Fixed Income

Highlights The coronavirus scare is the catalyst for the recent correction, not the cause. The true cause is that the stock market had reached a point of groupthink-triggered instability and therefore needed the slightest catalyst to correct. Bond yields will stay depressed for (at least) the first half of 2020. Long-term investors should use corrections to overweight equities versus bonds, provided bond yields stay near or below current levels. The pound and UK-exposed investments will come under near-term pressure as UK/EU trade deal tensions ratchet up. But ultimately, UK-exposed investments will enjoy a major leg up later this year if both the UK and EU blink. Feature Chart of the WeekThe Next Up-Leg In The Pound And UK-Exposed Investments Will Occur Later In 2020 The Next Up-Leg In The Pound And UK-Exposed Investments Will Occur Later in 2020 The Next Up-Leg In The Pound And UK-Exposed Investments Will Occur Later in 2020 Corrections, Catalysts, And Coronavirus Markets have suffered a correction, begging the question: what caused it? The question is a good one, because identifying the cause can help to inform our response. Yet the danger is that the knee-jerk narrative pinpoints the catalyst rather than the true cause. In which case our response will be wrong too. For example, consider the following two narratives: Tree foliage collapses because of 40 mph winds. Tree foliage collapses because it is autumn. The first narrative is exciting, satisfying, and headline grabbing, but it only pinpoints the catalyst for the foliage collapse: the puff of wind. The second explanation is dull and less newsworthy, but it pinpoints the true cause: in autumn, tree foliage is unstable. Likewise, the coronavirus scare is the catalyst for the recent correction. The true cause is that the stock market had reached a point of groupthink-triggered instability and therefore needed the slightest catalyst to correct. The catalyst could have come from anywhere at any time. If it hadn’t been the coronavirus scare, it would have been the next worry… or the one after that. On January 9 in Markets Are Fractally Fragile we warned that usually cautious value investors had become momentum traders – undermining market liquidity and stability. When this happens, there is a two in three chance of a tactical reversal (Chart I-2). Chart I-2When Markets Are Fractally Fragile, There Is A 2 In 3 Chance Of A Tactical Reversal When Markets Are Fractally Fragile, There Is A 2 In 3 Chance Of A Tactical Reversal When Markets Are Fractally Fragile, There Is A 2 In 3 Chance Of A Tactical Reversal We also warned that the bond yield 6-month impulse – the change in the change – had recently become a severe 100 bps headwind to growth. At this severity of headwind, there is a nine in ten chance that bond yields have reached a near-term peak (Chart I-3). Chart I-3When The Bond Yield 6-Month Impulse Becomes A Severe Headwind, There Is A 9 In 10 Chance Of A Near-Term Peak In Yields When The Bond Yield 6-Month Impulse Becomes A Severe Headwind, There Is A 9 In 10 Chance Of A Near-Term Peak In Yields When The Bond Yield 6-Month Impulse Becomes A Severe Headwind, There Is A 9 In 10 Chance Of A Near-Term Peak In Yields In combination, we warned that equities would underperform bonds by about 4 percent on a tactical horizon. Now that this anticipated correction has happened, what next? Long-term investors should use corrections to overweight equities versus bonds.  First, irrespective of coronavirus – or any other catalyst – the recent severe headwind to growth from the bond yield impulse suggests that bond yields will stay depressed for (at least) the first half of 2020. Second, the good news is that the ultra-low bond yields justify and underpin the valuation of equities. Hence, at the current level of bond yields, long-term investors should use corrections to overweight equities versus bonds. Brexit Is “Done”. Or Is It? Rumour has it that Boris Johnson will banish the word Brexit from the UK government lexicon after January 31, because Brexit is now “done”. Good luck with that. When Britain wakes up bleary-eyed on Saturday February 1, what will have changed? Not a lot. The UK will have lost its voice and votes in the EU decision making institutions. Yet in practical terms nothing will have changed, because the UK and EU will enter an 11-month ‘standstill’ transition period in which existing arrangements will continue: the free movement of people, financial contributions, and full access to the single market without tariffs or customs checks. The Conservative government made a manifesto pledge not to extend the 11-month transition, so the more important question is: what will change when the standstill period ends on December 31? The answer depends on what sort of trade deal the UK and EU can negotiate in the limited space of 11 months. Or indeed whether they can negotiate a trade deal at all. Therein lies the problem. A free trade deal with the EU will require a mutual commitment to a ‘level playing field’. If the UK wants to diverge on food standards, environmental protection, labour rights, and state aid – as the Brexit purists yearn – then there is zero chance that the EU will agree to a free trade deal.  This leaves two options, neither of which is appealing. The first is for the UK to end the 11-month standstill period without a trade deal. Technically, this would not be ‘no deal’ because the withdrawal agreement would still bind both sides on citizens’ rights, financial contributions, and arrangements for Northern Ireland. A free trade deal with the EU will require a mutual commitment to a ‘level playing field’.  However, for UK companies, the option of ending the standstill period without a trade deal would constitute a painful dislocation from the single market involving tariffs and customs checks. It would also hurt the EU economies most exposed to the UK, notably Ireland and the Netherlands. Moreover, a full customs and tariff border in the Irish Sea would endanger the very existence of a ‘United’ Kingdom which included Northern Ireland.   The second option is for the UK to accept a trade deal on EU terms, recognising that the EU is the larger and more economically powerful party in the negotiation. The EU will offer the UK a tariff-free and quota-free trade deal conditional on strict level playing field conditions where the UK chooses to diverge from EU standards, combined with a mechanism to adjudicate on any level playing field disputes. Though economically better than no trade deal at all, the Brexit purists would claim it isn’t Brexit. Meanwhile, even without tariffs and quotas, UK companies whose just-in-time supply chains depended on the EU would still suffer disruption, as the level playing field was policed at every border crossing. So this option would satisfy nobody in the UK. The bigger practical problem is a lack of time to leave the EU regulatory orbit smoothly. Nobody believes that eleven months is enough time to implement a system in Northern Ireland that prevent a hard border in the Irish Sea; or indeed to implement a new UK immigration system if free movement were to end at the end of 2020. So what’s the resolution? The answer is the same as it has always been for Brexit – a gradual ratcheting up of tension ahead of a hard deadline to focus minds and force progress. Followed by a ‘fudged resolution’ at the eleventh hour in which both sides blink – because neither side is prepared to go over the cliff-edge. Recall that to get the withdrawal agreement over the line, the UK blinked by allowing Northern Ireland to be treated differently; but the EU also blinked by allowing the withdrawal agreement to be reopened. And once this happened, the pound and UK-exposed investments enjoyed a major leg up (Chart I-1 and Chart I-4-Chart I-7). Chart I-4The FTSE 250 Is A UK-Exposed ##br##Investment The FTSE 250 Is A UK-Exposed Investment The FTSE 250 Is A UK-Exposed Investment Chart I-5The FTSE 100 Is Not A UK-Exposed Investment The FTSE 100 Is Not A UK-Exposed Investment The FTSE 100 Is Not A UK-Exposed Investment Chart I-6UK General Retail Is A UK-Exposed Investment UK General Retail Is A UK-Exposed Investment UK General Retail Is A UK-Exposed Investment Chart I-7UK Clothing And Accessories Is Not A ##br##UK-Exposed Investment UK Clothing And Accessories Is Not A UK-Exposed Investment UK Clothing And Accessories Is Not A UK-Exposed Investment In the next fudged resolution, the UK could blink by retaining full regulatory alignment with the EU in most areas for a little while longer, and where it doesn’t the EU could blink by becoming flexible in its interpretation of ‘level playing field’. Obviously, nobody would call this an extension to the transition, but the UK would, in most practical terms, still be in the single market on January 1 2021. UK-exposed investments will enjoy their next major leg up later this year In this playbook, the pound and UK-exposed investments will come under near-term pressure, as UK/EU trade deal tensions ratchet up. But ultimately, UK-exposed investments will enjoy their next major leg up later this year if both the UK and the EU blink (Chart I-8). Chart I-8The Pound Still Has A Brexit Discount The Pound Still Has A Brexit Discount The Pound Still Has A Brexit Discount Fractal Trading System* There are no new trades this week. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 62 percent. Chart I-9EUR/GBP EUR/GBP EUR/GBP When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated   December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Highlights BCA’s “Golden Rule of Bond Investing” framework, which links developed economy government bond returns to central bank policy rate “surprises” versus market expectations, also works in China. The relationship between unexpected changes in China’s de facto short-term policy rate and government bond yields has been surprisingly strong over the past decade. Any additional easing by the PBoC this year is likely to be focused on reducing lending rates to the real economy, not interbank rates (which drive government bond yields). As such, yields at the short-end are likely to be flat until later this year at the earliest, whereas yields at the long-end are likely to move modestly higher, at most. The persistent historical gap between economic growth and bond yields in China makes it difficult to forecast the structural outlook for yields using conventional methods. To the extent that Chinese policymakers succeed at shifting the drivers of growth from investment to consumption, we believe that bond yields are more likely to structurally rise than fall. Over the coming 6-12 months, investors should underweight Chinese government bonds versus Chinese equities and onshore corporate bonds. Within a regional government bond portfolio, however, investors should overweight USD-hedged China versus US and developed markets ex-US, as well as in unhedged terms. Feature Last year’s inclusion of Chinese onshore government and policy bank bonds in the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index was a significant milestone of China’s journey to internationalize its capital markets. Other bond benchmark providers have since followed suit, highlighting that the trend of increased passive exposure to Chinese assets is likely to continue. Over the past year, the bulk of the market discussion concerning the addition of China to the major bond indices has focused on estimating the size of potential capital inflows that could be triggered and the related impact on onshore bond yields. By contrast, comparatively little work has been done to analyze the core drivers of Chinese government bond yields, and how they compare to the factors that influence yields in the developed markets that dominate the bond indices. This Special Report attempts to fill a hole in the analysis of Chinese bonds. This Special Report attempts to fill that hole in the analysis of Chinese bonds. We look at the predictability of China’s government bond market through the lens of BCA’s “golden rule” framework, and find a surprisingly strong relationship between changes in China’s de facto short-term policy rate and government bond yields. We then present our cyclical (6-12 month) and secular outlooks for government yields given this relationship, and conclude by presenting four specific investment recommendations pertaining to China’s fixed-income market with two audiences in mind: mainland/onshore investors who are focused on returns in unhedged RMB terms, and global fixed-income investors who are primarily focused on hedged US-dollar regional bond exposure. The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing, With Chinese Characteristics In a July 2018 Special Report,1 BCA’s Chief US Bond Strategist, Ryan Swift, elegantly distilled the cyclical US government bond call into a simple question: During the next 12-months, will the Federal Reserve move interest rates by more or less than what is currently priced into the market? Chart 1The (US) Golden Rule Of Bond Investing In Practice The (US) Golden Rule Of Bond Investing In Practice The (US) Golden Rule Of Bond Investing In Practice Ryan argued that a predictive framework for US Treasury returns built around the answer to this question has historically worked so well that it should be referred to as the “Golden Rule of bond investing” (Chart 1). In a follow-up report, our Global Fixed Income Strategy service confirmed that the Golden Rule also largely works in non-US developed market economies, with the exception of Japan due to the absence of any meaningful fluctuation in policy rates over the past two decades.2 The Golden Rule provides a very strong framework to aid fixed-income investors with their cyclical (i.e. 6-12 month) asset allocation decisions, by quantitatively linking government bond returns relative to cash – in other words, the excess return earned by taking duration risk - to policy rate “surprises” compared to what is discounted in shorter-term money markets. The practical application is that a decision to allocate to longer-maturity government bonds is reduced to a bet on whether a central bank will adjust policy rates by more or less than the market expects. The first question we address in this report is to what degree does the Golden Rule apply in China (in yield space rather than in return space), along with an explanation of any differences that may exist. However, we must first note why the Golden Rule of bond investing works, particularly in the US. The first reason is that there is a strong relationship between the US 3-month T-bill rate and Treasury yields of all other maturities. Conceptually, all fixed income investors have a choice when buying US government bonds: they can purchase a 3-month Treasury bill and simply perpetually roll over the position as it matures, or they can purchase a Treasury bond of a longer maturity. This means that yields on longer maturity Treasury bonds simply reflect investor expectations for the average 3-month T-bill rate over the life of the bond, plus some positive risk premium to compensate for the inherent uncertainty of the path and tendency of short-term yields. This helps explain the close link between cyclical changes in 3-month T-bill rates and yields on longer maturity Treasurys. Chart 2In The US, The 3-Month T-Bill Rate Perfectly Tracks The Fed Funds Rate In The US, The 3-Month T-Bill Rate Perfectly Tracks The Fed Funds Rate In The US, The 3-Month T-Bill Rate Perfectly Tracks The Fed Funds Rate The second reason for the Golden Rule’s success is that there is a very tight relationship between the effective Fed funds rate and the 3-month T-bill rate. While it is the (higher) discount rate that is the theoretical no-arbitrage ceiling for the 3-month rate, in practice T-bill rates trade extremely close to the Fed funds rate (Chart 2). This means that Fed funds rate “surprises” (relative to traded market expectations) are akin to surprises in the 3-month rate, which in turn strongly influence the expected future path of short-term interest rates and thus yields on longer maturity Treasurys. In China, we noted in a February 2018 Special Report3 that the 7-day interbank repo rate is now the de jure short-term policy rate in China following the establishment of an interest rate corridor system in 2015. Chart 3 presents our first test of the Golden Rule in China (in yield space rather than in return space), by plotting the annual change in the level of Chinese government bond yields alongside the 7-day repo rate “surprise” over the past year from 2010 to the present. Here, we use the first principal component of zero coupon Chinese government bond yields to represent the average level of yields (rather than selecting a particular maturity), and we use the 12-month RMB swap rate (versus 7-day repo) to represent market expectations for the policy rate. The chart highlights that the fit is good, as measured by a 50% R-squared between the two series. However, deviations in the relationship do exist, with the most notable exception having occurred in 2017: Chinese government bond yields rose considerably more than what the annual surprise in the 7-day repo rate would have suggested. Chart 3In China, The Golden Rule Works Decently Well Using 7-Day Repo... In China, The Golden Rule Works Decently Well Using 7-Day Repo... In China, The Golden Rule Works Decently Well Using 7-Day Repo... Chart 4...And Extremely Well Using 3-Month SHIBOR ...And Extremely Well Using 3-Month SHIBOR ...And Extremely Well Using 3-Month SHIBOR Chart 4 helps resolve a good portion of the 2017 discrepancy, and clarifies the link between Chinese monetary policy and government bond yields. Chart 4 is similar to Chart 3, except that it replaces the 7-day repo rate surprise with that of 3-month SHIBOR (which trades very closely to the 3-month repo rate). The chart illustrates an even closer fit between the two series (with an R-squared close to 80%), and shows that the 3-month SHIBOR surprise does a meaningfully better job at explaining the 2017 rise in Chinese government bond yields. The Golden Rule of bond investing works surprisingly well in China. The fact that the annual surprise in 3-month SHIBOR has done a better job at predicting changes in bond yields over the past decade underscores that the 3-month repo rate is the de facto short-term policy rate in China, a point that we have made in several previous reports. We have noted that the spike in the 3-month/7-day repo rate spread that occurred in late-2016 and lasted until mid-2018 happened because of China’s crackdown on shadow banking activity. This crackdown caused a funding squeeze for China’s small & medium banks, which caused a material rise in lending rates and government bond yields. This episode highlights that future changes in the 3-month repo rate are likely to reflect both underlying changes in net liquidity provided to large commercial banks (measured by the 7-day repo rate), and any dislocations in the interbank market that have the potential to push up lending rates and government bond yields. Bottom Line: BCA’s “Golden Rule” framework, which links developed economy government bond returns to central bank policy rate “surprises” versus market expectations, works for China as well – using the correct measure of the PBOC policy rate. This provides a useful investment framework for Chinese government bonds, which are now significant part of major global bond market benchmarks. The Cyclical Outlook For Chinese Government Bond Yields Given the establishment of the relationship between Chinese short-term interbank rates and government bond yields detailed above, we are now able to more precisely discuss the likely cyclical trajectory of Chinese government bond yields as a function of Chinese monetary policy. Two opposing forces have the potential to affect China’s government bond market this year. The first, a stabilization and modest rebound in Chinese economic activity, may exert upward pressure on yields due to expectations of eventual policy tightening. The second, continued attempts by the PBoC to ease corporate lending rates, may exert downward pressure on yields as it will reflect not just easy but easier monetary conditions. Yields at the long-end are likely to move modestly higher this year, at most. For investors, the raises the obvious question of whether Chinese government bond yields are likely to move up, down, or trend sideways this year. In our view, yields at the short-end are likely to be flat until later this year at the earliest, whereas yields at the long-end are likely to move modestly higher, at most. Yields at the short-end of China’s government bond curve are likely to stay flat for most of this year. There are two reasons why yields at the short-end of China’s government bond curve are likely to stay flat for most of this year. The first is that the PBoC is generally a reactive central bank and has historically lagged a pickup in economic activity, as illustrated in Chart 5. The chart shows the historical path of 3-month SHIBOR in the year following a bottom in economic activity in 2009, 2012, and 2015, and makes it clear that there has been no precedent for a significant rise in interbank rates in the first nine months of an economic recovery. The 2012 episode did see a very sharp rise in 3-month SHIBOR once the PBoC shifted into tightening mode, but we doubt that this experience will be repeated again unless economic growth accelerates much more aggressively than we expect. The second reason why we expect yields at the short-end of the curve to remain muted this year is because any additional easing by the PBoC is likely to be focused on reducing corporate lending rates, not interbank rates. Chart 6 highlights that while there is a strong correlation between changes in Chinese government bond yields and average lending rates in the economy, the former leads the latter. In the past, this relationship has existed because changes in interbank rates have coincided with reductions in the now obsolete benchmark lending rate, with the former usually occurring earlier than the latter. But in a scenario where the PBoC reduces the loan prime rate (LPR) and keeps net banking sector liquidity roughly constant, the extremely tight relationship shown in Chart 4 suggests that short-term bond yields are unlikely to be affected by a reduction in lending rates. Any meaningful decline in short-term yields below short-term interbank rates would simply prompt banks to stop buying these bonds. Chart 5The PBoC Is Generally A Reactive Central Bank The PBoC Is Generally A Reactive Central Bank The PBoC Is Generally A Reactive Central Bank Chart 6Average Lending Rates Lag Short-Term Bond Yields Average Lending Rates Lag Short-Term Bond Yields Average Lending Rates Lag Short-Term Bond Yields Chart 7China's Yield Curve Is Generally Pro-Cyclical China's Yield Curve Is Generally Pro-Cyclical China's Yield Curve Is Generally Pro-Cyclical Additional easing by the PBoC does have the potential to impact the long-end of the government bond curve if investors view these actions as a sign that interbank rates will remain low for some time. This view is reinforced by the fact that China’s yield curve is not particularly flat, and thus has room to move lower. However, Chart 7 also shows that China’s yield curve, defined here as the second principal component of zero coupon Chinese government bond yields, is positively correlated with the relative performance of investable Chinese equities. This suggests that there is a procyclical element to the curve. We suspect that this procyclical element will dominate a potential decline in expectations for future short-term interest rates, but that yields at the long-end are likely to move modestly higher this year, at most. Bottom Line: Any additional easing by the PBoC this year is likely to be focused on reducing lending rates to the real economy, not interbank rates (which drive government bond yields). As such, yields at the short-end are likely to be flat until later this year at the earliest, whereas yields at the long-end are likely to move modestly higher, at most. The Secular Outlook For Chinese Government Bond Yields A common approach to forecasting the likely structural trend for nominal government bond yields is to estimate the trajectory of real long-term potential output growth and to add the monetary authority’s inflation target. This framework is based on the idea that interest rates are in equilibrium when the cost of borrowing is roughly equal to nominal income growth, a condition that results in no change in the burden to service existing debt. Chart 8China's Potential Growth Is Likely To Trend Lower... China's Potential Growth Is Likely To Trend Lower... China's Potential Growth Is Likely To Trend Lower... Based on this framework, we would expect Chinese government bond yields to trend down over time, or possibly flat if the PBoC were to tolerate higher inflation over the coming decade. Chart 8 illustrates the IMF’s forecast of falling real potential growth in China over the coming several years, which is consistent with a shift in the composition of growth from investment to consumption as well as China’s looming demographic crisis. But Chart 9highlights an obvious problem with applying this framework to forecast the secular trend in Chinese government bond yields: over the past decade, yields have persistently averaged below actual nominal GDP growth, both in China and in the developed world. In the latter case, it is an open question whether this will continue to be true in the future, but in China’s case it is clear that government bond yields have little connection (in magnitude) to the pace of GDP growth. This reflects the longstanding strategy of Chinese policymakers to promote investment via persistently low interest rates, as has occurred in other manufacturing and export-oriented Asian economies (Chart 10). Chart 9...But Bond Yields Are Well Below GDP Growth, Just Like In Developed Markets ...But Bond Yields Are Well Below GDP Growth, Just Like In Developed Markets ...But Bond Yields Are Well Below GDP Growth, Just Like In Developed Markets Chart 10In Industrial Asian Economies, Low Bond Yields Are A Policy Choice In Industrial Asian Economies, Low Bond Yields Are A Policy Choice In Industrial Asian Economies, Low Bond Yields Are A Policy Choice   The persistent historical gap between economic growth and bond yields in China makes it difficult to forecast the structural outlook for yields using conventional methods, and largely limits us to inference. To the extent that Chinese policymakers succeed at shifting the drivers of growth from investment to consumption, bond yields are more likely to rise than fall over time. This is because as long as interest rates remain well below the pace of income growth, the incentive to excessively borrow (and invest) is likely to persist. Chart 11China Needs Higher Interest Rates, But Only To A Point China Needs Higher Interest Rates, But Only To A Point China Needs Higher Interest Rates, But Only To A Point However, even in a scenario where Chinese government bond yields structurally trend higher, we expect the rise to be modest. Chart 11 highlights that China’s “private sector” debt service ratio is extremely elevated, underscoring that the country’s ability to tolerate significantly higher bond yields is not strong. In addition, since 2015, China’s debt service ratio has been mostly flat despite rising a rising debt-to-GDP ratio, which has been achieved through lower short-term interest rates. To the extent that policymakers fail to make meaningful progress in shifting China’s growth drivers away from investment over the coming few years, lower (potentially sharply lower) bond yields would appear to be all but inevitable to cope with what would become a permanently growing drag on economic activity from the servicing of debt. For now, we would characterize this scenario as a risk to our base case view, but it is a risk that we will be closely monitoring over the coming years. Bottom Line: The persistent gap between Chinese nominal GDP growth and government bond yields is likely contributing to the problem of excessive leveraging. To the extent that Chinese policymakers succeed at shifting the drivers of growth from investment to consumption, bond yields are more likely to structurally rise than fall. Investment Conclusions Our analysis above points to four recommendations for investors over the coming year: Overweight Chinese stocks versus Chinese government bonds in RMB and USD terms Overweight Chinese onshore corporate bonds versus duration-matched Chinese government bonds in RMB terms Overweight 7-10 year USD-hedged Chinese government bonds versus their US and developed market (DM) counterparts For offshore US dollar-based investors, long 7-10 year Chinese government bonds in unhedged terms Regarding the first two recommendations, our view that yields are likely to be flat at the short-end and modestly higher at the long-end suggests that investors can expect total returns on the order of 2-3% from Chinese government bonds this year. Barring a major and lasting economic slowdown from the 2019-nCoV outbreak, we expect Chinese domestic and investable equities to outperform government securities over the coming 6-12 months. Onshore corporate bonds have a similar outlook: onshore spreads are pricing in (massively) higher default losses than we believe is warranted, meaning that they will outperform duration-matched government equivalents without any changes in yield. Chart 12Within Global Fixed-Income, Hedged Chinese 10-Year Yields Are Relatively Attractive Within Global Fixed-Income, Hedged Chinese 10-Year Yields Are Relatively Attractive Within Global Fixed-Income, Hedged Chinese 10-Year Yields Are Relatively Attractive Chart 13Unhedged Yield Spreads Predict Hedged Relative Performance Versus The US Unhedged Yield Spreads Predict Hedged Relative Performance Versus The US Unhedged Yield Spreads Predict Hedged Relative Performance Versus The US For global fixed-income investors, Charts 12-14 present USD-hedged 10-year Chinese government yields versus the US and DM/DM ex-US, along with the historical relative return profile of USD-hedged Chinese bonds versus hedged and unhedged returns. In hedged space, Chinese 10-year government bond yields are modestly attractive: 2.2% versus 1.6% in the US and 1.8% in DM ex-US. China’s historically low yield beta to the overall level of global 10-year bond yields (Chart 15) suggests that Chinese yields should perform well in 2020 – a year where we expect global bond yields to drift higher as economic growth rebounds. Combined with relatively attractive valuation, this bodes well for the relative performance of Chinese debt versus DM equivalents. A low yield beta against a backdrop of drifting higher global yields implies that longer-maturity Chinese government bonds will outperform their DM equivalents. Chart 14Unhedged Yield Spreads Predict Hedged Relative Performance Versus DM Unhedged Yield Spreads Predict Hedged Relative Performance Versus DM Unhedged Yield Spreads Predict Hedged Relative Performance Versus DM Chart 15China's Yield Beta Has Been Rising, But Is Still Japan-Like China's Yield Beta Has Been Rising, But Is Still Japan-Like China's Yield Beta Has Been Rising, But Is Still Japan-Like   We would also recommend longer-maturity Chinese government bonds in unhedged terms versus a USD-hedged global government bond portfolio. Chart 16 highlights that the relative return of this trade is strongly (negatively) linked to USD-CNY, and we expect further (albeit more modest) gains in RMB over the cyclical horizon. Chart 16Modest Further RMB Upside Means Unhedged Chinese Bonds Will Outperform Modest Further RMB Upside Means Unhedged Chinese Bonds Will Outperform Modest Further RMB Upside Means Unhedged Chinese Bonds Will Outperform As a final point, investors should note that today’s report is part of a heightened focus on China’s fixed income market, in terms of both forecasting fixed income returns and analyzing the cyclical and structural implications of the increasing investability of China’s financial markets. More research on this topic is likely to come in 2020 and beyond: Stay Tuned!   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com         Footnotes 1    Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report "The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing," dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2   Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report "The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing," dated September 25, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 3   Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "Seven Questions About Chinese Monetary Policy," dated February 22, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com

Dear clients, Please note that in next week’s China Macro And Market Review, we will include a section explaining our view on the coronavirus outbreak and its economic as well as financial market implications. We maintain our overweight stance on both Chinese investable and A-share equities, over a tactical (0-3 months) and cyclical (6-12 months) time horizon. Please stay tuned. Jing Sima, China Strategist   Highlights BCA’s “Golden Rule of Bond Investing” framework, which links developed economy government bond returns to central bank policy rate “surprises” versus market expectations, also works in China. The relationship between unexpected changes in China’s de facto short-term policy rate and government bond yields has been surprisingly strong over the past decade. Any additional easing by the PBoC this year is likely to be focused on reducing lending rates to the real economy, not interbank rates (which drive government bond yields). As such, yields at the short-end are likely to be flat until later this year at the earliest, whereas yields at the long-end are likely to move modestly higher, at most. The persistent historical gap between economic growth and bond yields in China makes it difficult to forecast the structural outlook for yields using conventional methods. To the extent that Chinese policymakers succeed at shifting the drivers of growth from investment to consumption, we believe that bond yields are more likely to structurally rise than fall. Over the coming 6-12 months, investors should underweight Chinese government bonds versus Chinese equities and onshore corporate bonds. Within a regional government bond portfolio, however, investors should overweight USD-hedged China versus US and developed markets ex-US, as well as in unhedged terms. Feature Last year’s inclusion of Chinese onshore government and policy bank bonds in the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index was a significant milestone of China’s journey to internationalize its capital markets. Other bond benchmark providers have since followed suit, highlighting that the trend of increased passive exposure to Chinese assets is likely to continue. Over the past year, the bulk of the market discussion concerning the addition of China to the major bond indices has focused on estimating the size of potential capital inflows that could be triggered and the related impact on onshore bond yields. By contrast, comparatively little work has been done to analyze the core drivers of Chinese government bond yields, and how they compare to the factors that influence yields in the developed markets that dominate the bond indices. This Special Report attempts to fill a hole in the analysis of Chinese bonds. This Special Report attempts to fill that hole in the analysis of Chinese bonds. We look at the predictability of China’s government bond market through the lens of BCA’s “golden rule” framework, and find a surprisingly strong relationship between changes in China’s de facto short-term policy rate and government bond yields. We then present our cyclical (6-12 month) and secular outlooks for government yields given this relationship, and conclude by presenting four specific investment recommendations pertaining to China’s fixed-income market with two audiences in mind: mainland/onshore investors who are focused on returns in unhedged RMB terms, and global fixed-income investors who are primarily focused on hedged US-dollar regional bond exposure. The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing, With Chinese Characteristics In a July 2018 Special Report,1 BCA’s Chief US Bond Strategist, Ryan Swift, elegantly distilled the cyclical US government bond call into a simple question: During the next 12-months, will the Federal Reserve move interest rates by more or less than what is currently priced into the market? Chart 1The (US) Golden Rule Of Bond Investing In Practice The (US) Golden Rule Of Bond Investing In Practice The (US) Golden Rule Of Bond Investing In Practice Ryan argued that a predictive framework for US Treasury returns built around the answer to this question has historically worked so well that it should be referred to as the “Golden Rule of bond investing” (Chart 1). In a follow-up report, our Global Fixed Income Strategy service confirmed that the Golden Rule also largely works in non-US developed market economies, with the exception of Japan due to the absence of any meaningful fluctuation in policy rates over the past two decades.2 The Golden Rule provides a very strong framework to aid fixed-income investors with their cyclical (i.e. 6-12 month) asset allocation decisions, by quantitatively linking government bond returns relative to cash – in other words, the excess return earned by taking duration risk - to policy rate “surprises” compared to what is discounted in shorter-term money markets. The practical application is that a decision to allocate to longer-maturity government bonds is reduced to a bet on whether a central bank will adjust policy rates by more or less than the market expects. The first question we address in this report is to what degree does the Golden Rule apply in China (in yield space rather than in return space), along with an explanation of any differences that may exist. However, we must first note why the Golden Rule of bond investing works, particularly in the US. The first reason is that there is a strong relationship between the US 3-month T-bill rate and Treasury yields of all other maturities. Conceptually, all fixed income investors have a choice when buying US government bonds: they can purchase a 3-month Treasury bill and simply perpetually roll over the position as it matures, or they can purchase a Treasury bond of a longer maturity. This means that yields on longer maturity Treasury bonds simply reflect investor expectations for the average 3-month T-bill rate over the life of the bond, plus some positive risk premium to compensate for the inherent uncertainty of the path and tendency of short-term yields. This helps explain the close link between cyclical changes in 3-month T-bill rates and yields on longer maturity Treasurys. Chart 2In The US, The 3-Month T-Bill Rate Perfectly Tracks The Fed Funds Rate In The US, The 3-Month T-Bill Rate Perfectly Tracks The Fed Funds Rate In The US, The 3-Month T-Bill Rate Perfectly Tracks The Fed Funds Rate The second reason for the Golden Rule’s success is that there is a very tight relationship between the effective Fed funds rate and the 3-month T-bill rate. While it is the (higher) discount rate that is the theoretical no-arbitrage ceiling for the 3-month rate, in practice T-bill rates trade extremely close to the Fed funds rate (Chart 2). This means that Fed funds rate “surprises” (relative to traded market expectations) are akin to surprises in the 3-month rate, which in turn strongly influence the expected future path of short-term interest rates and thus yields on longer maturity Treasurys. In China, we noted in a February 2018 Special Report3 that the 7-day interbank repo rate is now the de jure short-term policy rate in China following the establishment of an interest rate corridor system in 2015. Chart 3 presents our first test of the Golden Rule in China (in yield space rather than in return space), by plotting the annual change in the level of Chinese government bond yields alongside the 7-day repo rate “surprise” over the past year from 2010 to the present. Here, we use the first principal component of zero coupon Chinese government bond yields to represent the average level of yields (rather than selecting a particular maturity), and we use the 12-month RMB swap rate (versus 7-day repo) to represent market expectations for the policy rate. The chart highlights that the fit is good, as measured by a 50% R-squared between the two series. However, deviations in the relationship do exist, with the most notable exception having occurred in 2017: Chinese government bond yields rose considerably more than what the annual surprise in the 7-day repo rate would have suggested. Chart 3In China, The Golden Rule Works Decently Well Using 7-Day Repo... In China, The Golden Rule Works Decently Well Using 7-Day Repo... In China, The Golden Rule Works Decently Well Using 7-Day Repo... Chart 4...And Extremely Well Using 3-Month SHIBOR ...And Extremely Well Using 3-Month SHIBOR ...And Extremely Well Using 3-Month SHIBOR Chart 4 helps resolve a good portion of the 2017 discrepancy, and clarifies the link between Chinese monetary policy and government bond yields. Chart 4 is similar to Chart 3, except that it replaces the 7-day repo rate surprise with that of 3-month SHIBOR (which trades very closely to the 3-month repo rate). The chart illustrates an even closer fit between the two series (with an R-squared close to 80%), and shows that the 3-month SHIBOR surprise does a meaningfully better job at explaining the 2017 rise in Chinese government bond yields. The Golden Rule of bond investing works surprisingly well in China. The fact that the annual surprise in 3-month SHIBOR has done a better job at predicting changes in bond yields over the past decade underscores that the 3-month repo rate is the de facto short-term policy rate in China, a point that we have made in several previous reports. We have noted that the spike in the 3-month/7-day repo rate spread that occurred in late-2016 and lasted until mid-2018 happened because of China’s crackdown on shadow banking activity. This crackdown caused a funding squeeze for China’s small & medium banks, which caused a material rise in lending rates and government bond yields. This episode highlights that future changes in the 3-month repo rate are likely to reflect both underlying changes in net liquidity provided to large commercial banks (measured by the 7-day repo rate), and any dislocations in the interbank market that have the potential to push up lending rates and government bond yields. Bottom Line: BCA’s “Golden Rule” framework, which links developed economy government bond returns to central bank policy rate “surprises” versus market expectations, works for China as well – using the correct measure of the PBOC policy rate. This provides a useful investment framework for Chinese government bonds, which are now significant part of major global bond market benchmarks. The Cyclical Outlook For Chinese Government Bond Yields Given the establishment of the relationship between Chinese short-term interbank rates and government bond yields detailed above, we are now able to more precisely discuss the likely cyclical trajectory of Chinese government bond yields as a function of Chinese monetary policy. Two opposing forces have the potential to affect China’s government bond market this year. The first, a stabilization and modest rebound in Chinese economic activity, may exert upward pressure on yields due to expectations of eventual policy tightening. The second, continued attempts by the PBoC to ease corporate lending rates, may exert downward pressure on yields as it will reflect not just easy but easier monetary conditions. Yields at the long-end are likely to move modestly higher this year, at most. For investors, the raises the obvious question of whether Chinese government bond yields are likely to move up, down, or trend sideways this year. In our view, yields at the short-end are likely to be flat until later this year at the earliest, whereas yields at the long-end are likely to move modestly higher, at most. Yields at the short-end of China’s government bond curve are likely to stay flat for most of this year. There are two reasons why yields at the short-end of China’s government bond curve are likely to stay flat for most of this year. The first is that the PBoC is generally a reactive central bank and has historically lagged a pickup in economic activity, as illustrated in Chart 5. The chart shows the historical path of 3-month SHIBOR in the year following a bottom in economic activity in 2009, 2012, and 2015, and makes it clear that there has been no precedent for a significant rise in interbank rates in the first nine months of an economic recovery. The 2012 episode did see a very sharp rise in 3-month SHIBOR once the PBoC shifted into tightening mode, but we doubt that this experience will be repeated again unless economic growth accelerates much more aggressively than we expect. The second reason why we expect yields at the short-end of the curve to remain muted this year is because any additional easing by the PBoC is likely to be focused on reducing corporate lending rates, not interbank rates. Chart 6 highlights that while there is a strong correlation between changes in Chinese government bond yields and average lending rates in the economy, the former leads the latter. In the past, this relationship has existed because changes in interbank rates have coincided with reductions in the now obsolete benchmark lending rate, with the former usually occurring earlier than the latter. But in a scenario where the PBoC reduces the loan prime rate (LPR) and keeps net banking sector liquidity roughly constant, the extremely tight relationship shown in Chart 4 suggests that short-term bond yields are unlikely to be affected by a reduction in lending rates. Any meaningful decline in short-term yields below short-term interbank rates would simply prompt banks to stop buying these bonds. Chart 5The PBoC Is Generally A Reactive Central Bank The PBoC Is Generally A Reactive Central Bank The PBoC Is Generally A Reactive Central Bank Chart 6Average Lending Rates Lag Short-Term Bond Yields Average Lending Rates Lag Short-Term Bond Yields Average Lending Rates Lag Short-Term Bond Yields Chart 7China's Yield Curve Is Generally Pro-Cyclical China's Yield Curve Is Generally Pro-Cyclical China's Yield Curve Is Generally Pro-Cyclical Additional easing by the PBoC does have the potential to impact the long-end of the government bond curve if investors view these actions as a sign that interbank rates will remain low for some time. This view is reinforced by the fact that China’s yield curve is not particularly flat, and thus has room to move lower. However, Chart 7 also shows that China’s yield curve, defined here as the second principal component of zero coupon Chinese government bond yields, is positively correlated with the relative performance of investable Chinese equities. This suggests that there is a procyclical element to the curve. We suspect that this procyclical element will dominate a potential decline in expectations for future short-term interest rates, but that yields at the long-end are likely to move modestly higher this year, at most. Bottom Line: Any additional easing by the PBoC this year is likely to be focused on reducing lending rates to the real economy, not interbank rates (which drive government bond yields). As such, yields at the short-end are likely to be flat until later this year at the earliest, whereas yields at the long-end are likely to move modestly higher, at most. The Secular Outlook For Chinese Government Bond Yields A common approach to forecasting the likely structural trend for nominal government bond yields is to estimate the trajectory of real long-term potential output growth and to add the monetary authority’s inflation target. This framework is based on the idea that interest rates are in equilibrium when the cost of borrowing is roughly equal to nominal income growth, a condition that results in no change in the burden to service existing debt. Chart 8China's Potential Growth Is Likely To Trend Lower... China's Potential Growth Is Likely To Trend Lower... China's Potential Growth Is Likely To Trend Lower... Based on this framework, we would expect Chinese government bond yields to trend down over time, or possibly flat if the PBoC were to tolerate higher inflation over the coming decade. Chart 8 illustrates the IMF’s forecast of falling real potential growth in China over the coming several years, which is consistent with a shift in the composition of growth from investment to consumption as well as China’s looming demographic crisis. But Chart 9highlights an obvious problem with applying this framework to forecast the secular trend in Chinese government bond yields: over the past decade, yields have persistently averaged below actual nominal GDP growth, both in China and in the developed world. In the latter case, it is an open question whether this will continue to be true in the future, but in China’s case it is clear that government bond yields have little connection (in magnitude) to the pace of GDP growth. This reflects the longstanding strategy of Chinese policymakers to promote investment via persistently low interest rates, as has occurred in other manufacturing and export-oriented Asian economies (Chart 10). Chart 9...But Bond Yields Are Well Below GDP Growth, Just Like In Developed Markets ...But Bond Yields Are Well Below GDP Growth, Just Like In Developed Markets ...But Bond Yields Are Well Below GDP Growth, Just Like In Developed Markets Chart 10In Industrial Asian Economies, Low Bond Yields Are A Policy Choice In Industrial Asian Economies, Low Bond Yields Are A Policy Choice In Industrial Asian Economies, Low Bond Yields Are A Policy Choice   The persistent historical gap between economic growth and bond yields in China makes it difficult to forecast the structural outlook for yields using conventional methods, and largely limits us to inference. To the extent that Chinese policymakers succeed at shifting the drivers of growth from investment to consumption, bond yields are more likely to rise than fall over time. This is because as long as interest rates remain well below the pace of income growth, the incentive to excessively borrow (and invest) is likely to persist. Chart 11China Needs Higher Interest Rates, But Only To A Point China Needs Higher Interest Rates, But Only To A Point China Needs Higher Interest Rates, But Only To A Point However, even in a scenario where Chinese government bond yields structurally trend higher, we expect the rise to be modest. Chart 11 highlights that China’s “private sector” debt service ratio is extremely elevated, underscoring that the country’s ability to tolerate significantly higher bond yields is not strong. In addition, since 2015, China’s debt service ratio has been mostly flat despite rising a rising debt-to-GDP ratio, which has been achieved through lower short-term interest rates. To the extent that policymakers fail to make meaningful progress in shifting China’s growth drivers away from investment over the coming few years, lower (potentially sharply lower) bond yields would appear to be all but inevitable to cope with what would become a permanently growing drag on economic activity from the servicing of debt. For now, we would characterize this scenario as a risk to our base case view, but it is a risk that we will be closely monitoring over the coming years. Bottom Line: The persistent gap between Chinese nominal GDP growth and government bond yields is likely contributing to the problem of excessive leveraging. To the extent that Chinese policymakers succeed at shifting the drivers of growth from investment to consumption, bond yields are more likely to structurally rise than fall. Investment Conclusions Our analysis above points to four recommendations for investors over the coming year: Overweight Chinese stocks versus Chinese government bonds in RMB and USD terms Overweight Chinese onshore corporate bonds versus duration-matched Chinese government bonds in RMB terms Overweight 7-10 year USD-hedged Chinese government bonds versus their US and developed market (DM) counterparts For offshore US dollar-based investors, long 7-10 year Chinese government bonds in unhedged terms Regarding the first two recommendations, our view that yields are likely to be flat at the short-end and modestly higher at the long-end suggests that investors can expect total returns on the order of 2-3% from Chinese government bonds this year. Barring a major and lasting economic slowdown from the 2019-nCoV outbreak, we expect Chinese domestic and investable equities to outperform government securities over the coming 6-12 months. Onshore corporate bonds have a similar outlook: onshore spreads are pricing in (massively) higher default losses than we believe is warranted, meaning that they will outperform duration-matched government equivalents without any changes in yield. Chart 12Within Global Fixed-Income, Hedged Chinese 10-Year Yields Are Relatively Attractive Within Global Fixed-Income, Hedged Chinese 10-Year Yields Are Relatively Attractive Within Global Fixed-Income, Hedged Chinese 10-Year Yields Are Relatively Attractive Chart 13Unhedged Yield Spreads Predict Hedged Relative Performance Versus The US Unhedged Yield Spreads Predict Hedged Relative Performance Versus The US Unhedged Yield Spreads Predict Hedged Relative Performance Versus The US For global fixed-income investors, Charts 12-14 present USD-hedged 10-year Chinese government yields versus the US and DM/DM ex-US, along with the historical relative return profile of USD-hedged Chinese bonds versus hedged and unhedged returns. In hedged space, Chinese 10-year government bond yields are modestly attractive: 2.2% versus 1.6% in the US and 1.8% in DM ex-US. China’s historically low yield beta to the overall level of global 10-year bond yields (Chart 15) suggests that Chinese yields should perform well in 2020 – a year where we expect global bond yields to drift higher as economic growth rebounds. Combined with relatively attractive valuation, this bodes well for the relative performance of Chinese debt versus DM equivalents. A low yield beta against a backdrop of drifting higher global yields implies that longer-maturity Chinese government bonds will outperform their DM equivalents. Chart 14Unhedged Yield Spreads Predict Hedged Relative Performance Versus DM Unhedged Yield Spreads Predict Hedged Relative Performance Versus DM Unhedged Yield Spreads Predict Hedged Relative Performance Versus DM Chart 15China's Yield Beta Has Been Rising, But Is Still Japan-Like China's Yield Beta Has Been Rising, But Is Still Japan-Like China's Yield Beta Has Been Rising, But Is Still Japan-Like   We would also recommend longer-maturity Chinese government bonds in unhedged terms versus a USD-hedged global government bond portfolio. Chart 16 highlights that the relative return of this trade is strongly (negatively) linked to USD-CNY, and we expect further (albeit more modest) gains in RMB over the cyclical horizon. Chart 16Modest Further RMB Upside Means Unhedged Chinese Bonds Will Outperform Modest Further RMB Upside Means Unhedged Chinese Bonds Will Outperform Modest Further RMB Upside Means Unhedged Chinese Bonds Will Outperform As a final point, investors should note that today’s report is part of a heightened focus on China’s fixed income market, in terms of both forecasting fixed income returns and analyzing the cyclical and structural implications of the increasing investability of China’s financial markets. More research on this topic is likely to come in 2020 and beyond: Stay Tuned!   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com         Footnotes 1    Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report "The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing," dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2   Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report "The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing," dated September 25, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 3   Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "Seven Questions About Chinese Monetary Policy," dated February 22, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Commercial rents have fallen in real terms, revealing that the commercial property price rally has been fueled exclusively by low rates. Limited upside for rents and an upward direction for future rates are two significant headwinds. However, commercial real estate is especially pro-cyclical and inflationary pressures need to work their way into the economy before the risk of a downturn becomes imminent. The good news is that the economy is less vulnerable to slipping commercial property prices. Large banks have shrunk their commercial property loan books and their composition has shifted towards safer categories of commercial loans. While the macroeconomic outlook remains somewhat neutral, CMBS’ risk/reward profile appears reasonably attractive relative to other US bond sectors. Feature Real estate was a bane for markets and the banking system in the last recession, and commercial properties have lately become an increasingly popular source of concern among investors. Average prices have grown by 90% over the past decade, rising well above their pre-Great Financial Crisis peaks. We have made the case that we are heading into the expansion’s last stretch. The study of economic cycles and our relentless quest to identify inflection points ahead of time become more timely as the bull market ages. To this end, current commercial property valuations deserve close scrutiny and we explore whether any underlying excesses could potentially disrupt financial stability or precipitate a recession in the US. We conclude that although commercial property prices have little hope of appreciating significantly from current levels, a reversal is not imminent until inflationary pressure forces rates higher. When prices eventually slip, the impact on the overall economy should be more attenuated than it was in the last recession, as the banking system has become less vulnerable to a downturn in commercial real estate. While the fundamental macro outlook remains neutral, suggesting no imminent pressure on spreads, US bond investors can find relative value in non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS (vs. corporate bonds rated A or higher) and in agency CMBS (vs. agency residential mortgaged-backed securities). A Rate-Driven Rally Chart 1Commercial Rents Have Decoupled From Property Prices Commercial Rents Have Decoupled From Property Prices Commercial Rents Have Decoupled From Property Prices Like all financial assets, commercial property prices are derived from discounting future cash flows to their present value. Since the crisis, a low rate environment, supported by a sluggish inflation backdrop and continuously accommodative monetary policy, has depressed the valuation equation’s denominator. Meanwhile, strong economic fundamentals and demographic trends - such as urbanization and the millennials’ tendency to marry and purchase a home at a later age - have helped boost the numerator for commercial and multi-family residential properties in the past decade. However, with the exception of multi-family residential real estate - for which price appreciation has also been the strongest - real rents have fallen (Chart 1), revealing that low rates have propelled commercial properties’ price appreciation over the past decade. The combination of falling real rents and surging property prices has depressed commercial real estate cap rates1 to cyclical low levels, raising the question of a potential unwind. Mathematically, an increase in cap rates could result, on the one hand, from rent growth outpacing inflation growth, translating into an increase in real rents on the numerator. Alternatively, cap rates could rise from falling property prices, reducing the denominator. On a cyclical horizon, the latter outcome seems more likely than the former. Little Upside Left For Rents First, the fact that rents in real terms have decreased in spite of sluggish inflation is a bad omen for the outlook for future real rents. We have made the case that there is more inflationary pressure than meets the eye beneath the surface of the US economy. The combination of an already very tight labor market and a pickup in manufacturing activity point towards further wage growth. Inflation is a lagging indicator that has more scope to rise than roll-over at this stage of the cycle. All else equal, upward inflationary pressure will depress real rents further. Second, nominal rents themselves are also facing significant headwinds. Office buildings’ and retail shopping centers’ vacancies have barely recovered from the hit they took in the last recession, while new inventory is struggling to get absorbed by new demand (Chart 2). A strong labor market generally supports the demand for office spaces but a tight labor market limits its future upside. The latter, though, increases potential wage gains and consumers’ purchasing power, whose fundamentals are already strong. We have shown that US consumers’ increased savings rates and lower debt levels put them in a good position to spend their incremental income. Chart 2Post-Crisis Office And Shopping Center Vacancies Remain Elevated... Post-Crisis Office And Shopping Center Vacancies Remain Elevated... Post-Crisis Office And Shopping Center Vacancies Remain Elevated... Chart 3...As These Sectors Face Structural Disruptions ...As These Sectors Face Structural Disruptions ...As These Sectors Face Structural Disruptions However, both sectors are facing structural disruptions. Co-working has introduced a new player in the office segment – a sub-lessor who signs long-term leases on space it rents out in short-term chunks. If a sizable sub-lessor like WeWork were forced to shrink its footprint, a lot of office supply would come back on to the market, while demand is shrinking as businesses attempt to reduce the area each employee occupies. Brick-and-mortar retailers continue to be buffeted as e-commerce captures an increasing share of consumer spending, keeping downward pressure on retail rents (Chart 3). The picture looks slightly brighter in the industrial properties space, where vacancies have recovered to healthier levels, though low vacancies have failed to lift rents as demand for properties is being met by new inventory (Chart 4). The revival in global manufacturing activity that we are expecting to occur this year should support industrial property rents in the near term, but the advanced age of the cycle limits future upside. Chart 4A Brighter Picture For Industrial And Apartment Buildings... A Brighter Picture For Industrial And Apartment Buildings... A Brighter Picture For Industrial And Apartment Buildings... Chart 5...Thanks To Rising Renters Income ...Thanks To Rising Renters Income ...Thanks To Rising Renters Income Chart 6Over-Construction Of High-Tier Properties Over-Construction Of High-Tier Properties Over-Construction Of High-Tier Properties Multi-family residential housing is the only sector that has experienced steady real rent growth, fueled by a combination of rising rentership rates and rising household income amongst renters (Chart 5). Homebuilders’ focus on building higher-end units has led to an oversupply of more expensive properties, and their prices have already started to contract on a year-on-year basis (Chart 6). Multi-family residential properties rents should lose momentum as the alternative cost of owning homes falls, especially as homebuilders attempt to right-size their mix of properties to offer more lower-end supply. Exhausted Demand A commercial real estate rally fueled by perpetually falling rates is unsustainable. Although the market sees the potential for an additional rate cut, we think the Fed is done cutting. Labor market strength and a revival in global manufacturing activity argue that no further accommodation or insurance rate cuts are necessary. From current levels, the path of least resistance for rates is upwards (Chart 7). Strong demand from institutional investors has also contributed to fueling prices. Pension funds and insurance companies’ holdings of mortgages and agency-backed securities have nearly doubled since 2010 (Chart 8, first panel) and their allocation as a percentage of total assets is nearing pre-recession highs (Chart 8, second panel). These levels allow them little flexibility to sustain their demand impulse, as there is only so much they can allocate to real estate and other alternative investments. Chart 7Stronger Economic Growth Will Put Upward Pressure On Government Bond Yields Stronger Economic Growth Will Put Upward Pressure On Government Bond Yields Stronger Economic Growth Will Put Upward Pressure On Government Bond Yields Chart 8Saturated Demand From Institutional Investors... Saturated Demand From Institutional Investors... Saturated Demand From Institutional Investors... Demand from yield-hungry investors may also get exhausted if CMBS yields deflate to the point where they lose competitiveness relative to other income-producing investments. CMBS yields have broadly moved with other bond yields since the crisis, though US high-yield corporates have widened somewhat over the last few years, making them a slightly more appealing alternative to CMBS, all else equal (Chart 9). The steady downward pressure on multi-family cap rates since 2010 (Chart 10) reveals that the collateral underlying multi-family loans has become increasingly ambitiously priced, suggesting that losses given default on multi-family backed CMBS without agency backing may be rising, eroding prospective default-adjusted returns. Chart 9...And From Yield-Hungry Investors? ...And From Yield-Hungry Investors? ...And From Yield-Hungry Investors? Chart 10Cap Rates Have Reached Cyclical Lows Cap Rates Have Reached Cyclical Lows Cap Rates Have Reached Cyclical Lows New regulations also have the potential to retract a significant share of demand for commercial mortgages. The severe housing market deterioration during the Great Financial Crisis and the government intervention required to ensure Freddie Mac’s and Fannie Mae’s solvency led the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to place these two government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) under conservatorship in 2014 and to cap their holdings of multi-family mortgages to US$ 100 billion for each GSE. A commercial real estate rally fueled by perpetually falling rates is unsustainable. Current holdings of multi-family residential loans far exceed the stated limits (Table 1). GSEs hold nearly half of all multi-family residential loans outstanding. The post-crisis growth in GSE-guaranteed loans is largely attributable to the exclusion from the cap of certain categories of loans such as green energy loans (Chart 11). The FHFA eliminated these exemptions last year, making the US$ 200 billion cap more binding and applicable to all multi-family loans without exception.2 The impact on mortgage originators and investors is yet to be seen but it would naturally follow that demand for multi-family mortgages to bundle into CMBS would decline if the GSEs are forced to take a step back from the space. Table 1Commercial Real Estate Loans By Holder ($US Mn) Commercial Real Estate And US Financial Stability Commercial Real Estate And US Financial Stability Chart 11Multi-Family Mortgage Debt Outstanding By Mortgage Holder Multi-Family Mortgage Debt Outstanding By Mortgage Holder Multi-Family Mortgage Debt Outstanding By Mortgage Holder Late-Cycle Dynamics Commercial mortgages are typically non-recourse (in case of default, the borrower can only recover the value of the collateralized property) making the loss given default a function of property prices. When times are good and property prices rise, borrowers can easily refinance their loans. The opposite holds in bad times. Therefore, commercial real estate prices are especially pro-cyclical. In spite of the headwinds outlined above, a commercial property downturn does not seem imminent. In spite of the headwinds outlined above, a commercial property downturn does not seem imminent. First, the US economy still has momentum, is supported by highly accommodative monetary policy and should get a boost from a global growth revival. Absent any major exogenous shock to the global economy, we expect that a recession is at least eighteen months away. For as long as the economy keeps expanding, commercial real estate prices can remain elevated. Second, sources of financing remain abundant as the emergence of alternative lenders (Chart 12) has offset the banks’ tighter lending standards for commercial properties (Chart 13). The proliferation of non-bank lenders is typically a late-cycle indicator. Chart 12The Proliferation Of Alternative Lenders… Commercial Real Estate And US Financial Stability Commercial Real Estate And US Financial Stability However, when the economy starts contracting, a commercial real estate downturn could have an outsized impact on banks with significant exposure. In the late 1980s, the commercial property downturn induced a recession and the subprime mortgage bust gave rise to the Great Financial Crisis. Healthier Balance Sheets The good news for the economy today is that banks are less vulnerable to a downturn in commercial real estate than they were back then. The good news for the economy today is that banks are less vulnerable to a downturn in commercial real estate. Banks have decreased their overall exposure to commercial property loans to levels below their 2008 and 1989 peaks (Chart 14). It is worth noting, though, that smaller banks have taken an increasingly important role in the commercial property market as they now finance 65% of all commercial property loans. However, a stronger concentration in smaller banks represents a localized rather than systemic risk, as smaller banks tend to have a more concentrated geographic exposure. Conversely, large banks have significantly shrunk their commercial real estate loan books.3 Chart 14Large Banks Have Shrunk Their CRE Books... Large Banks Have Shrunk Their CRE Books... Large Banks Have Shrunk Their CRE Books... Chart 15...And Shifted Away From Speculative-Grade Loans ...And Shifted Away From Speculative-Grade Loans ...And Shifted Away From Speculative-Grade Loans Most importantly, the composition of the commercial property loan book has changed drastically since the Great Financial Crisis. Banks have significantly reduced their exposure to more speculative construction and development loans (Chart 15). Risk appetite typically increases in the latter stages of an expansion, yet construction loans remain at relatively depressed levels. The growth in commercial property loans since 2013 has entirely been explained by the rise in relatively less risky multi-family and non-residential non-farm loans. Investment Implications A commercial real estate downturn is probably not a 2020 event. Inflationary pressures need to make their presence felt across a wide swath of the economy before Fed hikes will give rates the scope to move sustainably higher. In the meantime, bond investors with a mandate to remain exposed to CMBS can reap the benefits of attractive risk/reward profiles relative to other segments of the US bond market. US Bond Strategy’s Excess Return Bond Map measures the number of standard deviations of spread widening a sector would need to experience, before losing 100 basis points relative to a duration-matched position in Treasuries4 (Chart 16). Sectors plotting near the top-right of the Map carry both high expected return and low risk. Sectors plotting near the bottom-left carry low expected return and high risk. Chart 16BCA US Bond Strategy’s Excess Return Bond Map Commercial Real Estate And US Financial Stability Commercial Real Estate And US Financial Stability Chart 17Tighter Standards And Decelerating Prices Tighter Standards And Decelerating Prices Tighter Standards And Decelerating Prices This valuation framework currently suggests that CMBS look reasonably attractive. Non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS’ expected return is more promising than Aaa-and Aa-rated corporate bonds and somewhat similar to the expected return on an A-rated corporate bond. Meanwhile, CMBS exhibit a lower risk of losing 100 bps. Similarly, Agency CMBS offer greater expected return than Conventional 30-year Agency-backed residential MBS, along with a similar risk of losses. Although relative valuations appear attractive, the fundamental outlook remains neutral for CMBS spreads, for now. Periods of tightening commercial real estate lending standards and weakening commercial loan demand have historically coincided with decelerating commercial real estate prices and widening CMBS spreads. The Fed’s Q3 2019 Senior Loan Officer Survey revealed only a small net tightening of lending standards and unchanged demand (Chart 17). Overall, the lack of inflationary pressure suggests that neither a commercial real estate downturn nor a meaningful widening of CMBS spreads is an imminent threat.   Jennifer Lacombe Senior Analyst JenniferL@bcaresearch.com Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 A capitalization rate is the ratio of net operating income (rent) to price and measures the expected rate of return on a real estate investment. As such, a property’s price can also be derived by dividing its rent by its cap rate. 2 More information about GSE’s conservatorship can be found on the FHFA’s website (https://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Pages/History-of-Fannie-Mae--Freddie-Conservatorships.aspx and https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/New-Multifamily-Caps-9132019.aspx). 3 An analysis of the largest banks’ earnings call we carried out last October also revealed that large banks were unanimously shrinking their commercial real estate books. For more details, please refer to US Investment Strategy Weekly Report from October 28, 2019, "What The Biggest Banks See", available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 4 For more details on the methodology behind our Excess Return Bond Map please see US Bond Strategy October 15, 2019 Weekly Report "A Perspective On Risk And Reward", available at usbs.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Global Corporates: The cyclical backdrop – accommodative monetary policies, improving global growth momentum, moderate inflation and subdued volatility – is supportive for the continued outperformance of global corporate bonds over sovereign debt in 2020. Corporate Bond Valuation: Extending a valuation framework we’ve introduced for US corporates to non-US credit – looking at volatility-adjusted spreads relative to both their own history and the “phase” of the monetary policy cycle - we calculate spread targets for non-US corporates in the euro area, UK and Canada. 2020 Opportunities: Current corporate spread levels are furthest above our targets (i.e. cheap) for US high-yield (most notably for Ba- and Caa-rated credit), UK high-yield and UK investment grade. Spreads are furthest below our targets (i.e. expensive) for euro area high-yield (mostly Ba-rated), US investment grade (all credit tiers) and Canadian investment grade. Feature Chart 1Deviations From Corporate Spread Targets How To Find Value In Global Corporate Bonds How To Find Value In Global Corporate Bonds One of our main investment themes for 2020 is that accommodative monetary policies and faster economic growth will delay the peak in the aging global credit cycle, giving investors another year of corporate bond outperformance versus sovereign debt in the developed economies. Returns this year will be nowhere near as robust as in 2019, however, given rich valuation starting points for much of the global corporate universe. Against this backdrop, fixed income investors will have to be more selective in allocations by country, sector and credit quality in order to outperform. To that end, in this Special Report we extend a valuation framework for corporate bond spreads first introduced for US corporates by our sister service, US Bond Strategy, to non-US credit. This methodology looks at spreads on a volatility-adjusted basis, allowing comparison of valuations versus their own history and relative to similar stages of past monetary policy cycles. Chart 1 shows the deviations of current benchmark index option-adjusted spreads (OAS) from spread targets derived from our methodology for different countries (the US, euro area, the UK and Canada) and credit quality tiers (investment grade vs. high-yield). Positive deviations imply current spreads are above the targets derived from our framework – in other words, relatively undervalued - and vice-versa. Returns this year will be nowhere near as robust as in 2019, however, given rich valuation starting points for much of the global corporate universe. Against this backdrop, fixed income investors will have to be more selective in allocations by country, sector and credit quality in order to outperform. The conclusions are that there are still opportunities for additional spread tightening from current levels for lower-rated US high-yield and both UK investment grade and high-yield corporates. At the same time, valuations are looking most stretched for euro area high-yield, US investment grade (all credit tiers) and Canadian investment grade. A Brief Word On The Outlook For Global Corporate Credit In 2020 Chart 2Positive Backdrop For Corporate Bonds Positive Backdrop For Corporate Bonds Positive Backdrop For Corporate Bonds The backdrop for global corporate bond markets will remain positive in 2020 for three main reasons: Global monetary policies will remain accommodative. Central bankers are now focusing more on boosting soft growth and low inflation expectations. Real policy interest rates in the US, euro area, UK and Canada are already below estimates of neutral like r-star (Chart 2, top panel), and will likely remain so throughout 2020. In the past, periods of credit market underperformance have occurred when monetary policy was restrictive, with real rates above neutral or government bond yield curves that were very flat or inverted (more on that later). Global growth momentum will improve. Recent data releases (global manufacturing PMIs, sentiment surveys like the global ZEW and German IFO) have shown that the 2019 global industrial downturn was in the process of bottoming out during the 4th quarter of the year. Additional improvement is likely in the coming months, based on the steady gains of the BCA Global Leading Economic Indicator (LEI). The elevated level of our global LEI diffusion index – measuring the share of individual country LEIs that are rising and which is itself a leading indicator of both the global LEI and corporate bond returns - suggests that additional outperformance of global corporates versus sovereign bonds is likely within the next 12 months (Chart 2, middle panel). Financial conditions are stimulative. Global equities and credit are off to a strong start in 2020, while market volatility is subdued across a variety of asset classes. For example, the US VIX index is now just above its 2019 low, which is consistent with narrow global corporate bond spreads (Chart 2, bottom panel). That low volatility backdrop – supported by market-friendly central bank policies - is helping keep financial conditions easy enough to lift economic growth, while also boosting investor risk appetite for corporate credit. The overall outlook for global corporate credit is still positive and investors should expect another year of corporate bond outperformance versus sovereign debt in the developed economies. Nonetheless, returns will be lower in 2020 than in 2019 due to expensive valuation starting points. As can be seen from Chart 3, global corporate bond spreads are already fairly tight relative to their long-term historical range. Also, outright index yields in many asset classes, like US high-yield, are now at new all-time lows. We interpret this as a sign that the “easy money” has already been made in being generally long corporate credit versus government bonds. Having the right tools to assess the relative values among differing credit markets will be critical to finding the best investment opportunities in this environment. Chart 3Rich Valuation Starting Points In Corporate Credit How To Find Value In Global Corporate Bonds How To Find Value In Global Corporate Bonds We can use the breakeven spread as a valuation tool by looking at the percentile rank relative to its own history, effectively showing the percentage of time that the breakeven spread has been lower in the past. Bottom Line: The cyclical backdrop – accommodative monetary policies, improving global growth momentum, moderate inflation and subdued volatility – is supportive for the continued outperformance of global corporate bonds over sovereign debt in 2020. Valuations are likely to be more of a headwind for corporate bond returns, though. Using Breakeven Spreads As A Credit Valuation Tool As a reminder to existing readers (and to new clients), one of our main valuation tools for credit instruments is the 12-month breakeven spread. That is, the amount of spread widening required for corporate bond returns to break even with a duration-matched position in government bond securities over a 12-month horizon. It can be approximated by dividing the OAS of a bond (or a benchmark bond index) by its duration. More specifically, we can use the breakeven spread as a valuation tool by looking at the percentile rank relative to its own history, effectively showing the percentage of time that the breakeven spread has been lower in the past. We find this valuation tool to be superior to others for two main reasons: (i) using the breakeven spread rather than the average index OAS allows us to control for the changing average duration of the benchmark bond indices; and (ii) the percentile rank is often a better representation of credit spreads than the spread itself.1 BCA Research US Bond Strategy and Global Fixed Income Strategy have both regularly shown the percentile rankings of US investment grade and high-yield breakeven spreads as part of our discussion of US corporate bond markets. We have never produced such rankings for non-US credit, until now. InCharts 4- 7, we show those percentile ranks relative to history for credit in the US and, for the first time, the euro area, UK, Canada, Japan, Australia and Emerging Markets US dollar denominated corporates. We also provide the breakeven spread historical percentile ranks for each individual credit tier in the Appendix charts on pages 13-16. Chart 4US: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads US: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads US: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads Chart 5Euro Area: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads Euro Area: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads Euro Area: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads Chart 6UK: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads UK: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads UK: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads Using these charts, we can gauge which markets offer the best (or worst) level of spread, adjusted by its own volatility and compared to its own history. The most attractive corporate credit spreads on a volatility-adjusted basis are: US high-yield (mostly Caa-rated and B-rated) Japan investment grade (mostly Baa-rated and A-rated) Canada Aaa-rated UK high-yield (excluding financials) Chart 7Other Countries: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads More Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads More Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads The least attractive corporate credit spreads on a volatility-adjusted basis are: US investment grade (all credit tiers) UK Aaa-rated Canada Baa-rated Euro Area high-yield Using this metric, US Caa-rated junk bonds look most “undervalued”, with a volatility-adjusted spread in the upper 20% of all observations. Chart 8 displays the current breakeven spread historical percentile ranks across countries and credit quality, with high-yield markets shown in red. Using this metric, US Caa-rated junk bonds look most “undervalued”, with a volatility-adjusted spread in the upper 20% of all observations. While this chart provides a quick overview of which corporate bond markets are cheap/expensive with respect to their own history, it does not allow for comparisons of the relative cheapness between markets. To do this, we need to find a way to convert the percentile rankings into some measure of a “fair value” credit spread. Chart 8Global Corporate Bond 12-Month Breakeven Spreads By Percentile Rank (%) How To Find Value In Global Corporate Bonds How To Find Value In Global Corporate Bonds Using Monetary Policy Cycles To Determine Corporate Spread Targets Our colleagues at BCA Research US Bond Strategy have come up with a novel approach for determining spread targets for US corporate credit, based on the breakeven spread percentile rankings.2 Essentially, the stance of US monetary policy, as measured by the slope of the US Treasury curve, is used to predict changes in the US credit cycle, helping to determine “cyclical” spread targets relative to the stance of monetary policy. The first step of this process is to group corporate bond excess returns (vs government debt) into buckets defined by the following “phases” of the US monetary policy cycle, measured by the yield differential between 10-year and 3-year Treasuries: Phase 1: from the end of the previous recession until the slope goes below 50 bps. Phase 2: from the time that the slope crosses below 50 bps until it inverts. Phase 3: from the time that the yield curve first inverts to the start of the next recession. Recessionary periods are not included in these phases, as all corporate credit exhibits the worst returns during those episodes. That is because economic growth and downgrade/default risks, and not the state of monetary policy, are the driving factor behind credit spread moves during recessions. Chart 9 shows the history of the US corporate bond markets broken down into “curve-defined” cycles.3 Dating back to 1974, the earliest date for investment grade bond index data, there have been five such cycles. Chart 9US Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve US Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve US Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve In Charts 10-12, we show the same phases for the euro area, the UK and Canada, using their own government bond yield curves to determine the phase of the monetary policy cycle in the same fashion as was done for the US.4 Once the phases of the monetary policy cycle are defined, we can then calculate corporate bond excess returns during each phase. Chart 10Euro Area: Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve Euro Area Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve Euro Area Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve Chart 11UK: Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve UK: Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve UK: Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve Chart 12Canada: Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve Canada: Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve Canada: Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve Table 1 shows the average corporate bond annualized excess returns under each phase across every cycle that can be defined with available data. Excess returns tend to be highest in Phase 1, quite low but still positive in Phase 2, and usually turn negative during Phase 3, once the yield curve has inverted. Table 1Corporate Bond Annualized Excess Returns* (%) Under Each Phase Of The Cycle How To Find Value In Global Corporate Bonds How To Find Value In Global Corporate Bonds Currently, we are in Phase 2 in the US, euro area and UK, with yield curves that are relatively flat but still positively sloped. Historically, such periods have generated positive excess returns for corporate debt versus duration-matched government bonds, although of far smaller magnitudes compared to Phase 1 periods. Given our expectation that the Fed, ECB and Bank of England will maintain a dovish bias throughout 2020, we expect the no shift from Phase 2 for the US, euro area and the UK that would hurt corporate bond excess returns in those countries. With the Canadian yield curve now slightly inverted, however, Canada is now in Phase 3. This raises the risk that the recent strong outperformance of Canadian investment grade corporate bonds could end if the Bank of Canada does not deliver the monetary easing currently discounted in the Canadian yield curve. How We Determine Corporate Spread Targets Having defined the three phases of the monetary policy cycle, we then re-calculate our corporate bond breakeven spread percentile ranks within each phase. We then back-out a spread target for each credit tier by taking the median 12-month breakeven spread seen in similar monetary policy environments, as determined by the slope of the yield curve.5 Finally, we convert those “median” breakeven spreads into OAS targets using the current benchmark index duration and credit rating distribution. We are assuming that a reasonable spread target for any corporate bond market is determined by adjusting for both spread volatility AND the monetary policy cycle. So, essentially, we are assuming that a reasonable spread target for any corporate bond market is determined by adjusting for both spread volatility AND the monetary policy cycle. Charts 13-16 show the index OAS and their respective targets for the US (both investment grade and high-yield), euro area (both investment grade and high-yield), the UK (both investment grade and high-yield excluding financials), and Canada (only investment grade). Further, the spread targets for each individual credit tier are provided in the Appendix on pages 17-19. Chart 13US: Corporate Bond Spread Targets US Corporate Bond Spread Targets US Corporate Bond Spread Targets Chart 14Euro Area: Corporate Bond Spread Targets Euro Area: Corporate Bond Spread Targets Euro Area: Corporate Bond Spread Targets Chart 15UK: Corporate Bond Spread Targets UK: Corporate Bond Spread Targets UK: Corporate Bond Spread Targets Chart 16Canada: Corporate Bond Spread Targets Canada: Corporate Bond Spread Target Canada: Corporate Bond Spread Target For example, our spread target for US B-rated high-yield is 227bps, which is 80bps below the current index OAS. From the charts, we can make the following conclusions about the relative attractiveness of current spread levels: The largest deviations from our spread target (i.e. potentially most undervalued) are: US high-yield (mostly Caa-rated and B-rated) UK high-yield (excluding financials) The lowest deviations from our spread target (i.e. potentially most overvalued) are: Euro Area high-yield (mostly Ba-rated) Canada investment grade US investment grade (all credit tiers) This framework is an interesting way to derive corporate bond value, by adjusting for both the volatility and monetary policy backdrop. Of course, there are other factors that are more difficult to quantify that can keep spreads too tight or too wide versus these fair value levels, like investor risk tolerance or risk premia for political uncertainty. In terms of factors that are quantifiable, however, this spread target methodology is a useful way to get a sense of the richness or cheapness of global corporate debt. In terms of factors that are quantifiable, however, this spread target methodology is a useful way to get a sense of the richness or cheapness of global corporate debt. We will regularly update these targets in future BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy reports. Bottom Line: Current corporate spread levels are furthest above our targets (i.e. cheap) for US high-yield (most notably for Ba- and Caa-rated credit), UK high-yield and UK investment grade. Spreads are furthest below our targets (i.e. expensive) for euro area high-yield (mostly Ba-rated), US investment grade (all credit tiers) and Canadian investment grade.   Jeremie Peloso Research Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 This is because credit spreads often tighten to very low levels and then remain tight for an extended period. Thus, by showing the percentage of time that a given spread has been tighter than its current level, the percentile rank gives a better sense of this pattern than the actual spread. 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For US Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 3 Note that the Treasury curve used for this analysis is the spread between the 10-year Treasury and the 3-year Treasury yield. The more widely-followed 2-year Treasury was not used as there was more historical data available for the 3-year maturity. 4 Note that there are fewer cycles to analyze for these countries due to the shorter available history of corporate bond market data outside the US. 5 For more details on the spread targets please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Paid To Wait”, dated February 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Appendix Chart 1AUS: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads US: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads US: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Chart 1BUS: High-Yield Breakeven Spreads US: High-Yield Breakeven Spreads US: High-Yield Breakeven Spreads Chart 1CEuro Area: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads By Credit Tiers Euro Area: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Euro Area: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Chart 1DEuro Area: High-Yield Breakeven Spreads By Credit Tiers Euro Area: High-Yield Breakeven Spreads Euro Area: High-Yield Breakeven Spreads Chart 1EUK: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads UK: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads UK: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Chart 1FCanada: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Canada: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Canada: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Chart 1GJapan: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Japan: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Japan: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Chart 2AUS: Investment Grade Spread Targets US: Investment Grade Spread Targets US: Investment Grade Spread Targets Chart 2BUS: High-Yield Spread Targets US: High-Yield Spread Targets US: High-Yield Spread Targets Chart 2CEuro Area: Investment Grade Spread Targets By Credit Tiers Euro Area: Investment Grade Spread Targets Euro Area: Investment Grade Spread Targets Chart 2DEuro Area: High-Yield Spread Targets By Credit Tiers How To Find Value In Global Corporate Bonds How To Find Value In Global Corporate Bonds Chart 2EUK: Investment Grade Spread Targets By Credit Tiers UK: Investment Grade Spread Targets UK: Investment Grade Spread Targets Chart 2FCanada: Investment Grade Spread Targets By Credit Tiers Canada: Investment Grade Spread Targets Canada: Investment Grade Spread Targets