Fixed Income

Highlights Fed/BoE NIRP: It is too soon for either the Fed or Bank of England to consider a move to a negative interest rate policy (NIRP), even with US and UK money markets flirting with pricing in that outcome. Lessons from “NIRP 1.0”: In the countries that did go to negative rates in 2014-16 (Japan, Switzerland, the euro area, Sweden and Denmark), there existed some combination of weak economies, near-0% inflation, anemic credit growth or unwanted currency appreciation. Negative rates were needed to help fight those trends by driving down longer-term bond yields. NIRP 2.0?: Among the major countries without negative rate policies in effect (the US, UK, Canada and Australia), there is no evidence that longer-term borrowing rates need to fall further to boost credit growth, even in the midst of deep recessions. However, additional strength of the stubbornly resilient US dollar could be the deflationary shock that eventually forces the Fed into NIRP. Feature Chart 1NIRP 2.0 Would Trigger A Surge Of Negative Yielding Bonds NIRP 2.0 Would Trigger A Surge Of Negative Yielding Bonds NIRP 2.0 Would Trigger A Surge Of Negative Yielding Bonds Within a 20-month window in 2014-16, the central banks of Japan, Sweden, the euro area, Switzerland and Denmark all cut policy interest rates to below 0% - where they remain to this day. Fast forward to 2020, in the midst of a global pandemic and deep worldwide recession that has already forced major developed market central banks to cut rates close to 0%, there is now increased speculation that the negative interest rate policy (NIRP) club might soon get a few new members. The Federal Reserve has been front and center in that group. Fed funds futures contracts had recently priced in slightly negative rates in 2021, despite Fed Chair Jerome Powell repeatedly saying that a sub-0% funds rate was not in the Fed’s plans. The Bank of England (BoE) has also seen markets inch toward pricing in negative rates, although BoE officials have been more open to the idea of negative rates as a viable policy choice. Even the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has suggested that negative rates may be needed there soon. An expansion of the list of countries that have moved to negative rates, beyond the “NIRP 1.0” group of 2014-16, has the potential to drive down global bond yields even further. Already, there is $11 trillion of negative yielding debt within the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate index, representing 20% of the total (Chart 1) If there is a shift to negative rates in the potential “NIRP 2.0” group of major developed economies with policy rates now near 0% – a list that includes the US, the UK, Canada and Australia – then the amount of negative yielding debt worldwide will soar to new highs. An expansion of the list of countries that have moved to negative rates, beyond the “NIRP 1.0” group of 2014-16, has the potential to drive down global bond yields even further. In this report, we take a look at the conditions that led the NIRP 1.0 countries to shift to negative rates in the middle of the last decade, to see if any similarities exist in non-NIRP countries today. We conclude that the conditions are not yet in place for a shift to sub-0% policy rates in the US, the UK, Canada or Australia – all countries where central banks still have other policy tools available to provide stimulus before resorting to negative rates. How Negative Interest Rates Can “Work” To Revive Growth Broadly speaking, central banks around the world have had difficulty meeting their inflation targets since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. The main reason for this has been sub-par economic growth, much of which is structural due to aging demographics and weak productivity. Since central bankers must stick to their legislated inflation targeting mandates, they are forced to cut rates when economic growth and inflation are too low. If real economic growth remains weak for structural reasons, then central banks can enter into a cycle of continually cutting rates all the way to zero, or even below zero, in order to try and prevent low inflation from becoming entrenched into longer-term inflation expectations. If growth and inflation continue to languish even after policy rates have reached 0%, then other tools must be used to ease monetary conditions to try and stimulate economies. These typically involve driving down longer-term borrowing rates (bond yields) through dovish forward guidance on future monetary policy, bond purchases through quantitative easing (QE) and, if those don’t work, moving to negative policy interest rates. A nice summary indicator to identify this intertwined dynamic of real economic growth and inflation is to look at the trend growth rate of nominal GDP. Chart 2 shows the policy interest rates three-year annualized trend of nominal GDP growth for the NIRP 1.0 countries, dating back to before the 2008 crisis. Japan stands out as the weakest of the group, with trend nominal growth contracting during and after the 2009 recession, while struggling to reach even +2% since then. The euro area, Sweden and Switzerland all enjoyed +5% nominal growth prior to 2008, before a plunge to the 1-2% range during and after the recession. After that, the three countries had varying degrees of economic success. Between 2016 and 2019, Sweden saw trend nominal growth between 4-5%, while the euro area struggled to achieve even +3% nominal growth and Switzerland maintained a Japan-like pace. Chart 2Fewer Tools Left For NIRP 1.0 Countries To Boost Growth Fewer Tools Left For NIRP 1.0 Countries To Boost Growth Fewer Tools Left For NIRP 1.0 Countries To Boost Growth Chart 3NIRP 2.0 Candidates Can Still Expand QE First NIRP 2.0 Candidates Can Still Expand QE First NIRP 2.0 Candidates Can Still Expand QE First The European Central Bank (ECB), Swiss National Bank (SNB), the Bank of Japan (BoJ) and Sweden’s Riksbank all cut policy rates aggressively in 2008/09, helping spur a recovery in nominal growth. The central banks had to keep rates lower for longer because of structurally weak growth, leaving far less capacity to ease aggressively in response to the growth downturn a few years later. Eventually, the ECB, SNB, BoJ and Riksbank all went to negative rates between June 2014 and February 2016. The BoJ and SNB, facing persistent headwinds from strengthening currencies, also resorted to aggressive balance sheet expansion to provide additional monetary stimulus – trends that have continued to this day, with both central banks having balance sheets equal to around 120% of GDP. The experience of these four NIRP 1.0 countries showed that the move to negative rates was a process that began in the 2008 financial crisis. Central banks there were unable to raise rates much, if at all, after the recession, leaving little ammunition to fight the varying growth slowdowns suffered between 2012 and 2016. Eventually, rates had to be cut below 0% which, combined with QE, helped generate lower bond yields, weaker currencies and, eventually, a pickup in growth and inflation. Looking at the NIRP 2.0 candidate countries, nominal GDP growth has also struggled since the financial crisis, unable to stay much above 3-4% in the US, Canada and the UK. Only Australia has seen trend growth reach peaks closer to 5-6% (Chart 3). The Fed, BoE, Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and Bank of Canada (BoC) all also cut rates aggressively in 2008/09, with the Fed and BoE doing QE buying of domestic bonds. Rates were left at low levels after the crisis in the US and UK, with only the RBA and, to a lesser extent, the BoC hiking rates after the recession ended. When growth slowed again in these countries during the 2014-16 period, the RBA and BoC did lower policy rates, but negative rates were avoided by all four central banks. Today, nominal growth rates have collapsed because of the COVID-19 lockdowns that have shuttered much of the world economy. Central banks that have had any remaining capacity to cut policy rates back to 0% have done so, yet this recession has already become so deep that additional declines in rates may be necessary to stabilize unemployment and inflation. The experience of the NIRP 1.0 countries shows that negative rates can also be effective in boosting growth – especially in countries suffering unwanted currency strength. One way to see the problem that monetary policymakers are now facing is by looking at Taylor Rule estimates of appropriate interest rate levels (Charts 4 and 5). Given the rapid surge in global unemployment rates to levels that, in some cases, have not been seen since the Great Depression (Chart 6), alongside decelerating inflation, Taylor Rule implied policy rates are now deeply negative in the US (-5.6%), Canada (-2.9%) and euro area (-1.7%).1 Taylor Rules show that moderately negative rates are also needed in Sweden (-0.5%), Switzerland (-0.2%) and Japan (-0.2%). Only in Australia (+1.3%) and the UK (+0.3%) is the Taylor Rule indicating that negative rates are not currently required. Chart 4Taylor Rule Says More Rate Cuts Needed Here … Taylor Rule Says More Rate Cuts Needed Here ... Taylor Rule Says More Rate Cuts Needed Here ... Chart 5… But Rates Are Appropriate Here ... But Rates Are Appropriate Here ... But Rates Are Appropriate Here Chart 6The Main Reason Why Taylor Rule Implied Policy Rates Have Plunged The Main Reason Why Taylor Rule Implied Policy Rates Have Plunged The Main Reason Why Taylor Rule Implied Policy Rates Have Plunged Among the potential NIRP 2.0 candidates, the negative rate option has been avoided and aggressive QE balance sheet expansion has been pursued by all of them – including the BoC and RBA who avoided asset purchase programs in 2008/09. Balance sheet expansion can be an adequate substitute for policy interest rate cuts by helping drive down longer-term bond yields and borrowing rates, which helps spur credit demand and, eventually, economic growth. Yet the experience of the NIRP 1.0 countries shows that negative rates can also be effective in boosting growth – especially in countries suffering unwanted currency strength. How negative rates worked for the NIRP 1.0 countries For the ECB (Chart 7), BoJ (Chart 8), Riksbank (Chart 9) and SNB, the path from negative policy rates in 2014-16 to, eventually, faster economic growth and inflation followed a similar process: Chart 7The Euro Area's Negative Rates Experience The Euro Area's Negative Rates Experience The Euro Area's Negative Rates Experience Chart 8Japan's Negative Rates Experience Japan's Negative Rates Experience Japan's Negative Rates Experience Chart 9Sweden's Negative Rates Experience Sweden's Negative Rates Experience Sweden's Negative Rates Experience Moving to negative policy rates resulted in a sharp decline in nominal government bond yields The fall in yields helped trigger currency depreciation Nominal yields fell faster than inflation expectations, allowing real bond yields to turn negative Credit growth eventually began to pick up in response to the decline in real borrowing costs Inflation bottomed out and started to move higher. In Japan, the euro area and Sweden, this process played out fairly rapidly with credit growth and inflation bottoming within 6-12 months of the move to negative rates. Only in Switzerland (Chart 10), where the SNB gave up on currency intervention in January 2015, was the process delayed, as the surge in the currency triggered a move into deeper deflation and higher real bond yields. It took a little more than a year for the deflationary impact of the franc’s surge to fade, allowing real bond yields to decline and credit growth and inflation to bottom out and recover. The implication is clear – negative rates are good for real assets, but troublesome for banks.  Of course, we are talking about the pure economic effect of negative rates as a monetary policy tool. There are side effects of having negative nominal interest rates and deeply negative real bond yields, like surging asset values (especially for real assets like housing). Bank profitability is also negatively impacted by the sharp fall in longer-term bond yields that hurts net interest margins, even with higher lending volumes and reduced non-performing loans. Chart 10Switzerland's Negative Rates Experience Switzerland's Negative Rates Experience Switzerland's Negative Rates Experience Chart 11Negative Rates Are Good For Real Assets Negative Rates Are Good For Real Assets Negative Rates Are Good For Real Assets This can be seen in Charts 11 & 12, which compare the performance of real house prices and bank equities (relative to the domestic equity market) in the years leading up to, and following, the move to negative rates in 2014-16 for the NIRP 1.0 countries. The implication is clear – negative rates are good for real assets, but troublesome for banks. Chart 12Negative Rates Are Bad For Bank Stocks Negative Rates Are Bad For Bank Stocks Negative Rates Are Bad For Bank Stocks Nonetheless, the experience of the NIRP 1.0 countries suggests that the potential NIRP 2.0 countries could see similar benefits on growth and inflation – but not before other policy options are exhausted first. Bottom Line: In the countries that did go to negative rates in 2014-16 (Japan, Switzerland, the euro area, Sweden and Denmark), there existed some combination of weak economies, near-0% inflation, anemic credit growth or unwanted currency appreciation. Negative rates were needed to help fight those trends by driving down longer-term bond yields and helping spur credit growth and, eventually, some inflation. Depreciating currencies had a big role to play in generating those outcomes. Negative Rates Are Not Necessary (Yet) In The NIRP 2.0 Countries As discussed earlier, the sharp surge in unemployment because of the COVID-19 global recession means that negative interest rates may now be “appropriate” in the US and Canada, based on Taylor Rules. Negative rates are not needed in the UK and Australia, however, although policy rates need to stay very low in both countries. A similar divergence can be seen in inflation. Headline CPI inflation rates were already under severe downward pressure from the recent collapse in oil prices. The surge in spare economic capacity opened up by the current recession can only exacerbate the disinflation trend. However, the drop in inflation has been more acute in the US and Canada relative to the UK and Australia, suggesting a greater need for the Fed and BoC to be even more stimulative than the BoE or RBA (Chart 13). A renewed breakout of the currency to new cyclical highs could be the deflationary signal that triggers the Fed into an even more aggressive policy response. There is one area where the Fed stands alone in this group. The relentless strength of the US dollar, even as the Fed’s rate cuts have taken much of the attractive carry out of the greenback, hurts US export competitiveness in a demand-deficient recessionary global economy. The strong dollar also acts as a dampening influence on US inflation. A renewed breakout of the currency to new cyclical highs could be the deflationary signal that triggers the Fed into an even more aggressive policy response (Chart 14). This would mirror the experience of the NIRP 1.0 countries prior to the move to negative rates, where unwanted currency strength crippled both economic growth and inflation. Chart 13The Threat Of Deflation Could Trigger NIRP The Threat Of Deflation Could Trigger NIRP The Threat Of Deflation Could Trigger NIRP Chart 14Could More USD Strength Drag The Fed Into NIRP? Could More USD Strength Drag The Fed Into NIRP? Could More USD Strength Drag The Fed Into NIRP? For now, the Fed has many other policy options open before negative rates would be seriously considered. The reach of its QE programs could be expanded even further, even including equity purchases. The existing bond QE could be combined with a specific yield target (i.e. yield curve control) for shorter-maturity US Treasuries, helping anchor US yields at low levels for longer. Summing it all up, we do not see the need for any of the NIRP 2.0 candidates to move to negative rates anytime soon. The need for such extreme policies is not yet necessary, though, both in the US and the other NIRP 2.0 candidate countries. Bank lending is expanding at a double-digit pace in the US, and still at a decent 5-7% pace in the UK, Canada and Australia, even in the midst of a sharp recession (Chart 15). This may only be due to the numerous loan guarantees provided by governments as part of fiscal stimulus responses, or it may be related to companies running down credit lines to maintain liquidity. The experience of the NIRP 1.0 countries, though, suggests that credit growth must be far weaker than this to require negative policy rates to push down longer-term borrowing costs. Chart 15These Already Look Very "NIRP-ish" These Already Look Very "NIRP-ish" These Already Look Very "NIRP-ish" Chart 16Too Soon For Global NIRP, Maintain Neutral Global Duration Exposure Too Soon For Global NIRP, Maintain Neutral Global Duration Exposure Too Soon For Global NIRP, Maintain Neutral Global Duration Exposure Summing it all up, we do not see the need for any of the NIRP 2.0 candidates to move to negative rates anytime soon. In terms of investment implications, we continue to recommend an overall neutral stance on global duration exposure, as we see little immediate impetus for yields to move lower because of reduced expectations of future interest rates or inflation (Chart 16). We will continue to watch currency levels and credit growth as a sign that policymakers may need to shift their tone in the coming months. Bottom Line: Among the major countries without negative rate policies in effect (the US, UK, Canada and Australia), there is no evidence that longer-term borrowing rates need to fall further to boost credit growth, even in the midst of deep recessions. However, additional strength of the stubbornly resilient US dollar could be the deflationary shock that eventually forces the Fed into NIRP.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Negative Rates: Coming Soon To A Bond Market Near You? Negative Rates: Coming Soon To A Bond Market Near You? Footnotes 1 Our specification of the Taylor Rule uses unemployment rates relative to full employment (NAIRU) levels as the measure of spare capacity in the economies. For the neutral real interest rate, we use the New York Fed’s estimate of r-star for the US, Canada, the euro area and the UK; while using the OECD’s estimate of potential GDP growth as the neutral real rate measure for countries where we have no r-star estimate (Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and Australia).

Feature The SPX suffered its third 5.3-7.3% pullback since early April last week, which we deem a healthy development as markets cannot go up in a straight line. While there is a chance this latest pullback may morph into a correction, our sense is that equities will remain range bound in the near-term consolidating the vast gains made since the March 23 lows. Now that earnings season is practically over and macro data will remain backward looking, a large void signals that technicals will dominate trading. On that front, this looming lateral move will likely confine the SPX between the critical 50-day and 200-day moving averages – a roughly 10% range between 2,712 and 3,000 – until a catalyst breaks the stalemate (top panel, Chart 1A). With regard to the cyclical outlook, ultra-accommodative fiscal and monetary policies remain the dominant macro themes, and underpin our sanguine equity market view for the next year. Chart 1AConsolidating Gains Consolidating Gains Consolidating Gains Dollar The Reflator Importantly, King Dollar is a key macro variable that we are closely monitoring and as we highlighted last week, the Fed is indirectly aiming at jawboning the greenback.1 US dollar based liquidity is one of the most important determinants/drivers of global growth. The longer US dollar liquidity gets replenished, the more upward pressure it will put on SPX momentum and SPX EPS (Chart 1B). Sloshing US dollar based liquidity will serve as a much needed catalyst for a global growth recovery. Chart 1BHeed The Message From US Dollar Liquidity: Chart Of The Year Candidate Heed The Message From US Dollar Liquidity: Chart Of The Year Candidate Heed The Message From US Dollar Liquidity: Chart Of The Year Candidate The Yield Curve, Interests Rates And Profits Meanwhile, the yield curve, in fact a number of different yield curve slopes, troughed prior to the SPX in March, preserving its leading properties both near equity market tops and bottoms (middle & bottom panels, Chart 1A). The Fed orchestrated the steepening of the yield curve – which is typical during recessions – with the two preemptive cuts in March. Crucially, the yield curve is signaling that in the back half of the year SPX profits will also trough. True, a profit shortfall is upon us in Q2, and the steeper the fall, the higher the chance of a V-shaped recovery, owing to base effects (yield curve shown advanced, Chart 2). Chart 2Steep Yield Curve Slope Will Reflate Profits Steep Yield Curve Slope Will Reflate Profits Steep Yield Curve Slope Will Reflate Profits Encouragingly, the Fed reiterated last week that it will remain ultra-accommodative. While it will refrain from delving into NIRP, QE5 can expand anew and sustain the perching of the 2-year and even the 5-year and 7-year Treasury yields near zero. In fact, the shadow fed funds rate is already below zero as we highlighted last week.2 This monetary backdrop coupled with rising fiscal deficits as far as the eye can see – which will put upward pressure on long-term Treasury yields – will ensure a steep yield curve, and thus engineer a profit recovery (Chart 2). With regard to the interplay of interest rates and profit growth, the two are tightly inversely correlated (Chart 3). Empirical evidence suggests that since the mid-1980s profit growth is the mirror image of the year-over-year change in 7-year Treasury yields, albeit with a significant lag. Chart 3Interest Rate Pummeling Is A Boon For EPS Interest Rate Pummeling Is A Boon For EPS Interest Rate Pummeling Is A Boon For EPS What EPS Growth Is Discounted? Currently, if the relationship between profits and yields were to hold, then SPX EPS growth would stage a sizable come back in 2021. Chart 4 depicts the sell side’s quarterly EPS forecasts all the way to end 2021. Indeed, following a steep contraction, a brisk V-shaped profit recovery is looming in 2021 as we first argued three weeks ago that “historical precedents show an explosive year-over-year growth increase in EPS from recessionary troughs”.3 In more detail, Chart 5 breaks down 12-month forward EPS growth per sector. Tech comes out on top and by a wide margin with a near double-digit profit growth rate in absolute terms. This gulf is even more pronounced relative to the contracting SPX EPS growth rate. In fact, tech relative profit growth just reached the highest level since 2004 and explains the broad market’s tech dependence. As a reminder, tech market cap is back to the 2018 peak despite the fact the GOOGL and FB have now moved to the newly formed S&P communication services index. If one were to add the pair and AMZN back to the tech sector’s weight, it would comprise over 36% of the SPX, higher even than the dotcom bubble era (Chart 6)! Chart 4V-Shaped Profit Recovery V-Shaped Profit Recovery V-Shaped Profit Recovery Chart 5Tech… Tech… Tech… Chart 6…Reigns Supreme …Reigns Supreme …Reigns Supreme Tech Titans Digression A brief digression is in order as it pertains to the tech titans. We have been inundated with requests recently on the subject of valuations and the concentration of returns in the top five SPX stocks. We first commented on this in January, and reiterate today that the current tech sector’s supposed overvaluation is nowhere near the dotcom excesses .4 Back then, the top five SPX stocks commanded a forward P/E over 60, but today’s valuation pales in comparison with the late-1990s, as the equivalent P/E is roughly half that multiple (please refer to Chart 2 of the January 27, 2020 Weekly Report). Why? Because at the turn of the millennium, tech stocks had very little earnings to show for, but now the tech sector has the largest profit weight among its GICS1 peers. Thus, tech stocks trade at a modest 9% premium to the broad market whereas in 1999 they were changing hands at more than twice the SPX multiple (Chart 7). Chart 8 attempts to shed more light on the subject. The top panel shows the overall SPX market cap and also excluding the top five stocks. Then we subtract the top five stocks’ forward P/E from the broad market and show where the S&P 500 ex-top five stocks P/E trades (second panel, Chart 8). Since the FB IPO, these stocks have indeed increased their influence on the broad market’s valuation (third panel, Chart 8). Chart 7What Relative Overvaluation? What Relative Overvaluation? What Relative Overvaluation? Chart 8Top Five Are Pricey, But For Good Reason Top Five Are Pricey, But For Good Reason Top Five Are Pricey, But For Good Reason Sectorial Profit Growth Breakdown Circling back to the breakdown of 12-month forward EPS growth per sector, traditional defensive sectors (utilities, staples and health care) all enjoy positive 12-month forward profit growth in absolute terms, and so do communication services that just kissed off the zero line. All other sectors are contracting at differing degrees (Chart 5). On a longer-term basis, as expected no GICS1 sector is slated to contract, but their five-year growth rates are widely dispersed. Consumer discretionary, real estate, materials and tech occupy the top ranks with double digit growth rates, while utilities, consumer staples, energy, industrials and financials are in mid-single digits and at the bottom of the pit. Communication services and health care hover in the middle, on a par with the broad market (Chart 9). Chart 9Long-Term Growth Has Reset Lower Long-Term Growth Has Reset Lower Long-Term Growth Has Reset Lower Higher Profits Are Synonymous With Higher Returns Intuitively, the higher the forward profit growth rate, the higher each sector’s trailing return. Chart 10 depicts this positive correlation on the GICS1 sectors and corroborates that the laggard energy sector has the lowest year-to-date return, whereas tech stocks lead the pack. Importantly, SPX sector profit weights are extremely important. Chart 11 ranks the GICS1 sectors 12-month forward profit weights. Tech, health care and financials comprise roughly 60% of total S&P 500 earnings for the coming year. Whereas the drubbing in the energy sector (83% projected EPS contraction) has drifted into oblivion within the SPX context and has a mere 0.5% profit weight (Chart 11). Chart 10Higher Growth = Higher Returns Debunking Earnings Debunking Earnings Chart 11Top three Comprise 60% Of Profit Weight Debunking Earnings Debunking Earnings Bottom Line: While the top three sectors inherently carry the bulk of the risk on the SPX earnings front courtesy of the high concentration, our sense is that both tech (neutral) and health care (overweight) will deliver according to the messages from our macro EPS growth models (Chart 12). Financials (overweight) profits are a question mark, and therefore pose the greatest risk to our still constructive 9-12 month broad equity market view.     Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Chart 12EPS Growth Models Emit Positive Signals EPS Growth Models Emit Positive Signals EPS Growth Models Emit Positive Signals   Footnotes 1     Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “The Bottomless Punchbowl” dated May 11, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2     Ibid. 3    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Gauging Fair Value” dated April 27, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.          4    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Reports, “Three EPS Scenarios” dated January 13, 2020 and “When The Music Stops...” dated January 27, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.  

Dear Client, In lieu of our regular report next week, we will be sending you a Special Report on China from Matt Gertken, BCA Research’s Chief Geopolitical Strategist. Matt will discuss whether China’s President Xi Jinping is losing his political mandate. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights The pandemic is likely to have a more severe impact on Main Street than Wall Street, which helps explain why stocks have rallied off their lows even as bond yields have remained depressed. Equity investors are hoping that central banks will keep rates lower for longer, while fiscal easing will revive demand. The end result could be lower bond yields within the context of a full employment economy – a win-win for stocks.  In the near term, these hopes could be dashed, given bleak economic data, falling earnings estimates, and rising worries about a second wave of the pandemic. Longer term, an elevated equity risk premium and the likelihood that the pandemic will not have a significantly negative effect on the supply side of the economy argue for overweighting stocks over bonds. Negative real rates will continue to support gold prices. A weaker dollar later this year will also help. Divergent Signals Chart 1Conflicting Signals Conflicting Signals Conflicting Signals Global equities have rallied 24% off their March lows. The S&P 500 is down only 12% year-to-date and is trading close to where it was last August. In contrast, bond yields have barely risen since March. The US 10-year note currently yields 0.63%, down from 1.92% at the start of the year. The yield on the 30-year bond stands at a mere 1.3%. While crude oil and industrial metal prices have generally tracked bond yields, gold prices have rallied alongside equities (Chart 1). It would be easy to throw up one’s hands and exclaim that markets are behaving schizophrenically. Yet, we think it is possible to reconcile these seemingly divergent price patterns in a way that sheds light on where the major asset classes are likely to go in the months ahead. Two important points should be kept in mind: Bonds and industrial commodities tend to reflect the outlook for the real economy (i.e., Main Street) whereas stocks reflect the outlook for corporate earnings (i.e., Wall Street). The two often move together but can occasionally diverge in important ways. Stock prices and bond yields will tend to move in tandem when deflationary pressures are intensifying; however, the two often move in opposite directions when monetary policy is becoming more accommodative. The former prevailed in early March whereas the latter has been the dominant force since central banks have opened up the monetary spigots. The Real Economy Is Suffering The current economic downturn will go down as the deepest since the Great Depression. The IMF expects global GDP to contract by 3% this year, compared with a flat reading in 2009. GDP in advanced economies is projected to fall by 6%, twice as bad as in 2009 (Chart 2). Chart 2Severe Damage To The Global Economy This Year Are Stocks And Bonds Sending Mixed Messages? Are Stocks And Bonds Sending Mixed Messages? Unemployment rates are also likely to reach the highest levels since the 1930s. The US unemployment rate spiked to 14.7% in April. Even that understates the true increase in joblessness. The labor force has shrunk by 8 million workers since February. If everyone who had left the labor force had been considered unemployed, the unemployment rate would have jumped to nearly 19% (Chart 3). Unemployment among less-skilled workers rose more than among the skilled. Joblessness also increased more among women than men (Chart 4). Chart 3Increase In Joblessness Is Understated Increase In Joblessness Is Understated Increase In Joblessness Is Understated Chart 4Unemployment Has Risen More For Less Skilled Workers And Women Are Stocks And Bonds Sending Mixed Messages? Are Stocks And Bonds Sending Mixed Messages? The one silver lining is that unlike in past recessions, temporary layoffs have accounted for the vast majority of job losses (Chart 5). This suggests that the links between firms and workers have yet to be severed. As businesses reopen, the hope is that most of these workers will be able to return to their jobs, fueling a rebound in spending. Chart 5Temporary Layoffs Account For Most Of The Recent Increase In Unemployment Temporary Layoffs Account For Most Of The Recent Increase In Unemployment Temporary Layoffs Account For Most Of The Recent Increase In Unemployment Risks Of A Second Wave Will that hope be realized? As we discussed last week, the virus that causes COVID-19 is highly contagious – probably twice as contagious as the one that caused the Spanish flu.1 While some social distancing measures will persist even if governments relax lockdown orders, the risk is high that we will see a second wave of infections. Even if a second wave ensues, we do not expect stocks to take out their March lows. In many places, the second wave could come on top of a first wave that has barely abated. This is precisely what happened during the Spanish flu pandemic (Chart 6). Stock prices and credit spreads have closely tracked the number of Google queries about the coronavirus (Chart 7). If the number of new infections begins to trend higher, concern about the pandemic will deepen. This makes us somewhat wary about the near-term direction of risk assets. Chart 6The Lesson From The Spanish Flu: The Second Wave Could Be Worse Than The First Are Stocks And Bonds Sending Mixed Messages? Are Stocks And Bonds Sending Mixed Messages? Chart 7Joined At The Hip Joined At The Hip Joined At The Hip   March Was The Bottom In Equities Nevertheless, even if a second wave ensues, we do not expect stocks to take out their March lows. This is partly because the cone of uncertainty around the virus has narrowed. We now know that the fatality rate from the virus is around 1%-to-1.5%, which makes COVID-19 ten times more deadly than the common flu, but still less lethal than SARS or MERS, let alone some avian flu strains which have mortality rates upwards of 50%. A few treatments for the virus are on the horizon. Gilead’s remdesivir appears to be effective in treating COVID-19. Blood plasma injections also look promising. A vaccine developed by researchers at the University of Oxford has been shown to be safe on humans and effective against COVID-19 on rhesus monkeys. Production of the vaccine has already begun, and if it works well on humans, the Oxford scientists expect it to be widely available by September.2 The Stock Market Is Not The Economy Then there is the issue of Main Street versus Wall Street. US equities account for over half of global stock market capitalization. Tech and health care are the two largest sectors in the S&P 500. The former has benefited from the shift towards digital commerce in the wake of the pandemic, while the latter is a highly defensive sector that has gained from the flurry of interest in new treatments for the disease (Chart 8). Chart 8AUS Equity Sectors: Winners And Losers From The Pandemic (I) US Equity Sectors: Winners And Losers From The Pandemic US Equity Sectors: Winners And Losers From The Pandemic Chart 8BUS Equity Sectors: Winners And Losers From The Pandemic (II) US Equity Sectors: Winners And Losers From The Pandemic US Equity Sectors: Winners And Losers From The Pandemic Even within individual sectors, the impact on Wall Street has been more muted than on Main Street. For example, spending on consumer discretionary goods and services has plummeted across the real economy over the past few months. Yet, this has not hurt equity investors as much as one might have expected. Amazon accounts for 55% of the retail sector’s market capitalization. Home Depot is in second place by market cap. Home Depot’s stock is trading near an all-time high, buoyed by increased spending on home improvement projects by people stuck at home. McDonald's, which is benefiting from the shift to take-out ordering, is the largest stock in the consumer services sector (followed by Starbucks). Contrary to the claim that the stock market is blissfully ignorant of the mounting economic damage, those sectors that one would expect to suffer from a pandemic-induced downturn have, in fact, suffered. Airline stocks, which account for less than 2% of the industrials sector, have plunged. The same is true for cruise ship stocks. Bank stocks have also been beaten down, reflecting fears of heightened loan losses. Likewise, lower oil prices have undercut the stocks of energy exploration and production companies (Chart 9). At the regional level, non-US stocks, with their heavy weighting in deep cyclicals and financials, have underperformed their US peers. Small caps have also lagged their large cap brethren, while value stocks have trailed growth stocks (Chart 10). Chart 9Sectors Expected To Suffer From A Pandemic-Induced Downturn Have, In Fact, Suffered Sectors Expected To Suffer From A Pandemic-Induced Downturn Have, In Fact, Suffered Sectors Expected To Suffer From A Pandemic-Induced Downturn Have, In Fact, Suffered Chart 10Non-US Stocks, Small Caps, And Value Stocks Have Underperformed Non-US Stocks, Small Caps, And Value Stocks Have Underperformed Non-US Stocks, Small Caps, And Value Stocks Have Underperformed Tech stocks are overrepresented in growth indices, which helps explain why growth has outperformed value. Tech companies also tend to carry little debt while sporting large cash holdings. Companies with strong balance sheets have greatly outperformed companies with weak ones since the start of the year (Chart 11). Chart 11Firms With Strong Balance Sheets Have Excelled Relative To Weak Ones Firms With Strong Balance Sheets Have Excelled Relative To Weak Ones Firms With Strong Balance Sheets Have Excelled Relative To Weak Ones Chart 12Real Rates Have Come Down This Year Real Rates Have Come Down This Year Real Rates Have Come Down This Year In addition, growth companies have disproportionately benefited from the dramatic decline in real interest rates (Chart 12). A drop in the discount rate raises the present value of a stream of cash flows more the further out in time those cash flows are expected to be realized.   What Low Bond Yields Are Telling Us Doesn’t the decline in real long-term interest rates signal that future economic growth will be considerably weaker? If so, doesn’t this nullify the benefit to growth companies in particular, and the stock market in general, from a lower discount rate? Not necessarily! While lockdowns have led to a temporary drop in aggregate supply, they have not severely undermined the long-term productive capacity of the economy. Unlike during a war, no factories have been destroyed. And while heightened unemployment could lead to some atrophying of skills, the human capital base has remained largely intact. Chart 13 shows that output-per-worker eventually returned to its long-term trend following the Great Depression. Chart 13No Clear Evidence That The Great Depression Lowered Long-Term Trend Growth No Clear Evidence That The Great Depression Lowered Long-Term Trend Growth No Clear Evidence That The Great Depression Lowered Long-Term Trend Growth What the pandemic has done is made some forms of capital obsolete. We probably will not need as many cruise ships or airplanes as we once thought. But these items are not a huge part of the capital stock. And while some brick and mortar stores will disappear, this was part of a long-term shift toward a digital economy – a shift that has been raising productivity levels, rather than lowering them. Demand Is The Bigger Issue So why have long-term real interest rates fallen so much? The answer has more to do with demand than supply. Investors are betting that the pandemic will force central banks to keep interest rates at ultra-low levels for a very long period of time. All things equal, such an extended period of low rates might be necessary if the pandemic causes households to increase precautionary savings and prompts businesses to cut back on investment spending for an extended period of time. All things are not equal, however. As discussed in greater detail in Box 1, if real interest rates fall by enough, aggregate demand could still return to levels consistent with full employment since lower interest rates would discourage savings while encouraging capital expenditures. What if interest rates cannot fall by enough because of the zero-lower bound? In that case, fiscal policy would have to pick up the slack. Either taxes would need to be cut so that the private sector becomes more eager to spend, or the government would need to undertake more spending directly on goods and services. When interest rates are close to zero, worries about debt sustainability diminish since debt can be rolled over at little cost. In the end, the economy could end up in a new post-pandemic equilibrium where real interest rates are lower and fiscal deficits are larger. Applying Theory To Practice Framed in this light, we can make sense of what has happened over the past few months. The drop in long-term bond yields in February and early March was driven by falling inflationary expectations and rising financial stress. Yields then briefly jumped in mid-March as panicky investors dumped bonds in a mad scramble to raise cash. Not surprisingly, stocks suffered during this period. The Federal Reserve reacted to this turmoil by cutting rates to zero. It also initiated large-scale asset purchases, which injected much needed cash into the markets. In addition, the Fed dusted off the alphabet soup of programs created during the financial crisis, while launching a few new ones in an effort to increase the availability of credit and reduce funding costs. Other central banks also eased aggressively. As Chart 14 illustrates with a set of simple examples, even a modest decline in long-term interest rates has the power to significantly raise the present value of future cash flows. To compliment the easing in monetary policy, governments loosened fiscal policy (Chart 15). The point of the stimulus was not to raise GDP. After all, governments wanted most non-essential workers to remain at home. What fiscal easing did do was allow many struggling households and businesses to meet their financial obligations, while hopefully having enough income left over to generate some pent-up demand for when businesses did reopen their doors. Chart 14What Happens To Earnings During A Recessionary Shock? Are Stocks And Bonds Sending Mixed Messages? Are Stocks And Bonds Sending Mixed Messages? Chart 15Will It Be Enough? Are Stocks And Bonds Sending Mixed Messages? Are Stocks And Bonds Sending Mixed Messages? Ultimately, equity investors are hoping for an outcome where fiscal policy is eased by enough to eventually restore full employment while interest rates stay low well beyond that point in order to induce the private sector to keep spending: A win-win combination for stocks. Chart 16Gold Prices Move In The Opposite Direction To Real Rates Gold Prices Move In The Opposite Direction To Real Rates Gold Prices Move In The Opposite Direction To Real Rates The discussion above can also explain the divergent moves in commodity prices. Most industrial metals are consumed not long after they are produced. This makes industrial metal prices highly sensitive to the state of the global business cycle. In contrast, almost all of the gold that has ever been unearthed is still around. This makes gold an anticipatory asset whose price reflects expectations about future demand. Since owning gold does not generate any income, the opportunity cost of holding gold is simply the interest rate (Chart 16). When real interest rates rise, as they did briefly in early March when deflationary fears intensified, gold prices tend to fall. When real interest rates decline, as they did after central banks slashed rates and restarted large-scale QE programs, gold prices tend to rise. Investment Conclusions The current environment bears a passing resemblance to the one that prevailed in late 2008. Following the stock market crash in the wake of Lehman’s bankruptcy, the S&P 500 rallied by 24% between November 20, 2008 and January 6, 2009 to reach a level of 935. Had you bought stocks on that day in January, you still would have made good money over a 12-month horizon. However, you would have lost money over a 3-month horizon since the S&P 500 ultimately dropped to as low as 667 on March 6. During that painful first quarter of 2009, the economic surprise index remained firmly below zero, while earnings estimates continued to drift lower, just like today (Chart 17). As noted above, we do not expect stocks to take out their March 2020 lows, but a temporary sell-off would not surprise us, especially against a backdrop where a second wave of the pandemic looks increasingly likely. Chart 17Is Today A Replay Of Late 2008/Early 2009? Is Today A Replay Of Late 2008/Early 2009? Is Today A Replay Of Late 2008/Early 2009? Chart 18Favor Equities Over Bonds Over A 12-Month Horizon Favor Equities Over Bonds Over A 12-Month Horizon Favor Equities Over Bonds Over A 12-Month Horizon Despite our near-term concerns, we continue to think that stocks will outperform bonds over a 12-month horizon. The equity risk premium remains elevated, particularly outside the US (Chart 18). While non-US stocks do not have as much exposure to tech and health care, they do benefit from very cheap valuations. European banks are trading at washed out levels (Chart 19). The cyclically-adjusted PE ratio for EM stocks is near record lows (Chart 20). Investors should consider increasing exposure to non-US equities if global growth begins to reaccelerate this summer. Chart 19European Banks Are Trading At Washed Out Levels European Banks Are Trading At Washed Out Levels European Banks Are Trading At Washed Out Levels Chart 20EM Stocks Are Very Cheap Are Stocks And Bonds Sending Mixed Messages? Are Stocks And Bonds Sending Mixed Messages? Given our view that central banks want real rates to stay low and will refrain from tightening monetary policy even if inflation eventually begins to rise, investors should maintain above-average exposure to gold. A weaker US dollar later this year will also help bullion. Box 1The Role Of Monetary And Fiscal Policy Following Savings Shocks Are Stocks And Bonds Sending Mixed Messages? Are Stocks And Bonds Sending Mixed Messages? Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Risks To The U,” dated May 7, 2020. 2  Charlie D’Agata, “Oxford scientists say a vaccine may be widely available by September,” cbsnews (April 30, 2020). Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Are Stocks And Bonds Sending Mixed Messages? Are Stocks And Bonds Sending Mixed Messages? Current MacroQuant Model Scores Are Stocks And Bonds Sending Mixed Messages? Are Stocks And Bonds Sending Mixed Messages?

Highlights COVID-19 & The Economy: Australia is now in its first recession in 30 years, thanks to lockdown measures to contain the spread of COVID-19. Yet the nation’s rates of infection and death from the virus are relatively low, which should allow for a faster reopening of the domestic economy. Policy Responses: The RBA has taken extraordinary measures to cushion the blow from the lockdowns, like cutting policy rates to near-0% and capping shorter maturity bond yields through quantitative easing. The Australian government has also been aggressive in providing fiscal stimulus. These measures give the economy a better chance of seeing a “v”-shaped recovery as the lockdown restrictions are eased. Fixed Income Strategy: Downgrade Australian government bonds to neutral within global fixed income portfolios: the RBA has little room to cut rates, inflation expectations are too low and the structural convergence to global yields is largely complete. Favor inflation-linked bonds and investment grade corporate debt over government debt, as both now offer better value. Feature Chart 1The Australian Bond Yield Convergence Story Is Over The Australian Bond Yield Convergence Story Is Over The Australian Bond Yield Convergence Story Is Over Australia has a well-deserved reputation as a wonderful place to live, regularly sitting near the top of annual “world’s most livable countries” lists. A big reason for that is the stability of the economy, which has famously not suffered a recession since 1991. The COVID-19 pandemic has changed that happy economic story, with Australia now in the midst of a deep recession. Yet even during this uncertain time, Australia is living up to its reputation as a livable country, with one of the lowest rates of COVID-19 infection among the major economies. This potentially sets up Australia as an economy that can recover from the pandemic – and the growth-crushing measures used to contain its spread - more quickly than harder-hit countries like the US and Italy. For global fixed income investors, Australia has also been a very pleasant place to spend some time. The local bond market has enjoyed a stellar bull run since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, with policy rates and yields converging to much lower global levels (Chart 1). We have steadfastly maintained a structural overweight recommendation on Australian government bonds since December 2017. Over that time, the benchmark yield on the Bloomberg Barclays Australia government bond index declined -168bps, delivering a total return of +17.6% (in local currency terms). That soundly outperformed the global government benchmark index by 5.7 percentage points (in USD-hedged terms). However, just like the nation’s recession-free streak, Australia’s status as a secular bond outperformer is coming to an end. Just like the nation’s recession-free streak, Australia’s status as a secular bond outperformer is coming to an end. In this Special Report, we take a closer look at the Australian economy and fixed income landscape after the shock of the global pandemic. Our main conclusion is that most of the juice has been squeezed out of the Australian government bond yield global convergence trade. There are, however, some interesting opportunities still available in other parts of the Australian fixed income universe, like corporates and inflation-linked bonds. Yes, Recessions Can Actually Happen In Australia Chart 2A V-Shaped Recovery Is Widely Expected A V-Shaped Recovery Is Widely Expected A V-Shaped Recovery Is Widely Expected During the record streak of recession-free growth in Australia, the annual growth of real GDP has never dipped below 1.1%. The fact that a recession was avoided in 2009, given the degree of the shock from the Global Financial Crisis, is a testament to the balance within the Australian economy; consumer spending is 55% of GDP, business investment is 12%, government spending is 24% and exports are 25%. This stands out in contrast to more imbalanced economies like the US (where consumer spending is 70% of GDP) and Germany (where exports are 47% of GDP). Yet the unique nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has forced shutdowns across the entire economy, has nullified that advantage for Australia. There is no part of the economy that can avoid a major slowdown to help prevent a full-blown recession in 2020. Yet while expectations have adjusted to this new short-term reality, there appears to be a broad consensus that this Australian recession will be a short-lived “V” rather than an extended “U”. That can be seen in the forecasts of the Bloomberg Consensus survey and the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), both of which are calling for a year-over-year decline in real GDP growth of at least -7% in Q2/2020. That will represent the low point of the recession, with growth expected to steadily recover over the subsequent year, with annual real GDP growth reaching +7% by the second quarter of 2021 (Chart 2). The Westpac-Melbourne Institute consumer sentiment index suffered the single greatest monthly decline in the 47-year history of the series in April. Yet there was only a modest decline in the longer-run expectations component of that survey, which remains above recent cyclical lows (bottom panel) This is a message consistent with the RBA and Bloomberg consensus forecasts, where economic resiliency is expected. One reason for that relative optimism among Australian consumers is that COVID-19 has not hit the country as hard as other nations. A recent survey of Australian consumers conducted by McKinsey in April showed that 65% of respondents named “the Australian economy” as their biggest COVID-19 related concern. At the same time, only 33% of those surveyed cited “not being able to make ends meet” as their main worry related to the virus (Chart 3). Other responses to the survey showed a similar divide, with greater concern shown for the state of the overall Australian nation compared to worries about one’s own economic or health outlook. Chart 3Australians Worrying More About The Nation Than Their Own Situation Australia: All Good Streaks Must Come To An End Australia: All Good Streaks Must Come To An End For an economy that has not seen a recession in over a generation, a relative lack of concern over one’s own financial health – even in a global pandemic that has paralyzed the world economy – may not be that surprising. Another reason for that relative optimism is that Australia has, so far, escaped relatively unscathed from the spread of COVID-19 compared to other nations. Australia has, so far, escaped relatively unscathed from the spread of COVID-19 compared to other nations. The number of new daily COVID-19 cases is now only 1 per million people, according to the Johns Hopkins University data on the virus. This is down from the peak of 20 per million people reached on March 28, and substantially below the numbers seen in countries more severely struck by the virus like the US and Italy (Chart 4). Australia has also seen a relatively low fatality rate from the virus, with only 1.4% of confirmed cases resulting in deaths (Chart 5). Chart 4The COVID-19 Wave Has Crested Down Under The COVID-19 Wave Has Crested Down Under The COVID-19 Wave Has Crested Down Under Chart 5Australia Has Weathered The Pandemic Much Better Than Others Australia: All Good Streaks Must Come To An End Australia: All Good Streaks Must Come To An End Given these low rates of infection and death, it is likely that Australia will be able to reopen its economy faster than other nations. The Australian government has already announced an easing of the COVID-19 lockdown measures, which will include the opening of restaurants (with limited seating) and schools (on a staggered schedule). There is even talk of creating a “trans-Tasman travel bubble” with neighboring New Zealand, which has similarly low rates of COVID-19 infection. Yet even when Australians can begin resuming a more “normal” life, the backdrop for consumer spending will be constrained by relatively low income growth and high consumer debt levels (Chart 6). Real consumer spending has struggled to grow faster than 2-3% over the past decade and, with household debt now up to a staggering 190% of disposable income, a faster pace of spending is unlikely even as the economy reopens. Chart 6Weak Consumer Fundamentals Weak Consumer Fundamentals Weak Consumer Fundamentals Chart 7Australian Businesses Are Retrenching Australian Businesses Are Retrenching Australian Businesses Are Retrenching Among the other parts of the Australian economy, the near-term outlook is gloomy, but there are potential areas where the damage to growth could be more limited. Capital Spending Business fixed investment has been flat in real terms over the past year. With corporate profit growth already slowing rapidly and likely to contract because of the recession, firms will look to cut back on capital spending to preserve cash, leading to a bigger drag on overall growth from investment (Chart 7). According to the latest National Australia Bank business survey conducted in March, confidence has collapsed to lower levels than seen during the Global Financial Crisis, while capital spending and employment expectations have also declined sharply – trends that had already started before the COVID-19 breakout. Chart 8No Rebound In Housing No Rebound In Housing No Rebound In Housing Housing The housing market has long been a source of both strength and vulnerability for the Australian economy. While the days of double-digit growth in house prices are in the past, thanks to greater restrictions on banks for mortgage lending and worsening affordability, Australian housing was showing signs of life before the COVID-19 outbreak. National house prices were up +2.8% on a year-over-year basis in Q4/2019, while building approvals were stabilizing (Chart 8). That nascent housing rebound was choked off by the virus, with the Westpac-Melbourne Institute “good time to buy a home” survey plunging 30 points in April to the lowest level since February 2008. While the RBA’s interest rate cuts over the past decade have helped lower borrowing costs in Australia, the gap between the RBA cash rate and variable mortgage rates has been steadily widening (bottom panel). This suggests a worsening transmission from monetary policy into the most interest-sensitive parts of the economy like housing. Australian banks have been more stringent on mortgage lending standards over the past couple of years, which likely explains some of the widening gap between the RBA cash rate and mortgage rates. However, Australian banks have also seen an increase in their funding costs over that same period, both for onshore measures like the Bank Bill Swap Rate and offshore indicators like cross-currency basis swaps (Chart 9). Those funding costs have plunged in recent weeks, in response to the RBA’s aggressive monetary policy easing measures to help mitigate the hit to growth from COVID-19. The US Federal Reserve’s decision to activate a $60 billion currency swap line with the RBA back in March also helped reduce offshore funding costs for Australian banks. It is possible that the easing of funding costs could make banks more willing to make consumer and mortgage loans in the coming months, at lower interest rates, as the lockdown restrictions ease. This could help improve the transmission from easy RBA monetary policy to economic activity. Exports Demand for Australian exports was already starting to soften in the first few months of 2020. The year-over-year growth in total exports fell to 9.7% in March from a peak of 18.7% in July 2019. Exports to China, Australia’s largest trade partner, have held up better than non-Chinese exports (Chart 10). This was largely due to increased Chinese demand for Australian iron ore earlier in the year. Chart 9Bank Funding Pressures Have Diminished Bank Funding Pressures Have Diminished Bank Funding Pressures Have Diminished Iron ore prices have been declining more recently, but remain surprisingly elevated given the sharp contraction in global economic activity since March. This may be a sign that China’s reawakening from its own COVID-19 lockdowns, combined with more monetary and fiscal stimulus measures from Chinese policymakers, is putting a floor under the demand for Australian exports to China. Chart 10Australian Exports Will Not Rebound Anytime Soon Australian Exports Will Not Rebound Anytime Soon Australian Exports Will Not Rebound Anytime Soon Summing it all up, a major near-term economic contraction in Australia is unavoidable, but a relatively quick rebound could happen as domestic quarantine measures are lifted – especially given the significant amount of monetary and fiscal stimulus put in place by the RBA and the Australian government. Bottom Line: Australia is now in its first recession in 30 years, thanks to lockdown measures to contain the spread of COVID-19. Yet the nation’s rates of infection and death from the virus are relatively low, which should allow for a faster reopening of the domestic economy. A Powerful Policy Response To The Recession Almost every government and central bank in the world has introduced fiscal stimulus or monetary easing measures in response to the COVID-19 economic downturn. Australia’s policymakers have been particularly aggressive, both on the monetary and (especially) fiscal side. Monetary Policy The RBA has announced a variety of measures since late March to ease financial conditions and provide more liquidity to the economy, including: cutting the cash rate by 50bps to 0.25% the introduction of quantitative easing for the first time, buying government bonds in enough quantity in secondary markets to keep the yield on 3-year Australian government debt around 0.25% introducing a Term Funding Facility for the banking system under which authorized deposit-taking institutions can get funding from the RBA for three years at a rate of 0.25%, with additional funding available to increase lending to small and medium-sized businesses an increase in the amount and maturity of daily reverse repurchase (repo) operations, to support liquidity in the financial system setting up the currency swap line with the US Fed, providing US dollar liquidity to market participants in Australia. The RBA’s decisions on cutting the cash rate the 0.25%, and capping 3-year bond yields at the same level, sent a strong message to the markets that monetary policy must be highly accommodative until the threat of COVID-19 has passed. Fixed income markets have taken notice, with the yield on the benchmark 10-year Australian government bond falling from 1.30% just before the RBA announced the easing measures on March 19th to a low of 0.68% on April 1st. The yield has since rebounded to 0.95%, but this remains well below the level prevailing before the RBA eased. Those low interest rates have also helped to keep monetary conditions easy by dampening the attractiveness, and value, of the Australian dollar. The currency has historically been driven by three factors – interest rate differentials, commodity prices and global investor risk-aversion. With the RBA’s relentless rate cuts over the past decade, capped off by the measures introduced two months ago, the dominant factor on the currency has become interest rate differentials between Australia and other countries (Chart 11). The Aussie dollar has enjoyed a bounce as global equity markets have rebounded since the collapse in March, but remains well below levels implied by the RBA Commodity Price Index. The implication is that the upside in the currency will be capped by the RBA’s interest rate stance, which has taken all the formerly attractive carry out of the Aussie dollar. The RBA will need to maintain an accommodative stance for some time, as inflation – and inflation expectations – are likely to remain well below the central bank’s 2-3% target range. The RBA will need to maintain an accommodative stance for some time, as inflation – and inflation expectations – are likely to remain well below the central bank’s 2-3% target range. The new baseline forecast by the RBA calls for the Australian unemployment rate to double from 5.2% in Q1/2020 to 10% in Q2/2020, before drifting back down to 8.5% by Q2/2021 (Chart 12). The central bank sees the jobless rate returning to 6.5% in Q2/2022, but that will still not be enough to push headline or core CPI inflation back above 2% (middle panel). Chart 11Interest Rates Are The Main Driver Of The AUD Now Interest Rates Are The Main Driver Of The AUD Now Interest Rates Are The Main Driver Of The AUD Now Chart 12Inflation Is Dormant Down Under Inflation Is Dormant Down Under Inflation Is Dormant Down Under Inflation expectations have discounted a similar outcome. The Union Officials’ and Market Economists’ surveys of 2-year-ahead inflation expectations are both now under 2%. Market-based measures like the 2-year CPI swap rate are even more pessimistic, priced at a mere 0.12%! The recent plunge in oil prices is clearly playing a role in that extreme CPI swap pricing, but until there is some recover in market-based inflation expectations, the RBA will be unable to move away from its current emergency policy easing measures. Fiscal Policy The Australian government has been very aggressive in its economic support measures, including1: a so-called “JobKeeper Payment” to allow businesses to cover employee wages direct income support payments to individuals and households allowing temporary withdrawals from superannuation (retirement savings) plans direct financial support to businesses to “boost cash flow” temporary changes to bankruptcy laws to make it more difficult for creditors to demand payment increased financial incentives for new investment providing loan guarantees to small and medium-sized businesses temporarily easily regulatory standards (like capital ratios) for Australian banks, to free up more funds for lending The size of these combined measures is estimated to be 12.5% of GDP, according to calculations from the IMF (Chart 13). This puts Australia in the upper tier of G20 countries in terms of the size of the total government support measures, according to an analysis of fiscal policy responses to COVID-19 from our colleagues at BCA Research Global Investment Strategy.2 When looking at purely the fiscal policy response through tax changes and direct spending, and removing liquidity support and loan guarantees that may not be fully utilized, the Australian government’s stimulus response is 10.6% of GDP - the largest in the G20 (Chart 14). Chart 13Australian Policymakers Have Responded Aggressively To COVID-19 Australia: All Good Streaks Must Come To An End Australia: All Good Streaks Must Come To An End Chart 14Australia’s Planned Deficit Increase Is The Largest In The G20 Australia: All Good Streaks Must Come To An End Australia: All Good Streaks Must Come To An End Chart 15Australia Has The Fiscal Space To Be Aggressive Australia Has The Fiscal Space To Be Aggressive Australia Has The Fiscal Space To Be Aggressive The Australian government can deliver such a large response because it has the fiscal space to do it, with a debt/GDP ratio that was only 41.9% prior to the COVID-19 outbreak (Chart 15). This compares favorably to other countries that have delivered major stimulus packages but from a starting point of much higher levels of government debt. The Australian government can deliver such a large response because it has the fiscal space to do it. We do not see any downgrade risk for Australia’s sovereign AAA credit rating from the fiscal stimulus measures, despite the recent decision by S&P to put the nation on negative outlook. Australia will still have one of the lowest government debt/GDP ratios among the G20, even after adding in the expected increases in deficits for all the countries in 2020 (Chart 16). Chart 16Australia’s AAA Credit Rating Is Safe Australia: All Good Streaks Must Come To An End Australia: All Good Streaks Must Come To An End Net-net, the monetary and fiscal stimulus measures undertaken by Australian policymakers appear large enough to offset the immediate hit to the economy from the COVID-19 recession. This has important investment implications for Australian bond markets. The monetary and fiscal stimulus measures undertaken by Australian policymakers appear large enough to offset the immediate hit to the economy from the COVID-19 recession. Bottom Line: The RBA has taken extraordinary measures to cushion the blow from the lockdowns, like cutting policy rates to near-0% and capping shorter maturity bond yields through quantitative easing. The Australian government has also been aggressive in providing fiscal stimulus. These measures give the economy a better chance of seeing a “v”-shaped recovery as the lockdown restrictions are eased. Investment Conclusions We started this report by discussing the consistent outperformance of Australian government bonds versus other developed market debt over the past decade. After going through a careful analysis of the economy, inflation, monetary policy and fiscal policy, we now view the period of Australian bond outperformance as essentially complete. This leads us to make the following investment conclusions on a strategic (6-12 months) investment horizon. Duration: We recommend only a neutral duration stance for dedicated Australian fixed income portfolios; the RBA has little room to cut policy rates further; inflation expectations are too low; the nation is poised to rapidly emerge from COVID-19 lockdowns; and fiscal stimulus will be more than enough to offset the hit to domestic incomes from the recession. Country Allocation: Within global bond portfolios, we recommend downgrading Australia to neutral from overweight. The multi-year interest rate convergence story is largely complete, both in terms of central bank policy rates and longer-term bond yields. Our most reliable indicator for the future relative performance of Australian government bonds versus the global benchmark – the ratio of the OECD’s leading economic indicator for Australia to the overall OECD leading indicator – is increasing because of a greater decline in the non-Australian measure (Chart 17, second panel). This fits with the idea of the relative economic growth story turning into a headwind for Australian bonds after being a tailwind for the past few years. Within global bond portfolios, we recommend downgrading Australia to neutral from overweight.  Yield Curve: We recommend positioning for a steeper Australian government bond yield curve. The RBA is anchoring the short-end of the curve as part of its quantitative easing program, leaving the slope of the curve to be driven more by longer-term inflation expectations that are too depressed (third panel). Inflation-linked Bonds: We recommend overweighting Australian inflation-linked bonds versus nominal government debt. As we discussed in a recent report, breakevens on Australian inflation-linked bonds are far too low on our fair value models, which include the sharp decline in global oil prices (fourth panel).3 Chart 17Move To Neutral Duration Exposure In Australia, While Favoring Inflation-Linked Bonds Move To Neutral Duration Exposure In Australia, While Favoring Inflation-Linked Bonds Move To Neutral Duration Exposure In Australia, While Favoring Inflation-Linked Bonds Chart 18Australian Corporate Bonds Look More Attractive Now Australian Corporate Bonds Look More Attractive Now Australian Corporate Bonds Look More Attractive Now   Corporate Credit: We recommend going overweight Australian investment grade corporate debt versus government bonds. The recent spread widening has restored some value - especially when compared to the more modest increase seen in credit default spreads - while Australian equity market volatility, which correlates with spreads, has peaked (Chart 18). Also, the RBA has just announced that they will now accept investment grade corporates as collateral for its domestic repo market operations, which should increase the demand for corporates on the margin.4   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The full details of the Australian government economic response to COVID-19 can be found here: https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/Overview-Economic_Response_to_the_Coronavirus_2.pdf 2 Please see BCA Research Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “The Global COVID-19 Fiscal Response: Is It Enough?”, dated April 30, 2020, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Global Inflation Expectations Are Now Too Low", dated April 28, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 4https://www.rba.gov.au/mkt-operations/announcements/broadening-eligibility-of-corporate-debt-securities.html Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Australia: All Good Streaks Must Come To An End Australia: All Good Streaks Must Come To An End

Highlights Treasuries: Despite surging issuance, long-dated Treasury yields will move only slightly higher this year, driven by a modest recovery in global demand. There is also a risk that a second wave of COVID infections will send yields to new lows. We recommend keeping portfolio duration close to benchmark while hedging the risk of higher yields by entering duration-neutral curve steepeners. Negative Rates: The Fed will not cut rates into negative territory any time soon. Investors who are able to do so should go short fed funds futures contracts that are priced for negative rates. EM Sovereigns: US bond investors should avoid USD-denominated EM sovereign debt and focus instead on US corporate credit rated Ba and higher. Of the EM countries with large USD bond markets, Mexican debt looks most attractive on a risk/reward basis. Don’t Expect A Taper Tantrum The big announcement in bond markets last week was the Treasury department detailing its plans for note and bond issuance in the second and third quarters. Of course, with the CARES act injecting $2.8 trillion into the economy, investors were already prepared for a big step up in issuance.1 But the numbers are striking nonetheless, particularly at the long-end of the curve. Overall note and bond issuance will reach $910 billion in Q3, roughly equal to the 2010 peak as a percent of GDP (Chart 1). Issuance beyond the 10-year point of the curve (i.e. the 30-year bond and new 20-year bond) will far exceed its financial crisis highpoint (bottom panel). Many bond investors are understandably worried that surging issuance will put significant upward pressure on yields in the coming months. Long-maturity Treasury yields jumped after the Treasury’s announcement on Wednesday before reversing all of that bounce the following day. But despite the mild market reaction, many bond investors are understandably worried that surging issuance will put significant upward pressure on yields in the coming months, especially with the Fed paring its pace of Treasury purchases (Chart 2). Chart 1Gross Treasury Issuance Gross Treasury Issuance Gross Treasury Issuance Chart 2Fed Buying Fewer Treasuries Fed Buying Fewer Treasuries Fed Buying Fewer Treasuries Our base case outlook is that Treasury yields will be marginally higher by the end of the year, and the yield curve will be steeper.2 However, we do not foresee a Taper Tantrum-style bond market rout. Treasury supply will continue to expand in the months ahead. But on the flipside, the Fed’s forward rate guidance will remain very dovish. If investors believe that short-dated interest rates will stay pinned near zero for a long time, fear of significant losses will remain low and Treasury demand will keep pace with supply, even at the long-end of the curve. Chart 3No Taper Tantrum In 2020 No Taper Tantrum In 2020 No Taper Tantrum In 2020 Yes, the Fed has scaled back its pace of Treasury purchases during the past few weeks, removing a significant source of demand from the market. However, it has also given no indication that it intends to lighten up on monetary stimulus broadly speaking. Based on the Fed’s dovish posture, we can be sure that if surging issuance leads to undesirably high term premiums at the long-end of the Treasury curve, the Fed will quickly ramp purchases back up to squash them. In general, our view is that all dramatic bond sell-offs are caused by the market suddenly pricing in a much more hawkish Fed reaction function. This can be driven by surprisingly strong economic growth and inflation, or by investors collectively changing their assessments of how the Fed will react. In this regard, the 2013 Taper Tantrum is an interesting case study. The Treasury curve bear-steepened dramatically in 2013 after Fed Chair Ben Bernanke laid out the Fed’s plan for winding down asset purchases. But this is not a simple story of bond yields rising because the market reacted to less demand in the form of Fed purchases. Rather, yields rose so much because Bernanke signaled to investors that the overall stance of monetary policy was much less accommodative than they had previously thought. Notice that gold fell sharply during this period (Chart 3), not because of less direct demand for Treasuries but because a more hawkish Fed meant less long-run inflation risk. The dynamic is illustrated very clearly by the CRB Raw Industrials / Gold ratio (Chart 3, bottom panel). The ratio is highly correlated with long-dated Treasury yields, meaning that for yields to shoot higher we need to see either a surge in global demand (i.e. CRB commodity prices) or a hawkish shift in the Fed’s reaction function (i.e. a drop in the gold price). If, as we expect, global demand improves only modestly this year and the Fed remains steadfastly dovish, upside in both the CRB/Gold ratio and long-maturity Treasury yields will be limited. Bottom Line: Despite surging issuance, long-dated Treasury yields will move only slightly higher this year, driven by a modest recovery in global demand. There is also a risk that a second wave of COVID infections will send yields to new lows. We recommend keeping portfolio duration close to benchmark while hedging the risk of higher yields by entering duration-neutral curve steepeners. Don’t Bet On Negative Rates Table 1Fed Funds Futures The Treasury Market Amid Surging Supply The Treasury Market Amid Surging Supply The massive amount of new issuance was not the only exciting development in fixed income markets last week. Short-dated yields also started to price-in the possibility of negative interest rates in the US! Table 1 shows the price of different fed funds futures contracts (as of Monday morning) and what funds rate those prices imply for each contract’s maturity month. We also show the return you would earn by taking an unlevered short position in each contract and holding to maturity, assuming that the actual fed funds rate remains unchanged. We assume that the fed funds rate will stay at its current level (0.05%) because the Fed has made it very clear that a negative policy rate is not an option that will be considered. As evidence, we present some excerpts from recent Fed communications. Fed Chair Jerome Powell from his March 15 press conference:3 So, as I’ve noted on several occasions, really, the Committee – as you know, we did a year-plus-long study of our tools and strategies and communications. And we, really, at the end of that, and also when we started out, we view forward guidance and asset purchases – asset purchases and also different variations and combinations of those tools as the basic elements of our toolkit once the federal funds rate reaches the effective lower bound – so, really, forward guidance, asset purchases, and combinations of those. You know, we looked at negative policy rates during the Global Financial Crisis, we monitored their use in other jurisdictions, we continue to do so, but we do not see negative policy rates as likely to be an appropriate policy response here in the United States. The Fed staff’s assessment of negative interest rates from the October 2019 FOMC minutes:4 The briefing also discussed negative interest rates, a policy option implemented by several foreign central banks. The staff noted that although the evidence so far suggested that this tool had provided accommodation in jurisdictions where it had been employed, there were also indications of possible adverse side effects. Moreover, differences between the US financial system and the financial systems of those jurisdictions suggested that the foreign experience may not provide a useful guide in assessing whether negative interest rates would be effective in the United States. FOMC participants’ assessment of negative interest rates from the October 2019 minutes:5 All participants judged that negative interest rates currently did not appear to be an attractive monetary policy tool in the United States. Participants commented that there was limited scope to bring the policy rate into negative territory, that the evidence on the beneficial effects of negative interest rates abroad was mixed, and that it was unclear what effects negative interest rates might have on the willingness of financial intermediaries to lend and on the spending plans of households and businesses. Participants noted that negative interest rates would entail risks of introducing significant complexity or distortions to the financial system. In particular, some participants cautioned that the financial system in the United States is considerably different from those in countries that implemented negative interest rate policies, and that negative rates could have more significant adverse effects on market functioning and financial stability here than abroad. Notwithstanding these considerations, participants did not rule out the possibility that circumstances could arise in which it might be appropriate to reassess the potential role of negative interest rates as a policy tool. It is always possible that the Fed’s view of negative interest rates will change in the future. However, this won’t happen any time soon. The Fed still has other zero-lower-bound policy options it can deploy before it gets desperate enough to re-consider negative rates. The Fed still has other zero-lower-bound policy options it can deploy before it gets desperate enough to re-consider negative rates. For example, one logical next step would be to bring back the Evans Rule. That is, specify economic targets (related to unemployment and inflation) that must be met before the Fed will consider lifting rates. If that sort of forward guidance is deemed insufficient, the Fed could adopt a plan recently advocated by Governor Lael Brainard and start to cap short-maturity bond yields.6 If it wants more stimulus after that it could gradually move further out the curve, capping bond yields for longer and longer maturities. According to the FOMC minutes, this sort of Yield Curve Control policy had more support among participants at the October 2019 FOMC meeting than did negative interest rates:7 A few participants saw benefits to capping longer-term interest rates that more directly influence household and business spending. In addition, capping longer-maturity interest rates using balance sheet tools, if judged as credible by market participants, might require a smaller amount of asset purchases to provide a similar amount of accommodation as a quantity-based program purchasing longer-maturity securities. However, many participants raised concerns about capping long-term rates. Some of those participants noted that uncertainty regarding the neutral federal funds rate and regarding the effects of rate ceiling policies on future interest rates and inflation made it difficult to determine the appropriate level of the rate ceiling or when that ceiling should be removed; that maintaining a rate ceiling could result in an elevated level of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet or significant volatility in its size or maturity composition; or that managing longer-term interest rates might be seen as interacting with the federal debt management process. By contrast, a majority of participants saw greater benefits in using balance sheet tools to cap shorter-term interest rates and reinforce forward guidance about the near-term path of the policy rate. Bottom Line: The Fed will not cut rates into negative territory any time soon. Investors who are able to do so should go short fed funds futures contracts that are priced for negative rates. For example, a short position in the June 2021 fed funds futures contract will earn an unlevered 6.5 bps if the fed funds rate remains unchanged and the position is held to maturity. No Buying Opportunity Yet In EM Sovereigns When assessing the outlook for the US dollar denominated sovereign debt of emerging markets we consider two main factors: Valuation, relative to both US Treasuries and US corporate credit. The outlook for EM currencies versus the dollar. Ideally, we want to move into EM sovereign debt when spreads look attractive relative to the domestic investment alternatives and when EM currencies are on the cusp of rallying versus the dollar. Valuation At first blush, value looks like it has improved considerably for EM sovereigns. The average spread on the Bloomberg Barclays EM Sovereign index is 167 bps wider than it was at the beginning of the year and the spread differential with the duration-matched Ba-rated US corporate bond index is elevated compared to the recent past (Chart 4). However, widening has been driven by a select few distressed countries (e.g. Ecuador, Argentina and Lebanon). When we strip those out and look only at the investment grade EM sovereign index (Chart 4, panels 3 & 4), the average spread looks relatively tight compared to a duration-matched position in Baa-rated US corporate credit. Chart 4Only A Few EMs Look Cheap Only A few EMs Look Cheap Only A few EMs Look Cheap Because country-specific trends often exert undue influence on the overall index, we find it helpful to look at value on a country-by-country basis. Chart 5A shows the average option-adjusted spread for major countries included in the Bloomberg Barclays EM Sovereign index. This chart makes no adjustments for credit rating or duration, and as such we see the lower-rated nations (Turkey, South Africa, Brazil) offering the widest spreads. Chart 5B shows each country’s spread relative to a duration and credit rating matched position in US corporate credit. Viewed this way, the most attractive opportunities lie in Mexico, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Colombia, Qatar and South Africa. Chart 5AUSD-Denominated EM Sovereign Debt By Country: Spread Versus Treasuries The Treasury Market Amid Surging Supply The Treasury Market Amid Surging Supply Chart 5BUSD-Denominated EM Sovereign Debt By Country: Spread Versus US Credit The Treasury Market Amid Surging Supply The Treasury Market Amid Surging Supply Currency Outlook Chart 6EM Currencies Are Linked To Global Growth EM Currencies Are Linked To Global Growth EM Currencies Are Linked To Global Growth Currency is important for EM sovereign spreads because a stronger local currency literally makes US dollars cheaper for the EM nation to acquire. This, in turn, makes its USD-denominated debt easier to service, leading to tighter spreads. Chart 6 shows that EM Sovereign excess returns versus US Treasuries closely track EM currency performance. We also observe a strong link between EM currencies and high-frequency global growth indicators like the CRB Raw Industrials commodity price index (Chart 6, bottom panel). Based on this, we would only expect EM currencies to strengthen when global demand starts to pick up. Further, as our Emerging Market strategists wrote in a recent report, EM central banks are behaving differently during this recession than they have in past downturns.8 In the past, EMs would often run relatively tight monetary policies in order to fend off currency depreciation in the hopes of preventing capital outflows. This time, EM central banks are cutting rates aggressively, allowing their currencies to depreciate but supporting domestic demand. This is bearish for EM currencies and sovereign spreads in the near-term, but will probably lead to stronger economic recovery down the road. At the country level, we assess how vulnerable each country’s currency is to further depreciation by looking at its ratio of exports to foreign debt obligations.9 This ratio is a measure of US dollars coming in over a 12-month period relative to 12-month US dollar debt obligations. It has a relatively tight correlation with the dollar-denominated sovereign spread (Chart 7A). Low-rated countries, like Turkey and South Africa, have relatively low export coverage of foreign debt obligations, while Russia and South Korea have relatively strong debt coverage. Combining Valuation & Currency Outlook Chart 7B shows the same measure of currency vulnerability on the horizontal axis, but shows EM spreads relative to duration and credit rating matched US corporate credit on the vertical axis. Here, we see that Russia offers poor valuation, but a relatively safe currency. Meanwhile, Colombia offers an attractive spread but has a poor currency outlook. In this chart, Mexico stands out as the most attractive on a risk/reward basis. Chart 7AEM Sovereign Spread Versus Currency Vulnerability The Treasury Market Amid Surging Supply The Treasury Market Amid Surging Supply Chart 7BEM Sovereign Spread Over US Credit Versus Currency Vulnerability The Treasury Market Amid Surging Supply The Treasury Market Amid Surging Supply You will notice that the three Middle Eastern countries that stood out as having attractive spreads in Chart 5B are not shown in Charts 7A and 7B. This is because some data are unavailable, and also because those countries operate with currency pegs. Despite attractive spreads in those countries, we would not advise long-run positions in the USD-denominated sovereign debt of Saudi Arabia, Qatar or UAE. As our EM strategists wrote in a recent Special Report, if oil prices remain structurally low in the coming years (~$40 range), pressure will grow for Saudi Arabia to break its currency peg and allow some depreciation.10  The same holds true for Qatar and UAE. A bet on those countries’ sovereign spreads today amounts to a bet on higher oil prices. Despite attractive spreads, we would not advise long-run positions in the USD-denominated sovereign debt of Saudi Arabia, Qatar or UAE. Bottom Line: US bond investors should avoid USD-denominated EM sovereign debt and focus instead on US corporate credit rated Ba and higher. Of the EM countries with large USD bond markets, Mexican debt looks most attractive on a risk/reward basis. Appendix: Buy What The Fed Is Buying The Fed rolled out a number of aggressive lending facilities on March 23. These facilities focused on different specific sectors of the US bond market. The fact that the Fed has decided to support some parts of the market and not others has caused some traditional bond market correlations to break down. It has also led us to adopt a strategy of “Buy What The Fed Is Buying”. That is, we favor those sectors that offer attractive spreads and that benefit from Fed support. Right now, that means we are overweight corporate bonds rated Ba and higher, Aaa-rated Agency and non-agency CMBS, Aaa-rated consumer ABS and municipal bonds. We are underweight residential mortgage-backed securities and corporate bonds rated B and lower. The below Table tracks the performance of these different bond sectors since the Fed’s March 23 announcement. We will use this Table to monitor bond market correlations and evaluate our strategy's success. Table 2Performance Since March 23 Announcement Of Emergency Fed Facilities The Treasury Market Amid Surging Supply The Treasury Market Amid Surging Supply   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes  1 For more details on the size and potential efficacy of the CARES act please see Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, “The Global COVID-19 Fiscal Response: Is It Enough?”, dated April 30, 2020, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, “The Policy-Driven Bond Market”, dated May 5, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20200315.pdf 4  https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20191030.pdf 5 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20191030.pdf 6 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20191126a.htm 7 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20191030.pdf 8 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “EM Domestic Bonds And Currencies”, dated April 23, 2020, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 9 For more information on this ratio please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, “EM: Foreign Currency Debt Strains”, dated April 22, 2020, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, “Saudi Riyal Devaluation: Not Imminent But Necessary”, dated May 7, 2020, available at ems.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

In lieu of the next weekly report I will be presenting the quarterly webcast ‘Leaving The Euro Would Be MAD, But Mad Things Can Happen’ on Thursday 14 May at 10.00AM EDT (3.00PM BST, 4.00PM CEST, 10.00PM HKT). As usual, the webcast will take a TED talk format lasting 18 minutes, followed by live questions. Don’t miss it. Highlights For the time being, stick with the very successful strategies of: Overweighting higher yielding US T-bonds versus negative yielding German bunds and Swiss bonds. Overweighting technology and healthcare versus banks and materials. Overweighting growth versus value. Overweighting the S&P 500 versus the Eurostoxx 50. Overweighting Germany, France, and Switzerland in a European equity portfolio. The big caveat is that these strategies are highly correlated. Fractal trade: long euro area personal products versus healthcare. Feature Chart I-1Bond Yields And Commodity Prices Are Correlating To One Bond Yields And Commodity Prices Are Correlating To One Bond Yields And Commodity Prices Are Correlating To One Chatting with friends, family and clients it seems that our lives under lockdown and social distancing have lost much of their differentiation across time and space. Wherever in the world we live, whatever we do, our days and lives are correlating to one. Interestingly, the financial markets have experienced a similar loss of differentiation. In the coronavirus world, markets are also correlating to one. Financial Markets Are Not Complicated One of our abiding investment mantras is that: Financial markets are complex, but they are not complicated. The words complex and complicated are sometimes used synonymously, but they mean different things. Complex means something that is not fully predictable or analysable. Complicated means something that is made up of many parts. Financial markets are not complicated. The financial markets are not complicated because a few parts drive the relative prices of everything, though these parts themselves are complex. Identify and understand these few parts and you will get all your investment decisions right: asset allocation, sector allocation, style allocation, regional allocation, country allocation. This has become even more so this year as our response to the coronavirus has correlated all our lives and economic behaviour to one. One fundamental part is the bond yield. The collapse in commodity prices, more than any other real-time indicator, illustrates the demand destruction resulting from coronavirus-induced lockdowns and social distancing. Bond yields have plunged in lockstep with this demand destruction, given the implications for higher unemployment as well as lower inflation – the two key tenets that drive central bank policy (Chart of the Week). The plunging bond yield, in turn, has driven the underperformance of banks (Chart I-2), for two reasons. First, to the extent that a depressed bond yield reflects a low-growth economy, it also reflects a poorer outlook for bank credit growth, which effectively constitutes a bank’s ‘sales’. Second, a depressed bond yield means a flat or inverted yield curve, which squeezes bank net interest (profit) margins. Chart I-2Banks And Bond Yields Are Correlating To One Banks And Bond Yields Are Correlating To One Banks And Bond Yields Are Correlating To One Conversely, the plunging bond yield has signified an environment in which big tech and healthcare equities outperform (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4), also for two reasons. First, big tech and healthcare sales are more protected against a sudden dip in the economy. Second, their cashflows are weighted further into the future, and so their ‘net present values’ rise more when bond yields plunge. Chart I-3Tech (Inverted) And Bond Yields Are Correlating To One Tech (Inverted) And Bond Yields Are Correlating To One Tech (Inverted) And Bond Yields Are Correlating To One Chart I-4Healthcare (Inverted) And Bond Yields Are Correlating To One Healthcare (Inverted) And Bond Yields Are Correlating To One Healthcare (Inverted) And Bond Yields Are Correlating To One A declining bond yield also signifies an environment in which basic materials equities underperform, as our first chart powerfully illustrates. So, if you call the bond yield right, you will get your asset allocation between cash and bonds right, but you will also your equity sector allocation right. And if you get your equity sector allocation right you will automatically get your value versus growth style allocation right too. At an overarching level, the value versus growth allocation is nothing more than the performance of value sectors, like banks, versus growth sectors, like big tech and healthcare (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Value Versus Growth = Banks Versus Tech Value Versus Growth = Banks Versus Tech Value Versus Growth = Banks Versus Tech Furthermore, you will also get your regional and country allocation right. This is because each major stock market has distinguishing ‘long’ sectors in which it contains up to a quarter of its total market capitalisation, as well as distinguishing ‘short’ sectors in which it has a significant under-representation. The combination of this long sector and short sector gives each equity index its distinguishing fingerprint which drives relative performance (Table I-1): Table I-1The Sector Fingerprints Of Major Regional Stock Markets Markets Are Correlating To One Markets Are Correlating To One FTSE 100 = long financials and energy, short technology. Eurostoxx 50 = long financials, short technology and healthcare. Nikkei 225 = long industrials, short financials and energy. S&P 500 = long technology and healthcare, short materials. MSCI Emerging Markets = long financials, short healthcare. Specifically, the distinguishing fingerprints of the Eurostoxx 50 and the S&P 500 mean that the Eurostoxx 50 has a 12 percent over-representation to financials and materials at the expense of an 18 percent under-representation to technology and healthcare. It follows that if banks and materials underperform technology and healthcare, the Eurostoxx 50 must underperform the S&P 500. Everything else is irrelevant (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Euro Area Versus US = Banks Versus Tech Euro Area Versus US = Banks Versus Tech Euro Area Versus US = Banks Versus Tech The same principle applies to the stock markets within Europe. Relative performance comes from nothing more than the stock market’s long and short sector fingerprint combined with sector performance (Table I-2 and Table I-3). Table I-2The Sector Fingerprints Of Euro Area Stock Markets Markets Are Correlating To One Markets Are Correlating To One Table I-3The Sector Fingerprints Of Non Euro Area European Stock Markets Markets Are Correlating To One Markets Are Correlating To One For example, if healthcare outperforms then its overrepresentation in the stock markets of Switzerland and Denmark means that they must outperform too (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Likewise, if technology outperforms, then the technology-heavy Netherlands stock market must outperform (Chart I-9). Chart I-7Long Switzerland = Long Healthcare Long Switzerland = Long Healthcare Long Switzerland = Long Healthcare Chart I-8Long Denmark = Long Healthcare Long Denmark = Long Healthcare Long Denmark = Long Healthcare Chart I-9Long Netherlands = Long Tech Long Netherlands = Long Tech Long Netherlands = Long Tech All Investment Strategies Are Highly Correlated To repeat, financial markets are not complicated. If you get the over-arching decision(s) right, you will get everything right. The unfortunate corollary is that if you get the over-arching decision wrong you will get everything wrong. Asset allocation, sector allocation, style allocation, regional allocation, and country allocation are correlating to one. We really wish that financial markets were more complicated – because then asset allocation, sector allocation, style allocation, regional allocation and country allocation would be independent investment decisions which offered diversification at the total portfolio level. But the charts in this report should make it crystal clear that all these separate decisions are correlating to one. They are all really the same decision. Today, the decision on where bond yields are headed is particularly tough because they have already come down a lot in a very short space of time. Yet we do not foresee a sustained backup in yields for three reasons: First, even if governments ease lockdowns and reopen economies, demand will remain depressed. Most people are isolating themselves or socially distancing not because their governments are forcing them to, but because they fear infection. The easing of lockdowns, per se, will not remove that fear. And if workers are forced back into jobs when it is unsafe, then infection rates will start to rise again. Second, unless commodity prices rise sharply in the coming months the base effect of commodity prices will put downward pressure on 12-month inflation rates later in the summer (Chart I-10). To the extent that central banks focus on – and target – these totemic annual inflation rates, it will be very difficult to turn hawkish. On the contrary, there may be pressure to turn even more dovish. Chart I-10The Base Effect Will Weigh On Inflation Later This Year The Base Effect Will Weigh On Inflation Later This Year The Base Effect Will Weigh On Inflation Later This Year Third, our most trusted technical indicator is not flashing the red signal that bonds are dangerously overbought, as they were in January 2019, August 2019, and early-March 2020 (Chart I-11). Chart I-11Bonds Are Not Yet At A Technical Tipping Point Bonds Are Not Yet At A Technical Tipping Point Bonds Are Not Yet At A Technical Tipping Point So, for the time being, we are sticking with the very successful strategies of: Overweighting higher yielding US T-bonds versus negative yielding German bunds and Swiss bonds. Overweighting technology and healthcare versus banks and materials. Overweighting growth versus value. Overweighting the S&P 500 versus the Eurostoxx 50. Overweighting Germany, France, and Switzerland in a European equity portfolio. The big caveat is that these strategies are highly correlated. Fractal Trading System* With markets correlating to one, it is becoming more difficult to find trades which are not correlated with the over-arching driver. Hence, this week’s recommended trade is a pair-trade between two defensive sectors: long euro area personal products versus healthcare. The profit target is 7 percent, with a symmetrical stop-loss. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 61 percent. Chart I-12Euro Area Personal Products Vs. Health Care Euro Area Personal Products Vs. Health Care Euro Area Personal Products Vs. Health Care When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated  December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations