Europe

Highlights Oil demand expectations remain high. Realized demand continues to disappoint. This means OPEC 2.0's production-management strategy – i.e., keeping the level of supply below demand – will continue to dictate oil-price levels. US producers will remain focused on consolidation via M&A and on returning capital to shareholders, in line with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's (KSA) expectation. Going forward, shale producers will focus on protecting and growing profit margins. The durability of OPEC 2.0's tactical advantage arising from its enormous spare capacity – ~ 7mm b/d – is difficult to gauge: Tightening global oil markets now in anticipation of Iran's return as a bona fide exporter benefits producers globally, and could accelerate the return of US shales if that return is delayed or re-opening boosts demand more than expected. We are raising our average Brent forecast for 2021 to $66.50 vs. $63/bbl earlier, with 2H21 prices averaging $70/bbl. We are moving our 2022 and 2023 forecasts up slightly to $74 and $81/bbl (Chart of the Week). WTI will trade $2-$3/bbl lower. We remain long the S&P GSCI Dynamic Roll Index ETF (COMT) and the S&P GSCI, expecting tight supply-demand balances to further steepen backwardations in forward curves. Feature While the forecasted rebound in global oil demand continues to drive expectations for higher prices, it is the production discipline of OPEC 2.0 and capital discipline imposed on US shale producers that has and will continue to super-charge the recovery of prices. Continued monetary accommodation and fiscal stimulus notwithstanding, realized global oil demand has mostly flatlined at ~ 96mm b/d following its surge in February, as uncertainty over COVID-19 containment keeps governments hesitant about reopening their economies too quickly. Stronger demand in Asia, led by China, has been offset by weaker demand in India and Japan, where COVID-19 remains a deterrent to re-opening and recovery. The recovery in DM demand generally stalled over this period even as vaccine availability increased (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekOPEC 2.0 Comfortable With Higher Prices Balance Of Risks Tilts To Higher Oil Prices Balance Of Risks Tilts To Higher Oil Prices Chart 2Global Demand Recovery Stalled Balance Of Risks Tilts To Higher Oil Prices Balance Of Risks Tilts To Higher Oil Prices That likely will change in 2H21, but it is not a given: The UK, which has been among the world leaders in COVID-19 containment and vaccinations, delayed its full reopening by a month – to July 19 – in an effort to gain more time to bolster its efforts against the Delta variant first identified in India. In the US, New York state lifted all COVID-19-induced restrictions and fully re-opened this week. Still, even in the US, unintended inventory accumulation in the gasoline market – just as the summer driving season should be kicking into high gear – suggests consumers remain cautious (Chart 3). Chart 3Unintended Inventory Accumulation in US Gasoline Market Balance Of Risks Tilts To Higher Oil Prices Balance Of Risks Tilts To Higher Oil Prices We continue to expect the re-opening of the US and Europe (including the UK) will boost DM demand in 2H21, and wider vaccine availability will boost EM oil demand later in the year and in 2022. For all of 2021, we have lifted our demand-growth estimate slightly to 5.3mm b/d from 5.2mm b/d last month. We expect global demand to grow 4.1mm b/d next year and 1.6mm b/d in 2023. Our 2021 estimates are in line with those of the US EIA and the IEA. OPEC is more bullish on demand recovery this year, expecting growth of 6mm b/d. We continue to believe the risk on the demand side remains to the upside; however, given continued uncertainty around global COVID-19 containment, we remain circumspect. Supply-Side Discipline Drives Oil Prices OPEC 2.0 remains committed to its production-management strategy that is keeping the level of supply below demand. Compliance with production cuts in May reportedly was at 115%, following a 114% rate in April.1 Core OPEC 2.0 – i.e., states with the capacity to increase production – is holding ~ 7mm b/d of spare capacity, according to the IEA, which will allow it to continue to perform its role as the dominant supplier in our modeling (Chart 4). Earlier this year, KSA's Energy Minister Abdulaziz bin Salman correctly recognized the turn in the market that likely ensures OPEC 2.0's dominance for the foreseeable future – i.e., the shift in focus of the US shale-oil producers from production for the sake of production to profitability.2 This is a trend that has been apparent for years as capital markets all but abandoned US shale-oil producers. Chart 4OPEC 2.0 Remains Dominant Balance Of Risks Tilts To Higher Oil Prices Balance Of Risks Tilts To Higher Oil Prices Producers outside OPEC 2.0 – what we refer to as the "price-taking cohort" – have prioritized shareholder interests as a result of this market pressure, and remain focused on sometimes-forced consolidation via M&A, which we have been expecting.3 The significance of this evolution of shale-oil production is difficult to overstate, particularly as the survivors of this consolidation will be firms with strong balance sheets and a focus on profitability, as is the case with any well-run manufacturing firm. We also expect large producers to opportunistically shed production assets to reduce their carbon footprints, so as to come into compliance with court-ordered emission reductions and shareholder demands to reduce pollution.4 With the oil majors like Shell, Equinor and Oxy divesting themselves of shale properties, production increasingly will be in the hands of firms driven by profitability.5 We expect US shale-oil production to end the year at 9.86mm b/d and to average 9.57mm b/d next year; however, as the shales become the marginal global supply, production could become more volatile (Chart 5). The consolidation of US production also will alter the profitability of firms continuing to operate in the shales. We expect breakeven costs to fall as acquired production by stronger firms results in high-grading of assets – only the most profitable will be produced given market-pricing dynamics – while less profitable acreage will be mothballed until prices support development(Chart 6). Chart 5US Producers Focus On Profitability Balance Of Risks Tilts To Higher Oil Prices Balance Of Risks Tilts To Higher Oil Prices Chart 6Shale Breakevens Likely Fall As Consolidation Picks Up Balance Of Risks Tilts To Higher Oil Prices Balance Of Risks Tilts To Higher Oil Prices Supply-Demand Balances Tightening The current round of M&A consolidation and OPEC 2.0's continued discipline lead us to expect continued tightening of global oil supply-demand balances this year and next (Chart 7). This will allow inventories to continue to draw, which will keep forward oil curves backwardated (Chart 8). Chart 7Supply-Demand Balances Will Continue To Tighten Balance Of Risks Tilts To Higher Oil Prices Balance Of Risks Tilts To Higher Oil Prices Chart 8Tighter Markets, Lower Stocks Balance Of Risks Tilts To Higher Oil Prices Balance Of Risks Tilts To Higher Oil Prices The critical factor here will be OPEC 2.0's continued calibration of supply in line with realized demand and the return of Iran as a bona fide exporter, which we expect later this year. OPEC 2.0's restoration of ~ 2mm b/d of supply will be done by the beginning of 3Q21, when we expect Iran to begin restoring production and visible exports (i.e., in addition to its under-the-radar sales presently). The return of Iranian supply – and a possible increase in Libyan output – will present some timing difficulties for OPEC 2.0's overall strategy, but they will be short-lived. We continue to monitor output to assess the evolution of balances (Table 1). Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Balance Of Risks Tilts To Higher Oil Prices Balance Of Risks Tilts To Higher Oil Prices Investment Implications Oil demand will increase over the course of 2H21, as vaccines become more widely distributed globally, and the massive fiscal and monetary stimulus deployed worldwide kicks economic activity into high gear. On the supply side, markets will tighten on the back of continued restraint until Iranian barrels return to the market. The balance of risk is to the upside, particularly if the US and Iran are unable to agree terms that restore Iran as a bona fide exporter. In that case, the market tightening now under way will result in sharply higher prices. That said, realized demand growth has stalled over the past three months, which can be seen in unintended inventory accumulation in the US gasoline markets just as the summer driving season opens. We are raising our average Brent forecast for 2021 to $66.50 vs. $63/bbl earlier, with 2H21 prices averaging $70/bbl. We are moving our 2022 and 2023 forecasts up slightly as well to $74 and $81/bbl (Chart of the Week). WTI will trade $2-$3/bbl lower. We remain long the S&P GSCI Dynamic Roll Index ETF (COMT) and the S&P GSCI, expecting tight supply-demand balances to further steepen backwardations in forward curves. The big risk, as highlighted above, remains an acceleration of COVID-19 infections, hospitalizations and deaths, which force governments to delay re-opening or impose localized lockdowns once again. In this regard, KSA's strategy of calibrating its output to realized – vice forecasted – demand likely will remain in place.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish China's refinery throughput surged 4.4% to 14.3mm b/d in May, a record high that surpassed November 2020's previous record of 14.26mm b/d, according to S&P Platts Global. The increased runs were not unexpected, and were largely accounted for by state-owned refiners, which operated at 80% of capacity after coming out of turnaround season. Turnarounds will fully end in July. In addition, taxes on niche refined-product imports are due to increase, which will bolster refinery margins as inventories are worked down. China's domestic crude oil production was just slightly more than 4mm b/d. Base Metals: Bullish China's Standing Committee approved the release an undisclosed amount of its copper, aluminum and zinc stockpiles via an auction process in the near future, according to reuters.com. The government disclosed its intent on the website of National Food and Strategic Reserves Administration on Wednesday; however, specifics of the auction – volumes and auction schedule, in particular – were not disclosed. Prices had fallen ~ 9% from recent record highs in the lead-up to the announcement, which we flagged last month.6 Prices rallied from lows close to $4.34/lb on the COMEX Wednesday (Chart 9). Precious Metals: Bullish After a worse-than-expected US employment report, we do not expect the Federal Reserve to lift nominal interest rates in Wednesday’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting. The Fed will only raise rates once the US economy reaches a level consistent with its definition of "maximum employment." Wednesday’s interest rate decision will be crucial to gold prices. If the Fed does not mention asset tapering or an interest-rate hike, citing current inflation as a transitory phenomenon, gold demand and prices will rise. On the other hand, if the Fed indicates an interest rate hike sooner than the previously stated 2024, this will weigh on gold prices (Chart 10). Ags/Softs: Neutral As of June 13, 96% of the US corn crop had emerged vs. the five-year average of 91%, according to the USDA. 68% of the crop was rated in good to excellent condition, slightly below the five-year average. In the bean market, 94% of the crop was planted as of 13 June, vs. the five-year average of 88%. The Department reported 86% of the crop had emerged vs. the five-year average of 74%. According to the USDA, 52% of the bean crop was in good-to-excellent condition vs the five-year average of 72%. Chart 9 Balance Of Risks Tilts To Higher Oil Prices Balance Of Risks Tilts To Higher Oil Prices Chart 10 Balance Of Risks Tilts To Higher Oil Prices Balance Of Risks Tilts To Higher Oil Prices   Footnotes 1     Please see OPEC+ complies with 115% of agreed oil curbs in May - source published by reuters.com on June 11, 2021. 2     Please see Saudis raise U.S. and Asian crude prices for April delivery published by worldoil.com on March 8, 2021. 3    Please see US shale consolidation continues as Independence scoops up Contango Oil & Gas published by S&P Global Platts on June 8, 2021. 4    We discuss this in A Perfect Energy Storm On The Way, published on June 3, 2021.  Climate activism will become increasingly important to the evolution of oil and natural gas production, and likely will lead to greater concentration of supply in the hands of OPEC 2.0 and privately held producers that do not answer to shareholders. 5    Please see Interest in Shell's Permian assets seen as a bellwether for shale demand published by reuters.com on June 15, 2021. 6    Please see Less Metal, More Jawboning, which we published on May 27, 2021.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades Image

Highlights The ECB did not tighten policy, despite its upgrade to the Euro Area growth outlook. The rise in the Eurozone inflation will be transitory. The Euro Area continues to suffer from excessive slack, and current price pressures are narrow. The ECB rightfully worries about tightening financial conditions by prematurely removing monetary accommodation. The ECB does not want to move ahead of the release of its Strategy Review. Global growth is likely to experience a temporary hiccup this summer. The ECB will only taper its PEPP program in Q1 2022 with no firm announcement until Q4 2021. Stay overweight European peripheral bonds. Despite a favorable 18-month outlook, European cyclical equities face pronounced risks this summer. Investors should raise cash levels for now to keep dry powder for this fall. Feature At its policy meeting last week, the ECB refrained from adjusting policy. While the euro and bund yields barely budged on the news, Italian and Greek spreads narrowed a few basis point, welcoming the dissipating risk of decreased bond purchases. The ECB’s decision is in line with the analysis we published two weeks ago, which argued against the Governing Council hinting at a tapering of asset purchases at its June meeting.  Growing signs that the expected pick-up in the Eurozone inflation will be transitory and that China’s credit slowdown will negatively impact Europe increase our confidence that the ECB will not announce any adjustment to its asset purchases until the fourth quarter of 2021. This setup supports European peripheral bonds. However, it also points to a correction in European cyclical stocks. The ECB Announcement ECB President Christine Lagarde highlighted the need for a steady hand, with no policy change. The risks to growth are now “broadly balanced,” but enough uncertainty remains that removing accommodation too early still creates a much poorer risk/reward trade-off than maintaining the current policy. The ECB boosted its growth forecast in 2021 and 2022. As Table 1A illustrates, 2021 GDP growth was raised to 4.6% from 4% in March, and 2022 GDP growth was raised to 4.7% from 4.1%. Activity was left unchanged at 2.1% in 2023. The ECB and this publication are on the same page; Euro Area domestic activity will enjoy a welcomed fillip as a result of the re-opening of the economy, a response to the improving pace of vaccination across the continent. Moreover, the NGEU program will start disbursing funds this summer and will add another boost to growth. Despite this significant upgrade to anticipated growth, the ECB kept its accelerated pace of asset purchases in place, at least through the summer, because the inflation outlook remains below its target of “close but below 2%” durably. As Table 1B shows, the ECB expects HICP to hit 1.9% in 2021, but it will subsequently slow to 1.5% in 2022 and 1.4% in 2021. Table 1AUpgraded Growth Forecast Slow Ride Slow Ride Table 1BBelow Target Inflation Slow Ride Slow Ride Bottom Line: The ECB did not taper its PEPP purchases, because of uncertainty and below-target inflation. Too Many Deflationary Risks The policy stance of the ECB is appropriate on three levels. First, the case for Eurozone inflation to be transitory is even stronger than it is in the US. Second, financial conditions could easily deteriorate if the ECB were to tighten policy too early. Finally, the Strategy Review due this fall further paralyzes the ECB for now. Transitory Inflation Headline and core CPI in the Eurozone will increase significantly in the coming months but will slow next year. The ECB’s core CPI measure, which excludes food and energy, is set to rise above the levels of the past 15 years. As the US re-opened, core CPI spiked on both yearly and monthly bases. The presence of bottlenecks across domestic and global supply chains indicates that the Euro Area will experience a similar outcome. Assuming that monthly inflation rates will settle between 0.2% and 0.25% for the remainder of 2021, by year’s end, annual inflation will stand between 2% and 2.5% (Chart 1). The European PMI indices confirm the upside for the Euro Area’s core inflation. Service inflation has been more stable than in the US, but goods inflation is rising in line with the higher manufacturing PMI (Chart 2). Services inflation will accelerate according to the services PMI. Chart 1Higher Inflation For 2021 Higher Inflation For 2021 Higher Inflation For 2021 Chart 12Accelerating Goods And Services Inflation Accelerating Goods And Services Inflation Accelerating Goods And Services Inflation   Surveys confirm that this summer’s re-opening will jumpstart inflation. The employment components of both the European Commission’s Retail and Services Surveys are consistent with a rapid pickup in employment (Chart 3). This will support household income and consumption. Additionally, the EC’s Consumer Survey indicates that European households are ready to increase their purchase of homes and cars compared to last year (Chart 3, bottom panel). When stronger demand meets supply bottlenecks, higher prices ensue. Already, the EC’s Retail Survey points to this outcome (Chart 4). Despite these inflationary developments, most economic forces indicate that the Eurozone’s core and headline CPI will not stay elevated for long. Chart 3Stronger Employment In Pandemic-Hit Sectors Stronger Employment In Pandemic-Hit Sectors Stronger Employment In Pandemic-Hit Sectors Chart 4Re-Opening Pricing Pressures Re-Opening Pricing Pressures Re-Opening Pricing Pressures Our Trimmed Mean Inflation measure for the Euro Area (which mimics the construction of the Cleveland Fed Trimmed-Mean CPI in the US) has weakened to 0.1% (Chart 5). Hence, underlying inflation trends are still muted and the recent uptick in core CPI reflects outliers, as has been the case in the US. The outlook for the components of CPI confirms that any uptick in Euro Area inflation will be temporary. Shelter inflation, which accounts for 24% of the ECB core CPI, will rise as the unemployment rate declines. However, the strength in the euro is limiting import prices, which will cap non-energy industrial goods inflation (Chart 6). Moreover, the peak in oil price annual increases points toward a rollover in transportation inflation. Together, these two categories represent almost 60% of the core CPI components. Chart 5Inflation Is Not Broad-Based Inflation Is Not Broad-Based Inflation Is Not Broad-Based Chart 6Key CPI Components Will Slow Key CPI Components Will Slow Key CPI Components Will Slow Labor market dynamics are also consistent with a temporary inflation spurt. Total hours worked remain 6.5% below their pre-COVID-19 summit and underneath the level congruent with full employment based on the size of the Eurozone’s working-age population (Chart 7). This model understates the slack in the labor market, because the reforms implemented in peripheral economies in the wake of last decade’s Euro Area crisis have brought down structural unemployment. Moreover, the chart shows that, after total hours worked return to their equilibrium, it still takes a few years before negotiated wages firm up. Even if labor shortages materialized earlier than we anticipate, it does not guarantee a pickup in core CPI. From 2016 to 2019, a large proportion of Euro Area businesses cited labor shortages as a key factor limiting production. Yet, despite both this perceived tightness and a trendless euro, core CPI remained flat, averaging 1% per annum (Chart 8). Chart 7Still Too Much Slack Still Too Much Slack Still Too Much Slack Chart 8Labor Shortages Do Not Guarantee Inflation Labor Shortages Do Not Guarantee Inflation Labor Shortages Do Not Guarantee Inflation Outside of the labor market, the amount of stimulus injections also argues against a permanent increase in European inflation. BCA’s US Bond Strategy, Global Investment Strategy, and Bank Credit Analyst services believe that the current spurt of US Inflation is temporary, despite vast monetary and fiscal stimuli. In relation to 2019 GDP, the ECB’s liquidity injections have been larger than those of the Fed; however, the US fiscal activism greatly outdid that of the Eurozone (Chart 9). Consequently, the combined monetary and fiscal impulse in the US is larger, and its greater weight toward fiscal policy makes it more inflationary. Thus, if the US is unlikely to see durable inflation, the Eurozone is even less at risk. Chart 9More Timid European Stimulus Slow Ride Slow Ride Chart 10Lower European Inflation Expectations Lower European Inflation Expectations Lower European Inflation Expectations Euro Area inflation expectations are also muted compared to that of the US (Chart 10). This development confirms that Eurozone policy is less inflationary than that of the US. It also creates an anchor for realized inflation, which will constrain the acceleration in the Euro Area CPI. Financial Conditions The ECB is deeply concerned about the impact of the hurried removal of monetary accommodation on the Eurozone’s financial conditions. Chart 11The Euro Is Deflationary The Euro Is Deflationary The Euro Is Deflationary The ECB does not want to see a much more rapid pace of appreciation in the euro. If it begins to slow its QE program when the Fed remains reluctant to talk about tapering, EUR/USD will surge. This will feed into weaker core inflation in the region. The ECB’s broad trade-weighted euro, based on 41 currencies, has already rallied to a record high. Thus, an even more rapid euro rally would spell deeper deflationary pressures in the region (Chart 11). Peripheral spreads remain fragile. The ECB will not want to cause a rapid widening of Italian, Spanish, or Greek government bond spreads by decreasing its asset purchases prematurely. Otherwise, the health of the banking sector in the periphery will once again deteriorate, which will both harm the recovery and ignite deflationary tendencies. Strategy Review The ECB’s Strategy Review also prevents the Governing Council from adjusting policy. The ECB will release its Strategy Review in September or October. This exercise could result in a change to the inflation target. In line with the new Fed Average Inflation Target, the ECB objective may become more symmetric. Inflation has not hit the ECB’s target of nearly 2% since 2012, and the level of HICP stands 8% below what the target implies. Therefore, if the ECB adjusts its target this fall, it will become harder to justify the removal of accommodation. Bottom Line: The ECB wants to avoid a repeat of its 2011 policy mistake, when it tightened policy prematurely and catalyzed a period of profound weakness in the European economy. Eurozone inflation will increase this year; however, this bump is transitory and inflation will once again decline in 2022. Moreover, the ECB rightfully worries about tightening financial conditions, because the euro is exerting profound deflationary forces on the continent and peripheral spreads remain fragile. Finally, the ongoing Strategy Review limits what the ECB can do until its results are known. Look Out For Q4 2021 The ECB will keep the PEPP program in place until March 2022, as was originally announced. Therefore, the ECB will only telegraph its intention after the summer and will most likely announce in December its firm commitment to begin tapering. The program size does not constrain the ECB. The total envelope of the PEPP stands at EUR1850 billion, and the ECB has already purchased EUR1100 billion (Chart 12). Based on the current accelerated pace of purchases, the ECB will run out of room in February 2022. Thus, the ECB continues to enjoy great flexibility without adjusting the PEPP program meaningfully. Chart 12Plentiful PEPP Room Plentiful PEPP Room Plentiful PEPP Room Chart 13China Will Act As A Drag China Will Act As A Drag China Will Act As A Drag Chart 14The Global Growth Tax Is Biding The Global Growth Tax Is Biding The Global Growth Tax Is Biding The expanding threat of a global growth scare will likely limit the ability of the ECB to tighten policy ahead of Q4. China’s credit impulse is decelerating, which portends an imminent peak in our BCA Global Industrial Activity Nowcast (Chart 13). Moreover, the rise in global yields since August 2020 and the rapid rally in oil prices since April 2020 are consistent with a meaningful deceleration in global manufacturing activity. The collapse in our Global Leading Economic Indicator Diffusion Index also hints at a coming global soft patch (Chart 14). Hence, the heightened sensitivity of the Euro Area economy to the global manufacturing sector  points toward softer-than-anticipated growth this summer. Historically, a deceleration of the Chinese PMI New Orders components warns of a decline in the 1-year forward EONIA (Chart 15). While the ECB is unlikely to flag a rate reduction in response to the upcoming global deterioration, it could respond by delaying its tapering decision. Ultimately, the accumulation of constraints and risks suggests that, even after the PEPP taper starts in 2022, the ECB will roll it into the older PSPP program. The ECB will want to keep a lid on peripheral spreads and guarantee that the euro does not melt up. Germany is unlikely to block this initiative, because its large Target 2 surplus means that problems in the periphery will percolate to the German banking system (Chart 16). Moreover, Germany’s export sector will benefit from a euro whose appreciation is contained. Chart 15Chinese New Orders Are Inconsistent With A Tighter ECB Chinese New Orders Are Inconsistent With A Tighter ECB Chinese New Orders Are Inconsistent With A Tighter ECB Chart 16Germany Does Not Want Italian Troubles Germany Does Not Want Italian Troubles Germany Does Not Want Italian Troubles Bottom Line: The ECB will not formally announce its tapering until December 2021. The ECB still has considerable room to continue using the PEPP program, and the global economy is likely to generate a negative growth surprise this summer. Instead, once the PEPP taper begins in 2022, the program will be rolled into the PSPP rather than being completely discarded. European policy, therefore, will remain accommodative. Investment Implications A dovish ECB is consistent with a continued overweight in European peripheral bonds. Chart 17European Peripheral Bonds Remain Attractive Slow Ride Slow Ride Portuguese, Greek, Spanish, and Italian bonds offer much more attractive valuations than the global or the European averages (Chart 17). The robust pace of ECB bond purchases, along with the increased fiscal risk-sharing created by the NGEU programs, will allow this value to continue to generate excess returns for investors. The growth scare, however, threatens our positive stance on European equities and cyclical stocks. We expect a correction to take place this summer or early fall. Thus, investors should raise cash now to buy cyclicals stocks once they correct. First, a deceleration in global growth catalyzed by a Chinese credit slowdown is consistent with an underperformance of cyclical stocks and European stocks in general. Second, the ECB Central Bank Monitor currently sports an elevated 2.1 reading, which is negative for cyclicals. A high reading for the monitor materializes when the Eurozone economy is experiencing strong momentum. However, markets are forward looking, and they rapidly internalize a brightened outlook. Once the price of cyclical stocks embed enough good news, they will start to generate poorer returns. Consequently, positive readings of the monitor are followed by negative relative excess returns for cyclical stocks, such as Industrials, Financials, Tech, and Consumer discretionary on both 6- and 12-month horizons (Table 2A). Table 2AThe Higher The ECB Monitor Rises, The More Poorly Cyclicals Perform Slow Ride Slow Ride The higher the ECB Monitor reaches, the worse the cyclical sectors’ excess returns become, even if the ECB does not tighten policy. Moreover, outliers do not distort the results of the study. The batting averages confirm that, the higher the ECB Monitor, the lower the probability of a subsequent outperformance of cyclicals. The reverse is true for defensive sectors. The higher the ECB Monitor climbs, the greater the subsequent 6- and 12-month relative excess returns for Telecommunication, Consumer Staples, Utilities, and Healthcare turn out. Their probability of outperformance also increases (Table 2B). Table 2BThe Higher The ECB Monitor Rises, The More Poorly Cyclicals Perform Slow Ride Slow Ride Investors should therefore curtail their exposure to risk over the coming months, tactically tilt toward some attractive defensive names and buy some hedges or raise some cash in order to participate more fully in the rest of the rally later this year. Bottom Line: An easy ECB policy favors an overweight stance in European peripheral bonds. However, if global growth slows, the current reading of our ECB Monitor is consistent with a period of underperformance for cyclical equities. Such underperformance should correlate with a corrective episode for the broad market as well as an underperformance of European stocks relative to the US. Investors, therefore, should raise cash levels and tactically move into attractive defensive names in order to buy back cyclicals later this year.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Investment Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com Currency Performance Slow Ride Slow Ride Fixed Income Performance Government Bonds Slow Ride Slow Ride Corporate Bonds Slow Ride Slow Ride Equity Performance Major Stock Indices Slow Ride Slow Ride Geographic Performance Slow Ride Slow Ride   Sector Performance Slow Ride Slow Ride ​​​​​​​

Highlights Geopolitical risk is trickling back into financial markets. China’s fiscal-and-credit impulse collapsed again. The Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index is ticking back up after the sharp drop from 2020. All of our proprietary GeoRisk Indicators are elevated or rising. Geopolitical risk often rises during bull markets – the Geopolitical Risk Index can even spike without triggering a bear market or recession. Nevertheless a rise in geopolitical risk is positive for the US dollar, which happens to stand at a critical technical point. The macroeconomic backdrop for the dollar is becoming less bearish given China’s impending slowdown. President Biden’s trip to Europe and summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin will underscore a foreign policy of forming a democratic alliance to confront Russia and China, confirming the secular trend of rising geopolitical risk. Shift to a defensive tactical position. Feature Back in March 2017 we wrote a report, “Donald Trump Is Who We Thought He Was,” in which we reaffirmed our 2016 view that President Trump would succeed in steering the US in the direction of fiscal largesse and trade protectionism. Now it is time for us to do the same with President Biden. Our forecast for Biden rested on the same points: the US would pursue fiscal profligacy and mercantilist trade policy. The recognition of a consistent national policy despite extreme partisan divisions is a testament to the usefulness of macro analysis and the geopolitical method. Trump stole the Democrats’ thunder with his anti-austerity and anti-free trade message. Biden stole it back. It was the median voter in the Rust Belt who was calling the shots all along (after all, Biden would still have won the election without Arizona and Georgia). We did make some qualifications, of course. Biden would maintain a hawkish line on China and Russia but he would reject Trump’s aggressive foreign and trade policy when it came to US allies.1 Biden would restore President Obama’s policy on Iran and immigration but not Russia, where there would be no “diplomatic reset.” And Biden’s fiscal profligacy, unlike Trump’s, would come with tax hikes on corporations and the wealthy … even though they would fall far short of offsetting the new spending. This is what brings us to this week’s report: New developments are confirming this view of the Biden administration. Geopolitical Risk And Bull Markets Chart 1Global Geopolitical Risk And The Dollar Global Geopolitical Risk And The Dollar Global Geopolitical Risk And The Dollar In recent weeks Biden has adopted a hawkish policy on China, lowered tensions with Europe, and sought to restore President Obama’s policy of détente with Iran. The jury is still out on relations with Russia – Biden will meet with Putin on June 16 – but we do not expect a 2009-style “reset” that increases engagement. Still, it is too soon to declare a “Biden doctrine” of foreign policy because Biden has not yet faced a major foreign crisis. A major test is coming soon. Biden’s decision to double down on hawkish policy toward China will bring ramifications. His possible deal with Iran faces a range of enemies, including within Iran. His reduction in tensions with Russia is not settled yet. While the specific source and timing of his first major foreign policy crisis is impossible predict, structural tensions are rebuilding. An aggregate of our 13 market-based GeoRisk indicators suggests that global political risk is skyrocketing once again. A sharp spike in the indicator, which is happening now, usually correlates with a dollar rally (Chart 1). This indicator is mean-reverting since it measures the deviation of emerging market currencies, or developed market equity markets, from underlying macroeconomic fundamentals. The implication is positive for the dollar, although the correlation is not always positive. Looking at both the DXY’s level and its rate of change shows periods when the global risk indicator fell yet the dollar stayed strong – and vice versa. The big increase in the indicator over the past week stems mostly from Germany, South Korea, Brazil, and Australia, though all 13 of the indicators are now either elevated or rising, including the China/Taiwan indicators. Some of the increase is due to base effects. As global exports recover, currencies and equities that we monitor are staying weaker than one would expect. This causes the relevant BCA GeoRisk indicator to rise. Base effects from the weak economy in June 2020 will fall out in coming weeks. But the aggregate shows that all of the indicators are either high or rising and, on a country by country level, they are now in established uptrends even aside from base effects. Chart 2Global Policy Uncertainty Revives Global Policy Uncertainty Revives Global Policy Uncertainty Revives Meanwhile the global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index is recovering across the world after the drop in uncertainty following the COVID-19 crisis (Chart 2). Policy uncertainty is also linked to the dollar and this indicator shows that it is rising on a secular basis. The Geopolitical Risk Index, maintained by Matteo Iacoviello and a group of academics affiliated with the Policy Uncertainty Index, is also in a secular uptrend, although cyclically it has not recovered from the post-COVID drop-off. It is sensitive to traditional, war-linked geopolitical risk as reported in newspapers. By contrast our proprietary indicators are sensitive to market perceptions of any kind of risk, not just political, both domestic and international. A comparison of the Geopolitical Risk Index with the S&P 500 over the past century shows that a geopolitical crisis may occur at the beginning of a business cycle but it may not be linked with a recession or bear market. Risk can rise, even extravagantly, during economic expansions without causing major pullbacks. But a crisis event certainly can trigger a recession or bear market, particularly if it is tied to the global oil supply, as in the early 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s (Chart 3). Chart 3Secular Rise In Geopolitical Risk Soon To Reassert Itself Secular Rise In Geopolitical Risk Soon To Reassert Itself Secular Rise In Geopolitical Risk Soon To Reassert Itself While geopolitical risk is normally positive for the dollar, the macroeconomic backdrop is negative. The dollar’s attempt to recover earlier this year faltered. This underlying cyclical bearish dollar trend is due to global economic recovery – which will continue – and extravagant American monetary expansion and budget deficits. This is why we have preferred gold – it is a hedge against both geopolitical risk and inflation expectations. Tactically this year we have refrained from betting against the dollar except when building up some safe-haven positions like Japanese yen. Over the medium and long term we expect geopolitical risk to put a floor under the greenback. The bottom line is that the US dollar is at a critical technical crossroads where it could break out or break down. Macro factors suggest a breakdown but the recovery of global policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk suggests the opposite. We remain neutral. A final quantitative indicator of the recovery of geopolitical risk is the performance of global aerospace and defense stocks (Chart 4). Defense shares are rising in absolute and relative terms. Chart 4Another Sign Of Geopolitical Risk: Defense Stocks Outperform As Virus Ebbs And Military Spending Surges Another Sign Of Geopolitical Risk: Defense Stocks Outperform As Virus Ebbs And Military Spending Surges Another Sign Of Geopolitical Risk: Defense Stocks Outperform As Virus Ebbs And Military Spending Surges Can The WWII Peace Be Prolonged? Qualitative assessments of geopolitical risk are necessary to explain why risk is on a secular upswing – why drops in the quantitative indicators are temporary and the troughs keep getting higher. Great nations are returning to aggressive competition after a period of relative peace and prosperity. Over the past two decades Russia and China took advantage of America’s preoccupations with the Middle East, the financial crisis, and domestic partisanship in order to build up their global influence. The result is a world in which authority is contested. The current crisis is not merely about the end of the post-Cold War international order. It is much scarier than that. It is about the decay of the post-WWII international order and the return of the centuries-long struggle for global supremacy among Great Powers. The US and European political establishments fear the collapse of the WWII settlement in the face of eroding legitimacy at home and rising challenges from abroad. The 1945 peace settlement gave rise to both a Cold War and a diplomatic system, including the United Nations Security Council, for resolving differences among the great powers. It also gave rise to European integration and various institutions of American “liberal hegemony.” It is this system of managing great power struggle, and not the post-Cold War system of American domination, that lies in danger of unraveling. This is evident from the following points: American preeminence only lasted fifteen years, or at best until the 2008 Georgia war and global financial crisis. The US has been an incoherent wild card for at least 13 years now, almost as long as it was said to be the global empire. Russian antagonism with the West never really ended. In retrospect the 1990s were a hiatus rather than a conclusion of this conflict. China’s geopolitical rise has thawed the frozen conflicts in Asia from the 1940s-50s – i.e. the Chinese civil war, the Hong Kong and Taiwan Strait predicaments, the Korean conflict, Japanese pacifism, and regional battles for political influence and territory. Europe’s inward focus and difficulty projecting power have been a constant, as has its tendency to act as a constraint on America. Only now is Europe getting closer to full independence (which helped trigger Brexit). Geopolitical pressures will remain historically elevated for the foreseeable future because the underlying problem is whether great power struggle can be contained and major wars can be prevented. Specifically the question is whether the US can accommodate China’s rise – and whether China can continue to channel its domestic ambitions into productive uses (i.e. not attempts to create a Greater Chinese and then East Asian empire). The Great Recession killed off the “East Asia miracle” phase of China’s growth. Potential GDP is declining, which undermines social stability and threatens the Communist Party’s legitimacy. The renminbi is on a downtrend that began with the Xi Jinping era. The sharp rally during the COVID crisis is over, as both domestic and international pressures are rising again (Chart 5). Chart 5Biden Administration Review Of China Policy: More China Bashing Biden Administration Review Of China Policy: More China Bashing Biden Administration Review Of China Policy: More China Bashing While the data for China’s domestic labor protests is limited in extent, we can use it as a proxy for domestic instability in lieu of official statistics that were tellingly discontinued back in 2005. The slowdown in credit growth and the cyclical sectors of the economy suggest that domestic political risk is underrated in the lead up to the 2022 leadership rotation (Chart 6). Chart 6China's Domestic Political Risk Will Rise China's Domestic Political Risk Will Rise China's Domestic Political Risk Will Rise Chart 7Steer Clear Of Taiwan Strait Steer Clear Of Taiwan Strait Steer Clear Of Taiwan Strait The increasing focus on China’s access to key industrial and technological inputs, the tensions over the Taiwan Strait, and the formation of a Russo-Chinese bloc that is excluded from the West all suggest that the risk to global stability is grave and historic. It is reminiscent of the global power struggles of the seventeenth through early twentieth centuries. The outperformance of Taiwanese equities from 2019-20 reflects strong global demand for advanced semiconductors but the global response to this geopolitical bottleneck is to boost production at home and replace Taiwan. Therefore Taiwan’s comparative advantage will erode even as geopolitical risk rises (Chart 7). The drop in geopolitical tensions during COVID-19 is over, as highlighted above. With the US, EU, and other countries launching probes into whether the virus emerged from a laboratory leak in China – contrary to what their publics were told last year – it is likely that a period of national recriminations has begun. There is a substantial risk of nationalism, xenophobia, and jingoism emerging along with new sources of instability. An Alliance Of Democracies The Biden administration’s attempt to restore liberal hegemony across the world requires a period of alliance refurbishment with the Europeans. That is the purpose of his current trip to the UK, Belgium, and Switzerland. But diplomacy only goes so far. The structural factor that has changed is the willingness of the West to utilize government in the economic sphere, i.e. fiscal proactivity. Infrastructure spending and industrial policy, at the service of national security as well as demand-side stimulus, are the order of the day. This revolution in economic policy – a return to Big Government in the West – poses a threat to the authoritarian powers, which have benefited in recent decades by using central strategic planning to take advantage of the West’s democratic and laissez-faire governance. If the West restores a degree of central government – and central coordination via NATO and other institutions – then Beijing and Moscow will face greater pressure on their economies and fewer strategic options. About 16 American allies fall short of the 2% of GDP target for annual defense spending – ranging from Italy to Canada to Germany to Japan. However, recent trends show that defense spending did indeed increase during the Trump administration (Chart 8). Chart 8NATO Boosts Defense Spending Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was The European Union as a whole has added $50 billion to the annual total over the past five years. A discernible rise in defense spending is taking place even in Germany (Chart 9). The same point could be made for Japan, which is significantly boosting defense spending (as a share of output) after decades of saying it would do so without following through. A major reason for the American political establishment’s rejection of President Trump was the risk he posed to the trans-Atlantic alliance. A decline in NATO and US-EU ties would dramatically undermine European security and ultimately American security. Hence Biden is adopting the Trump administration’s hawkish approach to trade with China but winding down the trade war with Europe (Chart 10). Chart 9Europe Spending More On Guns Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Chart 10US Ends Trade War With Europe? Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was A multilateral deal aimed at setting a floor in global corporate taxes rates is intended to prevent the US and Europe from undercutting each other – and to ensure governments have sufficient funding to maintain social spending and reduce income inequality (Chart 11). Inequality is seen as having vitiated sociopolitical stability and trust in government in the democracies. Chart 11‘Global’ Corporate Tax Deal Shows Return Of Big Government, Attempt To Reduce Inequality In The West Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Risks To Biden’s Diplomacy It is possible that Biden’s attempt to restore US alliances will go nowhere over the course of his four-year term in office. The Europeans may well remain risk averse despite their initial signals of willingness to work with Biden to tackle China’s and Russia’s challenges to the western system. The Germans flatly rejected both Biden and Trump on the Nord Stream II natural gas pipeline linkage with Russia, which is virtually complete and which strengthens the foundation of Russo-German engagement (more on this below). The US’s lack of international reliability – given the potential of another partisan reversal in four years – makes it very hard for countries to make any sacrifices on behalf of US initiatives. The US’s profound domestic divisions have only slightly abated since the crises of 2020 and could easily flare up again. A major outbreak of domestic instability could distract Biden from the foreign policy game.2 However, American incapacity is a risk, not our base case, over the coming years. We expect the US economic stimulus to stabilize the country enough that the internal political crisis will be contained and the US will continue to play a global role. The “Civil War Lite” has mostly concluded, excepting one or two aftershocks, and the US is entering into a “Reconstruction Lite” era. The implication is negative for China and Russia, as they will now have to confront an America that, if not wholly unified, is at least recovering. Congress’s impending passage of the Innovation and Competition Act – notably through regular legislative order and bipartisan compromise – is case in point. The Senate has already passed this approximately $250 billion smorgasbord of industrial policy, supply chain resilience, and alliance refurbishment. It will allot around $50 billion to the domestic semiconductor industry almost immediately as well as $17 billion to DARPA, $81 billion for federal research and development through the National Science Foundation, which includes $29 billion for education in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, and other initiatives (Table 1). Table 1Peak Polarization: US Congress Passes Bipartisan ‘Innovation And Competition Act’ To Counter China Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was With the combination of foreign competition, the political establishment’s need to distract from domestic divisions, and the benefit of debt monetization courtesy of the Federal Reserve, the US is likely to achieve some notable successes in pushing back against China and Russia. On the diplomatic front, the US will meet with some success because the European and Asian allies do not wish to see the US embrace nationalism and isolationism. They have their own interests in deterring Russia and China. Lack Of Engagement With Russia Russian leadership has dealt with the country’s structural weaknesses by adopting aggressive foreign policy. At some point either the weaknesses or the foreign policy will create a crisis that will undermine the current regime – after all, Russia has greatly lagged the West in economic development and quality of life (Chart 12). But President Putin has been successful at improving the country’s wealth and status from its miserably low base in the 1990s and this has preserved sociopolitical stability so far. Chart 12Russia's Domestic Political Risk Russia's Domestic Political Risk Russia's Domestic Political Risk It is debatable whether US policy toward Russia ever really changed under President Trump, but there has certainly not been a change in strategy from Russia. Thus investors should expect US-Russia antagonism to continue after Biden’s summit with Putin even if there is an ostensible improvement. The fundamental purpose of Putin’s strategy has been to salvage the Russian empire after the Soviet collapse, ensure that all world powers recognize Russia’s veto power over major global policies and initiatives, and establish a strong strategic position for the coming decades as Russia’s demographic decline takes its toll. A key component of the strategy has been to increase economic self-sufficiency and reduce exposure to US sanctions. Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2014, Putin has rapidly increased Russia’s foreign exchange reserves so as to buffer against shocks (Chart 13). Chart 13Russia Fortified Against US Sanctions Russia Fortified Against US Sanctions Russia Fortified Against US Sanctions Putin has also reduced Russia’s reliance on the US dollar to about 22% (Chart 14), primarily by substituting the euro and gold. Russia will not be willing or able to purge US dollars from its system entirely but it has been able to limit America’s ability to hurt Russia by constricting access to dollars and the dollar-based global financial architecture. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov highlighted this process ahead of the Biden-Putin summit by declaring that the National Wealth Fund will divest of its remaining $40 billion of its US dollar holdings. Chart 14Russia Diversifies From USD Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was In general this year, Russia is highlighting its various advantages: its resilience against US sanctions, its ability to re-invade Ukraine, its ability to escalate its military presence in Belarus and the Black Sea, and its ability to conduct or condone cyberattacks on vital American food and fuel supplies (Chart 15). Meanwhile the US is suffering from deep political divisions at home and strategic incoherence abroad and these are only starting to be mended by domestic economic stimulus and alliance refurbishment. Chart 15Cyber Security Stocks Recover Cyber Security Stocks Recover Cyber Security Stocks Recover Europe’s risk-aversion when it comes to strategic confrontation with Russia, and the lack of stability in US-Russia relations, means that investors should not chase Russian currency or financial assets amid the cyclical commodity rally. Investors should also expect risk premiums to remain high in developing European economies relative to their developed counterparts. This is true despite the fact that developed market Europe’s outperformance relative to emerging Europe recently peaked and rolled over. From a technical perspective this outperformance looks to subside but geopolitical tensions can easily escalate in the near term, particularly in advance of the Russian and German elections in September (Chart 16). Chart 16Developed Markets In Europe Will Outperform Emerging Europe Unless Russian Geopolitical Risk Abates Developed Markets In Europe Will Outperform Emerging Europe Unless Russian Geopolitical Risk Abates Developed Markets In Europe Will Outperform Emerging Europe Unless Russian Geopolitical Risk Abates Developed Europe trades in line with EUR-RUB and these pair trades all correspond closely to geopolitical tensions with Russia (Chart 17). A notable exception is the UK, whose stock market looks attractive relative to eastern Europe and is much more secure from any geopolitical crisis in this region (Chart 17, bottom panel). The pound is particularly attractive against the Czech koruna, as Russo-Czech tensions have heated up in advance of October’s legislative election there (Chart 18). Chart 17Long UK Versus Eastern Europe Long UK Versus Eastern Europe Long UK Versus Eastern Europe Chart 18Long GBP Versus CZK Long GBP Versus CZK Long GBP Versus CZK Meanwhile Russia and China have grown closer together out of strategic necessity. Germany’s Election And Stance Toward Russia Germany’s position on Russia is now critical. The decision to complete the Nord Stream II pipeline against American wishes either means that the Biden administration can be safely ignored – since it prizes multilateralism and alliances above all things and is therefore toothless when opposed – or it means that German will aim to compensate the Americans in some other area of strategic concern. Washington is clearly attempting to rally the Germans to its side with regard to putting pressure on China over its trade practices and human rights. This could be the avenue for the US and Germany to tighten their bond despite the new milestone in German-Russia relations. The US may call on Germany to stand up for eastern Europe against Russian aggression but on that front Berlin will continue to disappoint. It has no desire to be drawn into a new Cold War given that the last one resulted in the partition of Germany. The implication is negative for China on one hand and eastern Europe on the other. Germany’s federal election on September 26 will be important because it will determine who will succeed Chancellor Angela Merkel, both in Germany and on the European and global stage. The ruling Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is hoping to ride Merkel’s coattails to another term in charge of the government. But they are likely to rule alongside the Greens, who have surged in opinion polls in recent years. The state election in Saxony-Anhalt over the weekend saw the CDU win 37% of the popular vote, better than any recent result, while Germany’s second major party, the Social Democrats, continued their decline (Table 2). The far-right Alternative for Germany won 21% of the vote, a downshift from 2016, while the Greens won 6% of the vote, a slight improvement from 2016. All parties underperformed opinion polling except the CDU (Chart 19). Table 2Saxony-Anhalt Election Results Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Chart 19Germany: Conservatives Outperform In Final State Election Before Federal Vote, But Face Challenges Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Chart 20Germany: Greens Will Outperform in 2021 Vote Germany: Greens Will Outperform in 2021 Vote Germany: Greens Will Outperform in 2021 Vote The implication is still not excellent for the CDU. Saxony-Anhalt is a middling German state, a CDU stronghold, and a state with a popular CDU leader. So it is not representative of the national campaign ahead of September. The latest nationwide opinion polling puts the CDU at around 25% support. They are neck-and-neck with the Greens. The country’s left- and right-leaning ideological blocs are also evenly balanced in opinion polls (Chart 20). A potential concern for the CDU is that the Free Democratic Party is ticking up in national polls, which gives them the potential to steal conservative votes. Betting markets are manifestly underrating the chance that Annalena Baerbock and the Greens take over the chancellorship (Charts 21A and 21B). We still give a subjective 35% chance that the Greens will lead the next German government without the CDU, a 30% that the Greens will lead with the CDU, and a 25% chance that the CDU retains power but forms a coalition with the Greens. A coalition government would moderate the Greens’ ambitious agenda of raising taxes on carbon emissions, wealth, the financial sector, and Big Tech. The CDU has already shifted in a pro-environmental, fiscally proactive direction. Chart 21AGerman Greens Will Recover Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Chart 21BGerman Greens Still Underrated Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was No matter what the German election will support fiscal spending and European solidarity, which is positive for the euro and regional equities over the next 12 to 24 months. However, the Greens would pursue a more confrontational stance toward Russia, a petro-state whose special relations with the German establishment have impeded the transition to carbon neutrality. Latin America’s Troubles A final aspect of Biden’s agenda deserves some attention: immigration and the Mexican border. Obviously this one of the areas where Biden starkly differs from Trump, unlike on Europe and China, as mentioned above. Vice President Kamala Harris recently came back from a trip to Guatemala and Mexico that received negative media attention. Harris has been put in charge of managing the border crisis, the surge in immigrant arrivals over 2020-21, both to give her some foreign policy experience and to manage the public outcry. Despite telling immigrants explicitly “Do not come,” Harris has no power to deter the influx at a time when the US economy is fired up on historic economic stimulus and the Democratic Party has cut back on all manner of border and immigration enforcement. From a macro perspective the real story is the collapse of political and geopolitical risk in Mexico. From 2016-20 Mexico faced a protectionist onslaught from the Trump administration and then a left-wing supermajority in Congress. But these structural risks have dissipated with the USMCA trade deal and the inability of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador to follow through with anti-market reforms, as we highlighted in reports in October and April. The midterm election deprived the ruling MORENA party of its single-party majority in the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of the legislature (Chart 22). AMLO is now politically constrained – he will not be able to revive state control over the energy and power sectors. Chart 22Mexican Midterm Election Constrained Left-Wing Populism, Political Risk Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Chart 23Buy Mexico (And Canada) On US Stimulus Buy Mexico (And Canada) On US Stimulus Buy Mexico (And Canada) On US Stimulus American monetary and fiscal stimulus, and the supply-chain shift away from China, also provide tailwinds for Mexico. In short, the Mexican election adds the final piece to one of our key themes stemming from the Biden administration, US populism, and US-China tensions: favor Mexico and Canada (Chart 23). A further implication is that Mexico should outperform Brazil in the equity space. Brazil is closely linked to China’s credit cycle and metals prices, which are slated to turn down as a result of Chinese policy tightening. Mexico is linked to the US economy and oil prices (Chart 24). While our trade stopped out at -5% last week we still favor the underlying view. Brazilian political risk and unsustainable debt dynamics will continue to weigh on the currency and equities until political change is cemented in the 2022 election and the new government is then forced by financial market riots into undertaking structural reforms. Chart 24Brazil's Troubles Not Truly Over - Mexico Will Outperform Brazil's Troubles Not Truly Over - Mexico Will Outperform Brazil's Troubles Not Truly Over - Mexico Will Outperform Elsewhere in Latin America, the rise of a militant left-wing populist to the presidency in a contested election in Peru, and the ongoing social unrest in Colombia and Chile, are less significant than the abrupt slowdown in China’s credit growth (Charts 25A and 25B). According to our COVID-19 Social Stability Index, investors should favor Mexico. Turkey, the Philippines, South Africa, Colombia, and Brazil are the most likely to see substantial social instability according to this ranking system (Table 3). Chart 25AMexico To Outperform Latin America Mexico To Outperform Latin America Mexico To Outperform Latin America Chart 25BChina’s Slowdown Will Hit South America China's Slowdown Will Hit South America China's Slowdown Will Hit South America Table 3Post-COVID Emerging Market Social Unrest Only Just Beginning Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Investment Takeaways Close long emerging markets relative to developed markets for a loss of 6.8% – this is a strategic trade that we will revisit but it faces challenges in the near term due to China’s slowdown (Chart 26). Go long Mexican equities relative to emerging markets on a strategic time frame. Our long Mexico / short Brazil trade hit the stop loss at 5% but the technical profile and investment thesis are still sound over the short and medium term. Chart 26China Slowdown, Geopolitical Risk Will Weigh On Emerging Markets China Slowdown, Geopolitical Risk Will Weigh On Emerging Markets China Slowdown, Geopolitical Risk Will Weigh On Emerging Markets Chart 27Relative Uncertainty And Safe Havens Relative Uncertainty And Safe Havens Relative Uncertainty And Safe Havens China’s sharp fiscal-and-credit slowdown suggests that investors should reduce risk exposure, take a defensive tactical positioning, and wait for China’s policy tightening to be priced before buying risky assets. Our geopolitical method suggests the dollar will rise, while macro fundamentals are becoming less dollar-bearish due to China. We are neutral for now and will reassess for our third quarter forecast later this month. If US policy uncertainty falls relative to global uncertainty then the EUR-USD will also fall and safe-haven assets like Swiss bonds will gain a bid (Chart 27). Gold is an excellent haven amid medium-term geopolitical and inflation risks but we recommend closing our long silver trade for a gain of 4.5%. Disfavor emerging Europe relative to developed Europe, where heavy discounts can persist due to geopolitical risk premiums. We will reassess after the Russian Duma election in September. Go long GBP-CZK. Close the Euro “laggards” trade. Go long an equal-weighted basket of euros and US dollars relative to the Chinese renminbi. Short the TWD-USD on a strategic basis. Prefer South Korea to Taiwan – while the semiconductor splurge favors Taiwan, investors should diversify away from the island that lies at the epicenter of global geopolitical risk. Close long defense relative to cyber stocks for a gain of 9.8%. This was a geopolitical “back to work” trade but the cyber rebound is now significant enough to warrant closing this trade.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Trump’s policy toward Russia is an excellent example of geopolitical constraints. Despite any personal preferences in favor of closer ties with Russia, Trump and his administration ultimately reaffirmed Article 5 of NATO, authorized the sale of lethal weapons to Ukraine, and deployed US troops to Poland and the Czech Republic. 2 As just one example, given the controversial and contested US election of 2020, it is possible that a major terrorist attack could occur. Neither wing of America’s ideological fringes has a monopoly on fanaticism and violence. Meanwhile foreign powers stand to benefit from US civil strife. A truly disruptive sequence of events in the US in the coming years could lead to greater political instability in the US and a period in which global powers would be able to do what they want without having to deal with Biden’s attempt to regroup with Europe and restore some semblance of a global police force. The US would fall behind in foreign affairs, leaving power vacuums in various regions that would see new sources of political and geopolitical risk crop up. Then the US would struggle to catch up, with another set of destabilizing consequences.

Highlights Bond Market Performance: Government bonds in the developed economies are currently trapped in ranges, consolidating the sharp upward moves seen in the first quarter of 2021. This is only a pause in the broader cyclical uptrend, however, with central banks under increasing pressure to turn less dovish amid surging inflation and tightening labor markets. Oversold USTs: Technical indicators of yield/price momentum and investor sentiment/positioning suggest that US Treasuries are oversold. Working off this condition can take another 2-3 months, based on an analysis of past oversold episodes. Beyond that, higher yields loom with the Fed starting to prepare the markets for a taper in 2022. Stay underweight Treasuries in global bond portfolios on a cyclical basis. RBA Checklist: Only one of the five components of our “RBA Checklist” – designed to measure the pressures that would force the Reserve Bank of Australia to turn less dovish – is flashing such a signal. We are upgrading our recommended allocation for Australian government bonds to overweight on a tactical (0-6 months) investment horizon. Feature Dear Client, Next week, in lieu of our regularly weekly report, I will be hosting a webcast on Tuesday, June 15 where I will discuss the outlook for global fixed income markets in the second half of 2021. Following that, we will be jointly publishing our bi-annual Global Central Bank Monitor Chartbook with our colleagues at BCA Research Foreign Exchange Strategy on Friday, June 18th. We will return to our regular publishing schedule on Tuesday, June 29th. Best Regards, Rob Robis Chart of the WeekA Tale Of Two Quarters A Summer Nap For Global Bond Yields A Summer Nap For Global Bond Yields The performance of government bond markets in the developed world so far in 2021 has been a tale of two quarters. In Q1, yields were rising steadily on the back of upside surprises in global growth and emerging signs of the biggest inflation upturn seen in nearly a generation. The Bloomberg Barclays Global Treasury index delivered a total return of -2.7% (hedged into US dollars) during the quarter, with no country escaping losses (Chart of the Week). The biggest declines were seen in the UK (-7.5%) the US (-4.3%), with the smallest losses occurring in Japan (-0.3%) and Italy (-0.7%). Chart 2Lower Vol Means High Yielders Outperform Low Yielders Lower Vol Means High Yielders Outperform Low Yielders Lower Vol Means High Yielders Outperform Low Yielders Q2 has been a different story, however. Yields have retreated somewhat from the year-to-date peaks seen at the end of Q1, leading to positive returns so far in Q2 in the UK (+0.8), the US (+1.2%) and Australia (+1.1%). The laggards are the low yielding euro area markets, most notably Italy (-0.7%) and France (-0.9%), that have seen yields move higher on the back of accelerating European growth. The Q2 returns look very much like a carry-driven market, with higher-yielding markets outperforming lower-yielding ones. That trend can persist if the current backdrop of low market volatility persists (Chart 2), although this calm will eventually be broken by a shift towards less dovish monetary policies. Some countries will make that shift at a faster pace than others, leading to relative value opportunities for bond investors in the latter half of 2021. This week, we discuss one such opportunity – Australia versus the US. US Treasuries: Oversold & Trendless – For Now After reaching a 2021 intraday high of 1.77% back on March 30, the benchmark 10-year US Treasury yield has traded in a narrow 15bp range between 1.55% and 1.70%. From a fundamental perspective, US yields are lacking direction because inflation expectations have already made a major upward adjustment to the more inflationary backdrop, but real yields have remained depressed by the continued dovish messaging from the Fed – for now - with regards to the timing of tapering or future rate hikes. From a technical perspective, however, the sideways pattern for US Treasury yields is also consistent for a market that trying to work off an oversold condition. Most of the technical indicators for the US Treasury market that we monitor regularly were at or close to the most bearish/oversold extremes seen since 2000 (Chart 3): Chart 3US Treasuries Are Working Off An Oversold Condition US Treasuries Are Working Off An Oversold Condition US Treasuries Are Working Off An Oversold Condition The 10-year Treasury yield is 39bps above its 200-day moving average, but that gap was as high as 84bps on March 19; The 26-week total return of the 10-year Treasury is -4.7%, after reaching a low of -8.8% on March 19; The JP Morgan client survey of bond managers and traders shows some of the largest underweight duration positioning in the 19-year history of the series; The Market Vane index of sentiment for Treasuries is in the bottom half of the range that has prevailed since 2000; The CFTC data on positioning in 10-year Treasury futures is the only one of our indicators that is not signaling an oversold market, with a small net long position of +3% (scaled by open interest). The overall message of these indicators suggests that price momentum and positioning reached such a bearish extreme by mid-March that some pullback in Treasury yields was inevitable. However, a look back at past periods when Treasuries became heavily oversold since the turn of the century shows that the duration and magnitude of such a pullback is highly variable – anywhere from two months to ten months. The main determining factors are the trends in economic growth and inflation in the US, and the Fed’s expected policy response to both. To show this, we conducted a simple study, updating work we first presented in a 2018 report.1 We looked at “oversold episodes” since 2000, which began when the 10-year Treasury yield was trading at least 50bps above its 200-day moving average. We then defined the end of the oversold episode as simply the point when the 10-year Treasury yield subsequently converged back to its 200-day moving average. We then looked at the length of the episode (in days), and the change in bond yields, for each oversold episode. There were nine such episodes since the year 2000, not counting the current one which has not yet ended. In Table 1, we rank the episodes by the number of days it took to complete each one, based on our simple moving average rule. We also show the change in both the 10-year Treasury yield and its 200-day moving average during each episode, to show how the convergence between the two unfolds. Table 1A Look At Prior Episodes Of An Oversold Treasury Market A Summer Nap For Global Bond Yields A Summer Nap For Global Bond Yields To describe the US economic backdrop during each episode, we looked at the change in the ISM manufacturing index and core PCE inflation during those oversold periods. We also show changes in two important determinants of the level of Treasury yields: inflation expectations using 10-year TIPS breakeven rates, and Fed rate hike expectations using our 12-month Fed discounter which measures the expected change in interest rates - one year ahead - priced into the US overnight index swap (OIS) curve. At the bottom of the table, we show the average for all nine oversold episodes, as well as the averages for the episodes were the ISM was rising and where core PCE inflation was rising. Chart 4US Treasury Market Oversold Episodes: 2003-2007 US Treasury Market Oversold Episodes: 2003-2007 US Treasury Market Oversold Episodes: 2003-2007 There are a few messages gleaned from the results in Table 1: The longest correction of an oversold Treasury market since 2000 took place between February 2018 and December 2018, when 305 days passed before the 10-year yield fell back to its 200-day moving average; The shortest correction was between June 2007 and August 2007, where only 52 days elapsed; Treasury yields typically decline during oversold periods, with two notable exceptions: 2018 and 2013/14, which were also the two longest episodes; During all of the oversold periods, markets reduced the amount of expected Fed tightening by an average of 26bps. However, that was entirely concentrated in four of the nine episodes - including three of the four shortest episodes – and is typically associated with a decline in inflation expectations. Growth momentum appears to be a bigger factor than inflation momentum in determining the length of an oversold episode, with longer episodes typically occurring alongside a rising ISM index, and vice versa. The notable exception was the longest episode in 2018, where the ISM declined by six points, although the bulk of that decline occurred in a single month at the end of the period (November 2018). For the more visually oriented, we present the time series for all the data in Table 1, shaded for the oversold periods, in Chart 4 (for the 2003-2007 period), Chart 5 (2008-2012), Chart 6 (2013-2017) and Chart 7 (2018 to today). We’ve added one additional variable – our Fed Monitor, designed to signal the need for tighter or looser US monetary policy – in the bottom panel of each of those charts. Chart 5US Treasury Market Oversold Episodes: 2008-2012 US Treasury Market Oversold Episodes: 2008-2012 US Treasury Market Oversold Episodes: 2008-2012 Chart 6US Treasury Market Oversold Episodes: 2013-2017 US Treasury Market Oversold Episodes: 2013-2017 US Treasury Market Oversold Episodes: 2013-2017 Chart 7US Treasury Market Oversold Episodes: 2018 To Today US Treasury Market Oversold Episodes: 2018 To Today US Treasury Market Oversold Episodes: 2018 To Today What does this look back tell us about looking ahead? The current episode, at only 105 days old, is still 62 days “younger” than the average oversold period, and 76 days “younger” than the average period where core inflation was rising. This would put the end of the current episode sometime in August. The ISM is essentially unchanged over the current episode so far, making it difficult to draw conclusions based on growth momentum – although the longest episode in 2018 shows that yields can trade sideways for a long time, even in the absence of a big slowing of growth, if the Fed is in a rate hiking cycle. However, the current episode differs dramatically from others in this analysis on two critical fronts. Core inflation has surged 1.6 percentage points since the oversold period began in February, far more than any other episode, while the gap between a rapidly increasing Fed Monitor and a flat 12-month Fed Discounter is also unique among post-2000 oversold periods. In other words, the Treasury market is still vulnerable to a repricing of Fed tightening expectations, especially with positioning and sentiment measures like the Market Vane survey and net futures positioning not yet at fully bearish extremes. Bottom Line: The current oversold condition in the US Treasury market can take another 2-3 months to unwind, based on an analysis of past oversold episodes. Beyond that, higher yields loom with the Fed starting to prepare the markets for a taper in 2022. Stay underweight Treasuries in global bond portfolios on a cyclical basis. RBA Checklist Update: No Case For A Hawkish Turn Yet Australia has been one of the top performing government bond markets within the developed economies, as discussed earlier. This performance has occurred even with strong acceleration of both Australian economic momentum and market-based inflation expectations (Chart 8). Despite our RBA Monitor flashing pressure on the RBA to tighten, and the Australian OIS curve already discounting 48bps of rate hikes over the next two years, Australian bond yields have remained very well behaved during the “calm” second quarter for global fixed income. Chart 8RBA Policies Limiting Rise In Bond Yields RBA Policies Limiting Rise In Bond Yields RBA Policies Limiting Rise In Bond Yields Chart 9RBA Stimulus Takes Many Forms RBA Stimulus Takes Many Forms RBA Stimulus Takes Many Forms The continued dovish messaging from the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) is the main reason for the solid Australia bond performance. The central bank is signaling no imminent shift in its combination of 0.1% nominal policy rates, deeply negative real rates, yield curve control on 3-year bonds and quantitative easing on longer-maturity bonds (Chart 9). Other central banks are starting to inch towards reining in the massive monetary accommodation of the past year. Could the RBA be next? In a Special Report published back in January of this year, we outlined a list of variables to watch to determine when the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) could be expected to turn less dovish.2 This checklist would also inform our country allocation view on Australian government bonds, which has remained neutral. A quick update on the latest readings from the RBA Checklist shows little pressure on the RBA to begin preparing markets for tighter monetary policy. 1. The vaccination process goes quickly and smoothly We are NOT placing a checkmark next to this part of our RBA Checklist. Australia has weathered COVID-19 far better than most other Western countries in terms of actual cases and deaths, but the vaccine rollout Down Under has been underwhelming. Only 16% of the population has received at least one vaccine jab, while a mere 2% is fully vaccinated. These are numbers that are more comparable to pandemic-ravaged emerging market countries like India and Brazil where access to vaccines is an issue (Chart 10). Chart 10A Slow Vaccine Rollout Down Under A Summer Nap For Global Bond Yields A Summer Nap For Global Bond Yields The slow vaccine rollout is less worrisome in light of the Australian government having secured enough vaccine doses to inoculate the entire population, and with the domestic economy facing limited remaining COVID-19 restrictions. The issue has been distribution and that is now occurring at a quickening pace. Until a much greater share of the population is vaccinated, however, Australia will continue to maintain aggressive COVID-related international travel restrictions – the government just announced that borders will remain shut until mid-2022 - that will be a major drag on the economically-important tourism sector. 2. Private sector demand accelerates alongside fiscal stimulus (✔) We ARE placing a checkmark next to this part of our RBA Checklist. Australia’s fiscal stimulus in response to the pandemic was one of the largest in the developed world. The stimulus was heavily focused on wage subsidies and income support measures like the JobSeeker program, which expired back in March. As the expensive stimulus programs are unwound, it is critical that the domestic economy can stand on its own without support. On that front, the news is good. Australia’s economy grew by 1.8% during Q1/2021, lifting the level of real GDP above the pre-pandemic peak (Chart 11). Both consumer spending and business investment posted solid growth during the quarter, fueled by surging confidence with the NAB business outlook measure hitting a record high in May (bottom panel). As a sign that the domestic economy is benefitting from a return to pre-pandemic habits, Q1 saw a 15% increase in spending in hotels, cafes and restaurants. That strength looked to extend into the Q2, with retail sales rising 1.1% in April, suggesting that Australian domestic demand is enjoying strong upward momentum. Chart 11A Confidence-Led Recovery In Domestic Demand A Confidence-Led Recovery In Domestic Demand A Confidence-Led Recovery In Domestic Demand Chart 12China Is A Drag On Australian Exports China Is A Drag On Australian Exports China Is A Drag On Australian Exports 3. China reins in policy stimulus by less than expected We are NOT placing a checkmark next to this part of our RBA Checklist. China is by far Australia’s largest trading partner, so Chinese demand is always an important contributor to Australian economic growth. This is why we included a China element in our RBA Checklist. Specifically, we deemed the outcome that would potentially turn the RBA more hawkish would be Chinese policymakers pulling back monetary and fiscal stimulus by less than expected in 2021 after the big policy support in 2020. The combined fiscal and credit impulse for China has already slowed by 9% of GDP since December 2020, signaling a meaningful cooling of Chinese growth in the latter half of 2021 that should weigh on demand for imports from Australia (Chart 12). However, Chinese import demand has already been severely impacted because of worsening China-Australia political tensions, which has led Beijing to impose restrictions on Australian imports for a variety of products, include coal, wine, beef, barley and cotton. The result is that there has been no growth in Australian total exports to China over the past year – an outcome that was flattered by the surge in iron ore prices - which has weighed on overall Australian export growth. Given this weak starting point for Chinese demand for Australian goods, the sharp reduction in the China stimulus is, on the margin, a factor that will not force the RBA to turn less dovish sooner than expected. 4. Inflation, both realized and expected, returns to the RBA’s 2-3% target We are NOT placing a checkmark next to this part of our RBA Checklist. Australian inflation remains well below the RBA’s 2-3% target range, with the headline CPI and the less volatile trimmed mean CPI both expanding at only a 1.1% annual rate in Q1/2021 (Chart 13). The RBA is forecasting a brief boost to both measures in Q2, before settling back below 2% to the end of 2022. Chart 13No Bond-Bearish RBA Policy Shift Without More Inflation No Bond-Bearish RBA Policy Shift Without More Inflation No Bond-Bearish RBA Policy Shift Without More Inflation Chart 14Diminishing Financial Stability Risks From Housing Diminishing Financial Stability Risks From Housing Diminishing Financial Stability Risks From Housing The RBA’s message on the inflation outlook has been very consistent. A sustainable move of realized inflation back to the 2-3% target range – that would prompt a normalization of monetary policy – cannot occur without a significant tightening of labor markets that drives wage growth back to 3% from the Q1/2021 reading of 1.5%. The RBA currently does not expect that outcome to occur before 2024. The RBA believes that the full employment NAIRU is between 4-4.5%, well below the OECD’s latest estimate of 5.4%. Given the sharp drop in Australian unemployment already seen over the past few quarters, there is the potential for an upside surprise in the wage data that could lead the RBA to change its policy bias. The central bank would need to see a few quarters of such wage surprises, however, before altering its forward guidance on the timing of future rate hikes. 5. House price inflation begins to accelerate We are NOT placing a checkmark next to this part of our RBA Checklist. Given Australia’s past history with periods of surging home values, signs that housing markets were overheating could prompt the RBA to consider tighten monetary policy. The annual growth of median house prices has dipped from +8% in Q1 2020 to +4% in Q4 2020, despite robust housing demand as evidenced by the 40% growth in building approvals. At the same time, housing valuations have become less stretched with the ratio of median home prices to median household incomes falling -9% from the 2017 peak according to data from the OECD (Chart 14). The RBA remains sensitive to the potential financial stability risks from overvalued housing. The latest trends in the house price data, however, suggest that the central bank does not yet to have the use the blunt tool of tighter monetary policy to cool off an overheated housing market. Chart 15Upgrade Australia To Overweight (Vs. USTs) Upgrade Australia To Overweight (Vs. USTs) Upgrade Australia To Overweight (Vs. USTs) In sum, the majority of items in our RBA Checklist are signaling no immediate pressure on the central bank to tighten policy. The first 25bp rate hike is not discounted in the Australian OIS curve until April 2023, a little ahead of RBA guidance but still consistent with a very dovish policy bias. The inflation data, in our view, will be the critical factor that could prompt the markets to pull forward expected monetary tightening, leading to a surge in Australian bond yields. With the RBA already expecting a surge in inflation in the Q2/2020 data, the central bank would likely want to see at least a couple of more quarterly inflation prints – both for the CPI and wage price index - before signaling a more hawkish policy shift. Thus, the RBA will likely stay dovish over the latter half of 2021 Therefore, we are moving to an overweight recommended stance on Australian government bonds on a tactical (0-6 months) basis. In our model bond portfolio on pages 16-17, we are “funding” that shift to an above-benchmark weighting in Australia out of US Treasury exposure. Given our view that the Fed will soon begin to signal a 2022 taper of its asset purchases, relative policy dovishness should lead Australian government bonds to outperform US Treasuries in the latter half of this year. In addition, Australian bonds have a lower yield beta to changes in US Treasury yields, relative to the high beta to changes in non-US developed market yields (Chart 15), making allocations out of the US into Australia attractive from a risk management perspective in a global bond portfolio. Bottom Line: Only one of the five components of our “RBA Checklist” – designed to measure the pressures that would force the Reserve Bank of Australia to turn less dovish – is flashing such a signal. We are upgrading our recommended allocation to Australian government bonds to overweight on a tactical investment horizon.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 See BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Report, "Bond Markets Are Suffering Withdrawal Symptoms", dated March 20, 2018. 2 See BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy/Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Australia: Regime Change For Bond Yields & The Currency?", dated January 20, 2021. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index A Summer Nap For Global Bond Yields A Summer Nap For Global Bond Yields Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns