Equities

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Firming leading rail freight indicators signal that intermodal, coal and commodity (ex-coal) carloads are in high demand. Tack on the global economic reopening in the back half of the year and rising commodity prices, and factors are falling into place for a durable outperformance phase in rails. Boost exposure in the S&P rails index to overweight. Recovering lodging demand coupled with restrained industry capacity should restore hoteliers’ pricing power and boost profitability. The S&P hotels, resorts and cruises index remains a high-conviction overweight. Recent Changes Boost the S&P railroads index to overweight, today. On March 9, our 5% rolling stop on the S&P autos & components index was triggered and we lifted exposure to neutral that netted our portfolio 29% in relative gains since the January 25, 2021 inception. This move also augmented the S&P consumer discretionary sector back to a benchmark allocation resulting in a 7.5% gain.  Table 1 Feature While President Biden signed a new $1.9tn fiscal package into law last week, valid concerns surrounding the path of the 10-year US Treasury yield added choppiness to the stock market’s consolidation phase (Chart 1). Junk bond spreads stayed calm despite the ongoing Treasury bond market selloff and related MOVE index (bond market volatility) jump and remain a key indicator to monitor in order to gauge if a garden variety equity market pullback can morph into something more significant. Recent empirical evidence suggests that the deviation between the MOVE index and junk spreads will likely return to equilibrium via a settling down of the former, as occurred in the May 2013 taper tantrum episode (Chart 2). Chart 1Choppiness Galore Chart 2A Taper Tantrum Repeat? Importantly, delving deeper in the relationship between bonds and stocks and putting it in historical context is instructive. Our sister Emerging Markets Strategy service recently posited that in the coming years the current negative correlation between stock and bond prices will revert to positive as it prevailed prior to the Asian Crisis (Chart 3). The post-1997 era is largely characterized as disinflationary, while the period from the 1960s to the mid-1990s as primarily inflationary. As a reminder core PCE price inflation was last above the Fed’s 2.5% target in the early 1990s (please see grey zone, top panel, Chart 3). Chart 3From Inflation To Disinflation And Back To Inflation? Importantly, what will cement the correlation between stock prices and bond prices becoming definitively positive anew will be a shift upward of core PCE price inflation. Chart 4 shows that core PCE inflation leads the stock-to-bond correlation by 45 months and can serve as a confirming signpost that bonds will no longer offer downward protection to stocks and likely render risk parity useless. Chart 4Joined At The Hip, Albeit With A Lag If this paradigm shift is indeed taking root, this raises two questions: First, how will the broad equity market perform during a more persistent bond market selloff phase? Second, what equity sectors will likely outperform under such a scenario and which ones should equity investors avoid/underweight in their portfolios? Our analysis centered on historically significant bond market selloffs, which we clearly depict in the shaded areas in Chart 5. Chart 5Don’t Fear The Bond Bear Table 2 shows the results of our analysis broken down in two separate eras. Between the 1960s and the early-1990s, “the inflation era”, we use monthly data, whereas from the early-1990s onward, “the disinflation era”, we use high quality daily data. In the seven inflationary iterations the SPX median fall was 3%,1 whereas in the nine disinflationary episodes the SPX median rise was 18%.2 Impressively, since the LTCM debacle every single bond market selloff has been cheered by the stock market (Table 2). Table 2SPX Returns During Bond Bear Markets Table 3 delves deeper into GICS1 sectors and compares relative returns to the SPX during sizable bond market selloffs. Table 3US Equity Sector Returns During Bond Bear Markets During “the inflationary era” deep cyclicals outperformed the broad market, whereas early cyclicals trailed the SPX. The defensives’ performance is split down the middle with telecom and utilities faring poorly, while health care and staples outshining the SPX. One surprising result is that during “the inflationary era” relative tech performance was very resilient compared with what one would expect. There is an accentuation of relative returns in “the disinflationary era”, with all the defensives significantly underperforming and the deep cyclicals broadly outshining the SPX. Early cyclicals make a U-turn and are clear outperformers. One surprising result is the energy sector’s negative median return. Finally, the real estate sector’s significant underperformance really stands out in “the disinflationary era”. Netting it all out, the broad equity market has historically risen consistently in tandem with a bond market sell off primarily in “the disinflationary era”. Impressively, the SPX has been resilient on average even in “the inflationary era”; granted there have also been some notable drawdowns (Table 2). The implication is that at the current juncture the SPX may have some trouble digesting the bond market’s rapid selloff, but will recover smartly especially as the bond market selloff eventually proves more reflective of growth rather than restrictive. (For inclusion purposes, the appendix on page 16 shows the GICS1 sector performance since the 1960s with shaded areas depicting periods of significant bond market selloffs, and similar to Chart 3 the appendix on page 19 plots the relative share price monthly returns correlation to bond price monthly returns.) This week, we update our high-conviction overweight view on an early-cyclical sub-group with a reopening tailwind, and lift a deep cyclical transportation index to an above benchmark allocation. Hop Back On The Rails The Dow Theory is in full force and serves as a confirmation of the breakout in the Dow Industrials recently, as transports have been firing on all cylinders of late, and is also a harbinger of new all-time relative share price highs in railroads (Chart 6). Today we recommend investors get back on board the rails, a key transportation sub group, and lift exposure from neutral to overweight. Chart 6Dow Theory Green Light Leading indicators in all three key rail freight categories suggests that the railroad rebound is still in the early innings. The V-shaped recovery in the ISM manufacturing and services surveys is underpinning total rail shipments and signals that our rail diffusion indicator has more upside (Chart 7). Chart 7All Aboard… The Cass Freight Index shipments and expenditures components are also on a tear and corroborate that demand for rail freight services is robust. The upshot is that still beaten down sell-side analysts’ relative revenue growth estimates will likely surprise to the upside (Chart 8). Importantly, our Railroad Indicator does an excellent job in capturing this firming rail demand backdrop and signals that relative share price momentum has more room to rise (second panel, Chart 9). Chart 8...The Rails Chart 9Intermodal Is On Fire On the intermodal front, the back half of the year economic reopening due to the population’s inoculation along with President Biden's freshly signed fiscal spending bill suggest that retail related hauling services will pick up steam. The overall business sales-to-inventories (S/I) ratio in general and the retail S/I ratio in particular corroborate the upbeat demand outlook for intermodal carloads (third panel, Chart 9). Similarly, the LA port is as busy as ever as containerships are arriving non-stop full of cargo from China (bottom panel, Chart 9). On the commodity front, coal shipments are staging a comeback from extremely depressed levels and there is scope for a jump to expansionary territory especially given the soaring natural gas prices (second & middle panels, Chart 10). With regard to the broad commodity complex (excluding the historically large coal carload category) the demand profile for rail services is as upbeat as ever. Not only are commodity prices galloping higher, but also BCA’s Global Leading Economic Indicator is steeply accelerating painting a bright picture for rail hauling (fourth & bottom panels, Chart 10). Moreover, the surging global PMI signals that the global economic recovery is also on the ascent, which bodes well for relative profit growth (middle panel, Chart 11). Chart 10Commodity Carloads Set To Surge Chart 11Global Recovery Is A Tailwind Importantly, on the operating front our railroad industry profit margin proxy is at an historically wide level and underscores that the path of least resistance is higher for margins (Chart 11). Thus, rail profits are highly levered to industry pricing power that is on the cusp of spiking higher, especially if our thesis of the firming rail demand backdrop is accurate. The implication is that a rerating phase is in the cards for the S&P railroads index (middle panel, Chart 12). Finally, our EPS macro model has slingshot higher and suggests that rail earnings have a long runway ahead (bottom panel, Chart 12). Netting it all out, firming leading rail freight indicators signal that intermodal, coal and commodity (ex-coal) carloads are in high demand. Tack on the global economic reopening and rising commodity prices, and factors are falling into place for a durable outperformance phase in rails. Bottom Line: Boost the S&P rails index to overweight, today. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5RAIL – CSX, KSU, NSC, UNP. Chart 12Pricing Power Holds The Key   Stay Checked In To Hotels In late-November we boosted the S&P hotels, resorts & cruises index to overweight and got some eyebrows raised from our diverse client base. Subsequently, we added this niche consumer discretionary sub-group to our high-conviction overweight list for 2021 and the client pushback intensified. Today, we reiterate our high-conviction call on the S&P hotels, resorts & cruises index that has already added alpha to our portfolio to the tune of 17% since inception. While relative share price momentum has climbed of late and relative valuations have troughed, our sense is that the re-rating phase is just getting under way (Chart 13). As the global push for COVID-19 vaccinations heats up, the semblance of normality will serve as a catalyst to unlock excellent value in hotels.    True, lodging services demand is as downbeat as ever, but this index is a prime beneficiary of the reopening trade. Pent-up services demand will get unleashed with consumers likely indulging on more lavish vacationing starting this Memorial Day. Rising government transfers, a soaring savings rate and increasing incomes all augur well for lodging demand and is also corroborated by our hotels demand indicator (Chart 14). Tack on firming consumer sentiment and the ISM services index staying squarely above the 50 expansion line, and the industry’s demand outlook lifts further.   Chart 13A Valuation Re-rating Phase Looms Chart 14Leading Demand Indicators Give The All-clear Given that hotel capacity has been restrained, there are high odds that upbeat demand will likely catch hoteliers unprepared to fulfil it, and thus causing a jump in selling prices (Chart 15). Business travel is also slated to return as a flexible work place environment becomes the norm and the need to meet clients and prospects in order to conduct business will come back with a vengeance. The implication is that beaten down industry profit margins will recover smartly and boost lodging profitability especially given the collapse in the industry’s wage bill (Chart 15). Finally, our S&P hotels, resorts & cruises macro sales model encapsulates all these moving parts and signals that the budding recovery in revenue growth will gain momentum in the back half of the year (Chart 16). Chart 15Widening Margins Will Restore Profitability Chart 16Macro-based Revenue Growth Model Points To A V-shaped RecoveryAdding it all up, recovering lodging demand coupled with restrained industry capacity should restore hoteliers’ pricing power and boost profitability.   Bottom Line: We reiterate the high-conviction overweight status in the S&P hotels, resorts and cruises index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOTL – MAR, HLT, CCL, RCL, NCLH.   Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com   Appendix Chart A1 Chart A2 Chart A3 Chart A4 Chart A5 Chart A6     Footnotes 1     Given the different time frames of the bond market selloffs we decided to show annualized equity returns. 2     Ibid. Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations Size And Style Views February 24, 2021 Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives January 12, 2021  Stay neutral small over large caps June 11, 2018 Long the BCA Millennial basket  The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, ABNB, V). January 22, 2018 Favor value over growth

Special Report

Highlights We find that the factors that are most important in making allocation decisions will depend on whether diversification takes place across countries or across sectors. In line with the academic literature, we find that there are larger potential diversification benefits from diversifying across sectors than across countries. However, investors who choose to diversify across countries should not focus on sector composition since country effects are a larger driver of return for countries. Likewise, most sector performance is explained by sector effects and not country composition. Thus, investors who diversify across sectors should mainly base their decisions on sector dynamics. Sector composition is relatively more important in countries like Canada or Australia whose composition is substantially different from the global portfolio. Meanwhile, country composition is relatively more important in sectors like I.T. or Materials whose composition is substantially different from the global portfolio. Most of the country effects cannot be explained by currency movements. This means that country-specific factors will drive country performance even for investors who hedge their currency exposure. Feature Suppose you are building your global equity portfolio from scratch. You must decide how much to allocate to the US, the euro area, Japan, China, etc. Which factors do you prioritize to make your decision? Should you focus on the economic outlook for each country? Or should you instead focus on making sector calls, and base your country selection on sector composition? How much does currency exposure affect returns? What if you are not diversifying across countries but instead across sectors? In this report we attempt to answer these questions by quantitatively deconstructing the different drivers of global equity performance. Specifically, we calculate the “pure” country and “pure” sector effects in a global portfolio – i.e., the variation of returns purely attributable to countries and the variation of returns purely attributable to sectors. We then use the insight of our analysis to investigate the following three questions: How does sector composition contribute to country relative performance? How does country composition contribute to sector relative performance? How much of the country effect is currency exposure? The report is structured as follows: We start with our Methodology section which explains the data used, our estimation method, as well as an explanation on how to interpret our estimates and a discussion on the limitations of our analysis. In the next section we show our Estimation Results of country and sector effects in the global portfolio. We then use these results to answer the Three Questions on Global Equity Allocation we mentioned above. We summarize our conclusions in our Investment Implications section. Finally, please see the Appendix for supplementary material. In addition, we will be releasing another report over the next few weeks taking this same approach but looking at an Emerging Markets portfolio instead of a global portfolio. Methodology Data We begin by obtaining total return indices from MSCI for 10 sectors in 10 different geographical areas. Our indices are USD- denominated and are evaluated from the perspective of a USD-based investor. We define our sample period from August 2000 to January 2021. We then exclude the indices which do not have enough history or where trading has halted. This leaves us with 94 different sector indices that we use for our estimation. Table 1 shows which sectors we can use for each geographical area. We also exclude the real estate sector from our calculations as it does not have enough back data. Table 1Sample Of Indices For Country And Sector Effect Estimation Estimation To estimate sector and country effects, we follow the Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regression approach of Phyltaktis & Xia & Heston & Rouwenhorts.1 The return of a sector index in a country can be decomposed into four components: A common return for equities (α), a country effect (β), a sector effect (γ), and an error term (ε) . For example, the return of Canada’s information technology (I.T.) sector can be decomposed into a common return for equities, a country effect for Canada, a sector effect for I.T., and an error term:   We can generalize this model by defining a dummy Ci that equals to 1 if the index belongs to Country i, and 0 otherwise, and a dummy Sjthat equals to 1 if the index belongs to sector j and 0 otherwise:       We use the above framework to estimate the individual effects. We calculate the different country (β) and sector (γ) effects using a Weighted Least Squares regression – using the market cap weight of each index in the global portfolio as a weight when minimizing the errors. Each time we perform the regression, we obtain the country and sector effects for a single month. Thus, we repeat our WLS regression for every month where we have data, to obtain time series of country and sector effects. Constraints Because every index belongs to exactly one sector and one country, we have a perfect multicollinearity problem. To solve this issue, we set the following restrictions:   Where wi represents the weight of country i at time t - 1 in the global stock market and vj represents the weight of sector j at time t - 1 in the global stock market. In essence, this adjustment means that on a market-cap weighted basis, all country effects net out to zero in the global portfolio (and the same for all sector effects). Interpretation Chart 1Interpretation And Limitations Of Our Analysis How should one interpret the different coefficients? By construction, the common return to equities (α) ends up being equal to the return of the benchmark – i.e., the market-weighted global portfolio (Chart 1, panel 1). The pure country effects (β) can be interpreted as the return from a country relative to the benchmark once we have neutralized the effect of sector composition. The pure sector effects (γ) can be interpreted as the return from a sector relative to the benchmark once we have neutralized the effect of country composition.   Limitations Our approach has the following limitations: It assumes that all indices have an equal exposure to the common return of equities. It assumes homogenous sectors across countries. We know this is not the case: The industry composition of sectors is different across countries. For example, the tech sector in the US has a much higher weighting to the Hardware & Equipment industry than the tech sector in the euro area, which has a relatively higher weighting in the Semiconductor industry (Chart 1, panels 2 and 3). It rules out the existence of interaction effects between variables. While it is a well established fact that style exposure (i.e., momentum, value, etc) is a significant contributor to returns of equities,2 our analysis ignores these factors. Estimation Results Sector Effects We can breakup our sample into two periods: The first period starts from the beginning of our sample in 2000, to the end of the Global Financial Crisis in March 2009. Over this cycle, Materials, Energy and Consumer Staples had the best cumulative pure sector effect (Chart 2A). Meanwhile, I.T., Communication Services, and Financials had the worst effect. The second period starts in March 2009 and ends in the present. During this period, I.T. and Consumer Discretionary had the best cumulative pure sector effect, with Industrials a distant third (Chart 2B). On the other hand, the biggest losers were Communication Services,3 Utilities, and Energy. Chart 2APure Sector Effects (Sept 2009 – Mar 2009) Chart 2BPure Sector Effects (Mar 2009 – Jan 2021) Country Effects Once again we divide our sample intotwo periods. In the pre-GFC period the countries with the best pure country effect were China, Australia, and EM ex-China (Chart 3A). Meanwhile the UK, the US, and Japan had the worst effects. Post-GFC, the US, Sweden, and Australia had the most positive country effects, while the euro area, Emerging Markets ex-China, and Japan had the most negative ones (Chart 3B). Chart 3APure Country Effects (Sept 2000 – Mar 2009) Chart 3BPure Country Effects (Mar 2009 – Jan 2021)       Sector Vs. Country Effects Chart 4Country Versus Sector Effects Which effect accounts for a greater amount of variation? To answer this question, we look at the market-weighted volatility of sector effects and country effects in the global portfolio. Chart 4 shows our results. In line with the academic literature,4 we find that sector-specific variation was generally higher than country-level variation in the global portfolio over the past two decades. Why is this the case? Previous work on sector and country effects has suggested that greater financial market integration across countries has reduced the country-level variability relative to sector-level variability. Indeed, studies using data that extends prior to 2000 have found that country effects variability used to dominate up to the beginning of the 1990s.5 This implies that equity allocators obtain greater diversification benefits from diversifying across sectors versus diversifying across countries. Three Questions On Global Equity Allocation 1. How does sector composition contribute to country performance? Does the fact that sector effects are larger than country effects mean that one should pay more attention to sectors than to countries? Not quite. The magnitude of country or sector effects only tells you the magnitude of variation across each aspect – and hence the potential for diversification benefits. It does not tell you what drives performance once you have chosen a particular method of diversification. So which aspect should you care about the most if you are diversifying across countries? We can use our estimates of sector and country effects to assess how much of the performance of a country can be attributed to its pure country effect and how much can be attributed to its sector composition. To perform this attribution analysis, we rearrange our original formula. As an example, suppose we are trying to decompose the return of Canadian equities over the global benchmark. We use the following approach:   In other words, the return of Canadian equities over the benchmark is a function of three things: Pure Country Effect: The premium/discount from holding Canadian equities. Sector Composition Effect: The effect of the unique sector composition of the Canadian equity market. If the sector composition is identical to the global benchmark, then the effect of sector composition is equal to zero. Residual Effect: The performance that is not explained by either the country effect or the sector composition. This could be either estimation error, the effect of the missing the Real Estate sector, idiosyncratic company factors, or industry composition differences between the sectors of the country and those in the global benchmark. Table 2 decomposes the performance of various countries relative to the global benchmark into these three elements over different time frames (Sep 2000 - Mar 2009, Apr 2009 - Mar 2020, and Apr 2020 - Jan 2021). From these tables we can make the following observations: Table 2Decomposition Of Country Relative Returns Chart 5Pure Country And Sector Composition Effects In Country Relative Returns     The US outperformance during the 2010s was mostly a US-specific story and not a tech-overweight story. The benefits of sector composition only contributed 0.5% per month (annualized) versus 2.4% from the pure US effect. We can confirm this insight by looking at the performance of the individual US sectors against the performance of global sectors. Apart from Energy, every single US sector outperformed its global counterpart over this period (Chart 5, top panel). Japan had the most favorable sector composition during the 2010s, thanks to its large underweight in Energy and overweight in Consumer Discretionary and Industrials (Chart 5, middle panel). However, this was not enough to prevent Japanese equities from underperforming the global benchmark, as the Japanese pure country effect subtracted almost 5% of returns per month on an annualized basis. For some countries like Canada and Australia, the effect of sectors composition was relatively more significant. Generally, these countries had a sector composition that was very different from the global benchmark (Chart 5, bottom panel).6   2. How does country composition contribute to sector performance? What about if you choose to diversify across sectors? Much like country indices are influenced by their sector composition, sector indices are also influenced by their country composition. But how much does country composition affect performance? We can use a similar framework to the one applied in our previous question. Suppose we are trying to decompose the return of global Energy equities over the global benchmark. We use the following approach:       In other words, the return of global Energy equities over the benchmark is a function of three things: Pure Sector Effect: The premium/discount from holding equities in the Energy sector. Country Composition Effect: The effect of the unique country composition of the Energy sector. If the country composition is identical to the global benchmark, then the effect of country composition is equal to zero. Residual Effect: The performance that is not explained by either the country effect or the sector composition. This could be either estimation error, the effect of missing countries, or idiosyncratic company factors. Table 3 decomposes the performance of various sectors relative to the benchmark. From these tables we can make the following observations: Table 3Decomposition Of Sector Relative Returns Chart 6Pure Sector And Country Composition Effects In Sector Relative Returns The outperformance of the Health Care sector during the 2010s was mostly a US story. The large overweight to the US gave this sector the most favorable composition during the 2010s. We can confirm this by looking at the performance of global ex-US Health Care stocks, which underperformed by 20% since the end of the Great Financial Crisis (Chart 6, top panel). However, country composition was generally small in its overall effect to sector performance. Much as it was the case for countries, sectors like Health Care or Materials whose country composition was very different from the global portfolio tended to be more influenced by country composition (Chart 6, bottom panel).7 3. How much of the country effect is currency exposure? One explanation as to what might drive country effects is simply foreign-currency variation. For example, in a USD-based portfolio, all UK equities will be influenced by movements of GBP/USD. But exactly how much does currency exposure influence country-specific variation? Determining this is critical for equity allocators since currency exposure can be hedged through currency futures. We attempt to answer this question using a regression approach.8 Since currencies are expressed in relative terms, we look at the pure country effect of each region relative to the US: i.e., the outperformance/underperformance of countries relative to the US that is purely a function of country effects. After, we then regress these relative country effects versus the corresponding currency (for example we regress the relative country effect of the UK to the US with GBP/USD). From the regression we can obtain the coefficient of variation, which is the percentage of country effect variance explained by the currency. Chart 7 shows the results for each country. From this chart we can make the following observations: Currency effects were generally stronger in more cyclical markets. Meanwhile, currency effects explained almost none of the country-specific returns of Japanese or Chinese equities.9 In line with the academic literature, we find that most of the country-specific variation is not attributable to currency movements. This means that country-specific effect will still be a major driver of returns even for investors who hedge their currency exposure. If currencies can’t explain the bulk of country-specific variation, then what does? While the answer to this question is outside of the scope of this report, our hypothesis is that the answer lies in a combination of macroeconomic, political, and sentiment factors that are particular to each country. Thus, there is great value in country-specific analysis when allocating across the equity markets of different countries. Chart 7Currency Exposure Explains At Most A Third Of The Country Effect Investment Implications In line with the academic literature, in this report we found that sector effects tend to be larger than country effects in the global portfolio. This means that there are larger diversification benefits from diversifying across sectors than across countries. However, for various reasons such as benchmarking constraints or index availability, we recognize that it is not always possible to choose how to diversify your equity portfolio. In this case, it is important to determine what drives performance when each method of diversification is used. We find that the main driver of outperformance or underperformance will depend on the choice of diversification. Country performance is mostly driven by country specific factors. Thus, making country allocation decisions based mainly on sector preferences will lead to the wrong conclusions. Instead, investors who diversify across countries should focus first and foremost on country-level analysis. Likewise, sector outperformance is mostly driven by sector-specific factors, which means that investors diversifying across sectors should focus mostly on sector-level analysis. This does not mean that composition is completely irrelevant. In countries like Canada, Switzerland, and Australia, whose sector weights are considerably different from the global benchmark, sector composition can have a substantial effect on relative performance. On the other hand, sectors like I.T. and Materials will also be influenced by their country weightings. Finally, we found that currency exposure can at most explain about one third of country-specific variation. This means that for investors who diversify across countries, country-specific factors will still be the biggest drivers of returns even if they hedge their currency.   Appendix Appendix Chart 1 (I)Pure Country And Sector Composition Effects For Country Indices Appendix Chart 1 (II)Pure Country And Sector Composition Effects For Country Indices   Appendix Chart 2 (I)Pure Sector And Country Composition Effects For Global Sector Indices Appendix Chart 2 (II)Pure Sector And Country Composition Effects For Global Sector Indices     Juan Correa Ossa, CFA Associate Editor juanc@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 For more details please see Kate Phylaktis & Lichuan Xia, “The Changing Role of Industry and Country Effects in the Global Equity Market,” The European Journal of Finance, 2-8, 627-648, 2006, and Steven L. Heston and K. Geert Rouwenhorst, “Does Industrial Structure Explain the Benefits of International Diversification?,” Journal of Financial Economics, 36-, 3-27, 1994. 2 Please see Geert Bekaert, Robert J Hodrick, and Xioyan Zhang, “International Stock Return Comovements,” The Journal of Finance, 64-6, 259-2626, 2009. 3 Be advised that the Communication Services sector substantially changed its industry composition in late 2018. This is not necessarily a problem since our regression is cross-sectional and not across time. However, it is notable that the pure sector effect of the Communication Services sector started to trend up following the change. 4 Please see “Country and Industrial Effects In Global Equity Returns,” Norges Bank Discission Note, 2019. 5 Please see “Country and Industrial Effects In Global Equity Returns,” Norges Bank Discission Note, 2019. 6 Please see the Appendix for more details on how sector composition influenced relative country performance. 7 Please see the Appendix for more details on how country composition influenced relative sector performance. 8 This approach is based on the methodology of Heston and Rouwenhorts. For details, please see Steven L. Heston and K. Geert Rouwenhorst, “Does Industrial Structure Explain the Benefits of International Diversification?,” Journal of Financial Economics, 36-1, 3-27, 1994. 9 Up until 2017, all stocks in the MSCI China investable index used to be HKD-denominated or USD-denominated. Since HKD volatility is very low it makes sense that currency effects are relatively low over our whole sample. However, Since 2017, MSCI has began to include A-shares (CNY denominated), which means that our analysis might not be representative of the current state of the index.

Today we take a deep dive into the S&P 500’s seasonality patterns. While over the last two decades Q1 has been the weakest quarter for stocks, on average, with March registering the steepest losses, using reconstructed S&P 500 daily data since 1928 tells a slightly different story. Interestingly, the market is fairly consistent with the upward sloping, albeit volatile, Q1 long-term seasonal trend. Historically, the weakest months are May, September and October the latter which eventually culminates into the “Santa rally”. Given that Q1 choppiness is 3/4 of the way done, Q2 should prove a lower vol quarter before investors have to contend with the seasonally weak months of September and October. Bottom Line: We reiterate our cyclically constructive broad equity market view.

Weekly Performance Update For the week ending Thu Mar 11, 2021 The Market Monitor displays the trailing 1-quarter performance of strategies based around the BCA Score. For each region, we construct an equal-weighted, monthly rebalanced portfolio consisting of the top 3 stocks per sector and compare it with the regional benchmark. For each portfolio, we show the weekly performance of individual holdings in the Top Contributors/Detractors table. In addition, the Top Prospects table shows the holdings that currently have the highest BCA Score within the portfolio. For more details, click the region headers below to be redirected to the full historical backtest for the strategy. BCA US Portfolio Total Weekly Return BCA US Portfolio S&P500 TRI 6.05% 4.56% Top Contributors   QFIN:US TTEC:US EVR:US LPX:US TX:US Weekly Return 105 bps 41 bps 38 bps 37 bps 37 bps Top Detractors   TTWO:US AM:US WES:US VICI:US CL:US Weekly Return -6 bps -2 bps -2 bps -1 bps 3 bps Top Prospects   TX:US SCCO:US UHAL:US QFIN:US LPX:US BCA Score 99.56% 96.29% 95.40% 93.79% 91.25% BCA Canada Portfolio Total Weekly Return BCA Canada Portfolio S&P/TSX TRI 6.05% 4.02% Top Contributors   LNR:CA APHA:CA CS:CA ENGH:CA VII:CA Weekly Return 80 bps 50 bps 39 bps 35 bps 35 bps Top Detractors   NXE:CA MIC:CA SOY:CA CCA:CA MRU:CA Weekly Return -3 bps 1 bps 4 bps 5 bps 7 bps Top Prospects   LNF:CA IFP:CA CFP:CA FTT:CA MIC:CA BCA Score 99.49% 99.43% 98.90% 89.34% 86.41% BCA UK Portfolio Total Weekly Return BCA UK Portfolio FTSE 100 TRI 1.23% 1.45% Top Contributors   TRMR:GB AO.:GB FDEV:GB CVSG:GB WOSG:GB Weekly Return 36 bps 26 bps 25 bps 22 bps 19 bps Top Detractors   CNE:GB DGOC:GB MXCT:GB LNTA:GB NLMK:GB Weekly Return -37 bps -21 bps -16 bps -14 bps -9 bps Top Prospects   NLMK:GB SVST:GB PLUS:GB GLTR:GB MNOD:GB BCA Score 99.75% 99.24% 97.88% 97.62% 96.93% BCA Eurozone Portfolio Total Weekly Return BCA EMU Portfolio MSCI EMU TRI 2.31% 3.32% Top Contributors   DLG:IT SAA1V:FI KESKOB:FI GCO:ES ABIO:FR Weekly Return 40 bps 22 bps 20 bps 19 bps 19 bps Top Detractors   WEG1:DE PHH2:DE QTCOM:FI FLUX:BE PMAG:AT Weekly Return -20 bps -11 bps -8 bps -6 bps -5 bps Top Prospects   SOL:IT FSKRS:FI LOG:ES RWAY:IT IPS:FR BCA Score 98.26% 97.91% 97.72% 96.18% 96.16% BCA Japan Portfolio Total Weekly Return BCA Japan Portfolio TOPIX TRI 4.43% 2.13% Top Contributors   8336:JP 8174:JP 6448:JP 7943:JP 9401:JP Weekly Return 32 bps 30 bps 30 bps 29 bps 28 bps Top Detractors   4966:JP 8739:JP 8979:JP 8595:JP 4694:JP Weekly Return -10 bps -8 bps -1 bps -1 bps -0 bps Top Prospects   4966:JP 8198:JP 8255:JP 8739:JP 3167:JP BCA Score 99.69% 99.29% 97.18% 96.36% 95.98% BCA Hong Kong Portfolio Total Weekly Return BCA Hong Kong Portfolio Hang Seng TRI -0.23% 0.81% Top Contributors   973:HK 182:HK 867:HK 1798:HK 6198:HK Weekly Return 17 bps 17 bps 17 bps 16 bps 14 bps Top Detractors   185:HK 1571:HK 579:HK 719:HK 2666:HK Weekly Return -21 bps -20 bps -17 bps -17 bps -14 bps Top Prospects   1378:HK 1830:HK 1571:HK 297:HK 1866:HK BCA Score 99.17% 99.13% 98.54% 98.41% 98.23% BCA Australia Portfolio Total Weekly Return BCA Australia Portfolio S&P/ASX All Ord. TRI 0.64% -0.62% Top Contributors   CXL:AU GRR:AU WPP:AU ADO:AU SDG:AU Weekly Return 27 bps 25 bps 13 bps 13 bps 12 bps Top Detractors   HT1:AU BFG:AU ADH:AU YAL:AU STX:AU Weekly Return -23 bps -13 bps -13 bps -11 bps -10 bps Top Prospects   GRR:AU BSE:AU BLX:AU BFG:AU PSQ:AU BCA Score 99.76% 99.68% 99.55% 99.26% 98.99%

Highlights The Biden administration’s early actions suggest it will be hawkish on China as expected – and the giant Microsoft hack merely confirms the difficulty of reducing strategic tensions. US-China talks are set to resume and piecemeal engagement is possible. However, most of the areas of engagement touted in the media are overrated. Competition will prevail over cooperation. Cybersecurity stocks have corrected, creating an entry point for investors seeking exposure to a secular theme of Great Power conflict in the cyber realm and beyond. Global defense stocks are even more attractive than cyberstocks as a “back to work” trade in the geopolitical context. Continue to build up safe-haven hedges as geopolitical risk remains structurally elevated and underrated by financial markets. Feature The Biden administration passed its first major law, the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan, on March 10. This gargantuan infusion of fiscal stimulus accounts for about 2% of global GDP and 9% of US GDP, a tailwind for risky assets when taken with a receding pandemic and normalizing global economy. The US dollar has perked up so far this year on the back of this extraordinary pump-priming and the rapid rollout of COVID-19 vaccines, which have lifted relative growth expectations with the rest of the world. Hence the dollar is rising for fundamentally positive reasons that will benefit global growth rather than choke it off. Our Foreign Exchange Strategist Chester Ntonifor argues that the dollar has 2-3% of additional upside before relapsing under the weight of rising global growth, inflation expectations, commodity prices, and relative equity flows into international markets. We agree with the dollar bear market thesis. But there are two geopolitical risks that investors must monitor: Cyclically, China’s combined monetary and fiscal stimulus is peaking, growth will decelerate, and the central government runs a non-negligible risk of overtightening policy. However, China’s National People’s Congress so far confirms our view that Beijing will not overtighten. Structurally, the US-China cold war is continuing apace under President Biden, as expected. The two sides are engaging in normal diplomacy as appropriate to a new US administration but the Microsoft Exchange hack (see below) underscores the trend of confrontation over cooperation. Chart 1Long JPY / Short KRW As Geopolitical Risk Is Underrated The second point reinforces the first since persistent US pressure on China will discourage it from excessive deleveraging at home. In a world where China is struggling to cap excessive leverage, the US is pursuing “extreme competition” with China (Biden’s words), and yet the US rule of law is intact, global investors will not abandon the US dollar in a general panic and loss of confidence. They will, however, continue to diversify away from the dollar on a cyclical basis given that global growth will accelerate while US policy will remain extremely accommodative. Reinforcing the point, geopolitical frictions are rising even outside the US-China conflict. A temporary drop in risk occurred in the New Year as a result of the rollout of vaccines, the defeat of President Trump, and the resolution of Brexit. But going forward, geopolitical risk will reaccelerate, with various implications that we highlight in this report. While we would not call an early end to the dollar bounce, we will keep in place our tactical long JPY-USD and long CHF-USD hedges. These currencies offer a good hedge in the context of a dollar bear market and structurally high geopolitical risk. If the dollar weakens anew on good news for global growth then the yen and franc will benefit on a relative basis as they are cheap, whereas if geopolitical risk explodes they will benefit as safe havens. We also recommend going long the Japanese yen relative to the South Korean won given the disparity in valuations highlighted by our Emerging Markets team, and the fact that geopolitical tensions center on the US and China (Chart 1). “Our Most Serious Competitor, China” Why are we so sure that geopolitical risk will remain structurally elevated and deliver negative surprises to ebullient equity markets? Our Geopolitical Power Index shows that China’s rise and Russia’s resurgence are disruptive to the US-led global order (Chart 2). If anything this process has accelerated over the COVID-19 crisis. China and Russia have authoritarian control over their societies and are implementing mercantilist and autarkic economic policies. They are carving out spheres of influence in their regions and using asymmetric warfare against the US and its allies. They have also created a de facto alliance in their shared interest in undermining the unity of the West. The US is meanwhile attempting to build an alliance of democracies against them, heightening their insecurities about America’s power and unpredictability (Chart 3). Chart 2Great Power Struggle Continues Massive fiscal and monetary stimulus is positive for economic growth and corporate earnings but it reduces the barriers to geopolitical conflict. Nations can pursue foreign and trade policies in their self-interest with less concern about the blowback from rivals if they are fueled up with artificially stimulated domestic demand. Chart 3Biden: ‘Our Most Serious Competitor, China’ Total trade between the US and China, at 3.2% and 4.7% of GDP respectively in 2018, was not enough to prevent trade war from erupting. Today the cost of trade frictions is even lower. The US has passed 25.4% of GDP in fiscal stimulus so far since January 1, 2020. China’s total fiscal-and-credit impulse has risen by 8.4% of GDP over the same time period. The Biden administration is co-opting Trump’s hawkish foreign and trade policy toward China, judging by its initial statements and actions (Appendix Table 1). Specifically, Biden has issued an executive order on securing domestic supply chains that demonstrates his commitment to the Trumpian goal of diversifying away from China and on-shoring production, or at least offshoring to allied nations. The Democratic Party is also unveiling bipartisan legislation in Congress that attempts to reduce reliance on China.1 These executive decrees are partly spurred on by the global shortage of semiconductors. China, the US, and the US’s allies are all attempting to build alternative semiconductor supply chains that bypass Taiwan, a critical bottleneck in the production of the most advanced computer chips. The Taiwanese say they will coordinate with “like-minded economies” to alleviate shortages, by which they mean fellow democracies. But this exposes Taiwan to greater geopolitical risk insofar as it excludes mainland China from supplies, either due to rationing or American export controls. The surge in semiconductor sales and share prices of semi companies (especially materials and equipment makers) will continue as countries will need a constant supply of ever more advanced chips to feed into the new innovation and technology race, the renewable energy race, and the buildout of 5G networks and beyond (Chart 4). It takes huge investments of time and capital to build alternative fabrication plants and supply lines yet governments are only beginning to put their muscle into it via stimulus packages and industrial policy. Chart 4Semiconductor Supply Shortage Supply shocks have geopolitical consequences. The oil shocks of the 1970s and early 1990s motivated the US to escalate its interventions and involvement in the Middle East. They also motivated the US to invest in stockpiles of critical goods and alternative sources of production so as to reduce dependency (Chart 5). Although semiconductors are not fungible like commodities, and the US has tremendous advantages in semiconductor design and production, nevertheless the bottleneck in Taiwan will take years to alleviate. Hence the US will become more active in supply security at home and more active in alliance-building in Asia Pacific to deter China from taking Taiwan by force or denying regional access to the US and its allies. China faces the same bottleneck, which threatens its technological advance, economic productivity, and ultimately its political stability and international defense. Chart 5ASupply Shortages Motivate Strategic Investments Chart 5BSupply Shortages Motivate Strategic Investments Semiconductor and semi equipment stock prices have gone vertical as highlighted above but one way to envision the surge in global growth and capex for chip makers is to compare these stocks relative to the shares of Big Tech companies in the communication service sector, i.e. those involved in social networking and entertainment, such as Twitter, Facebook, and Netflix. On a relative basis the semi stocks can outperform these interactive media firms which face a combination of negative shocks from rising interest rates, regulation, economic normalization, and ideologically fueled competition (Chart 6). Chart 6Long Chips Versus Big Tech What about the potential for the US and China to enhance cooperation in areas of shared interest? Generally the opportunity for re-engagement is overrated. The Biden administration says there will be engagement where possible. The first high-level talks will occur in Alaska on March 18-19 between Secretary of State Antony Blinken, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, Central Foreign Affairs Commissioner Yang Jiechi, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Presidents Biden and Xi Jinping may hold a bilateral summit sometime soon and the old strategic and economic dialogue may resume, enabling cabinet-level officials to explore a range of areas for cooperation independently of high-stakes strategic negotiations. However, a close look at the policy areas targeted for engagement reveals important limitations: Health: There is little room for concrete cooperation on the COVID-19 pandemic given that the pandemic is already receding, the Chinese have not satisfied American demands for data transparency, Chinese officials have fanned theories that the virus originated in the US, and the US is taking measures to move pharmaceutical and health equipment supply chains out of China. Trade: Trade is an area of potential cooperation given that the two countries will continue trading while their economies rebound. The Phase One trade deal remains in place. However, China only made structural concessions on agriculture in this deal so any additional structural changes will have to be the subject of extensive negotiations. Secretary of Treasury Janet Yellen says the US will use the “full array of tools” to ensure compliance and will punish China for abuses of the global trade system. Cybersecurity: On cybersecurity, China greeted the Biden administration by hacking the Microsoft Exchange email system, an even larger event than Russia’s SolarWinds hack last year. Both hacks highlight how cyberspace is a major arena of modern Great Power struggle, making it unlikely that there will be effective cooperation. The hack suggests Beijing remains more concerned about accessing technology while it can than reducing tensions. The Americans will make demands of China at the Alaska meetings. Environment: As for the environment, the US is a net oil exporter while China imports 73% of its oil, 42% of its natural gas and 7.8% of its coal consumption, with 40% and 10% of its oil and gas coming from the Middle East. The US wants to be at the cutting edge of renewable energy technology but it has nowhere near the impetus of China (or Europe), which are diversifying away from fossil fuels for the sake of national security. Moreover China will want its own companies, not American, to meet its renewable needs. This is true even if there is success in reducing barriers for green trade, since the whole point of diversifying from Middle Eastern oil supplies is strategic self-sufficiency. The Americans would have to accept less energy self-sufficiency and greater renewable dependence on China. Nuclear Proliferation: Cooperation can occur here as the Biden administration will seek to return to a deal with the Iranians restraining their nuclear ambitions while maintaining a diplomatic limiting North Korea’s nuclear weapons stockpile and ballistic missile development. China and Russia will accept the US rejoining the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal but they will require significant concessions if they are to join the US in forcing anything more substantial on the Iranians. China may enforce sanctions on North Korea but then it will expect concessions on trade and technology that the Biden administration will not want to give merely for the sake of North Korea. Bottom Line: The Biden administration’s China strategy is taking shape and it is hawkish as expected. It is not ultra-hawkish, however, as the key characteristic is that it is a defensive posture in the wake of the perceived failures of Trump’s strategy of “attack, attack, attack.” This means largely maintaining the leverage that Trump built for the US while shifting the focus to actions that the US can take to improve its domestic production, supply chain resilience, and coordination with allied producers. Punitive measures are an option, however, and if relations deteriorate over time, as expected, they will be increasingly relied on. Buy The Dip In Cybersecurity Stocks A linchpin of the above analysis is the Microsoft Exchange hack, which some have called the largest hack in US history, since it confirms the view that the Biden administration will not be able to de-escalate strategic tensions with China much. China has been particularly frantic to acquire technology through hacking and cyber-espionage over the past decade as it attempts to achieve a Great Leap Forward in productivity in light of slowing potential growth that threatens single-party rule over the long run. The breakdown in ties between Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping occurred not only because of Xi’s perceived violation of a personal pledge not to militarize the South China Sea but also because of the failure of a cybersecurity cooperation deal between the two. When the Trump administration arrived on the scene it sought to increase pressure on China and cybersecurity was immediately identified as an area where pushback was long overdue. Cyber conflict is highly likely to persist, not only with Russia but also with China. Cyber operations are a way for states to engage in Great Power struggle while still managing the level of tensions and avoiding a military conflict in the real world. The cyber realm is a realm of anarchy in which states are insecure about their capabilities and are constantly testing opponents’ defenses and their own offensive capabilities. They can also act to undermine each other with plausible deniability in the cyber realm, since multiple state and quasi-state actors and a vast criminal underworld make it difficult to identify culprits with confidence. Revisionist states like China, North Korea, Russia, and Iran have an advantage in asymmetric warfare, including cyber, since it enables them to undermine the US and West without putting their weaker conventional forces in jeopardy. Cybersecurity stocks have corrected but the general up-trend is well established and fully justified (Chart 7). It is not clear, however, that investors should favor cybersecurity stocks over the general NASDAQ index (Chart 8). The trend has been sideways in recent years and is trying to form a bottom. Cybersecurity stocks are volatile, as can be seen compared to tech stocks as a whole, and in both cases the general trend is for rising volatility as the macro backdrop shifts in favor of higher interest rates and inflation expectations (Chart 9). Chart 7Cyber Security Stocks Corrected Chart 8Major Hacks Failed To Boost Cyber Vs NASDAQ Chart 9Volatility Of Cyber & Tech Stocks Rising Great Power struggle will not remain limited to the cyber realm. There is a fundamental problem of military insecurity plaguing the world’s major powers. Furthermore the global economic upturn and new energy and industrial innovation race will drive up commodity prices, which will in turn reactivate territorial and maritime disputes. Turf battles will re-escalate in the South and East China Seas, the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean basin, the Mediterranean, and even the Baltic Sea and Arctic. One way to play this shift is as a geopolitical “back to work” trade – long defense stocks relative to cybersecurity stocks (Chart 10). The global defense sector saw a run-up in demand, capital expenditures, and profits late in the last business cycle. That all came crashing down with the pandemic, which supercharged cybersecurity as a necessary corollary to the swarm of online activity as households hunkered down to avoid the virus and obey government social restrictions. Cybersecurity stocks have higher EV/EBITDA ratios and lower profit margins and return on equity compared to defense stocks or the broad market. Chart 10Long Defense / Short Cyber Security: 'Back To Work' For Geopolitics The trade does not mean cybersecurity stocks will fall in absolute terms – we maintain our bullish case for cybersecurity stocks – but merely that defense stocks will make relative gains as economic normalization continues in the context of Great Power struggle. Bottom Line: Structurally elevated geopolitical risks will continue to drive demand for cybersecurity in absolute terms. However, we would favor global defense stocks on a relative basis. The US Is Not As War-Weary As People Think America is consumed with domestic divisions and distractions. Since 2008 Washington has repeatedly demonstrated an unwillingness to confront foreign rivals over small territorial conquests. This risk aversion has created power vacuums, inviting ambitious regional powers like China, Russia, Iran, and Turkey to act assertively in their immediate neighborhoods. However, the US is not embracing isolationism. Public opinion polling shows Americans are still committed to an active role in global affairs (Chart 11). The 2020 election confirms that verdict. Nor are Americans demanding big cuts in defense spending. Only 31% of Americans think defense spending is “too much” and only 12% think the national defense is stronger than it needs to be (Chart 12). Chart 11No Isolationism Here True, the Democratic Party is much more inclined to cut defense spending than the Republicans. About 43% of Democrats demand cuts, while 32% are complacent about the current level of spending (compared to 8% and 44% for Republicans). But it is primarily the progressive wing of the party that seeks outright cuts and the progressives are not the ones who took power. Chart 12Americans Against ‘Forever Wars’ But Not Truly Dovish Biden and his cabinet represent the Washington establishment, including the military-industrial complex. Even if Vice President Kamala Harris should become president she would, if anything, need to prove her hawkish credentials. Defense spending cuts might be projected nominally in Biden’s presidential budgets but they will not muster majorities in the two narrowly divided chambers of Congress. Biden has co-opted Trump’s (and Obama’s) message of strategic withdrawal and military drawdown. He is targeting a date of withdrawal from Afghanistan on May 1, notwithstanding the leverage that a military presence there could yield in its priority negotiations with Iran. Yet he is not jeopardizing the American troop presence in Germany and South Korea, much more geopolitically consequential spheres of action in a long competition with Russia and China. While it is true (and widely known) that Americans have turned against “forever wars,” this really means Middle Eastern quagmires like Iraq and Afghanistan and does not mean that the American public or political establishment have truly become anti-war “doves.” The US public recognizes the need to counter China and Russia and Congress will continue appropriating funds for defense as well as for industrial policy. The Biden administration will increase awareness about the risks of a lack of deterrence and alliance-building. This is especially apparent given the military buildup in China. The annual legislative session has revealed an important increase in military focus in Beijing in the context of the US rivalry. Previously, in the thirteenth five-year plan and the nineteenth National Party Congress, the People’s Liberation Army aimed to achieve “informatization and mechanization” reforms by 2020 and total modernization by 2035. However, at the fifth plenum of the central committee in October, the central government introduced a new military goal for the PLA’s 100th anniversary in 2027 – a “military centennial goal” to match with the 2021 centennial of the Communist Party and the 2049 centennial goal of the founding of the People’s Republic. While details about this new military centenary are lacking, the obvious implication is that the Communist Party and PLA are continuing to shift the focus to “fighting and winning wars,” particularly in the context of the need to deter the United States. The official defense budget is supposed to grow 6.8% in 2021, only slightly higher than the 6.6% goal in 2020, but observers have long known that China’s military budget could be as much as twice as high as official statistics indicate. The point is that defense spending is going up, as one would expect, in the context of persistent US-China tensions. Bottom Line: Just as US-China cooperation will be hindered by mutual efforts to reduce supply chain dependency and support domestic demand, so too it will be hindered by mutual efforts to increase defense readiness and capability in the event of military conflict. The beneficiary of continued high levels of US defense spending and Chinese spending increases – in the context of a more general global arms buildup – will be global arms makers. Investment Takeaways Geopolitical risk remains structurally elevated despite the temporary drop in tensions in late 2020 and early 2021. The China-backed Microsoft Exchange hack reinforces the Biden administration’s initial foreign policy comments and actions suggesting that US policy will remain hawkish on China. While Biden will adopt a more defensive rather than offensive strategy relative to Trump, there is no chance that he will return to the status quo ante. The Obama administration itself grew more hawkish on China in 2015-16 in the face of cyber threats and strategic tensions in the South China Sea. Cybersecurity stocks will continue to benefit from secular demand in an era of Great Power competition where nations use cyberattacks as a form of asymmetric warfare and a means of minimizing the risks of conflict. The recent correction in cybersecurity stocks creates a good entry point. We closed our earlier trade in January for a gain of 31% but have remained thematically bullish and recommend going long in absolute terms. We would favor defense over cybersecurity stocks as a geopolitical version of the “back to work” trade in which conventional economic activity revives, including geopolitical competition for territory, resources, and strategic security. Defense stocks are undervalued and relative share prices are unlikely to fall to 2010-era lows given the structural increase in geopolitical risk (Chart 13). Chart 13Global Defense Stocks Oversold Chart 14Global Defense Stocks Profitable, Less Indebted Defense stocks have seen profit margins hold up and are not too heavily burdened by debt relative to the broad market (Chart 14). Defense stocks have a higher return on equity than the average for non-financial corporations and cash flow will improve as a new capex cycle begins in which nations seek to improve their security and gain access to territory and resources (Chart 15). Chart 15Defense Stocks: High RoE, Capex Will Revive Chart 16Discount On Global Defense Stocks Valuation metrics show that global defense stocks are trading at a discount (Chart 16).     Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Appendix Table 1 Appendix Table 1Biden Administration's First 100 Days: Key Statements And Actions On China Footnotes 1 See Federal Register, "America’s Supply Chains", Mar. 1, 2021, federalregister.gov and Richard Cowan and Alexandra Alper, "Top U.S. Senate Democrat directs lawmakers to craft bill to counter China", Feb. 23, 2021, reuters.com.

In recent research we have highlighted the intricate relationship between stocks and bonds and how a selloff in the latter can cause some consternation in the SPX (please see Charts 7 and 9A here). Today we take a closer look at the interplay between the long-run median FOMC interest rate projections (DOTS) and the 10-year US Treasury yield. While the data only starts in 2012, we note a special episode that happened early in 2018. Virtually the same week when the 10-year US Treasury yield crossed above the long-run DOTS, the Trump corporate tax cut rally came to an abrupt halt, and the market suffered a 10% pullback (top & middle panels). As the Powell-led Fed embarked on four hikes throughout 2018 sustaining the selloff in the 10-year US Treasury bond market, the SPX remained jittery and fell 20% from the September peak to the Christmas Eve trough. Fast forward to today and while the monetary backdrop is anything but similar to 2018, the selloff in the bond market is gaining momentum. If history at least rhymes, it will take a further 100bps of tightening via a rise in the 10-year US Treasury yield before the bond market’s selloff turns from reflective to restrictive for stocks, assuming no change in the FOMC’s long-run DOTS. Bottom Line: A sizable selloff in the bond market from current levels remains a key risk to our cyclically sanguine equity market view.