Economic Growth

Highlights In the second half of 2019, economic growth will stop accelerating… …but an underpinning of equity valuations will limit sell-off magnitudes to around 10 percent or so, rather than deeper sustained plunges. The equity market will end up in a sideways channel… …but defensives, such as healthcare, will outperform economically-sensitive sectors. Overweight Euro Stoxx 50 versus Shanghai Composite. Overweight the JPY. Bitcoin is due another technical correction. Feature The 2019 playbook for economies and markets is playing out exactly as we predicted. In our first report of this year we wrote that 2019 would be the economic and investment opposite of 2018. Opposite to 2018 because the first half of 2019 would see inflation fade, and growth accelerate. And opposite to 2018 because the second half of 2019 would see inflation stop fading, and growth stop accelerating (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekIn The First Half Of 2019, Inflation Faded, Growth Accelerated In The First Half Of 2019, Inflation Faded, Growth Accelerated In The First Half Of 2019, Inflation Faded, Growth Accelerated Inflation Faded, Growth Accelerated Back in early January, we wrote: “Inflation is set to disappoint as the recent near-halving of the crude oil price feeds into both headline and core consumer price indexes. With central banks now promising even greater ‘dependence on the incoming data’, this unfolding dynamic will force them to temper any hawkish intentions and rhetoric, limiting the extent of upside in bond yields.” This was a controversial view at the time. Yet within a month of writing, the Federal Reserve had stopped hiking interest rates, while the ECB and other major central banks had also pivoted to more dovish. We also wrote: “Germany should benefit from another support to growth. Last year, the auto sector – a major engine of the German economy – spluttered as it absorbed the new WLTP emissions testing standard. Through the middle of 2018 German motor vehicle exports suffered a €20 billion hit which shaved 0.6 percent from Germany’s €3.4 trillion economy (Chart I-2). Now, if auto exports stabilize, this drag will disappear. And if auto exports recover to the pre-WLTP level after this one-off and temporary shock, Germany will receive a 0.6% mirror-image boost to growth.” 1 2019 is the economic and investment opposite of 2018. We now know that the German economy accelerated to a close-to-trend 1.7% clip in the second quarter, up from a -0.8 percent rate of contraction in the third quarter of 2018 (Chart I-3). This is not just due to relief in the auto sector. Growth in other European economies has also rebounded, so the acceleration in growth has a broader foundation, and is now beyond doubt. Given the openness of the European economy, it is also inconceivable that this growth pick-up does not reflect a more generalized acceleration in global activity.2 Chart I-2The WTLP Drag On German Auto Exports Is Over The WTLP Drag On German Auto Exports Is Over The WTLP Drag On German Auto Exports Is Over Chart I-3German GDP Growth Accelerated To A 1.7 Percent Clip German GDP Growth Accelerated To A 1.7 Percent Clip German GDP Growth Accelerated To A 1.7 Percent Clip To repeat, the 2019 playbook for economies and financial markets is playing out exactly as expected; in the first half of the year, inflation faded while growth accelerated. The question is: what happens next? Growth Will Struggle To Accelerate Further Clients ask us an important theoretical question: what is the most important driver for the economy and financial markets; is it the change in the bond yield (or interest rate) or is it the level of the bond yield? The answer is that both the change and the level of the bond yield are important in their different ways. The German economy accelerated to a close-to-trend 1.7% clip in the second quarter. When it comes to accelerations and decelerations in credit creation, it is the change in the bond yield that is the most important. Remember, GDP is a flow statistic, which means that GDP growth is a change of flow statistic receiving contributions from the change of flow of credit. As changes in the flow of credit result from the change in the bond yield – all else being equal – it is the change in the bond yield that drives GDP growth. If all of this sounds somewhat confusing, then Chart I-4 should make the point crystal clear. Chart I-4The Change In The Bond Yield Drives GDP Growth The Change In The Bond Yield Drives GDP Growth The Change In The Bond Yield Drives GDP Growth Since last November, high-quality 10-year bond yields have plunged 70 bps, and this collapse in yields helped to provide a strong impulse to growth in the first half of 2019. To receive the same impulse again in the second half, bond yields would have to plunge another 70 bps. But with the German 10-year bund yield already at -0.1 percent, the same rate of decline seems highly unlikely, if not mathematically impossible. The upshot is that the growth impulse from declining bond yields can only fade in the second half of this year.   However, when it comes to valuations and solvencies in the financial markets, it is the level of the bond yield that is the most important. Essentially, at a tipping point, higher bond yields can suddenly and viciously undermine the valuation support of equities, triggering a plunge in the stock market and other risk-assets which threatens a disinflationary impulse on the economy. The growth impulse from declining bond yields can only fade in the second half of this year. How can we sense this tipping point? It broadly equates to when the sum of the 10-year yields on the T-bond, German bund, and JGB is at 4 percent, the ‘rule of 4’ (Chart I-5). Conversely, when the sum is below 3 percent, the ‘rule of 3’, – as it is now – the seemingly rich valuation of equities versus bonds is broadly justified (Chart I-6).3 Chart I-5When The Sum Of 10-Year Yields On The T-Bond, Bund, And JGB Equals 4 Percent, The Global 10-Year Yield Equals 2 Percent When The Sum Of 10-Year Yields On The T-Bond, Bund, And JGB Equals 4 Percent, The Global 10-Year Yield Equals 2 Percent When The Sum Of 10-Year Yields On The T-Bond, Bund, And JGB Equals 4 Percent, The Global 10-Year Yield Equals 2 Percent Chart I-6The Rule Of 4, And The Rule Of 3 The Rule Of 4, And The Rule Of 3 The Rule Of 4, And The Rule Of 3 The upshot is that in the second half of 2019, economic growth will stop accelerating, but the support to equity valuations will limit sell-off magnitudes to around 10 percent or so, rather than deeper sustained plunges (Chart I-7). In aggregate, the equity market will end up in a sideways channel, but defensives, such as healthcare, will outperform economically-sensitive sectors. Chart I-7The Low Expected Return On Equities Is Justified When Bond Yields Are Ultra-Low The Low Expected Return On Equities Is Justified When Bond Yields Are Ultra-Low The Low Expected Return On Equities Is Justified When Bond Yields Are Ultra-Low How Did We Do? In our first report of the year, we also made (or reiterated) five investment recommendations. Today, we will review whether they worked or not, and what to do with them now. 1. Own a 25:75 combination of European banks relative to market, plus U.S. T-bonds. Chart I-8Banks Didn’t Outperform, But Bonds Did! Banks Didn't Outperform, But Bonds Did! Banks Didn't Outperform, But Bonds Did! Did it work? Yes. Although European banks underperformed the market, this was more than offset by the huge rally in T-bonds that resulted from the Fed going on hold (Chart I-8). Hence, the position is up 1 percent this year and 3.5 percent since its inception last November with the added advantage of negligible volatility. What to do now. Take profits. 2. Overweight EM versus DM. Did it work? No. EM has underperformed DM this year, though the position is broadly flat since its inception in November. What to do now. Close this position and switch into overweight Euro Stoxx 50 versus Shanghai Composite. 3. Overweight European versus U.S. equities. Did it work? The position is flat this year, though modestly up since its inception in November. What to do now. Maintain the position for a little while longer, as an expected short-term underperformance of the tech sector should benefit the tech-lite European equity market.  4. Overweight Italian assets versus European assets. Did it work? The position is broadly flat this year for both Italian equities and bonds relative to their European benchmarks. What to do now. Close any cyclical exposure to Italy, but maintain a structural exposure to Italian BTPs either in absolute or relative terms. 5. Overweight the JPY. Chart I-9In Japan And Europe, The Expected Interest Rate Cannot Go Much Lower In Japan And Europe, The Expected Interest Rate Cannot Go Much Lower In Japan And Europe, The Expected Interest Rate Cannot Go Much Lower Did it work? Yes. The broad trade-weighted JPY has outperformed this year, and especially so the JPY/EUR cross.   What to do now. Maintain the position. When the expected interest rate is at its lower bound, then it is difficult for the central bank to hurt its currency. In technical terms, the currency possesses a highly attractive payoff profile called positive skew (Chart I-9). Of course, there are plenty of currencies whose interest rates are near the technical lower bound, but we like the JPY because it has less political risk than the others. So for the moment, remain overweight the JPY.     Fractal Trading System*  This week we note that after a 100 percent rally in a near straight line, bitcoin’s 65-day fractal dimension is at the lower bound that has reliably signaled previous technical corrections. On that basis, this week’s recommended trade is short bitcoin, setting the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 27 percent. Also, we are very pleased to report that short tech versus healthcare quickly achieved its 6.5 percent profit target and is now closed. This leaves four open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 Bitcoin Bitcoin The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 German auto net exports and GDP are quoted at annualized rates. The Worldwide Harmonized Light Vehicle test Procedure (WLTP) is a new standard for auto emissions that took effect on September 1 2018. 2 Quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth at annualized rates. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report “The Rule of 4 Becomes the Rule of 3” dated March 21, 2019 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations    

Highlights Duration: We see current bond market behavior as very similar to mid-2016, when heightened political uncertainty obscured the economy’s true strength and kept bond yields lower for longer than was justified by the economic fundamentals. The correct strategy at that time was to sell into the bond market’s strength, and we advocate a similar strategy today. China: Any attempt by the Chinese government to retaliate in the trade war by selling U.S. Treasury securities would be either self-defeating or ineffective, depending on the exact strategy employed. In either case, U.S. Treasury yields will be unaffected. Fed: At least part of the Fed’s dovish turn might represent a desire to send the labor share of national income higher. We introduce a new data series for Fed Watchers to track. Feature The Trump Administration fired the latest salvo in the trade war two weeks ago, expanding tariffs to a broader swathe of Chinese imports. Then last week, the escalation of tensions spilled over to the bond market, sending global yields abruptly lower. Chart 1Flight To Safety Flight To Safety Flight To Safety The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield bounced off 2.35% last Thursday and has since settled at 2.39% (Chart 1). Meanwhile, the overnight index swap curve is now priced for 44 bps of Fed rate cuts over the next 12 months (Chart 1, bottom panel). It is possible, and even likely, that geopolitical tensions will keep yields low during the next month or two. In fact, our Geopolitical Strategy service places the odds of a complete breakdown in trade negotiations by the end of June at 50%.1  But we would encourage investors to sell into rallies, positioning for higher yields on a 6-12 month horizon. To see why, we return to a Weekly Report from early April where we walked through different factors that would be useful in the creation of a macroeconomic model for the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield.2 We consider what has changed during the past six weeks and what those developments mean for bond yields going forward. Back In The Bond Kitchen In early April, we ran through four different factors that should be included in any bond model and suggested macroeconomic indicators that best capture the trends in each. The four factors are: Global Growth: Best proxied by the Global Manufacturing PMI and Bullish Dollar Sentiment Policy Uncertainty: Best proxied by the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index Output Gap: Best proxied by Average Hourly Earnings Sentiment: Best proxied by the U.S. Economic Surprise Index We consider each factor in turn. Global Growth Chart 2Monitoring Global Growth Monitoring Global Growth Monitoring Global Growth The Global Manufacturing PMI, our preferred series for tracking global growth, ticked down during the past month, continuing the free-fall that has been in place since the end of 2017 (Chart 2). At 50.3, it is now only slightly above the 50 boom/bust line and is close to where it was in mid-2016, when the 10-year yield hit its cyclical low. But on a positive note, several leading indicators have hooked up in recent months, suggesting that the Global PMI could soon trough and move higher in the second half of the year. Specifically, the ZEW survey of global economic sentiment is off its lows, as is the BCA Global Leading Economic Indicator (LEI). Meanwhile, the Global LEI Diffusion Index has surged, indicating that 74% of the 23 countries in our sample are seeing improvement in their LEIs. Historically, the Global LEI Diffusion Index leads changes in both the Global LEI and the Global Manufacturing PMI (Chart 2, panel 3). Financial market prices that are highly geared to global growth had been singing a similar tune, but they rolled over as trade tensions flared during the past two weeks. For example, cyclical equity sectors recently started to underperform defensive sectors (Chart 2, bottom panel), and the important CRB Raw Industrials index took a nosedive. We place particular importance on the CRB Raw Industrials index as a timely indicator of global growth, because the ratio between the CRB index and gold correlates nicely with the 10-year Treasury yield (Chart 3).3 Unsurprisingly, the ratio’s recent dip coincides with last week’s drop in the 10-year. Several leading indicators have hooked up in recent months, suggesting that the Global PMI could soon trough and move higher in the second half of the year.  In addition to the Global Manufacturing PMI, we recommend including a survey of bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar in any bond model. More bullish dollar sentiment coincides with lower Treasury yields, and vice-versa. Our preferred survey shows that dollar sentiment remains elevated, but hasn’t changed much since April (Chart 4). The dollar itself, however, has begun to appreciate during the past two weeks (Chart 4, bottom panel). Chart 3A Falling CRB/Gold Ratio... A Falling CRB/Gold Ratio... A Falling CRB/Gold Ratio... Chart 4...And The Greenback Is On The Rise ...And The Greenback Is On The Rise ...And The Greenback Is On The Rise Bottom Line: The coincident global growth indicators that correlate best with bond yields – the Global Manufacturing PMI and Dollar Bullish Sentiment – are sending a similar message as in April. Meanwhile, leading economic indicators continue to suggest that we should expect improvement in the second half of the year. The biggest change from April is that global growth indicators derived from financial market prices – cyclical versus defensive equities, the CRB Raw Industrials index and the trade-weighted dollar – have responded negatively to heightened political risk. If this weakness persists and eventually infects the economic data, then it could prevent a second-half rebound in global growth, keeping Treasury yields low for even longer.   Policy Uncertainty Spikes in the monthly Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index often cause capital to seek out the safety of U.S. Treasuries, and we recommend including this index in any macroeconomic bond model (Chart 5A). Spikes in the monthly Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index often cause capital to seek out the safety of U.S. Treasuries. While there have been no updates to the monthly index since the trade war’s recent escalation, one of its components – a daily index that tracks the number of relevant news stories – has surged during the past two weeks (Chart 5B). This clearly illustrates that a sharp increase in political uncertainty has been the catalyst for the bond market rally. Investors are obviously concerned that an ongoing and intensifying trade war might derail the economic recovery, and they are seeking out Treasuries as a hedge. Chart 5AGlobal Uncertainty Set To Spike Global Uncertainty Set To Spike Global Uncertainty Set To Spike Chart 5BMarkets Are Concerned Markets Are Concerned Markets Are Concerned In such situations, the traditional playbook is to fade any purely uncertainty-driven rally, on the view that markets tend to overreact to headline risk. This strategy worked well following the mid-2016 Brexit vote. The uncertainty shock from the vote sent the 10-year quickly down to 1.37%, but it then increased in the second half of the year when it became apparent that the economic recovery would continue. While higher tariffs will certainly be a drag on growth going forward, accommodative Fed policy and a probable increase in Chinese economic stimulus will mitigate the impact, keeping the economic recovery intact.4 Output Gap Chart 6Wages Are Headed Higher Wages Are Headed Higher Wages Are Headed Higher The output gap is a concept that represents where the economy is operating relative to its peak capacity, and its progress during the past three years is the main reason why bond yields will not re-test 2016 lows. We have found that wage growth is the most reliable way to measure the output gap: higher wage growth signals less spare capacity, and less spare capacity coincides with higher bond yields. We recommend Average Hourly Earnings as the best wage measure to include in any bond model. Since April, average hourly earnings growth has been roughly flat, but leading indicators suggest that further acceleration is highly likely in the coming months (Chart 6). While the Fed is keen to let wage growth accelerate, rising wage growth also makes a rate cut difficult to justify. The combination of rising wage growth and an on-hold Fed should put a rising floor under long-maturity bond yields. Sentiment The final factor that should be included in any bond model is sentiment. In April, we suggested that the U.S. Economic Surprise Index is the best measure of sentiment. When the surprise index has been deeply negative for a long time, it usually means that investors are downbeat on the economy and that the bar for a positive surprise is low. This has actually been the case in recent months, and our simple auto-regressive model suggests that the surprise index is biased higher (Chart 7). Positioning data confirm this message, and in fact show that investors are taking as much duration risk as they were when yields troughed in mid-2016 (Chart 8). Chart 7Low Bar For Positive Surprises Low Bar For Positive Surprises Low Bar For Positive Surprises Chart 8Similar Positioning As In Mid-2016 Similar Positioning As In Mid-2016 Similar Positioning As In Mid-2016 The overall message is that bond investors have a very dim view of the economy, and it will not take much positive news to send yields higher. Investment Strategy We see current bond market behavior as very similar to mid-2016, when heightened political uncertainty obscured the economy’s true strength and kept bond yields lower for longer than was justified by the economic fundamentals. The correct strategy at that time was to sell into the bond market’s strength, and we advocate a similar strategy today. Timing when the next move higher in bond yields will occur is difficult, but we take some comfort in the fact that the flatness of the yield curve makes it less costly than usual to carry below-benchmark duration positions. In fact, the average yield on the Bloomberg Barclays Cash index is 7 bps higher than the average yield on the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Master Index. Bond investors have a very dim view of the economy, and it will not take much positive news to send yields higher. To further mitigate the cost of keeping duration low, we advocate taking duration-neutral positions that are short the belly (5-year & 7-year) part of the yield curve and long the very long and very short ends of the curve. Such trades are also provide a positive yield pick-up, and will earn capital gains when Treasury yields move higher.5 A Quick Note On China’s Treasury Purchases Chart 9Do Not Expect Treasuries To Be Used As A Weapon In This War Do Not Expect Treasuries To Be Used As A Weapon In This War Do Not Expect Treasuries To Be Used As A Weapon In This War The trade war’s recent escalation has led some to speculate that China could retaliate against higher tariffs by dumping U.S. Treasury securities onto the open market. The speculation only increased when the TIC data revealed that Chinese net Treasury purchases totaled -$24 billion in March, the most deeply negative figure since October 2016 (Chart 9).   We see low odds that China will employ this tactic in the trade war, and no meaningful impact on Treasury yields in any case. To see why, let’s consider two possible scenarios. In the first scenario, China sells a large amount of U.S. Treasury securities and keeps the proceeds from the sales in its domestic currency. Assuming the amounts in question are sufficiently large, these transactions would cause the RMB to appreciate and lead to a tightening of Chinese monetary conditions. Tighter monetary conditions are exactly what the Chinese government does not want as it seeks to counteract the negative economic impact from tariffs. In fact, China is much more likely to engineer a further easing of monetary conditions, much like in 2015/16 (Chart 9, bottom panel). In the second scenario, China could sell U.S. Treasuries and purchase other foreign bonds (German bunds, for example). This would nullify any impact on Chinese monetary conditions, but it would not have much impact on U.S. Treasury yields. With Chinese money still flowing into global bond markets, the re-balancing would only push other investors out of non-U.S. bond markets and into U.S. Treasuries. Without changing the overall demand for global bonds, it is difficult to envision much of an impact on U.S. yields. Bottom Line: Any attempt by the Chinese government to retaliate in the trade war by selling U.S. Treasury securities would be either self-defeating or ineffective, depending on the exact strategy employed. In either case, U.S. Treasury yields will be unaffected. A New Data Series For Fed Watchers: Rich’s Ratio A number of recent Fed speeches have referred to the time series plotted in Chart 10: The share of national income going to labor, as opposed to corporate profits. Chart 10Introducing Rich's Ratio Introducing Rich's Ratio Introducing Rich's Ratio Vice-Chair Richard Clarida brought this analysis to the Fed, and the data series was actually once dubbed “Rich’s Ratio” by Clarida’s old PIMCO colleague Paul McCulley. The idea behind Rich’s Ratio is that while some late-cycle wage gains are passed through to prices, a portion also eat into corporate profits. Notice in Chart 10 that Rich’s Ratio has a tendency to rise late in the economic recovery. Based on his past writings, we would not be surprised if at least part of the Fed’s recent dovish turn represents a desire to send Rich’s Ratio higher, even if that goal might entail a modest overshoot of the Fed's 2 percent inflation target. We will have more to say about Rich’s Ratio in the coming weeks. For now, we simply want to make Fed Watchers aware that they have a new series to track. Stay tuned. Ryan Swift, U.S. Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “How Trump Became A War President”, dated May 17, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Bond Kitchen”, dated April 9, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 The rationale for why the CRB/Gold ratio tracks the 10-year Treasury yield is found in U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Search For Aaa Spread”, dated March 12, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Tarrified”, dated May 16, 2019, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Paid To Wait”, dated February 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights We’ve searched in vain for imminent domestic weakness in the U.S. economy, … : Much of our work this spring has focused on trying to poke holes in our view that the equilibrium fed funds rate remains above the target fed funds rate, but we haven’t found any evidence of overheating in the real economy, or worrisome excesses in financial markets. … but an exogenous shock could well precipitate a recession if it were serious enough: The U.S. is a comparatively closed economy, but there’s no such thing as full-on decoupling. The U.S. may react more slowly than other major economies to what’s going on in the rest of the world, but it’s not immune to it. A trade war would threaten global growth, … : U.S.-China trade negotiations have taken center stage over the last couple weeks, and escalating tension between the world’s two largest standalone economies will surely cast a pall over the global outlook. … but there are other potential threats that bear monitoring: Tensions with Iran could be the catalyst for an oil price shock, while a significant rollback of globalization could crimp corporate profit margins. Either would hasten the end of the equity bull market and the expansion. Feature Tight monetary policy is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for a recession. We deem policy to be tight if the fed funds rate exceeds our estimate of the equilibrium fed funds rate, and easy if it is below our estimate of equilibrium. Over the six decades for which we compute an estimate of the equilibrium fed funds rate, the U.S. has only ever experienced recessions when the fed funds rate has exceeded our estimate of equilibrium (Chart 1). Tight policy isn’t always tantamount to a recession – nothing came of tight settings in 1984 or 1995 – but recessions don’t occur without it. Chart 1Recessions Only Occur When Monetary Conditions Are Tight Recessions Only Occur When Monetary Conditions Are Tight Recessions Only Occur When Monetary Conditions Are Tight We currently estimate that the equilibrium fed funds rate, a.k.a. the neutral rate, is about 3⅛%, and we continue to project that it will be around 3⅜% by the end of the year. Those estimates leave the Fed with plenty of headroom before it materially slows the economy. If our estimate is on the money, it will take four more rate hikes to induce an inflection in the business cycle. We have not seen anything in the ongoing flow of macro data, or evidence of excesses in the financial markets, that would suggest a recession is already under way or is lurking around the corner. Internal dynamics should continue to support the expansion, but threats from outside the U.S. are growing. We therefore conclude that the next recession may well not arrive for another two years, in the absence of a significantly adverse exogenous event. This week, we extend our focus beyond the U.S. to try to uncover the external threats that could stop the U.S. economy, and the bull markets in risk assets, in their tracks. Beyond the tariff fireworks, we also contemplate the possibility that conflict with Iran could lead to an oil price shock, and the impact of a significant rollback of globalization. It is not our base case that any of the various external threats will tip the U.S. into a recession, but investors should keep tabs on the biggest ones. Tariffs The U.S.-China trade saga has unfolded in three pairs of moves and counter-moves (Diagram 1). While the aggregate $50bn worth of Chinese goods tariffed in the first two salvos mostly targeted industrial equipment and machinery, the third installment, covering $200bn worth of imports, extended the tariffs’ reach to consumer products. Major categories included not only commodities such as base metals, chemical products and mineral fuels and oils, but also a broad swath of foods, textiles, electronics, vehicles and spare parts. After a three-month cease-fire, the developments of the last two weeks arguably marked the most significant escalation of tensions on both sides. The U.S. is now threatening to levy tariffs on the remaining $325bn of Chinese goods that have so far been spared. Diagram 1Anything You Can Do External Threats External Threats Our colleagues at BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy service suggest that recent foreign policy initiatives indicate that the White House does not feel any particular pressure to minimize economic risk this far ahead of the election. The risk of market-disruptive measures has therefore increased, and they see a 50-50 chance that the U.S. and China will fail to reach an accord (Table 1). Although the administration has delayed any action on autos and auto parts for now, Europe could be the next trade partner in its cross hairs. The odds that Section 232 (national-security-threat) tariffs will be levied on European auto imports is rising (Chart 2). Table 1U.S.-China Trade War: Probabilities Of A Deal By End Of June 2019 External Threats External Threats Chart 2 These heightened trade tensions may delay the global growth recovery that we were expecting to bloom in the summer, and they may also allow the dollar to keep advancing. The greenback is a countercyclical currency, moving inversely with global activity (Chart 3), and a bump in the road for global growth would likely extend its upward run. Chart 3The Countercyclical Dollar The Countercyclical Dollar The Countercyclical Dollar Although a strong dollar would be a headwind for exporters, the U.S. economy is comparatively closed. Tariffs are likely to exert the greatest pressure on the economy via softer consumption and investment. So far, the available evidence suggests that U.S. consumers and corporations have borne the brunt of higher tariffs in the form of higher retail prices and lower profit margins.1 Iran Our geopolitical strategists contend that investors have underrated conflict with Iran as a market risk for a while. Now that the contentiousness of U.S.-Iran relations has ratcheted higher upon the administration’s decision not to extend the import waivers on Iranian oil, the issue is back in the spotlight. Our strategists caution that managing the dispute may require more delicacy than the more hawkish elements of the administration realize. In their view, the potential for a misstep increases the odds of a recession and poses a significant risk to the equity bull market. In a joint Special Report by our Commodity and Energy Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy services at the beginning of the month, our in-house experts stressed that there are multiple moving parts driving the supply-demand balance in the global oil market.2 Investors should realize that the world faces the prospect of the loss of Venezuelan production (approximately 600,000 barrels per day (b/d)) and significant outages in Libya (~600,000 to 800,000 b/d), in addition to our strategists’ base-case estimate of 700,000 b/d from Iran’s current 1.3 million b/d output. BCA does not expect that all of that output will be lost, but the key point is that Iran is not the only potential source of a supply shortfall. Our energy strategists believe that OPEC 2.0 – the producer coalition led by Saudi Arabia and Russia, and supported by Saudi Arabia’s OPEC allies – has the capacity to make up for even their larger shortfall scenarios (Chart 4). The problem is that OPEC 2.0 may not have the will to do so in a timely fashion. Saudi Arabia and the rest of the OPEC 2.0 coalition were caught completely off guard by the administration’s issuance of import waivers in November, after they had ramped up production at its request to limit the market disruptions that would have ensued when Iran’s output was taken off the market. The last-minute waiver decision caused oil prices to crater in the wake of a supply glut that OPEC 2.0 has been working to sop up ever since (Chart 5). Chart 4 Chart 5... But The Oil Market Is Pretty Tight ... But The Oil Market Is Pretty Tight ... But The Oil Market Is Pretty Tight   OPEC 2.0’s members may feel that they were badly used last fall, and may not be inclined to move proactively now. Russia is managing its own low-grade conflict with the U.S., and all of the coalition should bear in mind that the U.S. could release over a million b/d from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) for a solid six to nine months, according to our energy team’s estimates. If rising oil prices are often viewed as a tax on American consumers, a late summer/early fall release of holdings could be viewed as an election rebate, courtesy of the skilled economic managers in the White House. Our team expects that OPEC 2.0 will likely guard against an oversupply-driven swoon in oil prices by managing its production on something akin to a just-in-time inventory strategy. Our energy and geopolitical strategists caution that there are two other ways the administration may overplay its hand. First, it might overestimate U.S. shale drillers’ ability to export their production. While new pipeline construction will relieve the transportation bottleneck limiting the Permian Basin output that reaches the Gulf of Mexico, oil exports from the Gulf are limited by a shortage of deep-water harbor facilities. If global trade tensions do worsen, both the dollar and U.S. equities may attract safe-haven flows. There is also the possibility that Iran might strike at Iraq, putting some of its 3.5 million b/d output at risk. It could also make good on its repeated threat to close the Straits of Hormuz, through which nearly a fifth of global oil supplies travel daily. Either of these options would dramatically escalate the conflict, but a desperate Iran might pursue them if it felt cornered. The bottom line is that the probability of an oil price shock is not negligible. Brinkmanship with Iran could upset a delicate supply-demand balance in global oil markets, and a delicate geopolitical balance in the Middle East. If the Volcker double-dip is treated as a single event, a surge in oil prices has preceded every recession in the last 45 years, except for the 2001 recession precipitated by the bursting of the dot-com bubble (Chart 6). Chart 6Oil Price Spikes Often Precede Recessions Oil Price Spikes Often Precede Recessions Oil Price Spikes Often Precede Recessions Significant Rollback Of Globalization Our Geopolitical Strategy and Global Asset Allocation services have cited peak globalization as an important long-term investment theme for the last several years. The tariff tensions between the U.S. and its trading partners would seem to have borne out their predictions, especially if one views them as having been inspired by unskilled workers’ losses from globalization. Taking on foreign exporters is likely to play well in the electorally decisive Rust Belt states, where manufacturing job losses have hit especially hard. We fully subscribe to the theory of comparative advantage as formulated by David Ricardo in the early 19th century. By allowing individual countries to specialize in what they do best, free trade increases the size of the global economic pie. Empirical evidence suggests that globalization also re-slices the pie, however. In the developed world, outsourcing manufacturing has operated to the benefit of investors and the detriment of less-skilled workers. For U.S.-based multinationals, tariffs are a minor irritant compared to the prospect of having to reroute supply chains around China. The modest headwinds to globalization observed before the U.S. began engaging in serial bilateral trade conflicts did not undermine corporate profit margins in any material way. A bigger anti-globalization push that forced global supply chains to be rerouted or partially unwound would have much more negative effects. The U.S. is a comparatively closed economy, but the multinationals that dominate equity market capitalization rely heavily on interactions with the rest of the world. Unwinding the global supply chains that have been carefully constructed over the last 30 years would be disruptive and costly. The worst-case scenario envisioned by our geopolitical strategists, in which U.S.-China relations dramatically worsen and the tariff back-and-forth escalates in a major way, would hit equities hard, especially if supply chains had to be rebuilt. As a proxy for what globalization has meant for investors’ and blue-collar workers’ share of the pie, we consider the path of real wages relative to productivity over the last 50 years. From 1970 through 2001, U.S. wages generally kept pace with productivity gains, observing a fairly narrow, well-defined range (Chart 7). Once China entered the WTO (as denoted by the vertical line on the chart), productivity-adjusted wages fell precipitously, and even their periodic bounces have fallen well short of the level that marked the lower end of the previous range. Chart 7The Pie Has Grown, But Unskilled Labor's Slice Has Shrunk The Pie Has Grown, But Unskilled Labor's Slice Has Shrunk The Pie Has Grown, But Unskilled Labor's Slice Has Shrunk Bottom Line: Temporary barriers to free trade, implemented as a negotiating tactic, are not a big deal for equities. A significant rollback of globalization would be, however, and a need to divert global supply chains away from China could stop the bull market in its tracks. Investment Implications Along with our Global Investment Strategy colleagues, we are somewhat more sanguine than our Geopolitical Strategy service that a worst-case outcome between the U.S. and China can be averted. We therefore continue to believe that the U.S. expansion, and the bull markets in risk assets, will persist until the Fed tightens monetary conditions enough to spark the next recession. We reiterate our recommendations that investors should maintain at least an equal weight position in equities and spread product. Enough is at stake in the conflicts with China and Iran, however, that a worsening of either could cause us to change our view, and we will be watching developments on each front closely. Doug Peta, CFA Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Jennifer Lacombe Senior Analyst, Global ETF Strategy jenniferl@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding, and David E. Weinstein, “The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. Prices and Welfare,” NBER Working Paper No. 25672, (March 2019). 2      Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy/Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “U.S.-Iran: This Means War?,”dated May 3, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights The trade war escalation is just the catalyst and not the cause of the market correction. This year’s absolute double-digit returns have most likely already been made during the early-2019 star alignment of near-perfect conditions for investors. The remainder of the year is likely to be a much tougher going for all the major asset-classes. Short a 30:60:10 portfolio of equities, bonds, and oil, setting the profit target and stop-loss at 3 percent. In the second half of the year, the big story will be sector rotation. Healthcare is likely to flip from underperformer to outperformer versus technology. Given their sector skews, it follows that European equities are likely to outperform Chinese equities. Feature A star alignment of near-perfect conditions lifted the entire financial market complex in the early part of the year. For investors, pretty much everything that could go right did go right! (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekIn Near-Perfect Conditions, European Equities Performed Very Well... But Chinese Equities Performed Even Better In Near-Perfect Conditions, European Equities Performed Very Well... But Chinese Equities Performed Even Better In Near-Perfect Conditions, European Equities Performed Very Well... But Chinese Equities Performed Even Better The Federal Reserve stopped hiking interest rates; the ECB and other major central banks also pivoted to dovish; Brexit was delayed; the Italy versus Brussels spat over fiscal policy de-escalated; the drag from new emissions standards on German auto production eased; the trade war threat seemed to recede; and crucially, economic activity accelerated sharply (more about this later). A Rare Star Alignment… Which Cannot Last There was another rare star alignment: equities, bonds, and crude oil generated simultaneous strong rallies (Chart I-2). Such a star alignment is almost unheard of, because there are no set of economic circumstances that should benefit all three asset-classes at the same time. For example, if the oil price surge is inflationary – or at least less deflationary – then it should hurt bonds; if the surge is deflationary on real demand, then it should hurt equities. Equities, bonds, and oil should not surge together. Equities, bonds, and oil should not surge together, and on the extremely rare occasions they do, the simultaneous rally soon breaks down. Consider a €100 investment portfolio consisting of €30 equities, €60 long-dated bonds, and €10 crude oil. At the start of this year, the portfolio returned 10 percent in just three months. This is extremely rare, and has happened on only two other occasions in the past 25 years, in 2009 and 2016 (Chart I-3). Chart I-2A Rare Star Alignment:##br## Equities, Bonds, And Oil Surged ##br##Simultaneously A Rare Star Alignment: Equities, Bonds, And Oil Surged Simultaneously A Rare Star Alignment: Equities, Bonds, And Oil Surged Simultaneously Chart I-3A Rare Star Alignment: A 30:60:10 Portfolio of Equities: Bonds: Oil Gained 10 Percent In 3 Months A Rare Star Alignment: A 30:60:10 Portfolio of Equities: Bonds: Oil Gained 10 Percent In 3 Months A Rare Star Alignment: A 30:60:10 Portfolio of Equities: Bonds: Oil Gained 10 Percent In 3 Months On both previous occasions, the simultaneous rally broke down, and the portfolio went on to lose a large chunk of its 10 percent gain. Hence, at our quarterly webcast last week, we initiated a new investment recommendation: to short a 30:60:10 portfolio of equities, bonds, and oil, setting the profit target and stop-loss at 3 percent.1 When conditions are perfect, they are vulnerable to the tiniest setback. But the vulnerability emanates from the fragility of the perfect conditions, and not the precise setback. As an analogy, visualize a tree bedecked in its beautiful foliage in the autumn, and imagine you gently shake the tree. The gentlest of shakes will make the leaves collapse. At first glance, your shake caused the collapse, but in truth, your shake was just the catalyst; the underlying cause was the fragility of the autumnal foliage. Another catalyst, say a puff of wind, could have equally triggered the same collapse. When conditions are perfect, they are vulnerable to the tiniest setback. The re-escalation of the trade war has dominated the recent column inches and investment analyst missives. But just like the gentle shake of the tree, it is just a catalyst for the market correction. The underlying cause was that the simultaneous and strong rallies in all financial assets, based on a star alignment of near-perfect conditions, was vulnerable to the first blemish to the perfection. And the blemish could have been anything. Economic Activity Has Undoubtedly Accelerated… One of the things that drove up equity markets was the acceleration in economic activity. This acceleration is beyond doubt: euro area GDP prints show that growth picked up to 1.6 percent in the first quarter of 2019 from a low of 0.6 percent in the third quarter of 2018 (Chart I-4). Given the openness of the euro area economy, it is inconceivable that this growth pick-up does not reflect a more generalized acceleration in global activity.2 Chart I-4Euro Area GDP Growth Accelerated To 1.6 Percent Euro Area GDP Growth Accelerated To 1.6 Percent Euro Area GDP Growth Accelerated To 1.6 Percent The trouble is that we do not receive these GDP prints in real-time. From the mid-point of the quarter to which the GDP prints refer to their release date around one month after the quarter end, there is a two and a half month delay. To proxy activity in real-time, we must look at current activity indicators (CAIs) which gauge GDP growth, but are available without much of a delay. While several such indicators exist, we have found that the ZEW economic sentiment indicator (not to be confused with the current situation indicator) does the job extremely well in real-time. Current activity indicators do not help equity investors. Having said that, current activity indicators do not help equity investors. The simple reason is that the equity market is a current activity indicator itself, and it would be absurd to expect one CAI to predict another CAI! In fact, the best current activity indicator is not the equity market taken as a whole. This is because the aggregate equity market can move as a result of drivers other than current economic activity, most notably central bank policy. Therefore, it turns out that the very best current activity indicator is found within the equity market: specifically, the performance of economically sensitive equity sectors – such as industrials and financials – relative to the aggregate market (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). Both this and the ZEW economic sentiment indicator confirm that economic activity has accelerated sharply since late last year, but has suffered a slight setback in the last month. Chart I-5The Best Current Activity Indicator Is The Relative Performance Of Economically Sensitive Equity Sectors The Best Current Activity Indicator Is The Relative Performance Of Economically Sensitive Equity Sectors The Best Current Activity Indicator Is The Relative Performance Of Economically Sensitive Equity Sectors Chart I-6The Best Current Activity Indicator Is The Relative Performance Of Economically Sensitive Equity Sectors The Best Current Activity Indicator Is The Relative Performance Of Economically Sensitive Equity Sectors The Best Current Activity Indicator Is The Relative Performance Of Economically Sensitive Equity Sectors …But Can The Acceleration In Economic Activity Continue? To be crystal clear, let’s repeat the crucial point. Economically sensitive investments do not move on the level of GDP growth; economically sensitive investments move on the real-time change in GDP growth. The simple reason is that profits growth is highly leveraged to economic growth. Hence when GDP growth picks up, the embedded ‘g’ used to calculate the present value of the investment rises very sharply, which means that today’s price also rises very sharply; and vice versa when GDP growth declines. But once GDP growth stabilizes, even at a high level, there is no further meaningful change in ‘g’, or in the price. For any remaining sceptics, Chart I-7 shows that for many years, the big moves in the Euro Stoxx 50 have resulted from the changes in euro area GDP growth.   Chart I-7The Euro Stoxx 50 Moves On Changes In GDP Growth The Euro Stoxx 50 Moves On Changes In GDP Growth The Euro Stoxx 50 Moves On Changes In GDP Growth   It follows that what investors really need is not a current activity indicator, but a future activity indicator (FAI). If investors could reliably predict the change in economic activity, then they could also reliably allocate between economically sensitive and defensive investments, as well as to the equity market as a whole.   We have found that a future activity indicator for Europe would contain three components: The domestic 6-month credit impulse. The international 6-month credit impulse, and specifically the 6-month credit impulse in China given the large volume of European exports that head to the largest emerging economy. The crude oil price 6-month impulse, where a price decline constitutes a positive impulse given Europe’s dependence on energy imports. Chart I-8The Drivers Of Europe's Future Activity Indicator Are Losing Momentum The Drivers Of Europe's Future Activity Indicator Are Losing Momentum The Drivers Of Europe's Future Activity Indicator Are Losing Momentum Today, we find that the 6-month credit impulse both in the euro area and in China have lost momentum; meanwhile, given the rebound in the oil price, the crude oil price 6-month impulse has clearly faded (Chart I-8). Hence, our future activity indicator suggests that in the second half of this year, euro area GDP growth is unlikely to accelerate much from the current 1.5-2 percent clip.  For investors, this means that this year’s absolute double-digit returns have most likely already been made during the early-2019 star alignment of near-perfect conditions. And the remainder of the year is likely to be much tougher going for all the major asset-classes.  Still, there are always double-digit returns to be found somewhere in the investment landscape. In the second half of the year, the big story will be sector rotation. For example, in recent reports, we highlighted that healthcare is likely to flip from underperformer to outperformer versus technology. Given their sector skews, it follows that European equities are likely to outperform Chinese equities. Fractal Trading System* This week’s recommended trade is based on an oddity. While the majority of stock markets have suffered corrections, New Zealand’s NZX 50 has escaped relatively unscathed so far, making it vulnerable to a corrective underperformance one way or another. Hence, short the NZX 50 versus the FTSE100, and set the profit target and stop-loss at 2 percent. In other trades, short China versus Japan quickly achieved its profit target. Long Nikkei 225 versus Hang Seng was also closed in profit at the end of the 65 day maximum holding period. Against these two profitable trades, long SEK/NOK was closed at its stop-loss. This leaves the Fractal Trading System with four open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-9 NZX 50 VS. FTSE100 NZX 50 VS. FTSE100 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. *  For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The precise mix of the portfolio is 29% MSCI World $, 29% German 30-year bund, 29% U.S. 30-year T-bond, 13% WTI. Please see a replay of the webcast ‘From Sweet Spot to Weak Spot’ available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 2  Quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth at annualized rates. Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Highlights U.S.: The Fed remains decidedly neutral, despite market expectations (and White House pressure) for lower U.S. interest rates. Treasury yields are mispriced and should grind higher over the next 6-12 months, led first by inflation expectations and later by a more hawkish Fed. Canada: The Bank of Canada’s latest reports and commentary indicate that monetary policy will stay on hold over at least the balance of 2019. Bond markets are already priced for that outcome. Maintain a neutral stance on Canadian government bonds in global hedged fixed income portfolios. Sweden: The Riksbank’s recent dovish turn, calling for a flatter trajectory for interest rates and extending asset purchases, will keep Swedish bond yields lower for longer. Thus, we are closing our recommended tactical trades in Sweden that were positioned for rate hikes. Feature Global bond yields remain stuck in a range, seeking a new directional narrative. The downside is limited by green shoots of improving global growth (mostly from China stimulus), some commodity price reflation through higher oil prices and robust returns in most risk asset markets (i.e. an easing of financial conditions). At the same time, the upside for yields is capped by dovish forward guidance from data-dependent central banks who see below-trend economic growth and below-target inflation in the rearview mirror. Chart of the WeekForward MIS-guidance Forward MIS-guidance Forward MIS-guidance We expect these opposing forces to be resolved through faster global growth and higher realized inflation over the next 6-12 months. Major central banks will not need to turn even more dovish and begin a monetary policy easing cycle to boost growth, despite current market pricing suggesting otherwise. Global bond yields will grind upward, first through higher inflation expectations and, later, from a shift away from discounting rate cuts and, in some countries, pricing in rate hikes. The pressure for higher yields will be strongest in the U.S., where the Treasury market now discounts that the current 2.5% fed funds rate will be the cyclical peak, below the median FOMC projection, even as inflation expectations have been moving higher (Chart of the Week).  We continue to recommend pro-growth, pro-risk allocations in global fixed income markets: below-benchmark overall duration exposure, favoring global corporates over government bonds, focusing government bond exposure to countries where policymakers will be relatively less hawkish (Japan, U.K., Australia, Canada, New Zealand), and positioning for faster inflation expectations and bearish steepening of yield curves (most notably in the U.S. and core Europe). May FOMC Meeting: Sorry, Mr. President The Fed kept rates unchanged at last week’s FOMC meeting, dashing market hopes of a potential shift in language toward a future rate cut. The official statement acknowledged that U.S. inflation was running below the 2% target, but Fed Chair Jerome Powell later described that inflation shortfall as “transitory” and expected to reverse. Treasury yields got whipsawed by the mixed messaging, with the 2-year yield falling -6bps after the statement but then climbing +11bps during Powell’s press conference. Powell standing his ground so firmly was a sharp rebuke to U.S. money markets, which remain priced for rate cuts over the next year. It was also a strong sign of the Fed maintaining its political independence in the face of U.S. President Trump calling for aggressive rate cuts. From a growth perspective, the Fed is right to not panic. The employment backdrop remains solid, with the U.S. unemployment rate hitting a 50-year low in April of 3.6%. While cyclical growth indicators like the ISM Manufacturing index have trended lower, the headline index remains above the expansionary 50 level (Chart 2). The rally in U.S. equity and credit markets seen so far in 2019 has eased financial conditions, signaling an imminent rebound in the U.S. leading economic indicator (second panel). Furthermore, core measures of retail sales and capital goods orders have begun to reaccelerate after the Q1 slump impacted by the U.S. government shutdown. From a growth perspective, the Fed is right to not panic. On the inflation side, the story is more nuanced. Higher oil prices will boost headline inflation measures over the next six months. At the same time, the lagged impact of the surprising pickup in U.S. productivity growth (+2.4% year-over-year in Q1) will help dampen core inflation rates (Chart 3) via lower unit labor costs (flat year-over-year in Q1). Further complicating the issue for the Fed is the impact of lower inflation in the components that Fed Chair Powell deemed “transitory”, such as airfares, apparel and, most interestingly, the cost of financial services. Chart 2A Blossoming U.S. ##br##Rebound A Blossoming U.S. Rebound A Blossoming U.S. Rebound Chart 3Blame Equities For The Cooling Of ##br##U.S. Core Inflation Blame Equities For The Cooling Of U.S. Core Inflation Blame Equities For The Cooling Of U.S. Core Inflation The broad Financial Services and Inflation grouping, which includes market-related costs such as wealth management fees, now represents 9% of the overall U.S. core PCE deflator. The inflation rate of the Financial Services index is highly correlated to the performance of U.S. equity markets (Chart 4). This makes sense, as the costs of professional portfolio management are often tied to the size of assets under management. At a minimum, the market should be priced for the same neutral (unchanged) stance that the Fed is currently signaling, which is appropriate given signs of U.S. growth perking up. Chart 4Faster Productivity Means The Fed Can Be Patient Faster Productivity Means The Fed Can Be Patient Faster Productivity Means The Fed Can Be Patient In 2018, prior to the year-end correction in U.S. equity markets, the contribution to core PCE inflation from the Financial Services category was a steady 0.5-0.6 percentage points. After the market rout, that contribution has fallen to 0.2 percentage points, accounting for nearly all of the 40bp decline in core PCE inflation since U.S. equities peaked last September. With equity markets having now regained all the late-2018 losses, Financial Services inflation should boost core PCE inflation by at least 20-30bps by year-end – and perhaps more if stocks continue to appreciate, per the BCA House View. With our Fed Monitor now sitting just above the zero line, indicating no pressure on the Fed to hike rates, the -30bps of rate cuts now discounted over the next year is too aggressive (Chart 5). At a minimum, the market should be priced for the same neutral (unchanged) stance that the Fed is currently signaling, which is appropriate given signs of U.S. growth perking up. The Fed will remain cautious on returning to a more hawkish stance until actual U.S. inflation turns higher, which will take some time given the competing forces of falling unit labor costs and fading “transitory” disinflationary effects. Chart 5Stay Underweight USTs & Below-Benchmark UST Duration Stay Underweight USTs & Below-Benchmark UST Duration Stay Underweight USTs & Below-Benchmark UST Duration We think the 2017 experience will be useful to think about in the coming months. Then, the Fed paused its rate hiking cycle for a few months, primarily due to softer inflation readings related to unusual forces temporarily dampening core inflation (most notably, a one-time collapse in wireless phone prices related to a change in how those costs were measured). Once those “transitory” forces faded out of the data, the Fed resumed lifting the funds rate. It will likely take longer in 2019 before the Fed would feel confident enough to begin raising rates again, especially with the funds rate now much closer to neutral than two years ago. Nonetheless, we expect a similar story of rebounding inflation driving Treasury yields higher to unfold over the latter half of this year. A moderate below-benchmark U.S. duration stance, favoring shorter maturities, combined with a long position in inflation-protected TIPS over nominal Treasuries, remains appropriate. Bottom Line: The Fed remains decidedly neutral, despite market expectations (and White House pressure) for lower U.S. interest rates. Treasury yields are mispriced and should grind higher over the next 6-12 months, led first by inflation expectations and later by a more hawkish Fed. Canada Update: Stay Neutral Back in March, we upgraded our recommended Canadian government bond exposure to neutral after spending a long time at underweight.1 The rationale for our move was that the stunning loss of momentum in the Canadian economy at the end of 2018 would force the Bank of Canada (BoC) to not only stop raising rates, but stay on hold for longer than expected. After our upgrade, we noted that we would consider additional changes to our Canadian allocation after the releases of the latest BoC Business Outlook Survey (BoS) and the updated economic projections at the April 24 monetary policy meeting. None of those events makes us want to move away from the current neutral recommendation. The problem for the BoC is that its policy rate of 1.75% remains well below its own estimated neutral range, which is now 2.25%-3.25% (Chart 6). A similar message comes when looking at the neutral real rate (“r-star”) estimate for Canada produced by the New York Fed, with an r-star of 1.5% versus a current real policy rate around 0%.2 This suggests that Canadian monetary policy remains accommodative and that the BoC should be looking for opportunities to continue moving interest rates toward “neutral” when the economy is accelerating. Yet our own BoC Monitor suggests that an unchanged policy stance is currently appropriate, while -11bps of rate cuts are now discounted in the Canadian Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve. In other words, the BoC is torn between a fundamental interest rate framework that says the hiking cycle is not done yet, and a sluggish economy that demands a dovish bias. The BoC is torn between a fundamental interest rate framework that says the hiking cycle is not done yet, and a sluggish economy that demands a dovish bias. In the press conference following the April 24 BoC policy meeting, BoC Governor Steve Poloz noted that any reference to the need for interest rates to return to the BoC’s neutral range was deliberately omitted from the official policy statement. This is a clear signal that the central bank has shifted its focus from “normalizing” rates to preventing a deeper downturn in Canadian growth. The latest BoS showed that business confidence, expected sales and future investment intentions all fell sharply in the first quarter of 2019 (Chart 7). There was a huge drop in the number of firms reporting capacity pressures and labor shortages, with more firms now expecting their prices to fall than rise over the next year. The main headwinds to the diminished outlook for future sales were related to “a more uncertain outlook in the Western Canadian energy sector, continued weakness in housing-related activity in some regions, and tangible impacts from global trade tensions”.3 Chart 6A Long Way From BoC ##br##Rate Cuts A Long Way From BoC Rate Cuts A Long Way From BoC Rate Cuts Chart 7Negative Messages From The BoC Business Outlook Survey Negative Messages From The BoC Business Outlook Survey Negative Messages From The BoC Business Outlook Survey   The BoC places a lot of weight on the BoS in determining its economic forecasts, and in setting monetary policy. Thus, it is no surprise that in the official statement following the April 24 monetary policy meeting, the BoC Governing Council noted that they were “monitoring developments in household spending, oil markets and global trade policy to gauge the extent to which the factors weighing on growth and the inflation outlook were dissipating”.4 Those were the same three concerns of businesses highlighted in the BoS, assuming that “weakness in the Canadian housing market” is related to “developments in household spending” – a logical link given the high level of Canadian household and mortgage debt. Looking at those three factors, there is nothing suggesting that the BoC needs to adjust policy anytime soon (Chart 8). Oil prices are rising, but household spending remains weak and global trade uncertainties have not completely diminished and Canadian export growth has stagnated. Given the mixed picture from the economic data, the BoC will likely remain on hold until there is a clear signal from the data. From a bond investment strategy perspective, staying at neutral also makes sense. A move to overweight Canadian bonds would require an even deeper economic downturn into recessionary territory that would push Canadian unemployment higher (Chart 9). Downgrading back to underweight, however, would require signs of a sustainable rebound in Canadian domestic demand and stronger global growth that would boost Canadian exports – an outcome that would not be visible in the data until at least the third quarter of 2019. Chart 8Watch What The BoC ##br##Is Watching Watch What The BoC Is Watching Watch What The BoC Is Watching Chart 9A Neutral Weight On Canada Is Still Justified A Neutral Weight On Canada Is Still Justified A Neutral Weight On Canada Is Still Justified   One final point on staying neutral on Canada comes from looking at cross-country spread levels between government bonds in Canada and other major developed economies. The spread levels look historically wide versus sovereign debt from Germany, the U.K., and Australia; wide versus recent history in Japan; but very narrow versus the U.S. (Chart 9). Those spreads are shown without hedging out the currency risk of going long Canadian bonds – and, by association, the Canadian dollar. Once the currency risk is hedged out of those cross-country spreads using 3-month currency forwards, the spread differentials are all far less interesting both in absolute terms and relative to history (Chart 10 & 11). Chart 10Big Differences In Canadian Bond Spreads Vs Other Major DM... Big Differences In Canadian Bond Spreads Vs Other Major DM... Big Differences In Canadian Bond Spreads Vs Other Major DM... Chart 11… But Those Spreads Disappear Once The C$ Exposure Is Hedged ...But Those Spreads Disappear Once The C$ Exposure Is Hedged ...But Those Spreads Disappear Once The C$ Exposure Is Hedged So even on an individual country basis, there is no compelling case to be anything but neutral Canadian government bonds versus global currency-hedged benchmarks – which is how we present all our fixed income recommendations in Global Fixed Income Strategy. Bottom Line: The Bank of Canada’s latest reports and commentary indicate that monetary policy will stay on hold over at least the balance of 2019. Bond markets are already priced for that outcome. Maintain a neutral stance on Canadian government bonds in global hedged fixed income portfolios. Sweden Trade Update – Time To Retreat & Regroup Exactly one year ago (May 8, 2018), we initiated trades in our Tactical Overlay portfolio to position for tighter monetary policy, and higher bond yields, in Sweden.5 Specifically, we have been recommending shorting 2-year Swedish government bonds versus German equivalents (hedging the currency exposure back into krona), while also selling 2-year Swedish bonds and buying 10-year Swedish debt in a yield curve flattening trade. The positions were chosen to benefit from an expected bearish repricing of the short-end of the Swedish curve. At this time last year, the positive upward momentum of Swedish growth and inflation had reached a point where the Riksbank was clearly – and credibly – signaling that the long process of normalizing its highly accommodative crisis-era monetary policies would begin. That meant lifting policy rates away from negative territory, as well as shutting down the bond-buying quantitative easing (QE) program. One year later, the economic backdrop has done a 180-degree turn against our original thesis (Chart 12): Swedish growth has slowed, with both the manufacturing PMI and leading economic indicator at the lowest levels since 2013. Unemployment has increased and nominal wage growth has rolled over. Headline CPIF inflation has fallen back below the Riksbank 2% target, while core CPIF inflation remains stuck near 1.5%. The Riksbank changed its forward guidance at last month’s monetary policy meeting, signaling that the benchmark interest rate will remain at -0.25% for “somewhat longer” than was indicated as recently as February (when a rate hike around the end of 2019 or in early 2020 was signaled). The Riksbank also pledged to maintain the size of its QE bond purchases from July 2019 to December 2020, a dovish surprise. Swedish money markets are still discounting 13bps of rate hikes over the next twelve months. Yet our Riksbank Monitor, on the other hand, is now indicating a need for rate cuts, driven by both softer inflation and weaker growth. The minutes from last month’s policy meeting revealed that the forward guidance was adjusted simply because headline inflation had temporarily dipped back below the 2% Riksbank target. The implication is that a return to 2% inflation would prompt the Riksbank to hike. Swedish money markets are still discounting 13bps of rate hikes over the next twelve months. Yet our Riksbank Monitor, on the other hand, is now indicating a need for rate cuts, driven by both softer inflation and weaker growth. A useful rule for investment risk management is: when the underlying rationale for a position is clearly not unfolding as expected, the best thing to do is simply close that position and look for new opportunities better aligned to the current reality. Chart 12No More Pressure On Riksbank ##br##To Hike No More Pressure On Riksbank To Hike No More Pressure On Riksbank To Hike Chart 13Time To Exit Our Recommended "Hawkish" Trades In Sweden Time To Exit Our Recommended "Hawkish" Trades In Sweden Time To Exit Our Recommended "Hawkish" Trades In Sweden With that in mind, we are choosing to close our tactical trades in Sweden (Chart 13). The 2-year Sweden-Germany spread trade generated a loss of -52bps (including the return from hedging the euro exposure in Germany back into Swedish krona). We were more fortunate with the curve flattening trade, which generated a return of +61bps as the Swedish curve bullishly flattened through falling 10-year yields rather than bearishly flattening through rising 2-year yields (our original expectation). Thus, we are closing out our Sweden trades at a small net gain of +9bps. We will do a deeper analysis on Sweden in an upcoming Global Fixed Income Strategy report to search for new potential trade ideas. Bottom Line: The Riksbank’s recent dovish turn, calling for a flatter trajectory for interest rates and extending asset purchases, will keep Swedish bond yields lower for longer. Thus, we are closing our recommended tactical trades in Sweden that were positioned for a faster path of rate hikes.   Robert Robis, CFA, Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, CFA, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “March Calmness”, dated March 19, 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 The NY Fed’s estimates for non-U.S. r-star rates for the euro area, Canada, and the U.K. can be found on the NY Fed website. https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/policy/rstar 3https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/04/business-outlook-survey-spring-2019/ 4https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/04/fad-press-release-2019-04-24/ 5 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “Sweden: The Riksbank Cannot Kick The Can Down The Road Anymore”, dated May 8, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations Reconcilable Differences Reconcilable Differences Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights The March data brought the first signs of a stabilization in China’s “hard” economic data, albeit from a weak level. The April PMIs disappointed, but they remained in expansionary territory; this is in addition to a continued significant improvement in the trade-related subcomponents of the official survey. Chinese credit growth is unlikely to relapse over the coming year, despite recent investor concerns that Chinese policymakers may dial back their stimulus efforts. The pace of growth may moderate, but halting the uptrend in growth this year would constitute a major policy mistake that we do not expect. Chinese stocks may trend flat-to-down in the very near term as investors await a signed trade deal with the U.S. and further signs of a recovery in activity. Over the next 6-12 months, however, an overweight stance is warranted, barring a major relapse in our leading indicator. Feature Tables 1 and 2 on pages 2 and 3 highlight key developments in China’s economy and its financial markets over the past month. On the growth front, March’s data brought the very first (albeit modest) signs of stabilization in actual Chinese economic activity. While the April manufacturing PMIs released earlier this week disappointed, the trade related components of the official survey continued to improve meaningfully, which implies that an improvement in domestic demand is still early. This conclusion is not particularly surprising given that the first green shoots in the actual data are emerging from a depressed level of activity. Credit growth has only recently picked up, implying that actual activity will strengthen over the coming 6-12 months followed a signed trade deal and a continued (modest) uptrend in credit. Table 1China Macro Data Summary China Macro And Market Review China Macro And Market Review Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary China Macro And Market Review China Macro And Market Review Within financial markets, the most significant recent development has been that Chinese stocks have sagged somewhat due to concerns that policymakers may meaningfully dial back their stimulus efforts over the coming year. In our view, recent statements from policymakers, as well as the fact that the recovery in activity is only now beginning, underscores that credit growth is unlikely to relapse over the coming year. It may not grow at the breakneck pace observed in the first quarter, but beyond the near-term jitters that this may introduce into the equity market, we do not see it as a threat to an overweight stance towards Chinese stocks over the coming 6-12 months. In reference to Tables 1 and 2, we provide below several detailed observations concerning developments in China’s macro and financial market data: Chart 1 highlights that March brought the first sign of a stabilization in actual Chinese economic activity. When measured on a smoothed basis, the Li Keqiang index itself weakened further in March, but total import growth moved sideways and nominal manufacturing output ticked higher. We noted in our last Macro & Market review that future changes in activity measures were now more likely to reflect actual changes in underlying economic circumstances given that the previously beneficial tariff front-running effect had probably washed out of the data. March’s data confirms this view, and underscores that activity will pickup in the second half of the year. Chart 1The First (Albeit Tentative) Sign Of Economic Stabilization The First (Albeit Tentative) Sign Of Economic Stabilization The First (Albeit Tentative) Sign Of Economic Stabilization Chart 2 shows that the uptrend in our leading indicator for Chinese economic activity is so far modest, but also that it is now at a 2-year high relative to its 12-month moving average. The indicator is being weighed-down by weak money growth (M2 and our definition of M3), even though monetary conditions remain easy and our measures of credit growth picked up sharply in Q1. We doubt that the trend in Chinese money and credit growth can sustainably decouple in a scenario where the latter is sustainably improving, as it would imply that all of the credit improvement was originating from non-bank financial institutions. As such, we expect money growth to catch up to credit growth in the coming months. The annual change in the PBOC’s pledged supplementary lending injection remained in negative territory in March, and both floor space started and sold decelerated modestly further. Construction and sales activity continue to diverge, with the latter still pointing to a further slowdown in the former. We will be updating our Chinese housing outlook in a Special Report next week. April’s Caixin and official manufacturing PMI disappointed, but this overshadowed a continued significant improvement in the new export orders and import components of the official PMI (Chart 3). In our view, this is consistent with a stabilization in the export outlook, but implies that Chinese domestically-oriented manufacturing activity is not yet booming. Nonetheless, a signed trade deal, improving importer/exporter sentiment, and an uptrend in credit growth still implies that activity will pick up meaningfully later in the year. Chart 2Our Leading Indicator Is Now Modestly Trending Higher Our Leading Indicator Is Now Modestly Trending Higher Our Leading Indicator Is Now Modestly Trending Higher Chart 3Trade-Related Components Of The Official PMI Continue To Rise Trade-Related Components Of The Official PMI Continue To Rise Trade-Related Components Of The Official PMI Continue To Rise   Over the past month, Taiwanese and domestic Chinese stocks have been the best performers within “Greater China”, relative to the MSCI Hong Kong index, the MSCI China index, and the Hang Seng China Enterprises index. The latter in particular has lagged other Chinese equity indexes since late-March (Chart 4), and may be due for a catch-up. Over the nearer-term, Chinese stocks, especially the domestic market, have sagged due to concerns that Chinese policymakers may meaningfully dial back their stimulus efforts over the coming year. We discussed this risk in our April 17thWeekly Report,1 and noted that while we expected credit growth to moderate somewhat, a more meaningful slowdown, particularly if coupled with signals from policymakers that a much slower pace of growth is desired, could pose a risk to our overweight equity stance. The April manufacturing PMIs disappointed, but the trade-related components of the official survey continued to improve meaningfully. In our view, recent statements from policymakers, particularly from PBOC Deputy Governor Liu Guoqiang,2 underscores that credit growth is unlikely to relapse over the coming year; it will simply not be growing at the breakneck pace observed in the first quarter. Beyond the near-term jitters that this may introduce into the equity market, we do not see it as a threat to an overweight stance towards Chinese stocks over the coming 6-12 months. Chart 5 highlights that Chinese consumer stocks have been the clear winners since the beginning of the year, particularly in the domestic market. Consumer stocks, including staples, sold off substantially in 2H2018 as investors responded to shockingly weak consumer spending data. Stimulus measures targeted to Chinese households, along with a meaningful improvement in some measures of consumer spending, has helped restore investor confidence in consumer stocks (which had previously been viewed as a bullish “no-brainer” structural trade). Chart 4Is An H-Share Catchup##br## Looming? Is An H-Share Catchup Looming? Is An H-Share Catchup Looming? Chart 5Chinese Consumer Stocks Have Been On Fire Chinese Consumer Stocks Have Been On Fire Chinese Consumer Stocks Have Been On Fire   The sharp rise in the 7-day interbank repo rate in April fed concerns among equity investors that Chinese policymakers might be in the process of paring back their stimulus efforts. However, as Chart 6 shows, China’s 7-day repo rate is extraordinarily volatile, and is affected by a variety of seasonal and technical factors. The chart shows that a 1-month moving average of the 7-day repo rate is broadly in line with the level that has prevailed over the past 9 months. In addition, the 3-month repo rate (which we have argued has been a more informative predictor of China’s monetary policy stance) remains well on the low end of its range over the past year. In short, despite investor concerns, Chinese interbank repo rates are not signaling a change in China’s monetary policy stance. Tighter monetary policy is not in the cards for this year. After having risen noticeably in late-March, Chinese onshore corporate bond spreads have fallen back to the low end of their trading range over the past 8 months. We continue to recommend that domestic investors hold a diversified portfolio of SOE corporate bonds, on the basis that actual bond defaults over the coming 6-12 months are likely to be materially lower than what investors are pricing in even though they are indeed likely to rise. Chart 7 shows that USD-HKD has eased somewhat over the past month from the top end of the band, and now trades closed at 7.845. This modest appreciation in HKD appears to have been catalyzed by a further reduction in the supply of interbank liquidity by the HKMA. While the appreciation in HKD is some modest good news for Hong Kong’s monetary authority, it remains reluctant to reduce liquidity in the system given how extremely weak loan growth is in Hong Kong. This implies that, barring a meaningful upturn in credit, a significant appreciation in HKD is not likely in the cards. Chart 6Interbank Repo Rates Are Not Trending Higher Interbank Repo Rates Are Not Trending Higher Interbank Repo Rates Are Not Trending Higher Chart 7A Modest Appreciation In HKD (Which Is Not Likely To Continue) A Modest Appreciation In HKD (Which Is Not Likely To Continue) A Modest Appreciation In HKD (Which Is Not Likely To Continue)   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report “In The Wake Of An Upgrade: An Investment Strategy Post-Mortem,” dated April 17, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 2      During a PBOC briefing on April 25, Deputy Governor Guoqiang noted that “no one can bear it if policy swings back and forth between tightening and loosening many times a year”. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Feature What Could Sour The Sweet Spot? This continues to look like a very benevolent environment for risk assets. Growth in the U.S. remains decent, with Q1 GDP growth beating expectations at 3.2% QoQ annualized (albeit somewhat distorted by rising inventories). Leading indicators point to U.S. GDP growth of around 2.5% for 2019. The rest of the world is showing the first “green shoots” of economic recovery. China continues to expand credit, and the effects of this are starting to stabilize growth in Europe, Japan, and the Emerging Markets (Chart 1). Recommended Allocation Monthly Portfolio Update Monthly Portfolio Update Chart 1China Reflation Helping Growth To Bottom China Reflation Helping Growth To Bottom China Reflation Helping Growth To Bottom At the same time, central banks everywhere have turned accommodative. Following the Fed’s dovish shift late last year, the market has priced in rate cuts by end-2019. The ECB is about to relaunch its TLTRO funding program, and is expected to keep rates in negative territory for at least another year (Chart 2) – though there are worries whether Mario Draghi’s successor as ECB president might be more hawkish. The Bank of Canada and Bank of Japan, among others, have recently reemphasized monetary caution. Chart 2No Rate Hikes Anywhere No Rate Hikes Anywhere No Rate Hikes Anywhere Chart 3Term Premium Keeping Down Yields Term Premium Keeping Down Yields Term Premium Keeping Down Yields This goes some way to explain the biggest puzzle in markets currently: why, despite global equities being less than 1% below a record high, long-term interest rates remain so low, with the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield at 2.5%, and yields in Germany and Japan hovering around zero. There are other explanations too. A decomposition of the U.S. 10-year yield shows that most of the downward pressure has come from a sharp drop in the term premium (Chart 3). This is partly because lousy growth in other developed economies, such as Germany and Japan, has pushed down yields in these countries and, given that spreads to the U.S. were at record highs, depressed U.S. rates too. It also reflects a lingering pessimism among investors who bought Treasuries at the end of last year to hedge against recession and who remain concerned about the economy. This is evidenced by continuing strong flows into bond funds in 2019 (Chart 4). A decomposition of the U.S. 10-year yield shows that most of the downward pressure has come from a sharp drop in the term premium. Chart 4Investors Buying Bonds, Not Equities Investors Buying Bonds, Not Equities Investors Buying Bonds, Not Equities Chart 5Why Has Inflation Fallen? Why Has Inflation Fallen? Why Has Inflation Fallen? A further explanation is the recent softness in inflation, with the Fed’s focus measure, core PCE inflation, slowing to an annual rate of only 0.7% over the past three months (Chart 5). This is probably mostly due to the economic slowdown late last year. But it may also have structural causes: the recent improvement in labor productivity can perhaps allow wages to rise without feeding through into consumer price inflation (Chart 6). Chart 6Maybe Because Of Better Productivity Maybe Because Of Better Productivity Maybe Because Of Better Productivity Chart 7Indicators Suggest Inflation Will Still Trend Up Indicators Suggest Inflation Will Still Trend Up Indicators Suggest Inflation Will Still Trend Up How is this all likely to pan out?  We think it improbable that inflation will stay low for long if growth is as robust as we expect. Leading indicators of inflation continue to suggest prices will trend higher (Chart 7). The Fed may not rush to raise rates (not least since, with the lower inflation recently, the Fed Funds Rate in real terms is now at neutral according to the Laubach-Williams model, Chart 8). But we also find it inconceivable that the Fed will cut rates, if growth remains strong, stocks continue to rise, and global risks recede. By the end of this year, it should be able to make a renewed case for a further hike. But even if it doesn’t do that – and permits either inflation to overheat for a while, or asset bubbles to form – these scenarios should be more conducive to equity outperformance, than bond outperformance. Global equities have already risen by 22% since last December’s low and may struggle to make rapid progress over the next few months. The key to further upside for stocks will be earnings: since analysts have cut EPS forecasts for S&P 500 companies for this year to only 4%, those expectations should not be hard to beat. In the Q1 earnings season, for instance, 79% of companies have so far come in ahead of the consensus EPS forecast. For global asset allocators, the key decision is always at the asset-class level. Will equities outperform bonds over the coming 12 months? Equities should have further upside if our macro scenario proves correct. On the other hand, we find it hard to imagine that global bond yields will not rise moderately if global growth recovers, the Fed refrains from cutting rates, inflation rises somewhat, and investors turn less wary of equities. We continue, therefore, to expect the stock-to-bond ratio (Chart 9) to rise further over the next 12 months. We think it improbable that inflation will stay low for long if growth is as robust as we expect. Chart 8Is Fed Now At Neutral? Is Fed Now At Neutral? Is Fed Now At Neutral? Chart 9Stock-To-Bond Ratio Can Rise Further Stock-To-Bond Ratio Can Rise Further Stock-To-Bond Ratio Can Rise Further   Chart 10Europe And EM Outperform Only Briefly Europe And EM Outperform Only Briefly Europe And EM Outperform Only Briefly Equities: We remain overweight global equities, but are reluctant to take higher beta country exposure until there is greater clarity on the bottoming out of ex-U.S. growth. Moreover, the structural headwinds that have prevented anything more than short-term outperformance for eurozone stocks (banking sector weakness) and Emerging Markets (excess debt and poor productivity) since 2010 remain powerful negative factors (Chart 10). Our moderately pro-cyclical sector recommendations (overweight energy and industrials) should hedge us against upside risk emanating from a strong rebound in Chinese imports. Fixed Income: Over the past few years, periods where equities have decoupled from bond yields have been resolved with bond yields playing catch-up (Chart 11). We expect the same to happen over the next few months, with global government bond yields rising moderately. The risk-on environment continues to be positive for credit. We prefer credit to government bonds within fixed income, but are only neutral within our overall recommended portfolio. U.S. high-yield bonds in particular look attractively valued, as long as growth continues and default rates don’t start to rise too much (Chart 12). Chart 11When Bonds And Equities Diverge… When Bonds And Equities Diverge... When Bonds And Equities Diverge... Chart 12Junk Bonds Attractively Valued Junk Bonds Attractively Valued Junk Bonds Attractively Valued Currencies: A pick-up in global growth would be negative for the U.S. dollar, typically a counter-cyclical currency (Chart 13). BCA’s currency strategists have slowly been moving towards a more positive stance on some currencies versus the dollar, particularly the euro and Australian dollar. We would expect to see the trade-weighted dollar start to depreciate in H2 once global growth accelerates, fueled by the very skewed long-dollar positioning currently. However, this may be only a six- to 12-month move, since growth and interest-rate differentials suggest that the structural dollar bull market that began in 2012 has not yet fully run its course. Commodities: Oil remains dominated by supply-side dynamics. How much the ending of waivers on Iranian oil sanctions, plus troubles in Venezuela and Libya, push up oil prices will depend on whether President Trump can persuade Saudi Arabia and UAE to increase production. BCA’s energy team expects he will be only partially successful in doing so, and see Brent reaching $80 a barrel and WTI $77 (from $72 and $64 currently) during 2019. Industrial commodities prices will depend on the strength and nature of China’s reflation: our commodities strategists see copper, the most sensitive metal to Chinese demand, as the best way to play this.1 Garry Evans Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist garry@bcaresearch.com Chart 13Stronger Growth Would Be Dollar Negative Stronger Growth Would Be Dollar Negative Stronger Growth Would Be Dollar Negative   Footnotes 1       Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, “Copper Will Benefit Most From Chinese Stimulus,” dated April 25, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation