Fixed Income

Highlights Global Corporates: The Fed is now clearly signaling a near-term capitulation to tightening financial conditions alongside slowing global growth and inflation. A pause in the U.S. rate hiking cycle, after credit spread valuations have cheapened up, opens up a window of opportunity for global corporate bond market outperformance versus government debt over the next 3-6 months. Country Allocation: Move to overweight (4 of 5) on both U.S. investment grade and high-yield corporates, while downgrading U.S. Treasuries to underweight (2 of 5). Upgrade euro area investment grade and high-yield corporates to neutral (3 of 5), while downgrading euro area governments to underweight (2 of 5). Upgrade emerging market U.S. dollar denominated debt (both sovereign and corporate) from maximum underweight to underweight (2 of 5). Feature We downgraded our overall recommended investment stance on global corporate debt to neutral on June 26 of last year.1 That decision reflected our concern at the time that less accommodative central banks, a rising U.S. dollar, weakening global growth momentum and intensifying U.S.-China trade tensions had all significantly worsened the near-term risk/reward tradeoff for owning corporate bonds. This accompanied a firm-wide call at BCA to pare back our recommended exposure to global equities for the same reasons. We now see an opportunity, driven by better value and diminished market volatility after the Fed has clearly signaled a pause on U.S. rate hikes (Chart of the Week), to go back to an overweight stance on corporate credit on a tactical basis (3-6 months). Chart of the WeekTime For A Pause In Corporate Spread Widening Time For A Pause In Corporate Spread Widening Time For A Pause In Corporate Spread Widening To be clear, we still see medium-term risks for corporate credit once global growth stabilizes and a resilient U.S. economy forces the Fed to restart the rate hikes in the latter half of 2019. A move to a restrictive stance by the Fed toward year-end, signaled by an inversion of the U.S. Treasury yield curve, will raise recession risks and be the eventual death knell for this credit cycle. In the meantime, corporate debt is likely to outperform government bonds, justifying a tactical overweight position. This mirrors the recent change in the BCA House View, returning to a tactical overweight stance on global equities. On a regional basis, we prefer taking more of our upgraded credit risk in U.S. corporates over European and emerging market (EM) equivalents. The outlook for growth remains more favorable on a relative basis to Europe or China, the latter being most critical for the outperformance of EM assets. Why The Spread Widening Will Pause: A Patient Fed Is Taking A Break Global corporate bond spreads have widened since we did our downgrade in June, across all countries and credit tiers (Chart 2). Typically, some underperformance of corporate credit should occur when global growth momentum slows, as was the case throughout 2018. Yet the most violent period of spread widening only began once the Fed began signaling that it would continue with its interest hikes and balance sheet runoff, despite softening global growth. Chart 2 This set off yet another clash between policy and the markets – one of BCA’s key investment themes for 2018 that still applies in 2019 – resulting in a sharp selloff in global risk assets, including corporate debt. The result was a tightening of U.S. financial conditions, first through a stronger U.S. dollar (supported by rate hike expectations) and later through lower equity prices and wider corporate spreads. This echoed the 2014/15 period when the Fed was trying to lift rates off the zero bound after ending its quantitative easing program. The Fed was only able to deliver a single rate hike in December 2015 before pausing because of severely slumping global growth (most notably in China) and a sharp tightening in financial conditions, both of which knocked the wind out of the U.S. economy. Turning to 2019, the downturn in cyclical growth indicators like manufacturing purchasing managers indices (PMI) and the global leading economic indicator (LEI) has reached levels last seen after that 2014/15 episode (Chart 3). Importantly, our global LEI diffusion index, which measures the number of countries with rising LEIs compared to falling LEIs and is itself a reliable leading indicator of the global LEI, is bottoming out at the same level that preceded the 2016 LEI revival (middle panel). This suggests that a stabilization of the global LEI could unfold in the next few months, which would also signal a potential rebound in corporate credit returns (bottom panel). Chart 3Credit Returns Already Reflect Slowing Growth Credit Returns Already Reflect Slowing Growth Credit Returns Already Reflect Slowing Growth Given the many similarities between today and the 2014/15 backdrop, it is sensible to look for other indicators that accurately heralded the end of that period of spread widening to help time a potential increase in recommended exposure to corporates. Over the past several weeks, our colleagues at our sister BCA service, U.S. Bond Strategy, have been following a checklist of market-based signals to determine the timing of a potential peak in U.S. credit spreads.2 These are grouped into two categories: signals of rebounding global growth and signals of Fed capitulation on rate hikes. For global growth, the indicators monitored are shown in Chart 4: Chart 4Checklist For Peak U.S. Spreads: Global Growth Checklist For Peak U.S. Spreads: Global Growth Checklist For Peak U.S. Spreads: Global Growth the CRB raw industrials index of commodity prices (a broader measure that excludes highly volatile oil prices) the BCA Market-Based China Growth Indicator (created by our China Investment Strategy team as a proxy of investor expectations of Chinese growth3) the Global Industrial Mining equity price index For Fed capitulation, the indicators monitored are shown in Chart 5: Chart 5Checklist For Peak U.S. Spreads: Fed Capitulation Checklist For Peak U.S. Spreads: Fed Capitulation Checklist For Peak U.S. Spreads: Fed Capitulation our 12-month fed funds discounter, which measures the amount of expected Fed rate hikes over the next year discounted in the U.S. Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve the price of gold in dollars (a higher price correlating with perceptions of easier U.S. monetary policy and vice versa) the nominal trade-weighted U.S. dollar index Among the growth-focused elements of the checklist, only the China Growth Indicator is in a clear uptrend. Non-oil commodity prices had been stabilizing at the end of 2018 but appear to be rolling over, while it is not yet clear if the downturn in Mining stocks has ended. With momentum in global PMIs and LEIs still having not yet bottomed out, it may be too early to expect a cyclical rebound in non-oil commodities and related equities. At a minimum, that will require even greater signs that China’s economy is regaining some vigor. However, as we discussed last week, Chinese policymakers’ options to stimulate growth are far more limited now than they were in 2015 and 2016 when a rebounding China boosted commodity demand and EM asset performance.4 Within the Fed-focused components of the “Peak Spreads Checklist”, the near-term bullish signal for credit is much stronger. Our fed funds discounter has rapidly priced out all rate hikes for 2019. Since November, gold is up nearly 8% and the nominal trade-weighted U.S. dollar is down 2%. The shift in recent Fed messaging from signaling a “gradual pace” of tightening to exhibiting “patience” on any future policy moves was a highly dovish signal for investors. This alone has been enough to stabilize equity and credit markets, which had been discounting that Fed tightening in 2019 would drive the U.S. into a possible recession. In the constant battle between financial conditions and the Fed, the former has won this latest round. How long will this Fed pause last? Continuing with the comparison to the 2014/15 episode, a critical difference is that underlying trends in U.S. economic growth and inflation are firmer today. This is evident in the BCA Fed Monitor, which is comprised of economic and financial data that indicate pressure on the Fed to tighten or ease monetary policy. Chart 6 shows a “cycle-on-cycle” comparison of the Fed Monitor (and its subcomponents) today versus 2014/15. The Fed Monitor is still signaling a need for the Fed to continue tightening because the Economic Growth and Inflation Components remain elevated. Yet the Monitor has declined from its recent peak thanks entirely to the plunge in the Financial Conditions Component, which has fallen even faster than it did in 2014/15. Chart 6BCA Fed Monitor: Today Vs 2014/15 BCA Fed Monitor: Today Vs 2014/15 BCA Fed Monitor: Today Vs 2014/15 The implication from our Fed Monitor is that there needs to be more evidence of slowing U.S. economic growth and reduced inflation pressures for the Fed to stay on hold for longer. If the data stay firm, but financial conditions ease because investors expect a prolonged pause from the Fed, then the Fed could quickly return to a hawkish bias later this year. This is now our base case scenario for how 2019 will play out. This is also why we are only upgrading corporate debt on a tactical basis. We do not expect U.S. growth or inflation to slow enough to prevent more Fed tightening later this year – an outcome that will weigh on credit returns as the Fed moves to a restrictive policy stance. Yet even if we are wrong and the U.S. economy decelerates more sharply, that is also a bad outcome for credit because it means weaker corporate profits and rising downgrades and defaults. For bond investors with longer-time horizons than 3-6 months, the credit rally that we are anticipating can actually provide an opportunity to reduce credit exposure for the final leg of the Fed’s monetary policy cycle and the multi-year corporate credit cycle. In other words, selling into the rally rather than chasing it. For now, we are choosing to play for the shorter-term move by upgrading our recommended global credit allocations. Yet we do not envision this turning into a long-term position. The medium-term outlook for corporates is far more challenging given the advanced age of the monetary, business and credit cycles. Bottom Line: The Fed is now clearly signaling a near-term capitulation to tightening global financial conditions alongside slowing global growth and inflation. A pause in the U.S. rate hiking cycle, after credit spread valuations have cheapened up, opens up a window of opportunity for global corporate bond market outperformance versus government debt over the next 3-6 months. The Specific Changes To Our Recommended Asset Allocation As part of our tactical upgrade of global corporate debt, we are making the following changes to our recommended portfolio allocation tables (see Page 13): Upgrade overall global credit exposure to overweight (4 out of 5) Upgrade both U.S. investment grade and high-yield corporate exposure to overweight (4 out of 5), while downgrading U.S. Treasury exposure to underweight (2 out of 5) Upgrade euro area investment grade and high-yield corporate exposure to neutral (3 out of 5) and downgrade euro area government bond exposure to underweight (2 out of 5) Upgrade EM U.S. dollar denominated debt from maximum underweight to underweight (2 out of 5), both for sovereign and corporate debt. The changes all represent a one-notch upgrade from our previous allocations, based on our more positive tactical view on overall global credit risk, while still maintaining our relative preference for U.S. corporates over non-U.S. equivalents. We prefer U.S. credit not only because we expect better relative economic growth momentum in the U.S., but also because our preferred valuation metrics indicate that U.S. corporate bond spreads now look relatively attractive. Our estimate of the default-adjusted spread on U.S. high-yield corporates, which is simply the current spread minus losses from defaults, has risen to 302bps, well above the long-run average of 268bps (Chart 7). That is a function of the high-yield spread now discounting a 2019 default rate of nearly 6%, well above our forecasted default rate of 2.5%.5 Chart 7Too Much Default Risk Priced Into U.S. Junk Too Much Default Risk Priced Into U.S. Junk Too Much Default Risk Priced Into U.S. Junk Corporate credit spreads in the U.S. also look attractive on a volatility-adjusted basis. Our estimates of Breakeven Spreads – the amount of spread widening required for corporate returns to break-even with duration-matched U.S. Treasuries on a one-year horizon – shows that credit spreads have cheapened to levels that are in the upper end of the historical range for both investment grade and high-yield debt (Charts 8 & 9). Chart 8Vol-Adjusted IG Spreads Have Cheapened Vol-Adjusted IG Spreads Have Cheapened Vol-Adjusted IG Spreads Have Cheapened   Chart 9Vol-Adjusted HY Spreads Are Cheap Vol-Adjusted HY Spreads Are Cheap Vol-Adjusted HY Spreads Are Cheap Credit spreads have also cheapened up in Europe and EM, and a “risk-on” rally from a Fed pause will likely benefit spread product in those regions. However, the performance of U.S. credit versus non-U.S. credit remains largely determined by relative growth trends (Charts 10 & 11). Given our more positive view on U.S. growth on a relative basis, we are maintaining a higher recommended allocation to U.S. corporates versus euro area and EM equivalents, even as we upgrade overall global corporate exposure. This is also a way to provide a partial hedge to the specific risks in the latter regions coming from: Chart 10Global Corporates: Continue Favoring U.S. Over Europe Global Corporates: Continue Favoring U.S. Over Europe Global Corporates: Continue Favoring U.S. Over Europe   Chart 11Global Corporates: Continue Favoring U.S. Over EM Global Corporates: Continue Favoring U.S. Over EM Global Corporates: Continue Favoring U.S. Over EM a) an end of the ECB’s corporate bond buying as part of its Asset Purchase Program, which takes a major buyer out of the euro area corporate market b) a more persistent slowing of Chinese growth momentum and softer non-oil commodity prices, both of which would be negatives for EM assets On a final note, we are also changing the specific weighting in our Model Bond Portfolio on Page 12 to reflect all of the above changes. The allocations to all U.S., euro area and EM corporates are increased – with bigger allocation changes in the U.S. – funded out of reduced weightings in U.S., German and French government bonds. Note that we are not making any changes to our relative U.K. exposures this week, given the unique risk for U.K. financial markets from the Brexit uncertainty. Thus, we are maintaining an overweight stance on U.K. Gilts in the government bond portion of the model portfolio, while remaining underweight U.K. corporates on the credit side.   Robert Robis, CFA, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “Time To Take Some Chips Off The Table: Downgrade Global Corporate Bond Exposure To Neutral”, dated June 26th 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A Checklist For Peak Credit Spreads”, dated November 27th 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Trade Is Not China’s Only Problem”, dated November 21st 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “Three Big Questions To Start Off 2019”, dated January 8th 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 5 That forecasted default rate is taken from Moody’s, who have a similarly positive outlook on 2019 U.S. growth as BCA. Therefore, we see no reason to use a different default rate assumption in our high-yield valuation estimate. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Enough With The Gloom: Upgrade Global Corporates On A Tactical Basis Enough With The Gloom: Upgrade Global Corporates On A Tactical Basis Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Corporates: The same indicators that called the early-2016 peak in credit spreads are once again sending a positive signal. Investors should tactically increase exposure to corporate bonds at the expense of Treasuries. Duration: Treasury yields will rise in the coming months as credit spreads tighten and financial conditions ease. Maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. TIPS: The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate has fallen too far, and it is now well below the fair value reading from our Adaptive Expectations model. Remain overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasury securities. Feature We continue to view the 2015/16 episode as the appropriate comparable for current market behavior, and the same indicators that called the early-2016 peak in credit spreads are once again sending a positive signal. As such, we recommend increasing portfolio allocations to both investment grade and high-yield corporate bonds at the expense of Treasury securities (see the Recommended Portfolio Specification Table on the last page of this report). Importantly, our cyclical view of the credit cycle has not changed. Elevated corporate debt balances and a relatively flat yield curve suggest that we are in the awkward middle phase of the cycle when excess returns from corporate credit tend to be positive, but low.1  However, recent spread widening has been excessive for this middle phase of the cycle, and we expect spreads to tighten from oversold levels during the next few months. Three Reasons To Upgrade Credit (& One Key Risk) Reason 1: Elevated Spreads The first reason to upgrade corporate credit is the attractive entry point (Chart 1). Outside of the Aaa space, 12-month breakeven spreads for every credit tier (encompassing both investment grade and junk) are above their respective historical medians. For example, the 12-month breakeven spread for the Baa credit tier is at 59%. This means that the spread has been tighter than its current level 59% of the time since 1988 and wider than its current level 41% of the time. Historically, spreads tend to hover within the tight-end of their historical range during this middle phase of the credit cycle, and only cheapen significantly when the yield curve inverts and the default rate moves higher. Chart 1Corporate Bonds: Attractive Entry Point Corporate Bonds: Attractive Entry Point Corporate Bonds: Attractive Entry Point Reason 2: Fed Capitulation The 2015/16 roadmap is applicable to the current market because in both cases credit spread widening was driven by the combination of weaker global growth and relatively hawkish Fed policy.2 With that in mind, an important pre-condition for spread tightening is a shift in the market’s expectations for Fed policy. Investor psyche must change from viewing monetary policy as restrictive to viewing it as accommodative. Chart 2 shows the three indicators we’ve been monitoring to signal when this shift occurs. All three called the early-2016 peak in credit spreads, and all are sending a strong buy signal at the moment. Chart 2Fed Capitulation Indicators Send A Strong Signal... Fed Capitulation Indicators Send A Strong Signal... Fed Capitulation Indicators Send A Strong Signal... Our 12-month Fed Funds Discounter, the change in the fed funds rate that is priced into the overnight index swap curve for the next 12 months, has collapsed from an early-November peak of 66 bps all the way to -4 bps (Chart 2, top panel). The gold price has also rebounded smartly (Chart 2, panel 2). Gold tends to rally when the market perceives that monetary policy is becoming more accommodative because the increased risk of future inflation makes gold’s “store of value” characteristics more appealing.3 Finally, the trade-weighted dollar has started to depreciate (Chart 2, bottom panel). This signals that U.S. monetary policy is easing relative to the rest of the world, and is historically correlated with stronger global growth. Reason 3: Imminent Global Growth Rebound The high-frequency global growth indicators that called the early-2016 peak in credit spreads are not sending as strong a signal as the monetary policy indicators, but there has been some positive movement (Chart 3). Chart 3...While There Is Positive Movement In Global Growth Indicators ...While There Is Positive Movement In Global Growth Indicators ...While There Is Positive Movement In Global Growth Indicators The CRB Raw Industrials index has only flattened-off in recent weeks (Chart 3, top panel), but the Market-Based China Growth Indicator created by our China Investment Strategy team has been rising quickly (Chart 3, panel 2).4  Finally, the price of global industrial mining stocks is no longer in free-fall. Rather, it is showing some signs of stabilization (Chart 3, bottom panel). Of the six indicators shown in Charts 2 and 3, four are sending strong buy signals and the other two are more or less neutral. In sum, we think this is enough of a signal to upgrade exposure to corporate bonds. One Key Risk The key risk to our tactical upgrade is that there is no follow-through from Fed easing to stronger global growth. In 2016, Fed capitulation coincided with a ramp-up in Chinese stimulus efforts. Chart 4 shows that our China Investment Strategy team’s Li Keqiang Leading Indicator moved sharply higher in early 2016.5 Moreover, all six components of the indicator participated in the uptrend. At present, only some components of the Leading Index have rebounded and the overall index has merely leveled-off. Chart 4Chinese Growth Is The One Key Risk China Is The One Key Risk China Is The One Key Risk When it comes to Chinese growth, a trade deal with the U.S. would certainly help matters. However, the risk remains that Chinese policymakers continue to curb credit growth so much that the pass through from easier Fed policy to global growth is weaker than in 2016. Bottom Line: With Fed rate hikes priced out of the market and signs of stabilization in high-frequency global growth indicators, the toxic combination of tight Fed policy and weak global growth is disappearing. This should allow credit spreads to tighten from current oversold levels. The rapid shift in monetary policy expectations makes us think that spread tightening could occur over a relatively short timeframe. As such, we would recommend this upgrade only to tactical (3-6 month) investors. Those with longer investment horizons may be better served by waiting for spreads to tighten and then using that opportunity to reduce cyclical corporate bond exposure. A Note On Portfolio Duration As mentioned above, the market has completely priced out Fed rate hikes. At present, the overnight index swap curve discounts 4 bps of rate cuts over the next 12 months and 17 bps of rate cuts over the next 24 months. This shift in market rate expectations is the main reason for our rosier outlook on corporate spreads, but it’s important to remember that the causation between credit spreads and policy expectations runs both ways (Chart 5). Chart 5 It is the recent spread widening and sharp tightening in financial conditions that caused the Fed to adopt a more accommodative policy stance in the first place (Chart 6). In the background, the U.S. economic data remain robust. The New York Fed’s GDP Nowcast model projects above-trend real GDP growth of 2.5% in 2018 Q4 and 2.1% in 2019 Q1. The corollary is that once credit spreads tighten and financial conditions ease, the Fed will have no further reason to stay on hold. Chart 6Financial Conditions Likely Going To Ease Going Forward Financial Conditions Likely Going To Ease Going Forward Financial Conditions Likely Going To Ease Going Forward If financial conditions ease during the next few months, as we expect, then it is very likely that the Fed will be ready to lift rates again at the June FOMC meeting. The fed funds futures curve currently discounts less than a 20% chance of that happening.  Bottom Line: The U.S. economic data are solid. The sharp fall in rate hike expectations and Treasury yields is purely a reaction to tighter financial conditions. Treasury yields will rise in the coming months as credit spreads tighten and financial conditions ease. Maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. Inflation & TIPS The main reason why the Fed feels comfortable responding to tighter financial conditions by adopting a more dovish policy stance is that inflation remains well contained. Last week’s CPI report showed that core CPI grew by 2.2% in 2018, somewhat below levels that are consistent with the Fed’s target (Chart 7).6 Chart 7Inflation Remains Well Contained Inflation Remains Well Contained Inflation Remains Well Contained Looking at the monthly changes, we also see that core CPI has increased by roughly 0.2% in each of the past three months. This translates to an annualized rate of approximately 2.4%, in line with the Fed’s target (Chart 8). The monthly changes shown in Chart 8 also reveal that the year-over-year growth rate in core CPI will almost certainly decline next month when the strong 0.35% print from last January falls out of the trailing 12-month sample. Chart 8Muted Inflationary Pressures For Now Muted Inflationary Pressures For Now Muted Inflationary Pressures For Now However, after next month base effects start to turn supportive. Our Base Effects Indicator, an indicator that compares rates of change in core CPI ranging from 1 to 11 months, predicts that year-over-year core CPI inflation will be higher six months from now (Chart 9). Chart 9Expect Higher Inflation Six Months From Now Expect Higher Inflation Six Months From Now Expect Higher Inflation Six Months From Now The conclusion is that inflationary pressures appear muted right now, and will continue to appear muted through the end of February. However, we expect them to ramp up again as we head into March. Come June, it is quite likely that the Fed will be feeling the pressure to lift rates as inflation approaches target. Coincident with a renewed uptick in inflation, TIPS breakeven inflation rates are also biased higher during the next six months. Slowing global growth and falling oil prices drove long-maturity breakevens lower during the past few months, with the result that the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is now 1.83%, 14 bps below the fair value reading from our Adaptive Expectations model (Chart 10).7  Chart 10Message From Our Adaptive Expectations Model Message From Our Adaptive Expectations Model Message From Our Adaptive Expectations Model Our Adaptive Expectations model contains three independent variables: The 10-year trailing rate of change in core CPI (Chart 10, panel 3) The 12-month trailing rate of change in headline CPI (Chart 10, panel 4) The New York Fed’s Underlying Inflation Gauge (Chart 10, bottom panel) Of those three variables, the 10-year trailing rate of change in core CPI carries the largest weight. This long-run measure of core inflation is currently running at an annualized pace of 1.83%. This translates roughly to an average monthly increase of 0.15%. In other words, as long as monthly core inflation prints above the 0.15% level, the fair value from our Adaptive Expectations model will continue to rise. Bottom Line: Core inflation has been steady during the past few months, but base effects will turn positive after next month’s report. This means that we will probably see higher year-over-year core CPI inflation in six months. With the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate already well below the fair value reading from our Adaptive Expectations model, we expect TIPS will outperform nominal Treasuries during the next six months.   Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “An Oasis Of Prosperity?”, dated August 21, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A Signal From Gold?”, dated May 1, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 For further details on how this indicator is constructed please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Trade Is Not China’s Only Problem”, dated November 21, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 5 The Li Keqiang Leading Indicator is a composite indicator of money and credit growth measures designed to predict changes in the Li Keqiang Index (a coincident indicator of Chinese economic activity). For further details on how the Leading Index is constructed please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, “The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China’s Business Cycle”, dated November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 6 The Fed targets 2% PCE inflation. CPI inflation tends to run about 0.4%-0.5% higher than PCE, which means the Fed’s target is roughly 2.4%-2.5% for CPI. 7 For further details on the model please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights Our leading indicator for China’s old economy continues to point to slower growth over the coming months, which is consistent with the bearish message from China’s housing market and forward-looking export indicators. We would caution investors against interpreting the recent relative outperformance of Chinese stocks as a basis to become cyclically bullish, as it has largely reflected a “catchup” selloff in global stocks. We remain tactically overweight, in recognition of the fact that investors may bid up Chinese stocks on positive signs that a trade deal may be in sight. Onshore corporate bond spreads remain wide relative to pre-2017 levels, suggesting that it is too early to expect easier liquidity conditions to significantly improve domestic economic conditions. Feature Tables 1 and 2 on pages 2 and 3 highlight key developments in China’s economy and its financial markets over the past month. On the growth front, the primary trend for China’s old economy remains down, although measures of freight remain supported by trade front-running activity (which will wane over the coming months). Our Li Keqiang leading indicator continues to suggest that economic activity will slow from current levels, a conclusion that is reinforced by recent developments in the housing market and December’s PMI release. Table 1The Trend In Domestic Demand, And The Outlook For Trade, Remains Negative Monitoring The (Weak) Pulse Of The Data Monitoring The (Weak) Pulse Of The Data   Table 2Financial Market Performance Summary Monitoring The (Weak) Pulse Of The Data Monitoring The (Weak) Pulse Of The Data From an investment strategy perspective, we remain tactically overweight Chinese investable stocks versus the global benchmark in recognition of the fact that investors may bid up Chinese stocks on positive signs that a trade deal may be in sight. However, China’s recent outperformance has been passive in nature (i.e. reflecting declining global stocks), suggesting that Chinese stocks have simply been the winner of an “ugly contest” over the past few months. This is hardly a basis to be cyclically long, and we continue to recommend that investors remain neutral for now. In reference to Tables 1 and 2, we provide several detailed observations concerning developments in China’s macro and financial market data below: Bloomberg’s measure of the Li Keqiang index (LKI) fell in November for the third month in a row, although our Alternative LKI has risen due to a pickup in freight transport turnover. We showed in our December 5 Weekly Report that trade front-running has clearly boosted economic activity since Q1 of 2018,1 implying that freight volume growth is set to decelerate in the months ahead. Our Li Keqiang leading indicator ticked lower in December, after having risen non-trivially in the third quarter of 2018 (Chart 1). The December decline was caused by a pullback in the monetary conditions components of the indicator, which in turn was caused by the recent rise in CNY-USD. This echoes a point that we have made in previous reports, that the improvement in our leading indicator last year was not broad-based and that it does not yet herald a positive turning point for China’s old economy. Chart 1The Q3 Rise In Our Leading Indicator Was Not Broad-Based The Q3 Rise In Our Leading Indicator Was Not Broad-Based The Q3 Rise In Our Leading Indicator Was Not Broad-Based The October housing market slowdown that we highlighted in our November 21 Weekly Report continued into December,2 with floor space started and sold decelerating further (Chart 2). The latter, which typically leads the former, has returned to negative territory which, in conjunction with weaker Pledged Supplementary Lending from the PBOC, does not bode well for housing over the coming few months. House price appreciation remains strong outside of tier 1 cities, but a peak in our price diffusion indexes signals slower price gains are likely over the coming months. Chart 2China's Housing Market Activity Continues To Weaken China's Housing Market Activity Continues To Weaken China's Housing Market Activity Continues To Weaken On the trade front, nominal Chinese US$ import and export growth is now trending lower, confirming the negative signal provided by China’s manufacturing PMIs over the past few months. Notably, the new export orders components of both the official and Caixin PMIs declined in December, despite the tariff ceasefire that emerged during the G20 meeting at the end of November, suggesting that export growth is set to slow further in the first quarter of 2019. In relative US$ terms, Chinese investable stocks rose nearly 10% versus the global benchmark from mid-October until the end of 2018. However, as Chart 3 shows, this outperformance was entirely passive in nature, as Chinese stocks have not been trending higher in absolute terms. Chart 3Recent Equity Outperformance Has Been Passive, Not Active Recent Equity Outperformance Has Been Passive, Not Active Recent Equity Outperformance Has Been Passive, Not Active We remain tactically overweight Chinese investable stocks; the Chinese market remains deeply oversold in absolute terms, and signs of a potential trade deal over the coming few weeks may significantly improve global investor sentiment towards the country’s bourse. However, we would caution investors against interpreting the recent relative outperformance as a basis to become cyclically bullish, as it has largely reflected a “catchup” selloff in global stocks. The underperformance of Chinese health care stocks over the past two months has been stunning, with investable health care having fallen nearly 30% in relative terms since mid-November (Chart 4). However, this decline appears to have been caused by a sector-specific event (a massive profit margin squeeze due to a new government generic drug procurement program), and does not seem to imply anything about the outlook for Chinese consumers. Chart 4A Stunning, Idiosyncratic, Collapse In Health Care Stocks A Stunning, Idiosyncratic, Collapse In Health Care Stocks A Stunning, Idiosyncratic, Collapse In Health Care Stocks Despite the recent collapse in the health care sector, Chinese consumer discretionary (CD) stocks remain the largest losers within the investable universe, having declined over 40% in US$ terms over the past 12 months. The next twelve months may look quite different for CD, especially if China’s efforts to stimulate consumer spending succeed. The recent changes to the global industrial classification system (GICS) mean that Alibaba (China’s largest e-commerce retailer) is now included in the sector with a significant weight, overwhelming the heavy influence that auto producers used to wield. Auto stocks have struggled in the past due to China’s pollution controls, weak auto sales, and pledges to open up the auto sector (which would be negative for the market share of domestic firms). We will be watching over the coming several months for a pickup in retail goods spending combined with a technical breakout in relative performance as a sign to overweight Chinese consumer discretionary stocks relative to the investable index. Chinese interbank rates have fallen substantially over the past month (Chart 5), in response to additional efforts by the PBOC to boost liquidity in the financial system. Whether the additional liquidity (and lower borrowing rates) will feed into materially stronger credit growth remains to be seen, as we have presented evidence in past reports showing that China’s monetary policy transmission mechanism is impaired.2 Chart 5More Liquidity Has Lowered Interbank Rates More Liquidity Has Lowered Interbank Rates More Liquidity Has Lowered Interbank Rates Chinese onshore corporate bond spreads have creeped modestly higher since early-November, although by a small magnitude. While we remain optimistic that onshore defaults over the coming year will be less intense than many investors believe, onshore corporate bond spreads have been one of the more successful leading indicators of economic growth in China over the past two years, and remain wide by historical standards. This suggests that it is too early to expect easier liquidity conditions to significantly improve domestic economic conditions. While it is too early to call a durable bottom, the gap between CNY-USD and its 200-day moving average is steadily closing (Chart 6). The recent (modest) uptrend has been caused by two factors: 1) cautious optimism about the possibility of a durable trade deal with the U.S., and 2) retreating U.S. interest rate expectations. We would expect further weakness if the trade ceasefire collapses and President Trump moves forward with the previously-announced tariffs, but also a sizeable rally if a deal is negotiated. Chart 6A Tentative, But Noteworthy Improvement A Tentative, But Noteworthy Improvement A Tentative, But Noteworthy Improvement   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report “2019 Key Views: Four Themes For China In The Coming Year”, dated December 5, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2      Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Trade Is Not China's Only Problem”, dated November 21, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Are Markets Too Pessimistic On U.S. Growth & Inflation? What Is China’s Economic Pain Threshold To Trigger A Policy Response? Have Central Banks Become Less Concerned About Financial Markets? Feature Happy New Year! 2019 has started much like 2018 ended, with elevated global market volatility. The combination of more evidence of slowing global growth – fueled by spillovers from U.S.-China trade tensions – and central banks perceived to be overly hawkish has crushed investor sentiment. Money has flooded out of risk assets like equities and corporate debt and shifted into the traditional safe haven assets – government bonds, surplus currencies like the Japanese yen and even gold. U.S. equities and credit, which had been a refuge from the global market weakness for much of last year, have underperformed sharply as markets have moved to price in the global economic softness reaching U.S. shores. These market trends obviously run counter to our recommended positioning for overall portfolio duration (below benchmark) and credit exposure (neutral overall, favoring the U.S. over Europe and Emerging Markets). Yet we advise staying the course with our recommendations, as market pricing has become too pessimistic relative to likely global growth and inflation outcomes. The bulk of the recent decline in global bond yields has come from falling inflation expectations, which have been linked to the sharp fall in oil prices seen in the final months of 2018 (Chart of the Week). This is shown in Table 1, which presents the breakdown of the decline in the 10-year benchmark government bond yields for the major developed markets since the peak in U.S. Treasury yields back on November 8. Real yields have fallen by a more modest amount than inflation expectations in most countries, even with the pullback in cyclical indicators like the global PMI. Expected 2019 rate hikes are now fully priced out of money market curves, most notably in the U.S. Chart of the WeekSlowing Growth Is Not Why Yields Have Plunged Slowing Growth Is Not Why Yields Have Plunged Slowing Growth Is Not Why Yields Have Plunged   Table 1Decomposing 10-Year Yield Changes Since The November 2018 Peak Three Big Questions To Start Off 2019 Three Big Questions To Start Off 2019 In our view, there are three vital questions regarding the recent market turbulence that must be answered before determining the appropriate global fixed income investment strategy over the next 6-12 months. The answers lead us to maintain our current recommendations on duration, country allocation and credit exposure, even with the recent market turbulence. 1) Are Markets Too Pessimistic On U.S. Growth & Inflation? The December reading for the U.S. ISM Manufacturing purchasing managers’ index (PMI) released last week showed the largest single month deceleration since 2008 (Chart 2). All the main subcomponents of the ISM index fell, including the New Orders and Export indices which are now close to falling below the 50 threshold (Chart 3). Coming on the heels of China’s PMI dipping below 50, markets became more worried that the mighty U.S. economy was being dragged down to the weaker pace of growth seen outside the U.S. Chart 2Decomposing 10-Year Yield Changes Since The November 2018 Peak Decomposing 10-Year Yield Changes Since The November 2018 Peak Decomposing 10-Year Yield Changes Since The November 2018 Peak   Chart 3U.S. ISM Overstating U.S. Economic Weakness U.S. ISM Overstating U.S. Economic Weakness U.S. ISM Overstating U.S. Economic Weakness Yet when looking a broader array of U.S. indicators, the domestic economy still appears to be in good shape, albeit with some lost growth momentum. Consumer confidence remains solid, employment growth is accelerating, household incomes are growing at a faster pace and the personal savings rate remains elevated – all of which provide support for a faster pace of consumer spending (third panel). At the same time, the U.S. Conference Board leading economic indicator is still pointing to a healthy above-trend pace of GDP growth in 2019. U.S. Treasury yields have fallen to levels consistent with the drift lower in the ISM index (top panel), with the market now discounting one full 25bp rate cut to occur within the next twelve months. That will not happen given the tightness of the U.S. labor market and persistence of underlying domestic inflation pressures. The robust December gain reported in last Friday’s U.S. Payrolls report (+312k) may have surprised the markets, but our U.S. Employment Growth model had been signaling a faster pace of job growth for the past several months (Chart 4). The year-over-year growth in Average Hourly Earnings rose to 3.2%, the highest level in nearly a decade. With the overall unemployment still at a historically low 3.9% as labor demand is increasing, wages are likely to remain under upward pressure in the next 6-12 months. Chart 4U.S. Employment & Wages Are Accelerating U.S. Employment & Wages Are Accelerating U.S. Employment & Wages Are Accelerating Given this backdrop of economic growth that is likely to remain above-trend throughout 2019, it will be difficult to generate a sustained downturn in U.S. inflation this year, even given the lagged impact of the strong U.S. dollar and lower oil prices. While some decline in headline inflation measures is inevitable in the coming months given the rapid pace and magnitude of the 2018 oil plunge, BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy team continues to see a positive demand/supply balance helping push oil prices back towards the $80/bbl level in 2019.1 That would ensure that any decline in headline U.S. inflation would be short in duration, and of far less magnitude than the move that occurred after the 2014/15 oil plunge given the more robust domestic inflation backdrop (Chart 5). Chart 5This Is NOT A Repeat Of the 2015/16 Deflation Scare This Is NOT A Repeat Of the 2015/16 Deflation Scare This Is NOT A Repeat Of the 2015/16 Deflation Scare A sober assessment of the U.S. economic and inflation data leads us to conclude that U.S. interest rate markets have swung too far to the dovish side. The inflation expectations component of U.S. Treasury yields is now too low, and the Fed rate cut that is now discounted in money markets will not materialize. Rate hikes are the more likely outcome, the repricing of which will put renewed upward pressure on Treasury yields. 2) What Is China’s Economic Pain Threshold To Trigger A Policy Response? Of the potential catalysts that could turn the current investor pessimism into optimism, signs of improving Chinese growth would likely top the list. China’s economy has lost considerable momentum, with year-over-year real GDP growth slowing to 6.5% in the third quarter of last year and higher frequency data showing a further deceleration in the fourth quarter. The profit warning issued by Apple last week, prompted by an unexpectedly sharp slowing of Chinese mobile phone demand, is a sign that Chinese consumer spending may be faltering. There are several causes for the growth slump, both domestic and foreign. Chinese authorities have been clamping down on domestic leverage given elevated private debt levels, while also taking action to reduce domestic pollution levels – policies that all have helped dampen industrial activity. More recently, and more importantly, the U.S.-China tariff war has started to have a real economic impact on the economy through slowing trade activity and diminished business confidence. Given the Chinese government’s perpetual interest in maintaining domestic stability by limiting any cyclical increases in unemployment, the incentive is there for policymakers to provide renewed stimulus to put a floor under economic growth. The last such boost came in 2015/16, when the Chinese government implemented an aggressive expansion of fiscal spending alongside monetary policy measures such as interest rate cuts, reductions in reserve requirement ratios and currency depreciation. That package was enough to cause a sharp reacceleration of the Chinese economy, but only after nominal GDP growth had fallen to an 16-year low of 6.4% at the end of 2015 (Chart 6). Chart 6Nominal China Growth Less Than 7.5% Should Trigger More Stimulus … Nominal China Growth < 7.5% Should Trigger More Stimulus... Nominal China Growth < 7.5% Should Trigger More Stimulus... Policymakers will likely be forced into action again in 2019 if nominal GDP growth, which hit 9.6% in the third quarter of 2018, falls back below 7.5%. Forward-looking economic measures like our Li Keqiang leading indicator and the export orders component of China’s manufacturing PMI suggest that weaker growth outcome could occur by mid-2019. China’s policymakers are likely to announce some form of stimulus in the first half of the year help counteract the growth slump, which could help boost global investor confidence (especially if it is accompanied by a new trade agreement with the U.S.). While Chinese policymakers are now under more pressure to provide stimulus measures, the tools available to them are more limited than was the case in 2015/16 (Chart 7). Interest rate cuts could happen if growth continues to fall more rapidly than expected, but that would create a burst in private sector leverage that policymakers would seek to avoid. The currency could also be weakened further, but the USD/CNY exchange rate is already back to near the 7.0 level reached in the 2016 devaluation. Chart 7...Atlhough Policy Options Are More Limited Than 2016 ...Atlhough Policy Options Are More Limited Than 2016 ...Atlhough Policy Options Are More Limited Than 2016 That leaves additional cuts in the reserve requirement ratio and increases in fiscal spending as the two most likely means for China to stimulate its economy in the coming months. Yet even the fiscal channel has limits, given the much higher starting point for the budget deficit today (3.7% of GDP) than in 2015 (2%). So while the trigger for a China policy stimulus will likely be reached by mid-2019, the magnitude of the stimulus will be nowhere near as large as the 2015/16 measures. This will help stabilize global growth expectations, but likely not by enough to provide a major boost to global commodity prices or export demand from emerging market countries that are heavily dependent on China. This leads us to remain cautious on emerging market credit exposure, as we prefer to own U.S. corporate debt instead where the growth/profit outlook is better. 3) Have Central Banks Become Less Concerned About Financial Markets? A popular market narrative of late has been that the Fed “made a mistake” with its last rate hike in December. A similar argument was made for the ECB choosing the end its Asset Purchase Program last month with inflation still well short of its target and European growth decelerating. The idea that central banks had fallen “out of tune” with financial markets has spooked investors who fear that policymakers are carrying out a pre-conceived plan to normalize monetary policy without any regard to financial markets. We find this to be a highly dubious conclusion. Central bankers still care about financial markets – or, more accurately, financial conditions – but the hurdle for policymakers to respond to falling asset prices is higher now than in previous years because of a lack of spare economic capacity. Simply put, any tightening of financial conditions must be large enough to trigger a slowing of growth to a below-potential pace, resulting in rising unemployment and weaker inflation pressures. That has not been the case – yet – in the major developed economies. Financial conditions indices (FCIs) – which measure the combined impact of equity prices, credit spreads and currencies – typically lead economic growth by 2-3 quarters. The latest selloffs in equity and credit markets in the U.S. and Europe, while significant, have not been large enough to push FCIs for those regions to levels that would be consistent with below-trend growth, using the 2015/16 episode as a reference point (Chart 8). Chart 8Tightening Financial Conditions Not Signaling Below-Trend Growth...Yet Tightening Financial Conditions Not Signaling Below-Trend Growth...Yet Tightening Financial Conditions Not Signaling Below-Trend Growth...Yet Financial conditions in the U.S. are much closer to that 2015/16 reference point than in Europe, where bond yields remain very depressed and the euro is still an undervalued currency. Yet the domestic U.S. economy is in a much better state than was the case in 2015/16, as discussed earlier in this report. It is highly likely that the level of the U.S. FCI that would trigger a move to below-trend U.S. growth is much different today than in 2015/16. In other words, it would take a bigger widening of U.S. corporate credit spreads, or a sharper selloff in U.S. equity values, to generate the same type of drag on U.S. growth relative to 2015/16. Yet U.S. interest rate markets have already responded as if there was no such change in the amount of FCI tightening that would result in a more dovish Fed policy. The U.S. money markets have gone from pricing three rate hikes in 2019 to one rate cut, while bond investors have largely neutralized their bearish Treasury duration positioning (Chart 9). Chart 9USTs Now Discounting Too Much Fed Dovishness USTs Now Discounting Too Much Fed Dovishness USTs Now Discounting Too Much Fed Dovishness That swing in sentiment on the Fed’s next move flies in the face of the underlying health of the U.S. economic data, as well as our Fed Monitor which continues to signal the need for more Fed rate hikes (Chart 10). Our other Central Bank Monitors tell a similar story (outside of Australia), with the Monitors signaling no need for easier monetary policy but with money markets pricing out any probability of a rate hike over the next year. This leaves global government bond yields exposed to any sign that global growth momentum is stabilizing, particularly with the inflation expectations component of bond yields also vulnerable to a rebound in oil prices (Chart 11). Chart 10Bond Yields Are Now Exposed To A Repricing Of Rate Hikes Bond Yields Are Now Exposed To A Repricing Of Rate Hikes Bond Yields Are Now Exposed To A Repricing Of Rate Hikes   Chart 11Bond Yields Are Now Exposed To A Rebound In Oil Prices Bond Yields Are Now Exposed To A Rebound In Oil Prices Bond Yields Are Now Exposed To A Rebound In Oil Prices Our conclusion is that financial conditions in the major economies have not yet tightened by enough to end the process of normalizing global monetary policy from the extraordinarily accommodative settings seen in recent years. In other words, bond yields have not yet peaked for this cycle.   Robert Robis, CFA, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, “Oil Volatility Will Persist: 2019 Brent Forecast Lowered to $80/bbl”, dated January 3rd 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Three Big Questions To Start Off 2019 Three Big Questions To Start Off 2019 Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Chart 1Checklist To Buy Credit Checklist To Buy Credit Checklist To Buy Credit The sell-off in spread product continued through the holiday season, but with spreads now looking more attractive, it is time to consider increasing exposure to corporate credit. Much like in 2015/16, spread widening is being driven by the combination of weaker global growth and the perception of restrictive monetary policy. With that in mind, we are monitoring a checklist of global growth and monetary policy indicators to help us decide when to step back in.1 With the market now pricing-in rate cuts for the next 12 months, monetary policy indicators already signal a buying opportunity (Chart 1). However, before increasing spread product exposure from neutral to overweight we are waiting for a signal from our high frequency global growth indicators. The CRB Raw Industrials index has so far only flattened off (Chart 1, top panel). It started to rise prior to the early-2016 peak in credit spreads. Investors should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration on a 6-12 month investment horizon, and a neutral allocation to spread product for now. We expect to upgrade spread product in the near future as global growth indicators stabilize. Stay tuned. Feature Investment Grade: Neutral Investment grade corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 106 basis points in December. The index option-adjusted spread widened 16 bps on the month to reach 153 bps. Corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 320 bps in 2018, making it the worst year for corporate bond performance since 2011. Recent poor performance has restored some value to the corporate bond sector. The 12-month breakeven spread for Baa-rated debt has only been wider 37% of the time since 1988 (Chart 2). As a result, we are actively looking for an opportunity to increase exposure to corporate bonds. Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview To assess when to raise exposure from neutral to overweight, we are monitoring a checklist of indicators related to global growth and monetary policy.2 While current spread levels present an attractive tactical entry point, spreads may not re-tighten all the way back to their post-crisis lows. Corporate profit growth far outpaced debt growth during the past year causing our measure of gross leverage to fall (panel 4), but a stronger dollar and rising wage bill will weigh on profit growth in 2019. We expect gross corporate leverage to rise in 2019. Chart   Chart High-Yield: Neutral High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 366 basis points in December. The average index option-adjusted spread widened 108 bps, and currently sits at 498 bps. High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 363 bps in 2018, making it the worst year for high-yield excess returns since 2015. Our measure of the excess spread available in the High-Yield index after accounting for expected default losses is currently 394 bps, well above average historical levels (Chart 3). In other words, if corporate defaults match the Moody’s baseline forecast for the next 12 months, high-yield bonds will return 394 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries, assuming no change in spreads. If we factor in enough spread compression to bring the default-adjusted spread back to its historical average, then we get a 12-month expected excess return of 814 bps. Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview For a different perspective on valuation, we can also calculate the default rate necessary for High-Yield to deliver 12-month excess returns in line with the historical average. As of today, this spread-implied default rate is 4.58%, well above the 2.64% default rate anticipated by Moody’s (panel 4). Junk bond value is definitely attractive, and as stated on the front page of this report, we are looking for an opportunity to tactically upgrade the sector. That being said, the uptrend in job cut announcements makes it likely that default rate forecasts will be revised higher in 2019 (bottom panel). At present, spreads appear to offer enough of a buffer to absorb these upward revisions. MBS: Neutral Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 15 basis points in December. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility spread widened 8 bps on the month, driven by a 7 bps increase in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) and a 1 bp widening in the option-adjusted spread (OAS). MBS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 59 bps in 2018. The zero-volatility spread widened 12 bps on the year, split between a 10 bps widening in the OAS and a 2 bps increase in the option cost. Lower mortgage rates during the past two months spurred a small jump in refinancings, but this increase will prove fleeting. Interest rates are poised to move higher in 2019, and higher rates will limit mortgage refi activity and keep a lid on MBS spreads (Chart 4). Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview All in all, with higher interest rates likely to limit refinancings, and with mortgage lending standards still easing from restrictive levels (bottom panel), the macro back-drop for MBS remains supportive. Elevated corporate bond spreads currently offer a better opportunity than those in the MBS space, but the supportive macro back-drop means that there is very low risk of significant MBS spread widening during the next 12 months. We maintain a neutral allocation to MBS for now, and will only look to upgrade the sector as the credit cycle matures and it becomes time to adopt an underweight allocation to corporate credit. For the time being, corporate bonds are the more attractive play. Government-Related: Underweight The Government-Related index underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 31 basis points in December, and by 80 bps in 2018. Sovereign debt underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 77 bps in December and by 263 bps in 2018. Sovereign spreads still appear unattractive compared to similarly-rated U.S. corporate spreads (Chart 5). Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Foreign Agencies underperformed by 24 bps in December and by 152 bps in 2018. Local Authorities underperformed by 86 bps in December and by 75 bps in 2018. Domestic Agencies underperformed by 7 bps in December and by 6 bps in 2018. Supranationals outperformed by 3 bps in December and by 22 bps in 2018. In a recent report we looked at USD-denominated Emerging Market Sovereign debt by country and found that only a few nations offer excess spread compared to equivalently-rated U.S. corporates.3 Those countries are Argentina, Turkey, Lebanon and Ukraine at the low-end of the credit spectrum and Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE at the upper-end. We continue to view the Local Authority sector as very attractive. The sector offers similar value to Aa/A-rated corporate debt on a breakeven spread basis (bottom panel), and it is also dominated by taxable municipal securities that are insulated from weak foreign economic growth. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 114 basis points in December, and by 17 bps in 2018 (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio rose 2% in December, and currently sits at 87% (Chart 6). This is about one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean but above the average of 81% that prevailed in the late stages of the previous cycle, between mid-2006 and mid-2007. Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview In our research into the phases of the credit cycle, we often divide the cycle based on the slope of the yield curve. Since 1983, in the middle phase of the credit cycle when the 3/10 Treasury slope is between 0 bps and +50 bps (where it stands today), investment grade corporate bonds have delivered annualized excess returns of -49 bps. In contrast, municipal bonds have delivered annualized excess returns of +45 bps before adjusting for the tax advantage.4 We attribute the pattern of mid-cycle outperformance to the fact that state & local government balance sheet health tends to lag the health of the corporate sector. At present, our Municipal Health Monitor remains in “improving health” territory, consistent with an environment where ratings upgrades will outpace downgrades (bottom panel). Meanwhile, corporations are already deep into the releveraging process. Treasury Curve: Favor The 2-Year Bullet Over The 1/5 Barbell Treasury yields fell sharply in December, but with only minor changes to the slope beyond the 2-year maturity point. The 2/10 slope was unchanged on the month and currently sits at 17 bps. The 5/30 slope steepened 5 bps on the month and currently sits at 49 bps. The biggest changes in slope occurred for maturities less than 2 years, as a result of Fed rate hikes being completely priced out of the curve (Chart 7). Our 12-month Fed Funds Discounter fell from +44 bps at the beginning of the month to -11 bps currently. Meanwhile, our 24-month discounter fell from +41 bps to -23 bps. Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview As a result of the sharp 1/2 flattening, the 2-year note no longer appears cheap relative to the 1/5 barbell (panel 4). Alternatively, we could say that the 1/2/5 butterfly spread is now priced for 15 bps of 1/5 steepening during the next six months (bottom panel). In fact, our yield curve models now point to bullets being expensive relative to barbells for almost every butterfly spread combination (see Tables 4 and 5). This means it is currently less attractive to initiate curve steeper trades than flattener trades. Despite the relatively low yield pick-up in steepener trades, we think they still make sense at the moment given that the Treasury market is discounting an economic outlook that is far too grim. As we discussed in our Key Views report for 2019, sustainable yield curve inversion is unlikely until later in the year, after inflation expectations are re-anchored around pre-crisis levels.5 As such, we maintain our recommendation to favor the 2-year bullet over the duration-matched 1/5 barbell.  TIPS: Overweight TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 196 basis points in December, and by 175 bps in 2018. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 26 bps on the month and currently sits at 1.71%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate also fell 26 bps on the month and currently sits at 1.91%. Long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates have fallen sharply alongside the prices of oil and other commodities during the past two months, as they continue to grapple with two competing forces: Falling commodity prices on the one hand, and U.S. core inflation that continues to print close to the Fed’s target on the other. Eventually, the decisive factor in the TIPS market will be core U.S. inflation continuing to print close to the Fed’s 2% target. This will drive both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates back into a range between 2.3% and 2.5%, once the headwind from weakening commodity prices has passed. This is reinforced by the fact that the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is now well below the fair value from our Adaptive Expectations Model (Chart 8).6 This model is based on a combination of long-run and short-run inflation measures and is premised on the idea that investors’ expectations take time to adjust to changing macro environments. In other words, the market will need to see core inflation print close to the Fed’s target for some time before deciding that it will remain there on a sustained basis. Chart 8Inflation Compensation Inflation Compensation Inflation Compensation ABS: Neutral Asset-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 8 basis points in December, but outperformed by 13 bps in 2018. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened by 6 bps on the month and now stands at 48 bps, 14 bps above its pre-crisis low. The excess return Bond Map on page 15 shows that consumer ABS offer greater expected returns than Domestic Agencies and Supranationals, though with a commensurate increase in risk. The Map also shows that Agency CMBS offer very similar return potential with much less risk. The New York Fed’s most recent SCE Credit Access Survey showed a decline in consumer credit applications during the past year, as well as an increase in rejection rates. This is consistent with the observed uptrends in household interest expense and the consumer credit delinquency rate (Chart 9). Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Going forward, consumer credit delinquencies will continue to rise from very low levels, but are unlikely to spike without a significant deterioration in labor market conditions. As such, we maintain a neutral allocation to consumer ABS for now, but our next move will likely be a reduction to underweight as consumer credit delinquencies rise further. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 62 basis points in December, but outperformed by 20 bps in 2018. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 14 bps on the month and currently sits at 92 bps (Chart 10). A typical negative environment for CMBS is characterized by tightening bank lending standards on commercial real estate loans as well as falling demand. The Fed’s Q3 Senior Loan Officer Survey showed that lending standards were close to unchanged and that demand deteriorated. All in all, a slightly negative macro picture for CMBS that will bear close monitoring in the coming quarters. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 15 bps in December, and by 2 bps in 2018. The index option-adjusted spread widened 4 bps on the month and currently sits at 60 bps. The Bond Maps on page 15 show that Agency CMBS offer high potential return compared to other low-risk spread products. An overweight allocation to this sector continues to make sense. Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview The BCA Bond Maps The following page presents excess return and total return Bond Maps that we use to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the U.S. fixed income market. The Maps employ volatility-adjusted breakeven spread/yield analysis to show how likely it is that a given sector will earn/lose money during the subsequent 12 months. The Maps do not impose any macroeconomic view. The Excess Return Bond Map The horizontal axis of the excess return Bond Map shows the number of days of average spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps versus a position in duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of average spread widening and are therefore less likely to see losses. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average spread tightening required for each sector to earn 100 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of spread tightening and are therefore more likely to earn 100 bps in excess of Treasuries. The Total Return Bond Map The horizontal axis of the total return Bond Map shows the number of days of average yield increase required for each sector to lose 5% in total return terms. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of yield increases and are therefore less likely to lose 5%. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average yield decline required for each sector to earn 5% in total return terms. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of yield decline and are therefore more likely to earn 5%. Chart 11   Chart 12   Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation (As Of January 4, 2019) Get Ready To Buy Credit Get Ready To Buy Credit   Table 5Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Get Ready To Buy Credit Get Ready To Buy Credit   Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Research Analyst JeremieP@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Charts 2A and 2B in U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Fed In 2019”, dated December 18, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 For the full checklist please see Charts 2A and 2B from the U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Fed In 2019”, dated December 18, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Oil Supply Shock Is A Risk For Junk”, dated October 9, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)