Fixed Income
Highlights All the U.S. data look broadly similar to us, …: The data series are decelerating, one by one, but they generally remain at a fairly high level relative to history. … and we have begun sounding like a broken record in our morning meetings, … : “There’s no doubt that [insert data series name here] is slowing, but it’s still nowhere close to heralding a recession. As a matter of fact, it remains at a level consistent with above-trend growth. That’s what we should expect given the pattern of fiscal thrust across last year and this year, combined with still-accommodative monetary policy.” … so we’re revisiting our checklists to see if we should change our bearish rates and bullish equities views: We periodically review our checklists, which we rolled out in the fall, to assess whether or not our positioning rationale still applies. Our recommendations may still be the same, but at least we put them to the test: The business cycle, the inflation outlook, the Fed’s reaction function, the corporate profit outlook, and valuations have not changed enough to dictate changing our views. We continually seek out evidence that we’re getting it wrong, but we haven’t found any in the current data. Feature We have become a bit self-conscious about offering our take on the latest U.S. economic data releases at BCA’s daily morning meetings. It’s one thing to be out of step with the prevailing view, or to offer a novel theory that fails to achieve much traction in the room. (Strategists who don’t get shot down by their peers every once in a while aren’t pushing the conventional wisdom enough.) It’s quite another to keep recycling the same narrative, and we’re at something of a loss for a way to maintain our colleagues’ interest. Beep. You’ve reached the voicemail box of the U.S. Investment Strategy team. We believe today’s (insert series name here) release indicates that while the U.S. economy is decelerating, it continues to be on a path to grow at, if not above, trend in 2019. This is consistent with the 60-basis-point decline in fiscal thrust from 2018 to 2019. That decline is large enough to ensure deceleration in 2019, but the 40 bps that’s still going to be deployed this year is also sufficient to ensure that the economy will be able to grow above its 2% trend rate, provided the rest of the world does not fall apart. Thank you for your call, and please do not hesitate to call again if we can be of any further assistance. Beep. We created our bond upgrade and equity downgrade checklists last fall to help guard against sticking with our views beyond their sell-by date. Both checklists have a negative bias, in that they’re meant to help reveal the points at which the underpinnings of our views no longer apply. The bond checklist is broadly geared to identifying either, one, the presence of slack in the economy that might call for easier policy, or, two, a convergence of the fixed-income markets’ views with ours that would limit the potential payoff from maintaining below-benchmark duration positioning.1 Our equity downgrade checklist looks out for signs of an approaching recession, pressure on corporate earnings, inflation pressures that might inspire the Fed to remove accommodation in a hurry, or signs of euphoria that can’t be sustained.2 Reviewing the data series that comprise the checklists did not lead us to change our views. The exercise does help us adhere to a process, however, and we think they help keep us from falling into an analytical rut. We will revisit them with increasing frequency as the cycles we’re trying to track approach their inflection points, while keeping an eye out for any new indicators that might broaden their insights. Is A Bearish Rates View Still Appropriate? The first section of our bond checklist (Table 1) focuses on market perceptions of the Fed. Following our U.S. Bond Strategy service’s golden rule, if the Fed hikes more than it is expected to hike, long-duration positions will underperform. If it hikes less than expected, long-duration positions will outperform. As implied by the overnight index swap (OIS) curves, the money market now expects that the fed funds rate has peaked at 2.5%, and that a rate cut will likely bring it down to 2.25% by the end of 2020 (Chart 1). Table 1Bond Upgrade Checklist
Status Quo
Status Quo
Chart 1Markets Are Pricing In A Rate Cut
Markets Are Pricing In A Rate Cut
Markets Are Pricing In A Rate Cut
We beg to differ. With little to no slack remaining in the economy as a whole (the output gap is closed), and unemployment well below its natural level and poised to fall further, we think inflation pressures are percolating below the surface. Once they begin to reveal themselves, we expect the Fed will have no choice but to resume its tightening campaign. Our estimate of the equilibrium rate (3% now, rising to about 3⅜% by year-end) appears to be well above the financial markets’ estimate, and we therefore believe the Fed has plenty of room to hike without capsizing the economy. An inverted yield curve has historically been a reliable sign that the Fed has gone too far in its efforts to prevent overheating, and we are watching it now for hints that the fed funds rate may be done rising. Though the curve flattened considerably as the 10-year Treasury yield plunged in the fourth quarter (Chart 2), we think it’s very unlikely to invert while the Fed is on hold. An on-hold Fed implies that the 3-month bill rate will remain in the mid-to-high 2.40s and that the 10-year Treasury yield would have to dip below 2.5% for the curve to invert. Such an outcome would be completely incompatible with below-target inflation and above-trend economic growth. Chart 2The Yield Curve Has Flattened, But Inversion Is A Stretch
The Yield Curve Has Flattened, But Inversion Is A Stretch
The Yield Curve Has Flattened, But Inversion Is A Stretch
Inflation is not yet an issue on most investors’ radar screens because it has been conspicuously missing in action around the developed world for the last ten years. In the U.S., headline measures rolled over upon oil’s slide, masking the fact that the core measures are hovering around 2% and remain in uptrends (Chart 3). Inflation break-evens have plunged, and are well below the 2.3-2.5% level that is consistent with the Fed’s 2% inflation target, but their decline was nearly entirely a function of the decline in oil prices (Chart 4). Our Commodity & Energy Strategy service is calling for higher crude prices across the rest of this year, so even though we’ve checked the break-evens box, we expect we’ll be unchecking it as the break-evens reverse in step with oil. Chart 3Headline Inflation's Decline ...
Headline Inflation's Decline ...
Headline Inflation's Decline ...
Chart 4... Is An Oil Story
... Is An Oil Story
... Is An Oil Story
The labor market remains quite tight. Although the unemployment rate ticked up in December and January, it came down again in February and remains below the estimated natural rate of unemployment where upward wage pressures typically begin to take hold (Chart 5, top panel). Unemployment ticked higher in December and January, despite robust job gains, because the share of working-age Americans participating in the labor force rose. The exodus of the baby boomers from the work force will make it very difficult for the participation rate to keep rising, however (Chart 5, middle panel), and the elevated level of workers quitting their jobs (Chart 5, bottom panel) indicates that employers are poaching workers from one another, driving wages higher. Chart 5The Labor Market Is Tight And Getting Tighter
The Labor Market Is Tight And Getting Tighter
The Labor Market Is Tight And Getting Tighter
Instability is a double-edged sword as it relates to monetary policy. The Fed is likely to return to hiking rates if it believes it can cut off rising instability before it goes too far. If instability is far enough advanced that it threatens the economy, however, the Fed may well ease policy to try to counteract it. For now, it appears to us that the key cyclical segments of the economy are on track to keep warming up, but are nowhere near overheating (Chart 6). We are not overly concerned about the frisky lending climate that Governor Brainard called out in September, but ongoing anecdotal reports of bond-market froth will presumably keep the Fed alert to the need to dial back accommodation. Acutely bad conditions elsewhere in the global economy would make the Fed consider rate cuts, but if the rest of the world perks up by mid-year, in line with BCA’s base case, the Fed will feel less urgency to indemnify the U.S. against foreign distress. Chart 6Cyclical Segments Are Warming Up
Cyclical Segments Are Warming Up
Cyclical Segments Are Warming Up
Should We Still Be Constructive On Equities? Every box in our equity downgrade checklist remains unchecked, starting with our silent recession alarms (Table 2). The yield curve has not inverted, and as we noted in the review of our rates checklist, we do not believe it will while the Fed remains on hold. Growth has come off the boil, but the LEI is not close to contracting on a year-over-year basis (Chart 7). The fed funds rate remains below our estimate of equilibrium, as we expect it will for the rest of the year, and the three-month moving average of the unemployment rate has not risen by a third of a percentage point from its current cyclical bottom. Table 2Equity Downgrade Checklist
Status Quo
Status Quo
Chart 7The LEI May Be Decelerating, But It's Still A Ways From Contracting
The LEI May Be Decelerating, But It's Still A Ways From Contracting
The LEI May Be Decelerating, But It's Still A Ways From Contracting
Labor market tightness will eventually manifest itself in higher wages, which will squeeze corporate profit margins, but until real wage gains begin to outstrip productivity growth (i.e., until labor starts capturing a bigger piece of the pie), corporate earnings will not be at risk (Chart 8). The dollar has spent the last several months going sideways, and BBB corporate yields are now below their level when we rolled out the equity checklist in mid-October (Chart 9). The savings rate has backed up to near the top of its six-year range, and we would check the box if it were to break out of it (Chart 10). There have been no blowups in EM or anywhere in the rest of the world that cast a shadow over U.S. corporate earnings. Chart 8Wage Growth Doesn't Cut Into Profits Until It Outstrips Productivity And Inflation
Wage Growth Doesn't Cut Into Profits Until It Outstrips Productivity And Inflation
Wage Growth Doesn't Cut Into Profits Until It Outstrips Productivity And Inflation
Chart 9Round Trip
Round Trip
Round Trip
Chart 10The Savings Rate Has Risen, But Not Enough To Check The Box
The Savings Rate Has Risen, But Not Enough To Check The Box
The Savings Rate Has Risen, But Not Enough To Check The Box
As noted in our bond checklist comments, above, core inflation measures have dipped below 2% but remain in an uptrend. Both headline CPI and the inflation break-evens relapsed with oil prices, but we expect that a crude recovery will help restore inflation expectations. Bull markets tend to end amid a general feeling of euphoria, and we therefore continue to keep an eye out for signs of over-exuberance. Valuations are elevated but hardly extreme, and we don’t see anecdotal indications of widespread silliness, or suspension of disbelief. Investment Implications From our perspective, overheating in the U.S. remains a very real possibility. Since that is a distinctly minority view, the potential reward for underweighting Treasuries and holding all bond exposures below benchmark duration is alluring. We reiterate our recommendations that investors underweight Treasuries and maintain below-benchmark-duration across their fixed-income portfolios. We expect we will continue to do so until the U.S. economy weakens, or the Treasury curve begins to price in some of our bearish rates view. We reiterate our cyclical recommendation to overweight equities despite the tactical caution we expressed last week.3 We simply expect that the S&P 500 will have to consolidate some of its rapid year-to-date gains before moving on to an eventual new cycle high at 3,000 or above. Stocks don’t go straight up, even if they did for nearly all of January and February, and it is reasonable to expect elevated volatility in the latter stages of a bull market. We thought that the 2,800 level might provide some technical resistance, offering tactically oriented sellers an attractive point to reduce equity exposures, while tactically oriented buyers were likely to find better entry points going forward. Doug Peta, CFA Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “What Would It Take To Change Our Bearish Rates View?,” published September 17, 2018. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see the U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Introducing Our Equity Downgrade Checklist,” published October 15, 2018. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see the U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “How Much Do U.S. Equities Have Left?,” published March 4, 2019. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights Chart 1Track The CRB/Gold Ratio
Track The CRB/Gold Ratio
Track The CRB/Gold Ratio
Earlier this year the Fed signaled a dovish policy shift in response to slowing global growth and tighter financial conditions. In large part due to the Fed’s move, financial conditions are now easing and the CRB Raw Industrials index – a timely proxy for global growth – is starting to perk up. But when will this improvement translate to higher Treasury yields? The CRB/gold ratio offers some clues. Gold moves higher when monetary policy eases. Then with a lag, that easier policy spurs stronger global growth and a rising CRB index. Eventually, that stronger growth puts rate hikes back on the table. A more hawkish Fed limits the upside in gold and sends Treasury yields higher. In fact, we find that the 10-year Treasury yield only starts to rise when the CRB index outpaces the gold price (Chart 1). The recent jump in the CRB index is a positive sign, but we shouldn’t expect Treasury yields to rise until the CRB/gold ratio heads higher. In the meantime, investors should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration and initiate positive-carry yield curve trades (see page 10) to boost returns while we wait for the next upward adjustment in yields. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 59 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +243 bps. The Federal Reserve’s pause opens a window for corporate spreads to tighten during the next few months. We recommend overweight positions in corporate bonds for now, but will be quick to reduce exposure once spreads reach our near-term targets (Chart 2). Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview
Investment Grade Market Overview
Investment Grade Market Overview
In last week’s report we published option-adjusted spread targets for each corporate credit tier.1 The targets are based on the median 12-month breakeven spreads during prior periods when the slope of the yield curve is quite flat but not yet inverted, what we call a Phase 2 environment.2 Currently, the Aa-rated spread of 59 bps is 3 bps above our target (panel 2). The A-rated spread of 91 bps is 6 bps above our target (panel 3). The Baa-rated spread of 156 bps is 28 bps above our target (panel 4). The Aaa-rated spread is already below our target. We advise investors to avoid the Aaa-rated credit tier. With profit growth poised to moderate during the next few quarters, it is unlikely that gross corporate leverage will continue to decline at its current pace (bottom panel). As such, we will be quick to reduce corporate bond exposure when spreads reach our targets. Renewed Fed hawkishness will be another headwind for corporate bonds in the second half of the year.
Chart
Chart
High-Yield: Overweight High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 175 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +590 bps. In last week’s report we published near-term spread targets for each high-yield credit tier.3 The targets are based on the median 12-month breakeven spreads seen during periods when the yield curve is quite flat but not yet inverted, what we call a Phase 2 environment.4 At present, the Ba-rated option-adjusted spread is 224 bps, 37 bps above our target. The B-rated spread is 376 bps, 81 bps above our target. The Caa-rated spread is 780 bps, 208 bps above our target. Our default-adjusted spread is an alternative measure of high-yield valuation. It represents the excess spread available in the High-Yield index after accounting for expected default losses. It is currently 243 bps, very close to the historical average of 250 bps (Chart 3). In other words, if corporate defaults match the Moody’s baseline forecast during the next 12 months, high-yield bonds will return 243 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries, assuming no change in spreads. Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview
High-Yield Market Overview
High-Yield Market Overview
The Moody’s baseline forecast calls for a default rate of 2.4% during the next 12 months. This appears a touch too optimistic, as our own macro model is calling for a default rate closer to 3.5%.5 In either case, junk bonds currently offer adequate compensation for default risk. MBS: Neutral Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 6 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +39 bps. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility spread tightened 2 bps on the month, driven by a 5 bps decline in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost). The fall in option cost was partially offset by a 3 bps widening in the option-adjusted spread (OAS). The recent drop in the 30-year mortgage rate led to a jump in mortgage refinancings from historically low levels, putting some temporary upward pressure on MBS spreads (Chart 4). However, the relatively tepid pace of new issuance during the past few years means that the existing MBS stock is not very exposed to refinancing risk, even if mortgage rates fall further. All in all, we view agency MBS as one of the safest spread products in the current macro environment. Chart 4MBS Market Overview
MBS Market Overview
MBS Market Overview
The problem with MBS is that valuation remains unattractive. The index option-adjusted spread for conventional 30-year MBS is well below its average pre-crisis level (panel 3) and the sector offers less compensation than normal compared to corporate bonds (panel 4). We continue to recommend a neutral allocation to agency MBS. An upgrade will only be appropriate when value in the corporate sector is no longer attractive relative to expected default risk. Government-Related: Underweight The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 38 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +92 bps. Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 97 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +320 bps. Local Authorities outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 54 bps in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +86 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed by 44 bps in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +109 bps, while Domestic Agencies outperformed by 12 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +9 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 10 bps in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +13 bps. The USD-denominated sovereign debt of most countries continues to look expensive relative to equivalently-rated U.S. corporate credit. However, in a recent report we highlighted that Mexican sovereign debt is an exception (Chart 5).6 Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview
Government-Related Market Overview
Government-Related Market Overview
Not only is Mexican sovereign debt cheap relative to U.S. corporate credit, but our Emerging Markets Strategy service highlights that the Mexican peso is very cheap as measured by the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs.7 This is not surprising given that the peso has been relatively flat versus the dollar during the past two years, despite real interest rates being much higher in Mexico than in the U.S. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 85 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +92 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal / Treasury yield ratio fell 5% in February, and currently sits at 81% (Chart 6). This is more than one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean and right at the average level that prevailed in the late stages of the previous cycle, between mid-2006 and mid-2007. Chart 6Municipal Market Overview
Municipal Market Overview
Municipal Market Overview
In other words, municipal bonds on average are no longer cheap. Rather, they appear fairly valued compared to similar prior macro environments. But a pure focus on the average yield ratio across the curve hides an important distinction. The yield ratio for short maturities (2-year and 5-year) is very low relative to history, while the yield ratio for long maturities (10-year, 20-year and 30-year) remains quite cheap (panel 2). Investors should continue to focus on long-maturity municipal debt to add yield to U.S. bond portfolios. In our research into the phases of the credit cycle, we often divide the cycle based on the slope of the yield curve. Since 1983, in the middle phase of the credit cycle when the 3/10 Treasury slope is between 0 bps and 50 bps (where it stands today), investment grade corporate bonds have delivered annualized excess returns of +3 bps. In contrast, municipal bonds have delivered annualized excess returns of +64 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage).8 Given strong historical returns during the current phase of the cycle and the fact that our Municipal Health Monitor remains in “improving health” territory (bottom panel), we advocate an overweight allocation to municipal bonds. Treasury Curve: Favor 2/30 Barbell Over 7-Year Bullet Treasury yields rose in February, led by the long-end of the curve. The 2/10 Treasury slope steepened 3 bps on the month and currently sits at 21 bps. The 5/30 slope steepened 1 bp on the month and currently sits at 57 bps. Our 12-month fed funds discounter remains below zero, meaning that the market is priced for rate cuts during the next year (Chart 7). We continue to view rate hikes as more likely than cuts on this time horizon, and therefore recommend yield curve trades that will profit from a move higher in our discounter. In prior research we found that the 5-year and 7-year Treasury maturities are most sensitive to changes in our discounter, so any trade where you sell the 5-year or 7-year bullet and buy a duration-matched barbell consisting of the long and short ends of the curve will provide the appropriate exposure.9 Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview
Treasury Yield Curve Overview
Treasury Yield Curve Overview
An added benefit of implementing a barbell over bullet strategy in the current environment is that barbells currently offer higher yields than bullets, meaning that you earn positive carry as you wait for the market to price rate hikes back into the curve (bottom 2 panels).10 Not surprisingly, barbell strategies also look attractively valued on our yield curve models, the output of which is found in Appendix B. TIPS: Overweight TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 36 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +120 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 11 bps on the month and currently sits at 1.96%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 7 bps on the month and currently sits at 2.07%. Both rates remain below the 2.3% - 2.5% range that has historically been consistent with inflation expectations that are well-anchored around the Fed’s target. After last month’s increase, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is currently very close to the fair value reading from our Adaptive Expectations model (Chart 8).11 This model is based on a combination of backward-looking and forward-looking inflation measures and is premised on the idea that investors’ inflation expectations take time to adjust to changing macro environments. The current fair value reading from the model is 1.97%, but that fair value will trend steadily higher as long as core CPI inflation remains above 1.84%. The 1.84% threshold is the annualized trailing 10-year growth rate in core CPI, and it is the most important variable in the model. Chart 8Inflation Compensation
Inflation Compensation
Inflation Compensation
On that note, core CPI has increased at an annual rate of 2.58% during the past four months, well above the necessary threshold. And while some forward-looking inflation measures have moderated, notably the ISM Prices Paid index (panel 3), this is largely a reaction to the recent drop in energy prices. A drop that should reverse as global growth improves in the coming months. ABS: Neutral Cut To Underweight Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 22 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +38 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS narrowed 8 bps on the month and currently sits at 31 bps, 3 bps below its pre-crisis low (Chart 9). Chart 9ABS Market Overview
ABS Market Overview
ABS Market Overview
Our excess return Bond Map, shown in Appendix C on page 18, shows that Aaa-rated ABS offer a relatively poor risk/reward trade-off compared to other U.S. bond sectors. Aaa-rated auto loan ABS in particular offer greater risk and lower potential return than the Aggregate Plus index (the Bloomberg Barclays Aggregate index plus high-yield). Tight spreads look even more unattractive when you consider that the delinquency rate for consumer credit is rising, and according to the uptrend in household interest expense, will continue to march higher in the coming quarters (panel 4). Lending standards are also tightening for both credit cards and auto loans, a dynamic that often coincides with a rising delinquency rate and wider ABS spreads (bottom panel). Given the recent spread tightening, we advise investors to reduce consumer ABS exposure in U.S. bond portfolios. Other sectors, such as Agency CMBS, offer a more attractive risk/reward trade-off within high-rated spread product. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 74 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +142 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS tightened 13 bps on the month and currently sits at 93 bps, below the average pre-crisis level but somewhat higher than the recent tights (Chart 10). Chart 10CMBS Market Overview
CMBS Market Overview
CMBS Market Overview
The Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Survey showed that banks tightened lending standards on commercial real estate (CRE) loans in Q4 and witnessed falling demand (bottom 2 panels). This, coupled with decelerating CRE prices paints a relatively negative picture for non-agency CMBS. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Teasury index by 49 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +77 bps. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 8 bps on the month and currently sits at 48 bps. The excess return Bond Map in Appendix C shows that Agency CMBS offer high potential return compared to other low-risk spread products. An overweight allocation to this defensive sector continues to make sense. Appendix A - The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing We follow a two-step process to formulate recommendations for bond portfolio duration. First, we determine the change in the federal funds rate that is priced into the yield curve for the next 12 months. Second, we decide – based on our assessments of the economy and Fed policy – whether the change in the fed funds rate will exceed or fall short of what is priced into the curve. Most of the time, a correct answer to this question leads to the appropriate duration call. We call this framework the Golden Rule Of Bond Investing, and we demonstrated its effectiveness in the U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Chart 11 illustrates the Golden Rule’s track record by showing that the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Master Index tends to outperform cash when rate hikes fall short of 12-month expectations, and vice-versa. At present, the market is priced for 2 basis points of rate cuts during the next 12 months. Given that we expect the Fed to deliver rate hikes in the second half of this year, we recommend that investors maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. Chart 11The Golden Rule's Track Record
The Golden Rule's Track Record
The Golden Rule's Track Record
We can also use our Golden Rule framework to make 12-month total return forecasts for the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index under different scenarios for the change in the fed funds rate. To forecast total returns we first calculate the 12-month fed funds rate surprise in each scenario by comparing the assumed change in the fed funds rate to the current value of our 12-month discounter. This rate hike surprise is then mapped to an expected change in the Treasury index yield using a regression based on the historical relationship between those two variables. Finally, we apply the expected change in index yield to the current characteristics (yield, duration and convexity) of the Treasury index to estimate total returns on a 12-month horizon. The below tables present those results, along with 95% confidence intervals.
Image
Image
Appendix B - Butterfly Strategy Valuation The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of +55 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 55 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As of February 28, 2019)
The Sequence Of Reflation
The Sequence Of Reflation
Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As of February 28, 2019)
The Sequence Of Reflation
The Sequence Of Reflation
Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs)
The Sequence Of Reflation
The Sequence Of Reflation
Appendix C - Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the U.S. fixed income market. The Map employs volatility-adjusted breakeven spread analysis to show how likely it is that a given sector will earn/lose money during the subsequent 12 months. The Map does not incorporate any macroeconomic view. The horizontal axis of the Map shows the number of days of average spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps versus a position in duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of average spread widening and are therefore less likely to see losses. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average spread tightening required for each sector to earn 100 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of spread tightening and are therefore more likely to earn 100 bps of excess return.
Chart 12
Ryan Swift, U.S. Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Research Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Paid To Wait”, dated February 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Paid To Wait”, dated February 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Value In Corporate Bonds”, dated February 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Value In Corporate Bonds”, dated February 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “Dissecting China’s Stimulus”, dated January 17, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Don’t Position For Curve Inversion”, dated January 22, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Paid To Wait”, dated February 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 11 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018 available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation
Feature Recommendations
Monthly Portfolio Update
Monthly Portfolio Update
Two Key Questions For Asset Allocators Stocks have rallied this year – MSCI ACWI is up 17% from its late December low – despite the fact that economic growth outside the U.S. has continued to deteriorate. The PMI in Germany has fallen to 47.6, in Japan to 48.5, and the average in Emerging Markets to 49.5 (Chart 1). Chart 1PMIs Ex-U.S. Still Falling
PMIs Ex-U.S. Still Falling
PMIs Ex-U.S. Still Falling
U.S. growth remains robust, though recent data have showed some signs of weakness. The Citigroup Economic Surprise Index has fallen sharply, capex indicators have slipped, and December retail sales were terrible (Chart 2). The New York Fed NowCast for Q1 is now pointing at only 1.2% real GDP growth. Most of the slippage, however, was caused by the six-week government shutdown, and should be reversed in Q2. And the retail sales number appears “rogue”, perhaps caused by irregular data-collection methods during the shutdown, since other retail data do not support it (Chart 2, panel 3). The tightening of financial conditions in the last months of 2018 – which has now partly reversed – may have added to the slowdown (Chart 3). BCA’s view is that U.S. GDP growth is likely to come in well above 2% in 2019, slower than last year’s 2.9% but still above trend. Chart 2Should We Worry About U.S. Growth Too?
Should We Worry About U.S. Growth Too?
Should We Worry About U.S. Growth Too?
Chart 3Financial Conditions Now Easing
Financial Conditions Now Easing
Financial Conditions Now Easing
Our recommendation, therefore, is to continue to overweight equities (particularly U.S. equities), which should be supported by decent earnings growth (our top-down model points to 12% EPS growth for the S&P500 this year, compared to a bottom-up consensus forecast of only 5%), reasonable valuations, and sentiment that appears still to be damaged by the Q4 sell-off (Chart 4). Chart 4Environment Still Positive For U.S. Equities
Environment Still Positive For U.S. Equities
Environment Still Positive For U.S. Equities
Two key questions will determine which asset allocation will be optimal this year. First, how long will the Fed stay “patient” and keep rates on hold? The futures market has almost completely priced out the possibility of any rate hikes in 2019, and even assigns a 15% probability of a cut (Chart 5). We still see upside risk to inflation, with core PCE likely to print above the Fed’s target of 2% by mid-year, partly because of the year-on-year base effect (in January 2018, monthly inflation was especially high), but also because underlying inflation pressures remain (Chart 6). Chart 5Is The Fed Really Going To Cut Rates?
Is The Fed Really Going To Cut Rates?
Is The Fed Really Going To Cut Rates?
Chart 6Inflation Pressures Haven't Gone Away
Inflation Pressures Haven't Gone Away
Inflation Pressures Haven't Gone Away
The market has misunderstood two of the Fed’s recent messages. Its mooted plan to end balance-sheet reduction by year-end is not intended as part of monetary policy. It is simply that bank excess reserves will have reached USD1-1.2 trillion, the level required to operate monetary policy using current tools, rather than those used before 2007 when reserves were zero (Chart 7). Second, recent discussions about changing the Fed’s inflation target from 2% a year to a price-level target will probably become effective only when the effective lower bound is hit in the next recession and, anyway, no decision will be taken until mid-2020. Chart 7Excess Reserves Will Be At Equilibrium Soon
Excess Reserves Will Be At Equilibrium Soon
Excess Reserves Will Be At Equilibrium Soon
The market has taken this talk as dovish. We read recent comments by Fed Chairman Jay Powell to mean that if, by June, the economy is robust, risk assets are still rebounding, and inflation is ticking up, the Fed will continue to hike, maybe two or three times by year-end. This implies long-term bond yields will rise too. Equities may wobble initially but, as long as the Fed is hiking because growth is solid and not because of an inflation scare, this should not undermine the 12-month case for equity outperformance. The second key question is whether China has now abandoned its focus on deleveraging and switched to a 2016-style liquidity-driven stimulus. Certainly, the January total social financing number pointed in that direction, with new credit creation of almost 5 trillion RMB ($750 billion) and the first signs of an easing of restrictions on shadow banking (Chart 8). But the jury is still out on whether this is the massive reflation the market has been waiting for. Premier Li Keqiang criticized the increase, saying, “the increase in total social financing appears rather large…it may also bring new potential risks”. A PBOC official commented that the big increase was “due to seasonal factors” and emphasized that China was not embarking on “flood irrigation-style” stimulus. The recent more positive noises on the U.S./China trade war may also alleviate the pressure on China to stimulate. Chart 8First Signs Of Chinese Reflation?
First Signs Of Chinese Reflation?
First Signs Of Chinese Reflation?
If and when Chinese growth does rebound, this will have major implications for asset allocation. It would signal a bottoming of the global cycle, which would favor stocks in Emerging Markets, Europe and Japan. It would push up commodity prices, and imply a weaker dollar. For now, we are not positioning ourselves like this, since global growth remains weak. Nonetheless, the first signs of a bottoming are appearing with, for example, the diffusion index of the global Leading Economic Index (which often leads the LEI itself) turning up (Chart 9). We may shift in this direction mid-year, and are now making some minor changes to our recommendations (see below) to hedge against this risk. But for the moment we prefer U.S. equities, expect further USD appreciation, and remain cautious on EM. Chart 9Is The LEI Close To Bottoming?
Is The LEI Close To Bottoming?
Is The LEI Close To Bottoming?
Equities: We prefer U.S. equities given their better growth, reasonable valuations, and depressed sentiment (despite their outperformance year-to-date). But we are watching for an opportunity to increase our weighting in Europe, where growth still looks poor but may rebound in H2 due to fiscal stimulus, improving wage growth, a dovish turn by the ECB, and an eventual recovery in exports to China (Chart 10). We still see problems in EM, since earnings growth expectations need to be revised down further and stock prices have risen prematurely on expectations of a Chinese recovery (Chart 11). But we reduce the size of our underweight bet, to hedge against Chinese credit growth continuing to accelerate. We are also raising our recommendation for the industrials sector (with its large weight in capital goods companies dependent on exports to China) to overweight for the same reason. We fund this by cutting consumer staples to underweight. We also raise our weighting on the energy sector, given our positive view on oil prices (see below). This gives our sector weightings a slightly more cyclical tilt, in line with our macro view. Chart 10Some Good News In Europe Too
Some Good News In Europe Too
Some Good News In Europe Too
Chart 11EM Has Further Downside
EM Has Further Downside
EM Has Further Downside
Fixed Income: It has been a conundrum this year why equities have risen and credit spreads tightened significantly, but the 10-year Treasury yield remains stuck below 2.7%. One explanation is that inflation expectations have been dampened by the crude oil price and if, as we forecast, oil continues to recover, the inflation component of the yield will rise (Chart 12). U.S. yields have also been dragged down by weak growth in other developed markets, where bond yields have therefore fallen. The spread between U.S. and German and Japanese yields reached record high levels in late 2018 (Chart 13). The term premium also is deeply into negative territory because many investors remain highly bearish and have hedged this view by buying Treasuries. If our view of robust U.S. growth, rising inflation, and more Fed hikes is correct, we would see 10-year Treasury yields rising towards 3.5% over the next 12 months. Accordingly, we are underweight global government bonds. We raised credit to neutral last month, but continue to have some qualms about this asset class, and prefer equities as a way of taking exposure to further upside for risk assets. Besides high leverage among U.S. corporates, we are worried about the deterioration in the quality of the credit market, since duration has been extended, covenants weakened, and the average credit rating fallen (Chart 14). Chart 12Inflation Expectations Driven By Oil
Inflation Expectations Driven By Oil
Inflation Expectations Driven By Oil
Chart 13U.S. Yields Pulled Down By Europe And Japan
U.S. Yields Pulled Down By Europe And Japan
U.S. Yields Pulled Down By Europe And Japan
Chart 14Deterioration In Credit Market Fundamentals
Deterioration In Credit Market Fundamentals
Deterioration In Credit Market Fundamentals
Currencies: We see some more upside in the U.S. dollar over the next few months, given U.S. growth and monetary policy relative to the euro area and Japan (Chart 15). This may reverse, however, if global cyclical growth rebounds in the second half. The dollar is particularly vulnerable if macro conditions change, since it looks around 10% overvalued relative to other major DM currencies, and speculative positions are predominantly long dollar (Chart 16). Chart 15Relative Rates Support USD
Relative Rates Support USD
Relative Rates Support USD
Chart 16But Dollar Vulnerable To Macro Shifts
But Dollar Vulnerable To Macro Shifts
But Dollar Vulnerable To Macro Shifts
Commodities: With demand likely to grow steadily this year, but supply under pressure because of production cuts by OPEC and Canada, lower U.S. shale oil output, and disruptions in Venezuela and elsewhere, our energy strategists see drawdowns in inventories throughout the year (Chart 17). They forecast Brent to average $75 a barrel during 2019 (compared to $66 now), with WTI $5 a barrel lower. Industrial commodities continue to be driven by China which means, given our view expressed above, that we may see further weakness short-term, with a possible rebound in H2 (Chart 18). Chart 17Oil Supply/Demand Is Tight
Oil Supply/Demand Is Tight
Oil Supply/Demand Is Tight
Chart 18When Will Metal Prices Bottom?
Chinese Slowdown Will Weigh On Metal Prices
Chinese Slowdown Will Weigh On Metal Prices
Garry Evans Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist garry@bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation
Decomposing Treasury-Bund & Treasury-JGB Spreads
…
Investors have priced out any possibility of a Fed rate hike over the next year, and now even discount a modest rate cut, according to the U.S. Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve. Yet, while most of the attention of bond investors has been focused on the U.S.,…
in the current environment is by initiating a duration-neutral yield curve trade where you buy a barbell consisting of the long and short ends of the curve, while selling the 5-year or 7-year maturity. The 5-year and 7-year Treasury yields are most…
Highlights Fed: With financial conditions easing and core inflation more likely to rise than fall, the majority of Fed officials will feel justified lifting rates again in the second half of this year. The best way to position for the resumption of rate hikes is to sell the 5-year or 7-year part of the Treasury curve and buy a duration-matched barbell consisting of the short and long ends of the curve. These sorts of positions currently offer positive carry, meaning you get paid as you wait for the market to price rate hikes back in. Corporate Spreads: Maintain an overweight allocation to corporate bonds (both investment grade and high-yield) with the exception of the Aaa credit tier. But be prepared to reduce exposure when spreads reach our target levels. Economy: Tracking estimates for 2018 Q4 and 2019 Q1 real GDP have fallen significantly during the past two weeks. The decline in tracking estimates is heavily influenced by an abnormal December retail sales report. That impact will reverse in 2019. Feature The Federal Reserve’s “on hold” strategy is now well known and has been completely discounted in the market. In fact, the overnight index swap curve is priced for 9 bps of rate cuts during the next 12 months and 21 bps of cuts during the next 24 months (Chart 1). Chart 1Primary Dealers Still Looking For Hikes
Primary Dealers Still Looking For Hikes
Primary Dealers Still Looking For Hikes
At this point, the only thing that’s unclear is how the Fed will respond to the economic data going forward. Will it be eager to re-start rate hikes at the first sign of calm? Or perhaps the Fed is leaning toward a strategy where the next move will be a rate cut in the face of flagging economic growth? Survey Says Unfortunately, last month’s FOMC meeting was not accompanied by an updated Summary of Economic Projections. We therefore don’t know how policymakers have revised their rate hike expectations since December. However, the New York Fed’s Survey of Primary Dealers was updated in January, and it shows that the median primary dealer still expects two rate hikes this year. The only change between the December and January surveys is that the median primary dealer now expects one of the 2019 rate hikes in June and the other in December. In the December survey, both 2019 rate hikes were anticipated before the end of June (Chart 1). Typically, the median primary dealer and the median FOMC participant have very similar views on the future interest rate trajectory. Counting The Minutes The next stop on our search for clarity is the minutes from the January FOMC meeting, which were released last week. The January minutes provide a lot of insight into the thought processes of different FOMC participants. Unfortunately, they also reveal a serious lack of cohesion amongst the group. All in all, the document might confuse more than it clarifies. A few key excerpts from the document drive this point home. Referring to “global economic and financial developments”: Many participants observed that if uncertainty abated, the Committee would need to reassess the characterization of monetary policy as “patient” and might then use different language. This suggests that many Fed participants view the pause in rate hikes as a result of slower non-U.S. growth and tighter financial conditions. They also suggest that if global growth improves and financial conditions ease it would be appropriate to abandon a “patient” stance. … several […] participants argued that rate increases might prove necessary only if inflation outcomes were higher than in their baseline outlook. This second statement is much more dovish than the first. It suggests that several participants think that even improving global growth and an easing of financial conditions would not be sufficient to re-start rate hikes. They would also need to see inflation come in stronger than expected. Several other participants indicated that, if the economy evolved as they expected, they would view it as appropriate to raise the target range for the federal funds rate later this year. Finally, this last statement reveals that several other participants disagree with the view that an unexpected rise in inflation is a pre-condition for further rate hikes. What can we make of all this mess? The first thing that seems clear is that all Fed members view easier financial conditions as a pre-condition for further rate hikes. In this regard, we are already well on our way. Financial conditions have eased considerably since the start of the year, with the stock-to-bond total return ratio up sharply and credit spreads, the VIX and the dollar all off their highs (Chart 2). Chart 2Financial Conditions Are Easing
Financial Conditions Are Easing
Financial Conditions Are Easing
Second, all FOMC participants need more confidence that inflation will return to target before re-starting rate hikes, but this bar seems higher for some than for others. Year-over-year core and trimmed mean CPI are currently running at 2.15% and 2.19%, respectively. This is slightly below the 2.4% level that is consistent with the Fed’s inflation target (Chart 3).1 The minutes suggest that some FOMC participants would be comfortable re-starting rate hikes as long as core inflation moves higher in the next few months and approaches the Fed’s target from below. Some others, however, may need to see an overshoot of the Fed’s inflation target before recommending rate hikes. Chart 3Core Inflation Needs To Move Higher
Core Inflation Needs To Move Higher
Core Inflation Needs To Move Higher
Depressed inflation expectations, as seen in the TIPS market or the Michigan Consumer Sentiment survey, are a related issue (Chart 3, bottom 2 panels). The Fed will probably want to see upward movement in both of these measures before resuming rate hikes. In fact, New York Fed President John Williams warned last week that the “persistent undershoot of the Fed’s [inflation] target risks undermining the 2 percent inflation anchor.” He added that “the risk of the inflation expectations anchor slipping toward shore calls for a reassessment of the dominant inflation targeting framework.”2 Williams has long been an advocate for a monetary policy framework where the Fed targets an overshoot of its inflation target in the future to “make up” for undershooting its target in the past, i.e. some form of price level targeting. The Fed is currently conducting a year-long investigation into whether it should switch to this sort of regime and we learned last week that the Fed will announce the results of its investigation in the first half of 2020. Our own sense is that the Fed will eventually adopt some sort of “history dependent” inflation target as a way to avoid continuously bumping up against the zero-lower bound on interest rates. But this change will not occur this year and maybe not even next year. Of course, the more immediate concern for bond investors is whether inflation pressures will be meaningful enough in the next few months for the Fed to resume rate hikes in 2019. We expect they will be. We have previously shown that base effects alone will pressure year-over-year core CPI higher as we head toward mid-year.3 Meanwhile, other signs also point toward rising core inflation (Chart 4): Chart 4Inflation Pressures Building
Inflation Pressures Building
Inflation Pressures Building
The New York Fed’s Underlying Inflation Gauge is running close to 3% (Chart 4, top panel). The ISM Manufacturing PMI is off its highs, but is still consistent with rising year-over-year core CPI (Chart 4, panel 2). Our CPI Diffusion Index is deep in positive territory, pointing to further near-term upside in the core measure (Chart 4, bottom panel). Bottom Line: With financial conditions easing and core inflation more likely to rise than fall, the majority of Fed officials will feel justified lifting rates again this year. January’s FOMC minutes imply that several Fed members want to see an overshoot of the inflation target before advocating for the resumption of rate hikes, but until the Fed changes its inflation targeting regime they will likely be out-voted. The Best Way To Trade The Fed We continue to recommend a below-benchmark duration bias in U.S. bond portfolios, on the view that rate hikes will exceed depressed market expectations on a 12-month horizon. However, this is not the most attractive way to position for the resumption of Fed rate hikes. The best way to trade the Fed in the current environment is by initiating a duration-neutral yield curve trade where you buy a barbell consisting of the long and short ends of the curve, and sell the 5-year or 7-year maturity. In a prior report we demonstrated that the 5-year and 7-year Treasury yields are most sensitive to changes in our 12-month fed funds discounter.4 That is, when the market starts to price-in more Fed rate hikes, the 5-year and 7-year Treasury yields increase more than other maturities. Similarly, the 5-year and 7-year yields fall the most when our discounter declines. Clearly, this means that if you are short the 5-year/7-year part of the curve versus the wings, you will make money as rate hikes are priced back into the market. Usually the problem with implementing such a trade is that it has negative carry. That is, the 5-year or 7-year bullet typically offers a greater yield than what you would earn on a duration-matched 2/10 or 2/30 barbell. If you don’t time the trade properly, you end up losing money waiting for Fed rate hike expectations to move. However, this is not a problem at the moment. In fact, duration-matched barbells are now positive carry propositions relative to 5-year and 7-year bullets (Chart 5). Chart 5 Barbell Yields Greater Than Bullet Yields
Barbell Yields Greater Than Bullet Yields
Barbell Yields Greater Than Bullet Yields
In other words, if you think rate hikes will resume at some point, you are currently getting paid to wait for the market to catch on. The only way to lose money in this sort of trade is if our 12-month fed funds discounter falls further from its current -9 bps level. We view that as an unlikely scenario. Bottom Line: The best way to position for the resumption of Fed rate hikes is to sell the 5-year or 7-year part of the Treasury curve, and buy a barbell consisting of the long and short ends of the curve. We currently recommend being short the 7-year and long the 2/30 barbell. This trade has positive carry, meaning that you will earn money as you wait for rate hikes to get priced back in. Corporate Spread Targets As we have discussed in prior reports, we think the Fed’s pause opens up a window where corporate bond spreads have room to tighten during the next few months.5 However, we also acknowledge that the window for outperformance is limited. Once financial conditions ease and the Fed resumes rate hikes, the environment will quickly become more difficult for corporate bonds. For this reason, in last week’s report we presented Chart 6. The diamonds in Chart 6 show where corporate 12-month breakeven spreads are today relative to past “Phase 2” periods, which are environments similar to today when the yield curve is quite flat but still positively sloped.6 We argued that we would be quick to reduce corporate bond exposure when the breakeven spreads reach the historical median for Phase 2 periods, i.e. when the diamonds fall to the 50% line in Chart 6.
Chart 6
However, we acknowledge that this is not a helpful guide for investors who don’t have timely access to our valuation metrics. So this week we present Charts 7A and 7B. These charts estimate the option-adjusted spread (OAS) levels for each credit tier of the Bloomberg Barclays corporate bond indexes that would be consistent with the 50% line in Chart 6. To make these estimates we need to assume that the average duration of each index remains constant. The results show the following spread targets: For Aa we target 55 bps. The current OAS is 61 bps. For A we target 84 bps. The current OAS is 94 bps. For Baa we target 128 bps. The current OAS is 161 bps. For Ba we target 186 bps. The current OAS is 236 bps. For B we target 298 bps. The current OAS is 391 bps. For Caa we target 571 bps. The current OAS is 813 bps. We do not recommend an overweight allocation to Aaa-rated corporate bonds, where spreads are already expensive relative to past Phase 2 periods (Chart 7A, top panel). Chart 7aInvestment Grade Spread Targets
Investment Grade Spread Targets
Investment Grade Spread Targets
Chart 7BHigh-Yield Spread Targets
High-Yield Spread Targets
High-Yield Spread Targets
Bottom Line: Maintain an overweight allocation to corporate bonds (both investment grade and high-yield) with the exception of the Aaa credit tier. But be prepared to reduce exposure when spreads reach our target levels. Economic Update We will finally receive GDP data for the fourth quarter of 2018 on Thursday, and investors should ready themselves for a weak number. In fact, the most recent tracking estimates from the New York Fed have real GDP coming in at 2.35% in Q4 and a mere 1.20% in 2019 Q1 (Chart 8). Chart 8Poor GDP Tracking Estimates ...
Poor GDP Tracking Estimates ...
Poor GDP Tracking Estimates ...
It will come as no surprise that the trend in GDP growth is vital to our interest rate call. In fact, we showed in a recent report that when year-over-year nominal GDP growth falls below the 10-year Treasury yield it is often a good signal that monetary policy has turned restrictive and that interest rates have peaked for the cycle.7 With that in mind, if we add 1.2% expected real growth in Q1 to the 1.7% average growth rate of the GDP deflator (Chart 8, bottom panel), we can roughly estimate nominal GDP growth of 2.9% in Q1. This remains above the current 10-year Treasury yield, suggesting that monetary conditions would still be accommodative, but just barely. However, we expect the Q1 tracking forecast to improve as new data come in. According to the New York Fed’s model, the weak December retail sales report trimmed 0.41% from its Q1 growth forecast and this report increasingly looks like an aberration. In contrast to the retail sales number, the Johnson Redbook index of same-store sales is growing at a rate close to 5%, and indexes of consumer confidence remain elevated (Chart 9). Chart 9...Driven By Abnormal Retail Sales
...Driven By Abnormal Retail Sales
...Driven By Abnormal Retail Sales
Even the Fed staff’s economic report, as presented in the January FOMC minutes, suggests that December should have been a good month for consumer spending: The release of the retail sales report for December was delayed, but available indicators – such as credit card and debit card transaction data and light motor vehicle sales – suggested that household spending growth remained strong in December. Bottom Line: However, we expect the Q1 tracking forecast to improve as new data come in. According to the New York it seems likely that the partial government shutdown influenced the collection of the December retail sales data and led to an abnormal print. Since the retail sales data feed directly into GDP, the impact will be felt in the next GDP report. But the impact will prove fleeting. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The Fed’s target is for 2% PCE inflation. CPI tends to run about 0.4% above PCE. 12-month core PCE is currently 1.88%, but data only go to November. This is why we refer to CPI in this report, which has data through January. 2 https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2019/wil190222 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Caught Offside”, dated February 12, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Don’t Position For Curve Inversion”, dated January 22, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Buy Corporate Credit”, dated January 15, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 For more detail on the different phases of the economic cycle please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Running Room”, dated January 29, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Low Bond Volatility: Weakening non-U.S. growth and a more dovish Fed have crushed global government bond volatility, especially in Europe and Japan where yields are struggling to stay above 0%. Treasury-Bund and Treasury-JGB spreads, which now largely reflect long-run real growth differentials between the U.S and Europe/Japan, are likely to stay range bound. USTs vs Bunds/JGBs: Stay overweight Bunds & JGBs versus Treasuries, on a hedged basis in U.S. dollars, given the boost to returns from hedging into higher-yielding dollars. Feature Bond Yields Are In Winter Hibernation Developed market (DM) government bonds, never the most exciting of asset classes to begin with, have become boring of late. While benchmark 10-year yields since the end of January have moved in line with our recommended country allocations - lower in Germany (-7bps), Japan (-3bps), the U.K. (-5bps) and Australia (-11bps) where we are overweight, higher in the U.S. (+5bps), Canada (+2bps) and Italy (+19bps) where we are underweight – government bonds have settled into trading ranges and lack direction. The proximate trigger for the muted yield volatility was the Federal Reserve shifting to a neutral stance on U.S. monetary policy in January. Investors have priced out any possibility of a Fed rate hike over the next year, and now even discount a modest rate cut, according to the U.S. Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve. Yet while most of the attention for bond investors have been focused on the U.S., there are developments in other major economies that are also depressing yields – namely, weakening economic momentum and sluggish inflation. In particular, the downturn has shown no signs of stabilizing in the eurozone and Japan, with the latest readings on manufacturing PMIs now below the 50 line, signaling a contraction (Chart of the Week). The latest data in both regions still shows that core inflation is nowhere near the inflation targets of the European Central Bank (ECB) and Bank of Japan (BoJ). The story is much different in the U.S, with the manufacturing PMI still well above 50 and core inflation hovering close to the Fed’s 2% inflation target. Yet Treasury yield volatility has collapsed, with the MOVE index of Treasury options prices now back to the lows of this cycle. Chart Of The WeekAre Treasuries Leading Or Following?
Are Treasuries Leading Or Following?
Are Treasuries Leading Or Following?
For the time being, non-U.S. factors are driving the direction of global bond yields. We think that will change later this year, as steady U.S. growth and surprisingly firm U.S. inflation readings will prompt the Fed to begin hiking rates again. Yet until there are signs that non-U.S. growth is stabilizing, the low yields in Europe and Japan will act as an anchor on U.S. Treasury yields, particularly given how wide U.S./non-U.S. yield differentials already reflect faster growth and inflation in the U.S. Decomposing Treasury-Bund & Treasury-JGB Spreads When looking at the pricing of the “Big 3” DM government bond markets – the U.S., Germany and Japan – there are some major differences but also some similarities as well. Even with the benchmark 10-year U.S. Treasury sitting at 2.68% compared to a mere 0.11% and -0.03% on the 10-year German Bund and 10-year Japanese government bond (JGB), respectively. Simply looking at the breakdown of those nominal 10-year yields into the real and inflation expectations components, there is not much of a comparison (Chart 2). The real 10-year Treasury yield is in positive territory at 0.6%, compared to -1.4% and +0.2% for JGBs and German bunds, respectively. Inflation expectations, measured by 10-year CPI swap rates, are 2.1% in the U.S., 1.5% in Germany and 0.2% in Japan. Thus, the current wide 10-year Treasury-Bund spread (just under +260ps) can be broken down into a real yield spread of +200bps and an inflation expectations gap of +60bps. In the case of the 10-year Treasury-JGB spread (just under +270bps), that breaks down into a real yield differential of +80bps and an inflation gap of +190bps. Chart 2Big Differentials Here...
Big Differentials Here...
Big Differentials Here...
So while the Treasury-Bund and Treasury-JGB spreads are of similar magnitude, the valuation components driving the spread are much different. The former is more of a real yield gap, while the latter is more of an inflation expectations gap. That is no surprise given the BoJ’s Yield Curve Control policy that maintains a ceiling on the 10-year JGB yield of between 0.1% and 0.2%, limiting how much real yields can move (there are no BoJ restrictions on the level of CPI swap rates). Yet the U.S.-Japan inflation expectations gap is not too far off the spread between realized headline and core inflation measures in both countries - both are 1.4 percentage points higher in the U.S. as of January. Looking at other valuation metrics, the cross-county differentials are less pronounced (Chart 3). Chart 3...But Less So For Other Yield Measures
...But Less So For Other Yield Measures
...But Less So For Other Yield Measures
Yield curves are quite flat, with the 2-year/10-year slope a mere +16bps in the U.S., +14bps in Japan and only +66bps in Germany. Our estimates of the term premia on 10-year government debt are negative for all three markets, most notably in the countries that have seen quantitative easing in recent years (-10bps in the U.S., -90bps in Germany and -60bps in Japan). Perhaps most importantly, our preferred measure of the market pricing of the real terminal policy rate – the 5-year OIS rate, 5-years forward minus the 5-year CPI swap rate, 5-years forward – is +0.2% in the U.S., -0.5% in Germany and 0.0% in Japan. That means the market is pricing in only a +70bp differential, in real terms, between the neutral policy rates of the Fed and ECB. That gap is only +20bps between market pricing of the neutral real rates for the Fed and BoJ. That narrower gap between the market-implied pricing of the real neutral rate is consistent with the theoretical macroeconomic drivers of real rate differentials, like growth rates of potential GDP and labor productivity. According to OECD estimates, potential GDP growth is 1.8% in the U.S., 1.5% in the overall euro area and 1.2% in Japan (Chart 4). This implies a long-run real yield gap between the U.S. and Germany of +60bps and the U.S. and Japan of +30bps – very close to the market pricing for the real terminal rate differentials.1 When looking at the 5-year annualized growth rates of labor productivity data from the OECD, there is no difference between the three regions with all growing at a mere 0.5% (suggesting that either a faster growth rate of the labor input, or greater productivity of capital, accounts for the higher potential growth rate in the U.S.). Chart 4No Major Differences In Long-Run Real Growth
No Major Differences In Long-Run Real Growth
No Major Differences In Long-Run Real Growth
With the cross-country yield spreads now effectively priced for the long-run real growth differentials between the U.S. and Europe/Japan, this will limit the ability for nominal Treasury-Bund and Treasury-JGB spreads to widen much further. Right now, U.S. inflation expectations are rising faster than those of Europe and Japan, in response to the Fed’s more dovish stance. Yet if those expectations continue to rise, likely in the context of stickier realized U.S. inflation alongside solid U.S. growth, then the Fed will return to a hawkish bias. That ultimately means higher U.S. real yields and, most likely, some pullback in U.S. inflation expectations since the markets would begin to price in the implications of the Fed moving to a restrictive policy stance (including a stronger U.S. dollar that will help dampen U.S. inflation, at the margin). So that means inflation differentials between the U.S. and Germany/Japan can move wider now but will narrow later; and vice versa for real yield differentials (narrower now and wider later). The main investment implication: nominal UST-Bund and UST-JGB spreads are unlikely to move much wider, likely for the remainder of this business cycle/Fed tightening cycle. The main takeaway is that bond yields in core Europe and Japan are effectively anchoring global yields, in general, and U.S. yields, in particular. Treasury yields will not be able to break out of the current narrow trading ranges until there are signs that growth has stabilized in Europe and Japan. Reduced global trade tensions and faster Chinese growth (and import demand) are necessary conditions to reflate the export-heavy economies of Europe and Japan. Yet even if that scenario does unfold in the months ahead (which is BCA’s base case scenario), there is still a case to prefer Bunds and JGBs over U.S. Treasuries on a currency-hedged basis in U.S. dollars. Given the wide short-term interest rate differentials between the U.S. and Europe/Japan, those near-zero 10-year Bund and JGB yields, after hedging into U.S. dollars, are actually higher than 10-year Treasury yields, which benefits the relative hedged performance of the low-yielders versus the U.S. (Chart 5) Chart 5Stay Overweight Bunds & JGBs Vs. USTs (Hedged Into USD)
Stay Overweight Bunds & JGBs Vs. USTs (Hedged Into USD)
Stay Overweight Bunds & JGBs Vs. USTs (Hedged Into USD)
Thus, we continue to recommend an overweight stance on core Europe and Japan, versus an underweight tilt on the U.S., in global U.S. dollar-hedged government bond portfolios. Bottom Line: Weakening non-U.S. growth and a more dovish Fed have crushed global government bond volatility, especially in Europe and Japan where yields are struggling to stay above 0%. Treasury-Bund and Treasury-JGB spreads, which now largely reflect long-run real growth differentials between the U.S and Europe/Japan are likely to stay range bound. Stay overweight Bunds & JGBs versus Treasuries, on a hedged basis in U.S. dollars, given the boost to returns from hedging into higher-yielding dollars. Robert Robis, CFA, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 We are using the full euro area data for these economic comparisons, even though we are discussing U.S.-German yield differentials in this report. We think this is reasonable given the status of German government bonds as the benchmark for the euro area, and with the ECB setting its monetary policy for the overall euro area. The differences between the data for Germany and the overall euro area are modest, with German potential GDP and 5-year productivity growth both only 0.3 percentage points higher. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index
Europe & Japan: The Anchor Weighing
On Global Bond Yields
Europe & Japan: The Anchor Weighing
On Global Bond Yields
Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
High-Yield default-adjusted spread is the excess spread available in the high-yield index after accounting for expected 12-month default losses. Expected default losses are calculated using the Moody’s baseline default rate forecast and our own forecast of…
At BCA, we define the three phases of the cycle as follows: Phase 1: From the end of the prior recession until the 3-year / 10-year Treasury slope flattens to below 50 bps; Phase 2: When the 3/10 slope is between 0 bps and 50 bps; Phase 3: From when…