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Venezuela’s stability is deteriorating rapidly along the lines of our projections in recent years. Regime failure is at this point a high probability and poses immediate risks to global oil production. Our conviction is high because of the unprecedented combination of internal and external factors working against the regime: Economic collapse: Economic collapse has translated into total social collapse, as indicated by the large-scale emigration from the country (Chart 1). The current mass protests are the largest ever and are gaining momentum, while the opposition movement is coalescing into a single force against the regime as a whole for the first time. Political illegitimacy: What remained of the Maduro administration’s political legitimacy has eroded with his decision to ignore the results of the 2015 election and rig the election of 2018. The President of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, has declared himself President of the Republic based on an interpretation of the Venezuelan constitution and his leadership of the democratically elected National Assembly.1 International opposition: The erosion of Maduro’s legitimacy is reinforced by a rapidly changing international environment, with several countries becoming more assertive in opposing the regime. The United States and Colombia, on January 23, formally recognized Guaidó as president. They are joined by Canada and several other Latin American states, including Brazil, which is taking a more confrontational posture under the newly inaugurated President Jair Bolsonaro. This marks a rare coordination of North and South American states in pursuing a harder policy toward Venezuela. U.S. intervention: The United States, in particular, is taking a more interventionist stance through tighter sanctions. Indeed a limited U.S. military intervention is one of our top five geopolitical “Black Swans” for this year. Such an intervention could be further motivated by President Donald Trump’s need to distract from his domestic woes (Chart 2). His weak popular approval is comparable to that of President Ronald Reagan at this stage in Reagan’s first term, when he intervened in the small island state of Grenada. Venezuela is not Grenada, but the U.S. is also not considering outright invasion. Trump is facing a serious risk of becoming a “lame duck” due to the fall in his popularity amid the government shutdown and gridlock in Congress. A foreign policy response to a humanitarian crisis is an obvious way for him to try to increase his influence over the remainder of his term. Moreover, the U.S. diplomatic and defense establishment may agree on the need to reinforce the Monroe Doctrine against anti-democratic politics and growing Chinese (and Russian) influence in Venezuela. Chart 1 Chart 2Trump May Distract From His Woes Trump May Distract From His Woes Trump May Distract From His Woes What remains is to see whether the U.S. adds force (tougher sanctions) to its more aggressive diplomatic posture, and whether the Venezuelan opposition remains mobilized and unified in rejecting anything except a transition to a new government. The U.S. is already considering expanding sanctions, including a likely deathblow that would involve sanctioning Venezuelan oil imports and the export of diluents necessary to process Venezuela’s heavy sour crude. Within Venezuela, the opposition’s momentum and the role of the National Bolivarian Armed Forces will be decisive: so far there are small signs of fracture (Table 1), but no sign of a substantial turn against the Maduro regime.Sufficient popular pressure can create a “tipping point,” however, after which the military and security forces are no longer effective in executing the government’s writ and the socio-political situation declines beyond the ability of the regime to stay in power. Persistent large-scale protests concentrating on Maduro’s departure and/or a split in the security forces could precipitate the final stage of transition to a new interim government in the short to medium term. Table 1Military Insurgencies Have Been Small And Unsuccessful … So Far Venezuelan Production Near Collapse Venezuelan Production Near Collapse Impact On The Oil Market In this context, we are raising the likelihood of a collapse of that state to an 80% probability, from our prior assessment (33%). We use the word “collapse” to stand for Venezuela’s production falling to 250k b/d to feed domestic refineries, from ~ 1mm b/d at present. In our simulation of how a collapse could affect oil prices, we make the following assumptions based on recent history – i.e., the run-up to the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions against Iranian oil exports. These assumptions are driven by our prior belief that the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia, which we’ve dubbed OPEC 2.0, and the Trump administration will attempt to hold Brent crude oil prices at or below $80/bbl in the event of a collapse in Venezuela’s oil production. Here are our assumptions: Venezuela collapses next month; OPEC 2.0 responds with a one-month lag, and increases production by 500k b/d in March 2019. If Brent spot prices trade to $85/bbl, OPEC 2.0 raises production an additional 100k b/d. If prices continue to rise toward $100/bbl, OPEC 2.0 adds another 300k b/d to global supply. Further increases lead to the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) releasing 100k b/d as needed to reduce Brent prices to $80/bbl or less. If spot Brent prices rise toward $100/bbl, we assume there will be 200k b/d of demand destruction globally. Chart 3 shows how Brent and WTI prices would evolve per these assumptions. Because Venezuela’s production has fallen so much, we believe the collapse of that country’s oil industry can be managed by OPEC 2.0, and, if necessary, via U.S. SPR releases. Of course, a similar trajectory likely would occur in the event Venezuela’s oil industry collapses later.2 Chart 3A Venezuela Collapse Would Trigger OPEC 2.0 and U.S. Supply Responses A Venezuela Collapse Would Trigger OPEC 2.0 and U.S. Supply Responses A Venezuela Collapse Would Trigger OPEC 2.0 and U.S. Supply Responses In our simulation, the Brent spot price trades to $85/bbl in December 2019, and OPEC 2.0 adds an additional 100k b/d to global supply. Prices continue to rise, and we assume OPEC 2.0 member states release a combined 300k b/d in March 2020. The U.S. release 100k b/d of SPR in 2020. In addition, we do see demand destruction of 200k b/d in 2020, as prices reach close to $100/bbl. With all of this, prices are contained and start decreasing in mid-2020. Of course, whether these surges can be maintained indefinitely – i.e., until Venezuela comes back on line, or comparable crude grades can be shipped south from Canada – is an open question. Even so, there is no doubt that the leaders of OPEC 2.0 silenced more than a few critics by means of their 4Q18 production surge. KSA stands out in this regard, taking its November 2018 production over 11mm b/d from ~ 10mm b/d in 1H18 (Table 2). Table 2BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Venezuelan Production Near Collapse Venezuelan Production Near Collapse As a practical matter, we have no way of knowing how OPEC 2.0 or the U.S. SPR would respond to a collapse in Venezuela’s oil industry. In these simulations, we’re making a call on how and when OPEC 2.0 might choose to release its spare capacity once again, as they did in the run-up to the U.S.’s Iran oil export sanctions last year (Chart 4). Chart 4 As the members of OPEC 2.0 – mostly KSA, when it’s all said and done – dig deeper into spare capacity, less is available to meet another unplanned outage – e.g., Libya or Nigeria lose significant barrels to civil unrest. That is, we are sure, a discussion OPEC 2.0 is and will be having among its members, and with the U.S. SPR. The global oil market still is exposed to a sharp loss of Iranian barrels on top of the loss of Venezuela’s supplies in the event that country’s oil industry collapses. This argues strongly for an extension of the waivers granted by the Trump administration in November for anywhere from 90 to 180 days, depending on how the Venezuela situation evolves. These waivers expire at the end of May. This would require us to change our balances assessment, should it occur.   Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see Articles 233, 333, 350 of the Venezuelan constitution. The domestic and international legal debate is beside the point: the effective power of the people, the security forces, and the international community will determine the outcome. 2 For more information on global supply and demand balances, and our most recent oil price forecasts, please see “OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy today. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com.  

Dear Client, I will be meeting clients in Europe next week. Instead of our usual weekly bulletin, I will be sending you a Special Report discussing how “The Most Important Trend In The World” – a trend that has been around for thousands of years and accounts for all of the economic growth the world has ever experienced – has recently reversed, and what this means for your investment decisions. This is one report you will not want to miss. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights China’s debt problem is a symptom of a deeper ailment: The country’s excessively high saving rate. While the authorities are taking steps to boost consumption, this is likely to be a drawn-out process. In the meantime, the economy will have to continue recycling savings into fixed-asset investment. Now that credit growth has fallen close to nominal GDP growth, the need to further suppress credit growth has abated. The 6-month credit impulse is already moving higher, and the 12-month impulse should follow suit by the middle of the year. As Chinese growth bottoms out this summer, global growth will start to reaccelerate. This will help boost global cyclical stocks as well as EM shares. Feature Global Growth Worries Weigh On Risk Sentiment Global growth is clearly slowing (Chart 1). Our tactical MacroQuant model, which did an exemplary job of flagging the Q4 selloff in stocks, is flashing amber again, after having turned more constructive in late December (Chart 2). Chart 1Growth Is Slowing Growth Is Slowing Growth Is Slowing   Chart 2 As we discussed last week, the world economy should stabilize by mid-year, paving the way for global equities to rise further from current levels.1 Until then, volatility will remain elevated. Many factors will influence the trajectory of global growth over next 12 months, but perhaps none more important than what happens to China. In this week’s report, we focus on one of the most critical problems facing the Chinese economy – a problem that surprisingly gets very little attention from market participants. China’s Savings Problem Saving is usually considered a virtue. At the individual level, that is certainly true. However, at the economy-wide level, saving can be a vice if it leads to a shortfall of spending, resulting in higher unemployment. This is precisely the problem that China confronts today. Simply put, the country consumes too little of what it produces. The result is a national saving rate of 45% of GDP, higher than any other major economy in the world (Chart 3). Chart 3China Saves A Lot China Saves A Lot China Saves A Lot The reasons for China’s high saving rate are long and varied. Just as the Great Depression instilled a sense of thrift among Americans who came of age in the 1930s, memories of the abject poverty that many older Chinese citizens endured during the Cultural Revolution have restrained the desire to spend needlessly. While the younger generation is more willing to live it up, it also faces severe constraints to spending more. The labor market remains challenging, even for those with a university degree. Sky-high property prices require young people to save a large fraction of their incomes in order to have any hope of owning a home. Looking out, there is little reason to expect China’s saving rate to fall rapidly. While the number of people entering retirement is steadily increasing, the share of the population in their prime savings years – ages 30-to-59 – has yet to peak (Chart 4). Chart 4China: Share Of Population In Its High Savings Years Has Yet To Peak China: Share Of Population In Its High Savings Years Has Yet To Peak China: Share Of Population In Its High Savings Years Has Yet To Peak In addition, an increasingly skewed male-female sex ratio has created an "arms race" of sorts among Chinese bachelors hoping to accumulate enough wealth to find a bride. One academic study concluded that this factor accounts for half of the increase in the household saving rate since the late-1970s.2 Unfortunately, China’s gender imbalance is only likely to worsen, given that the ratio of men between the ages of 25-and-39 and women between the ages of 20-and-34 – a proxy for gender imbalances in the marriage market – is projected to rise from 1.06 in 2011 to 1.34 by the middle of the next decade (Chart 5). Chart 5Not Enough Chinese Brides Not Enough Chinese Brides Not Enough Chinese Brides What To Do With Excess Savings? By definition, a country’s savings are either recycled into domestic investment or exported abroad via a current account surplus. The latter strategy served China well in the years leading up to the Great Recession, when the country’s current account surplus reached a whopping 10% of GDP (Chart 6). Just like Germany today, China was able to export its excess production with the help of a highly undervalued currency. Chart 6China: No Longer Exporting Savings Abroad China: No Longer Exporting Savings Abroad China: No Longer Exporting Savings Abroad Unfortunately for China, as its economy has grown in relation to the rest of the world, running massive trade surpluses has become more difficult. This is especially true today, when the country is being singled out by the Trump administration and much of the international community for alleged unfair trade practices. As China’s ability to churn out large current account surpluses declined, the government moved to Plan B: propping up growth by recycling the country’s copious savings into fixed-asset investment (see Box 1). This process saw households park their savings in banks and other financial institutions which, in turn, lent the money out to companies and local governments in order to finance various investment projects. Not surprisingly, debt levels exploded (Chart 7). Chart 7China: From Exporting Savings To Investing Domestically (And Building Up Debt) China: From Exporting Savings To Investing Domestically (And Building Up Debt) China: From Exporting Savings To Investing Domestically (And Building Up Debt) This strategy was feasible when China did not have a lot of debt and needed more factories, housing, and public infrastructure. But those days are long gone. The rate of return on assets among state-owned enterprises has now fallen below their borrowing costs (Chart 8). Our EM team estimates that 15%-to-20% of apartments in China are sitting vacant.3 Chart 8Rate Of Return On Assets Below Borrowing Costs For Chinese SOEs Rate Of Return On Assets Below Borrowing Costs For Chinese SOEs Rate Of Return On Assets Below Borrowing Costs For Chinese SOEs How To Boost Consumption There is only one long-term solution to China’s excess savings problem: Tackle it head-on by taking steps to increase consumption. The good news is that there is some scope to do so. The Chinese income tax structure is fairly regressive. Poor households face an effective income tax rate exceeding 40%. This is well above OECD norms (Chart 9). A more progressive tax system would boost spending among poorer households. It would also curb inequality, which has increased sharply since the 1980s (Chart 10). The saving rate among the richest 10% of Chinese earners is close to 50%. Policies that shift income from the rich to the poor would reduce overall household savings. Chart 9 Chart 10China: Inequality Has Risen In The Past Two Decades China: Inequality Has Risen In The Past Two Decades China: Inequality Has Risen In The Past Two Decades As a share of GDP, public-sector spending in China on education, health care, and pensions is close to half of the OECD average (Chart 11). If the government were to finance the increase in social spending by running larger budget deficits, this would help reduce overall national savings both by increasing the budget deficit and by discouraging precautionary household savings. Unlike in most countries, the poor in China are net savers, largely because they cannot rely on a publicly-funded social safety net (Chart 12). Chart 11 Chart 12 Recent tax changes, including an increase in the threshold at which income begins to be taxed and an expansion of deductions for childhood education, medical costs, and home loan interest and rent, are steps in the right direction. More Financial Repression? Over a longer-term horizon, the Chinese authorities are also likely to step up efforts to discourage savings by driving down real interest rates into negative territory. Since nominal interest rates are already low in China, the only way to reduce real rates is to raise inflation. The added benefit of higher inflation is that it would boost nominal GDP growth, thus putting downward pressure on the debt-to-GDP ratio. The catch is that negative real rates could destabilize the currency, fueling capital outflows. Negative real rates could also inflate asset bubbles, especially in the property market. The only way to square the circle is to tighten administrative controls, such as those relating to property speculation and capital flows, in order to preserve the benefits of negative real rates, while attenuating the costs. This suggests that hopes that the RMB will become an international reserve currency anytime soon are likely to be dashed. China Will Continue To Back Off From Its Deleveraging Campaign Realistically, the measures to boost consumption listed above will take time to implement. In the meantime, China’s economy continues to slow. Not only does a weaker economy endanger domestic stability, it also puts the Chinese government in a weaker negotiating position with the Trump administration over trade matters. This suggests that the government will continue to ease off its deleveraging campaign at least until growth recovers. Granted, one could have said the same thing last year. That is correct, but here is the thing: last year, credit growth was running at a much faster pace than today. Total social financing increased by only 11% year-over-year in December, not much higher than trend nominal GDP growth. On all three occasions over the past ten years when credit growth has fallen back towards nominal GDP growth, the government has allowed credit growth to accelerate (Chart 13). Chart 13China: Credit Growth Versus GDP Growth China: Credit Growth Versus GDP Growth China: Credit Growth Versus GDP Growth We do not expect growth to surge this time around. However, if monthly credit growth simply stabilizes at current levels, the credit impulse, which is just the change in credit growth, will turn positive. Chart 14 shows that the 6-month impulse is already moving higher. The 12-month impulse is still trending down, but if credit growth remains constant at its current pace, it will start hooking up this summer (Chart 15). Chart 14Rebound In Chinese 6-Month Credit Impulse Bodes Well For Metals Rebound In Chinese 6-Month Credit Impulse Bodes Well For Metals Rebound In Chinese 6-Month Credit Impulse Bodes Well For Metals   Chart 15The 12-Month Credit Impulse Will Turn Up If Monthly Credit Growth Even Merely Stabilizes The 12-Month Credit Impulse Will Turn Up If Monthly Credit Growth Even Merely Stabilizes The 12-Month Credit Impulse Will Turn Up If Monthly Credit Growth Even Merely Stabilizes Importantly, the Li Keqiang index, a broad real-time measure of economic growth in China, is highly correlated with the 12-month credit impulse. As Chinese growth bottoms out this summer, global growth will start to reaccelerate. This will help boost global cyclical stocks as well as EM shares. My colleague, Arthur Budaghyan, BCA’s chief emerging markets strategist, remains bearish on EM equities in both relative and absolute terms. While this publication does not have a strong view on the relative performance of EM versus DM shares, we do expect EM stocks to rise in absolute terms over the remainder of the year. Accordingly, we sold our March-2019 EEM put on January 3rd for a gain of 104%, and are now outright long the ETF as one of our recommended trades. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com   BOX 1 Do Banks Create Money Out Of “Thin Air”? Strictly speaking, banks can create deposits by issuing new loans without the need for economic savings (which economists define as the difference between what an economy produces and consumes). In that sense, banks can create money out of “thin air.” However, this does not mean, as is sometimes claimed, that economic savings are irrelevant to credit creation or that there is no effective limit on the volume of loans that banks can originate. Even if one ignores the presence of legal capital requirements, the public must still be willing to hold whatever deposits banks create. Just like the number of apples a society wishes to consume is simultaneously determined by the number of apples farmers wish to produce and the number of apples people wish to eat (with the price of apples equilibrating supply and demand), the answer to the question of whether loans create deposits or deposits create loans is always “both.” The aggregate volume of deposits that people wish to hold depends, among other things, on the level and distribution of net worth across society, as well as the rate of return that bank deposits offer compared to competing financial instruments (including cash, which pays nothing). A country’s net worth tends to be closely correlated with the value of its capital stock. Both are mainly determined by accumulated economic savings. Real interest rates are also largely determined by economic savings, especially at the global level, where rates adjust to ensure that world savings equals investment. The distribution of savings also matters. When some people wish to spend more than they earn, while others wish to do the opposite, debt levels will rise. The same is true for individual sectors of the economy. If there are some sectors that save a lot (such as households in China) and other sectors that borrow a lot (Chinese state-owned companies and local governments), debt levels will go up. Debt levels will also rise when people purchase assets using credit. Fresh economic savings are not necessary to finance the purchase of existing assets, but with the exception of undeveloped land and natural resources, economic savings are needed to create those assets (such as when a home is constructed or a factory is built). In China, a perfect trifecta of sky-high property prices, a high and uneven distribution of savings throughout the economy, and a financial sector that has been willing to intermediate savings without much regard for credit quality, have all contributed to the elevated debt levels we see today. Footnotes 1      Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Patient Jay," dated January 18, 2019. 2      Shang-Jin Wei and Xiao Zhang, "The Competitive Saving Motive: Evidence From Rising Sex Ratios And Savings Rates In China," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 119, No. 3, 2011. 3      Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, “China Real Estate: A Never-Bursting Bubble?” dated April 6, 2018. Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Chart 16 Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

OPEC 2.0 is building physical optionality, to deal with different possible moves the U.S. can make on Iranian oil export sanctions and waivers. This comes despite an apparent break in the sense of urgency Saudi Arabia and Russia feel re production cuts. The coalition’s market monitoring committee meets in April, followed by a full gathering in May, when U.S. waivers expire. If the U.S. extends waivers, OPEC 2.0 can extend production cuts; if it doesn’t, it can add supply as needed.1 On the demand side, markets appear to be overly concerned about a sharper-than-expected slowdown in China, which, if borne out, would restrain EM growth. We believe these fears are overdone, and expect a slight improvement in EM demand generally this year and next. In our new balances estimates, we see the OECD commercial oil inventory overhang clearing in 1H19, on the back of resilient demand, OPEC 2.0 discipline, and a more moderate level of growth in U.S. shale oil output. This keeps Brent on track to average $80/bbl this year and $85/bbl next year, with WTI trading $74/bbl this year, and $82/bbl next year. Highlights Energy: Overweight. Mandatory cuts of 325k b/d, coupled with additional exports of ~ 190k b/d due to additional train and pipeline capacity out of Canada, will drain the 35mm barrels of excess crude oil inventories targeted by the Alberta government in December by 1H19. The WCS – WTI spread narrowed to -$10/bbl from -$50/bbl on these mandatory cuts. By 2H19, we expect Canadian production cuts to average 95k b/d. Base Metals: Neutral. Aluminum output in China surged 11.3% y/y in December, hitting 3.05mm MT, according to Metal Bulletin. Total output for 2018 was 35.8mm MT, a 7.4% y/y increase. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold is holding its recent gains, as markets become more comfortable with the Fed pausing on its rates-normalization policy until 2H19. Agriculture: Underweight. Hot and dry weather in Brazil is threatening crop yields there. The unfavorable weather is expected to affect three-quarters of cotton-growing regions, half of sugar areas, a third of first-crop corn acreage, and a quarter of soy regions. Feature The first signs of fraying in the relationship between the putative leaders of OPEC 2.0 – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), which cut production ~ 450k b/d m/m in December, and Russia, which raised output – are emerging, as world leaders meet in Davos. While this casts doubt on the leadership’s carefully cultivated amity, and their shared willingness to abide by the recently agreed output cuts, we do not believe it signals the end of the historic cooperation between these states. Total OPEC output – estimated by production-tracking sources outside the Cartel – stood at 31.6mm b/d in December, a prodigious 751k b/d reduction m/m. We expect continued oil production cuts from core OPEC states and decline-curve losses among non-Gulf OPEC and non-OPEC states within the coalition this year to remove at least 1.2mm b/d from the market, per the quotas agreed by members in December (Chart of the Week, Table 1). On top of this, mandatory Canadian production cuts of 325k b/d in 1H19 and 95k b/d in 2H19 will keep average production cuts at ~ 1.4mm b/d this year. Chart of the WeekOPEC 2.0 Will Resume Production Cuts OPEC 2.0 Will Resume Production Cuts OPEC 2.0 Will Resume Production Cuts Table 1OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts Could Exceed Quotas OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone OPEC 2.0’s cuts could persist into 2020, depending on how the U.S. deals with Iranian oil-export sanctions and waivers. Even though KSA and Russia apparently do not share the same sense of urgency re production cuts right now, we believe OPEC 2.0 is committed to draining oil inventories, particularly in the OECD.2 To do so, they’re increasing their operational flexibility – creating physical options, in a manner of speaking – to deal with a range of uncertain outcomes when U.S. waivers on Iranian export sanctions expire in May. Sanctions And OPEC 2.0’s Physical Options Despite the waivers granted to its eight top consumers shortly after U.S. sanctions took effect in November, Iranian exports plunged below 0.5mm b/d in December. As of December, China had substituted almost all of its Iranian imports for alternative barrels.3 This coincided with a production surge by OPEC 2.0 at the behest of the U.S. leading up to the November sanctions deadline of November 4, 2018, which swelled OECD inventories and took them above their rolling 5-year average level (Chart 2). India retained 30% of its May import levels from Iran, while Europe complied at 100% with U.S. sanctions (Table 2). Chart 3 shows the decrease in exports in preparation for the sanctions over the course of 2018. Chart 2OECD Inventory Overhang Will Draw As OPEC 2.0 Cuts and Losses Kick In OECD Inventory Overhang Will Draw As OPEC 2.0 Cuts and Losses Kick In OECD Inventory Overhang Will Draw As OPEC 2.0 Cuts and Losses Kick In Table 2Iran Exports By Destination 2018 (‘000 b/d) OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone Chart 3 Whether or not the waivers are extended is anyone’s guess. It is possible waivers will be extended for 90 or 180 days, as a way to counter OPEC 2.0 production cuts, and to offset the lag between filling new pipeline takeaway capacity in the Permian. We expect importers to queue up for Iranian barrels as the market tightens in 1H19. OPEC 2.0’s market monitoring committee will meet in April, followed by a ministerial meeting in May, just ahead of the expiration of the waivers.4 If the U.S. extends them, OPEC 2.0 can extend production cuts after it meets in May; if waivers are not extended, the Cartel can calibrate an appropriate supply response. Either way, we expect OPEC 2.0 will closely align its production schedule with any U.S. action on the sanctions and waivers. This will, we believe, keep change in the overall market’s supply side relatively constant, except for the month or two required to adjust OPEC 2.0 output. Permian Will Drive OPEC 2.0 Policy The larger issue for OPEC 2.0 comes in 4Q19, when ~ 2mm b/d of new pipeline takeaway capacity comes on line in the Permian Basin in West Texas. With additional takeaway capacity due to come on in 2020, the Cartel will have its work cut out for it next year.5 Our models show a slight decrease then flattening in U.S. rig counts over the coming months, as a result of the 4Q18 sell-off in WTI, with a rebound around mid-year (Chart 4). This is because rig count lags oil prices by ~4 months. Chart 4U.S. Shales Continue to Drive Lower 48 Production Growth (ex GOM) U.S. Shales Continue to Drive Lower 48 Production Growth (ex GOM) U.S. Shales Continue to Drive Lower 48 Production Growth (ex GOM) We are expecting production in the Big 5 shale basins to average 8.4mm b/d in 2019 and 9.0mm b/d next year, a somewhat higher level than projected by the EIA. Growth in the shales accounts for close to 80% of the 2.3mm b/d of growth in the U.S. over 2019 – 2020. Globally, U.S. shales will continue to provide the bulk of y/y crude oil production growth, accounting for 73% of the 2.5mm b/d of growth we will see over the next two years. Given the near-death experience OPEC 2.0 member states had in the price collapse of 2014 – 2016, we remain convinced OPEC 2.0 member states will once again have to embark on a strategy to backwardate the Brent forward curve as they did in 1H18, to moderate the growth of shale-oil production in the U.S. (Chart 5). Reducing production in the short term will force refiners to draw inventories to supply their units and produce products like gasoline, diesel, jet fuel and a wide range of petrochemicals. Chart 5OPEC 2.0 Needs Backwardated Brent Forwards OPEC 2.0 Needs Backwardated Brent Forwards OPEC 2.0 Needs Backwardated Brent Forwards This will backwardate the Brent forward curve – i.e., prompt-delivery barrels will be more expensive than deferred-delivery barrels. A backwardated forward curve means OPEC 2.0 member states with term contracts indexed to spot prices receive higher prices for their oil than shale producers hedging 2 years forward, all else equal. The trick for OPEC 2.0 will be to keep the Brent forwards backwardated when the Permian takeaway capacity starts to fill, and exports from the U.S. rise in the early 2020s, as deep-water harbors are brought on line. If OPEC 2.0 is successful in keeping the Brent forwards in backwardation, this will, over time, moderate the growth of shale production: Hedgers’ revenue is constrained by lower forward prices.6 We would not be surprised if OPEC 2.0 states started announcing final investment decisions on select investments in spare capacity to augment existing resources, so they are able to quickly bring production to market in the event of unplanned outages that could lift the entire forward curve and incentivize hedging at higher prices. Demand Still Looks Good Oil markets continue to fret over a possible hard landing in China – resulting either from an internal policy error or a ratcheting up of tensions in the Sino – U.S. trade war. This is causing markets to extrapolate into the wider EM space, and take oil-demand projections lower on an almost-daily basis. In a word, markets are overwrought. Chinese policymakers are sensitive to the tight financial conditions that prevailed in 2H18, which, along with the trade war with the U.S., slowed growth and fostered uncertainty among households and firms in China. We agree with our Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy groups that presidents Trump and Xi are pragmatists dealing with restive populations, and want to deliver a deal ahead of U.S. elections and the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021.7 We’ve been expecting the government to deploy a modest amount of stimulus in 1H19, which will begin having an effect on the Chinese economy in the second half of this year. Toward the end of the year and into 2020, we expect the larger stimulus to be deployed in the run-up to put a bid under industrial commodities – oil, base metals and bulks in particular. Overall, we are seeing signs global growth may be reviving over the next few months via an apparent bottoming in our Global LEI Diffusion index (Chart 6). The diffusion index measures the proportion of countries where Leading Economic Indicators (LEIs) are rising relative to those in which LEIs are falling. As is apparent in Chart 6, the diffusion index suggests the downturn in the global LEI has bottomed. The index leads the global LEI by a few months. Chart 6BCA's Global LEI Likely Bottoming BCA's Global LEI Likely Bottoming BCA's Global LEI Likely Bottoming In our latest supply-demand balances, we are expecting Chinese oil demand to average 14.3mm b/d this year, and 14.8mm b/d next year. Along with India – expected to consume 5.0mm b/d this year, and 5.2mm b/d next year – these two states account for 36% of the total 54.3mm b/d of EM demand we expect in 2019 and 2020 (Table 3).8 Table 3BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone Overall EM demand, the powerhouse of global oil-demand growth led by China and India, is expected to increase 1.1mm b/d this year – slightly more than we estimated last month – and 1.3mm b/d in 2020. DM demand growth, as always, comes in lower, at 390k b/d this year and 280k b/d next year. Oil Supply-Demand Balances Will Tighten We expect global oil production to average 100.9mm b/d this year and 102.9mm b/d in 2020. Consumption is expected to average 101.8mm b/d this year and 103.4mm b/d next year, respectively (Chart 7). This puts OECD inventories back on a downward trajectory, as storage draws resume (Chart 2). Chart 7Global Oil Balances Will Resume Tightening Global Oil Balances Will Resume Tightening Global Oil Balances Will Resume Tightening On the back of these estimates, we expect Brent to average $80/bbl this year and $85/bbl next year, with WTI averaging $74/bbl and $82/bbl, respectively. Given our expectation for higher prices in Brent and WTI, we continue to favor being long crude oil exposure. We are long outright WTI spot futures; long July 2019 Brent vs. short July 2020 Brent; long call spreads along the 2019 forward Brent curve, and long the S&P GSCI. Bottom Line: Markets will continue to tighten as a combination of lower supply growth and rising consumption allows OECD commercial oil inventories to resume their downward trajectory. The apparent lack of a shared sense of urgency by OPEC 2.0’s leaders – KSA and Russia – will be resolved, in our view. OPEC 2.0 will once again focus on backwardating the Brent forward curve, in order to gain some control over the rate at which U.S. shale oil production grows. We continue to favor long exposures to the crude oil futures.   Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Pavel Bilyk, Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy PavelB@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      In last week’s Commodity & Energy Strategy we noted these upcoming meetings, and OPEC 2.0’s resolve to drain the market.  Please see “Fed’s Capitulation Will Boost Oil,” published by BCA Research January 17, 2019.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2      Bloomberg reported this week KSA’s and Russia’s oil ministers cancelled a planned meeting in Davos, following al-Falih’s criticism of the pace at which Russian oil production is being cut.  Please see “Saudi, Russian Energy Ministers Cancel Planned Davos Meeting,” published by bloomberg.com January 22, 2019.  KSA cut its crude oil output 450k b/d m/m in December to 10.64mm b/d from 11.09mm b/d in November.  Russia increased crude and liquids production to a record 11.65mm b/d in December, an 80k b/d increase m/m, according to OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report published January 17, 2019.  OPEC expects Russian oil output to average 11.47mm b/d in 1H19, and 11.49mm b/d in 2019.  We are carrying something close to this in our balances (11.51mm b/d) for 2019 and 2020. 3      China imported 10.3mm b/d of crude oil in December after posting a record 10.4mm b/d of imports in November 2018, just as sanctions were kicking in. 4      In our base case estimate, we assume Iran’s crude oil output will average ~ 2.8mm b/d, down ~ 1.0mm b/d from its 3.8mm b/d production level in 1H18, which was prior to the U.S.’s announcement it intended to re-impose export sanctions.  One way or another, we expect OPEC 2.0 to adjust production to compensate for whatever production is lost due to sanctions.  5      Please see “Permian tracker: Production growth slowing as pipeline race still on,” published by S&P Global Platts July 2, 2018, for a discussion of the new takeaway capacity planned for the Permian Basin by midstream companies in 2019 and 2020. 6      The Permian basin is closely tied to hedging activity in the WTI futures market.  It is the only basin for which WTI commercial short open interest is an explanatory variable for rig counts in our modeling.  Commercial short open interest in the WTI futures also Granger causes Permian rig counts. 7      Please see the Special Report entitled “Is China Already Isolated,” published by BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy January 23, 2019.  It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com and cis.bcaresearch.com. 8      Our EM demand assumptions are driven by the IMF and World Bank EM GDP forecasts. This week the IMF lowered its global growth forecast for 2019 and 2020 by 0.2 and 0.1 percentage points to 3.5% and 3.6%, respectively. This is only slightly down from our lower estimate last month, but still above the World Bank’s expectation. We are using these variables directly in regressions to estimate prices and EM consumption. This replaced our earlier income-elasticity models used to calculate EM oil consumption.  We proxy EM demand with non-OECD oil consumption. We discuss this in “Fed’s Capitulation Will Boost Oil,” published by BCA Research January 17, 2019.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 4q18 Image Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Insert table images here Summary Of Trades Closed In 2018 Image