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Economic Growth

Special Report Highlights Economy: The Italian economy is enjoying a solid, if unspectacular, cyclical upturn led by exports, but inflation pressures remain subdued. Banks: The health of Italian banks has improved drastically over the last year, with liquidity, solvency, and systemic risks fading for the time being. Politics: Euroskepticism will not be the major issue in the election given an expanding economy, but none of the likely outcomes will lead to a prudent fiscal policy. ECB: The inevitable tapering of ECB asset purchases later in 2018 will not have a meaningful impact on Italian government bond valuations - as long as the ECB does not begin to raise rates soon after. Upgrade Italian government bonds to neutral until signs of an economic slowdown in Italy emerge. Feature Italy's financial markets have been on quite a roll over the past year. Italian equities are up 13% since the beginning of 2017 in local currency terms, well above the 8% increase in overall Euro Area stocks (Chart 1). Italian government bonds returned 1.8% over that same period (also in local currency terms), massively outperforming core European equivalents that have suffered significant losses as global bond yields have risen substantially. Investors have been focusing on the upbeat news of a cyclical economic expansion and the improving health of Italian banks, which has helped reduce the risk premia on Italian financial assets (Chart 2). At the same time, markets are not pricing in any political risk in the run-up to next month's Italian parliamentary elections that could end up with, at best, yet another unstable coalition government. Chart 1Italy Has Been##BR##A Star Performer Chart 2Investors Are Focusing On Italian Growth,##BR##Not Politics Most importantly, the growing pressure on the European Central Bank (ECB) to begin shifting away from the era of extreme monetary policy accommodation threatens to remove a major buyer of Italian debt. This is a large problem down the road, as the easy money policies of the ECB have helped paper over a lot of structural cracks that still exist in Italy. In this Special Report, jointly prepared by BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy teams, we examine the outlook for Italian financial assets, both in the short run heading into the March 4th election and also over a medium-term perspective. Specifically, we look at the ultimate measure of Italian risk - the Italy-Germany government bond yield spread. Our conclusion is that Italy's economy and financial markets may be better placed to survive the more volatile global investment backdrop in 2018 than is commonly believed. Beyond this time horizon, however, Italian politics remains a risk. The Economy: Looking Better, But Highly Levered To Global Growth Italy's economy is enjoying a relatively strong economic expansion, judged by its own modest standards. Real GDP grew 1.5% last year, delivering the fourth consecutive year of growth following the recession in 2012-13. That was slower than the 2.5% pace witnessed across the entire Euro Area. The cyclical trend in Italy, however, remains highly correlated to that of its common currency neighbors, as all have benefitted from the easy financial conditions created by ECB policy (Chart 3). Consumer spending has been a modest contributor to the current economic upturn. Consumer confidence is steadily climbing and approaching its 2015 highs, yet retail sales volumes are only growing at a 1% pace. Sluggish incomes are the reason. Real wage growth has struggled to stay positive in the years since the last recession and now sits at a mere 0.25% (Chart 4). Against this backdrop, Italian consumers have been reluctant to significantly run down savings or ramp up debt to support a faster pace of consumption. The household debt/GDP ratio is only 42%, well below the Euro Area median. The decline in Italian interest rates, however, has helped free up income available for spending; the household debt service ratio is now sitting at 4.5%, one full percentage point below the 2012 peak (bottom panel). Chart 3Italian Growth Is Out Of The Doldrums Chart 4A Modest Pick-Up In Consumer Spending A bigger boost to Italian growth has come from the corporate sector. Business confidence has been steadily improving in response to the cyclical upturn in global economic growth. Exports, which now represent about one-third of Italian GDP, are growing just over 5% in real terms. This has helped boost industrial production and capacity utilization, with the latter reaching the highest level since 2007 (Chart 5). Companies have responded by ramping up capital spending, which grew 4.6% (year-over-year) in Q3 2017. Structurally, problems of poor labor productivity continues to plague Italian companies, however, and it remains to be seen if the rise in the euro over the past year will begin to have an impact on sales and profits. For now, the cyclical industrial upturn will likely continue as long as global growth, and specifically export demand, remain buoyant. Another underappreciated driver of the current Italian expansion has been mildly stimulative fiscal policy. Italy benefited from four consecutive years of positive "fiscal thrust", i.e., the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance (Chart 6). This was a welcome relief given the austerity that was imposed on Italy after the European Debt Crisis, which drained 3% from the Italian economy from 2011 to 2013. The IMF is projecting that Italian fiscal policy will turn restrictive this year and in 2019 but, as we discuss later in this report, the upcoming Italian election is likely to deliver a government that will go for more fiscal stimulus, not less. Chart 5An Expansion##BR##Fueled By Exports Chart 6Fiscal Tightening Will Not Happen,##BR##Post-Election The labor market recovery from the 2012 recession has been slow. Italy's unemployment rate is 10.8%, down from a peak level of 13% in 2014 but still well above the OECD's estimate of full employment (NAIRU). For Italy, the youth unemployment rate remains a major problem - at 33%, it is easily the highest among European countries and continues to fuel support for the anti-establishment Five Star Movement. More generally, Italy's relatively high unemployment rate is not necessarily a sign of underlying economic malaise. Italy's labor force participation rate has risen from a low of 60.4% in August 2010 to 64.5% at the end of 2017 (Chart 7). The steadily improving economy is drawing discouraged workers back into the labor force, as we predicted it would in 2012,1 with the extra labor supply ensuring that Italian wage growth will stay sluggish for some time. On a related note, Italy's inflation remains well below the ECB's 2% target rate. Headline HICP and core HICP inflation are 1% and 0.6%, respectively. These levels are also well below the Euro Area aggregate levels, which are 1.35% and 1.2% for headline and core HICP, respectively. Although consumer spending has improved in Italy, it has not been strong enough to put upward pressure on consumer prices, and weaker wage growth will not force businesses to raise prices to protect profitability. In addition, the IMF projects that Italy's output gap will not close until 2022, or three years after the overall Euro Area gap will be eliminated (Chart 8). Chart 7Plenty Of Labor Market Slack In Italy Chart 8No Sign Of Inflation Pressures Bottom Line: The Italian economy is enjoying a solid, if unspectacular, cyclical upturn. This is being led by exports and flowing through into domestic production and investment. Inflation pressures remain subdued, however, given ample slack in labor markets. The Banks: Drastic Improvement, But Risks Remain The Italian banking system has a well-earned reputation of being dysfunctional, undercapitalized and plagued by non-performing loans (NPLs). However, last summer, the ECB declared that two Italian banks were "failing or likely to fail," prompting state intervention. The Italian government followed that with a E5.4 billion bailout for Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Italy's fourth largest bank. Given the tight correlation between Italy's relative financial asset performance and its banking sector, these actions were met with loud cheers from investors as both Italian equities and bonds rallied. Standard & Poor's credit rating agency then raised Italy's sovereign debt rating to BBB, citing "subsiding risks" in the banking sector. As a result, investors' fears have eased, as evidenced by recent successful capital raisings and the collapse in bank credit default spreads (CDS) for the major banks, which have now fallen to nearly the same levels as their European counterparts (Chart 9). The health of the Italian banking system has improved drastically over the past year given the improving economy. Italy still sits on a large absolute amount of non-performing loans at E274 billion, but this is a risk has receded quickly from its peak of E328 billion in Q1 2017. The continued economic recovery and sales of bad loans have pushed the NPL ratio down to approximately 15%, well below its peak of over 19% (Chart 10). The Bank of Italy's recent Financial Stability Review projects that the one-year forward default probability from a sample of nearly 300,000 indebted companies has fallen to 1% in mid-2017 from 2.5% in 2013. Fewer new loans are becoming impaired, which is encouraging given the ongoing pressures on the banks from the ECB and the Italian government to improve asset quality. Chart 9Italian Bank Risk##BR##Has Declined Chart 10Banks Better Capitalized,##BR##But NPLs Remain A Problem The rise in capital ratios over the last year is also a very positive development. For the major banks, liquidity coverage ratios are nearly 200%, the ratio of tangible equity to tangible assets has skyrocketed to nearly 7%, and the Tier 1 capital ratio has increased to 14.8%. Even with the introduction of the IFRS 9 accounting rules in January, which is estimated to reduce the Tier 1 ratio by 38bps, capital levels are high and will allow for banks to operate more normally. Bank earnings rebounded in Q4 2017 on the back of aggressive cost cutting, falling loan impairments and solid net interest income. Margins remain stubbornly weak, even though the yield curve has been steepening since early 2015. Going forward, earnings expectations do not seem overly optimistic, particularly in relation to long-term averages. The continued acceleration in economic growth will provide a considerable tailwind. Lending volumes should rise, albeit at a relatively slow pace, due to improving business confidence. Asset quality is set to strengthen as NPLs decline further, reducing the cost of capital and loss provisions. Bank expenses will also decline due to additional layoffs and a reduction in branch locations. However, despite the substantial improvement in their balance sheets, the Italian banking system is far from invulnerable. Apart from the obvious downturn in economic growth, banks are heavily exposed to Italian government bonds. Holdings of government debt securities as a percentage of total assets have declined considerably to 9% from nearly 11% a year ago, but still remain much higher than levels seen during the euro debt crisis (Chart 11). This suggests that fears of the so-called "doom loop" - where the credit quality of the government and the banks are intertwined through bond holdings – may arise once again in the future if Italy suffers another sovereign debt crisis. Another potential source of risk to the banking sector is the housing market. Unlike its EU counterparts, where house prices have been in an uptrend since 2013, house prices in Italy have been collapsing in both nominal and real terms since 2008, falling -20% and -28% respectively (Chart 12). The Italian real estate market is facing multiple headwinds: poor demographics, a lack of property investors dampening transaction volumes, banks aggressively selling repossessed homes at large discounts, and a large stock of unsold properties. Further declines could damage asset quality and impair bank balance sheets. Nevertheless, prices in nominal terms appear to be stabilizing. As real GDP growth continues to recover, the real estate market should eventually start to catch up. Chart 11Can The 'Doom Loop' Be Broken? Chart 12No Recovery In Italian House Prices Bottom Line: The health of Italian banks has improved drastically over the last year. Cost cutting has been aggressive, capital levels have risen, and non-performing loans are slowly declining in a growing economy. Recently added macro-prudential measures will provide additional buffers. As such, liquidity, solvency and systemic risks have faded for the time being. The Political Outlook: Acute Pain Is Gone, But Chronic Risks Linger Italian equity and bond markets have priced out political risk in the country's asset markets over the past 12 months, and for good reasons: New election rules: The October 2017 electoral rule changes have made it highly likely that the next government in Italy will be a coalition government, reducing the probability of a runaway electoral performance by an anti-establishment party.2 Anti-establishment becomes the establishment: Italy's populists have dulled their edge by moving to the middle on the key question of Euro Area membership. The anti-establishment Five Star Movement (M5S) announced in early January that "it is no longer the right moment for Italy to leave the euro." The party's leader, Luigi Di Maio, pledged to remain "comfortably below the antiquated and stupid three percent level" EU deficit limit. The party followed this announcement by slaughtering its final sacred cow and renouncing its promise never to form a coalition with traditional, centrist parties. Migration crisis has ended: While continental Europe has gotten relief from the migration wave since early 2016, Italy continued to be impacted throughout 2017. Nonetheless, the EU's intervention in Libyan security and politics has successfully, and dramatically, altered the trajectory of migrants arriving in Italy and Europe as a whole (Chart 13). Current polls show that no single party is close to the 40% threshold needed to win the election outright, although the ostensibly center-right coalition of Forza Italia, Lega Nord, and Fratelli d'Italia is the closest (Chart 14). Predicting the outcome of the election is therefore impossible, other than to guarantee that the next Italian government will be a coalition. Chart 13Italians (And Europeans) Reject Immigration Chart 14Italy: No Party Will Rule Alone New electoral rules - which favor coalition building - and poor turnout in a recent regional election will encourage parties to make extravagant promises, particularly on the spending side of the ledger. Italian politicians understand that, in a coalition government, the partner can always be blamed for why election promises fell by the wayside. This has produced a deluge of unrealistic promises.3 What should investors know about the upcoming election? First, the center-right is not the center-right. When investors hear that the "center right is likely to win," they are likely to bid up assets in expectation of structural reforms and prudent fiscal policy. If the recent polling performance of Forza Italia and Lega Nord has in any way contributed to the appreciation of Italian assets, we would caution investors to fade the rally. Former PM Silvio Berlusconi, leader of Forza Italia, has promised to reverse crucial (and bitterly fought) employment law reforms. Meanwhile, his coalition partner Matteo Salvini, leader of Lega Nord, has promised to scrap pension cuts altogether. The proper characterization for the Forza-Lega alliance is therefore "conservative populism," not pro-market center-right. In fact, the two parties are the most vociferously anti-EU and anti-euro of the four major parties, with Lega still pushing for the abolishment of the euro and even for an EU exit. For a summary of the most market-relevant electoral promises, please refer to Box 1. Box 1: Italian Electoral Promises Of Major Parties Presented in the order of current polling Five Star Movement (M5S) Italy's anti-establishment party wants to abolish 400 laws, including a web of regulation that makes it difficult for businesses to invest. The promise is unusually "supply-side" oriented for an anti-establishment party, but Italy's establishment has made the business environment difficult. In addition, the party wants to invest in technology and clean energy. What is truly anti-establishment is that M5S has promised to provide a monthly universal income of E780, but also to introduce means-testing for public services so that the well-off pensioners do not receive them. It also seeks broad justice system reforms, including a crackdown on corruption and the mafia, building new prisons, and hiring more police. Its immigration plans are centrist, if not right-leaning, with plans to repatriate migrants back to their original countries. Democratic Party (PD) Led by former PM Matteo Renzi, the Democratic Party (PD) is contesting elections on the basis of its past achievements, which includes passing the 2015 "Jobs Act," mitigating the country's banking crisis, and keeping up the pulse of the otherwise sclerotic economy. Current caretaker PM Paolo Gentiloni remains popular, in part because of his no-nonsense, humble approach to governance. Other than minor proposals - scrapping the TV license fee that finances the national Rai network and raising the minimum wage - the party is largely standing pat in terms of promises. The PD-led government has clashed with the EU, including over its 2018 budget proposal, which the Commission criticized as a "significant deviation" from the bloc's fiscal target. However, aside from its disagreements with the Commission over fiscal policy, PD is broadly pro-Europe and pro-euro. Forza Italia Populist Forza is proposing a flat tax of 23%, which would abolish the current staggered income tax rate. It would also abolish taxes on real estate, inheritance, and transportation, and expand reprieves to tax payers with financial problems. The party would double minimum pension payments and scrap the 2015 "Jobs Act." That said, leader Silvio Berlusconi has said that his proposals would respect the EU's 3% of GDP budget deficit target - in fact that his government would eliminate the deficit completely by 2023 - and that it would rein in the debt-to-GDP ratio to 100%. However, it is unclear how the math would actually work. At the same time, a collision course with the EU is likely as the party wants not only to end budget austerity but also to revise EU treaties, including the fiscal compact, and to pay less into the EU's annual budget. Lega Nord The other populist party looks to out-do the more establishment Forza by proposing an even lower flat tax rate of 15%. The revenue shortfall would be made up by aggressive enforcement against tax cheats. The party is the most Euroskeptic of the major Italian parties, arguing that a Euro-exit is in the country's national interest and should be contemplated unless fiscal rules set out by the Maastricht Treaty are scrapped. Leader Matteo Salvini recently suggested that he had changed his position on the euro, but the chief economist of the party - Claudio Borghi - has since reversed that position, stating that "one second after the League is in government it will begin all possible preparations to arrive at our monetary sovereignty." This last statement is more in keeping with the Lega's recent history of euroskepticism. Second, the electoral platforms of all four major parties are profligate. The flat tax proposal by Forza and Lega is likely the most egregious. Generally speaking, Berlusconi's previous governments can be associated with a rise in expenditure, deficits, and debt levels, with no real track record of fiscal prudence. Even during the boom years (2001-2006), Berlusconi failed to reduce the budget deficit. By contrast, the center-left has been marginally more fiscally prudent (Chart 15), with a considerable improvement in the country's budget balance under each Democratic Party-led government (Chart 16). Chart 15Italy's Debt Dynamics Are Contained Chart 16Democratic Party Is Relatively Prudent Given the mildly Euroskeptic positioning of the conservative populist coalition and their likely bias toward profligacy, we would rank the currently most likely electoral coalition as the least pro-market. Below are the three potential outcomes and their likely impact on the markets: Scenario 1 - Populist Coalition Probability of winning: 35% - Polls currently put the Forza-Lega coalition in a clear lead and only several percentage points away from the likely 40% threshold needed to secure a majority. Fiscal impact: We would assign a 100% probability that the Forza-Lega coalition would negatively impact the country's budget balance, with debt levels most likely rising. Reform impact: There is a 0% probability of pro-growth, structural reforms being passed by the conservative populist coalition. As such, investors should stop referring to the Forza-Lega alliance as a center-right alliance. European integration: We would assign a high probability, around 50%, that a Forza-Lega government would threaten to exit the Euro Area at some point during its mandate. This is based on a two-fold assumption that there will be a recession at some point during its reign and that its electoral platform reveals the potential for a serious Euroskeptic turn not only by Lega Nord but also by the formerly staunchly pro-EU Forza Italia. Scenario 2 - Grand Coalition Probability of winning: 35% - If the Forza-Lega coalition fails to win enough votes, the second-most likely outcome would be a grand coalition between Forza Italia and the center-right Democratic Party (PD), perhaps with both M5S and Lega joining in. Fiscal impact: Given that all four major parties are essentially looking to spend more money and collect less revenue, we would expect that the country's budget balance would be negatively impacted in this scenario. However, both PD and M5S have less profligate electoral platforms. As such, the impact would likely be a lot less dramatic than if Forza-Lega coalition won. Reform impact: With Forza-Lega potentially in a grand coalition, we would expect the probability of pro-growth reforms to be just 25%. European integration: We would assign a very low probability, essentially 0%, that a grand coalition contemplates Euro-exit during its mandate. However, a global recession that impacts Italy would almost certainly force such a government to fall as Euroskeptic parties withdrew their support, thus shortening the electoral mandate. This means that a grand coalition is the least viable and least stable outcome. It would allow the Euroskeptic Forza-Lega to campaign from a populist, Euroskeptic, position. Scenario 3 - Center-Left Coalition Probability of winning: 30% - A PD-M5S coalition is less likely despite being mathematically the most likely. This is because M5S has not said that it would ever join a coalition with the PD; only that it would join a grand coalition with all parties. Nonetheless, such a coalition makes the most sense ideologically now that M5S has abandoned its Euroskepticism. Fiscal impact: Both parties are looking to expand the minimum wage, with M5S arguing for a universal basic income. It is very likely that the impact on the budget balance would be negative, although we would not expect extreme profligacy. Reform impact: Given the electoral platform of M5S and the reform record of PD, we assign a healthy 75% probability for pro-growth structural reforms. Despite the view that M5S is an anti-establishment party, it is actually quite pro-reform, with several of its proposals in the past being characterized as impacting the supply-side. Investors should remember that being anti-establishment does not mean being anti-reform, especially in Italy where the establishment has an atrocious record of being pro-reform! European integration: We do not think that the M5S move to the middle on European integration is false. Forcing it to be in government, particularly once a recession hits over the course of its mandate, will only lock in its establishment position on European integration. As we have expected for some time, the M5S has followed the path of other Mediterranean, left-leaning, anti-establishment parties on the euro, with both Podemos (Spain) and SYRIZA (Greece) now being fully pro-Europe. As such, the probability that a PD-M5S government considers Euro-exit during its mandate is 0%. Counterintuitively, a PD-M5S coalition is therefore the most pro-market option for Italy. It would be relatively fiscally prudent and would surprise to the upside on structural reforms. In addition, it would give Italy a five-year window during which no challenge to its membership in European institutions is possible (provided that the coalition does not rely on small parties whose exit threatens the stability of government). This outcome could extend the current rally in Italian assets, although that rally is already long-in-the-tooth. On the other hand, a Forza-Lega coalition is the least stable. First, we believe that such a coalition has a 50% probability of challenging Italy's membership in European institutions at the first sign of a domestic recession. Lega is outwardly Euroskeptic, even at the top of the global economic cycle and with a healthy Italian recovery underway. Meanwhile, Silvio Berlusconi has consciously evolved his Forza Italia towards a more Euroskeptic position. In addition, we believe that this populist alliance would be fiscally profligate and would not attempt any structural reforms. This political outcome is therefore an occasion to underweight Italian sovereign bonds. Finally, a grand coalition would have a neutral market impact. However, due to structural political risks, we would expect such a government to collapse at the first sign of economic hardship.4 This would open up the risk of a Euroskeptic electoral challenge and a potential market riot as the likelihood of brinkmanship with Brussels and Berlin rises.5 We encourage our clients to revisit our "Divine Comedy" series on Italy, where we have set out the argument for why Euroskepticism continues to have appeal in Italy. We would briefly remind our readers that: Italians remain Euroskeptic despite a European-wide recovery in support for the common currency (Chart 17); Italians are increasingly confident in a future outside of Europe (Chart 18), whereas such a trend is not identifiable in wider Europe (Chart 19); Chart 17Italy Lags In Support For Euro Chart 18Italians Optimists About Future Outside EU While Europeans are increasingly comfortable with dual-identities (national and continental), Italians are increasingly identifying as strictly Italian (Chart 20); Chart 19Europeans Pessimists About Future Outside EU Chart 20We Are Italian (Not European)! Italians do not see the EU as a geopolitical project, leaving them more likely to focus on the transactional and economic nature of their relationship with Europe (Chart 21); Chart 21Italians View The EU In Transactional Terms On net, Italians are the most anti-immigrant people in core Europe (Chart 22), which suggests that the migration crisis hit them quite hard. Any restart of that crisis could push the country towards anti-EU politicians; Chart 22Italians Are Staunchly Anti-Immigration Finally, we would remind investors that many Italians continue to see FX devaluation as a panacea that can save the economy. Our view is that Italy has, by far, the highest baseline level of Euroskepticism among Euro Area members. The March 4 election is important because the next government will likely have to face a recession and a global downturn during its mandate. A grand coalition or a populist coalition would both leave Italy more vulnerable to Euroskeptic alternatives. This is because a grand coalition would most likely collapse at the first sign of a recession whereas a populist government would itself turn to Euroskepticism. If the election produces either of these outcomes, we would assign a very high probability - near 50% - that Italy produces a global risk off event sometime within the next five years. Bottom Line: The upcoming Italian parliamentary election is difficult to call, but one thing seems certain - the winning coalition will seek to ease fiscal policy. Euroskepticism will not be the major issue in the election given the expanding economy; yet, in two of the scenarios discussed above, it will come back with a vengeance after the next Italian recession. The ECB: Don't Fear The QE Unwind If there is one consensus view on Italy among investors (at least among the BCA clients that ask questions on Italy!), it is that Italian government bonds will suffer significant losses when the ECB begins to unwind its easy money policies. For many people, 10-year bonds trading with less than a 2% yield, with a government debt/GDP ratio near 130%, in a country with a structural low growth problem and perpetually unstable politics, just screams "bubble" - one that will end badly when the ECB is eventually forced to stop buying government bonds. With the broader Euro Area economy now operating at full employment, an announcement of a tapering of asset purchases by the ECB is inevitable. Our base case remains that the ECB will announce during the summer that the bond buying program will be wound down by year-end. After that, maturing bonds will be reinvested, with the first interest rate hike not taking place until the latter half of 2019. How the ECB communicates that message to the markets will be critical in avoiding a "Taper Tantrum 2.0." Already, the ECB is sending a bit of a mixed message with its current asset purchases. Officially, the central bank has been aiming to distribute its monthly pace of asset purchases along the lines of the ECB's Capital Key, which is roughly correlated to the size of each Euro Area country. This rule was put in place by the ECB to avoid any accusations that the central bank would politically favor the more indebted countries when executing its bond buying. Yet a look at the ECB's actual data on its monthly purchases shows that the Capital Key limits have often been breached, and for what appears to be reasons rooted in politics (Chart 23). The ECB exceeded the Capital Key limit on French bonds in the run-up to last year's French presidential election. The limit on Italian bonds was also consistently breached for much of last year, as investors were beginning to grow more concerned about potential ECB tapering and anti-euro factions winning the next election in Italy. We shared those concerns, which led us to downgrade Italian government bonds to underweight in Global Fixed Income Strategy in late 2016, both in absolute terms and versus Spanish debt. That call has obviously not worked out as we hoped. In fact, a counterintuitive result occurred where Italian bonds outperformed German debt in 2017, even as the ECB was already beginning to slow the pace of its bond buying. That can be seen in Chart 24, which shows the annual growth rate of the ECB's monetary base (which proxies the flow of bonds purchased by the ECB) versus both the Italy-Germany 10-year government bond spread (top panel) and the annual excess return of Italian government bonds relative to German debt (bottom panel).6 There has been no reliable correlation between the pace of ECB buying and the Italy-Germany spread, but there has been a very strong correlation with relative returns. When the ECB was buying more bonds in 2015 and 2016, Germany was outperforming Italy. The opposite occurred last year when the ECB started to dial back the pace of its purchases. Why? Most likely, it was because the Italian economy was starting to gain momentum, which helps alleviate (but not eliminate) the debt sustainability fears about Italy's massive debt stock. The ECB's other extraordinary policy tool, low interest rates, has been an even bigger support for Italian debt sustainability. The government of Italy has been able to consistently issue bonds with coupons below 1% in the years after the ECB went to its zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) in 2014, according to the Bank of Italy (Chart 25). This has lowered the average interest rate on all outstanding Italian government bonds from 4% to 3% over that same period. This also reduced the ratio of Italian government interest payments to GDP by nearly one full percentage point over the past three years (bottom panel). Chart 23The Capital Key Is Only##BR##A 'Guideline' For ECB QE Chart 24Less ECB Bond Buying =##BR##Italian Bond Outperformance! Chart 25ZIRP/NIRP More Helpful##BR##For Italy Than QE Italy still has a significant long-run fiscal problem, however. The gross government debt/GDP ratio of 126% is only dwarfed by Japan and Greece within the developed markets (Chart 26). Even when looked at on a net basis (i.e. excluding the debt owned by Italian government entities like state pension funds) and, more importantly, after removing the bonds owned by the ECB, Italy still has a stock of debt equal to 100% of GDP (Chart 27). This is the highest in the Euro Area for countries eligible for the ECB's asset purchase program. Chart 26Italy's Debt Problems Have Not Gone Away Chart 27Still A Big Stock Of Italian Debt, Net Of ECB Purchases Importantly for market perceptions of Italy's debt sustainability, the ECB absorbing 15% of the stock of Italian government bonds has provided some wiggle room for an expansion of fiscal deficits without materially affecting long-term interest rates. That is no small matter, given how it is highly likely that the winner of the March 4th Italian election will step on the fiscal accelerator. Bottom Line: The inevitable tapering of ECB asset purchases later in 2018 will not have a meaningful impact on Italian government bond valuations - as long as the ECB is not planning on quickly raising interest rates soon after tapering. Upgrade Italian government bonds to neutral until signs of an economic slowdown in Italy emerge. Investment Conclusions After assessing the four main drivers of Italian bond risk premia - economic growth, the health of the banks, domestic politics and ECB monetary policy - it is clear that the state of the economy is the most important factor. If Italian growth is strong enough, investors will feel more comfortable about chasing the higher yields on Italy's government bonds and be a lot more relaxed about its Euroskeptic leanings. Given Italy's heavy reliance on exports as the driver of the current cyclical upturn, this means Italian financial assets are a levered play on global growth. The next most important factor is the ECB's monetary policy, but specifically, its interest rate policy and not its asset purchase program. Chart 28Upgrade Italian Debt To##BR##Neutral Until Growth Rolls Over This week, we are upgrading our recommended allocation to Italian government bonds to neutral from underweight in Global Fixed Income Strategy. At current yield levels and spreads to core European debt, a move all the way to an overweight recommendation is not ideal. Yet the case for Italian bond underperformance on the back of political uncertainty and eventual ECB tapering is even less ideal. Moving to neutral is a sensible compromise between a positive cyclical backdrop with poor valuation. Going forward through 2018, we will monitor the Italy Leading Economic Indicator (LEI) as a signal for when to consider downgrading Italian debt. If the LEI begins to hook down, that would be a bearish sign for the relative performance of both Italian government bonds and Italian equities (Chart 28). In addition, any indication that the ECB is considering not only tapering its bond buying, but also raising interest rates, could pose a problem for Italian assets. Although given the low starting point for any shift higher in policy rates, it would likely take several interest rate increases before Italian economic growth would start to be negatively impacted. Over a longer-term time horizon, investment implications are difficult to gauge. Structurally, both from an economic and political perspective, Italy is the least stable pillar of European economy. As such, it still has a potential to be a source of global risk-off if an economic downturn negatively impacts the current political stability. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Patrick Trinh, Associate Editor Patrick@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst Ray@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Demographics And Geopolitics, Part I: A Silver Lining?", dated October 10, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 The new Italian Electoral law - also known as Rosatellum - is particularly negative for Five Start Movement (M5S). First, it assigns over a third (37%) of the seats using a first-past-the-post system. This will hurt M5S, which lacks a geographical base where it can guarantee easy electoral district wins. Second, the vote eliminates a seat bonus for the party that wins a plurality of votes, forcing the winning coalition to gain at least around 40% of the vote to govern. Eliminating the bonus hurts M5S as it has led other parties in the polls. That said, a coalition government almost guarantees that fiscal spending will increase over the course of the next administration, given that budget outlays will be used to grease-the-wheels of any coalition deal. 3 The Italian public, known for its knack for satire, has parodied the electoral platforms with a Twitter hashtag #AboliamoQualcosa ("let's abolish something"). Twitter and Facebook have suggested that everything from French carbonara to vegan Bolognese should be abolished (BCA's Geopolitical Strategy heartily agrees with both suggestions!). 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Divine Comedy: Italian Inferno," dated September 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Divine Comedy Part II: Italy In Purgatorio," dated June 21, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 It is important to note that the relative returns shown in the bottom panel Chart 24 are calculated using the Bloomberg Barclays benchmark Treasury indices for Italy and Germany. These indices include debt across all maturities for both countries, not just the benchmark 10-year Italy-Germany spread shown in the top panel.
Special Report Highlights Japan Economy & Inflation: Japan is in the midst of a solid cyclical upturn, driven by strong exports and rising investment spending. Yet despite signs that the economy is running at an above-potential pace with no spare capacity in labor or product markets, inflation remains tame. This puts no immediate pressure on the Bank of Japan (BoJ) to move away from its easy policy stance. Future BoJ Options: When the BoJ does finally consider a shift in its monetary policy, the first thing it will do is raise its yield target on the 10-year JGB. Before doing that, three things must happen - yen weakness, higher core Japanese inflation and much higher non-Japanese global bond yields. Feature Chart 1A 'Non-Systemic' Vol Spike Global financial markets appear to be calming down a bit after the Great Volatility Scare of 2018. While the equity market sell-off and spike in volatility was intensely compacted into a brief period of time, the changes has been relatively modest when looked at against the broader history of the past decade (Chart 1). This may have been a serious market tremor, but it is not clear that this was the beginning of "The Big One." What could turn investor sentiment into a more permanently bearish state would be a sign of a coordinated move to tighter monetary policy by all the major global central banks. The Federal Reserve is in the midst of a prolonged tightening cycle, while the European Central Bank (ECB) is more openly debating the future of its asset purchase program. Yet amidst all the current investor worries about higher inflation and rising global bond yields, any sign that the hyper-easy BoJ is openly moving to a less accommodative monetary policy could be the trigger for the next wave of market volatility. The BoJ's current policy is to manage short-term interest rates and asset purchases to keep the benchmark 10-year Japanese Government Bond (JGB) yield around 0%. What would it take for the BoJ to make a change to that policy? In this Special Report, we take a look at the current cyclical dynamics for Japanese economic growth and inflation, and determine what it would take to force the BoJ to consider altering its current policy. We conclude that three things that must ALL happen before the BoJ could possibly change its strategy: The USD/JPY exchange rate must increase back to at least the 115-120 range Japanese core CPI inflation and nominal wage inflation must both rise sustainably above 1.5% The 10-year JGB yield must reach an overvalued extreme versus the 10-year U.S. Treasury Strong Japanese Growth, But Where's The Inflation? If it was strictly a growth story, the BoJ could have a case to begin formally removing monetary accommodation relatively soon. The Japanese economy is enjoying a broad-based upturn led by robust export demand and a pickup in capital spending (Chart 2). Private consumption and government spending have also provided smaller, but still positive, contributions to Japanese GDP growth in the current cycle. The BoJ stated in its latest Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (January 2018) that Japan's economy has entered a virtuous cycle from income to spending that would support continued growth this year. The leading economic indicator estimated by Japan's Cabinet Office is expanding at a solid rate that suggests real GDP growth could accelerate to a well-above potential pace around 2.5% in 2018. The manufacturing PMI is now at the highest level in four years, while the December Tankan survey was the highest reading since Japan's asset bubble burst in the early 1990s. The cyclical upturn in growth has boosted corporate profits, business confidence and capital spending (Chart 3). This is especially so on the manufacturing side of the Japanese economy, where machinery orders and capacity utilization are at the highest levels in almost three years and the level of industrial production is now back to pre-crisis highs. The high level of capacity utilization is a boost both to the economy - through capital spending, as firms need to invest to keep up with underlying demand - and to corporate profits as companies can spread their fixed costs of production over more units sold. Against this backdrop, it is no surprise that Japanese business confidence is solid (bottom panel). Chart 2Lots Of Good Economic News In Japan Chart 3A Cyclical Rise In Production & Confidence Japan's economy remains highly levered to global growth, as the pickup in machinery orders has been focused on foreign demand (Chart 4, bottom panel). With the global leading economic indicator still in a steady uptrend, however, overall export growth should remain in good shape in the next few quarters. For most countries, a solid economic upturn like Japan is currently enjoying would potentially trigger some inflationary pressures. Alas, Japan is not most countries. Over the past several years, the BoJ has consistently projected that Japanese inflation will be on a path to reach its 2% target. That can be seen in Chart 5, which shows Japanese core CPI inflation (ex fresh food) with the annual forecasts produced by the BoJ each year (the dotted lines). Yet the only time that core inflation got remotely close to that level was in 2014 - and, only then, after global oil prices had breached the $100/bbl level. Inflation expectations momentarily rose at that time, but plunged in 2015 as oil prices collapsed. Since then, CPI swaps have struggled to trade much above 0%, only starting to perk up last year as oil prices began rising once again (bottom panel). Chart 4Japan Is Benefiting From##BR##Strong Global Growth Chart 5Watch Oil & The Yen,##BR##Not The BoJ Inflation Forecasts Having inflation consistently below its target rate is frustrating to the BoJ. By its own estimates, Japan's output gap closed in 2016 and now sits at +1.35% - levels that have been consistent with headline CPI inflation rates of 2% or greater since the mid-1980s (Chart 6, top panel). Our own Japan headline CPI diffusion index, which measures the breadth of the moves in inflation across ten CPI sectors, is struggling to stay above the 50 line, unlike those previous periods where Japan had a large positive output gap. The main reason for this is that Japanese service sector inflation, consisting of around ½ of the total Japanese CPI index, remains anemic at 0.8% or a massive 2.3 percentage points below the rate of goods inflation (bottom panel). The odds of the BoJ successfully seeing Japanese inflation reach its target are low without any meaningful pickup in services inflation. The latter requires a boost to household purchasing power, which is next to impossible without faster wage growth. One of the fundamental reasons for Japan's low inflation continues to be the surprising lack of wage inflation despite strong Japanese profitability and a very tight labor market. Japanese firms are enjoying an extended period of robust earnings growth, with corporate profits up nearly 500% since the trough during the 2009 recession (Chart 7, top panel). Moreover, firms have not been cutting back on labor over that period. The jobs-to-applicant ratio has steadily climbed and is now at the highest level since 1974, and while the annual rate of employment growth remains well above the historical average (2nd panel). The result is an unemployment rate that is currently at 2.8%, well below the OECD's estimate of the full employment NAIRU at 3.6% (3rd panel). Yet despite firms remaining desperate to hire new employees to fill empty or newly created positions, at a time when there is no spare labor capacity, wage growth remains stagnant. Nominal wage growth is only 0.6%, or -0.6% in real terms. The problem of low real wage growth is not unique to Japan, of course (bottom panel), but it is unusual given how far the Japanese unemployment rate is below NAIRU. The subject of persistent low wages has become an important political matter for Japanese PM Shinzo Abe, given that breaking Japan out of its low inflation trap has become critical to the long-term success of his "Abenomics" program. Our colleagues at BCA Geopolitical Strategy discussed this exact topic in a Special Report published last week, noting that: Wages will be a decisive factor in Abe's economic success .... In this spring's "shunto" negotiations between businesses and unions, both the Abe administration and Keidanren, the top business group, are asking for 3% wage increases. The biggest union, Rengo, is only asking for one percentage point more. Abe has dedicated the current Diet session, beginning January 22, to "work-style reforms" that should be, on net, positive for wage growth. He wants to remove disparities between regular and irregular workers, particularly regarding wages, training opportunities, and welfare benefits. He also wants to impose limits on the workweek - putting a cap on the average 80-hour workweek of Japan's full-time workers so as to force companies to hire more irregular workers on a full-time basis (and to encourage employed people to have children). Companies that raise wages by 3% or more will see a cut in the corporate tax rate from around 30% to 25%.1 If Abe is successful in convincing Japanese companies to boost wages, this can help broaden the current cyclical economic upturn in Japan through faster consumer spending. Consumption has lagged other more robust parts of the economy during the current cycle (Chart 8, top panel), even though consumer confidence has surged in response to the healthy labor market (middle panel). Real disposable income growth has been unable to exceed 1% since 2010, a problem for consumer spending that has been exacerbated by the five percentage point rise in the household saving rate since 2013 (bottom panel). Chart 6Domestic Inflation,##BR##Like Services, Is Anemic Chart 7Japanese Companies##BR##Are Not Sharing The Wealth Chart 8Poor Fundamentals For##BR##The Japanese Consumer Putting it all together, the Japanese economy is in good shape, but inflation continues to undershoot the BoJ's goals. Bottom Line: Japan is in the midst of a solid cyclical upturn, driven by strong exports and rising investment spending. Yet despite signs that the economy is running at an above-potential pace with no spare capacity in labor or product markets, inflation remains tame. This puts no immediate pressure on the BoJ to move away from its easy policy stance. Plausible Next Steps For The BoJ The BoJ is in a difficult spot at the moment. The underwhelming pace of inflation is forcing the central bank to continue committing to its aggressive monetary easing programs, which include large-scale purchases of Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) and Japanese equities via ETFs. Yet the BoJ already shifted from a quantity target for its JGB purchases to a price target back in September 2016 when it introduced the "Yield Curve Control" (YCC) element to its overall Quantitative & Qualitative Easing (QQE) program. By switching to a price level on the 10-year, the BoJ was aiming to reduce the amount of JGBs it was buying from 80 trillion yen per year to whatever level was required to keep the 10-year yield at 0%. After switching to the YCC framework, the growth in the BoJ's JGB holdings slowed sharply to a pace that is now below the pace of new JGB issuance for the first time since the QQE program started in 2013 (Chart 9). It is no coincidence that the peak in the pace of BoJ buying coincided with the cyclical trough in our own BoJ Central Bank Monitor, which suggests that tighter monetary policy is now required in Japan (top panel). The BoJ has been successful in keeping the 10-year JGB yield near its 0% target, but that outcome will be operationally harder to achieve in the future. The BoJ currently holds about 70% of all 10-year JGBs outstanding, and the increase in ownership has risen by 5-7% in each quarter (Chart 10). In other words, if this pattern lasts, without a major increase in issuance at that maturity, the BoJ will effectively own all the 10-year JGBs outstanding by the middle of 2019. Already, the BoJ owns around 43% of the entire stock of JGBs, draining liquidity away from the market for the risk-free asset (government bonds) that is needed by Japanese banks and major investors like pension funds and insurance companies (Chart 11). Chart 9BoJ Has Already 'Tapered'##BR##Its Bond Purchases Chart 10The BoJ Is Cornering##BR##The JGB Market With the BoJ unwilling to continue impairing the liquidity in the JGB market, it will be forced to consider alternatives to its current YCC program settings. Last week, the Japanese government nominated BoJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda for another five-year term as the head of the central bank. Kuroda has received the full trust from PM Abe in his handling of monetary policy. However, maintaining the current monetary policy has some limitations. What can the BoJ realistically do? Until realized inflation reaches the BoJ target, there can be no shift to a less accommodative monetary policy involving a full tapering of asset purchases or interest rate increases. Yet the BoJ cannot continue to buy bonds at the current pace without essentially "cornering the market" for 10-year JGBs. The solution that would be the least disruptive, in our view, would be increasing the YCC yield target from the current 0%. It has been rumored over the past year that the BoJ would consider raising that yield curve target, although that idea has been repeatedly shot down by Governor Kuroda - no surprise, given how far inflation is from the BoJ target. The BoJ has been already been effectively "tapering" by buying fewer bonds under YCC than QQE. An explicit announcement to reduce the pace of bond buying, however, would be taken as a hawkish sign by the markets. Just ask the ECB, who is dealing with its own communication problems with the markets as it tries to prepare for the inevitable exit from its bond buying program. Explicitly raising the yield curve target would only be an option for the BoJ if it felt that a) the domestic economy could tolerate some increase in longer-term bond yields; b) Japanese inflation was likely to reach (or even surpass) the BoJ's 2% target; and c) the global economy was strong enough to push global bond yields to a sustained higher trajectory. We see the following as being a necessary "checklist" of events that must occur before the BoJ would even contemplate a more to a higher target on the 10-year JGB yield (Chart 12): Chart 11JGB Ownership Shares##BR##By Investor Category Chart 12These Must ALL Happen Before##BR##The BoJ Lifts Its JGB Yield Target 1) The USD/JPY exchange rate must increase back to at least the 115-120 range The recent rise in the yen versus the U.S. dollar has flied in the face of interest rate differentials that should be highly supportive of the U.S. dollar (top panel). This is not the only currency pair where this has happened, of course, but it matters far more for Japan given the low readings on headline inflation. A strengthening yen makes a difficult job - boosting Japanese inflation sustainably to 2% - almost impossible. 2) Japanese core CPI inflation and nominal wage inflation must both rise sustainably above 1.5% This is fairly obvious, but the BoJ cannot be confident that its 2% inflation target can be reached if core inflation continues to muddle along at levels well below that target. If wage growth were to also rise at the same time and pace as core inflation, both within hailing distance of 2%, then the BoJ would be even more convinced that some modest change to its yield target was required. 3) The 10-year JGB yield must reach an overvalued extreme versus U.S. Treasuries Table 1JGB Yield Model Or put more simply, global bond yields must rise by enough for the BoJ to say that there has been a shift in the global growth/inflation backdrop, justifying a structurally higher level of bond yields. The BoJ could then point to non-Japanese factors as the reason to bump up the target for 10-year JGB yields. We can evaluate this using the BoJ's own model for the 10-year JGB yield that was introduced back in 2016 (Table 1). This model includes Japanese potential GDP growth, the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield and the share of JGBs owned by the BoJ (along with "dummy variables" to identify the dates of the BoJ's QQE and negative interest rate policy). In the bottom two panels of Chart 12, we show a scenario that would lower the residual of the model (i.e. how far JGB yields are below fair value) to the same extremes seen during the QQE era since 2013. That would require a move in the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield to 3.5% AND an increase in the BoJ ownership share of the entire stock of JGBs to 50%. That would increase the fair value of the 10-year JGB yield to 0.18%, leaving the current yield around 10bps too expensive. Importantly, all three items in our checklist would have to happen at the same time for the BoJ to contemplate any shift in its yield curve target. That is especially true for USD/JPY. Japan would face considerable international pressure if the yen was held at undervalued levels by an overly accommodative BoJ policy that was no longer needed with Japanese inflation approaching the 2% target. What are the odds of all three of these items in our checklist being reached in 2018? Quite low, perhaps no more than 20%. For that reason, we do not see the BoJ being a new reason for frazzled global investors to worry about another spike in volatility. Bottom Line: When the BoJ does finally consider a shift in its monetary policy stance, the first thing it will do is raise its yield target on the 10-year JGB. Before doing that, three things must happen - yen weakness, higher core Japanese inflation and much higher non-Japanese global bond yields. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst Ray@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Kuroda Or No Kuroda, Reflation Ahead", dated February 7th 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights Persistent QE, ZIRP and NIRP have severely distorted the valuation relationship between equities and bonds on a global scale. Hence, the risk is that financial market distortions will infect the economy, not the other way round. A global mini-downturn in the first half of 2018 is now all but guaranteed. High conviction equity sector recommendation: underweight the major cyclical equity sectors: specifically, Banks, Materials and Energy; but overweight Airlines. High conviction currency recommendation: yen first; euro second; pound third; dollar fourth. Feature Stock markets ascend by walking up the stairs, but they descend by jumping out of the window. Unfortunately, investors often misinterpret the low volatility of a market ascent as a sign that equity risk has diminished. In fact, the low volatility just tells us that walking up the stairs is a slow and dull process (Chart I-2). It tells us nothing about equity risk. Chart of the WeekA Global Mini-Downturn In H1 2018 Is Now All But Guaranteed Chart I-2Stock Markets Climb Up The Stairs, And Then Jump Out Of The Window The risk of equities, as we have just seen, is that they do periodically jump out of the window. Meaning that equities have the potential to suffer much more intense short-term losses than short-term gains. This ratio of potential losses to potential gains is technically known as negative skew. For a reminder why equity returns have this unattractive asymmetry, please revisit our Special Report 'Negative Skew': A Ticking Time-Bomb.1 That said, equity returns always possess negative skew, so there is nothing new about stock markets jumping out of the window, as they have this week. Persistent QE, ZIRP And NIRP Have Created A Severe Financial Distortion The much bigger story is that persistent QE, ZIRP and NIRP2 have imparted negative skew on bond returns too. Central banks accept that there is a 'lower bound' for policy interest rates - perhaps slightly negative - below which there would be an exodus of bank deposits. The limit also marks the lower bound for bond yields. Approaching this lower bound for yields, bond prices have diminishing upside with increasing downside (Chart I-3). So at low bond yields, mathematics necessarily forces bond markets also to walk up the stairs and then jump out of the window (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Chart I-3Approaching The Lower Bound For Yields, Bond Prices ##br##Have Diminishing Upside With Increasing Downside Chart I-4In A Low Yield Era, Bond Markets ##br##Also Climb Up The Stairs... Chart I-5... And Then Jump Out ##br##Of The Window As the risk of owning 10-year bonds has increased to become 'equity-like', it has removed the requirement for an excess return, a risk premium, on equities. In other words, persistently ultra-accommodative monetary policy has diminished the prospective 10-year annual return on global equities to become 'bond-like', collapsing from 9% in 2012 to 1.5% today - exactly the same rate of return that is now offered by the global 10-year bond (Chart I-6). In effect, persistent QE, ZIRP and NIRP have severely distorted the valuation relationship between equities and bonds. Chart I-6Equities' Prospective Returns##br## Have Become 'Bond-Like' However, as we explained last week in Beware The Great Moderation 2.0,3 the nose-bleed valuation of the world stock market is justified only as long as bond yields stays low. Above a 2% yield, the payoffs offered by bonds gradually lose their negative skew and thereby become less risky than those offered by equities. So equities must once again compensate by offering an excess prospective return, necessitating a derating of today's elevated valuations. Specifically, we wrote that the big threat to equity valuations "comes from the global 10-year bond yield rising to 2% - broadly equivalent to the German 10-year bund yield rising to 1% or the U.S. 10-year T-bond yield rising to 3%." To which one client responded "markets do not respect round numbers... if the trigger-point is 3%, then you must act well before that." Wise words indeed. The U.S. 10-year T-bond yield got as far as 2.88% before triggering a reversal in equity valuations. Financial Distortions Threaten The Real Economy Chart I-7Financial Conditions 'Easiness' Is Just ##br##Tracking The Stock Market Many people naturally assume that the economy drives the financial markets. This may be true some of the time, or even most of the time. But in the last three downturns, the causality ran the other way round - financial market distortions dragged down the economy. The bursting of the dot com bubble triggered the downturn in 2001; the large-scale mispricing of U.S. mortgages caused the Great Recession in 2008; and the explosive widening of euro area sovereign credit spreads resulted in the euro area recession in 2011. Which begs the question: is there a financial distortion or mispricing that could once again drag down the economy? The answer is an emphatic yes. To repeat, six years of persistent QE, ZIRP and NIRP have severely distorted the valuation relationship between equities and bonds on a global scale, compressing the prospective 10-year annual return on world equities from 9% to 1.5%.4 Thereby, equity returns which would have accrued in the future have been brought forward to the here and now in the form of elevated capital values. But if higher bond yields correct the severely distorted valuation relationship between equities and bonds, the effect will be to move these returns from the present back to the future, depressing capital values today. Now note that while world GDP is worth around $80 trillion, the combination of equities and correlated risk-assets such as corporate and EM debt is worth double that, around $160 trillion, and real estate is worth $220 trillion. If returns from these richly valued asset-classes are redistributed from the present back to the future, through lower capital values today, there is a very real risk that current spending could take a hit. Supporting this broad thesis, central bank measures of 'financial conditions easiness' just track tick for tick the level of the stock market (Chart I-7). What To Do Now The upturn in bond yields which started last summer threatens to impact activity through two separate channels. As just discussed, the first is the financial market channel via a setback to global risk-asset capital values. The second is the bank credit channel. Changes in the bond yield very clearly and reliably lead changes in credit flows, the credit impulse, by 6 months. Therefore, the rise in bond yields is only now starting to pull down the credit impulse - and thereby the global activity mini-cycle, which is the all-important driver of mainstream European investments. It follows that a global mini-downturn in the first half of 2018 is now all but guaranteed (Chart of the Week). And that the higher that bond yields go from here, the more marked this mini-downturn will be. This reinforces two high conviction investment recommendations. First, it is now appropriate to underweight cyclical equity sectors: specifically, Banks, Materials and Energy. Against this, the one cyclical sector to upgrade to overweight is Airlines, given the sector's negative correlation with the oil price. Second, the payoff profile for exchange rates is just tracking expected long-term interest rate differentials (Chart I-8). This means that when the expected interest rate is close to the lower bound, the currency possesses a highly attractive payoff profile called positive skew. In essence, for any central bank already at the realistic limit of ultra-loose policy - such as the BoJ and ECB - the direction of policy rate expectations cannot go significantly lower. Conversely, tightening expectations for the Federal Reserve are approaching a magnitude that threatens either risk-asset prices and/or economic growth. So these expectations cannot go significantly higher (Chart I-9). Chart I-8Exchange Rates Are Tracking Long-Term ##br## Interest Rate Differentials Chart I-9Expected Interest Rates In The Euro Area And ##br##U.S. Will Converge One Way Or The Other On this basis, we reiterate our high conviction pecking order for currencies in 2018. Yen first; euro second; pound third; dollar fourth. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report 'Negative Skew: A Ticking Time-Bomb', July 27 2017 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Quantitative Easing, Zero Interest Rate Policy and Negative Interest Rate Policy. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, 'Beware The Great Moderation 2.0', February 1 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 4 This 1.5% forecast comes from regressing the world equity market to GDP multiple through 1998-2008 with subsequent 10-year returns, observing a very tight relationship, and then using the same relationship on current world equity market cap to GDP. Fractal Trading Model* This week's recommended trade is to go long utilities versus the market. The profit target is 3.5% outperformance with a symmetrical stop-loss. It was an excellent week for our other trades with short palladium hitting its 6% profit target, while underweight Japanese energy and long USD/ZAR are both in comfortable profit. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights A potential rise in U.S. inflation and China's growth slowdown represent formidable headwinds to EM risk assets. A manifestation of these tectonic macro shifts will be a U.S. dollar rally and weakening commodities prices. These two will dent the EM risk asset rally. Strong DM growth will not offset the impact of a slower Chinese economy on EMs and commodities. A new fixed-income trade: bet on a steeper swap curve in Mexico relative to Canada. Feature The global macro landscape in 2018 will be shaped by the two tectonic shifts: U.S. fiscal stimulus amid vigorous growth, and policy tightening in China amid lingering credit and money excesses. The former will grease the wheels of the already robust U.S. economy, generating a whiff of inflation and fueling a further selloff in the U.S. bond market. China's tightening will in turn weigh on commodities prices and curtail the emerging market (EM) economic recovery. A manifestation of these tectonic macro shifts will be a U.S. dollar rally and weakening commodities prices producing formidable headwinds to EM risk assets. As such, we are reiterating our recommendation to underweight EM risk assets versus their DM peers. As to the absolute performance, we believe EM risk assets are close to a major market top. A Whiff Of U.S. Inflation Strong U.S. growth could in fact be damaging to EM financial markets, as it will likely augment U.S. consumer price inflation. Investors are currently extremely sanguine on U.S. inflationary pressures. An upside surprise to inflation will lift U.S. interest rate expectations further, supporting the greenback and hurting EM carry trades. There is some evidence that U.S. inflation is about to pick up: The New York Federal Reserve underlying inflation gauge is rising, signaling higher inflation ahead (Chart I-1). The nascent revival in the MZM (money of zero maturity) impulse presages a trough in inflation (Chart I-2). Chart I-1Fed Price Pressure Gauge Signifies Higher Inflation Chart I-2U.S. Money Growth And CPI The weak U.S. dollar will also help augment inflation in America. U.S. import prices from emerging Asia and Mexico have been rising - even before the latest carnage in the U.S. dollar (Chart I-3). This will filter through into higher domestic price pressures. Chart I-3U.S. Import Prices Are Rising In brief, fiscal stimulus amid buoyant growth as well as overwhelming optimism among consumers and businesses is creating fertile ground for companies to raise prices. This will amplify corporate profit growth but will also lead to higher inflation. We are not making a case that U.S. inflation is about to surge. Our thesis is that market participants are very complacent on inflation. The money market is pricing in only 96 basis points in rate hikes in 2018-'19. In the meantime, the term premium in the U.S. yield curve is extremely depressed. Therefore, even modest inflation surprises will likely produce an additional meaningful selloff in U.S./DM bond markets. Will global share prices rise in response to strong corporate profit growth, or sell off in the face of higher U.S. inflation? Our hunch is that share prices will suffer as rising bond yields cause multiples to shrink. Rising bond yields will overpower the profit growth impact on share prices. The basis is that multiples are disproportionately and inversely linked to percentage change interest rates but are proportionately and positively linked to EPS.1 At still-low yields, a 50-basis-point rise in bond yields constitutes a sizable percentage change in the bond yield, likely leading to a meaningful P/E de-rating. Current sky-high bullish sentiment towards equities combined with elevated valuations and overbought conditions will mean that even a modest rise in inflation readings will likely trigger equity market jitters. EMs will underperform DMs amid such a selloff, as the former has benefited much more than the latter from low interest rates. Bottom Line: U.S. fiscal stimulus is arriving at a time when final demand is robust, the labor market is tight and business and consumer confidence is buoyant. This will encourage companies to raise prices, resulting in a whiff of U.S. inflation. The latter will rattle markets in the months ahead. China: Tightening Amid Credit/Money Excesses Inflation in China has already been steadily rising (Chart I-4). Interest rates adjusted for inflation remain low. Rising inflation along with still-lingering credit and money excesses necessitates policy tightening. We have written extensively about China's ongoing tightening trifecta - liquidity tightening, increased regulatory oversight and clampdown as well as an anti-corruption crackdown in the financial industry.2 Regulatory tightening in particular could inflict a particular bite as it outright constrains banks' ability to originate credit. This tightening has already led to record low broad money growth, and credit growth is downshifting too (Chart I-5). The cumulative impact of this tightening will play out in the months ahead, weighing further on money and credit growth and ultimately on final demand. Chart I-4China: Inflation Is In Steady Uptrend Chart I-5China: Broad Money And Credit Growth On the fiscal front, local government spending has languished in recent months (Chart I-6, top panel) and general (central plus local) government spending growth has been lackluster (Chart I-6, bottom panel). In 2017, local government annual spending amounted to RMB 19 trillion, or 22% of nominal GDP. Central government expenditures are about 6-fold smaller. Local governments rely on land sales to replenish their coffers, but timid money growth points to weaker land sales ahead (Chart I-7). In the meantime, their annual borrowing is restricted by the central government. Overall, this will constrain local government expenditures in 2018. Chart I-6China: Government Expenditures Chart I-7China: Land Sales To Slump The combined credit and fiscal spending impulse heralds a relapse in mainland imports of goods and commodities (Chart I-8). This constitutes a major threat to commodities prices, and consequently to EM. A pertinent question is whether financial markets will react to rising U.S. inflation or a slowdown in Chinese growth. Clearly, one could argue that strong U.S. growth would offset a mainland growth slump, resulting in a stable global macro environment. However, financial markets are an emotional discounting mechanism, and they do not always follow rational thinking. For example, in the first half of 2008 - just a few months ahead of the Global Financial Crisis - global financial markets were preoccupied with mounting global inflation due to strong growth in EM/China. At the time, oil and many other commodities prices were literally surging, and U.S. bond yields were climbing (Chart I-9). Global financial markets were not concerned with the ongoing U.S. recession, shrinking bank loans and deflating house prices. Chart I-8China's Impact On Rest Of The World Chart I-92008: An Inflation Scare Just ##br##Before Deflationary Bust In retrospect, financial markets traded on the theme of rising global inflation in the first half of 2008 even though the U.S. was already in a recession, and was heading into the most severe deflationary bust of the past 80 years. Similarly, the financial markets today could trade on the U.S. inflation theme for a couple months, even though China will be slowing. Bottom Line: China's policy tightening is particularly dangerous because it is occurring amid substantial and still-lingering credit, money and property market excesses. Won't Strong DM Growth Support China And Other EMs? Our investment stance on EM has been and remains negative, despite our positive view on U.S. and European growth. The key rationale for this stance is that EMs are much more leveraged to China than to the U.S. and Europe. Hence, our view assumes de-synchronization of growth between EM and DM. In our opinion, an EM slowdown will be largely due to China's deceleration and the latter's impact on commodities prices and non-commodity economies in Asia via trade. South America, Russia, South Africa, Malaysia and Indonesia are commodities producers, and as such are sensitive to fluctuations in commodities prices. The rest of Asia - Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines - are still exposed to the mainland economy as the latter is their largest export destination. Thus out of the EM sphere, China's dynamics will have a limited impact on only Mexico, India, and Turkey. However, Mexico is at risk of a NAFTA abrogation, while Turkey is at risk of runaway inflation and monetary profligacy. India on the other hand has its own problems and its bourse is unlikely to do well, given it is overbought and expensive. Furthermore, while we are bullish on the growth outlook in central European economies, they are too small to matter from an EM benchmark perspective. It might be useful to contemplate the late 1990s macro dynamics when major decoupling occurred between DM and EM. The booming economies of the U.S. and Europe did not prevent recurring crises in EM in the second half of the 1990s. Chart I-10 illustrates that U.S. and European imports growth was surging at that time, but EM stocks and currencies collapsed. What's more, despite the economic boom in DM during that period - U.S. and euro area real GDP growth rates averaged 4.2% and 2.6%, respectively, between 1996 and 1998 - commodities prices were in a bear market (Chart I-11). Chart I-10EM Crises In 1997-98: U.S. And ##br##Europe's Imports Were Booming Chart I-11Booming DM GDP And ##br##Falling Commodities Prices One might suspect that EM crises in the second half of the 1990s occurred because booming DM growth led to rising U.S. bond yields. However, Chart I-12 portrays that U.S. bond yields actually fell in 1997 and 1998 due to the deflationary shock stemming from the EM turmoil. Chart I-12EM Crises Occurred Amid ##br##Falling U.S. Bond Yields By and large, the 1997-98 EM crises occurred despite buoyant DM growth and falling DM bond yields. Nowadays, advanced economies carry much smaller weight in global trade and GDP than they did 20 years ago. Furthermore, EMs are much less dependent on exporting to DMs than they were two decades ago. In addition, China was not an economic powerhouse 20 years ago like it is today, and it did not buy as much from the rest of EMs as it does today. Presently, China holds the key to the EM outlook, and the link is through Chinese imports of goods and commodities. As China's credit and fiscal spending impulse suggests, mainland imports are likely to slow, weighing on commodities prices (refer to Chart I-8 on page 6). To be sure, we are not suggesting that EMs are facing crises similar to what transpired in 1997-98. The point of this comparison is to highlight that robust DM growth in of itself is not sufficient to head off an EM downturn if the latter faces a negative shock from China. With respect to DM growth benefiting China itself, it is critical to realize that China's exports to the U.S. and EU together account for only 6.6% of Chinese GDP (Chart I-13). By far, the largest component of the mainland economy is capital spending, constituting 42% of GDP. Construction and infrastructure are an integral part of capital expenditures, and they are very sensitive to money/credit cycles. Finally, from a global trade perspective, China and the rest of EM account for 46% of global imports, while the U.S. and EU account for 20% and 15%, respectively (Chart I-14). Hence, the total import bill of EM including China is larger than that of the U.S.'s and EU's imports combined. This entails that the pace of global trade growth is set to moderate if EM/China domestic demand decelerates. Chart I-13What Drives Chinese Economy: ##br##Capex Not Exports To DM Chart I-14Important Of EM/China In Global Trade Bottom Line: Strong DM growth will not offset the impact of a slower Chinese economy on EMs and commodities. Investment Conclusions A manifestation of the above-discussed tectonic macro shifts - a rise in U.S. inflation and China's slowdown - will be a U.S. dollar rally and weakening commodities prices. These two macro shifts will produce a perfect storm for EM risk assets. As a harbinger of a forthcoming selloff in EM exchange rates and DM commodities currencies (AUD, NZD and CAD), their implied volatility measures are already picking up (Chart I-15). As to a China/Asia slowdown, Korean, Taiwanese and Singaporean manufacturing output volume growth rates have already relapsed (Chart I-16). Their exports and corporate profits still appear robust because of rising prices. This certifies that there are inflationary pressures, even in Asia. Chart I-15Currency VOLs Are Rising Chart I-16Asian Manufacturing Output Volume All in all, we maintain a negative stance on EM risk assets in absolute terms and recommend underweighting them versus their DM peers. Within the EM universe, our equity market overweights are Taiwan, India, Korean technology, Thailand, Russia, central Europe and Chile. Our underweights are South Africa, Turkey, Brazil, Peru and Malaysia. Among currencies, our favorite shorts are the TRY, the ZAR, the MYR and the BRL. For investors who prefers relative EM currency trades, we recommend the following longs for crosses: RUB, TWD, THB, CNY and INR. For fixed-income trades, please refer to our open position table on page 18. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Mexico: Bet On A Steeper Swap Curve Relative To Canada For Mexican financial markets, the key uncertainty at the moment is the outcome of the ongoing NAFTA negotiations. Mexico's macro backdrop argues for considerable central bank easing, as inflation is about to roll over and domestic demand is extremely weak. However, if the U.S. pulls out of NAFTA - the odds of which are considerable, as our Geopolitical Strategy team has argued3 - the peso will sell off and interest rates are likely to rise. How should investors position themselves in Mexican fixed-income markets given this binominal outcome from the NAFTA negotiations and uncertainty over its timing? One way is to position for a swap curve steepening in Mexico, and hedge it by betting on a swap curve flattening in Canada by entering the following pair trades (Chart II-1): Chart II-1Mexico, Canada And Their ##br##Relative Swap Curve Receive 6-month and pay 10-year swap rates in Mexico Pay 6-month and receive 10-year swap rates in Canada In A Scenario Where The U.S. Withdraws From NAFTA: The Mexican swap curve would invert due to short-term rates going up more than long-term rates. In Canada, potential risks from NAFTA abrogation and tightening monetary policy amid frothy property markets and high household debt will cap upside in its long-term interest rates. With its long-term bond swap rates at par with those in the U.S., it seems as though the Canadian fixed income market is underpricing the risk of potential growth disappointments beyond the near run. In essence, should the U.S. withdraw from NAFTA, the loss realized on the Mexican steepener leg would partially be offset by the potential gain on the Canadian flattener leg. In A Scenario Where The U.S. Does Not Withdraw From NAFTA: The Mexican swap curve would start steepening. The rationale is that domestic dynamics suggest inflation has peaked and Banxico should begin its easing cycle soon. Monetary and fiscal policies have been extremely restrictive in Mexico, and considerable monetary easing is justified going forward: A significant part of the rise in inflation in 2017 was caused by peso depreciation in 2016. Last year's peso rally suggests that inflation should start to roll over soon (Chart II-2). Besides, one-off effects on inflation - such as the gasoline subsidy removal that took place at the end of 2016 - will subside as the base effect it has caused fades. In brief, the consumer inflation rate will rapidly decline, justifying substantial monetary easing. Banxico's 425 basis points in rate hikes since the end of 2015 are still filtering through the economy. The persistent slowdown in money and credit growth will continue to weigh on domestic demand for the time being. Notably, retail sales volume and gross fixed capital formation are both contracting while domestic vehicles sales are shrinking sharply (Chart II-3). Chart II-2Mexico: Inflation Is Set To Drop Chart II-3Mexico: Consumer And Business ##br##Spending Are Extremely Weak Due to currently high inflation, real wage growth remains weak. This will continue to weigh on consumer spending (Chart II-4). Fiscal policy has been tightening. Fiscal expenditures, excluding interest payments, are contracting in nominal terms (Chart II-5). Chart II-4Mexico: Real Wage Growth Is Very Timid Chart II-5Mexico: Fiscal Policy Is Super Tight Canada is currently on the opposite side of the business cycle spectrum relative to Mexico. The Canadian economy is very strong, being led by domestic demand. Real consumer spending is growing at its fastest pace in nearly 10 years, while the unemployment rate is at 40-year lows. Moreover, a record proportion of Canadian firms are having difficulty meeting demand because of capacity constraints and a tight labor market (Chart II-6, top and middle panel). Chart II-6Canadian Economy Is ##br##Above Full-Employment As such, the output gap is positive and growing, which has historically led to rising inflation (Chart II-6, bottom panel). Robust growth and rising inflation will force the Bank of Canada to hike rates further. In the meantime, real estate and consumer credit in Canada are overextended, leaving the Canadian consumer at risk from much higher interest rates. The threat that monetary tightening will hurt domestic demand in the future will cap the swap curve in Canada relative to Mexico. On the whole, in the scenario where the U.S. remains in NAFTA, the potential for swap curve steepening in Canada is less than in Mexico. Investment Recommendations We have been recommending that investors maintain a neutral stance across all asset classes in Mexico and wait for clarity on NAFTA negotiations before going overweight the country's currency, fixed-income markets and possibly equities relative to their EM peers. In the face of lingering NAFTA uncertainty, fixed-income investors should contemplate the following relative trade: Receive 6-month and pay 10-year swap rates in Mexico / pay 6-month and receive 10-year swap rates in Canada. Overall, this trade is exposed to minimal losses in the scenario where the U.S. withdraws from NAFTA but is exposed to considerable gains where the U.S. remains in NAFTA, making the overall risk/reward attractive. Provided the NAFTA negotiations could drag till year-end, this trade offers a reasonable risk-reward for traders. It offers a profitable opportunity to profit from Mexico's swap curve steepening, while limiting downside in case NAFTA is terminated before year-end. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 This is due to the fact that interest rates are in the denominator of the Gordon Growth model while EPS/dividends are in the numerator. 2 Please refer to Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Questions For Emerging Markets," dated November 29, 2017, the link is available on page 19. 3 Please refer to the Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, titled "Nafta - Populism Vs. Pluto-Populism," dated November 10, 2017, the link is available at gps.bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights Q4 earnings are beating raised expectations, and the bar for 2018 EPS is even higher. Housing, capex and a nudge from government spending are set to boost GDP in 2018. BCA's consumer spending model shows that economic factors, not sentiment or political affiliation, are the main drivers of household consumption. Feature Risk assets continued their early 2018 surge last week, supported by better than expected Q4 corporate earnings results, solid economic growth and a weaker dollar. The headline 2.6% gain in Q4 GDP understated the strength in the U.S. economy as 2017 ended (Chart 1). Real final sales to domestic purchasers rose 4.3% in Q4, the fastest clip in nearly four years. Moreover, the economy is poised to grow well above its long term potential in the first half of 2018, aided by surging capex, the lagged effect of easy financial conditions and the tax bill. Faster growth will push down the unemployment rate and lead to higher inflation by year end. Q4 corporate earnings are beating raised expectations. However, managements have raised the bar for 2018 results, which may lead to disappointment later this year. Investors have correctly ignored the elevated level of political polarization in Washington and focused on the fundamentals. The final section of this week's bulletin suggests that despite a widening gap in consumer sentiment between political parties, economic fundamentals, not political affiliation, drives consumer behavior. Chart 1GDP Growth Remains Below Average, But Above Fed's Long Run Target Raising The Bar The Q4 earnings reporting season is off to a strong start, with both EPS and revenue growth ahead of consensus expectations at the start of January. Moreover, the counter-trend rally in margins remains in place. We previewed the Q4 2017 S&P 500 earnings season earlier this month.1 Table 1S&P 500: Q4 2017 Results* Just under 30% of companies have reported results thus far, with 80% beating consensus EPS projections, well above the long term average of 69%. Furthermore, 82% have posted Q4 revenues that topped expectations, which exceeded the long-term average of 56%. The surprise factor for Q4 stands at 5% for EPS and 1% for sales. Both readings are right at the average surprise in the past five years. The surprise figures are even more impressive given that analysts' views of Q4 results increased between the start of Q4 2017 and the start of Q4 reporting season. Analysts' estimates typically move lower as the quarter unfolds, in effect lowering the bar for results. We anticipate the secular mean-reversion of margins to re-assert itself in the S&P data, perhaps beginning in mid-2018. Nonetheless, initial results imply that Q4 will be another quarter of margin expansion. Average earnings growth (Q4 2017 versus Q4 2016) is solid at 13% with revenue growth at 7%. However, on a four quarter basis, U.S. margins fell slightly in the fourth quarter, but remain at a high level on the back of decent corporate pricing power. A pick-up in productivity growth into year-end helped as well. Strength in earnings and revenues are broadly based (Table 1). Earnings per share increased in Q4 2017 versus Q4 2016 in 9 of the 11 sectors. EPS results are particularly stout in energy (140%), materials (28%), technology (18%) and financials (15%). The energy, materials and technology sectors likewise experienced significant sales gains (21%, 11%, and 11% respectively). The 5% year-over-year increase in financial sector earnings follows the 7% drop in Q3, owing to the impact of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma on the insurance and reinsurance industries. Excluding energy, S&P 500 profits in Q4 2017 versus Q4 2016 are a still-robust 11%. Upbeat managements have raised the bar significantly for 2018 results in the past few months (Chart 2). On October 1, 2017, before the GOP introduced the bill, the bottom-up estimate for 2018 S&P 500 EPS growth stood at 11%. As of January 26, 2018, the estimate is 17%. Moreover, the upward revisions are widespread. 2018 EPS growth rate estimates in 9 of 11 sectors are higher today than at the start of October (Table 2). 2018 consensus projections increased the most for Telecom, Financials, Energy, and Consumer Discretionary. Analysts have cut their view of 2018 results for the Utilities and Real Estate sectors since the bill was introduced. Our U.S. Equity Strategy service introduced profit models for all 11 S&P 500 sectors earlier this month.2 Chart 2Buybacks, Surging Capex Raising The Bar For 2018 EPS Growth Table 2Estimated Earnings Growth For 2018 The Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017 is behind most of this ebullience, but improving global growth, a steeper yield curve and higher energy prices are also responsible. The tax bill lowered the corporate tax rate for 2018 and the repatriation holiday provides firms with excess cash. As we noted in last week's report,3 companies are likely to return almost all of that cash to shareholders via increased buybacks. Moreover, a few firms are marking up 2018 estimates in anticipation of a surge in capital spending, as managements pull ahead new investment into 2018 from later years to benefit from the bill. Chart 3Profit Growth Will Peak In 2018 Analysts expect EPS growth to slow significantly in 2019 from the anticipated 2018 clip, which matches BCA's view. However, unlike estimates for 2017 and 2018, we anticipate that EPS estimates for 2019 will move lower throughout 2018 and 2019, ahead of a recession in late 2019.4 Bottom Line: The BCA earnings model shows that S&P 500 EPS growth is peaking on a four-quarter moving total basis, and should begin to decelerate in 2H 2018 to a level commensurate with 3 ½-4% nominal GDP growth (Chart 3). After-tax earnings growth will be higher than this, however, due to the recently passed tax cuts. Margins will crest in mid-2018, but BCA believes that the earnings backdrop will remain a tailwind for the equity market. The Tax Cut and Job Act raised expectations for 2018 in most sectors, and it remains to be seen whether managements can match the lofty projections, especially in the second half of the year. BCA expects growth outside the U.S. to remain robust, an additional support for EPS growth in the coming quarters. Further weakness in the dollar, counter to our call for a 5% gain in the DXY, would also provide a modest boost to S&P 500 results in 2018. Strong domestic economic activity will also boost profits this year. Setting The Stage For 2018 Q4 GDP posted a 2.6% gain, failing to match (raised) expectations of a 2.9% increase (Chart 1 again). At 2.5%, the year-over-year change in GDP exceeded the FOMC's forecast for 2017 GDP (2.1%) at the start of 2017. Moreover, the 2.5% year-over-year reading in Q4 is well above the Fed's estimate of potential GDP (1.8%). The implication for investors is that because U.S. economic growth is faster than its long-term potential, the labor market is tightening and inflation is poised to move higher. Accordingly, market odds for a Fed hike in March are over 90%, and investors expect almost three additional hikes in the next 12 months (Chart 4). The FOMC expects to raise rates three times this year. BCA's stance is that the Fed will raise rates 4 times. Chart 4The FOMC And The Market Are Closely Aligned On Rate Hikes In 2018 BCA's view is that U.S. economic growth is set to accelerate in the first half of 2018 aided by the tax cut, strong global growth and the lagged effect of easier financial conditions. The direct effect of the tax cuts will likely boost U.S. real GDP growth in 2018 by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points. It could be more, depending on the impact on animal spirits in the business sector and any fresh infrastructure spending. Full expensing of capital goods and changes to the budget sequesters would add another 0.2 percentage points. Global growth estimates are still on the upswing, which will provide U.S. capex a boost (Charts 5 and 6). Moreover, financial conditions have eased since the Fed's initial hike of the cycle (Chart 7). Financial lead GDP growth by 6 to 9 months, suggesting that real GDP growth in the U.S. will remain at or above 3% for at least the first half of 2018 (Chart 8). The New York Fed's Nowcast for Q1 2018 stands at 3.1%, while the Atlanta Fed's GDP Now reading for Q1 is 3.4% (Chart 9). Chart 5Global Growth Expectations##BR##Are Accelerating Chart 6Capex Poised##BR##For Liftoff Chart 7Financial Conditions Have Eased Since##BR##The Fed's First Rate Hike Of The Cycle Chart 8Easier Financial Conditions##BR##Will Boost U.S. Growth Chart 9Solid GDP Growth##BR##Expected In Q1 Residential investment, which surged in Q4 as communities in Texas and Florida began to rebuild after the storms, will add to growth in 2018. Inventories of new and existing homes are close to all-time lows (Chart 10). Housing affordability remains well above average, and will remain supportive of housing investment even if rates rise by 100 bps (Chart 11). Bank managements are upbeat about credit quality and loan growth,5 although the recent soundings from the Fed's Senior Loan Officers survey shows that mortgage demand has ebbed in recent quarters. However, banks' lending standards for home loans remain relatively loose (Chart 12). Moreover, household formation recovered in the past few years alongside the labor market, providing additional support for housing. Risks to housing include the impact of the limits to mortgage interest and state and local taxes imposed by the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017. Chart 10Solid Housing##BR##Fundamentals In Place Chart 11Housing Affordability Under##BR##Various Rate Assumptions Chart 12Mortgage Spigot##BR##Open For Homebuyers Bottom Line: U.S. economic growth is poised to string together the longest period of above-potential GDP growth since early in the recovery. The odds of a recession in 2018 are very low (Chart 13). Housing, capital spending and a modest lift from government spending will lift GDP, pushing the output gap further into positive territory (Chart 14). The added support to the economy from the tax bill makes it more likely that the economy will overheat, and lead to higher inflation and faster rate hikes than the market, or the Fed, expects. Stay underweight duration and overweight stocks versus bonds for now, although we plan to take some risk off the table later in the year. Despite record levels of political polarization, the U.S. consumer will provide support for the economy in 2018 as well. Chart 13Odds Of A Recession Are Low Chart 14U.S. Economy Growing Faster Than Potential Tribal Economics Chart 15Income Inequality Fosters Polarization Many of our clients have been asking: "Why is consumer confidence so high if Americans are so angry?" BCA's view is that Americans' anger is based to some extent on "economic discontent",6 driven largely by political orientation. However, economy-wide, the negative attitude based on party affinity is more than offset by a higher level of optimism based on economic fundamentals. Moreover, the dissatisfaction among households may be about structural issues that have long-term implications, like income inequality, which fosters or nurtures polarization and where the latter continues to grow. The polarization in the cultural realm has been mirrored in the political arena. According to political scientists Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, polarization in Congress is currently at its highest level since World War II (Chart 15). Furthermore, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service stance is that the long-term implications of polarization are here to stay as income inequality remains the most significant driver, among five main factors, that explain the polarization in the U.S. today.7 & 8 The election of President Trump in November 2016 ushered in a period of significant polarization and partisan conflict. Compared with other administrations, Trump effected the most change in economic expectations9 (Table 3). Moreover, even a year later, the partisan gap (Republicans minus Democrats) has widened further; Republicans are most optimistic and Democrats are most pessimistic (Chart 16). Table 3Change In Economic Assessments##BR##Pre And Post Elections Chart 16Partisan Gap Is Widest##BR##And Persistent, For Now To further understand the divergence between the elevated consumer sentiment readings and households' high level of anger, it is useful to look through the lens of the stages of "economic discontent".10 The framework pioneered by the University of Michigan identifies five typical stages of a collapse in economic confidence (Table 4). The study acknowledges that consumers are rational individuals. As such, households tend to shape their economic expectations on cyclical fundamental drivers of the economy, rather than political affiliation (Chart 17). The implication is that as long as consumers remain satisfied with the performance of the three cyclical drivers, readings on consumer sentiment will hold up, as the positive views on fundamentals outweigh any resentment they may have about long-term issues like income inequality. Finally, it is clear that households have not lost all hope (stage four), where economic discontent turns into political discontent. Consumers are very far away from total despair, not seen since the 1930s! Nonetheless, BCA's view is that with recession likely by late 2019/early 2020, the U.S. will see a revolt of some kind by the 2020 election.11 Table 4Five Stages Of##BR##Economic Discontent Chart 17Expectations For Cyclical##BR##Fundamental Drivers Are Solid Consumers have hope that their economic expectations will be met by the Trump administration's policies as the economy continues to deliver strong job growth/job security and tame inflation, preserving households' purchasing power. BCA's consumer spending model shows that economic factors, not sentiment, are the main drivers of household consumption (Chart 18). Several academic studies support this view. Researchers at Princeton University and the National Bureau of Economic Research find that political polarization's impact on consumer spending is trivial.12 Furthermore, a recent study by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,13 also finds that the election of President Trump had negligible partisan impact on consumer spending patterns. Economists at the NY Fed show that consumers' expectations in surveys may include "true beliefs" based on economic factors and "some noise". They conclude that if the partisan gap does not cause economic decisions to vary significantly, then macroeconomists and policymakers should downplay the impact of consumers' political views on spending patterns. Chart 18Consumption Has##BR##Room To Grow Chart 19Lower-Lows In The Personal##BR##Savings Rate Unlikely Bottom Line: BCA expects consumer spending to grow by at least 2% in 2018. Consumption is well supported by record high household net worth, and accelerating wages. On the other hand, employment growth will slow later this year and we should not assume that the personal saving rate will keep falling given that it has hit a recovery low of 3.1% (Chart 19). John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Jizel Georges, Senior Analyst jizelg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Smooth Transition" published January 15, 2018. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "White Paper: Introducing Our U.S. Equity Sector Earnings Models" published January 16, 2018. Available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Variations On A Theme" published January 22, 2018. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Strategy Outlook Fourth Quarter 2017: Goldilocks And The Recession Bear," October 4, 2017. Available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Variations On A Theme", published January 22,2018. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 6 "Economic Discontent: Causes and Consequences", Richard Curtin, Director, Survey of Consumers, University of Michigan, November 12, 2008. 7 Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Future Of Western Democracy: Back To Blood", dated November 18, 2016. Available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Election: Outcomes And Investment Implications", dated November 9, 2016. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 "Consumer Expectations: Politics Trumps Economics", Richard Curtin, University of Michigan, June 1, 2017. 10 "Economic Discontent: Causes and Consequences", Richard Curtin, Director, Survey of Consumers, University of Michigan, November 12, 2008. 11 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Special Report "Populism Blues: How And Why Social Instability Is Coming To America" June 9, 2017. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 "Partisan Bias, Economic Expectations, and Household Spending", Atif Mian, Amir Sufi and Nasim Koshkhou, Stanford University, University of Chicago Booth of Business, NBER and Argus Information and Advisory Services, July 2017. 13 "Political Polarization In Consumer Expectations", Olivier Armantier, John J. Conlon and Wilbert van der Klaauw, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, December 15, 2017.
Highlights December's money and trade data releases were not positive, but they do not likely herald a more aggressive economic slowdown than our base case view would suggest. Conventional methods of gauging the tightness of China's monetary policy stance tend to ignore the fact that market-based interest rates have already increased over the past year. Meaningful increases to the benchmark lending rate are therefore unwarranted barring a significant improvement in China's growth momentum. Despite several identifiable risk factors, investors should remain overweight Chinese investable stocks versus the emerging market and global benchmarks. Feature Several highly-watched Chinese data releases are being published as we go to press, including Q4 GDP growth, and December retail sales, industrial production, and fixed asset investment. We are inclined to agree with Bloomberg's consensus expectations that these series will come in flat-to-modestly down, given our base case view of a benign, controlled economic slowdown. While we cannot rule out the potential for significantly positive surprises from this data, our November 30 Special Report noted in detail that these types of activity indicators tend to lag (or are not correlated with) the Li Keqiang index, which we have shown continues to act as an important predictor of the growth in investable EPS and nominal import growth.1 As such, the series in today's release do not rank highly on our list of important data to watch over the coming 6-12 months. Instead, we remain focused on the components of our BCA Li Keqiang Leading Indicator, as well as the evolution of the relationship between the Li Keqiang index and the growth in earnings and imports. December: A Bad Month For Money & Trade Chart 1A Non-Trivial Deceleration##br## In Money Growth Among the December data released in the first half of this month, the most important series in our view have been the Caixin Manufacturing PMI, imports/exports, and the money supply. The PMI was a bright spot; after having decelerated since August, the index unexpectedly increased from 50.8 in November to 51.5 in December. The Caixin Services PMI also surprised to the upside. The year-over-year (YoY) growth rate of nominal imports, however, fell sharply in December, and significantly missed expectations. In addition, supply of money (measured either as M2 or BCA-defined M3) also fell on a YoY basis, with the 3-month annualized rate of change declining meaningfully (Chart 1). Given that M2 and M3 are components of our BCA Li Keqiang Leading Indicator, and that nominal imports directly impact China's contribution to global growth, this raises the question of whether December's economic data suggest that China is slowing at a more aggressive pace than we expect. For now, our answer is no. Several points are worth considering: China's trade data is highly volatile, and a smoothed version of nominal import growth is behaving exactly as the Li Keqiang index suggests that it should (Chart 2). In addition, while import growth significantly missed the street's expectations, negative surprises of this magnitude have frequently occurred in the past (Chart 3). Chart 2Despite A Weak December, ##br##Smoothed Nominal Imports Look As They Should Chart 3Negative Import Surprises ##br##Are Fairly Common Money supply measures form just one-third of our Li Keqiang Leading Indicator, and the other factors aren't nearly as negative as these measures imply. Chart 4 illustrates that the indicator would be considerably higher if M2 and M3 were excluded, and that the overall indicator is not falling at a sharp or aggressive pace. Even though we did not include it in our composite indicator, we noted in our November 30 Special Report that the manufacturing PMI is an important signal for the Chinese economy, so it is encouraging that it ticked higher. While 51.5 may not seem like an elevated reading when compared with developed economies, it ranks in the 91st percentile of the data since mid-2011. Export growth remained buoyant, which will provide the industrial sector with some reflationary offset. We noted in a previous report that strong export growth would likely decelerate and converge to global industrial production growth over the coming year,2 but a regression-based approach to modelling Chinese export growth suggests that it may stay strong if leading indicators of global economic activity remain robust (Chart 5). Chart 4Severely Weak Money Measures ##br##Are In Contrast To Other Indicators Chart 5Chinese Export Growth ##br##May Stay Strong Bottom Line: December's money and trade data releases were not positive, but they do not likely herald a more aggressive economic slowdown than our base case view would suggest. Some Approaches To Gauging The Stance Of Chinese Monetary Policy While we do not regard December's economic data as a deviation from our base case view, that view does acknowledge that a gradual, controlled slowdown is occurring. There are two drivers of this ongoing economic slowdown. The first is the past imposition of "supply side" constraints on some industrial sectors, which have been part of the government's efforts to cut excess capacity and reduce pollution. For example, we noted in our October 5 Special Report that coal, base metals and cement producers have chronically underperformed in recent years, and have also hurt the overall performance of the industrial sector.3 Similarly, capital spending in the mining sector, historically highly sensitive to moves in global metals prices, have continued to contract, despite the sharp increase in metals prices since 2016 (Chart 6). The more obvious catalyst for a slowdown in the economy is, however, the tightening in monetary policy that began in late-2016. We have strongly emphasized the importance of monetary conditions in our approach to tracking the end of China's mini-cycle, and part of the tightening in these conditions can be linked to the end of material RMB depreciation. But a variety of interest rates have also increased substantially over the past year, which has been worrying to some investors. These concerns have been magnified recently by quite a bit of hawkish rhetoric from the PBOC, including an ultimately retracted statement from a leading PBOC researcher last week that stronger economic conditions have created enough room for a hike in the benchmark one-year lending rate. The current environment naturally raises the question of what would constitute tight policy in China. Chart 7 presents two conventional methods of answering this question, both of which aim to compare the benchmark 1-year policy lending rate to a fair, neutral, or equilibrium level. The first method uses a Taylor Rule approach with the IMF's output gap, headline consumer price inflation, and the IMF's assumptions of a 6% nominal equilibrium interest rate and a 3% headline inflation target.4 The second method simply compares the benchmark lending rate to that prescribed by our BCA China Interest Rate Model, which is a proprietary indicator based on China's growth momentum relative to its recent average, Chinese inflation, U.S. interest rates, and the CNY/USD exchange rate. Chart 6Policy Constraints Weigh Heavily On ##br##Some Sectors Chart 7Conventional Methods Say The Benchmark##br## Lending Rate Should Rise... At first blush, Chart 7 seems to imply that a significant increase in the benchmark 1-year policy lending rate is warranted. But these approaches ignore the fact that market-based interest rates have already increased over the past year, in some cases materially. A comprehensive understanding of the framework and mechanics of China's new monetary policy era is still elusive to many investors, and is an area of ongoing research at BCA. But for now, it is important to note that the benchmark lending rate merely acts as a reference point for Chinese banks when determining the actual interest rate charged on new loans. Chart 8 highlights that the percentage of loans issued above the benchmark rate correlates strongly with, and is led by, the 3-month interbank lending rate. Given the significant increase in 3-month SHIBOR over the past year, it is not surprising that China's weighted average lending rate has recently been increasing, even though the benchmark rate has remained constant. The rise in the average lending rate has so far been moderate, with our Q4 estimate showing only a 35% cumulative retracement of the 180bps decline that occurred from 2014 - 2016. But Chart 9 illustrates what would likely occur to the average lending rate if the PBOC were to hike the benchmark rate by 50bps over the coming year, based on two different scenarios: 1) an unchanged 3-month SHIBOR rate, and 2) a 50bps rise in 3-month SHIBOR (i.e. a parallel shift with the benchmark rate). The chart makes it clear that such a move would push average lending rates above the midpoint of the 2014-2016 range, which from our perspective is a reasonable estimate of the threshold between easy and tight monetary policy. Chart 8...But This Ignores The Recent Rise##br## In Market-Based Interest Rates Chart 9Even Modest Hikes To The Benchmark Rate ##br##Will Create Tight Policy A rise into tight monetary policy territory would be exacerbated even further if the 3-month SHIBOR rate rose disproportionately to any increase in the benchmark rate, which is not a trivial risk given the extent of their rise since late-2016. In short, given that China's economy is already slowing, this analysis underscores that any meaningful increases to the benchmark rate are likely unwarranted, and would be greeted negatively by global investors were they to occur. Bottom Line: Conventional methods of gauging the tightness of China's monetary policy stance tend to ignore the fact that market-based interest rates have already increased over the past year. Meaningful increases to the benchmark lending rate are therefore unwarranted barring a significant improvement in China's growth momentum. Monetary Policy And Investment Strategy We presented a "decision tree" for Chinese stocks in our January 4 Weekly Report,5 and noted that signs of significant further tightening of monetary policy should be met with a downgrade bias towards Chinese equities. We argued that the "bark" of monetary authorities would be worse than their "bite" over the coming several months, given that growth momentum and house price appreciation has already peaked. Recent market performance suggests that global investors agree with our assessment that the PBOC will refrain from any meaningful increases to the benchmark lending rate, and that any further rise in the average lending rate will be modest. Chart 10 shows that while the performance of Chinese investable ex-tech stocks versus global ex-tech did challenge its 200-day moving average in mid-December, the selloff has been completely reversed over the past month. In addition, Chart 11 shows that bottom-up 12-month forward EPS growth expectations remain solid and net earnings revisions remain close to a seven-year high, suggesting that there is no imminent fundamental basis for a major decline in Chinese investable equity prices. Chart 10Investors Aren't Worried##br## By The Specter Of Tight Policy Chart 11There Is Fundamental Support ##br##For Chinese Stocks Accordingly, while further monetary policy tightening remains a risk to be monitored over the course of the year, our "decision tree" framework continues to suggest that investors should be overweight Chinese stocks. We regard this as a recommendation to be cautiously bullish, a stance that we will be continually evaluating over the course of the year as more information about the risk factors that we have identified presents itself. Stay tuned! Bottom Line: Despite several identifiable risk factors, investors should remain overweight Chinese investable stocks versus the emerging market and global benchmark. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability of China's Business Cycle", dated November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "China's Economy - 2015 Vs Today (Part I): Trade", dated October 26, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "On A Higher Note", dated October 5, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 IMF Country Report No. 17/247, People's Republic of China : 2017 Article IV Consultation, August 8, 2017. 5 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The "Decision Tree" For Chinese Stocks", dated January 4, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights Upbeat economic reports for December set the stage for a solid 2018. The FOMC minutes acknowledged the flatter curve and only a minority of members discounted the signal from the curve. A majority thought that a tighter labor market would lead to higher inflation. The Citi Economic Surprise Index is peaking, but risk assets should hold up as the Index rolls over. Feature The first week of 2018 brought more good news for risk assets. U.S. stocks beat bonds, oil prices rose, and credit spreads narrowed amid a solid set of economic data. Several high-profile U.S. companies announced share buybacks, and/or one-time bonuses or wage increases linked to the tax cut plan passed by Congress at the end of 2017. Moreover, there were hints of further economic stimulus as lawmakers from both sides of the aisle discussed relaxing the sequester rules that would lift federal spending this year. Markets shrugged off a fresh round of saber rattling between the U.S. and North Korea. Gold prices nudged higher and the U.S. dollar fell despite the upbeat economic news. December's reports on manufacturing and service sector ISM, vehicle sales and the labor market, along with November's numbers on construction spending, trade and factory orders, all lifted estimates for Q4 GDP and boosted the prospects for corporate earnings in Q4 2017 and beyond. Chart 1 shows that the elevated ISM figures provide a favorable backdrop for earnings and sales in 2018. Moreover, Chart 2 indicates that IP, a proxy for S&P 500 sales, is poised to advance in 2018 and provide a lift to corporate profits. We will preview the S&P 500's Q4 2017 earnings reports in next week's U.S. Investment Strategy. Chart 1Favorable Macro Backdrop For Earnings And Sales Chart 2ISM Components Suggest IP Poised To Accelerate The Atlanta Fed GDP Now estimate stood at 2.7% on January 5, while the New York Fed's Nowcast for Q4 GDP was a healthy 4% (Chart 3). Both soundings are well above the FOMC's assessment of the economy's long-term potential growth rate (1.8%) and puts GDP growth in 2017 above the Fed's forecast. The implication is that the output gap pushed deeper into positive territory as 2017 ended, setting the stage for higher inflation in 2018. The December 2017 jobs report, released last Friday, January 5, does not change BCA's outlook for the U.S. economy or the Fed. The U.S. economy added a lower than expected 148,000 new jobs in December, which left the unemployment rate unchanged at 4.1%. Despite the softer than anticipated data, the 3-month average of payrolls growth is still a very healthy 204,000. The monthly increase in wages quickened to 0.3% m/m in December, up from 0.1% m/m last month. However, annual wage inflation remains modest at just 2.5% (Chart 4). Chart 3U.S. Economic Growth Well##BR##Ahead Of Potential In Q4 Chart 4Labor Market Still Tightening Despite##BR##Soft December Report The indications for Q4 GDP growth are solid. Aggregate hours worked rose 2.5% at an annualized rate in Q4 2017. Assuming modest growth in productivity, the payrolls data are consistent with over 3% GDP growth in Q4. There is nothing in the December payroll data to suggest that the underlying trajectory in the U.S. economy has changed. The economy continues to grow above trend. Wage gains are modest at the moment, but should accelerate as the labor market keeps tightening with above-trend GDP growth. This upbeat economic outlook is also supported the December 2017 non-manufacturing ISM survey, also released last Friday. While the overall index fell from 57.4 to 55.9, it is still consistent with solid GDP growth. Moreover, the employment index rose from 55.3 to 56.3, which signals firm job gains, and the prices paid index held steady at a fairly elevated level of 60.8. Bottom Line: It's been solid start to 2018 and it's steady as she goes for the U.S. economy and the Fed. FOMC Minutes: A Rubric BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy service expects that the 2/10 yield curve will languish between 0 and 50 bps in 2018. The curve will steepen from 51 bps at the end of 2017 through mid-year 2018, and then flatten into year-end (Chart 5). Which asset classes would benefit if our curve call is accurate? BCA's "The Bucket List"1 explains our view of the curve in 2018 and details the past performance of various U.S. assets in differing yield curve environments. Chart 5A Flat Yield Curve Is OK For Most Risk Assets BCA expects that the yield curve will first steepen in 2018, then become flatter, ultimately spending most of the year between 0 and 50 bps. A flat curve is the ideal environment for the S&P 500 and the stock-to-bond ratio. However, small cap stocks struggle when the curve is flat; BCA's view is that small caps will outperform large caps in 2018. A flat yield curve raises the risk of a sell-off in high yield, but provides a favorable grounding for oil, which is in line with BCA's fundamental view. BCA expects EPS growth will be positive this year; earnings growth is higher 75% of the time when the curve is flat. The yield curve's slope was a focus of debate at the FOMC's December 12-13, 2017 meeting. Participants cited several reasons for the flat curve2: recent increases in the target range for the federal funds rate; reductions in investors' estimates of the longer-run, neutral real interest rate; lower longer-term inflation expectations; lower term premiums Fed economists recently updated their quantitative assessments of the FOMC's minutes. The note provides a guide (Table 1 in the Fed paper3 and Tables 1 and 2 below) to the number of quantitative descriptors in the minutes (one, a couple, a few, etc.). We use this rubric to assess the committee's latest views on the yield curve and inflation. Table 1FOMC Assessment Of The Yield Curve Table 2FOMC Assessment Of Inflation In short, the FOMC acknowledged the flatter curve and only a minority of members discounted the signal from the curve. Moreover, a majority thought that a tighter labor market would lead to higher inflation. Only one participant held the view that secular trends were muting inflation. Bottom Line: BCA expects the Fed to deliver 3 to 4 rate hikes in 2018, which is still not fully priced in by the market. Investors should maintain below-benchmark duration in fixed income portfolios. Asset allocators should remain overweight stocks versus bonds. Growth is strong and the yield curve is not inverted yet. Therefore, it is still early to de-risk portfolios. Is Economic Surprise Peaking? The Citigroup (Citi) Economic Surprise Index is elevated relative to its recent history, but it may have further to run. Economic prospects were cheery following the 2016 presidential election and the economic data exceeded those lofty projections, aided by a warmer than usual winter. However, the temperate conditions borrowed activity from the spring, which was cooler and wetter than normal, and the combination of lofty expectations and seasonal distortions sent the Citi Economic Surprise Index spiraling lower through mid-year 2017. Since its bottom in June 2017 at -78.6%, the index climbed for 135 days before its peak in late December 2017 (Chart 6, panel 1). On average since 2010, the Citi Index moved from trough-to-peak in 96 days, which means the recent run-up was much longer than usual. However, that phenomenon may have been due to the raised economic expectations and variable weather patterns at the start of 2017. Chart 6Economic Surprise Index Has Surged, But Expectations Remain Muted At 80.7%, the Index has been above zero for 68 days (Chart 6, panel 1). It typically takes 46 days for it to climb from zero to its zenith. Table 3 shows the performance of financial markets and other assets after the Index moves from zero to the peak. The most recent episode (October through December 2017) matched historical averages across most asset classes, although the underperformance of small caps versus large ran counter to the past as the Surprise Index climbed from zero. Table 3Risk Assets Perform Well As Surprise Index Climbs Since 2010, the Index has stayed above 40 for an average of 51 days (Chart 6, panel 1). The Index has been over 40 since November 16, 2017, or 35 days. This suggests that it can remain elevated for another month or so before it again moves lower. However, the Index is mean reverting and investors wonder what will happen to risk assets after economic surprise rolls over. Table 4 and Chart 7 shows the performance of key financial markets and commodities when the Citi Index returned to zero from 40-plus. There have been six such intervals since 2010. On average, gold and oil perform well as the surprise index dips to zero. Stocks and credit outperform Treasuries during these episodes, and small caps beat large caps. Rising economic surprise (Table 3) is a more favorable environment for stocks, credit and oil than when the surprise index is rolling over. However, the performance of gold and small caps is better after the Citi Surprise Index peaks (Table 4). Table 4Risk Assets Hold Up When Citi Surprise Index Rolls Over Chart 7U.S. Assets As Economic Surprise Rolls Over Nonetheless, muted economic expectations will limit the downside in the Index in the coming months. Panel 3 of Chart 6 shows that the outlook for both hard and soft economic data remained muted through the end of November 2017, especially when compared with the significant improvement in economic prospects in late 2016 and early 2017. Bottom Line: Risk assets outperformed as the Citi Economic Surprise Index climbed in the second half of 2017. The Index can stay near recent peaks for several more months thanks to subdued economic forecasts, but it will roll over eventually. However, the elevated level of the Index suggests that there are near-term risks for equities and credit because a lot of good economic news is already priced in. Still, we recommend that investors ride out the volatility given our view that stocks will outperform bonds in the next 6-12 months. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "The Bucket List", published December 18, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20171213.htm 3 https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/the-fomc-meeting-minutes-an-update-of-counting-words-20170803.htm
Highlights The dollar continues to suffer as global growth remains strong. The year-end performance of the dollar rarely heralds things to come for the next six to twelve months. Signs are slowly accumulating that global growth may soften, but it could take a quarter to happen. In the meanwhile, the dollar could continue to weaken. Already boosted by global growth, the euro received a further fillip as markets upgraded the anticipated terminal interest rate in Europe. The U.S. terminal rate will be upgraded too, but only when this happen will the dollar be able to rally. Stay cautious. Feature As a cold snap engulfed North America, the U.S. dollar finished 2017 falling as fast as the mercury. This move is worrisome, as it pushed the greenback to the edge of a cliff. If the DXY punches below 91, the low hit on September 7, the greenback could hit 88. For EUR/USD, a decisive break above 1.21 constitutes the same threshold, and would indicate that the euro will rally to 1.25. Vigilance is required. A December Signal? The performance of the dollar in the last two weeks of December rarely offers a reliable signal of things to come. As Table I-1 illustrates, based on more than 20 years of data, the performance of the dollar index in the last weeks of a year has been negatively correlated with the dollar's performance over the following six to 12 months. This would imply that investors fighting dominating trends over the course of the prior 12 months capitulate in the last two weeks of the year, cleaning the slate in the process. Table I-1A Cold Snap Doesn't Make A Winter When it comes to specific pairs, relationships vary. The correlation of EUR/USD's subsequent six-month and 12-month returns with its year-end performance is zero, thus there is little to glean from the euro's recent strength in terms of its implications for 2018. However, interestingly, there is a strong negative correlation between the AUD/USD's year-end performance and the Aussie's returns over the next six to 12 months. It would seem the AUD's blistering rally is to be sold, not bought. The weakness in the USD was supercharged by the greenback's countercyclical nature. Our global synchronicity indictor - which measures the proportion of DM economies with PMIs above 50 - displays a negative correlation with the dollar's returns. This indicator's extraordinarily strong performance elucidates why the dollar was so weak last year, and also why the euro performed so well (Chart I-1). Going forward, two key leading indicators of our global synchronicity measure are saying that the global upswing could lose power (Chart I-2). The performance of Swedish equities relative to U.S. stocks and the annual change in U.S. 10-year yields reveal that even if global growth remains above trend, it will decelerate from current elevated readings. This could support the dollar index. However, we should keep an eye on the performance of EM carry trades.1 EM carry trades had been indicating that the best days for global growth are also behind us (Chart I-3), but lately EM carry trades have regained some vigor. If this strength is maintained, the message from the relative performance of Swedish equities and of U.S. bond yields will be invalidated. Such a move could be associated with a DXY breaking down below 91, potentially hitting 88; and EUR/USD rallying above 1.21 to 1.25. Chart I-1Strong Global Growth Hurts The Dollar Chart I-2Will This Synchronized Boom Peter Off? Chart I-3EM Carry Trades And Growth When all these forces are taken together, the picture for the dollar remains murky. The recent weakness in the Baltic Dry Index as well as the outperformance of oil relative to metals prices suggests we are entering a late cycle environment where even if global growth remain above trend, it is likely to be peaking. Thus, even if the dollar were to sell off further in the coming weeks, the downside will be limited. Nonetheless, a rally in the USD will have to wait for clear signs that U.S. inflation is picking up. It is best to stay on the sidelines for now. Bottom Line: The performance of the dollar in the last weeks of the year is rarely a good gauge of the dollar trend for the next six to 12 months. However, the dollar has been suffering on the back of strong global growth. While important metrics are suggesting that global growth could lose some momentum, other essential indicators such as EM carry trades are regaining some vigor. For now, limiting directional dollar bets is a safer strategy. The dollar will only rally once U.S. inflation picks up. EUR/USD And Terminal Rates The recent strength in the euro is linked to strong global growth. However, EUR/USD has been supercharged by domestic factors. In December, the differential in expected terminal policy rates between the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve moved violently in favor of the euro. This move reflected a forceful upgrade of the anticipated terminal policy rate in the euro area (Chart I-4). This sudden upgrade in Europe makes sense: the European economy is strong. Euro area PMIs are at record highs, German unemployment has hit post-unification lows and German inflation regained gumption. Moreover, Benoit Coeure, a member of the ECB's Executive Board, expressed some very hawkish views. The market is correct to upgrade the outlook for the ECB. However, interest rate markets continue to expect too-shy-a-Fed over the remainder of the cycle. This leaves room to upgrade the expected terminal interest rate for the U.S. The U.S. economy is also firing on all cylinders. The U.S. ISM came in at 59.7 this week, with the new order component standing at a very strong 69.4. Additionally, total hours worked have been accelerating (Chart I-5). Together, these point to very robust GDP growth. Already, the Atlanta Fed GDPNow tracker foresees growth of 3.2% for Q4. Chart I-4EM Carry Trades And Growth Chart I-5U.S. Growth Set To Accelerate Strong U.S. growth is materializing in an environment of increasingly significant capacity constraints, which has historically been associated with rising inflationary pressures (Chart I-6). The recent easing in U.S. financial conditions only reinforces this message, and argues that U.S. inflation has upside (Chart I-7). Moreover, U.S. compensation costs have been accelerating, from a low of 1.9% in 2016 to 2.5% today. Hence, U.S. inflation should perk up this year, letting the Fed increase rates more than what markets currently foresee. Chart I-6Inflationary Backdrop In The U.S. Chart I-7U.S. Financial Conditions Furthermore, the relative growth picture indicates that the increase in U.S. terminal rate should outpace the eurozone's. The Goldman Sachs Current Activity Indicator in the euro area has rolled over relative to the U.S., highlighting that the euro has tightened relative financial conditions enough to now harm the growth profile of Europe vis-à-vis the U.S. (Chart I-8). Moreover, European economic surprises are slowing sharply relative to the U.S. and the Euro Stoxx is re-testing its cycle low against the S&P 500, further corroborating the message from the Current Activity Indicator (Chart I-9). Chart I-8EUR/USD Starting To Hurt European ##br## Relative Growth Prospects Chart I-9Strains In The ##br##Eurozone Despite these dynamics, it is not clear that making a bet today on a weak euro is the proper tactic. At the time of writing, EUR/USD was flirting with its previous high of 2017; any break above 1.21 would likely push EUR/USD toward 1.25. Thus, we recommend investors continue to play pairs like short EUR/SEK to take advantage of the tightening in euro area financial conditions rather than bet outright on EUR/USD. To make this latter bet, investors will need either a marked failure of EUR/USD to break out, thus invalidating previous bullish technical signals, or a pick-up in U.S. inflation, whose timing remains unclear. Bottom Line: The euro's rally has been supercharged by an upgrade of the market's expected terminal policy rates in Europe relative to the U.S. While upgrading the ECB makes sense, markets should also upgrade the U.S. policy path as the American economy is just as strong and closer to capacity constraints, thus more likely to generate inflation. However, fighting the momentum in EUR/USD is currently dangerous. Thus, we recommend investors to wait for U.S. inflation to pick up before selling the euro. Instead, sell EUR/SEK. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert: EM/JPY Carry Trades", dated December 1, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.S. has been positive: Personal consumption expenditure and core personal expenditure grew at 1.8% YoY and 1.5% YoY respectively. Both measures increased from last month's reading. ISM manufacturing PMI came in at 59.7, surprising significantly to the upside. This measure also increased from last month. Meanwhile, ISM prices paid came in at 69, smashing expectations. The dollar ended 2017 on a free fall, as the enigma of low inflation in an environment of very low unemployment continues to puzzle investors. Meanwhile global growth continues to be very strong, adding an additional handicap to the dollar. We continue to believe that the Fed will hike more than expected, pushing the dollar upwards. However for this process to star, inflation must first emerge in the U.S. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - December 15, 2017 Riding The Wave: Momentum Strategies In Foreign Exchange Markets - December 8, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in Europe has been positive: M3 Money supply yearly growth surprised to the upside, coming in at 4.9%. Moreover, Europe's Markit manufacturing PMI, came in line with expectations at 60.6. Finally, Germany's headline inflation also outperformed expectations, coming in at 1.6%. However this number did decline from the previous month. EUR/USD has rallied by almost 2% since Christmas. This has been mainly due to the rhetoric by ECB members, who appear to be much less dovish than before. Indeed, ECB board member Mersch warned that the ECB "must be careful not to act too timidly and too late and to fall behind the curve". Overall, we continue to believe that the Fed will surprise the market more than the ECB will. However to have an outright bullish dollar view inflation will have to pick up in the U.S. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Temporary Short-Term Rates - November 10, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been positive: Retail trade yearly growth came in at 2.2%, exceeding expectations by a wide margin. Meanwhile, housing starts also surprised to the upside, as they contracted by only 0.4%. Tokyo CPI ex fresh food yearly growth also beat expectations, coming in at 0.8%. Finally, the unemployment rate declined to 2.7%. The yen has appreciated against the U.S. dollar, with USD/JPY falling by about 0.7%. Meanwhile, Kuroda continued to assert that no change is needed to the BoJ's yield curve control program. Overall, in spite of the improved global outlook which is benefiting the Japanese economy, it is unlikely that Japan will abandon its extremely dovish monetary policy unless inflation rises much further. This is unlikely to happen in the near future. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Riding The Wave: Momentum Strategies In Foreign Exchange Markets - December 8, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed: Gross domestic product growth surprised to the upside, coming in at 1.7%. However this number did decline from the previous quarter. Additionally, total business investment yearly growth also outperformed expectations, coming in at 1.7%. However, Markit manufacturing PMI underperformed expectations, coming in at 56.3. Moreover, construction PMI also surprised to the downside, coming in at 52.2. Since Christmas, cable has gone up by roughly 1.5%. Overall we believe that the BoE is unlikely to raise rates meaningfully, as they will be more cautious than otherwise as the U.K. muddles through the Brexit negotiations. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - November 3, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia has been mixed: Private sector credit yearly growth increased relatively to last month, coming in at 5.4%. However the AiG Performance of Manufacturing Index declined relatively to last month, coming in at 56.2 in December versus 57.3 in November. Finally, the RBA Commodity SDR Index, which in an early indicator of export price changes, contracted by 5.9%, a decline from last month's 4% contractions. The Australian dollar has rallied by more than 2.6% since Christmas, as multiple indicators point to continued strength in global growth. However we expect a temporary slowdown, as a result of tightening financial conditions in China. This will be negative for the AUD. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 The kiwi has increased by roughly 1.2% since Christmas, partly because of the decline of the U.S. dollar. However the New Zealand dollar has depreciated against almost every single G10 currency. Overall, we expect the NZD to appreciate relative to the AUD, given that the Australian dollar is much more sensitive to Chinese tightening financial conditions. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - November 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada has been mixed: Gross Domestic Product month-on-month growth underperformed expectations, coming in at 0%. However, Markit manufacturing PMI surprised to the upside, coming in at 54.7. This measure also increased relatively to last month's. USD/CAD has plunged by nearly 2.8%. We expect the Canadian dollar to outperform the AUD and the NZD, as oil should outperform metals in the commodity space. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Market Update - October 27, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland has been positive: The KOF leading indicator surprised to the upside, coming in at 111.3 in December. This measure also increased relative to November's reading. Meanwhile, the SVME Purchasing Manager's Index also outperformed expectations, coming in at 65.2. Finally, the ZEW survey expectations component increased relatively to last month, coming in at 52. EUR/CHF has continued its appreciation into the New Year. This is good news for the SNB, as this will provide an easing in financial conditions. Overall, we expect the franc to have limited downside against the euro, as the still low inflation in Switzerland will keep the SNB intervening in currency markets. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway has been mixed: Retail sales growth for November increased relatively to last month's number, coming in at 2.1%. However, registered unemployment surprised negatively, as it increased from 2.3% to 2.4%. Since Christmas, USD/NOK has plunged by nearly 3%, as it has been battered by very strong oil prices. Overall, we expect USD/NOK to find upside, however this will happen only when rate expectations in the U.S. rise meaningfully. In order for this to happen, inflation must once again accelerate. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - December 15, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden has been mixed: Retail sales yearly growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 2.8%. This measure also increased from last month's reading. Producer price inflation also increased from last month's number, coming in at 2.7%. However, Manufacturing PMI declined in December relatively to November, coming in at 60.4. In line with multiple indicators signaling that global growth continues to improve, USD/SEK has plunged by more than 2.5% since Christmas. Investors willing to bet on a temporary slowdown in the euro area, caused by tightening financial conditions should short EUR/SEK. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - December 15, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights Question #1: Will global growth remain above trend? Yes. Question #2: Will growth continue to outperform outside the U.S.? No. Question #3: Will productivity growth pick up? Yes, but only cyclically. The structural outlook remains bleak. Question #4: Will continued strong global growth finally deliver higher inflation? Yes, although the increase in inflation will be gradual and concentrated in economies that already have little spare capacity. Feature Global Growth In Focus We wish all our readers a joyous and prosperous 2018. As the new year begins, four questions about the global growth outlook loom large. Question #1: Will global growth remain above trend? Our answer: Yes. It is likely that global growth will come down a notch from its current elevated pace. However, it should remain firmly above trend. For one thing, the global economy continues to exhibit a lot of positive momentum. Real-time measures of economic activity, such as the Goldman Sachs Current Activity Indicator (CAI), highlight that global real GDP is rising at a robust pace (Chart 1). Our global leading indicator, as well as a wide swath of PMI data, suggest that this trend has legs (Chart 2). Chart 1APositive Global Growth Momentum Can Be Seen Here Chart 1BPositive Global Growth Momentum Can Be Seen Here Since 1980, above-trend global growth in one year has been accompanied by above-trend growth in the following year nearly three-quarters of the time. This bodes well for 2018. Chart 2... And Here Too Chart 3Financial Conditions Tend To Lead Growth By Six-To-Nine Months Global financial conditions eased significantly in 2017, thanks mainly to higher equity prices and narrower credit spreads. Easier financial conditions tend to benefit growth with a 6-to-9 month lag (Chart 3). The 6-month global credit impulse, which tends to lead activity, is also positive (Chart 4). Fiscal policy should remain stimulative. The fiscal thrust moved into positive territory in advanced economies in 2016-17 and this should remain the case in 2018 (Chart 5). Tax cuts will add about 0.3 percentage points to U.S. growth, while hurricane reconstruction spending and a likely congressional agreement to raise the cap on federal discretionary spending will add another 0.2 points. Chart 4Positive Credit Impulse Is Another Tailwind For Growth Chart 5Fiscal Policy Has Turned More Stimulative Our political strategists expect further fiscal easing in Japan this year. They also believe that German coalition talks will produce more government spending, with the SDP extracting concessions from Merkel on public investment and the CSU securing a commitment for more defense expenditure. On the flipside, our strategists expect some fiscal tightening in France as President Macron takes steps to trim France's bloated welfare state. Question #2: Will growth continue to outperform outside the U.S.? Our answer: No. Global revisions were more favorable outside the U.S. in the first nine months of 2017, which helps explain why the dollar came under downward pressure (Chart 6). More recently, U.S. growth estimates have begun to drift higher. As a result, the U.S. surprise index has surged relative to those of other economies (Chart 7). Chart 6U.S. Growth Expectations Were Lagging... ##br## But Not Anymore Chart 7U.S. Economic Surprise Index Increased ##br## Relative To Those Of Other Countries We expect the data to continue to favor the U.S. Aggregate U.S. hours worked in November was up 3.4% at an annualized rate over Q3 levels. If we add in productivity growth, Q4 GDP growth was probably in excess of 4% - well above current consensus estimates. Financial conditions have eased a lot more in the U.S. than in the rest of the world. Fiscal policy is also set to loosen relatively more in the U.S. Euro area growth is likely to tick lower next year from its current stellar pace, as the impact of a stronger euro begins to bite. The 6-month credit impulse has already turned negative there. Japanese growth should also cool somewhat from the heady pace of 2.7% seen over the past two quarters. The Chinese economy will decelerate modestly in 2018. The authorities are tightening the screws on the shadow banking system, expediting efforts to reduce excess capacity in the industrial sector, and clamping down on corruption. All of these reforms will pay off in the long run, but they could dent growth in the short run. Question #3: Will productivity growth pick up? Our Answer: Yes, but only cyclically. The structural outlook remains bleak. U.S. nonfarm productivity rose by 1.5% over the prior year in Q3, well above the post-2010 average of 0.8%. This improvement occurred despite the fact that low-skilled workers continue to re-enter the labor market - dragging down output-per-hour in the process - a phenomenon that is not well captured by the official productivity data. Productivity growth elsewhere in the world also appears to be on the upswing (Chart 8). Increased business investment should support productivity in 2018. Corporate surveys indicate that a rising percentage of companies anticipate boosting capital budgets (Chart 9). This often happens in the last few innings of business-cycle expansions, as more companies begin to experience capacity constraints. Chart 8Productivity Growth Showing Signs Of ##br## A Tentative Recovery Chart 9Surveys Are Signaling Acceleration ##br## In Capex Unfortunately, while the cyclical outlook for productivity is improving, the structural backdrop remains downbeat. As we have discussed in the past, flagging educational achievement, decreased creative destruction, and a shift in technological innovation towards consumers and away from businesses all augur poorly for future productivity trends.1 The much-hyped Amazon effect makes for good news stories, but is not borne out by the data.2 Question #4: Will continued strong global growth finally deliver higher inflation? Our answer: Yes, although the increase in inflation will be gradual and concentrated in economies that already have little spare capacity. Chart 10A Pick-Up In Wage Growth Would Put Upward Pressure ##br## On Service Inflation Going into 2017, the Fed had expected core PCE inflation to end the year at 1.9%. It is likely to have finished the year at only 1.5%. We expect core PCE inflation to move toward 2% by the end of 2018. Wage growth should accelerate as the labor market continues to tighten. This should put upward pressure on service inflation (Chart 10). Goods price inflation should also recover due to the lagged effects of a weaker dollar and the bleed-through of higher energy prices into several core components of the CPI (airline fares being a notable example). Slower rent growth will dampen inflation. However, this will be partially offset by higher health care prices. The cost control measures introduced in the Affordable Care Act helped push down PCE health care services inflation from 3% in late 2010 to less than 0.5% in early 2016 (Chart 11). Many of these measures have been realized, and as a consequence, health care inflation has begun to revert to its long-term trend (though in level terms, the savings to consumers remain). The Republican tax bill could put some upward pressure on health care costs. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the repeal of the Individual Mandate will raise premiums on health care exchanges by 10% because a larger share of healthy individuals will decide to forgo buying health insurance.3 Japanese inflation should move modestly higher in 2018, but from extremely depressed levels. The Japanese unemployment rate is now a full percentage point lower than in 2007 and the ratio of job opening-to-applicants has reached the highest level since 1974 (Chart 12). Chart 11U.S. Inflation Breakdown Chart 12Japan's Tightening Labor Market Euro area inflation will be held down by the lagged effects of a stronger euro and continued high levels of slack across southern Europe. Outside Germany, labor market underutilization is still 6.3 percentage points higher than it was in 2008 (Chart 13). U.K. inflation should edge lower as the spike in import prices stemming from the post-Brexit pound depreciation dissipates. Chart 13There Is Still Labor Market Slack Outside Of Germany Investment Conclusions A shift in global growth leadership back towards the U.S. would benefit the beleaguered U.S. dollar. Higher U.S. inflation will prompt the Fed to raise rates four times in 2018, one more hike than implied by the dots and two more hikes than implied by current market expectations. Rising inflation should also keep Treasury yields on an upward trajectory. We expect the 10-year yield to finish 2018 at around 3%. As long as inflation is rising in response to stronger growth, and from below-target levels, both U.S. and global risk assets should continue to rally. Only once U.S. inflation rises above 2% in 2019, and growth begins to slow on the back of binding supply-side constraints, will equities flounder. Stay long stocks for now, but look to significantly trim exposure towards the end of the year. Regionally, we favor euro area and Japanese equities over U.S. stocks for the next 12 months on a currency-hedged basis. Both the euro area and Japanese stock markets are dominated by large multinational companies whose prospects are geared more towards global growth than demand in their own regions. Above-trend global growth and rising capital spending should disproportionately benefit European and Japanese bourses, given that they have a greater tilt towards cyclically-sensitive companies. Valuations also tend to favor non-U.S. stocks. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Is Slow Productivity Growth Good Or Bad For Bonds?," dated May 31, 2017; Weekly Report, "A Secular Bottom In Inflation," dated July 28, 2017; and Weekly Report, "Is The Phillips Curve Dead Or Dormant?" dated September 22, 2017. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Did Amazon Kill The Phillips Curve?" dated September 1, 2017. 3 Please see "Repealing the Individual Health Insurance Mandate: An Updated Estimate," Congressional Budget Office, dated November 8, 2017. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights Global bourses celebrated solid earnings growth and the passage of U.S. tax cuts heading into year-end. The direct effect of the tax cuts will likely boost U.S. real GDP growth in 2018 by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points. It could be more, depending on the impact on animal spirits in the business sector and any fresh infrastructure spending. The good news on global growth continue to roll in. Real GDP growth is accelerating in the major advanced economies, driven in part by a surge in capital spending. Nonetheless, record low volatility and a flat yield curve in the U.S. highlight our major theme for 2018; policy is on a collision course with risk assets because output gaps are closing and monetary policy is moving away from "pedal to the metal" stimulus. We expect inflation to finally begin moving higher in the U.S. and some of the other advanced economies. This will challenge the consensus view that "inflation is dead forever", and that central banks will respond quickly to any turbulence in financial markets with an easier policy stance. The S&P 500 would suffer only a 3-5% correction if the VIX were to simply mean-revert. But the pain would likely be more intense if there is a complete unwinding of 'low-vol' trading strategies. We will be watching inflation expectations and our S&P Scorecard for signs to de-risk. Government yield curves should bear steepen, before flattening again later in 2018. Stay below benchmark in duration for now and favor bonds in Japan, Italy, the U.K. and Australia versus the U.S. and Canada (currency hedged). Interest rate differentials in the first half of the year should modestly benefit the U.S. dollar versus the other major currencies. Investors should remain exposed to oil and related assets, and bet on rising inflation expectations in the major bond markets. The intensity of forthcoming Chinese reforms will have to be monitored carefully for signs they have reached an economic 'pain threshold'. We do not view China as a risk to DM risk assets, but even a soft landing scenario could be painful for base metals and the EM complex. Bitcoin is not a systemic threat to global financial markets. Feature Chart I-1Policy Collision Course? Global bourses celebrated solid earnings growth and the passage of U.S. tax cuts heading into year-end. Ominously, though, a flatter U.S. yield curve and extraordinarily low measures of volatility hover like dark clouds over the equity bull market (Chart I-1). The flatter curve could be a sign that the Fed is at risk of tightening too far, which seems incompatible with depressed asset market volatility. This combination underscores the major theme of the BCA Outlook 2018 that was sent to clients in November; policy is on a collision course with risk assets because output gaps are closing and monetary policy is moving away from "pedal to the metal" stimulus. Analysts are debating how much of the decline in volatility is due to technical factors and how much can be pinned on the macro backdrop. For us, they are two sides of the same coin. Betting that volatility will remain depressed has reportedly become a yield play, via technical trading strategies and ETFs. Trading models encourage more risk taking as volatility declines, such that lower volatility enters a self-reinforcing feedback loop. The danger is that this virtuous circle turns vicious. On the macro front, many investors appear to believe that the structure of the advanced economies has changed in a fundamental and permanent way. Deflationary forces, such as Uber, Amazon and robotics are so strong that inflation cannot rise even if labor becomes very scarce. If true, this implies that central banks will proceed slowly in tightening, and that the peak in rates is not far away. Moreover, below-target inflation allows central banks to respond to any economic weakness or unwanted tightening in financial conditions by adopting a more accommodative policy stance. In other words, investors appear to believe in the "Fed Put". Implied volatility is a mean-reverting series. It can remain at depressed levels for extended periods, especially when global growth is robust and synchronized. Nonetheless, we believe that the "outdated Phillips curve" and the "Fed Put" consensus views will be challenged later in 2018, leading to an unwinding of low-vol yield plays. For now, though, it is too early to scale back on risk assets. Global Growth Shifts Up A Gear... The good news on global growth continue to roll in. Easy financial conditions and the end of fiscal austerity provide a supportive growth backdrop. A measure of fiscal thrust for the G20 advanced economies shifted from a headwind to a slight tailwind in 2016 (Chart I-2). Our short-term models for real GDP growth in the major countries continue to rise, in line with extremely elevated purchasing managers' survey data (Chart I-3). The major exception is the U.K., where our GDP growth model is rolling over as the Brexit negotiations take a toll. Chart I-2Fiscal Austerity Is Over Chart I-3GDP Growth Models Are Upbeat Much of the acceleration in our GDP models is driven by the capital spending components. Animal spirits appear to be taking off and it is a theme across most of the advanced economies. G3 capital goods orders pulled back a bit in late 2017, but this is more likely due to noise in the data than to a peak in the capex cycle (Chart I-4). Industrial production, the PMI diffusion index and advanced-economy capital goods imports confirm strong underlying momentum in investment spending. Chart I-4Capital Spending Helping To Drive Growth In the U.S., tax cuts will give business outlays and overall U.S. GDP growth a modest lift in 2018. The House and Senate hammered out a compromise on tax cuts that is similar to the original Senate version. The new legislation will cut individual taxes by about $680 billion over ten years, trim small business taxes by just under $400 billion, and reduce corporate taxes by roughly the same amount (including the offsetting tax on currently untaxed foreign profits). The direct effect of the tax cuts will likely boost U.S. real GDP growth in 2018 by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points. However, much depends on the ability that the tax changes and immediate capital expensing to further lift animal spirits in the business sector and bring forward investment spending. Any infrastructure program would also augment the fiscal stimulus. The total impact is difficult to estimate given the lack of details, but it is clearly growth-positive. ...But The U.S. Yield Curve Flattens... Bond investors are unimpressed so far with the upbeat global economic data. It appears that long-term yields are almost impervious as long as inflation is stuck at low levels. In the U.S., a rising 2-year yield and a range-trading 10-year yield have resulted in a substantial flattening of the 2/10 yield slope (although some of the flattening has unwound as we go to press). Investors view a flattening yield curve with trepidation because it smells of a Fed policy mistake. It appears that the bond market is discounting that the Fed can only deliver another few rate hikes before the economy starts to struggle, at which point inflation will still be below target according to market expectations. We would not be as dismissive of an inverted yield curve as Fed Chair Yellen was during her December press conference. There are indeed reasons for the curve to be structurally flatter today than in the past, suggesting that it will invert more easily. Nonetheless, the fact that the yield curve has called all of the last seven recessions is impressive (with one false positive). The good news is that, in the seven episodes in which the curve correctly called a recession, the signal was confirmed by warning signs from our Global Leading Economic Indicator and our monetary conditions index. At the moment, these confirming indicators are not even flashing yellow.1 Our fixed-income strategists believe that the curve is more likely to steepen than invert over the next six months. If inflation edges higher as we expect, then long-term yields will finally break out to the upside and the curve will steepen until the Fed's tightening cycle is further advanced. If we are wrong and inflation remains stuck near current levels or declines, then the FOMC will have to revise the 'dot plot' lower and the curve will bull-steepen. In other words, we do not think the FOMC will make a policy mistake by sticking to the dot plot if inflation remains quiescent. Rising inflation is a larger risk for stocks and bonds than a policy mistake. A clear uptrend in inflation would shake investors' confidence in the "Fed Put" and thereby trigger an unwinding of the low-vol investment strategies. A sharp selloff at the long end of the curve in the major markets would send a chill through the investment world because it would suggest that the Phillips curve is not dead, and that central banks might have fallen behind the curve. ...As Inflation Languishes For now there is little evidence of building inflation pressure in either the CPI or the Fed's preferred measure, the core PCE price index. The latter edged up a little in October to 1.4% year-over-year, but the November core CPI rate slipped slightly to 1.7%. For perspective, core CPI inflation of 2.4-2.5% is consistent with the Fed's 2% target for the core PCE index. The Fed has made no progress in returning inflation to target since the FOMC started the tightening cycle. A risk to our view is that the expected inflation upturn takes longer to materialize. The annual core CPI inflation rate fell from 2.3 in January 2017 to 1.7 in November, a total decline of 0.55 percentage points. The drop was mostly accounted for by negative contributions from rent of shelter (-0.31), medical care services (-0.13) and wireless telephone services (-0.1). These categories are not closely related to the amount of slack in the economy, and thus might continue to depress the headline inflation rate in the coming months even as the labor market tightens further. Recent regulatory changes, for example, suggest that there is more downside potential in health care services inflation. We have highlighted in past research that it is not unusual for inflation to respond to a tight labor market with an extended lag, especially at the end of extremely long expansion phases. Chart I-5 updates the four indicators that heralded inflection points in inflation at the end of the 1980s and 1990s. All four leading inflation indicators are on the rise, as is the New York Fed's Underlying Inflation Indicator (not shown). Importantly, economic slack is disappearing at the global level. The OECD as a group will be operating above potential in 2018 for the first time since the Great Recession (Chart I-6). Finally, oil prices have further upside potential. Higher energy prices will add to headline inflation and boost inflation expectations in the U.S. and the other major economies. Chart I-5U.S. Inflation: Indicators Point Up Chart I-6Vanishing Economic Slack The bottom line is that we are sticking with the view that U.S. inflation will grind higher in the coming months, allowing the FOMC to deliver the three rate hikes implied by the 'dot plot' for 2018. In December, the FOMC revised up its economic growth forecast to 2.5% in 2018, up from 2.1%. The projections for 2019 and 2020 were also revised higher. Growth is seen remaining above the 1.8% trend rate for the next three years. The FOMC expects that the jobless rate will dip to 3.9% in 2018 and 2019, before ticking up to 4.0% in 2020. With the estimate for long-run unemployment unchanged at 4.6%, this means that the labor market is expected to shift even further into 'excess demand' territory. If anything, these forecasts look too conservative. It is unreasonable to expect the unemployment rate to stabilize in 2019 and tick up in 2020 if the economy is growing above-trend. This forecast highlights the risk that the FOMC will suddenly feel 'behind the curve' if inflation re-bounds more quickly than expected, at a time when the labor market is so deep in 'excess demand' territory. The consensus among investors would also be caught off guard in this scenario, resulting in a rise in bond volatility from rock-bottom levels. How Vulnerable Are Stocks? How large a correction in risk assets should we expect? One way to gauge this risk is to estimate the historical 'beta' of risk asset prices to mean-reversions in the VIX. The VIX is currently a long way below its median. Major spikes to well above the median are associated with recessions and/or financial crises. However, as a starting point, we are interested in the downside potential for risk asset prices if the VIX simply moves back to the median. Table I-1 presents data corresponding to periods since 1990 when the VIX mean-reverted from a low level over a short period of time. We chose periods in which the VIX surged at least to its median level (17.2) from a starting point that was below 13. The choice of 13 as the lower threshold is arbitrary, but this level filters out insignificant noise in the data and still provides a reasonable number of episodes to analyze.2 Table I-1Episodes Of VIX 'Mean Reversion' The episodes are presented in ascending order with respect to the starting point for the 12-month forward P/E ratio. This was done to see whether the valuation starting point matters for the size of the equity correction. The "VIX Beta" column shows the ratio of the percent decline in the S&P 500 to the change in the VIX. The average beta over the 15 episodes suggests that stocks fall by almost a half of a percent for every one percent increase in the VIX. Today, the VIX would have to rise by about 7½% to reach the median value, implying that the S&P 500 would correct by roughly 3½%. Investment- and speculative-grade corporate bonds would underperform Treasurys by 22 and 46 basis points, respectively, in this scenario. Interestingly, the equity market reaction to a given jump in the VIX does not appear to intensify when stocks are expensive heading into the shock. The implication is that a shock that simply returns the VIX to "normal" would not be devastating for risk assets. The shock would have to be worse. Chart I-7Market Reaction To 1994 Fed Shock The episodes of VIX "mean reversion" shown in Table I-1 are a mixture of those caused by financial crises and by monetary tightening (and sometimes both). The U.S. 1994 bond market blood bath is a good example of a pure monetary policy shock. It was partly responsible for the "tequila crisis", but that did not occur until late that year. Chart I-7 highlights that the U.S. equity market reacted more violently to Fed rate hikes in 1994 than the average VIX beta would suggest. The VIX jumped by about 14% early in the year, coinciding with a 9% correction in the S&P 500. Investors had misread the Fed's intension in late 1993, expecting little in the way of rate hikes over the subsequent year. A dramatic re-rating of the Fed outlook caused a violent bond selloff that unnerved equity investors. We are not expecting a replay of the 1994 bond market turmoil because the Fed is far more transparent today. Nonetheless, the equity correction could be quite painful to the extent that the VIX overshoots the median as the large volume of low-volatility trades are unwound. A 10% equity correction in the U.S. this year would not be a surprise given the late stage of the bull market and current market positioning. Yield Curves To Bear Steepen Upward pressure on inflation, bond yields and volatility will not only come from the U.S. We expect inflation to edge higher in the Eurozone, Canada, and even Japan, given tight labor markets and diminished levels of global spare capacity. The European economy has been a star performer this year and this should continue through 2018. Even the periphery countries are participating. The key driving factors include the end of the fiscal squeeze in the periphery and the recapitalization of troubled banks. The latter has opened the door to bank lending, the weakness of which has been a major growth headwind in this expansion. Taken at face value, recent survey data are consistent with about 3% GDP growth (Chart I-3). We would dis-count that a bit, but even continued 2.0-2.5% GDP growth in the euro area would compare well to the 1% potential growth rate. This means that the output gap is shrinking and the labor market will continue tightening. Despite impressive economic momentum, the ECB is sticking to the policy path it laid out in October. Starting in January, asset purchases will continue at a reduced rate of €30bn per month until September 2018 or beyond. Meanwhile, interest rates will remain steady "for an extended period of time, and well past the horizon of the net asset purchases." If asset purchases come to an end next September, then the first rate hike may not come until 2019 Q1 at the earliest. Thus, rate hikes are a long way off, but the deceleration of growth in the Eurozone monetary base will likely place upward pressure on the long end of the bund curve (shown inverted in Chart I-8). Chart I-8ECB Tapering Will Be Bond-Bearish Canada is another economy with ultra-low interest rates and rapidly diminishing labor market slack. The Bank of Canada will be forced to follow the Fed in hiking rates in the coming quarters. In Japan, strong PMI and capital goods orders are hopeful signs that domestic capital spending is picking up, consistent with our upbeat real GDP model (Chart I-3). Recent data on industrial production and retail sales were weak, but this was likely due to heavy storm activity; we expect those readings to bounce back. Nonetheless, it is still not clear that the Japanese economy has moved away from a complete dependency on the global growth engine. We would like to see stronger wage gains to signal that the economy is finally transitioning to a more self-reinforcing stage. It is hopeful that various measures of core inflation are slightly positive, but this is tentative at best. That said, the BoJ may be forced to alter its current "yield curve control" strategy by modestly lifting the target on longer-term JGB yields later in 2018, in response to pressures from robust growth and rising global bond yields. Thus, the pressure for higher bond yields should rotate away from the U.S. in the latter half of 2018 towards Europe, Canada and possibly Japan. This could eventually see the U.S. dollar head lower, but we still foresee a window in the first half of 2018 in which the dollar will appreciate on the back of widening interest rate differentials. We are less bullish than we were in mid-2017, expecting only about a 5% dollar appreciation. China: Long-Term Gain Or Short-Term Pain? The Chinese cyclical outlook remains a key risk to our upbeat view on risk assets. Significant structural reforms are on the way, now that President Xi has amassed significant political support for his reform agenda. These include deleveraging in the financial sector, a more intense anti-corruption campaign focused on the shadow-banking sector, and an ongoing restructuring in the industrial sector. The reforms will likely be positive for long-term growth, but only to the extent that they are accompanied by economic reforms. This month's Special Report, beginning on page 19, highlights that 2018 will be pivotal for China's long-term investment outlook. In the short term, reforms could be a net negative for growth depending on how deftly the authorities handle the monetary and fiscal policy dials. We witnessed this tension between growth and reform in the early years of President Xi's term, when the drive to curtail excessive credit growth and overcapacity caused an abrupt slowdown in 2015. Managing the tradeoff means that China's economy will evolve in a series of growth mini cycles. China is in the down-phase of a mini cycle at the moment, as highlighted by the Li Keqiang Index (LKI; Chart I-9). The LKI is a good proxy for the business cycle. BCA's China Strategy service recently combined the data with the best leading properties for the LKI into a single indicator.3 This indicator suggests that the LKI will end up retracing about 50% of its late 2015 to early 2017 rise before the current slowdown is complete. The good news is that broad money growth, which is a part of the LKI leading indicator, has re-accelerated in recent months. This suggests that the current economic slowdown phase will not be protracted, consistent with our 'soft landing' view. The intensity of forthcoming reforms will have to be monitored carefully for signs they have reached an economic pain threshold. We will be watching our LKI leading indicator and a basket of relevant equity sectors for warning signs. We do not view China as a risk to DM risk assets, but even a soft landing scenario could be painful for base metals and the EM complex (Chart I-10). Chart I-9China: Where Is The Bottom? Chart I-10Metals At Risk Of China Soft Landing Equity Country Allocation For now we continue to recommend overweight positions in stocks versus bonds and cash within balanced portfolios. We also still prefer Japanese stocks to the U.S., reflecting our expectation for rising bond yields in the latter and an earnings outlook that favors the former. Chart I-11 updates our earnings-per-share growth forecast for the U.S., Japan and the Eurozone. We expect U.S. EPS growth to decelerate more quickly in 2018 than in Japan, since the U.S. is further ahead in the earning cycle and is more exposed to wage and margin pressure. European earnings growth will also be solid in 2018, but this year's euro appreciation will be a headwind for Q4 2017 and Q1 2018 earnings. European and Japanese stocks are also a little on the cheap side versus the U.S., although not by enough to justify overweight positions on valuation grounds alone. We have extended our valuation work to a broader range of countries, shown in Chart I-12. All are expressed relative to the U.S. market. These metric exclude the Financials sector, and adjust for both differing sector weights and structural shifts in relative valuation. Mexico is the only one that is more than one standard deviation cheap relative to the U.S. Nonetheless, our EM team is reluctant to recommend this market given uncertainty regarding the NAFTA negotiations. Russia is not as cheap, but is in the early stages of recovery. Our EM team is overweight. Chart I-11Top-Down EPS Projection Chart I-12Valuation Ranking Of Nonfinancial Equity Markets Relative To The U.S. A Note On Bitcoin Finally, we have received a lot of client questions regarding bitcoin. The incredible surge in the price of the cryptocurrency dwarfs previous asset price bubbles by a wide margin (Chart I-13). As is usually the case with bubble, supporters argue that "this time is different." We doubt it. Chart I-13Bitcoin Bubble Dwarfs All The Rest BCA's Technology Sector Strategy weighed into this debate in a recent Special Report.4 In theory, blockchain technology, including cyber currencies, can be used as a highly secure, low cost, means of transfer value from one person to the next without an intermediary. However, the report highlights that bitcoin is highly subject to fraud and manipulation because it is unregulated. Liquidity and accurate market quotes are questionable on the "fly by night" exchanges. Its use as a medium of exchange is very limited, and governments are bound to regulate it because cryptocurrencies are a tool for money laundering, tax evasion and other criminal activities. Another fact to keep in mind is that, although the supply of new bitcoins is restricted, the creation of other cryptocurrencies is unlimited. Would the bursting of the bitcoin bubble represent a risk to the economy? The market cap of all cryptocurrencies is estimated to be roughly US$400 billion (US$250 billion for bitcoin alone). This is tiny compared to global GDP or the market cap of the main asset classes such as stocks and bonds. The amount of leverage associated with bitcoin is unknown, but it is hard to see that it would be large enough to generate a significant wealth effect on spending and/or a marked impact on overall credit conditions. The links to other financial markets appear limited. Investment Conclusions Our recommended asset allocation is "steady as she goes" as we move into 2018. The policy and corporate earnings backdrop will remain supportive of risk assets at least for the first half of the year. In the U.S., the recently passed tax reform package will boost after-tax corporate cash flows by roughly 3-5%. Cyclical stocks should outperform defensives in the near term. Nonetheless, we expect 2018 to be a transition year. Stretched valuations and extremely low volatility imply that risk assets are vulnerable to the consensus macro view that central banks will not be able to reach their inflation targets even in the long term. The consensus could be in for a rude awakening. We expect equity markets to begin discounting the next U.S. recession sometime in early 2019, but markets will be vulnerable in 2018 to a bond bear phase and escalating uncertainty regarding the economic outlook. If risk assets have indeed entered the late innings, then we must watch closely for signs to de-risk. One item to watch is the 10-year U.S. CPI swap rate; a shift above 2.3% would be consistent with the Fed's 2% target for the PCE measure of inflation. This would be a signal that the FOMC will have to step-up the pace of rate hikes and aggressively slow economic growth. We will also use our S&P Scorecard Indicator to help time the exit from our overweight equity position (Chart I-14). The Scorecard is based on seven indicators that have a good track record of heralding equity bear markets.5 These include measures of monetary conditions, financial conditions, value, momentum, and economic activity. The more of these indicators in "bullish" territory, the higher the score. Currently, four of the indicators are flashing a bullish signal (financial conditions, U.S. unemployment claims, ISM new orders minus inventories, and momentum). We demonstrated in previous research that a Scorecard reading of three or above was historically associated with positive equity total returns in the subsequent months. A drop below three this year would signal the time to de-risk. Our thoughts on the risks facing equities carry over to the corporate bonds space. Our Global Fixed Income Strategy service notes that uncertainty about future growth has the potential to increase interest rate volatility that can also push corporate credit spreads wider (Chart I-15).6 Elevated leverage in the corporate sector adds to the risk of a re-rating of implied volatility. For now, however, investors should continue to favor corporate bonds relative to governments for the (albeit modest) yield pickup. Chart I-14Watch Our Scorecard To Time The Exit Chart I-15Higher Uncertainty & ##br##Vol To Hit Corporate Bonds Overall bond portfolio duration should be kept short of benchmark. We may recommend taking profits and switching to benchmark duration after global yields have increased and are beginning to negatively affect risk assets. While yields are rising, investors should favor bonds in Japan, Italy, the U.K. and Australia within fixed-income portfolios (on a currency-hedged basis). Underweight the U.S. and Canada. German and French bonds should be close to benchmark. Yield curves should steepen, before flattening later in the year. Interest rate differentials in the first half of the year should modestly benefit the U.S. dollar versus the other major currencies. Finally, investors should remain exposed to oil and related assets, and bet on rising inflation expectations in the major bond markets. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst December 28, 2017 Next Report: January 25, 2018 1 Please see BCA Global ETF Strategy service, "A Guide to Spotting And Weathering Bear Markets," August 16, 2017, available at etf.bcaresearch.com 2 Note that we are not saying that a rise in the VIX "causes" stocks to correct. Rather, we are assuming that a shock occurs that causes stocks to correct and the VIX to rise simultaneously. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle," November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see BCA Technology Sector Strategy Special Report, "Cyber Currencies: Actual Currencies Or Just Speculative Assets?" December 12, 2017, available at tech.bcaresearch.com 5 Market Timing: Holy Grail Or Fool's Gold? The Bank Credit Analyst, May 26, 2016. 6 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy service, "Our Model Bond Portfolio Allocation In 2018: A Tail Of Two Halves," December 19, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com II. A Long View Of China 2018 is a pivotal year for China, as it will set the trajectory for President Xi Jinping's second term ... and he may not step down in 2022. Poverty, inequality, and middle-class angst are structural and persistent threats to China's political stability. The new wave of the anti-corruption campaign is part of Xi's attempt to improve governance and mitigate political risks. Yet without institutional checks and balances, Xi's governance agenda will fail. Without pro-market reforms, investors will face a China that is both more authoritarian and less productive. Hearts rectified, persons were cultivated; persons cultivated, families were regulated; families regulated, states were rightly governed; states rightly governed, the whole world was made tranquil and happy. - Confucius, The Great Learning Comparisons of modern Chinese politics with Confucian notions of political order have become cliché. Nevertheless, there is a distinctly Confucian element to Chinese President Xi Jinping's strategy. Xi's sweeping anti-corruption campaign, which will enter "phase two" in 2018, is essentially an attempt to rectify the hearts and regulate the families of Communist Party officials and civil servants. The same could be said for his use of censorship and strict ideological controls to ensure that the general public remains in line with the regime. Yet Xi is also using positive measures - like pollution curbs, social welfare, and other reforms - to win over hearts and minds. His purpose is ultimately the preservation of the Chinese state - namely, the prevention of a Soviet-style collapse. Only if the regime is stable at home can Xi hope to enhance the state's international security and erode American hegemony in East Asia. This would, from Beijing's vantage, make the whole world more tranquil and happy. Thus, for investors seeking a better understanding of China in the long run, it is necessary to look at what is happening to its governance as well as to its macroeconomic fundamentals and foreign relations.1 China's greatest vulnerability over the long run is its political system. Because Xi Jinping's willingness to relinquish power is now uncertain, his governance and reform agenda in his second term will have an outsized impact on China's long-run investment outlook. The Danger From Within From 1978-2008, the Communist Party's legitimacy rested on its ability to deliver rising incomes. Since the Great Recession, however, China has entered a "New Normal" of declining potential GDP growth as the society ages and productivity growth converges toward the emerging market average (Chart II-1). In this context, Chinese policymakers are deathly afraid of getting caught in the "middle income trap," a loose concept used to explain why some middle-income economies get bogged down in slower growth rates that prevent them from reaching high-income status (Chart II-2).2 Chart II-1The New Normal Chart II-2Will China Get Caught In The Middle-Income Trap? Such a negative economic outcome would likely prompt a wave of popular discontent, which, in turn, could eventually jeopardize Communist Party rule. The quid pro quo between the Chinese government and its population is that the former delivers rising incomes in exchange for the latter's compliance with authoritarian rule. The party is not blind to the fate of other authoritarian states whose growth trajectory stalled. The threat of popular unrest in China may seem remote today. The Communist Party is rallying around its leader, Xi Jinping; the economy rebounded from the turmoil of 2015 and its cyclical slowdown in recent months is so far benign; consumer sentiment is extremely buoyant; and the global economic backdrop is bright (Chart II-3). Yet these positive political and economic developments are cyclical, whereas the underlying political risks are structural and persistent. China has made massive gains in lifting its population out of poverty, but it is still home to 559 million people, around 40% of the population, living on less than $6 per day, the living standard of Uzbekistan. It will be harder to continue improving these workers' quality of life as trend growth slows and the prospects for export-oriented manufacturing dry up. This is why the Xi administration has recently renewed its attention to poverty alleviation. The government is on target in lifting rural incomes, but behind target in lifting urban incomes, and urban-dwellers are now the majority of the nation (Chart II-4). The plight of China's 200-250 million urban migrants, in particular, poses the risk of social discontent. Chart II-3China's Slowdown So Far Benign Chart II-4Urban Income Targets At Risk Moreover, while China knows how to alleviate poverty, it has less experiencing coping with the greatest threat to the regime: the rapid growth of the middle class, with its high expectations, demands for meritocracy and social mobility, and potential for unrest if those expectations are spoiled (Chart II-5). Democracy is not necessarily a condition for reaching high-income status, but all of Asia's high-income countries are democracies. A higher level of wealth encourages household autonomy vis-à-vis the state. Today, China has reached the $8,000 GDP per capita range that often accompanies the overthrow of authoritarian regimes.3 The Chinese are above the level of income at which the Taiwanese replaced their military dictatorship in 1987; China's poorest provinces are now above South Korea's level in that same year, when it too cast off the yoke of authoritarianism (Chart II-6). Chart II-5The Communist Party's Greatest Challenge Chart II-6China's Development Beyond Point At Which Taiwan And Korea Overthrew Dictatorship This is not an argument for democracy in China. We are agnostic about whether China will become democratic in our lifetime. We are making a far more humble point: that political risk will mount as wealth is accumulated by the country's growing middle class. Several emerging markets - including Thailand, Malaysia, Turkey and Brazil - have witnessed substantial political tumult after their middle class reached half of the population and stalled (Chart II-7). China is approaching this point and will eventually face similar challenges. Chart II-7Middle Class Growth Troubles Other EMs The comparison reveals that an inflection point exists for a society where the country's political establishment faces difficulties in negotiating the growing demands of a wealthier population. As political scientists have shown empirically, the very norms of society evolve as wealth erodes the pull of Malthusian and traditional cultural variables.4 Political transformation can follow this process, often quite unexpectedly and radically.5 Clearly the Chinese public shows no sign of large-scale, revolutionary sentiment at the moment. And political opposition does not necessarily result in regime change. Nevertheless, it is empirically false that the Chinese people are naturally opposed to democracy or representative government. After all, Sun Yat Sen founded a Republic of China in 1912, well before many western democratic transformations! And more to the point, the best survey evidence shows that the Chinese are culturally most similar to their East Asian neighbors (as well as, surprisingly, the Baltic and eastern European states): this is not a neighborhood that inherently eschews democracy. Remarkably, recent surveys suggest that China's millennial generation, while not wildly enthusiastic about democracy, is nevertheless more enthusiastic than its peers in the western world's liberal democracies (Chart II-8)! Chart II-8Chinese People Not Less Fond Of Democracy Than Others China is also home to one of the most reliable predictors of political change: inequality. China's economic boom is coincident with the rise of extreme inequalities in income, wealth, region, and social status. True, judging by average household wealth, everyone appears to be a winner; but the average is misleading because it is pulled upward by very high net worth individuals - and China has created 528 billionaires in the past decade alone. A better measure is the mean-to-median wealth ratio, as it demonstrates the gap that opens up between the average and the typical household. As Chart II-9 demonstrates, China is witnessing a sharp increase in inequality relative to its neighbors and peers. More standard measures of inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, also show very high readings in China. And this trend has combined with social immobility: China has a very high degree of generational earnings elasticity, which is a measure of the responsiveness of one's income to one's parent's income. If elasticity is high, then social outcomes are largely predetermined by family and social mobility is low. On this measure, China is an extreme outlier - comparable to the U.S. and the U.K., which, while very different economies, have suffered recent political shocks as a result of this very predicament (Chart II-10). Chart II-9Inequality: A Severe Problem In China Chart II-10China An Outlier In Inequality And Social Immobility "China does not have voters" unlike the U.S. and U.K., is the instant reply. Yet that statement entails that China has no pressure valve for releasing pent-up frustrations. Any political shock may be more, not less, destabilizing. In the U.S. and the U.K., voters could release their frustrations by electing an anti-establishment president or abrogating a trade relationship with Europe. In China, the only option may be to demand an "exit" from the political system altogether. Note that there is already substantial evidence of social unrest in China over the past decade. From 2003 to 2007, China faced a worrisome increase in "mass incidents," at which point the National Bureau of Statistics stopped keeping track. The longer data on "public incidents" suggests that the level of unrest remains elevated, despite improvements under the Xi administration (Chart II-11). Broader measures tell a similar story of a country facing severe tensions under the surface. For instance, China's public security spending outstrips its national defense spending (Chart II-12). Chart II-11Chinese Social Unrest Is Real Chart II-12China Spends More On ##br##Domestic Security Than Defense In essence, Chinese political risk is understated. This conclusion may seem counterintuitive, given Xi's remarkable consolidation of power. But is ultimately structural factors, not individual leaders, that will carry the day. The Communist Party is in a good position now, but its leaders are all-too-aware of the volcanic frustrations that could be unleashed should they fail to deliver the "China Dream." This is why so much depends upon Xi's policy agenda in the second half of his term. To that question we will now turn. Bottom Line: The Communist Party is at a cyclical high point of above-trend economic growth and political consolidation under a strongman leader. However, political risk is understated: poverty, inequality, and middle-class angst are structural and persistent and the long-term potential growth rate is slowing. If we assume that China is not unique in its historical trajectory, then we can conclude that it is approaching one of the most politically volatile periods in its development. Chart II-13Xi's Anti-Corruption Campaign The Governance And Reform Agenda Since coming to office in 2012-13, President Xi has spearheaded an extraordinary anti-corruption campaign and purge of the Communist Party (Chart II-13). The campaign has understandably drawn comparisons to Chairman Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution (1966-76). Yet these are not entirely fair, as Xi has tried to improve governance as well as eradicate his enemies. As Xi prepares for his "re-election" in March 2018, he has declared that he will expand the anti-corruption campaign further in his second term in office: details are scant, but the gist is that the campaign will branch out from the ruling party to the entire state bureaucracy, on a permanent basis, in the form of a new National Supervision Commission.6 There are three ways in which this agenda could prove positive for China's long-term outlook. First, the regime clearly hopes to convince the public that it is addressing the most burning social grievances. Corruption persistently ranks at the top of the list, insofar as public opinion can be known (Chart II-14). Public opinion is hard to measure, but it is clear that consumer sentiment is soaring in the wake of the October party congress (see Chart II-3 above). It is also worth noting that the Chinese public's optimism perked up in Xi's first year in office, when the policy agenda on offer was substantially the same and the economy had just experienced a sharp drop in growth rates (Chart II-15). Reassuring the public over corruption will improve trust in the regime. Second, the anti-corruption campaign feeds into Xi's broader economic reform agenda. Productivity growth is harder to generate as a country's industrialization process matures. With the bulk of the big increases in labor, capital, and land supply now complete in China, the need to improve total factor productivity becomes more pressing (Chart II-16). Unlike the early stages of growth, this requires reaching the hard-to-get economic conditions, such as property rights, human capital, financial deepening, entrepreneurship, innovation, education, technology, and social welfare. Chart II-14Chinese Public Grievances Chart II-15Anti-Corruption Is Popular Chart II-16Productivity Requires Institutional Change On this count, the Xi administration's anti-corruption campaign has been a net positive. The most widely accepted corruption indicators suggest that it has made a notable improvement to the country's governance. Yet the country remains far below its competitors in the absolute rankings, notably its most similar neighbor Taiwan (Chart II-17 A&B). The institutionalization of the campaign could thus further improve the institutional framework and business environment. Chart II-17AAnti-Corruption Campaign Is A Plus... Chart II-17B...But There's A Long Way To Go Third, the anti-corruption campaign can serve as a central government tool in enforcing other economic reforms. Pro-productivity reforms are harder to execute in the context of slowing growth because political resistance increases among established actors fighting to preserve their existing advantages. If the ruling party is to break through these vested interests, it needs a powerful set of tools. Recently, the central government in Beijing has been able to implement policy more effectively on the local level by paving the way through corruption probes that remove personnel and sharpen compliance. Case in point: the use of anti-corruption officials this year gave teeth to environmental inspection teams tasked with trimming overcapacity in the industrial sector (Chart II-18). And there are already clear signs that this method will be replicated as financial regulators tackle the shadow banking sector.7 Chart II-18Reforms Cut Steel Capacity, ##br##Reduced Need For Scrap These last examples - financial and environmental regulatory tightening - are policy priorities in 2018. The coercive aspect of the corruption probes should ensure that they are more effective than they would otherwise be. And reining in asset bubbles and reducing pollution are clear long-term positives for the regime. Ideally, then, Xi's anti-corruption campaign will deliver three substantial improvements to China's long-term outlook: greater public trust in the government, higher total factor productivity, and reduced systemic risks. The administration hopes that it can mitigate its governance deficit while improving economic sustainability. In this way it can buy both public support and precious time to continue adjusting to the new normal. The danger is that these policies will combine to increase downside risks to growth in the short term.8 Bottom Line: Xi's anti-corruption campaign is being expanded and institutionalized to cover the entire Chinese administrative state. This is a consequential campaign that will take up a large part of Xi's second term. It is the administration's major attempt to mitigate the socio-political challenges that await China as it rises up the income ladder. Absolute Power Corrupts Absolutely? The problem, however, is that Xi may merely use the anti-corruption campaign to accrue more power into his hands. As is clear from the above, Xi's governance agenda is far from impartial and professional. The anti-corruption campaign is being used not only to punish corrupt officials but also to achieve various other goals. Xi has even publicly linked the campaign to the downfall of his political rivals.9 In essence, the campaign highlights the core contradiction of the Xi administration: can Xi genuinely improve China's governance by means of the centralization and personalization of power? Chart II-19China's Governance Still Falls Far Behind Over the long haul, the fundamental problem is the absence of checks and balances, i.e. accountability, from Xi's agenda. For instance, the National Supervision Commission will be granted immense powers to investigate and punish malefactors within the state - but who will inspect the inspectors? Xi's other governance reforms suffer the same problem. His attempt to create "rule of law" is lacking the critical ingredients of judicial independence and oversight. The courts are not likely to be able to bring cases against the party, central government, or powerful state-owned firms, and they will not be able to repeal government decisions. Thus, as many commentators have noted, Xi's notion of rule of law is more accurately described as "rule by law": the reformed legal system will in all probability remain an instrument in the hands of the Communist Party. Likewise, Xi's attempt to grant the People's Bank of China greater powers of oversight in order to combat systemic financial risk suffers from the fact that the central bank is not independent, and will remain subordinate to the State Council, and hence to the Politburo Standing Committee. This is not even to mention the lamentable fact that Xi's campaign for better governance has so far coincided with extensive repression of civil society, which does not mesh well with the desire to improve human capital and innovation.10 Thus it is of immense importance whether Xi sets up relatively durable anti-corruption, legal, and financial institutions that will maintain their legitimate functions beyond his term and political purposes. Otherwise, his actions will simply illustrate why China's governance indicators lag so far behind its peers in absolute terms. Corruption perceptions may improve further, but there will be virtually no progress in areas like "voice and accountability," "political stability and absence of violence," "rule of law," and "regulatory quality," each of which touches on the Communist Party's weak spots in various ways (Chart II-19). Analysis of the Communist Party's shifting leadership characteristics reinforces a pessimistic view of the long run if Xi misses his current opportunity.11 The party's top leadership increasingly consists of career politicians from the poor, heavily populated interior provinces - i.e. the home base of the party. Their educational backgrounds are less scientific, i.e. more susceptible to party ideology. (Indeed, Xi Jinping's top young protégé, Chen Miner, is a propaganda chief.) And their work experience largely consists of ruling China's provinces, where they earned their spurs by crushing rebellions and redistributing funds to placate various interest groups (Chart II-20). While one should be careful in drawing conclusions from such general statistics, the contrast with the leadership that oversaw China's boldest reforms in the 1990s is plain. Chart II-20China's Leaders Becoming More 'Communist' Over Time Bottom Line: Xi's reform agenda is contradictory in its attempt to create better governance through centralizing and personalizing power. Unless he creates checks and balances in his reform of China's institutions, he is likely to fall short of long-lasting improvements. The character profiles of China's political elite do not suggest that the party will become more likely to pursue pro-market reforms in Xi's wake. Xi Jinping's Choice Xi is the pivotal player because of his rare consolidation of power, and 2018 is the pivotal year. It is pivotal because it will establish the policy trajectory of Xi's second term - which may or may not extend into additional terms after 2022. So far, the world has gained a few key takeaways from Xi's policy blueprint, which he delivered at the nineteenth National Party Congress on October 18: Xi has consolidated power: He and his faction reign supreme both within the Communist Party and the broader Chinese state; Xi's policy agenda is broadly continuous: Xi's speech built on his administration's stated aims in the first five years as well as the inherited long-term aims of previous administrations; China is coming out of its shell: In the international realm, Xi sees China "moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind"; The 2022 succession is in doubt: Xi refrained from promoting a successor to the Politburo Standing Committee, the unwritten norm since 1992. Markets have not reacted overly negatively to these developments (Chart II-21), as the latter do not pose an immediate threat to the global rally in risk assets. The reasons are several: Chart II-21Market Not Too Worried About ##br##Party Congress Outcomes Maoism is overrated: While the Communist Party constitution now treats Xi Jinping as the sole peer of the disastrous ruler Mao Zedong, the market does not buy the Maoist rhetoric. Instead, it sees policy continuity, yet with more effective central leadership, which is a plus. Reforms are making gradual progress: Xi is treading carefully, but is still publicly committed to a reform agenda of rebalancing China's economic model toward consumption and services, improving governance and productivity, and maintaining trade openness. Whatever the shortcomings of the first five years, this agenda is at least reformist in intention. China's tactic of "seeking progress while maintaining stability" is certainly more reassuring than "progress at any cost" or "no progress at all"! Trump and Xi are getting along so far: Xi's promises to move China toward center stage threaten to increase geopolitical tensions with the United States in the long run, yet markets are not overly alarmed. China is imposing sanctions on North Korea to help resolve the nuclear missile standoff, negotiating a "Code of Conduct" in the South China Sea, and promoting the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which will marginally add to global development and growth. Trump is hurling threatening words rather than concrete tariffs. 2022 is a long way away: Markets are unconcerned with Xi's decision not to put a clear successor on the Politburo Standing Committee, even though it implies that Xi will not step down at the end of his term in five years. Investors are implicitly approving Xi's strongman behavior while blissfully ignoring the implication that the peaceful transition of power in China could become less secure. Are investors right to be so sanguine? Cyclically, BCA's China Investment Strategy is overweight Chinese investible equities relative to EM and global stocks. Geopolitical Strategy also recommends that clients follow this view and overweight China relative to EM. Beyond this 6-12 month period, it depends on how Xi uses his political capital. If Xi is serious about governance and economic reform, then long-term investors should tolerate the other political risks, and the volatility of reforms, and overweight China within their EM portfolio. After all, China's two greatest pro-market reformers, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, were also heavy-handed authoritarians who crushed domestic dissent, clashed with the United States from time to time, and hesitated to relinquish control to their successors. However, if Xi is not serious, then investors with a long time horizon should downgrade China/EM assets - as not only China but the world will have a serious problem on its hands. For Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin always reaffirmed China's pro-market orientation and desire to integrate into the global economic order. If Xi turns his back on this orientation, while imprisoning his rivals for corruption, concentrating power exclusively in his own person, and contesting U.S. leadership in the Asia Pacific, then the long-run outlook for China and the region should darken rather quickly. Domestic institutions will decay and trade and foreign investment will suffer. How and when will investors know the difference? As mentioned, we think 2018 is critical. Xi is flush with political capital and has a positive global economic backdrop. If he does not frontload serious efforts this year then it will become harder to gain traction as time goes by.12 If he demurs, the Chinese political system will not afford another opportunity like this for years to come. The country will approach the 2020s with additional layers of bureaucracy loyal to Xi, but no significant macro adjustments to its governance or productivity. It is not clear how long China's growth rate is sustainable without pro-productivity reforms. It is also not clear that the world will wait five years before responding to a China that, without a new reform push, will appear unabashedly mercantilist, neo-communist, and revisionist. Bottom Line: The long-run investment outlook for China hinges on Xi Jinping's willingness to use his immense personal authority and concentration of power for the purposes of good governance and market-oriented economic reform. Without concrete progress, investors will have to decide whether they want to invest in a China that is becoming less economically vibrant as well as more authoritarian. We think this would be a bad bet. Matt Gertken Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy Marko Papic Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist Geopolitical Strategy 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Chinese policymakers are expressly concerned about the middle-income trap. Please see the World Bank and China's Development Research Center of the State Council, "China 2030: Building A Modern, Harmonious, And Creative Society," 2013, available at www.worldbank.org. Liu He, who is perhaps Xi Jinping's top economic adviser, had a hand in drafting this report and is now a member of the Politburo and shortlisted to take charge of the newly established Financial Stability and Development Commission at the People's Bank of China. 3 Please see Indermit S. Gill and Homi Kharas, "The Middle-Income Trap Turns Ten," World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 7403 (August, 2015), available at www.worldbank.org 4 Please see Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: the Human Development Sequence (Cambridge: CUP, 2005). 5 For example, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Arab Spring, as well as the downfall of communist regimes writ large, were completely unanticipated. 6 Specifically, Xi is creating a National Supervision Commission that will group a range of existing anti-graft watchdogs under its roof at the local, provincial, and central levels of administration, while coordinating with the Communist Party's top anti-graft watchdog. More details are likely to be revealed at the March legislative session, but what matters is that the initiative is a significant attempt to institutionalize the anti-corruption campaign. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China's Party Congress Ends ... So What?" dated November 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 China has recently drafted top anti-graft officials, such as Zhou Liang, from the powerful Central Discipline and Inspection Commission and placed them in the China Banking Regulatory Commission, which is in charge of overseeing banks. Authorities have already imposed fines in nearly 3,000 cases in 2017 affecting various kinds of banks, including state-owned banks. On the broader use of anti-corruption teams for economic policy, please see Barry Naughton, "The General Secretary's Extended Reach: Xi Jinping Combines Economics And Politics," China Leadership Monitor 54 (Fall 2017), available at www.hoover.org. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Three Questions For 2018," dated December 13, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see Gao Shan et al, "China's President Xi Jinping Hits Out at 'Political Conspiracies' in Keynote Speech," Radio Free Asia, January 3, 2017, available at www.rfa.org 10 Xi has cranked up the state's propaganda organs, censorship of the media, public surveillance, and broader ideological and security controls (including an aggressive push for "cyber-sovereignty") to warn the public that there is no alternative to Communist Party rule. This tendency has raised alarms among civil rights defenders, lawyers, NGOs, and the western world to the effect that China's governance is actually regressing despite nominal improvement in standard indicators. This is the opposite of Confucius's bottom-up notion of order. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Xi faces politically sensitive deadlines in the 2020-22 period: the economic targets in the thirteenth Five Year Plan; the hundredth anniversary of the Communist Party in 2021; and Xi's possible retirement at the twentieth National Party Congress in 2022. At that point he will need to focus on demonstrating the Communist Party's all-around excellence and make careful preparations either to step down or cling to power. III. Indicators And Reference Charts Global equity indexes remained on a tear heading into year-end on the back of robust earnings growth in the major countries and U.S. tax cuts. There are some dark clouds hanging over this rally, as discussed in the Overview section. The technicals are stretched, but none of our fundamental indicators are warning of a market top. Implied equity volatility is very low, which can be interpreted in a contrary fashion. Investor sentiment is frothy and our Speculation Indicator is very elevated. Moreover, our equity valuation indicator has finally reached one standard deviation, which is our threshold of overvaluation. Valuation does not tell us anything about timing, but it does highlight the downside risks. Our monetary indicator also deteriorated a little more in December, although not by enough on its own to justify downgrading risk assets. On a positive note, earnings surprises and the net revisions ratio are not sending any warning signs for profit growth (although net revisions have edged lower recently). Moreover, our new Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) continued on its bullish equity signal in November for the fifth consecutive month. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicators are also bullish on stocks in the U.S., Europe and Japan. These indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. The small dip in the Japanese WTP in December is a little worrying, but we need to see more weakness to confirm that flows no longer favor Japanese equities. In contrast, Europe's WTP rose sharply in December, suggesting that investors are allocating more to their European equity holdings. We are overweight both Europe and (especially) Japan relative to the U.S. (currency hedged). U.S. Treasury valuation is still very close to neutral, even following December's backup in yields. There is plenty of upside potential for yields before they hit "inexpensive" territory. Similarly, our technical bond indicator suggests that technical factors will not be headwind to a further bond selloff in 2018. Little has change for the dollar. The technicals are neutral. Value is expensive based on PPP, but less so by other valuation metrics. We see modest upside for the greenback in 2018. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart II-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart II-10U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart II-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart II-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart II-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart II-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart II-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart II-16U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart II-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart II-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart II-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart II-20Euro Technicals Chart II-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart II-22Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart II-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart II-24Commodity Prices Chart II-25Commodity Prices Chart II-26Commodity Sentiment Chart II-27Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart II-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart II-29U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart II-30U.S. Growth Outlook Chart II-31U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart II-32U.S. Labor Market Chart II-33U.S. Consumption Chart II-34U.S. Housing Chart II-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart II-36U.S. Financial Conditions Chart II-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart II-38Global Economic Snapshot: China