturity Treasury positions are also likely to coincide with very low Treasury index total returns during the next 1-2 years. Feature Chart 1The Long End Catching The Train The Long End Catching The Train The Long End Catching The Train The sell-off in U.S. bond markets continued last week with the 10-year yield breaking above its previous peak of 2.62%. Of course yields at the short end of the curve made new cyclical highs long ago and have increased even further during the past few weeks (Chart 1). In this report we look at both the long and short ends of the yield curve and ask whether yields are finally fairly priced. But first, a quick re-cap of our cyclical investment stance. In our prior two bulletins we noted that the cyclical outlook for bonds remains bearish, and this continues to be the case. The main reason is that, despite recent increases, the long-term cost of inflation protection is still below levels consistent with the Fed's 2% inflation target. However, we have also warned that the message from some near-term technical indicators is starting to shift. Specifically, net speculative positions in 10-year Treasury futures are now 2% net short. Positioning at these levels has historically been consistent with a modest decline in the 10-year yield during the subsequent three months (Chart 2). Also, the U.S. Economic Surprise Index (ESI) sits at a lofty +65 and is poised to mean revert as investor expectations grow increasingly optimistic. Our simple auto-regressive model of the ESI projects that it will decline to +28 during the next month.1 A positive value on the ESI is consistent with a continued increase in Treasury yields (Chart 3), but we will be watching closely for signs that the ESI is about to break below zero. Chart 2Message From Our Near-Term Indicators (I) Message From Our Near-Term Indicators (I) Message From Our Near-Term Indicators (I) Chart 3Message From Our Near-Term Indicators (II) The Long And Short Of It The Long And Short Of It Taken together, the modest bond-bullish message from our technical indicators does not yet outweigh the bond-bearish forces we expect to prevail on a 6-12 month horizon. We therefore maintain our below-benchmark duration bias. We also maintain our overweight allocation to spread product versus Treasuries. Though inflationary pressure in the economy is starting to build, it is still not sufficient to spur significant spread widening. We will elaborate further on our spread product views in next week's report. How High For The 10-Year? In the current environment we find it instructive to split the nominal 10-year yield into its two main components - the compensation for inflation protection and the real yield - and consider each in turn. Inflation Chart 4TIPS Breakevens Are Still Low TIPS Breakevens Are Still Low TIPS Breakevens Are Still Low As was mentioned in the first section of this report, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate has risen a lot. From a trough of 1.66% last June to 2.05% as of last Friday. But this is still somewhat too low (Chart 4). Historically, the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate has traded in a range between 2.4% and 2.5% when realized inflation is well-anchored around the Fed's 2% target. With inflation almost certain to move back to the Fed's target before the end of the cycle, and indeed our Pipeline Inflation Indicator shows that inflationary pressures continue to build (Chart 4, bottom panel), there is still another 35 bps to 45 bps of cyclical upside in the 10-year breakeven rate. Real Yield As for the 10-year real yield, a simple model introduced in a report last month shows that it is driven by a combination of: The fed funds rate. The expected change in the fed funds rate during the next 12 months, as measured by our 12-month Fed Funds Discounter. Implied rate volatility as measured by the MOVE index. Included as a proxy for the term premium embedded in 10-year yields. The model is shown in Chart 5, where we also incorporate very conservative assumptions for each of the three independent variables. We assume that: The fed funds rate is raised three times this year, in line with the FOMC's median projection (Chart 5, panel 2). The 12-month discounter falls to 25 bps by year end. In other words, we assume that by then investors will only be looking for one rate hike only in 2019 (Chart 5, panel 3). The MOVE volatility index stays flat at historically low levels (Chart 5, bottom panel).2 Chart 5A Simple Model Of The Real 10-Year Treasury Yield A Simple Model Of The Real 10-Year Treasury Yield A Simple Model Of The Real 10-Year Treasury Yield The key message from Chart 5 is that it is very difficult to craft a reasonable scenario where the 10-year real yield has meaningful downside from current levels. Even using the benign assumptions described above, our model projects that the 10-year real yield will increase 4 bps in the next 11 months. From current levels that suggests a 10-year real yield of 0.61% by the end of the year. Summing it all up, on a cyclical horizon we project another 35 bps to 45 bps of upside in the inflation component of the 10-year Treasury yield, and at least 4 bps of upside in the real component. This suggests that the 10-year nominal Treasury yield should move into a range between 3.01% and 3.11% by the time that inflation reaches the Fed's target. Bottom Line: The 10-year Treasury yield has risen a lot, but still has considerable upside on a 6-12 month horizon. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is still 35 bps below its fair value range, and it is difficult to craft a realistic scenario where a higher cost of inflation protection is offset by lower real yields. Is The Front End Fairly Priced? At this time last year the 1-year Treasury yield was 0.84% and the fed funds rate was 0.66%. During the past 12 months the fed funds rate rose from 0.66% to 1.42%, equating to an average fed funds rate of 1.10% during this period (using monthly compounding). An investor who bought a 1-year Treasury note last year and held to maturity would have earned a risk premium of -26 bps relative to a position in cash. Not a great return by any means, but yields have moved a lot since then. The 1-year yield is now 1.79% and the 2-year yield is 2.05%. Is it possible that front-end yields now provide adequate compensation for the path of rate hikes during the next 1-2 years? And more importantly, does the risk premium earned on short-maturity notes tell us anything about the total returns we can expect to earn from the overall Treasury index? These are the two questions we consider in this section. Calculating The Ex-Ante Risk Premium In Short-Maturity Yields Table 1 shows three different scenarios for the path of Fed rate hikes during the next two years. The median FOMC scenario assumes that the funds rate rises in line with the Fed's median projection. That is, the rate is lifted three times this year and twice next year. The hawkish scenario assumes that the funds rate is raised once per quarter between now and mid-2019, and the dovish scenario assumes that after hiking rates in March and June of this year the Fed is forced to go on hold. Table 1Fed Rate Hikes Scenarios & The Implied Risk Premium The Long And Short Of It The Long And Short Of It We see that the 1-year yield is priced exactly in line with the FOMC's median projection. That is, if the fed funds rate is hiked three times in 2018, then 12 months from now an investor will have been indifferent between a position in a 1-year note and a position in cash. In this same scenario an investor holding a 2-year note to maturity will end up losing 4 bps relative to a position in cash. Unsurprisingly, the hawkish scenario leads to much more negative realized risk premiums for both 1-year and 2-year hold-to-maturity trades. The dovish scenario leads to a small positive risk premium on a 2-year horizon, but a small negative risk premium on a 1-year horizon. This is because our dovish scenario still assumes there are two rate hikes this year. Our initial conclusion is that despite the recent increases in short-dated Treasury yields, Treasuries with 1-2 years remaining until maturity do not offer adequate compensation for the likely future path of rate hikes. Especially since a position in a 1-year or 2-year note is somewhat riskier than a position in cash, due to the additional duration risk. Short-Maturity Risk Premiums And Treasury Returns But there is one more possible application for the above analysis. We calculated the actual risk premiums earned in 1-year and 2-year hold-to-maturity positions going back to 1973, and found that these risk premiums correlate quite well with changes in the average yield for the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index for the same time horizon. In other words, 12-month periods in which an investor in a 1-year note would have earned a positive risk premium relative to an investor in cash tend to coincide with a falling Treasury index yield, and vice-versa (Chart 6). The correlation is even stronger on a 2-year horizon (Chart 7). Chart 61-Year Risk Premium & 12-Month Change ##br## In Treasury Index Yield The Long And Short Of It The Long And Short Of It Chart 72-Year Risk Premium & 24-Month Change ##br## In Treasury Index Yield The Long And Short Of It The Long And Short Of It Using the relationships from Charts 6 & 7 we are able to calculate the expected change in the average index Treasury yield in each of our three scenarios for Fed rate hikes. We can then translate those yield changes into expectations for total returns from the Treasury index. Those projected total return figures are shown in the final column of Table 1. Our calculation shows that the median FOMC scenario translates into a projected Treasury index 1-year total return of 2.7%, and an annualized 2-year return of 1.7%. The annualized 2-year return in the hawkish scenario is only 84 bps, while it is 2.3% in the dovish scenario. Chart 8Very Low Returns On The Horizon Very Low Returns On The Horizon Very Low Returns On The Horizon Of course, these figures come with a good deal of uncertainty. Nowhere in the calculation do we consider possible price changes in longer-maturity bonds, which of course are a significant part of the index. In fact, Chart 8 shows that while the total return projections derived from this exercise give a good sense of the general direction in Treasury index returns, there is still considerable variability from year to year. Perhaps the most accurate statement we can make is that with 1-year and 2-year risk premiums likely to be negative - or at least very close to zero - during the next 1-2 years, we should also expect very low total returns from the overall Treasury index. Bottom Line: Despite the recent increases in short-dated Treasury yields, Treasuries with 1-2 years remaining until maturity still do not offer adequate compensation for the likely future path of rate hikes. Negative risk premiums in 1-year and 2-year hold-to-maturity Treasury positions are also likely to coincide with very low Treasury index total returns during the next 1-2 years. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 For further details on the model please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "How Much Higher For Yields?", dated October 31, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 For further details on the model please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Ill Placed Trust?", dated December 19, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights Global Duration Strategy: Global bond yields continue to move higher, driven by rising inflation expectations and falling investor risk aversion. With global interest rates still not at levels that will restrict growth or draw capital away from booming equity markets, the path of least resistance for yields remains upward. Maintain a below-benchmark overall portfolio duration stance, with a bearish curve steepening bias in the U.S. and core Europe. U.K. Gilts: The momentum in the U.K. economy is slowing, as a weaker consumer, slower housing activity, and softer capital spending are offsetting a pickup in exports. With the inflationary impulse from the 2016 plunge in the Pound now fading, and with Brexit uncertainty weighing on business confidence, the Bank of England will struggle to raise rates in 2018. Stay overweight Gilts. Feature Revisiting Our Duration Strategy After The Rise In Yields Global government bond markets have started 2018 in a grumpy mood. The price return on the overall Barclays Global Treasury index is already down -0.6% so far in January, and yields are up for almost every country and maturity bucket within the developed market universe. Only longer-dated Peripheral European debt (Italy, Spain, Portugal, even Greece) has seen lower yields month-to-date, as the powerful growth upturn in the Euro Area has resulted in sovereign credit upgrades and narrowing spreads to core European bonds. The global sell-off has been led by the U.S., with the benchmark 10-year U.S. Treasury yield climbing all the way to 2.66% last week, already surpassing the 2016 high seen last March. Rising inflation expectations are the biggest culprit, with the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate climbing to 2.07%, the highest level since 2014. Chart of the WeekNo Good News For Bonds Right Now No Good News For Bonds Right Now No Good News For Bonds Right Now The relentless surge in global stock markets - driven by faster worldwide economic growth and an absence of volatility - is also helping fuel the bearishness in government bond markets. The economic growth momentum is showing no signs of abating. The IMF just raised its global growth forecast for both 2018 and 2019 to 3.9% in both years - the fastest pace since 2011 - largely because of the impact of the U.S. tax cuts but also because of much faster expected growth in Europe.1 The IMF noted that "the cyclical rebound could prove stronger in the near term as the pickup in activity and easier financial conditions reinforce each other." We could not agree more. With robust growth pushing a majority of economies to operate beyond full employment, and with financial conditions remaining highly accommodative, global bond markets are now pricing in both higher inflation expectations and less accommodative monetary policy (Chart of the Week). While we only expect actual rate increases in the U.S. and Canada in 2018, the pressures on global central banks to respond to the coordinated growth upturn with hawkish talk will keep government bond markets on the defensive - especially if global inflation rates are moving up at the same time. Diminishing demand for government bonds from recently reliable sources may also act to push up yields in the months ahead. A reduced pace of asset purchases from the European Central Bank (ECB) and Bank of Japan (BoJ), combined with the Fed reducing the reinvestments of its maturing Treasury holdings, means that the private sector must now absorb a greater share of bond issuance, on the margin. In the U.S. in particular, the biggest swing factor for the Treasury market could end up being the retail investor. Households have been notably risk-averse in the years since the Great Financial Crisis, keeping relatively high allocations to fixed income and relatively low allocations to equities after suffering such steep losses in the 2008 crash. Those attitudes are changing, however, with the U.S. equity market continuing to hit new all-time highs amid increased media coverage of the rally (as well as the bullish Tweets from the White House taking credit for it). The latest University of Michigan U.S. consumer confidence survey showed that the expected probability of another year of rising stock prices is now at the highest level (66%) in the fifteen years that question was asked. U.S. investment advisors are also very optimistic, with the Investors' Intelligence bull/bear ratio back to the highest level since 1987! (Chart 2) Yet actual equity returns over the past three years have lagged those seen during periods of elevated investor sentiment, like in 1987, 2005 and 2014 (Chart 2). What is missing now is a big surge of retail investor money into equities that can fuel the next leg of the equity rally, particularly through mutual funds and ETFs. Chart 2The Bond-Bearish Equity Party##BR##Is Just Getting Started The Bond-Bearish Equity Party Is Just Getting Started The Bond-Bearish Equity Party Is Just Getting Started This is starting to happen. The rolling 12-month total of net flows into U.S. equity mutual funds and ETFs is about to accelerate into positive territory for the first time since 2012, according to data from the Investment Company Institute (3rd panel). This could soon pose a problem for U.S. bond markets as, since 2008, there has been a reliable negative correlation between U.S. retail flows into equity funds and flows into fixed income funds, especially at major turning points (bottom panel). For example, after that 2012 bottom in net equity flows, the rolling total of net flows into bond funds collapsed from over $400bn to zero in a span of 18 months, with the vast majority of the outflow from bonds going into equities. An exodus of U.S. retail investors from fixed income would be a major problem for bond markets, especially at a time when net Treasury issuance is expected to increase due to wider fiscal deficits and the Fed will be buying fewer bonds as it begins to unwind its massive balance sheet. Other buyers like commercial banks and global reserve fund managers can pick up some of the slack if the retail bid fades from U.S. Treasuries. However, in an environment of strong global growth, rising inflation and more hawkish central banks, it may require higher yields to entice those buyers to ramp up their allocations. In the near-term, the next wave of global bond-bearish news will have to come from upside surprises in inflation, not growth. The Citi Global Economic Data Surprise index - which has historically correlated with swings in global bond yields - is now at elevated levels which should raise the odds of data disappointments as growth expectations get revised up (Chart 3). The Citi Global Inflation Data Surprise index, however, remains just below zero after last year's plunge, but is showing signs of stabilizing (bottom panel). U.S. inflation is already starting to bottom out, but Euro Area core inflation has been underwhelming of late. It will likely take a rise in the latter to trigger the next move higher in global yields, as the market will begin to more aggressively price in less accommodative monetary policy from the ECB. For now, U.S. Treasuries are driving the path of yields, with the "leadership" of the bond bear market expected to switch to Europe later on in 2018. In terms of our recommend duration strategy and country allocations, we are sticking with our current positions which are finally beginning to move in favor of our forecasts (Chart 4): Chart 3The Next Leg Higher In Global Yields##BR##Must Be Driven By Inflation Surprises The Next Leg Higher In Global Yields Must Be Driven By Inflation Surprises The Next Leg Higher In Global Yields Must Be Driven By Inflation Surprises Chart 4Our Recommended##BR##Country & Curve Allocations Our Recommended Country & Curve Allocations Our Recommended Country & Curve Allocations Underweights to countries where we expect central banks to hike rates (U.S., Canada) or more openly discuss a tapering of asset purchases (Germany, France). Overweights to countries where we expect no change in policy rates (U.K., Australia) or only modest changes to asset purchase programs (Japan). Positioning for steeper yield curves in countries where growth is strong, economies are at or beyond full employment, but where inflation expectations remain far enough below central bank targets to prevent policymakers from turning more hawkish faster than expected (U.S., Germany, Japan). Bottom Line: Global bond yields continue to move higher, driven by rising inflation expectations and falling investor risk aversion. With global interest rates still not at levels that will restrict growth or draw capital away from booming equity markets, the path of least resistance for yields remains upward. Maintain a below-benchmark overall portfolio duration stance, with a bearish curve steepening bias in the U.S. and core Europe. U.K. Gilts: The BoE's Hands Are Tied In our final report of 2017, we updated our recommended allocations in our Model Bond Portfolio based on the key views stemming from the 2018 BCA Outlook.2 We upgraded our country allocation to U.K. Gilts to overweight, primarily as a "defensive" position within a portfolio positioned for an expected rise in global bond yields. That may sound surprising given the current elevated level of inflation and low unemployment rate in the U.K. Yet our view is based on the notion that the Bank of England (BoE) will have a very difficult time trying to raise interest rates at all in 2018 when other major global central banks are likely to take a more hawkish turn. The main reason that the BoE will be unable to do much on the interest rate front is that the U.K. economy is likely to slow in the coming quarters. The OECD leading economic indicator is decelerating steadily, and is pointing to a real GDP growth rate below 2% in 2018 (Chart 5). The updated IMF forecast for the U.K. calls for growth to only reach 1.5% in both 2018 and 2019. The biggest factors that will weigh on growth will be a sluggish consumer and softer capex. Household consumption growth has already been slowing since early 2017, driven by diminishing consumer confidence (Chart 6, top panel). High realized inflation which has sapped the purchasing power of U.K. workers who have not seen matching increases in wages, is weighing on confidence (3rd panel). Consumers were able to maintain a decent pace of spending during a period of stagnant real income growth by drawing down on savings, but that looks to be tapped out now with the saving rate down to a 19-year low of 5.5% (bottom panel). Chart 5U.K. Growth Set To Slow U.K. Growth Set To Slow U.K. Growth Set To Slow Chart 6The U.K. Consumer Looks Tapped Out The U.K. Consumer Looks Tapped Out The U.K. Consumer Looks Tapped Out Making matters worse, U.K. consumers are not seeing much of a wealth effect from the housing market. The December 2017 readings of the year-over-year growth rate of U.K. house prices from the Halifax and Nationwide house prices came in at 1.1% and 2.5% respectively (Chart 7, top panel). In addition, the net balance of national house price expectations from the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) survey has steadily declined since mid-2016 and now sits just above zero (i.e. equal number of respondents expecting higher prices and falling prices). The same indicator for London was a staggering -54% in November 2017. U.K. homeowners have had to take a lot of hits over the past couple of years. A 2016 hike in the stamp duty for second homes and buy-to-let properties prompted a plunge in more "speculative" property transactions. The squeeze on real household incomes that has damaged consumer spending has also made homes less affordable, even with very low mortgage rates. Most importantly, the 2016 Brexit vote and subsequent uncertainty over the U.K.'s future relationship with Europe has placed an enormous cloud over housing demand - both from potential reduced immigration to the U.K. and businesses and jobs potentially relocating to European Union countries. The Brexit uncertainty is also weighing on U.K. business investment spending. U.K. capital expenditure growth slowed to 4.3% year-over-year in nominal terms in Q3 2017, and is even lower in real terms (Chart 8, top panel). Capex is generally import-intensive, and the rise in import costs due to the depreciation of the Pound after the 2016 Brexit vote raised the cost of investment. Chart 7No Growth In##BR##U.K. Housing No Growth In U.K. Housing No Growth In U.K. Housing Chart 8Brexit Gloom Trumps Export##BR##Boom For U.K. Companies Brexit Gloom Trumps Export Boom For U.K. Companies Brexit Gloom Trumps Export Boom For U.K. Companies This explains why U.K. capital spending has lagged even with manufacturing indicators in decent shape, such as the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) survey which shows the highest readings on total industrial orders and export orders since 1988 and 1995, respectively (2nd panel). Yet non-financial credit growth stalled out in the latter half of 2017, while the CBI survey of business optimism has turned into negative territory. Brexit uncertainties are clearly trumping strong export demand, thus U.K. capital investment is likely to remain sluggish in 2018 even with robust global growth. With U.K. economic growth likely to slow in 2018, the lingering problem of high inflation should start to fade. Already, both headline and core CPI inflation have stabilized, with the latter actually drifting a touch lower in the latter half of 2017 (Chart 9). The small gap between the two can be explained by the rise in global oil prices seen over the past year. The impact of oil on U.K. inflation expectations is relatively modest compared to other countries with much lower realized inflation rates, as we discussed in last week's Weekly Report.3 What is far more relevant is the path of British pound. The 16% plunge in the trade-weighted sterling index after the 2016 Brexit vote was a major reason why U.K. realized inflation blew through the BoE's 2% target last year. The currency has since stabilized at a depressed level and traded in a relatively narrow range in 2017. The trade-weighted index is now 3% above year-ago-levels, which should help U.K. inflation rates drift lower in the next 6-12 months - especially if U.K. growth underwhelms at the same time. Already, the more stable currency has allowed the inflation rates of import prices and producer prices to fall sharply last year (bottom panel), which should soon start to feed through into overall inflation rates. Lower realized inflation would be a welcome boost for the spending power of U.K. households and businesses, but will likely be dwarfed by the impact of oil prices in the near term. More importantly, the slowing momentum of economic growth, now fueled more by Brexit uncertainty than high inflation, will limit the BoE's ability to continue normalizing the very low level of U.K. interest rates. Our 12-month U.K. discounter shows that markets are pricing in 25bps of rate hikes over the next twelve months (Chart 10). The forward path of interest rates shown in the U.K. Overnight Index Swaps curve suggests that the hike could come by October. That is unlikely to happen given the slump in leading economic indicators, and peaking in currency-fueled inflation, currently underway. Chart 9Currency-Fueled U.K. Inflation Is Peaking Out Currency-Fueled U.K. Inflation Is Peaking Out Currency-Fueled U.K. Inflation Is Peaking Out Chart 10Stay Overweight U.K. Gilts Stay Overweight U.K. Gilts Stay Overweight U.K. Gilts A stand-pat BoE, combined with more stable and potentially falling U.K. inflation, will limit the ability for U.K. Gilt yields to rise by as much as we are expecting in the U.S., and even core Europe, over the next 6-12 months. Gilts have become a relative safe haven within a global bond bear market in the developed markets, with a yield beta of around 0.5 to U.S. Treasuries and German government bonds. This has already allowed Gilts to outperform the Barclays Global Treasury index (in currency-hedged terms) since the most recent cyclical low in global bond yields last September (bottom panel). We continue to expect Gilts to outperform in 2018. Stay overweight. Bottom Line: The momentum in the U.K. economy is slowing, as a weaker consumer, slower housing activity, and softer capital spending are offsetting a pickup in exports. With the inflationary impulse from the 2016 plunge in the Pound now fading, and with Brexit uncertainty weighing on business confidence, the Bank of England will struggle to raise rates in 2018. Stay overweight Gilts. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst Ray@bcaresearch.com 1 http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2018/01/11/world-economic-outlook-update-january-2018 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Our Model Bond Allocation In 2018: A Tale Of Two Halves", dated December 19th 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "The Importance Of Oil", dated January 16th 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations A Melt-Up In Equities AND Bond Yields? A Melt-Up In Equities AND Bond Yields? Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights The Beige Book released on January 17 keeps the Fed on track to raise rates at least three times this year and highlights the impact of the tax bill on the economy. BCA's Big 5 Bank Lending Beige Book highlights several of the positive trends supporting our view of the economy, the tax bill and the Fed. The Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017 has the potential to generate significant supply-side benefits for consumers, shareholders and the broad economy. We decided to stay long the dollar after a lengthy internal debate, although we have revised down our view on the upside potential. Feature U.S. risk assets continued to outperform last week outside of the dollar, as S&P 500 firms started to report Q4 2017 results and provide guidance for Q1 2018 and beyond. BCA's Bank Lending Beige Book summarizes the most optimistic comments from the Big 5 banks. The Fed's Beige Book captured comments on the broad economy in December and early January that were equally ebullient. Both Beige books suggested that firms were planning to return their tax savings to shareholders in the New Year, and to continue to boost capex, which was stout even before the law was passed. Yet, despite the upbeat news, the dollar broke down last week, as the ECB sounded a hawkish note and the Japanese economy continued to improve. On balance, the Beige Book, the Q4 earnings season, the health of the U.S. economy (notably capital spending), all support BCA's stance on the U.S. stock-to-bond ratio, the Fed, duration and the dollar. However, the dollar has not behaved as we would have expected. Beige Book Barometer Bounces The Beige Book released on January 17 keeps the Fed on track to raise rates at least three times this year and highlights the impact of the tax bill on the economy. BCA's quantitative approach1 to the Beige Book's qualitative data points to underlying strength in GDP and a tighter labor market, but there is still a disconnect between the Beige Book's view of inflation and the market's stance. Moreover, references to the stronger dollar have disappeared from the Beige Book and business uncertainty is significantly reduced, reflecting the tax cut bill and President Trump's assault on regulation. Chart 1Latest Beige Book Supports##BR##The Fed's View On Rates, Economy Latest Beige Book Supports The Fed's View On Rates, Economy Latest Beige Book Supports The Fed's View On Rates, Economy Chart 1, panel 1 shows that at 66%, BCA's Beige Book Monitor stayed near its cycle highs in January, re-confirmation that the underlying economy was still upbeat in Q4 and early 2018. (The latest Beige Book covered the period from mid-November 2017 to January 8, 2018). The number of 'weak' words in the Beige Book returned to near four-year lows after ticking higher in the wake of last summer's hurricanes. Moreover, there were 12 mentions of the tax bill in the January Beige Book, up from only 3 in November (not shown). The tax bill was cast in a positive light in 75% of the remarks. In November, the references to either the tax bill (or tax reform) cited the consequent uncertainty as a constraint on growth. Based on the minimal references to a robust dollar in the past five Beige Books, the greenback should not be an issue in Q4 2017 or Q1 2018, which is in sharp contrast with 2015 and early 2016 when there was a surge in Beige Book mentions (Chart 1, panel 4). The last time that five consecutive Beige Books had so few remarks about a strong dollar was in late 2014. Business uncertainty over government policy (fiscal, regulatory and health) ticked up in the past few Beige Books as Congress debated the particulars of the tax bill. Nonetheless, comments of uncertainty in the Beige Book have dropped since Trump took office in early 2017. The implication is that the business community is correctly focused on policy and not politics in D.C. (Chart 1, panel 5). The disconnect with the Fed on inflation is evident in the Beige Book's number of inflation words (Chart 1, panel 3). Expressions regarding inflation rose to a four-month high in January and the disconnect persists between the still-elevated mentions of inflation and the soft readings on CPI and PCE. In the past, increased references to inflation have led measured inflation by a few months, suggesting that the CPI and core PCE may soon turn up. Bottom Line: The recent Beige Book backs BCA's view that the U.S. economy is poised to grow above its long-term potential in the first half of 2018. However, the Beige Book has done little to resolve the debate around why an economy growing above potential and a tightening labor market have not boosted inflation. Likewise, the latest Beige Book confirmed that at least initially, businesses and bankers across the U.S. welcomed the Tax Cut and Jobs Act. Bankers' Beige Book Returns Chart 2Banking System Shipshape Banking System Shipshape Banking System Shipshape BCA's Big 5 Bank Lending Beige Book highlights several of the positive trends supporting our view: Pristine credit quality, a positive U.S. credit impulse, loosening U.S. banking regulatory requirements, and pent up demand for shareholder friendly activities. We introduced the Big 5 Bank Lending Beige Book2 in early 2014 to interpret the health of the banking system based on comments from leaders of the Big Five banks during earnings season. Managements were upbeat on loan demand and credit quality as they unveiled Q4 results in the past two weeks, and most expressed optimism that the positive credit trends would continue to improve in 2018. Several bank executives shared their Fed rate hike expectations for this year, with most forecasting three or four increases. One institution planned for a flatter curve, while another noted that rising rates on both the short and long ends will benefit their operations. Chart 2 shows key banking related variables cited in the Bank Lending Beige Book. Appendix Table 1 shows the Big 5 Bank Lending Beige Book for Q4 2017. All five banks were uniformly upbeat in their assessments of the tax bill's impact on their operations, their customers' businesses or the overall economy. One bank noted that it took a repatriation charge in Q4, and another said it would return capital to shareholders via buybacks and dividends. A third said the bill will provide "immediate and ongoing benefit to our employees, customers, communities and our shareholders, as we invest a portion of our tax savings in each of these important constituencies." Bottom Line: The banking system is shipshape as 2018 begins and lenders are ready to extend credit to businesses and consumers to boost the economy despite higher rates. BCA's U.S. Equity strategists recommend an overweight position in the S&P 500's financial sector, with a high conviction overweight on banks.3 A Different Lens On Earnings Chart 3Corporate Health Has Improved##BR##Since Start Of 2017 Corporate Health Has Improved Since Start Of 2017 Corporate Health Has Improved Since Start Of 2017 The early December release of the U.S. flow of funds report allows us to update BCA's Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) (Chart 3). The CHM's level improved slightly between Q2 and Q3, but the overall reading remains in 'deteriorating health' territory. The marginal improvement in Q3 was driven by rising profit margins. In addition, profit growth surged while debt moved up modestly in Q3. The CHM is a reliable indicator of the trend in corporate bond spreads which supports our corporate bond overweight. Given that corporate balance sheets are declining, the sole supports for corporate spreads are low inflation and accommodative monetary policy. We anticipate spreads will start to widen later this year when inflation climbs and policy turns more restrictive. BCA's U.S. Bond strategists remain overweight the U.S. high-yield bond market.4 Although spreads appear a bit more attractive than for investment-grade corporates, there is still not much room for spread compression in high-yields. We calculate that if the high-yield index spread tightens by another 117 bps, then junk bonds will be the most expensive since 1995. In an optimistic scenario where the index spread tightens 100 bps, bringing it close to all-time expensive levels, then we would expect junk excess returns to be in the range of 600 bps (annualized). Nonetheless, in view of the trends in corporate leverage, it is unlikely that there will be another 100 bps of spread tightening. More realistically, we expect excess returns between 200 bps and 500 bps (annualized) between now and the end of the credit cycle. Bottom Line: BCA's indicators suggest that we are moving into the late stages of the credit cycle, but we retain an overweight cyclical stance on corporate bonds. A shift to a more restrictive monetary policy, tightening C&I bank lending standards and/or a continued uptrend in gross corporate leverage are the main catalysts we will monitor to gauge the end of the cycle. An abrupt end to the positive capex or earnings cycle would also be concerns for our upbeat view on credit. Repatriation Redux The Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017 has the potential to generate significant supply-side benefits for consumers, shareholders and the broad economy. There are several uses for corporate cash, including capital spending, M&A, increasing compensation to employees, paying down debt and returning capital to shareholders. Chart 4 shows that through Q3 2017, share buybacks and dividends ran slightly ahead of prior cycles, while capex was about average. Investors wonder how that mix may change under the new law. Corporate behavior in the wake of the 2004 overseas tax holiday5 provides some guidance. Chart 4Comparison Of Corporate Outlays Across Four Economic Expansion Phases Variations On A Theme Variations On A Theme Corporations used cash generated from the 2004 tax break to return capital to shareholders. However, we found scant evidence that firms who benefited from the tax holiday increased capital spending, raised wages or hired more workers. A study by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) noted that a dollar increase in repatriations "was associated with an increase of almost $1 in payouts to shareholders."6 Moreover, a 2008 IRS paper7 concluded that nearly half of all the cash repatriated in 2004 and 2005 came from only the tech and pharma sectors. A Congressional Research Service (CRS) found that small firms tended to benefit less than large firms from the tax holiday.8 A paper9 by the left-leaning, U.S.-based think tank, the Center For Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP), stated that several firms that benefitted the most from the 2004 law laid off workers soon after the tax law was enacted. In 2018, BCA expects firms to return capital to shareholders, boost capex and continue to bump up wages. Chart 5 shows that buybacks will probably augment S&P 500 EPS by around 2% this year, while panel 2 shows that there was a noticeable upswing to buyback announcements as 2017 ended. Aside from the post-recession bounce in buybacks in 2010, the last big swell in buyback announcements occurred in 2004 and 2005. That said, corporate balance sheets were in much better shape in 2004/2005 than they are today (Chart 3 again). The implication is that management teams may decide to pay down debt before returning the cash windfall back to shareholders. However, with rates still low, most firms will chose to distribute the cash to shareholders, despite high corporate debt levels. The positive reading on BCA's Capital Structure Preference Indicator supports our stance on buybacks (Chart 6, third panel). This Indicator is defined as the equity risk premium minus the default-adjusted yield in high-yield corporate bonds. When the indicator is above zero, there is financial incentive for firms to issue debt and buy back shares. Conversely, firms are incentivized to issue stock and retire debt when the indicator is below zero. The Indicator is currently positive, although not as high as it was in 2015. Moreover, Chart 7 shows that the dividend payout ratio rebounded from the 2007-2009 financial crisis, but has moved above its pre-crisis level. However, dividend distributions remain below their pre-crisis peak reached in the early 1990s. Chart 5Still Some Room##BR##To Run For Buybacks Still Some Room To Run For Buybacks Still Some Room To Run For Buybacks Chart 6Buybacks Adding Almost##BR##2 Percentage Points To EPS Growth Buybacks Adding Almost 2 Percentage Points To EPS Growth Buybacks Adding Almost 2 Percentage Points To EPS Growth Capital spending was already on a tear in late 2017, even before the tax bill passed. Industrial production, the PMI diffusion index and advanced-economy capital goods imports, all confirm strong underlying momentum in investment spending (Chart 8). Chart 7Corporations Poised To Return##BR##Capital To Shareholders Corporations Poised To Return Capital To Shareholders Corporations Poised To Return Capital To Shareholders Chart 8Capital Spending Helping##BR##To Drive Growth Capital Spending Helping To Drive Growth Capital Spending Helping To Drive Growth Both BCA's real and nominal capex models, driven by surging capital goods orders along with elevated ISM data, roaring global exports and soaring sentiment on business spending, indicate strong investment in plant and equipment in the next few quarters (Chart 9). CEO confidence soared to a 13-year high in Q4, according to the latest Duke's Fuqua School of Business/CFO Magazine Global Business Outlook (Chart 10, panel 1). Duke noted that "Among CFOs who responded to the survey after the Senate passed its version of the tax reform bill, optimism spiked to 73, which is the highest U.S. optimism ever recorded in the history of the survey."10 Chart 9Bright Outlook##BR##For Capital Spending Bright Outlook For Capital Spending Bright Outlook For Capital Spending Chart 10CEO Confidence And##BR##Capex Plans Surging CEO Confidence And Capex Plans Surging CEO Confidence And Capex Plans Surging Surveys by the Conference Board and Business Roundtable show a similar pattern. (panel 1 again). Notably, the soundings on all three surveys have climbed since Trump's election, but then retreated as his pro-business agenda stalled in the summer months. The dip in sentiment reflected the lack of legislative progress in Washington in the first 10 months of the Trump administration. The dip in CEO sentiment in Q2 and Q3 was in sharp contrast to the easing of policy concerns in the Fed's Beige Book (Chart 1, bottom panel). The upbeat numbers in the regional FRBs' surveys of capital spending intentions further support escalating capex spending in the next few quarters. The average readings from the New York, Philadelphia and Richmond Feds' capex survey plans are at an all-time high (Chart 10, panel 2). Moreover, the regional Feds' capex spending plans diffusion index is close to a cycle high, despite a modest pullback last summer (panel 3). Bottom Line: Stay overweight stocks versus bonds, and underweight duration. The tax bill will boost returns to shareholders via buybacks and dividends. In addition, rising capex will drive up GDP, employment and EPS in the coming quarters. Dollar View Revisited The dollar fell by 4% between mid-December and mid-January, amid a hawkish market interpretation of the ECB minutes, persistently strong growth in Japan and a key technical breakdown in the DXY index. The decline has some investors questioning BCA's bullish stance on the currency (Chart 11). We were correct on the direction of interest rate differentials vis-à-vis the other major economies, but this has not translated into a stronger dollar so far. We decided to stay long the dollar after a lengthy internal debate, although we have revised down our view on the upside potential. A lot of good news on the European and Japanese economies is now discounted and investors are quite pessimistic on the dollar (which is bullish the dollar from a contrary perspective) (Chart 12). Given this technical backdrop, we would expect at least a 5% rise in the trade-weighted dollar as expectations of Fed rate hikes rise this year. We are likely to exit our long dollar position if we get such an appreciation. Chart 11We Are Sticking With##BR##Our Long Dollar View We Are Sticking With Our Long Dollar View We Are Sticking With Our Long Dollar View Chart 12The Case For Crisis Era Monetary Stimulus##BR##In Europe And Japan Is Weakening The Case For Crisis Era Monetary Stimulus In Europe And Japan Is Weakening The Case For Crisis Era Monetary Stimulus In Europe And Japan Is Weakening Bottom Line: BCA's bullish dollar trade was initiated in October 2014 and although the DXY index is up 4% since that time, we are maintaining the trade. While downside risks remain, a unilateral decision by the Trump Administration to leave NAFTA will boost the U.S. dollar versus the Canadian dollar and the peso. Italy's upcoming spring Presidential election could prompt a rally in the dollar if the Eurosceptic parties outperform expectations. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Great Debate Continues", published on April 17, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Commitments", published January 20, 2014. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "High Conviction Calls", published November 27, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "January Effect", published January 9, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 5 https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/house-bill/4520 6 http://www.nber.org/papers/w15023 7 https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/08codivdeductbul.pdf 8 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40178.pdf 9 https://www.cbpp.org/research/tax-holiday-for-overseas-corporate-profits-would-increase-deficits-fail-to-boost-the 10 http://www.cfosurvey.org/2017q4/press-release.html Appendix: Bankers Beige Book Variations On A Theme Variations On A Theme Variations On A Theme Variations On A Theme

Highlights Trade #1: Go Short The December 2018 Fed Funds Futures Contract. The trade has gained 64 bps since we initiated it. We are lifting the stop to 60 bps and targeting a profit of 75 bps. Trade #2: Go Long Global Industrial Stocks Versus Utilities. The trade is up 13.1%. We are targeting a profit of 15%, and are tightening the stop further to 12%. Trade #3: Go Short 20-Year JGBs Relative To Their 5-Year Counterparts. The trade is up 0.7%. We see this as a multi-year trade with significant upside potential. The unwinding of heavy short positions could cause the yen to strengthen temporarily. The euro is vulnerable to negative growth surprises. A retracement of some of its recent gains is likely. Feature Looking Back, Thinking Forward I had the pleasure of speaking at BCA's Annual Investment Conference held in New York on September 27th of last year where I offered three "tantalizing" trade ideas. Chart 1 reviews their performance. They were the following: Trade #1: Go Short The December 2018 Fed Funds Futures Contract We argued last summer that U.S. growth was likely to accelerate, taking rate expectations higher. That has indeed happened. Aggregate hours worked rose by 2.5% in Q4 over the previous quarter. Assuming that productivity increased by 1.5% in Q4 - equal to the pace recorded in Q3 - real GDP probably increased by nearly 4%. A variety of leading indicators point to continued above-trend growth in the months ahead (Chart 2). Chart 1Three Tantalizing Trades: ##br##An Update Three Tantalizing Trades: An Update Three Tantalizing Trades: An Update Chart 2Leading Indicators Pointing ##br##To Above-Trend U.S. Growth Leading Indicators Pointing To Above-Trend U.S. Growth Leading Indicators Pointing To Above-Trend U.S. Growth We think the Fed will raise rates four times this year, one more hike than projected by the dots and roughly 35 bps more in tightening than implied by current market expectations. The median Fed dot calls for an unemployment rate of 3.9% by end-2018, only marginally lower than today's rate of 4.1%. We have been saying for a while that above-trend growth will take the unemployment rate down to a 49-year low of 3.5% by the end of this year. If the unemployment rate falls this much, the Fed will probably turn more hawkish. Stronger inflation numbers should also give the Fed confidence to keep raising rates once per quarter. Core inflation surprised on the upside in December. We expect this trend to continue in the coming months, as the ISM manufacturing index, the New York Fed's Inflation Gauge, and our own proprietary pipeline inflation index are already foreshadowing (Chart 3). Chart 3U.S. Inflation ##br##Should Accelerate U.S. Inflation Should Accelerate U.S. Inflation Should Accelerate Chart 4A Pick-Up In Wage Growth ##br##Would Put Upward Pressure On Service Inflation A Pick-Up In Wage Growth Would Put Upward Pressure On Service Inflation A Pick-Up In Wage Growth Would Put Upward Pressure On Service Inflation As we noted two weeks ago,1 service sector inflation should get a lift from faster wage growth this year (Chart 4). Goods inflation should also rise on the back of higher oil prices and the lagged effects of a weaker dollar (Chart 5). In addition, health care inflation is likely to pick up from its current depressed level, especially if the Congressional Budget Office is correct that insurance premiums will rise due to the elimination of the individual mandate (Chart 6). Housing inflation will moderate, but this is unlikely to stymie the Fed's tightening plans since excessively low interest rates could lead to even more overbuilding in the increasingly vulnerable commercial real estate sector. Chart 5Higher Oil Prices And A Weaker Dollar ##br##Are A Tailwind For Inflation Higher Oil Prices And A Weaker Dollar Are A Tailwind For Inflation Higher Oil Prices And A Weaker Dollar Are A Tailwind For Inflation Chart 6Health Care Inflation ##br##Should Move Higher Health Care Inflation Should Move Higher Health Care Inflation Should Move Higher Granted, four rate hikes equal four opportunities to defer raising rates. It is easy to imagine scenarios where the Fed stands pat, but hard to conjure scenarios where the Fed has to raise rates five times or more this year. Thus, the risk to our four-hike view is to the downside. As such, we will be looking to take profits of 75 bps on the trade, and are putting in a stop of 60 bps. Trade #2: Go Long Global Industrial Stocks Versus Utilities Capital spending tends to accelerate in the late innings of business-cycle expansions. We are in such a phase now, as evidenced by capital goods orders, capex intention surveys, and our global capex model (Chart 7). Increased capital spending will benefit industrial companies. Conversely, rising bond yields will hurt rate-sensitive utilities. Valuations in the industrial sector have gotten stretched, but are not at extreme levels (Chart 8). Based on enterprise value-to-EBITDA, industrials are still only slightly more expensive than utilities compared to their post-1990 average. Chart 7Capex Is Shifting Into ##br##Higher Gear Capex Is Shifting Into Higher Gear Capex Is Shifting Into Higher Gear Chart 8Industrial Stocks: Valuations Are Stretched, ##br## But Not Yet Extreme Industrial Stocks: Valuations Are Stretched, But Not Yet Extreme Industrial Stocks: Valuations Are Stretched, But Not Yet Extreme While we do think global growth will slow this year from the heady pace of 2017, it should remain firmly above-trend. A bigger-than-expected slowdown - especially if it is concentrated in China - would undoubtedly hurt industrials. A stronger dollar could also be a headwind. Thus, we are keeping this trade on a short leash, with a target of 15% and a stop of 12%. Trade #3: Go Short 20-Year JGBs Relative To Their 5-Year Counterparts The Japanese economy is on fire. Growth almost reached 2% in 2017 and leading indicators suggest a solid start to 2018 (Chart 9). The unemployment rate has fallen to 2.7%, a full point below 2007 levels. The ratio of job openings-to-applicants has surpassed its bubble peak. The Tankan Employment Conditions Index is pointing to an exceptionally tight labor market. Wages excluding overtime pay are rising at the fastest pace in twenty years (Chart 10). Chart 9Japanese Growth Momentum Is Positive Japanese Growth Momentum Is Positive Japanese Growth Momentum Is Positive Chart 10Signs Of A Tight Labor Market Signs Of A Tight Labor Market Signs Of A Tight Labor Market Inflation is low but is starting to edge up. The most recent release surprised on the upside. Inflation expectations moved higher on the news, benefiting our long Japanese 10-year CPI swap trade recommendation (Chart 11). A simple scatterplot between the unemployment rate and core inflation suggests the Phillips curve remains intact in Japan -- amazingly, it even looks like Japan (Chart 12)! Chart 11Inflation Expectations Have Edged Higher Inflation Expectations Have Edged Higher Inflation Expectations Have Edged Higher Chart 12The Phillips Curve In Japan Looks Like Japan Three Tantalizing Trades - Four Months On Three Tantalizing Trades - Four Months On Still, with core inflation excluding food and energy running at only 0.3%, there is a long way to go before inflation reaches the BoJ's target -- and even longer if the BoJ honours its promise to generate a meaningful overshoot to compensate for the below-target inflation of prior years. This suggests the BoJ will not meaningfully water down its Yield Curve Control regime anytime soon. As such, five-year yields are likely to stay put while yields with maturities in excess of ten years should move higher. Our "tantalizing trade" being short 20-year JGBs versus their 5-year counterparts still has a long way to run. Too Risky To Short The Yen The exceptionally strong correlation between USD/JPY and U.S. Treasury yields has broken down this year (Chart 13). Had the relationship held, the yen would have actually weakened against the dollar. Still, we are reluctant to get too bearish on the yen (Chart 14). The yen real effective exchange rate is close to multi-decade lows. Positioning on the currency is heavily short. The current account surplus has mushroomed from close to zero in 2014 to 4% of GDP at present. And even if the BoJ keeps the Yield Curve Control regime in place, investors may still anticipate its demise, leading to a temporary bout of yen strength. Chart 13Strong Correlation Is Broken Strong Correlation Is Broken Strong Correlation Is Broken Chart 14Too Risky To Short The Yen Too Risky To Short The Yen Too Risky To Short The Yen What's Propping Up The Euro? The euro has been on a tear since last week, egged on by the ECB minutes, which hinted at a faster pace of monetary normalization. Growing confidence that Angela Merkel will be able to form a grand coalition also helped the common currency, along with hopes that the new government will loosen the fiscal purse strings. The euro is often thought of as the "anti-dollar." And sure enough, the euro's strength has been reflected in a broad-based decline in the dollar index in recent days. BCA's Global Investment Strategy service went long the dollar on October 31, 2014. We "doubled up" on this call in the fall of 2016, controversially arguing that "Trump will win and the dollar will rally." Obviously, in retrospect, I should have rung the register and declared victory on our long dollar view when I had the chance. EUR/USD fell to 1.04 on December 2016, within striking distance of our parity target. Bullish dollar sentiment had reached unsustainably lofty levels. That was the time to sell the greenback. But hubris got the best of me. While our other currency trade recommendations have delivered net gains of 11% since the start of 2017, the long DXY trade has stuck out like a sore thumb. Hindsight is 20/20. The key question is what to do today. EUR/USD is still trading below the level it was at when we went long the DXY. Relative to the IMF's Purchasing Power Parity exchange rate of 1.32, the euro is 7% undervalued. That said, PPP exchange rates may not be a reliable benchmark in this case. Given current market expectations, EUR/USD would need to strengthen to 1.41 over the next ten years just to cover the carry cost of being short the dollar. Even assuming lower inflation in the euro area, that would still leave the euro trading above its long-term fair value. It is possible, of course, that rate differentials will narrow further, but the scope for this is more limited than it might appear. The market currently expects policy rates ten years out to be 95 basis points higher in the U.S., down from a spread of nearly 180 basis points in late December (Chart 15). Given that euro area inflation expectations are 40-to-50 bps lower than in the U.S., this implies a real spread of about 50 bps - broadly in line with our estimate of the real neutral rate gap between the two regions. Ultimately, the fate of the euro in 2018 will rest on the same question that drove the currency in 2017: Will euro area growth surprise on the upside, prompting investors to price in a faster pace of monetary normalization? The bar for success is certainly higher at present. Chart 16 shows that euro area consensus growth estimates have risen significantly since the start of last year. The expected lift-off date for policy rates has also shifted in by more than a year to mid-2019. Considering that Jens Weidmann stated earlier this week that he thinks current market pricing is broadly consistent with when the ECB expects to hike rates, there is little scope for the lift-off date to move forward. Chart 15Little Scope For Rate Differentials ##br## To Narrow Further Little Scope For Rate Differentials To Narrow Further Little Scope For Rate Differentials To Narrow Further Chart 16Euro Area Growth Estimates Have Been Revised Up ##br##Since The Start Of 2017 Euro Area Growth Estimates Have Been Revised Up Since The Start Of 2017 Euro Area Growth Estimates Have Been Revised Up Since The Start Of 2017 Meanwhile, financial conditions have tightened significantly in the euro area relative to the U.S., the euro area credit impulse has turned negative, and the U.S. economic surprise index has jumped above that of the euro area (Chart 17). Euro area inflation has also dipped. Especially worrying is that core inflation in Italy has fallen back to a near record-low of 0.4% (Chart 18). How is Italy supposed to navigate its way out of its debt trap if nominal growth stays this weak? On top of all that, long speculative euro positions have soared to record-high levels (Chart 19). Given the choice of betting whether EUR/USD will first hit 1.30 or 1.15, we would go with the latter. If our bet turns out to be correct, we will use that opportunity to shift to neutral on the dollar. Chart 17The Euro Is Vulnerable ##br##To Negative Growth Surprises The Euro Is Vulnerable To Negative Growth Surprises The Euro Is Vulnerable To Negative Growth Surprises Chart 18Euro Area Core Inflation ##br##Has Dipped Euro Area Core Inflation Has Dipped Euro Area Core Inflation Has Dipped Chart 19Euro Positioning: From Deeply Short ##br##To Record Long Euro Positioning: From Deeply Short To Record Long Euro Positioning: From Deeply Short To Record Long Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Four Key Questions On The 2018 Global Growth Outlook," dated January 5, 2018. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights Duration: Economic fundamentals indicate that U.S. TIPS breakeven inflation rates have further cyclical upside and this will drive nominal bond yields higher on a 6-12 month horizon. In the near term, however, positioning data suggest that the uptrend in U.S. bond yields is due for a pause. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance. Oil & U.S. Bonds: The cost of inflation compensation is an important driver of U.S. bond yields and the oil price is an important driver of the cost of inflation compensation. This will continue to be true until long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5%. At that point the oil price will become a less important driver of U.S. bond yields. Australia: Maintain an overweight position in Australian government debt. Economic data are still mixed and the RBA will stay on hold for the foreseeable future. Against a backdrop of Fed rate hikes, Australian debt should outperform. Feature Chart of the WeekHigher Yields, Driven By Inflation Higher Yields, Driven By Inflation Higher Yields, Driven By Inflation There was certainly no shortage of possible catalysts for last week's bond rout (Chart of the Week). The Bank of Japan (BoJ) reduced its buying of long-dated JGBs, there was a rumor that China plans to slow or stop its purchases of U.S. Treasury debt, and U.S. inflation expectations started to ramp back up - driven by a combination of higher oil prices and a strong December core CPI print. But of all these factors we think it is only the third that merits much attention. Once the BoJ started targeting the level of the yield curve in September 2016, its quantity targets became irrelevant. A reduction in the pace of BoJ buying only matters if it foreshadows a shift to a higher yield curve target. Our foreign exchange strategists don't think such a move is likely in the next 12-18 months.1 China, for its part, still has a highly managed currency and now that capital is no longer flowing out of the country it will start to rebuild its foreign exchange reserves. Given that the U.S. Treasury market remains the world's most liquid, it is hard to see how China can avoid having to park much of its excess foreign capital in the United States (Chart 2). The compensation for 10-year U.S. inflation protection broke above 2% last week, after having been as low as 1.66% as recently as last June. This 34 basis point increase in inflation compensation coincided with a 36 basis point increase in the nominal U.S. 10-year yield and a Brent crude oil price that rose from $45 per barrel last June to $70 per barrel as of last Friday. We think these correlations will continue to be the most important factors driving bond yields during the next 6-12 months, and the bulk of this report is dedicated to disentangling the linkages between oil prices, inflation, inflation expectations and nominal bond yields. But first we reiterate our cyclical investment stance. Last week's U.S. CPI report provided further evidence that U.S. core inflation is in the process of bottoming-out (Chart 3). The 10-year U.S. TIPS breakeven inflation rate will settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5% by the time that core inflation returns to the Fed's target. By that time the nominal 10-year yield will be in a range between 2.8% and 3.25%. Likewise, our energy strategists anticipate that an ongoing steady decline in commercial inventories will keep crude prices well supported on a 6-12 month horizon. Chart 2China's Forex Reserves Are Rising China's Forex Reserves Are Rising China's Forex Reserves Are Rising Chart 3U.S. Inflation Turns The Corner U.S. Inflation Turns The Corner U.S. Inflation Turns The Corner However, on a shorter time horizon (3 months or less), recent shifts in speculative positioning signal that the uptrends in bond yields and the oil price might be due for a pause (Chart 4). After having been solidly "net long" since the middle of last year, net speculative positions in the 10-year U.S. Treasury futures contract have just dipped into "net short" territory. Historically, net speculative positions have been a decent indicator of 3-month changes in the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield, and at current levels they signal that the 10-year yield could decline modestly during the next three months (Chart 5). Similarly, speculators in the oil futures market are now more "net long" than at any time since last February. While this positioning indicator does not work quite as well for the oil market as for the Treasury market, net longs at more than 20% of open interest (most recent reading is 26%) have more often than not been met with 3-month price declines since 2010 (Chart 6). Chart 4Net Speculative Positioning##BR##For Oil And Bonds Net Speculative Positioning For Oil And Bonds Net Speculative Positioning For Oil And Bonds Chart 5Net Speculative Positions &##BR##10-Year Treasury Yield (2010 - Present) The Importance Of Oil The Importance Of Oil Chart 6Net Speculative Positions &##BR##WTI Oil Price (2010 - Present) The Importance Of Oil The Importance Of Oil Bottom Line: The outlook for U.S. inflation suggests that TIPS breakeven rates have further cyclical upside and this will drive nominal bond yields higher. However, positioning data in both bond and oil markets suggest that the recent run-up in yields might be due for a near-term pause. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance on a 6-12 month horizon. Oil, TIPS, Inflation And U.S. Bond Yields: Sorting Out The Mess During the post-financial crisis period two relationships have been both (i) incredibly robust and (ii) unlike relationships observed in prior periods. They are: The cost of inflation protection has been an unusually important determinant of nominal U.S. bond yields. The oil price has shown a very strong correlation with the cost of inflation protection. Both relationships can be explained by the Federal Reserve's asymmetric ability to control inflation. We consider each relationship in turn. The Importance Of Inflation Chart 7TIPS Beta Declines When##BR##Breakevens Are Low TIPS Beta Declines When Breakevens Are Low TIPS Beta Declines When Breakevens Are Low A common rule of thumb is to estimate the TIPS beta - the proportion of movement in U.S. nominal bond yields that is explained by movement in TIPS (real) yields - at around 0.8. In other words, this assumes that 80% of the movement in nominal bond yields is explained by the real component. However, we observe that since the financial crisis the 10-year TIPS beta has been a much lower 0.68, and at times it has been closer to 0.5 on a 12-month rolling basis (Chart 7). We also observe that the TIPS beta tends to be lower when TIPS breakeven inflation rates are un-anchored to the downside. There is a very good reason for this. The reason is that the Fed's ability to influence inflation is asymmetric. The Fed has a strong track record of successfully tightening to bring inflation down, but has been less successful at easing to drive it up. This asymmetric ability to influence prices is due in no small part to the zero-lower bound on interest rates. Because the Fed's ability to ease policy is constrained while its ability to tighten is not, bond market participants may at times question the Fed's ability to ease and revise their inflation expectations lower. It is also during these periods that inflation expectations become more volatile and a more important determinant of nominal bond yields. This is because they are increasingly driven by the swings in the economic data and less by the Fed's policy bias. The Importance Of Oil This is where the oil price comes in. Oil and other commodities are crucial inputs to the production process. As such, not only do these prices rise in response to stronger aggregate demand, but higher prices also signal mounting cost-push inflationary pressures. But despite this obvious truth, there is not always a strong correlation between oil prices and inflation expectations. This is because the Fed's reaction function influences the relationship. Consider the pre-crisis (2004-2008) period. Long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates stayed range-bound between 2.4% and 2.5% even as the oil price increased dramatically (Chart 8). Since investors perceived that the Fed would simply tighten policy to tamp out any inflationary pressures that might arise, there was no desire to demand greater compensation for inflation. However, this logic does not work in reverse. When commodity prices fell in 2014, inflation expectations declined alongside. In fact we observe that the correlations between long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates and both oil and commodity prices have been much stronger in the post-crisis period, when inflation expectations have been un-anchored (Table 1). Chart 8The Unstable Correlation: Breakevens & Oil The Unstable Correlation: Breakevens & Oil The Unstable Correlation: Breakevens & Oil Table 1Correlations Between TIPS Breakeven Inflation & Commodities The Importance Of Oil The Importance Of Oil Investment Conclusions The Fed's asymmetric reaction function leads to two crucial investment conclusions. First, long-maturity inflation expectations (as measured by the U.S. TIPS breakeven inflation rate) can fall when deflationary pressures mount, but their upside is capped in the 2.4% to 2.5% range. This is because the market has no reason to question the Fed's ability to lower inflation by lifting rates. The upside limit of 2.4% to 2.5% will remain in place unless the Fed changes its inflation target. A change to the inflation target that allows for higher inflation is an idea that is quickly gaining traction among policymakers, but is unlikely to be implemented this year. Second, when long-maturity inflation expectations are below their 2.4% to 2.5% upper-bound they become both (i) a more important driver of nominal yields - as evidenced by the lower TIPS beta - and (ii) more sensitive to swings in commodity prices. For this reason, the oil price will continue to be an important driver of inflation expectations and nominal U.S. bond yields for the next few months, but will decrease in importance as TIPS breakevens move back to their 2.4% to 2.5% range. Once inflation expectations are re-anchored, nominal bond yields will once again be predominantly driven by the real component and swings in the price of oil will be less important for bond markets. The dynamics described above are not merely theoretical. Consider the evidence from five developed countries presented in Charts 9 & 10. Chart 9 shows that the oil price is tightly correlated with inflation expectations in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan, but also that inflation expectations in the U.K. and Australia did not respond to the recent increase in oil prices. The reason is that core inflation in the U.K. and Australia is already relatively close to the central bank's target (Chart 10). It is only where core inflation is far below target (in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan) that the oil price remains an important driver of bond yields. Chart 9Oil & Inflation Expectations Highly Correlated... Oil & Inflation Expectations Highly Correlated... Oil & Inflation Expectations Highly Correlated... Chart 10...But Only When Inflation Is Low ...But Only When Inflation Is Low ...But Only When Inflation Is Low The U.K. in particular presents an interesting case study. U.K. core inflation was quite far below target throughout 2015 and 2016, and during this time period U.K. inflation expectations were tightly linked with the oil price. It is only in the past few months that U.K. core inflation has moved back above target, and not surprisingly the correlation between the U.K. 10-year CPI swap rate and the price of oil has started to break down. Bottom Line: At present, the cost of inflation compensation is an important driver of U.S. bond yields and the oil price is an important driver of the cost of inflation compensation. Both of these dynamics will continue to be true for the next few months, but will decline in importance as TIPS breakeven inflation rates rise. When long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5%, then the oil price will become a less important driver of U.S. bond yields. Australia: Too Soon To Expect A Hike Chart 11Australia: A Solid Rebound In Growth... Australia: A Solid Rebound In Growth... Australia: A Solid Rebound In Growth... Over the last quarter much of the economic data from Australia have improved. Real GDP growth rebounded sharply to 2.8% YoY in Q3 from 1.9% the previous quarter (Chart 11). Iron ore prices have been rising since mid-October. Employment growth is robust and the unemployment rate is well below its estimated natural level. This begs the question - with so much going right is it time for the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) to lift rates? Our answer is an emphatic "no." First, most data improvements have been relatively minor and the overall economic picture remains mixed. As we mentioned in our recent Special Report,2 the RBA is stuck between conflicting forces. Booming house prices and rising household indebtedness on the one hand, and an economy still working off excess capacity on the other. Nevertheless, our expectation is that the RBA will allow the economy to recover further for the following reasons: Consumer health is fragile. Policymakers left cash rates unchanged at the last monetary policy meeting in December, and Governor Philip Lowe expressed concerns about household consumption. Consumption is a significant driver of economic growth and the combination of declining savings, elevated debt levels and weak income growth is worrisome (Chart 12). Since then, real income growth has dipped back into positive territory, but only barely so. Meanwhile, house prices are still surging, despite macro-prudential measures aimed at tightening lending standards, thereby supporting consumer spending through the wealth effect. Given an extreme household debt to income ratio, consumption would be very vulnerable if the RBA were to curb house price gains by raising rates. Labors markets have plenty of slack. The unemployment rate has fallen to a four year low and other labor market statistics show a broad-based improvement over the last quarter. However, the unemployment rate is still significantly higher than it was in the previous cycle and other improvements in the labor market have also occurred from extremely weak levels. In 2017Q1, the underemployment rate and part-time workers as a percentage of total workers both reached all-time highs. Those numbers have dipped slightly in Q3, with underemployment falling to 8.3% and part-time workers as a percentage of total declining to 31.7%, but those elevated levels suggest there still needs to be significant improvement before spare capacity is worked off and real wage growth starts to move higher (Chart 13). Chart 12...But Consumers Can't Afford A Rate Hike ...But Consumers Can't Afford A Rate Hike ...But Consumers Can't Afford A Rate Hike Chart 13Still Plenty Of Slack In Australian Labor Markets Still Plenty Of Slack In Australian Labor Markets Still Plenty Of Slack In Australian Labor Markets Inflation is still too low. Headline and core inflation readings came in at 1.8% and 1.9% respectively in Q3 (Chart 14). While headline slowed, core inflation recovered over the last quarter. Tradeable goods inflation collapsed into negative territory at -0.9%, as a result of currency strength and increased competition among retailers. Going forward, we expect consumer price growth to be muted given the lack of inflationary pressures. The output gap is wide, despite rebounding growth, and the IMF forecasts that it will be years before the Australian economy reaches capacity. The trade-weighted Aussie dollar index has risen almost 5% since it bottomed in early December, while the AUD/USD has broken above its 40-week moving average. Continued currency strength would exert even further deflationary pressure. As stated above, the labor market also requires significant improvement to work off excess capacity. All of these factors caused the RBA to dial back its inflation forecast in the November statement. It now expects that inflation will remain quite flat for the next two years, only touching the lower-end of its 2%-3% target range at the end of 2019. Consequently, inflation will not be forcing the RBA's hand in the foreseeable future. One of our key themes for 2018 is that global growth will be less synchronized. Central banks will therefore employ diverging monetary policies, presenting cross-country bond market investment opportunities. As such, we recently shifted to a slight overweight position in Australian debt within our model portfolio, arguing that it would outperform global government bond benchmarks during a year expected to be driven by Fed tightening and ECB/BoJ tapering concerns. Historically, relative yield moves have closely tracked relative shifts in monetary policy (Chart 15). In the U.S., above-trend growth, a tight labor market and the continued recovery in inflation will force the Fed to become more aggressive. If the RBA stays inactive as we expect, then this gap should continue to move in favor of Australian debt. Additionally, there is still a modest yield pickup in Australian debt relative to the global index and as we expect global bond yields to rise, low-beta Australian government bonds should offer considerable protection. Chart 14Australia: Lacking Inflationary Pressures Australia: Lacking Inflationary Pressures Australia: Lacking Inflationary Pressures Chart 15Australian Relative Yields Track Relative Policy Australian Relative Yields Track Relative Policy Australian Relative Yields Track Relative Policy This also leads us to continue holding our tactical Long Dec 2018 Australian Bank Bill futures trade from last October. We initially entered into this trade as a more focused way of expressing that the RBA will stay on hold. The trade is currently 6 bps in the money and with markets still pricing about 30 bps of rate hikes during the next 12 months, there is plenty of room for further profit as market expectations are revised down. Bottom Line: Maintain an overweight position in Australian government debt. Economic data are still mixed and the RBA will stay on hold for the foreseeable future. Against a backdrop of Fed rate hikes, Australian debt should outperform. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Patrick Trinh, Associate Editor Patrick@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC!", dated January 12, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Australia: Stuck Between A Rock And A Hard Place", dated July 25, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index The Importance Of Oil The Importance Of Oil Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Duration: Economic fundamentals indicate that TIPS breakeven inflation rates have further cyclical upside and this will drive nominal bond yields higher on a 6-12 month horizon. In the near term, however, positioning data suggest that the uptrend in bond yields is due for a pause. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance. Oil & Bonds: The cost of inflation compensation is an important driver of bond yields and the oil price is an important driver of the cost of inflation compensation. This will continue to be true until long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5%. At that point the oil price will become a less important driver of yields. Fed: The Fed will start actively discussing alternative monetary policy frameworks in 2018. While we think the Fed will eventually adopt a policy framework that tolerates higher inflation, this shift probably won't occur this year. Feature There was certainly no shortage of possible catalysts for last week's bond rout (Chart 1). The Bank of Japan (BoJ) reduced its buying of long-dated JGBs, there was a rumor that China plans to slow or stop its purchases of U.S. Treasury debt, and U.S. inflation expectations started to ramp back up - driven by a combination of higher oil prices and a strong December core CPI print. But of all these factors we think it is only the third that merits much attention. Once the BoJ started targeting the level of the yield curve in September 2016 its quantity targets became irrelevant. A reduction in the pace of BoJ buying only matters if it foreshadows a shift to a higher yield curve target. Our foreign exchange strategists don't think such a move is likely in the next 12-18 months.1 China, for its part, still has a highly managed currency and now that capital is no longer flowing out of the country it will start to rebuild its foreign exchange reserves. Given that the U.S. Treasury market remains the world's most liquid, it is hard to see how China can avoid having to park much of its excess foreign capital in the United States (Chart 2). Chart 1Higher Yields, Driven By Inflation Higher Yields, Driven By Inflation Higher Yields, Driven By Inflation Chart 2China's Forex Reserves Are Rising China's Forex Reserves Are Rising China's Forex Reserves Are Rising The compensation for 10-year U.S. inflation protection broke above 2% last week, after having been as low as 1.66% as recently as last June. This 34 basis point increase in inflation compensation coincided with a 36 basis point increase in the nominal 10-year yield and a Brent crude oil price that rose from $45 per barrel last June to $70 per barrel as of last Friday. We think these correlations will continue to be the most important factors driving bond yields during the next 6-12 months, and the bulk of this report is dedicated to disentangling the linkages between oil prices, inflation, inflation expectations and nominal bond yields. But first we reiterate our cyclical investment stance. Last week's CPI report provided further evidence that core inflation is in the process of bottoming-out (Chart 3). The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate will settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5% by the time that core inflation returns to the Fed's target. By that time the nominal 10-year yield will be in a range between 2.8% and 3.25%. Likewise, our energy strategists anticipate that an ongoing steady decline in commercial inventories will keep crude prices well supported on a 6-12 month horizon. Chart 3U.S. Inflation Turns The Corner U.S. Inflation Turns The Corner U.S. Inflation Turns The Corner Chart 4Net Speculative Positioning For Oil And Bonds Net Speculative Positioning For Oil And Bonds Net Speculative Positioning For Oil And Bonds However, on a shorter time horizon (3 months or less), recent shifts in speculative positioning signal that the uptrends in bond yields and the oil price might be due for a pause (Chart 4). After having been solidly "net long" since the middle of last year, net speculative positions in the 10-year U.S. Treasury futures contract have just dipped into "net short" territory. Historically, net speculative positions have been a decent indicator of 3-month changes in the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield, and at current levels they signal that the 10-year yield could decline modestly during the next three months (Chart 5). Similarly, speculators in the oil futures market are now more "net long" than at any time since last February. While this positioning indicator does not work quite as well for the oil market as for the Treasury market, net longs at more than 20% of open interest (most recent reading is 26%) have more often than not been met with 3-month price declines since 2010 (Chart 6). Chart 5Net Speculative Positions & 10-Year Treasury Yield It's Still All About Inflation It's Still All About Inflation Chart 6Net Speculative Positions & WTI Oil Price It's Still All About Inflation It's Still All About Inflation Bottom Line: The outlook for U.S. inflation suggests that TIPS breakeven rates have further cyclical upside and this will drive nominal bond yields higher. However, positioning data in both bond and oil markets suggest that the recent run-up in yields might be due for a near-term pause. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance on a 6-12 month horizon. Oil, TIPS, Inflation And Bond Yields: Sorting Out The Mess During the post-financial crisis period two relationships have been both (i) incredibly robust and (ii) unlike relationships observed in prior periods. They are: The cost of inflation protection has been an unusually important determinant of nominal U.S. bond yields The oil price has shown a very strong correlation with the cost of inflation protection Both relationships can be explained by the Federal Reserve's asymmetric ability to control inflation. We consider each relationship in turn. The Importance Of Inflation Chart 7TIPS Beta Declines When ##br##Breakevens Are Low TIPS Beta Declines When Breakevens Are Low TIPS Beta Declines When Breakevens Are Low A common rule of thumb is to estimate the TIPS beta - the proportion of movement in U.S. nominal bond yields that is explained by movement in TIPS (real) yields - at around 0.8. In other words, this assumes that 80% of the movement in nominal bond yields is explained by the real component. However, we observe that since the financial crisis the 10-year TIPS beta has been a much lower 0.68, and at times it has been closer to 0.5 on a 12-month rolling basis (Chart 7). We also observe that the TIPS beta tends to be lower when TIPS breakeven inflation rates are un-anchored to the downside. There is a very good reason for this. The reason is that the Fed's ability to influence inflation is asymmetric. The Fed has a strong track record of successfully tightening to bring inflation down, but has been less successful at easing to drive it up. This asymmetric ability to influence prices is due in no small part to the zero-lower bound on interest rates. Because the Fed's ability to cut rates is constrained by the zero-bound while its ability to lift rates is not, bond market participants may at times question the Fed's ability to ease and revise their inflation expectations lower. It is also during these periods that inflation expectations become more volatile and a more important determinant of nominal bond yields. This is because they are increasingly driven by the swings in the economic data and less by the Fed's policy bias. The Importance Of Oil This is where the oil price comes in. Oil and other commodities are crucial inputs to the production process. As such, not only do these prices rise in response to stronger aggregate demand, but higher prices also signal mounting cost-push inflationary pressures. But despite this obvious truth, there is not always a strong correlation between oil prices and inflation expectations. This is because the Fed's reaction function influences the relationship. Consider the pre-crisis (2004-2008) period. Long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates stayed range-bound between 2.4% and 2.5% even as the oil price increased dramatically (Chart 8). Since investors perceived that the Fed would simply tighten policy to tamp out any inflationary pressures that might arise, there was no desire to demand greater compensation for inflation. However, this logic does not work in reverse. When commodity prices fell in 2014, inflation expectations declined alongside. In fact we observe that the correlations between long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates and both oil and commodity prices have been much stronger in the post-crisis period, when inflation expectations have been un-anchored (Table 1). Chart 8The Unstable Correlation Breakevens & Oil The Unstable Correlation Breakevens & Oil The Unstable Correlation Breakevens & Oil Table 1Correlations Between TIPS Breakeven Inflation And Commodities It's Still All About Inflation It's Still All About Inflation Investment Conclusions The Fed's asymmetric reaction function leads to two crucial investment conclusions. First, long-maturity inflation expectations (as measured by the TIPS breakeven inflation rate) can fall when deflationary pressures mount, but their upside is capped in the 2.4% to 2.5% range. This is because the market has no reason to question the Fed's ability to lower inflation by lifting rates. The upside limit of 2.4% to 2.5% will remain in place unless the Fed changes its inflation target. A change to the inflation target that allows for higher inflation is an idea that is quickly gaining traction among policymakers, but is unlikely to be implemented this year (see section titled "The Fed In 2018: Contemplating A Major Change" below). Second, when long-maturity inflation expectations are below their 2.4% to 2.5% upper-bound they become both (i) a more important driver of nominal yields - as evidenced by the lower TIPS beta - and (ii) more sensitive to swings in commodity prices. For this reason, the oil price will continue to be an important driver of inflation expectations and nominal bond yields for the next few months, but will decrease in importance as TIPS breakevens move back to their 2.4% to 2.5% range. Once inflation expectations are re-anchored, nominal bond yields will once again be predominantly driven by the real component and swings in the price of oil will be less important for bond markets. The dynamics described above are not merely theoretical. Consider the evidence from five developed countries presented in Charts 9 & 10. Chart 9 shows that the oil price is tightly correlated with inflation expectations in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan, but also that inflation expectations in the U.K. and Australia did not respond to the recent increase in oil prices. The reason is that core inflation in the U.K. and Australia is already relatively close to the central bank's target (Chart 10). It is only where core inflation is far below target (in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan) that the oil price remains an important driver of bond yields. Chart 9Oil & Inflation Expectations Highly Correlated... Oil & Inflation Expectations Highly Correlated... Oil & Inflation Expectations Highly Correlated... Chart 10...But Only When Inflation Is Low ...But Only When Inflation Is Low ...But Only When Inflation Is Low The U.K. in particular presents an interesting case study. U.K. core inflation was quite far below target throughout 2015 and 2016, and during this time period U.K. inflation expectations were tightly linked with the oil price. It is only in the past few months that U.K. core inflation has moved back above target, and not surprisingly the correlation between the U.K. 10-year CPI swap rate and the price of oil has started to break down. Bottom Line: At present, the cost of inflation compensation is an important driver of bond yields and the oil price is an important driver of the cost of inflation compensation. Both of these dynamics will continue to be true for the next few months, but will decline in importance as TIPS breakeven inflation rates rise. When long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5%, then the oil price will become a less important driver of bond yields. The Fed In 2018: Contemplating A Major Change? As was alluded to in the prior section, the biggest potential change for bond markets in 2018 would be if the Fed changed its monetary policy framework to one that tolerated higher levels of inflation. For example, let's imagine that the Fed suddenly lifted its inflation target from 2% to 3%. This would likewise shift the upper-bound range for long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates to approximately 3.4% to 3.5%. It would mean that nominal bond yields have further upside over the course of the cycle, and also that oil and commodity prices would play an important role in bond markets for much longer. It would also lengthen the period where spread product can outperform Treasuries since the Fed would not be so quick to choke off the recovery. We still think it is unlikely that such a change will be implemented this year, but recent weeks have seen a marked increase in the number of Fed policymakers either advocating for a different policy framework or saying that the Fed should start researching alternative frameworks. What's crucial to remember is that the reason policymakers are unsatisfied with the current 2% inflation target is that it brings the zero-lower bound on interest rates into play too often. So any potential change in policy framework would be to one that tolerates higher inflation rates. Bernanke's Idea Chart 11The Implications Of A Price Level Target The Implications Of A Price Level Target The Implications Of A Price Level Target One potential new policy approach was put forward by ex-Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke in a recent blog post.2 Bernanke made the case for "Temporary Price Level Targeting", a policy where the Fed continues to use a 2% inflation target when the fed funds rate is sufficiently far from zero, but then switches to a price-level target when the fed funds rate is close to the zero bound. In his own words, the strategy would be communicated as follows: The Committee therefore agrees that, in future situations in which the funds rate is at or near zero, a necessary condition for raising the funds rate will be that average inflation since the date at which the federal funds rate first hit zero be at least 2 percent. Chart 11 provides an illustration of this example. Under the current framework the Fed targets 2% PCE inflation and forecasts that it will achieve this target sometime in 2019. In Bernanke's proposed framework the Fed would not target 2% inflation, but rather a price level that is consistent with 2% trend growth in prices since the zero-lower bound was hit in December 2008. In order to achieve this goal by the end of 2019 the Fed would need to tolerate a significant overshoot of inflation during the next two years (bottom panel). Who's On Board? The Appendix to this report is a list of all Fed Governors and Regional Fed Presidents. It also shows our own assessment of each committee member's policy bias. We noted from the most recent Summary of Economic Projections that 6 FOMC participants expect three rate hikes in 2018, 6 expect fewer than three rate hikes and 4 expect more than three hikes. From recent speeches we attempted to discern which member owns which forecast and then we attributed a "dovish" policy bias to those with a forecast for fewer than three hikes, a "neutral" bias to those expecting three hikes, and a "hawkish" bias to those expecting more than three hikes. We also show which FOMC participants are voters in 2018, although we do not think that distinction carries much practical importance. The Committee tends to arrive at decisions by consensus anyways, and all participants voice their opinions at every meeting whether or not it is their turn to vote. But it is the "notes" column of the Appendix that is most striking. There we highlighted all the FOMC participants who have recently made comments regarding the exploration of alternative policy frameworks. A general consensus seems to be forming that alternative frameworks should be studied this year, and a few policymakers (San Francisco Fed President John Williams, in particular) have strongly made the case that the Fed should switch to some sort of price level targeting regime. The Appendix also identifies the biggest source of uncertainty for the Fed this year. Namely that there are four vacant Governor positions that need to be filled. The New York Fed will also need a new President when William Dudley retires later this year. Who is nominated to fill those vacant positions will go a long way toward determining how aggressively the Fed pursues alternative policy frameworks. Bottom Line: The Fed will start actively discussing alternative monetary policy frameworks in 2018. While we think the Fed will eventually adopt a policy framework that tolerates higher inflation, this shift probably won't occur this year. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC!", dated January 12, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2017/10/12/temporary-price-level-targeting-an-alternative-framework-for-monetary-policy/ Appendix Table 2Composition Of The FOMC It's Still All About Inflation It's Still All About Inflation Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights An increase in the "synthetic" supply of bitcoins via financial derivatives, along with the launch of bitcoin-like alternatives by large established tech companies, will cause the cryptocurrency market to collapse under its own weight. Other areas that could see supply-induced pressures over the coming years include oil, high-yield debt, global real estate, and low-volatility trades. In contrast, the U.S. stock market has seen an erosion in the supply of shares due to buybacks and voluntary delistings. Investors should consider going long U.S. equities relative to high-yield credit, while positioning for higher volatility. Such an outcome would be similar to what happened in the late 1990s, a period when the VIX and credit spreads were trending higher, while stocks continued to hit new highs. A breakdown in NAFTA talks remains the key risk for the Canadian dollar and Mexican peso. Feature Bubbles Burst By Too Much Supply The "cure" for higher prices is higher prices. The dotcom and housing bubbles did not die fully of their own accord. Their demise was expedited by a wave of new supply hitting the market. In the case of the dotcom bubble, a flood of shares from initial and secondary public offerings inundated investors in 2000 (Chart 1). This put significant downward pressure on the prices of internet stocks. The housing boom was similarly subverted by a slew of new construction - residential investment rose to a 55-year high of 6.6% of GDP in 2006 (Chart 2). Chart 1Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 1 Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 1 Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 1 Chart 2Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 2 Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 2 Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 2 Is bitcoin about to experience a similar fate? On the surface, the answer may seem to be "no." As more bitcoins are "mined," the computational cost of additional production rises exponentially. In theory, this should limit the number of bitcoins that can ever circulate to 21 million, about 80% of which have already been created (Chart 3). Yet if one looks beneath the surface, bitcoin may also be vulnerable to a variety of "supply-side" factors. Chart 3Bitcoin: Most Of It Has Been Mined Bitcoin: Most Of It Has Been Mined Bitcoin: Most Of It Has Been Mined First, the expansion of financial derivatives tied to the value of bitcoin threatens to create a "synthetic" supply of the cryptocurrency. When someone writes a call option on a stock, the seller of the option is effectively taking a bearish bet while the buyer is taking a bullish bet. The very act of writing the option creates an additional long position, which is exactly offset by an additional short position. Moreover, to the extent that a decision to sell a particular call option will depress the price of similar call options, it will also depress the underlying price of the stock. This is simply because one can have long exposure to a stock either by owning it outright or owning a call option on it. Anything that hurts the price of the latter will also hurt the price of the former. As bitcoin futures begin to trade, investors who are bearish on bitcoin will be able to create short positions that cause the effective number of bitcoins in circulation to rise. This will happen even if the official number of bitcoins outstanding remains the same. Imitation Is The Sincerest Form Of Flattery An increase in synthetic forms of bitcoin supply is one worry for bitcoin investors. Another is the prospect of increased competition from bitcoin-like alternatives. There are now hundreds of cryptocurrencies, most of which use a slight variant of the same blockchain technology that underpins bitcoin. Chart 4Governments Will Want Their Cut Governments Will Want Their Cut Governments Will Want Their Cut So far, the proliferation of new currencies has been largely driven by technologically savvy entrepreneurs working out of their bedrooms or garages. But now companies are getting in on the act. The stock price of Kodak, which apparently is still in business, tripled earlier this week when it announced the launch of its own cryptocurrency. That's just a small taste of what's to come. What exactly is stopping giants such as Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, and Google from issuing their own cryptocurrencies? After all, they already have secure, global networks. Amazon could start giving out a few coins with every sale, and allow shoppers to purchase goods from the online retailer using its new currency. It's simple.1 The only plausible restriction is a legal one: The threat that governments will quash upstart cryptocurrencies for fear that will drive down demand for their own fiat monies. As we noted several weeks ago, the U.S. government derives $100 billion per year in seigniorage revenue from its ability to print currency and use that money to buy goods and services (Chart 4).2 As large companies get into the cryptocurrency arena, governments are likely to respond harshly - sooner rather than later. This week's news that the South Korean government will consider banning the trading of cryptocurrencies on exchanges is a sign of what's to come. Who Else? What other areas are vulnerable to an eventual tsunami of new supply? Four come to mind: Oil: BCA's bullish oil call has paid off in spades. Brent has climbed from $44 last June to $69 currently. Further gains may not be as easily attainable, however. Our energy strategists estimate that the breakeven cost of oil for U.S. shale producers is in the low-$50 range.3 We are now well above this number, which means that shale supply will accelerate. This does not mean that prices cannot go up further in the near term, but it does limit the long-term potential for crude. Real estate: Ultra-low interest rates across much of the world have fueled sharp rallies in home prices. Inflation-adjusted home prices in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and parts of Europe are well above their pre-Great Recession levels (Chart 5). U.S. real residential home prices are still below their 2006 peak, but commercial real estate (CRE) prices have galloped to new highs (Chart 6). Rent growth within the U.S. CRE sector is starting to slow, suggesting that supply is slowly catching up with demand (Chart 7). Chart 5Where Low Rates Have ##br##Fueled House Prices Where Low Rates Have Fueled House Prices Where Low Rates Have Fueled House Prices Chart 6Commercial Real Estate Prices Have ##br##Surpassed Pre-Recession Levels Commercial Real Estate Prices Have Surpassed Pre-Recession Levels Commercial Real Estate Prices Have Surpassed Pre-Recession Levels Chart 7Rent Growth Is Cooling Rent Growth Is Cooling Rent Growth Is Cooling Corporate debt: Low rates have also encouraged companies to feast on credit. The ratio of corporate debt-to-GDP in the U.S. and many other countries is close to record-high levels (Chart 8A and Chart 8B). Credit spreads remain extremely tight, but that may change as more corporate bonds reach the market. Chart 8ACorporate Debt-To-GDP ##br##Is Close To Record Highs Corporate Debt-To-GDP Is Close To Record Highs Corporate Debt-To-GDP Is Close To Record Highs Chart 8BCorporate Debt-To-GDP ##br##Is Close To Record Highs Corporate Debt-To-GDP Is Close To Record Highs Corporate Debt-To-GDP Is Close To Record Highs Low-volatility trades: A recent Bloomberg headline screamed "Short-Volatility Funds Are Being Flooded With Cash."4 The number of volatility contracts traded on the Cboe has increased more than tenfold since 2012. Net short speculative positions now stand at record-high levels (Chart 9). Traders have been able to reap huge gains over the past few years by betting that volatility will decline. The problem is that if volatility starts to rise, those same traders could start to unload their positions, leading to even higher volatility. In contrast to the aforementioned areas, the stock market has seen an erosion in the supply of shares due to buybacks and voluntary delistings. The S&P divisor is down by over 8% since 2005. The number of U.S. publicly-listed companies has nearly halved since the late 1990s (Chart 10). This trend is unlikely to reverse any time soon, given the elevated level of profit margins and the temptation that many companies will have to use corporate tax cuts to step up the pace of share repurchases. Chart 9Low Volatility Is In High Demand Low Volatility Is In High Demand Low Volatility Is In High Demand Chart 10Erosion Of Supply In The Stock Market Erosion Of Supply In The Stock Market Erosion Of Supply In The Stock Market Bet On Higher Equity Prices, But Also Higher Volatility And Higher Credit Spreads The discussion above suggests that the relationship between equity prices and both volatility and credit spreads may shift over the coming months. This would not be the first time. Chart 11 shows that the VIX and credit spreads began to trend higher in the late 1990s, even as the S&P 500 continued to hit new record highs. We may be entering a similar phase now. Continued above-trend growth in the U.S. and rising inflation will push up Treasury yields. We declared "The End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market" on July 5, 2016 - the exact same day that the 10-year Treasury yield hit a record closing low of 1.37%.5 Higher interest rates will punish financially-strapped borrowers, leading to wider credit spreads. Equity volatility is also likely to rise as corporate health deteriorates and the timing of the next downturn draws closer. Our baseline expectation is that the U.S. and the rest of the world will fall into a recession in late 2019. Financial markets will sniff out a recession before it happens. However, if history is any guide, this will only happen about six months before the start of the recession (Table 1). This suggests that global equities can continue to rally for the next 12 months. With this in mind, we are opening a new trade going long the S&P 500 versus high-yield credit. Chart 11Volatility Can Increase And Spreads ##br##Can Widen As Stock Prices Rise Volatility Can Increase And Spreads Can Widen As Stock Prices Rise Volatility Can Increase And Spreads Can Widen As Stock Prices Rise Table 1Too Soon To Get Out Will Bitcoin Be DeFANGed? Will Bitcoin Be DeFANGed? Four Currency Quick Hits Four items buffeted currency and fixed-income markets this week. The first was a news story suggesting that China will slow or stop its purchases of U.S. Treasury debt. China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) decried the report as "fake news." Lost in the commotion was the fact that China's holdings of Treasurys have been largely flat since 2011 (Chart 12). China still has a highly managed currency. Now that capital is no longer pouring out of the country, the PBoC will start rebuilding its foreign reserves. Given that the U.S. Treasury market remains the world's largest and most liquid, it is hard to see how China can avoid having to park much of its excess foreign capital in the United States. The second item this week was the Bank of Japan's announcement that it will reduce its target for how many government bonds it buys. This just formalizes something that has already been happening for over a year. The BoJ's purchases of JGBs have plunged over the past twelve months, mainly because its ¥80 trillion target is more than double the ¥30-35 trillion annual net issuance of JGBs (Chart 13). Chart 12China's Holdings Of Treasurys: ##br##Largely Flat Since 2011 China's Holdings Of Treasurys: Largely Flat Since 2011 China's Holdings Of Treasurys: Largely Flat Since 2011 Chart 13BoJ Has Been Reducing ##br##Its Bond Purchases BoJ Has Been Reducing Its Bond Purchases BoJ Has Been Reducing Its Bond Purchases Ultimately, none of this should matter that much. The Bank of Japan can target prices (the yield on JGBs) or it can target quantities (the number of bonds it owns), but it cannot target both. The fact that the BoJ is already doing the former makes the latter irrelevant. And with long-term inflation expectations still nowhere near the BoJ's target, the former is unlikely to change. What does this mean for the yen? The Japanese currency is cheap and its current account surplus has swollen to 4% of GDP (Chart 14). Speculators are also very short the currency (Chart 15). This increases the likelihood of a near-term rally, as my colleague Mathieu Savary flagged this week.6 Nevertheless, if global bond yields continue to rise while Japanese yields stay put, it is hard to see the yen moving up and staying up a lot. On balance, we expect USD/JPY to strengthen somewhat this year. Chart 14Yen Is Already Cheap... Yen Is Already Cheap... Yen Is Already Cheap... Chart 15...And Unloved ...And Unloved ...And Unloved The third item was the revelation in the ECB's December meeting minutes that the central bank will be revisiting its communication stance in early 2018. The speculation is that the ECB will renormalize monetary policy more quickly than what the market is currently discounting. If that were to happen, EUR/USD would strengthen further. All this is possible, of course, but it would likely require that euro area growth surprise on the upside. That is far from a done deal. The euro area economic surprise index has begun to edge lower, and in relative terms, has plunged against the U.S. (Chart 16). Unlike in the U.S., the euro area credit impulse is now negative (Chart 17). Euro area financial conditions have also tightened significantly relative to the U.S. (Chart 18). Chart 16Euro Area Economic ##br##Surprises Edging Lower Euro Area Economic Surprises Edging Lower Euro Area Economic Surprises Edging Lower Chart 17Negative Credit Impulse In The Euro ##br##Area Will Weigh On Growth Negative Credit Impulse In The Euro Area Will Weigh On Growth Negative Credit Impulse In The Euro Area Will Weigh On Growth Chart 18Diverging Financial Conditions ##br##Favor U.S. Over The Euro Area Diverging Financial Conditions Favor U.S. Over The Euro Area Diverging Financial Conditions Favor U.S. Over The Euro Area Meanwhile, EUR/USD has appreciated more since 2016 than what one would expect based on changes in interest rate differentials (Chart 19). Speculative positioning towards the euro has also gone from being heavily short at the start of 2017 to heavily long today (Chart 20). Reasonably cheap valuations and a healthy current account surplus continue to work in the euro's favor, but our best bet is that EUR/USD will give up some of its gains over the coming months. Chart 19The Euro Has Strengthened More Than ##br##Justified By Interest Rate Differentials The Euro Has Strengthened More Than Justified By Interest Rate Differentials The Euro Has Strengthened More Than Justified By Interest Rate Differentials Chart 20Euro Positioning: From Deeply ##br##Short To Record Long Euro Positioning: From Deeply Short To Record Long Euro Positioning: From Deeply Short To Record Long Lastly, the Canadian dollar and Mexican peso came under pressure this week on news reports that the U.S. will be pulling out of NAFTA negotiations. Of the four items discussed in this section, this is the one that worries us most. The global supply chain has become highly integrated. Anything that sabotages it would be greatly disruptive. At some level, Trump realizes this, but he also knows that his base wants him to get tough on trade, and unless he does so, his chances of reelection will be even slimmer than they are now. Ultimately, we expect a new NAFTA deal to be reached, but the path from here to there will be a bumpy one. Housekeeping Notes Our long global industrials/short utilities trade is up 12.4% since we initiated it on September 29. We are raising the stop to 10% to protect gains. We are also letting our long 2-year USD/Saudi Riyal forward contract trade expire for a loss of 2.9%. Given the recent improvement in Saudi Arabia's finances, we are not reinstating the trade. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 My thanks to Igor Vasserman, President of SHIG Partners LLC, for his valuable insights on this topic. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Bitcoin's Macro Impact," dated September 15, 2017; and Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve," dated December 22, 2017. 3 Please see Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Breakeven Analysis: Shale Companies Need ~$50 Oil To Be Self-Sufficient," dated March 15, 2017. 4 Dani Burger, "Short-Volatility Funds Are Being Flooded With Cash," Bloomberg, November 6, 2017. 5 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Alert, "End Of The 35-year Bond Bull Market," dated July 5, 2016. 6 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy, "Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC!" dated January 12, 2018. Tactical Global Asset Allocation Recommendations Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights Chart 1Bond Bear On Pause? Bond Bear On Pause? Bond Bear On Pause? The start of a new year often brings optimism and nowhere is this more evident than in economic projections. In three of the past four years (2017 being the exception) Bloomberg consensus GDP growth expectations ended the year lower than where they began. A related pattern played itself out in the Treasury market. At the turn of each of the past four years the average yield on the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Index increased in December only to fall back in January. In two of those instances the January decline exceeded the December increase. Should we expect a similar January bond rally this year? Our favorite short-term indicators are not sending a strong signal (Chart 1). Net speculative futures positions weakly suggest that the 10-year yield will be lower in three months, but our auto regressive model suggests the Economic Surprise Index will still be in positive territory at the end of the month. In a recent report we showed that yields tend to rise in months where the Surprise Index is above zero.1 Perhaps most importantly, our 2-factor Treasury model shows that yields are significantly lower than is suggested by global economic fundamentals. Maintain below-benchmark duration. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 49 basis points in December and by 335 bps in 2017. At 94 bps, the average index spread is 28 bps tighter than at the beginning of 2017 and investment grade corporate spreads are extremely expensive compared to history (Chart 2). After adjusting for changes in the average duration of the index over time, we calculate that A-rated corporate spreads have only been tighter 5% of the time since 1989 (panel 2), and Baa-rated spreads have only been tighter 7% of the time (panel 3). Essentially, at this stage of the credit cycle we should expect excess returns no greater than carry. As for the credit cycle itself, we noted in our last report that with corporate balance sheets deteriorating, low inflation and still-accommodative monetary policy are the sole supports for corporate spreads.2 We expect spreads will start to widen later this year once inflation rises and policy becomes more restrictive. With excess returns likely to be lower in 2018 than in 2017, we should also expect a lower marginal return from increasing the riskiness within credit portfolios.3 For investors looking to scale back on credit risk, our model shows that Financials and Technology are the most attractive low-risk sectors. Energy, Basic Industry and Communications are all attractive high-risk sectors (Table 3). Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* January Effect January Effect Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* January Effect January Effect High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 23 basis points in December and by 602 bps in 2017. The average index option-adjusted spread tightened 1 bp on the month and 66 bps in 2017. Though spreads appear somewhat more attractive than for investment grade corporates, there is still not much room for spread compression in high-yield. In fact, we calculate that if the high-yield index spread tightens another 117 bps, junk bonds will be the most expensive they have been since 1995. In an optimistic scenario where the index spread tightens 100 bps, bringing it close to all-time expensive levels, then we would expect junk excess returns to be in the range of 600 bps (annualized). Given trends in corporate leverage, another 100 bps of spread tightening should be viewed as unlikely. More realistically, we expect excess returns in the range of 200 bps to 500 bps (annualized) between now and the end of the credit cycle (Chart 3). Given our forecast for default losses, flat spreads translate to a 12-month excess return of 213 bps. An additional warning sign for junk spreads is that the slope of the 2/10 Treasury curve is hovering around 50 bps. We showed in a recent report that when the 2/10 slope is between 0 bps and 50 bps, junk bonds underperform Treasuries in 48% of months, and average monthly excess returns (though still positive) are much lower than when the curve is steeper.4 MBS: Neutral Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 16 basis points in December and by 51 bps in 2017. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility MBS spread narrowed 2 bps in December, the combination of a flat option-adjusted spread (OAS) and a 2 bps decline in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost). The Z-spread widened 2 bps in 2017, as an 8 bps OAS widening was offset by a decline of 6 bps in the compensation for prepayment risk. The substantial OAS widening in early 2017 was almost certainly caused by investors pricing-in the eventual run-off of the securities on the Fed's balance sheet. Now that run-off has begun we see no obvious catalyst for further OAS widening in the months ahead. Turning to the compensation for prepayment risk, with Treasury yields biased higher as the Fed continues to lift rates, we see little risk of a material increase in refinancing activity. This will ensure that overall MBS spreads stay capped near historically low levels (Chart 4). All in all, with MBS OAS looking more attractive relative to Aaa-rated credit than at any time since 2015 (panel 3), we think this is an opportune time for investors looking to de-risk their portfolios to shift some of their spread product allocation away from corporate bonds and into MBS. We already upgraded our recommended allocation to MBS from underweight to neutral in October, and will likely further increase exposure as we advance toward the end of the credit cycle. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 5 basis points in December, but outperformed by 216 bps in 2017. Sovereign bonds underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 36 bps in December, Foreign Agencies and Domestic Agencies underperformed by 8 bps and 1 bp, respectively. Local Authorities outperformed the benchmark by 17 bps, and Supranationals underperformed by 1 bp. Sovereign bonds were the best performers within the Government-Related index in 2017, delivering excess returns of 538 bps relative to duration-matched U.S. Treasuries. This outperformance was concentrated early in the year and was driven by the sharp depreciation of the U.S. dollar (Chart 5). With the market still priced for a relatively modest 63 bps of Fed rate hikes during the next 12 months, further sharp dollar depreciation appears unlikely. We recommend an underweight allocation to Sovereign debt. We remain overweight Local Authority and Foreign Agency bonds, sectors that delivered excess returns of 420 bps and 248 bps, respectively in 2017. Despite the outperformance, both of these sectors still offer attractive spreads after adjusting for credit rating and duration. We remain underweight Domestic Agency and Supranational bonds. Though both sectors offer low risk and high credit quality, they also only offer 15 bps and 17 bps of option-adjusted spread, respectively. We much prefer Agency-backed MBS and CMBS which are also relatively low risk and offer option-adjusted spreads of 28 bps and 42 bps, respectively. Municipal Bonds: Underweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 99 bps in December and by 332 bps in 2017 (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio fell 5% in December, and is 12% below where it began 2017 (Chart 6). The recent decline follows a sharp increase that was driven by fluctuating supply trends related to the passage of U.S. tax legislation. The final tax bill ends the practice of advance refunding municipal bonds. As a result, December set a new high of $55.6 billion for municipal issuance as issuers rushed to get their advance refunding deals to market before the bill was passed (panel 3). Now that the bill has passed, visible supply has evaporated and the average M/T yield ratio has fallen back to one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean. The absence of advance refunding will bias municipal bond issuance lower in 2018, thus removing one potential risk for yield ratios. The M/T yield ratio for short maturity debt has risen considerably relative to the yield ratio for long maturity debt in recent months (panel 2), and the risk/reward trade-off now appears more balanced. We close our recommendation to favor long maturities versus short maturities on the Aaa Muni curve. The third quarter update of our Muni Health Monitor showed a slight improvement (panel 5), but still no clear reversal of trend. Although health remains supportive for now - and consistent with municipal upgrades outpacing downgrades - with yield ratios close to their lows we maintain an underweight allocation to Municipal bonds.  Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bear-flattened in December. The 2/10 Treasury slope flattened 13 bps on the month, and the 5/30 Treasury slope flattened 15 bps. The evolution of the Treasury curve in 2018 will come down to a trade-off between how quickly inflation rises versus how quickly the Fed lifts rates. For example, in a recent report we showed that the 10-year Treasury yield will likely settle into a range between 2.80% and 3.25% by the time that core PCE inflation reaches the Fed's 2% target.5 That same report shows that if that adjustment occurs relatively quickly, and the Fed has only lifted rates once or twice between now and then, then the 2/10 Treasury slope is much more likely to steepen than to flatten. Conversely, if the Fed lifts rates three or four more times between now and the time that inflation returns to target, then the curve is more likely to flatten. For our part, we think it is wise to maintain a position long the 5-year bullet and short a duration-neutral 2/10 barbell. Such a position profits from a steeper curve, and our model shows that the butterfly spread is currently priced for significant curve flattening (Chart 7). According to our model, the 2/5/10 butterfly spread is discounting 27 bps of 2/10 flattening during the next six months.6 In other words, if the 2/10 slope steepens or flattens by less than 27 bps, then our recommended position will profit. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 41 basis points in December, but underperformed by 43 bps in 2017. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate went on a wild ride last year. It started 2017 at 1.95% and, driven by strong inflation prints and continued post-election euphoria, reached as high as 2.09% in January. The breakeven dropped to a low of 1.66% in June, as inflation started to disappoint in the second quarter, but has rebounded during the past couple of months and just recently broke back above 2%. The 10-year TIPS breakeven rate is currently 2.02%, above where it began 2017. According to our TIPS Financial Model, the recent widening in breakevens is in line with the message from other related financial market instruments (Chart 8). Specifically, oil prices, the trade-weighted dollar and the stock-to-bond total return ratio. Further, measures of pipeline inflation pressure continue to signal an increase in inflationary pressures (panels 3 and 4), and the trimmed mean PCE shows that the realized inflation data are forming a tentative bottom (bottom panel). The annualized 6-month rate of change in the trimmed mean PCE ticked up to 1.68% in November, higher than the 12-month rate of change (1.67%). The 1-month rate of change is higher still at 2.19%, annualized. We continue to see signs that inflation will start to rebound in the coming months, and this will cause long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates to reach a range between 2.4% and 2.5% by the time that inflation returns to the Fed's target. Remain overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasury securities. ABS: Neutral Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities performed in line with the duration-equivalent Treasury index in December and outperformed by 92 basis points in 2017. In 2017, Aaa-rated ABS outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 79 bps and non-Aaa ABS outperformed by 217 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened 1 bp in December, but tightened 21 bps in 2017. It now sits at 31 bps, only 4 bps above its all-time low (Chart 9). At 31 bps, Aaa-rated ABS now offer only a 3 bps spread advantage over Agency-backed MBS, and offer 11 bps less spread than Agency-backed CMBS. With consumer lending standards tightening and delinquency rates rising, we view no more than a neutral allocation to ABS as appropriate. On lending standards, the Fed's October Senior Loan Officer's Survey showed a continued tightening in lending standards on both credit cards and auto loans (panel 4), and also that demand for credit card and auto loans was essentially unchanged from the prior quarter. It also included a set of special questions regarding the reasons for changes in the supply and demand for consumer credit. Banks cited a less favorable or more uncertain economic outlook, a deterioration in existing loan quality and a general reduced risk tolerance as reasons for tightening the supply of credit. The hard data confirm that banks are seeing a deterioration in the quality of their consumer loan books (bottom panel). Although delinquencies remain depressed compared to history, with ABS spreads near all-time tights, rising delinquencies and tightening lending standards make for a poor risk/reward trade-off in the sector. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 20 basis points in December and by 201 bps in 2017. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS tightened 2 bps in December and 13 bps in 2017. At its current level of 64 bps, the index spread is about one standard deviation below its pre-crisis mean, and only 13 bps above its all-time low reached in 2004 (Chart 10). With spreads at such low levels in an environment of tightening commercial real estate (CRE) lending standards and falling CRE loan demand, we continue to view the risk/reward trade-off in non-Agency CMBS as unfavorable. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 21 basis points in December and by 133 bps in 2017. The index option-adjusted spread for Agency CMBS tightened 3 bps in December and 13 bps in 2017. At its current level of 42 bps, the sector offers greater option-adjusted compensation than a position in Agency-backed MBS (28 bps) and Aaa-rated consumer ABS (31 bps). Such an attractive spread pick-up in a sector that benefits from Agency backing is surely worth grabbing.   Treasury Valuation Chart 11Treasury Fair Value Models Treasury Fair Value Models Treasury Fair Value Models The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.94% (Chart 11). Our 3-factor version of the model (not shown), which also incorporates the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, places fair value at 2.92%. PMIs across the world continue to surge. December PMI data show increases in the four largest economic blocs (U.S., Eurozone, China, Japan), and more broadly show that 86% of the 36 countries with available data currently have PMIs above the 50 boom/bust line. Meanwhile, bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar continues to trend lower in response to strong growth in the rest of the world (bottom panel). This is also a bearish development for U.S. bonds. For further details on our Treasury models please refer to U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Models", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.48%. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Alex Wang, Research Analyst alexw@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Research Assistant jeremiep@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "How Much Higher For Yields?", dated October 31, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Ill Placed Trust?", dated December 19, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Proactive, Reactive Or Right?", dated December 12, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Proactive, Reactive Or Right?", dated December 12, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Ill Placed Trust?", dated December 19, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 For further details on the model please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies", dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)