Equities

Dear Client From March 18 I will be writing under a new product title, the BCA Research Counterpoint. The aim of the Counterpoint is to generate a high volume of investment opportunities that are unconnected to the business cycle and run counter to the conventional wisdom. For those of you that have followed the European Investment Strategy through the past ten years, Counterpoint will seamlessly continue the same intellectual framework of investment ‘mega-themes’, fundamental analysis, fractal analysis, and sector primacy. The difference is that the investment opportunities will encompass all geographies. To whet your appetite, early Counterpoint reports will introduce new investment mega-themes including: the compelling structural case for cryptocurrencies; why shocks such as the pandemic are inherently predictable; and the structural transformation coming to the global labour market. There will also be an upgrade of the proprietary Fractal Trading System to generate more ideas per week and to boost the win ratio towards 70 percent. As for the European Investment Strategy, it will continue in the very capable hands of my colleague and friend, Mathieu Savary. Mathieu has previously written the Foreign Exchange Service, the flagship Bank Credit Analyst, and most recently the Daily Insights. Moreover, Mathieu is French. So if anyone knows how Europe works (and doesn’t work), it is Mathieu! I do hope you read both products. Best regards Dhaval Highlights If bond yields continue their march higher, the most dangerous earthquake will happen in the global real estate market. If higher bond yields caused even a 10 percent decline in the $300 trillion global real estate market it would unleash a deflationary impulse equal to one third of world GDP This would make any preceding inflationary impulse feel like a waltz in the park. For long-term investors who can ride out near term pain, there are three important conclusions: The ultimate low in bond yields is still ahead of us. The structural bull market in stocks will continue until bond yields reach their ultimate low. Equity investors should structurally tilt towards ‘growth’ sectors that will benefit from the ultimate low in bond yields. Feature Chart of the WeekThe Real Estate Market Dwarfs The Stock Market And The Global Economy In the last couple of weeks, higher bond yields have caused tremors in the stock market. But if bond yields continue their march higher and stay there, the most dangerous earthquake will not happen in the stock market, it will happen in the real estate market. The $90 trillion worth of the global stock market is large, but it is chicken feed compared with the $300 trillion worth of global real estate (Chart of the Week). The big worry is that the valuation of global real estate is critically dependent on bond yields staying low. If higher bond yields caused even a 10 percent decline in global real estate values, it would amount to a $30 trillion plunge in global wealth. Such a deflationary impulse, equal to one third of world GDP, would make any preceding inflationary impulse feel like a waltz in the park. Hence, to anybody worried that we are on the road to inflation, we pose a simple question. How would the world economy cope with the massive deflationary impact on $300 trillion of global real estate?1   The Real Risk Is Real Estate Over the past decade, global real estate rents have broadly tracked nominal GDP, as they should. But real estate prices have massively outperformed rents (Chart I-2). The reason is that the valuation paid for those rents has surged by 35 percent. This ‘multiple expansion’ of real estate which has added $80 trillion to global wealth – broadly equivalent to global GDP – is entirely due to lower bond yields. Chart I-2Real Estate Prices Have Massively Outperformed Rents And GDP Within the global real estate market, the residential segment constitutes 80 percent by value. Commercial real estate accounts for a little over 10 percent, and agricultural and forestry real estate makes up the remainder. It follows that the most important component of the real estate boom has been a housing boom. Given that most homes are owner-occupied, the boom in house prices has boosted the wealth of the ordinary global citizen by much more than the boom in stock prices. Moreover, the 2010s housing boom was unprecedented in its penetration and regional breadth, simultaneously encompassing cities, suburbs, and rural areas across North America, Europe, Asia and Australasia. Even Germany and Japan joined in, making it the most widely participated-in housing boom in economic history. What was behind this synchronised and broad-based housing boom? The answer is the universal decline in bond yields. As the global real estate firm Savills puts it: “Real estate has increased significantly in value, spurred on by the intervention of central banks and their suppression of bond yields” In fact, as the US and China now dominate the global real estate market, the downtrend in the global rental yield has closely tracked the downtrend in the US and China long bond yields. The big danger would be if this downtrend turned into an uptrend, undermining the valuation of $300 trillion of global real estate. To repeat, even a 10 percent synchronised decline in global real estate prices would wipe out $30 trillion of global wealth equal to one third of annual GDP, and it would impact almost everybody. The ‘multiple expansion’ of real estate has added $80 trillion to global wealth, broadly equivalent to global GDP. But where is the pain point? Our answer is that if inflation fears lifted the average US and China 30-year bond yield to 3.75 percent (from 3 percent now), it would constitute the change in trend that would unleash a massive countervailing deflationary impulse from falling house prices (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Higher Bond Yields Would Unleash A Massive Deflationary Impulse From Falling House Prices Waiting For Rationality To Return To Stocks In the stock market, the August to mid-February period was a brief aberration in which stocks rallied in tandem with rising bond yields. But looking at the bigger picture, the bull market in stocks, just as for real estate, is due to lower bond yields (Chart I-4). Chart I-4The August To Mid-February Rally In Stocks Was An Aberration Since 2008, global stock market profits have gone nowhere. Therefore, the only reason that the stock market surged is that the valuation paid for those unchanged profits surged. Just as for real estate, the stock market’s valuation surged because bond yields collapsed (Chart I-5). Chart I-5The Bull Market In Stocks Is Entirely Due To Higher Valuations Taking account of this downtrend in bond yields, the post-2008 boom in valuations is rational. However, as we warned two weeks ago, the continued expansion of valuations while bond yields are backing up means that The Rational Bubble Is Turning Irrational. The point of vulnerability is in high-flying tech stocks. Since 2009, the technology sector earnings yield has always maintained a minimum 2.5 percent premium over the 10-year T-bond yield, defining the envelope of the rational bubble. But in recent weeks, this envelope has been breached, indicating that valuation is entering a new and irrational phase (Chart I-6). Chart I-6The Rational Bubble Is Turning Irrational For long-term investors the pressing questions are: how much higher can bond yields go, and for how long? Our answers are, much less than 1 percent, and not for long – because the deflationary impact on $300 trillion of real estate would eventually force bond yields into a very sharp reversal. The Road To Inflation Ends At Deflation Many people believe that ‘real’ assets such as real estate and stocks perform well in an inflationary scare. But this is a misunderstanding. Granted, the income generated by real assets should keep pace with nominal GDP. But the valuation paid for that income collapses, taking the price of the asset down with it. From the state of price stability, in which most developed economies now find themselves, the creation of inflation is a non-linear phenomenon. Non-linear means that policymakers’ efforts result in either nothing (witness Japan or Switzerland), or in uncontrolled inflation (witness the US in the late 1960s). In fact, can you name any economy that has shifted from price stability to a controlled inflation? If you can, please tell me in an email! When an economy phase shifts from price stability to price instability, the valuations of real assets collapse. This is because the starting valuation needed to generate a given real return during uncontrolled inflation is much lower than during price stability. When an economy phase shifts from price stability to price instability, the valuations of real assets collapse. Chart I-7 should make this crystal clear. During the low-inflation 1990s and 2000s, a starting price to earnings multiple of 15 consistently generated a prospective 10-year real return of 10 percent. But during the uncontrolled inflation of the 1970s, the same starting multiple of 15 generated a real return of zero. To generate a real return of 10 percent, the starting multiple had to sink to 7. This explains why the prices of stocks and real estate collapsed in the 1970s and why they would collapse again in a new inflationary scare. Chart I-7In An Inflation Scare, Valuations Have To Collapse To Generate An Adequate Real Return As an aside, this also explains why so-called ‘financial repression’ – whereby the central bank holds down bond yields while the government generates inflation – will not work. While it is conceivable that a government could corner its government bond market and thereby repress it, it would be near-impossible to repress the much larger asset-classes of stocks and real estate. Once these large and privately priced markets sniffed out the government’s nefarious plan, the valuation of such assets would collapse to generate the previously required real return – the result being an almighty crash in stock and real estate prices. Given that the combined value of such markets dwarfs the $90 trillion global economy, the road to inflation would end at deflation. For long-term investors who can ride out near term pain, all of this leads to three important conclusions: The ultimate low in bond yields is still ahead of us. The structural bull market in stocks will continue until bond yields reach their ultimate low. Equity investors should structurally tilt towards ‘growth’ sectors that will benefit from the ultimate low in bond yields. Fractal Trading System* In a very successful week, short MSCI Korea versus MSCI AC World achieved its 10.6 percent profit target and short tin versus lead quickly achieved its 13 percent profit target. This takes the rolling 12-month win ratio to 60 percent. Given the transition to the new product title, there are no new trades this week. We look forward to introducing the upgraded Fractal Trading System and some new trades in the BCA Counterpoint on March 18. Chart I-8MSCI Korea Vs. MSCI All-Country World* For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Source: Savills Prime Index: World Cities, August 2020; and Savills: 8 things to know about global real estate value, July 2018. Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Highlights Portfolio Strategy The selloff in the long end of the Treasury bond market and related yield curve steepening, rising loan growth and a turnaround in bank net interest margins, all signal that a durable re-rating phase is in the offing in the beaten down financials sector. Soaring real and nominal yields on the back of a US economic reopening, sinking policy uncertainty, and the specter of a countertrend USD rally, all undermine global gold mining stocks. Downgrade to underweight. We deem there is an exploitable opportunity within the reopening theme and we reiterate our recent pair trade recommendation: long USES “Laggards” basket/short USES “Overshooters” basket (excluding the GICS1 sectors). Recent Changes Downgrade the global gold mining index to underweight, today. This move also pushes the S&P materials sector to a neutral allocation. Last week our rolling 2.5% stop was triggered and we booked gains of 17% in the deep cyclicals/defensives portfolio bent that is now on even keel. On February 10, we closed the S&P consumer staples and the S&P homebuilding high-conviction underweights for 8% and -11% returns, respectively, since the December 7 inception. On February 11, we rolled over the synthetic long SPY options structure from March expiry (long $390/$410 call spread/short $340 put) to June expiry (long $400/$420 call spread/short $340 put) netting gains of $5.41/contract or 676% since the January 12 inception. Feature While stocks swiftly gyrated last week and the selloff in Treasury bonds dominated the news flow, the corporate bond market remained as placid as ever. This eerie calmness is slightly unnerving as junk spreads, all the way out to the CCC poor-quality spectrum, have been steadily sinking. But, resurging commodities likely confirm that there is no real reason to panic as global growth remains on an upward trajectory courtesy of pent-up demand that will get unleashed in the back half of the year as the global economy reopens (Chart 1). We recently reinitiated the long “Back-To-Work” basket as the expense of our “COVID-19 Winners” basket and this trade is already up another 21.3% since the second inception on Feb 3, 2021. With regard to monetary policy that remains a key pillar of equity euphoria, the Fed has vociferously signaled that they will not be backing down from QE and their ZIRP policy. The FOMC is not even thinking about thinking about tapering asset purchases, despite a looming inflation spike in the coming months due to base effects and bottlenecks that they vehemently deem transitory. Chart 1Eerie Calm? Importantly, Charts 2 & 3 show that both the ISM’s manufacturing prices paid index and a sideways move in retail gasoline prices predict a surge in headline CPI in the April/May time frame as we first showed in a recent Special Report. Chart 2The Bond Market Is Already… Chart 3…Testing The Fed Tack on a plethora of anecdotes regarding shortages and price hikes in a slew of industries and an inflationary spurt is already here. In more detail, an inflationary impulse is not only evident in chip and car shortages and in container freight shipping rates, but also in dry bulk transport rates. Drilling beneath the surface of the Baltic Dry Index, and looking beyond Capesize carriers, reveals that Panamax and Handysize vessel freight rates are on a tear, probing 11-year highs and more than quadrupling since the March lows (Chart 4). These smaller ships are more nimble and rarely take voyage empty as recent container ships have been when returning to China to reload. Thus, the sizable increase in Handysize and Panamax shipping rates suggests that commodity demand is robust, especially industrial commodities. Returning to US shores, the most recent retail sales report also caused a jump in the Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow and the NY Fed’s Nowcast forecasts for Q1 near double digit real GDP growth. For calendar 2021, according to daily data from Bloomberg, economists expect US real GDP growth north of 4.9% (Chart 5). More blow out quarters are in the offing courtesy of the inoculation of the population, the reopening of the economy and persistent government largesse. Chart 4Look Beneath The Surface… Chart 5…And The Economic Recovery Is Gaining Steam… Crudely put, while consumers will not buy 10 coffees or eat 10 meals at a restaurant all at once when the economy fully reopens, they may choose to fly business on their next vacation and indulge on a more lavish hotel. Add on that the hospitality industry specifically has aggressively shut down capacity and an inflationary impulse is likely as consumer purse strings will loosen very quickly. Thus, trust in the Fed’s ultra-dovishness represents the biggest equity market risk in the coming months as the FOMC allows the economy to run hot and there are high odds that the bond market will continue to test the Fed’s resolve. Our sense is that the Fed will initially ignore the spike in inflation, at least until the summer, thus refraining from removing the proverbial “punch bowl”. However, if the market detects any signs of a “less dovish” Fed, especially if high inflation prints persist for whatever reason, risk premia will get repriced a lot higher (Chart 6). Chart 6…But A Lot Of Good News Is Baked In Staying on the topic of interest rates, we have a long-held rule of thumb that stocks cannot stomach more than 100-125bps tightening via a selloff in the 10-year US Treasury bond in a less than a year time frame basis. In other words, were the 10-year US Treasury yield to surpass and stay over 1.55% by March, 2.05% by June, and 1.75% by August, then the equity market will likely suffer a pullback, especially given the absence of a valuation cushion. In fact, last Thursday the 10-year US Treasury yield cleared the 1.6% hurdle and stocks sold off violently. In more detail, we examined data from 2009 onward, therefore only covering the QE era, which would increase the applicability of our analysis. Importantly, the 2009-2011 iterations provide the closest parallels as to what will likely take root this cycle as those instances occurred in a post recessionary environment, which is similar to today. The 2009-2011 period also best aligns with the main reason for having this rule of thumb in the first place: to gauge the risk of interest rates undermining the market by weighing on forward multiples and/or via an economic slowdown because of tightening in monetary conditions. Our analysis shows that while the exact timing and size of the stock market drawdown varies from episode to episode, it is generally consistent with a roughly 10% pullback in the S&P 500 albeit with a 1-2 month lag following the trigger in our rule1 (Chart 7). Chart 7Monitoring Our 100-125bps Rule Of Thumb Keep in mind that such a pullback is consistent with historical precedents when the Fed is actively engaged in QE, with the most recent example being last September’s/October’s 10% drawdown. Our sense is that the ongoing bond market selloff will serve as a catalyst for a continuation/acceleration of the reopening/rotation/reflation trade out of highly valued tech stocks and into more compellingly valued deep and early cyclicals. Such a transition typically proves tumultuous. This week, we update our sanguine view on an early-cyclical sector, and act on the downgrade alert to a deep cyclical sector via downgrading a safe haven commodity index to a below benchmark allocation. Financials Are On Fire Within the GICS1 universe, the most levered sector to interest rates is the S&P financials sector. Given that the bond selloff has staying power, we reiterate our overweight stance on this early-cyclical sector that we fist boosted to an above benchmark allocation on November 16, 2020. Following up from the 100-125bps bond market tightening rule of thumb, adding another layer of complexity via bringing in the yield curve (YC) is instructive. This analysis corroborates our rule of thumb and suggests that not only do 10-year US Treasury yields have more room to rise, but also so does the S&P financials sector, especially given that it is hovering at an extremely depressed level relative to the S&P 500 (Chart 8). Chart 8V-Shaped Recovery? Historically the yield curve peaks at a range of 150 to 250 bps. In the past 7 cycles, this range was in place with only one exception: the first leg of the double dip recession in the early 80s. This represents a stellar track record of where the YC peters out based on empirical evidence. Even in the post GFC world, the YC steepened north of 250bp (thrice) and during the early stages of that recovery. The implication is that if history at least rhymes, then the yield curve can steepen a lot more. Were it to revisit the 250bps level, the YC could nearly double from current levels (Chart 9A). Practically, given that the Fed will pin the 2-year US Treasury yield near zero with a near-term max value of roughly 50bps, this equates to a tentative early-cycle peak 10-year Treasury yield range of 2% to 3%.   Chart 9AYield Curve Can Steepen A Lot More Putting this in perspective, at current levels, the 10-year US Treasury yield is roughly where it stood right after Brexit in mid-2016, which was last cycle’s trough, and still deeply in overvalued territory according to BCA bond valuation model (Chart 9B). Importantly, back then, as now, yields have been late comers to the equity rally. As a reminder, during the manufacturing recession the SPX troughed on Feb 15, 2016 – the day the Royal Dutch Shell / BG Group merger closed – while interest rates bottomed in the first week of July 2016. One key driver of the positive impact of rising interest rates on relative financials share prices will be the end to the banking sector’s hemorrhaging net interest margins (Chart 10). Chart 9BBonds Remain Extremely Overvalued Chart 10NIM Turnaround Looms   Financial services companies represent the nervous system of every economy and a vibrant economy is synonymous with firming loan growth (bottom panel, Chart 11). Beyond the recovery in the broad non-financial corporate sector, the overheating residential housing market in particular is another vital area that is propping up the financials sector (top panel, Chart 11).  All of this suggests that relative profitability will pick up steam this year, a message that our macro-driven relative EPS models also corroborate (second panel, Chart 12). This stands in marked contrast to sell-side analysts’ profit expectations and represents an exploitable trading opportunity: the earnings hurdle is so low for financials that even a modest beat of suppressed EPS growth expectations will go a long way in breathing fresh life into this neglected early-cyclical sector (third & bottom panels, Chart 12). Tack on pent up financials sector buyback demand and a 40bps dividend yield carry versus the SPX and the profit outlook brightens further for this interest rate-sensitive sector. Chart 11Financials Rising Alongside The Economy Finally, relative valuations are bombed out on any metric used (middle, fourth & bottom panels, Chart 13). Granted, relative technicals are not as alluring as last November, however our Technical Indicator is still below overbought levels that have marked prior relative performance peaks (second panel, Chart 13). Chart 12Green Light On Earnings Chart 13Financials Are Cheap No Matter How You Cut It Adding it all up, the selloff in the long end of the Treasury bond market and the associated yield curve steepening, rising loan growth and a turnaround in bank net interest margins signal that a durable re-rating phase looms for the beaten down financials sector. Bottom Line: Continue to overweight the S&P financials sector. Are Gold Miners Losing Their Luster? Last December when we penned the 2021 high-conviction calls Strategy Report, we put global gold miners in the “also rans” section as we did not have the courage to go underweight despite our view of an economic reopening and selloff in the bond market. It is never too late. Today, we use the downgrade alert we issued on the S&P materials sector to trim the sector to neutral via downgrading the global gold mining index to a below benchmark allocation. As a reminder, in mid-January we had put the materials sector on our downgrade watch list as a way to express the move of the cyclicals/defensives portfolio bent back down to even keel. The stock-to-bond (S/B) ratio has broken out to at least a three decade high because stocks are near all-time highs and bonds are selling off violently. This represents an explosive cocktail for gold stocks and is warning that there is ample downside for relative share prices (S/B ratio shown inverted, Chart 14). Chart 14Sell Gold Miners… This is largely due to the definitive reopening of the US economy in the coming quarters (bottom panel, Chart 15). It is also evident in 5-year/5-year forward real yields that have been soaring year-to-date signaling that investors should shy away from gold miners (real yields shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 15). Even nominal yields underscore that the path of least resistance for global gold mining equities points lower, especially given that the recent bond market selloff is driven by the real (i.e. growth) not inflation component. As a reminder, gold bullion and gold miners yield next to nothing thus when real rates rise, the opportunity cost to hold gold and gold miners skyrockets and investors abandon gold miners for higher yielding assets (top panel, Chart 16). The recent fall in the share of global negative yielding bonds by over $4tn also weighs on the prospects of gold miners (bottom panel, Chart 16). Importantly, while we are not calling for the Fed to raise rates any time soon, the 12-month forward fed funds rate discounter (as backed out of the OIS curve) has jumped back to the zero line, opening a wide gap with relative share prices. This is unsustainable and our sense is that this gulf will narrow via a drop in the latter in the coming months (fed funds rate discounter shown inverted and advanced, middle panel, Chart 16). Chart 15…When The Economy Is Roaring Another source of worry for gold stocks is the USD. Historically, a rising greenback pushes gold bullion and gold equities lower and vice versa. If the US economy will rebound at a faster clip than the euro area as the Fed is explicitly taking inflation risk and is allowing the economy to run hot, then at some point the US dollar may start to flex its muscles. Granted, this will likely be a countertrend rally in the context of a USD bear market that commenced last spring, especially given the still lopsided US dollar positioning (Chart 17). Chart 16Rising Rates Are bearish Bullion Chart 17Mighty USA = Countertrend Rally In The USD In addition, US and global policy uncertainties are melting as the US/Sino trade war has been in hibernation, the US elections are behind us and a “Blue Wave” sweep is certain to deliver mega fiscal easing packages, thus exerting downward pressure on the safe haven status of gold bullion and gold mining equities (Chart 18). Finally, the global equity risk premium is in freefall as not only the Fed, but also the ECB, the BoJ, and a plethora of other CB including EM ones are doing QE effectively engineering a “risk on” asset price inflation phase (Chart 18). Nevertheless, our bearish gold mining equity thesis has to contend with oversold conditions and bombed out relative valuations. We will be closely monitoring these two risks and stand ready to act and cut losses in case value oriented buyers come out of left field (Chart 19). Chart 18Mind The Catch Down Phase Chart 19Two Risks To Monitor Netting it all out, soaring real and nominal yields on the back of a US economic reopening, sinking policy uncertainty, and the specter of a countertrend USD rally, all undermine global gold mining stocks. Bottom Line: Downgrade the global gold mining index to underweight today. This move also pushes the S&P materials sector back to the neutral zone. A Few Words On The “Back-To-Work” Trade Last year we created two baskets of stocks to capture the economic reopening theme by constructing a long/short pair trade. This year, we crystallized 21.5% in gains from that pair trade and subsequently reopened it and it is already up another 21.3% since the second inception on February 3, 2021. Two weeks ago, we took a fresh look at the economic reopening theme and pitted “Back-To-Work” laggards against leaders. First, we filtered for well-behaved cyclical industries among all the sectors and sub-sectors we cover. We define a well-behaved cyclical industry as one that trailed the SPX from February 19, 2020 to March 23, 2020; and then outpaced the broad market from March 23, 2020 to today (all computations are in relative to SPX terms). Such filtering excluded all of the defensive & cyclical industries that outperformed the market during the recession, and it also excluded those industries that were too damaged by the pandemic and could not recover above the March 23 trough level (for example, airlines) always in relative terms. Chart 20 is a stylized depiction of our analysis. In total 27 industries survived the filtering. We then computed what is the minimum percentage increase required in order for each group to recover to its February 19 level, and then calculated the difference between that required increase and the one that actually materialized. A positive value signifies that the sector climbed above its February 19 level, whereas a negative value means that the sector still has not recovered. Chart 20Stylized Depiction Of “Back-To-Work” Sectors To Buy And To Avoid… Chart 21 displays the results. Our rationale is as follows: should the economic recovery and normalization themes continue unabated as we expect, then the risk/reward trade-off of owning the “laggards” is greater than the “overshooters”: the former have ample upside potential left, whereas the latter are already discounting a lot of good news. Chart 22 plots the ratio of the two baskets against the ISM manufacturing prices paid sub-component and the 10-year US Treasury yield and supports our rationale that the “laggards” have a long runway ahead versus the “overshooters”. Chart 21…Buy The Laggards / Sell The Overshooters Chart 22Inflation Impulse Beneficiaries Bottom Line: We deem there is an exploitable opportunity within the reopening theme and we reiterate our recent pair trade recommendation: long USES “Laggards” basket/short USES “Overshooters” basket (excluding the GICS1 sectors). As a proxy for this trade we include tickers for the largest stock in each sub-sector (excluding GICS1). Laggards: V, BLK, HCA, MCD, HON, AXP, JPM, COP, PSX, MAR, SLB. Overshooters: EMR, BLL, LIN, NUE, UNP, HD, DHI, CAT, MS, J, TSLA, AMAT. We are aware of some minor conflicts between the “Overshooters” and the “Back-To-Work” basket and also versus our current recommendations table, but we still recommend investors stick with this pair trade.   Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     A quick note on the taper tantrum and the 2016 iterations. During those periods the S&P 500 actually fell at the same time as yields rose (not after the rule was triggered), so technically we should not have counted that as a valid iteration on our chart.     Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations Size And Style Views February 24, 2021 Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives January 12, 2021  Stay neutral small over large caps June 11, 2018 Long the BCA Millennial basket  The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, ABNB, V). January 22, 2018 Favor value over growth

Highlights We continue to believe that the distribution of Goldilocks economic and market outcomes is quite wide, … : Financial markets and the economy are in a good spot, supported by a combination of above-trend growth and easy monetary policy that will remain in place for at least the next year. … though an unwelcome COVID turn could put the US in the left-hand tail, … : Growth could fall short of expectations in the event of a negative pandemic surprise. As long as vaccinations occur at a pace that confers herd immunity by the end of September, the left-tail scenario is highly unlikely. … and a consumption tidal wave could bring the right tail into play: An explosive release of pent-up consumer demand could push US growth beyond the top of the sanguine consensus range. Too-strong growth would eventually become self-limiting because it would pull the Fed off the sidelines. Our recommendations are unchanged: Goldilocks is just right for risk assets, and we continue to favor equities over bonds and spread product over Treasuries. Feature The potential outcomes for financial markets and the US economy broadly align with Goldilocks’ porridge choices at the three bears’ house: one is too hot, one is too cold and one is just right. The just-right outcome is where we are positioned now: thanks to enormous infusions of emergency aid that have morphed into consumption pump-priming, above-trend growth appears to be assured. That would be plenty favorable for equities and credit on its own, but they also benefit from the Fed’s promise to maintain accommodative monetary policy longer than it previously would have. As our Chief Global Fixed Income Strategist Rob Robis puts it, emergency COVID monetary and fiscal policy will persist well beyond the COVID emergency. That’s an awfully good combination for risk assets and investors have taken note of it, driving equity multiples up and credit spreads down. It is entirely possible that they could spoil things by bidding prices too high, but so far the growth impacts – in the form of knockout earnings surprises and better-than-expected credit performance – have been able to keep the party going. It is our view that they will continue to do so this year, as the range of good-enough growth outcomes is so wide that a Goldilocks outcome is considerably more probable than not. Figure 1 doesn’t quite do it justice, because the area under the tails had to be large enough to accommodate lengthy words like “resurgent” and “consumption,” but we think the tails begin at least one standard deviation away from the middle of the distribution. Figure 1This One Is Just Right How Did We Get Here? It is too soon for humanity to declare victory over COVID-19 but we do appear to have gained the upper hand as new case counts have plummeted from their January peaks in the US and the rest of the developed world (Chart 1). Much of Europe re-imposed stringent restrictions on activity for much of November and December, but US officials applied a loose patchwork of local measures, stepping in mostly when hospital capacity was strained (Chart 2). The good news going forward is that increased vigilance, and the cumulative infections that have already occurred, were apparently enough to slow the virus’ spread even during the northern hemisphere winter. The pandemic news can apparently be kept trending in the right direction without cutting off the economy’s oxygen. Chart 1The Tide Has Turned ... Chart 2... Relieving Pressure On Local Health Care Systems Lavish fiscal support has been the other critical element. The CARES Act swiftly rushed a great deal of aid to vulnerable households in two bursts spanning spring and early summer, with the first arriving mainly in April and May via economic impact payments of $1,200 per adult and $500 per child (Chart 3, top panel). The second burst came in the form of a weekly $600 federal unemployment insurance (UI) benefit supplement available through the end of July (though processing delays spread some of the flows into August) (Chart 3, middle panel). The transfers boosted aggregate household income above its pre-pandemic level despite a drop in compensation (Chart 3, bottom panel). Chart 3As Fiscal Transfers Wax And Wane, ... Chart 4... So Does The Economy By the end of the third quarter, however, the transfer flow had slowed to a trickle, with only the pandemic unemployment assistance (PUA) program, which expanded UI benefits to several categories of otherwise ineligible workers, still operating. President Trump’s executive order reallocating some FEMA funds briefly revived supplemental federal UI benefits, but the maximum $400 weekly bump only lasted for a handful of weeks in September and October. Once the fiscal transfers faded, signs of fraying rapidly emerged, with hiring flat-lining and retail sales falling sequentially in all three months of the fourth quarter (Chart 4). A New Paradigm No sooner had the economy begun to show signs of wear than the second round of economic impact payments, provided for in December’s compromise spending bill, arrived in two-thirds1 of American households and the federal government resumed topping up UI benefits. Both the direct payments ($600 per qualifying adult and $600 per child) and the supplemental UI benefits ($300 per week) were smaller than in the spring but we take the snapback in January retail sales as evidence that high marginal-propensity-to-consume households immediately put them to work. Households’ ability to satisfy their obligations to creditors (Chart 5) and landlords slipped as the year wore on as well. We expect that February rent collections and leading 30-day consumer delinquency rates will also show improvement (Chart 6), albeit not as dramatically as the retail series. Chart 560-Day Delinquency Rates Have Stopped Falling … Chart 6... And Leading 30-Day Delinquencies Had Been Ticking Higher With another, larger round of stimulus coming down the pike, the US economy will cease fraying around the edges. The immediate catalyst for the passage of the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Act was Georgia’s Senate run-off elections, but there were two longer-term developments at play. First, the mainstream economic consensus has come full circle since the global financial crisis and a chorus of expert voices is now warning governments of the perils of cutting off aid too quickly. Fed Chair Powell and Treasury Secretary Yellen have avidly taken up this theme, along with their central bank and finance ministry peers around the world. Second, and more lastingly and influentially, US voters have lost their taste for fiscal austerity. As we wrote with our US Political Strategy colleagues in last week’s Special Report, Democrats are actively renouncing Reaganite budget discipline and Republicans have quietly retired it. Now that the Fed has determined that Volcker-era inflation vigilance is no longer relevant, the stage is being set for a reversal of the investment-friendly inflation and interest rate trends that have been in place for four decades. That will weigh on financial market returns over the long run, but it should prop them up in the near term. Staying Out Of The Left Tail Central bankers are as prone as generals to fight the last war. Corrosively high inflation was every Fed official’s bête noire since the seventies, but a decade of missed inflation targets and tepid, plodding recoveries around the world has shifted central bankers’ focus to hysteresis and the specter of secular stagnation. Once the pandemic arrived, threatening self-reinforcing waves of defaults and bankruptcies, the Fed effectively declared that providing too much accommodation was a lesser evil than prematurely tightening to counter inflation fears that may prove to be unfounded. With fiscal policy makers also at pains to err on the side of doing too much, the near-term growth picture looks awfully good. Chart 7The Vaccination Effort Is Picking Up Steam Against that policy backdrop, it will be hard for the US economy to slide into the left-hand tail of the distribution in the absence of a negative virus surprise. We cannot rule out the possibility of virus-resistant mutations or new rounds of outbreaks among a weary populace that lets its guard down, but a failure to vaccinate at a pace consistent with achieving herd immunity by the end of September looks to be the most likely route to disappointment. To that end, we are monitoring vaccination progress against the pace required to get enough of the population inoculated to effect herd immunity by the end of the third quarter (Chart 7). The US got off to a slow start, but we are confident that it will catch up by early spring under an administration that has made crushing the virus its top priority and a Congress that is providing the resources to enable local health authorities to get the job done. Overheating Is Not Inevitable The case for an upside near-term surprise stems from the notion that Congress has provided households with considerably more aid than they need. As we have previously noted, the number of households receiving economic impact payments is multiples of the number of households that have had to grapple with unemployment. Thanks to the first two rounds of fiscal transfers, we estimate that aggregate household income from March through January was nearly $600 billion greater than it would have been in the absence of COVID-19 (Table 1). The looming third round of direct payments could put incremental pandemic income in the neighborhood of $1 trillion. Table 1Households' Excess Pandemic Savings Keep Growing Coupled with foregone consumption that already sums to $1.1 trillion, households’ excess pandemic savings is on course to top $2 trillion. That’s a lot of dry powder, even in a $21 trillion economy, and it underpins our view that the probability-adjusted distribution of Goldilocks outcomes is very wide. Without another major virus shock, it is hard to see a scenario where growth doesn’t comfortably exceed its 2% trend level. The question is whether or not enough of the savings will be spent in 2021 and 2022 to push the economy into the right-hand tail and potentially overheat. No one can say with much conviction, as the current backdrop is without precedent. Mount Rushmore-level economists David Ricardo and Milton Friedman would advise investors to temper their enthusiasm. Ricardian equivalence suggests that households will be reluctant to spend distributions they may be taxed to pay for later, and Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis posits that one-off windfalls have little effect on consumption decisions. The multiplier effect of the direct payments to households may not be all it’s cracked up to be, but the lion’s share of the savings stash has come from reduced consumption. How much of that reduced consumption was merely deferred rather than destroyed will determine how much growth can rise. Despite the vast household spending shortfall, consumption of goods has actually tracked above the level that would have been expected if the pandemic had not occurred; the spending gap has entirely been a function of diminished services spending, especially in pandemic-stricken categories like food service, recreation and transportation (Table 2). People surely have an appetite to resume that spending, and will flock to their favorite places once they can again enjoy them fully, but there’s a hitch. Last year’s forgone spending cannot be caught up by eating multiple restaurant dinners in a day, going back in time to attend last season’s sports and entertainment events, or flying on two planes2 and staying in two hotel rooms. Table 2The Spending Gap Is Almost Entirely On The Services Side As a result, it seems that a fair amount of forgone services consumption is likely to turn into demand destroyed. Some demand for services could be diverted to demand for goods – one might build out a home theater instead of going to ballgames, movies and concerts; one might buy home exercise equipment in place of a gym membership – but much of that substitution has already taken place and may not persist going forward. The bottom line is that some goods demand appears to have been pulled forward by the pandemic while some services demand has likely been destroyed. There is surely pent-up consumer demand, but only some of the accumulated savings will be directed to satisfying it and we do not think they’ll push the economy to overheat. Investment Implications Our base case has the Goldilocks backdrop of solid growth and ample monetary accommodation remaining in place for at least the rest of the year. Markets have fully discounted that scenario but earnings growth has surprised to the upside by a remarkable margin over the last three quarters (Chart 8) and we expect that the fundamental backdrop will support mid- to high-single-digit equity returns. That will allow stocks to easily surpass bonds and we continue to overweight the former and underweight the latter. If some of the excess savings fuels multiple expansion, equity returns could be even better. Chart 8Earnings Have Been Beating Expectations By A Remarkable Margin Although we are not worried that inflation is about to break out to uncomfortably high levels, we do expect further yield curve steepening from the combination of accelerating growth and an inflation-tolerant Fed. We continue to recommend that fixed income investors keep duration below benchmark levels. We expect an ongoing rotation from COVID winners to COVID losers as the virus is increasingly contained and look for value to outperform growth.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Every single adult taxpayer with adjusted gross income (AGI) of $75,000 or less (and every married filing jointly taxpayer with AGI of $150,000 or less) was eligible for the full payments. 2 Even GE’s CEO doesn’t have this option anymore.

Dear Client, In addition to this week’s abbreviated report, we are sending you a Special Report on Bitcoin. I don’t recommend you buy it. Best regards, Peter Berezin Highlights Real government bond yields have increased in recent weeks, which could put further downward pressure on equity prices in the near term. Nevertheless, we continue to advocate overweighting equities over a 12-month horizon. Historically, rising real yields have been most toxic for stocks when yields have increased in response to hawkish central bank rhetoric. This is manifestly not the case today. The Fed’s accommodative stance should limit any near-term upward pressure on the US dollar. Investors should favor cyclical and value-oriented stocks over defensive and growth-geared plays. Higher Real Yields: A Near-Term Risk For Stocks Chart 1Government Bond Yields Have Increased Since Bottoming Last Year Bond yields have jumped in recent weeks. After bottoming at 0.52% in August, the US 10-year Treasury yield has climbed to 1.54%, up from 0.93% at the beginning of the year. Government bond yields in the other major economies have also risen (Chart 1). While inflation expectations have bounced, the most recent increase in yields has been concentrated in the real component of bond yields (Chart 2). Optimism about a vaccine-led global growth recovery, reinforced by continued fiscal stimulus – especially in the US – has prompted investors to move forward their expectations of how soon and how high policy rates will rise (Chart 3). Chart 2AThe Real Component Has Fueled The Most Recent Rise In Bond Yields (I) Chart 2BThe Real Component Has Fueled The Most Recent Rise In Bond Yields (II) How menacing is the increase in bond yields to stock market investors? Chart 4 shows that there has been a close correlation between real yields and the forward P/E ratio at which the S&P 500 trades. The 5-year/5-year forward real yield, in particular, has moved up sharply, which could put further downward pressure on stocks in the near term. Chart 3Path Of Expected Policy Rates Being Revised Upwards Chart 4Rise In Real Rates Is A Headwind For Equity Valuations Nevertheless, we continue to advocate overweighting equities over a 12-month horizon. As we pointed out two weeks ago, rising real yields have historically been most toxic for stocks when yields have increased in response to hawkish central bank rhetoric. This is manifestly not the case today. In his testimony to Congress this week, Jay Powell downplayed inflation risks, stressing that the US economy was “a long way” from the Fed’s goals. He pledged to tread “carefully and patiently” and give “a lot of advance warning” before beginning the process of normalizing monetary policy. We expect the 10-year Treasury yield to stabilize in the 1.6%-to-1.7% range, still well below the level that would threaten the health of the economy. Favor Cyclical And Value-Oriented Stocks In  A Weaker Dollar Environment The Fed’s accommodative stance should limit any near-term upward pressure on the US dollar. Whereas stocks are most sensitive to absolute changes in long-term real bond yields, the dollar is more sensitive to changes in short-term real rate differentials with US trading partners (Chart 5). Since the Fed is unlikely to tighten monetary policy anytime soon, US short-term real rates could fall further as inflation rises.  Chart 5The Dollar Is Sensitive To Changes In Short-Term Real Rate Differentials Chart 6Cyclical Stocks Tend To Benefit The Most From Stronger Global Growth And A Weaker Dollar   Cyclical stocks, which are overrepresented outside the US, tend to benefit the most from strengthening global growth and a weakening dollar (Chart 6). Value stocks also generally do well in a weak dollar-strong growth environment (Chart 7). Moreover, bank shares – which are concentrated in value indices – typically outperform when long-term bond yields are rising (Chart 8). Chart 7AA Weaker US Dollar And Stronger Global Growth Should Help Value Stocks (I) Chart 7BA Weaker US Dollar And Stronger Global Growth Should Help Value Stocks (II)     Chart 8Bank Shares Typically Excel When Long-Term Bond Yields Are Rising In contrast, as relatively long-duration assets, growth stocks often struggle when bond yields go up. The same is true for more speculative plays such as cryptocurrencies. In this week’s Special Report, we discuss the fate of Bitcoin, arguing that investors should resist buying it.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com     Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores

Highlights Market-based geopolitical analysis is about identifying upside as well as downside risk. So far this year upside risks include vaccine efficacy, coordinated monetary and fiscal stimulus, China’s avoidance of over-tightening policy, and Europe’s stable political dynamics. Downside risks include vaccine rollout problems, excessive US stimulus, a Chinese policy mistake, and traditional geopolitical risks in the Taiwan Strait and Persian Gulf. Financial markets may see more turmoil in the near-term over rising bond yields and the dollar bounce. But the macro backdrop is still supportive for this year. We are initiating and reinitiating a handful of trades: EM currencies ex-Brazil/Turkey/Philippines, the BCA rare earth basket, DM-ex-US, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership markets, and global value plays. Feature Chart 1Bond Yield Spike Threatens Markets In Near Term Investors hear a lot about geopolitical risk but the implication is always “downside risk.” What about upside risks? Where are politics and geopolitics creating buying opportunities? So far this year, on the positive side, the US fiscal stimulus is overshooting, China is likely to avoid overtightening policy, and Europe’s political dynamics are positive. However, global equity markets are euphoric and much of the good news is priced in. On the negative side, the US stimulus is probably too large. The output gap will be more than closed by the Biden administration’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan yet the Democrats will likely pass a second major bill later this year with a similar amount of net spending, albeit over a longer period of time and including tax hikes. The countertrend bounce in the dollar and rising government bond yields threaten the US and global equity market with a near-term correction. The global stock-to-bond ratio has gone vertical (Chart 1). Meanwhile Biden faces immediate foreign policy tests in the Taiwan Strait and Persian Gulf. These two are traditional geopolitical risks that are once again underrated by investors. The near term is likely to be difficult for investors to navigate. Sentiment is ebullient and likely to suffer some disappointments. In this report we highlight a handful of geopolitical opportunities and offer some new investment recommendations to capitalize on them. Go Long Japan And Stay Long South Korea China’s stimulus and recovery matched by global stimulus and recovery have led to an explosive rise in industrial metals and other China-sensitive assets such as Swedish stocks and the Australian dollar that go into our “China Play Index” (Chart 2). Chart 2China Plays Looking Stretched (For Now) While a near-term pullback in these assets looks likely, tight global supplies will keep prices well-bid. Moreover long-term strategic investment plans by China and the EU to accelerate the technology race and renewable energy are now being joined by American investment plans, a cornerstone of Joe Biden’s emerging national policy program. We are long silver and would buy metals on the dips. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “new era” policies will be further entrenched at the March National People’s Congress with the fourteenth five-year plan for 2021-25 and Xi’s longer vision for 2035. These policies aim to guide the country through its economic transition from export-manufacturing to domestic demand. They fundamentally favor state-owned enterprises, which are an increasingly necessary tool for the state to control aggregate demand as potential GDP growth declines, while punishing large state-run commercial banks, which are required to serve quasi-fiscal functions and swallow the costs of the transition (Chart 3). Xi Jinping’s decision to promote “dual circulation,” which is fundamentally a turn away from Deng Xiaoping’s opening up and liberal reform to a more self-sufficient policy of import substitution and indigenous innovation, will clash with the Biden administration, which has already flagged China as the US’s “most serious competitor” and is simultaneously seeking to move its supply chains out of China for critical technological, defense, and health goods. Chart 3Xi Jinping Leans On The Banks To Save The SOEs Chinese political and geopolitical risks are almost entirely priced out of the market, according to our GeoRisk Indicator, leaving Chinese equities exposed to further downside (Chart 4). Hong Kong equities have traded in line with GeoRisk Indicator for China, which suggests that they also have downside as the market prices in a rising risk premium due to the US’s attempt to galvanize its allies in a great circumvention of China’s economy in the name of democracy versus autocracy. Chart 4China/HK Political Risk Priced Out Of Market China has hinted that it will curtail rare earth element exports to the US if the US goes forward with a technological blockade. Biden’s approach, however, is more defensive rather than offensive – focusing on building up domestic and allied semiconductor and supply chain capacity rather than de-sourcing China. President Trump’s restrictions can be rolled back for US designed or manufactured tech goods that are outdated or strictly commercial. Biden will draw the line against American parts going into the People’s Liberation Army. Biden has a chance in March to ease the Commerce Department’s rules implementing Trump’s strictures on Chinese software apps in US markets as a gesture of engagement. Supply constraints and shortages cannot be solved quickly in either semiconductors or rare earths. But both China and the US can circumvent export controls by importing through third parties. The problem for China is that it is easier for the US to start pulling rare earths from the ground than it is for China to make a great leap forward in semiconductor production. Given the US’s reawakening to the need for a domestic industrial policy, strategic public investments, and secure supply chains, we are reinitiating our long rare earth trade, using the BCA rare earth basket, which features producers based outside of China (Chart 5). The renminbi is starting to rolling over, having reached near to the ceiling that it touched in 2017 after Trump’s arrival. There are various factors that drive the currency and there are good macro reasons for the currency to have appreciated in 2016-17 and 2020-21 due to strong government fiscal and monetary reflation. Nevertheless the People’s Bank allowed the currency to appreciate extensively at the beginning of both Trump’s and Biden’s terms and the currency’s momentum is slowing as it nears the 2017 ceiling. We are reluctant to believe the renminbi will go higher as China will not want to overtighten domestic policy but will want to build some leverage against Biden for the forthcoming strategic and economic dialogues. For mainland-dedicated investors we recommend holding Chinese bonds but for international investors we would highlight the likelihood that the renminbi has peaked and geopolitical risk will escalate. There is no substantial change on geopolitical risk in the Taiwan Strait since we wrote about it recently. A full-scale war is a low-probability risk. Much more likely is a diplomatic crisis – a showdown between the US and China over Taiwan’s ability to export tech to the mainland and the level of American support for Taiwan – and potentially a testing of Biden’s will on the cybersecurity, economic security, or maritime security of Taiwan. While it would make sense to stay long emerging markets excluding Taiwan, there is not an attractive profile for staying long emerging markets excluding all of Greater China. Therefore investors who are forced to choose should overweight China relative to Taiwan (Chart 6). Chart 5Rare Earth Miners Outside China Can Go Higher Market forces have only begun to register the fact that Taiwan is the epicenter of geopolitical risk in the twenty-first century. The bottleneck for semiconductors and Taiwan’s role as middleman in the trade war have supported Taiwanese stocks. It will take a long time for China, the US, and Europe to develop alternative suppliers for chips. But geopolitical pressures will occasionally spike and when they do Taiwanese equities will plunge (Chart 7). Chart 6EM Investors Need Either China Or Taiwan ... Taiwan Most At Risk South Korean geopolitical risk is also beneath the radar, though stocks have corrected recently and emerging market investors should generally favor Korea, especially over Taiwan. The first risk to Korea is that the US will apply more pressure on Seoul to join allied supply chains and exclude shipments of sensitive goods to China. The second risk is that North Korea – which Biden is deliberately ignoring in his opening speeches – will demand America’s attention through a new series of provocations that will have to be rebuked with credible threats of military force. Chart 7Markets Starting To Price Taiwan Strait Geopolitical Risk Chart 8South Korea Favored In EM But Still Faces Risks Over Chips, The North   Chart 9Don't Worry About Japan's Revolving Door The North Korean risk is usually very fleeting for financial markets. The tech risk is more serious but the Biden administration is not seeking to force South Korea to stop trading with China, at least not yet. The US would need to launch a robust, multi-year diplomatic effort to strong-arm its allies and partners into enforcing a chip and tech ban on China. Such an effort would generate a lot of light and heat – shuttle diplomacy, leaks to the press, and public disagreements and posturing. Until this starts to occur, US export controls will be a concern but not an existential threat to South Korea (Chart 8). Japan is the geopolitical winner in Asia Pacific. Japan is militarily secure, has a mutual defense treaty with the US, and stands to benefit from the recovery in global trade and growth. Japan is a beneficiary of a US-driven tech shift away from excess dependency on China and is heavily invested in Southeast Asia, which stands to pick up manufacturing share. Higher bond yields and inflation expectations will detract from growth stocks more than value stocks, and value stocks have a larger market-cap weight in European and Japanese equity markets. Japanese politics are not a significant risk despite a looming election. While Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga is unpopular and likely to revive the long tradition of a “revolving door” of short-lived prime ministers, and while the Liberal Democratic Party will lose the super-majorities it held under Shinzo Abe, nevertheless the party remains dominant and the national policy consensus is behind Abe’s platform of pro-growth reforms, coordinated dovish monetary and fiscal policy, and greater openness to trade and immigration (Chart 9). Favor EU And UK Over Russia And Eastern Europe Russian geopolitical risk appears to be rolling over according to our indicator but we disagree with the market’s assessment and expect it to escalate again soon (Chart 10). Not only will Russian social unrest continue to escalate but also the Biden administration will put greater pressure on Russia that will keep foreign investors wary. Chart 10Russia Geopolitical Risk Will Not Roll Over While geopolitics thus poses a risk to Russian equities – which are fairly well correlated (inversely) with our GeoRisk indicator – nevertheless they are already cheap and stand to benefit from the rise in global commodity prices and liquidity. Russia is also easing fiscal policy to try to quiet domestic unrest. The pound and the euro today are higher against the ruble than at any time since the invasion of Ukraine. It is possible that Russia will opt for outward aggressiveness amidst domestic discontent, a weak and relapsing approval rating for Vladimir Putin and his government, and the Biden administration’s avowed intention to prioritize democracy promotion, including in Ukraine and Belarus (Chart 11). The ruble will fall on US punitive actions but ultimately there is limited downside, at least as long as the commodity upcycle continues. Chart 11Ruble Can Fall But Probably Not Far Biden stated in his second major foreign policy speech, “we will not hesitate to raise the cost on Russia.” There are two areas where the Biden administration could surprise financial markets: pipelines and Russian bonds. Biden could suddenly adopt a hard line on the Nordstream 2 pipeline between Russia and Germany, preventing it from completion. This would require Biden to ask the Germans to put their money where their mouths are when it comes to trans-Atlantic solidarity. Biden is keen to restore relations with Germany, and is halting the withdrawal of US troops from there, but pressuring Germany on Russia is possible given that it lies in the US interest and Biden has vowed to push back against Russia’s aggressive regional actions and interference in American affairs. The US imposed sanctions on Russian “Eurobonds” under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act) in the wake of Russia’s poisoning of secret agent Sergei Skripal in the UK in 2018. Non-ruble bank loans and non-ruble-denominated Russian bonds in primary markets were penalized, which at the time accounted for about 23% of Russian sovereign bonds. This left ruble-denominated sovereign bonds to be sold along with non-ruble bonds in secondary markets. The Biden administration views Russia’s poisoning of opposition leader Alexei Navalny as a similar infraction and will likely retaliate. The Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act is not yet law but passed through a Senate committee vote in 2019 and proposed to halt most purchases of Russian sovereign debt and broaden sanctions on energy projects and Kremlin officials. Biden is also eager to retaliate for the large SolarWinds hack that Russia is accused of conducting throughout 2020. Cybersecurity stocks are an obvious geopolitical trade in contemporary times. Authoritarian nations have benefited from the use of cyber attacks, disinformation, and other asymmetric warfare tactics. The US has shown that it does not have the appetite to fight small wars, like over Ukraine or the South China Sea, whereas the US remains untested on the question of major wars. This incentivize incremental aggression and actions with plausible deniability like cyber. Therefore the huge run-up in cyber stocks is well-supported and will continue. The world’s growing dependency on technology during the pandemic lockdowns heightened the need for cybersecurity measures but the COVID winners are giving way to COVID losers as the pandemic subsides and normal economic activity resumes. Traditional defense stocks stand to benefit relative to cyber stocks as the secular trend of struggle among the Great Powers continues (Chart 12). Specifically a new cycle of territorial competition will revive military tensions as commodity prices rise. Chart 12Back To Work' Trade: Long Defense Versus Cyber By contrast with Russia, western Europe is a prime beneficiary of the current environment. Like Japan, Europe is an industrial, trade-surplus economy that benefits from global trade and growth. It benefits as the geopolitical middleman between the US and its rivals, China and Russia, especially as long as the Biden administration pursues consultation and multilateralism and hesitates to force the Europeans into confrontational postures against these powers. Chart 13Political Risk Still Subsiding In Continental Europe Meanwhile Russia and especially China need to court Europe now that the Biden administration is using diplomacy to try to galvanize a western bloc. China looks to substitute European goods for American goods and open up its market to European investors to reduce European complaints of protectionism. European domestic politics will become more interesting over the coming year, with German and French elections, but the risks are low. The rise of a centrist coalition in Italy under Mario Draghi highlights how overstated European political risk really is. In the Netherlands, Mark Rutte’s center-right party is expected to remain in power in March elections based on opinion polling, despite serious corruption scandals and COVID blowback. In Germany, Angela Merkel’s center-right party is also favored, and yet an upset would energize financial markets because it would result in a more fiscally accommodative and pro-EU policy (Chart 13). The takeaway is that there is limit to how far emerging European countries can outperform developed Europe, given the immediate geopolitical risk emanating from Russia that can spill over into eastern Europe (Chart 14). Developed European stocks are at peak levels, comparable to the period of Ukraine’s election, but Ukraine is about to heat up again as a battleground between Russia and the West, as will other peripheral states. Chart 14Favor DM Europe Over EM Europe Chart 15GBP: Watch For Scottish Risk Revival In May Finally, in the UK, the pound continues to surge in the wake of the settlement of a post-Brexit trade deal, notwithstanding lingering disagreements over vaccines, financial services, and other technicalities. British equities are a value play that can make up lost ground from the tumultuous Brexit years. There is potentially one more episode of instability, however, arising from the unfinished business in Scotland, where the Scottish National Party wants to convert any victory in parliamentary elections in May into a second push for a referendum on national independence. At the moment public opinion polls suggest that Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s achievement of an EU trade deal has taken the wind out of the sails of the independence movement but only the election will tell whether this political risk will continue to fall in the near term (Chart 15). Hence the pound’s rally could be curtailed in the near term but unless Scottish opinion changes direction the pound and UK domestic-oriented stocks will perform well. Short EM Strongmen Throughout the emerging world the rise of the “Misery Index” – unemployment combined with inflation – poses a persistent danger of social and political instability that will rise, not fall, in the coming years. The aftermath of the COVID crisis will be rocky once stimulus measures wane. South Africa, Turkey, and Brazil look the worst on these measures but India and Russia are also vulnerable (Chart 16). Brazilian geopolitical risk under the turbulent administration of President Jair Bolsonaro has returned to the 2015-16 peaks witnessed during the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff amid the harsh recession of the middle of the last decade. Brazilian equities are nearing a triple bottom, which could present a buying opportunity but not before the current political crisis over fiscal policy exacts a toll on the currency and stock market (Chart 17). Chart 16EM Political Risk Will Bring Bad Surprises Chart 17Brazil Risk Hits Impeachment Peaks On Bolso Fiscal Populism Bolsonaro’s signature pension reform was an unpopular measure whose benefits were devastated by the pandemic. The return to fiscal largesse in the face of the crisis boosted Bolsonaro’s support and convinced him to abandon the pretense of austere reformer in favor of traditional Brazilian fiscal populist as the 2022 election approaches. His attempt to violate the country’s fiscal rule – a constitutional provision passed in December 2016 that imposes a 20-year cap on public spending growth – that limits budget deficits is precipitating a shakeup within the ruling coalition. Our Emerging Market Strategists believe the Central Bank of Brazil will hike interest rates to offset the inflationary impact of breaking the fiscal cap but that the hikes will likely fall short, prompting a bond selloff and renewed fears of a public debt crisis. The country’s political crisis will escalate in the lead up to elections, not unlike what occurred in the US, raising the odds of other negative political surprises. Chart 18Reinitiate Long Mexico / Short Brazil While Latin America as a whole is a shambles, the global cyclical upturn and shift in American policy creates investment opportunities – particularly for Mexico, at least within the region. Investors should continue to prefer Mexican equities over Brazilian given Mexico’s fundamentally more stable economic policy backdrop and its proximity to the American economy, which will be supercharged with stimulus and eager to find ways to use its new trade deal with Mexico to diversify its manufacturing suppliers away from China (Chart 18). In addition to Brazil, Turkey and the Philippines are also markets where “strongman leaders” and populism have undercut economic orthodoxy and currency stability. A basket of emerging market currencies that excludes these three witnessed a major bottom in 2014-16, when Turkish and Brazilian political instability erupted and when President Rodrigo Duterte stormed the stage in the Philippines. These three currencies look to continue underperforming given that political dynamics will worsen ahead of elections in 2022 (possibly 2023 for Turkey) (Chart 19). Chart 19Keep Shorting The Strongmen Investment Takeaways We closed out some “risk-on” trades at the end of January – admittedly too soon – and since then have hedged our pro-cyclical strategic portfolio with safe-haven assets, while continuing to add risk-on trades where appropriate. The Biden administration still faces one or more major foreign policy tests that can prove disruptive, particularly to Taiwanese, Chinese, Russian, and Saudi stocks. Biden’s foreign policy doctrine will be established in the crucible of experience but his preferences are known to favor diplomacy, democracy over autocracy, and to pursue alliances as a means of diversifying supply chains away from China. We will therefore look favorably upon the members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and recommend investors reinitiate the long CPTPP equities basket. These countries, which include emerging markets with decent governance as well as Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada all stand to benefit from the global upswing and US foreign policy (Chart 20). Chart 20Reinitiate Long Trans-Pacific Partnership Chart 21Reinitiate Long Global Value Over Growth The Biden administration will likely try to rejoin the CPTPP but even if it fails to do so it will privilege relations with these countries as it strives to counter China and Russia. The UK, South Korea, Thailand and others could join the CPTPP over time – though an attempt to recruit Taiwan would exacerbate the geopolitical risks highlighted above centered on Taiwan. The dollar is perking up, adding a near-term headwind to global equities, but the cyclical trend for the dollar is still down due to extreme monetary and fiscal dovishness. Tactically, go long Mexican equities over Brazilian equities. From a strategic point of view we still favor value stocks over growth stocks and recommend investors reinitiate this global trade (Chart 21). Strategically, wait to overweight UK stocks in a global portfolio until the result of the May local elections is known and the risk of Scottish independence can be reassessed. Strategically, favor developed Europe over emerging Europe stocks as a result of Russian geopolitical risks that are set to escalate. Strategically go long global defense stocks versus cyber security stocks as a geopolitical “back to work” trade for a time when economic activity resumes and resource-oriented territorial, kinetic, military risks reawaken. Strategically, favor EM currencies other than Brazil, Turkey, and the Philippines to minimize exposure to economic populism, poor macro fundamentals, and election risk. Strategically, go long the BCA Rare Earths Basket to capture persistent US-China tensions under Biden and the search for alternatives to China.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   We Read (And Liked) … Supply-Side Structural Reform Supply-Side Structural Reform, a compilation of Chinese economic and policy research, discusses several aspects of Chinese economic reform as it is practiced under the Xi Jinping administration, spanning the meaning and importance of supply-side structural reform in China as well as five major tasks.1 The book consists of contributions by Chinese scholars, financial analysts, and opinion makers in 2015, so we have learned a lot since it was published, even as it sheds light on Beijing’s interpretation of reform. 2015 was a year of financial turmoil that saw a dramatic setback for China’s 2013 liberal reform blueprint. It also saw the launch of a new round of reforms under the thirteenth Five Year Plan (2016-20), which aimed to push China further down the transition from export-manufacturing to domestic and consumer-led growth. Beijing’s renewed reform push in 2017, which included a now infamous “deleveraging campaign,” ultimately led to a global slowdown in 2018-19 that was fatefully exacerbated by the trade war with the United States – only to be eclipsed by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Built on fundamental economic theory and the social background of China, the book’s authors examine the impact of supply-side reform on the Chinese financial sector, industrial sector, and macroeconomic development. The comprehensive analysis covers short-term, mid-term and long-term effects. From the perspective of economic theory, there is consensus that China's supply-side structural reform framework did not forsake government support for the demand side of the economy, nor was it synonymous with traditional, liberal supply-side economics in the Western world. In contrast to Say’s Law, Reaganomics, and the UK’s Thatcherite privatization reforms, China's supply-side reform was concentrated on five tasks specific to its contemporary situation: cutting excessive industrial capacity, de-stocking, deleveraging, cutting corporate costs, and improving various structural “weaknesses.” The motives behind the new framework were to enhance the mobility and efficiency of productive factors, eliminate excess capacity, and balance effective supply with effective demand. Basically, if China cannot improve efficiencies, capital will be misallocated, corporations will operate at a loss, and the economy’s potential will worsen over the long run. The debt buildup will accelerate and productivity will suffer. Regarding implementation, the book sets forth several related policies, including deepening the reform of land use and the household registration (hukou) system, and accelerating urbanization, which are effective measures to increase the liquidity of productive factors. Others promote the transformation from a factor-driven economy to efficiency and innovation-driven economy, including improving the property rights system, transferring corporate and local government debt to the central government, and encouraging investment in human capital and in technological innovation. The book also analyzes and predicts the potential costs of reform on the economy in the short and long term. In the short run, authors generally anticipated that deleveraging and cutting excessive industrial capacity would put more pressure on the government’s fiscal budget. The rise in the unemployment rate, cases of bankruptcy, and the negative sentiment of investors would slow China’s economic growth. In the medium and long run, this structural reform was seen as necessary for a sustainable medium-speed economic growth, leading to more positive expectations for households and corporates. The improved efficiency in capital allocation would provide investors with more confidence in the Chinese economy and asset market. Authors argued that overall credit risk was still controllable in near-term, as the corresponding policies such as tax reduction and urbanization would boost private investment and consumption in the short run. These policies increased demand in the labor market and created working positions to counteract adverse impacts. Employment in industries where excessive capacity was most severe only accounted for about 3% of total urban employment in 2013. Regarding the rise in credit risk during de-capacity, the asset quality of banks had improved since the 1990s and the level of bad debt was said to be within a controllable range, given government support. Moreover, in the long run, the merger and reorganization of enterprises would increase the efficient supply and have a positive effect on economic innovation-driven transformation. We know from experience that much of the optimism about reform would confront harsh realities in the 2016-21 period. The reforms proceeded in a halting fashion as the US trade war interrupted their implementation, prompting the government to resort to traditional stimulus measures in mid-2018, only to be followed by another massive fiscal-and-credit splurge in 2020 in the face of the pandemic. Yet investors could be surprised to find that the Politburo meeting on April 17, 2020 proclaimed that China would continue to focus on supply-side structural reform even amid efforts to normalize the economy and maintain epidemic prevention and control. Leaders also pledged to maintain the supply-side reform while emphasizing demand-side management during annual Central Economic Work Conference in December 2020. In other words, Xi administration’s policy preferences remain set, and compromises forced by exogenous events will soon give way to renewed reform initiatives. This is a risk to the global reflation trade in 2021-22. There has not been a total abandonment of supply-side reform. The main idea of demand-side reform – shifts in the way China’s government stimulates the economy – is to fully tap the potential of the domestic market and call for an expansion of consumption and effective investment. Combined with the new concept of “dual circulation,” which emphasizes domestic production and supply chains (effectively import substitution), the current demand-side reforms fall in line with the supply-side goal of building a more independent and controllable supply chain and produce higher technology products. These combined efforts will provide “New China” sectors with more policy support, less regulatory constraint, and lead to better economic and financial market performance. Despite the fluctuations in domestic growth and the pressure from external demand, China will maintain the focus on reform in its long-term planning. The fundamental motivation is to enhance efficiency and innovation that is essential for China’s productivity and competitiveness in the future. Thus, investors should not become complacent over the vast wave of fiscal and credit stimulus that is peaking today as we go to press. Instead they should recognize that China’s leaders are committed to restructuring. This means that the economic upside of stimulus has a cap on it– a cap that will eventually be put in place by policymakers, if not by China’s lower capacity for debt itself. It would be a colossal policy mistake for China to overtighten monetary and fiscal policy in 2021 but any government attempts to tighten, the financial market will become vulnerable. A final thought: it is unclear whether there is potential for an improvement in China’s foreign relations contained in this conclusion. What the western world is demanding is for China to rebalance its economy, open up its markets, cut back on the pace of technological acquisition, reduce government subsidies for state-owned companies, and conform better to US and EU trade rules. There is zero chance that China will provide all of these things. But its own reform program calls for greater intellectual property protections, greater competition in non-strategic sectors (which the US and EU should be able to access under recent trade deals), and targeted stimulus for sustainable energy, where the US and EU see trade and investment opportunities. Thus there is a basis for an improvement in cooperation. What remains to be seen is how protectionist dual circulation will be in practice and how aggressively the US will pursue international enforcement of technological restrictions on China under the Biden administration. Jingnan Liu Research Associate JingnanL@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Yifu L, et al. Supply-Side Structural Reform (Beijing: Democracy & Construction Publishing House, 2016). 351 pages. Appendix: GeoRisk Indicator China Russia UK Germany France Italy Canada Spain Taiwan Korea Turkey Brazil Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Upgrade Alert Small cap indexes regained their footing late last year and recovered two years of losses relative to the SPX in a mere quarter. During that uprising in mid-January we monetized sizable gains both on a cyclical and tactical (high-conviction) time horizon, and subsequently added the small cap bias back to our upgrade watch list. Following a drubbing in absolute and relative valuations, small caps have regained their luster and are now trading at a near 15% premium on a 10-year Cyclically Adjusted P/E (CAPE) basis. Given BCA’s view that the sell-off in the bond market has staying power, we are monitoring this ratio closely for a better entry point.  Bottom Line: Small cap stock indexes remain on our upgrade alert list, awaiting a more compelling level to re-establish a small cap size portfolio bias.