Corporate

Highlights Portfolio Strategy A window has opened up for utilities outperformance. Upgrade to overweight on a short-term (1-3 month) view. Leading indicators of beverage sales have improved, heralding an upgrading in depressed expectations. Stay overweight. The pullback in consumer finance stocks appears to be contagion from the overall financial sector selloff than a reflection of deteriorating industry-specific fundamentals. Buy on weakness. Recent Changes S&P Utilities - Boost to overweight from neutral on a tactical basis. Table 1 Feature Our view remains that stocks are in a consolidation phase, waiting for economic/profit confirmation that earnings will grow into the latest valuation expansion. Thin equity market risk premia can be justified if the economy has embarked on an extended and strong non-inflationary growth path that will spawn robust corporate profitability. Chart 1A Second Half Squeeze? On this note, the third mini-economic up-cycle since the Great Recession has been underway since last year. The first two bursts of economic strength fizzled quickly, eventually requiring a new dose of stimulus to reinvigorate growth. The current up-cycle may have more legs given that the rest of the world is now participating and the U.S. economy at full employment, but it would be dangerous to become complacent. The stock-to-bond ratio has crested on a growth rate basis, and its mean reversion properties suggest that key macro gauges such as the ISM index may cool as the year progresses (Chart 1). Odds of growth-propelling fiscal stimulus, that equities have already bought and paid for, may now fade following Congress' failure to move on health care reform. Total bank credit growth is decelerating on a broad basis. Chart 1 shows that of the 8 major bank loan categories, only 1 has a positive credit impulse (the annual change in the 52-week rate of change), the other 7 are negative, i.e. it isn't simply C&I loan weakness driving the credit deceleration. Traditionally, credit and economic growth move together, so the current gap warrants close attention. Meanwhile, the reflationary impulse over the past 18 months from China is set to fade as the authorities tap the brakes, particularly in the housing market, which may throw a wrench into new construction. Chinese property prices have been especially correlated with global economic up-cycles. Real estate inflation downturns have been important global economic signals (Chart 1). Consequently, the second half of the year may 'feel' slower from a growth perspective and challenge the reflation hypothesis. Some trepidation about the durability/breadth of the economic expansion is becoming evident in internal market behavior. Our Intermediate Equity Indicator (IEI) has continued to weaken as breadth and participation thin (Chart 2). If the IEI drops below zero, the odds of a meaningful pullback will rise substantially. Keep in mind there is a lot of air between the S&P 500 index and its 40-week moving average. The number of S&P 500 groups with a positive 52-week rate of change has pulled back to post-Great Recession lows (Chart 2). Last week we showed a composite of relative industry and sector performance that also heralded a choppy period ahead for the broad averages. All of these factors suggest that a tactical consolidation needs time to play out, especially with first quarter reporting season fast approaching and optimism in the outlook bursting at the seams. While trading sentiment is not overly stretched, the truest measure of sentiment is asset valuations and expectations. On this front, our Global Economic Sentiment Index, which contrasts equity and government bond valuations in the major economies, has reached the 'extreme optimism' zone (Chart 3, middle panel). Such a reading does not automatically foretell of an imminent major equity peak, but reinforces that there is little margin for disappointment. Chart 2Deteriorating Internals Chart 3Early Signs Of Overconfidence? In addition, the trend in analyst earnings expectations is also consistent with an overriding theme of exuberance. Cyclical earnings estimates have tentatively peaked after a steep upgrade over the last few quarters, and are now sitting below 5-year growth expectations, suggesting overwhelming confidence in the longevity of the expansion. The last three times that cyclical (12-month) profit growth estimates diverged negatively from lofty long-term estimates was in 2000, 2007 and 2015 (Chart 3). Each episode coincided with ebullient global economic sentiment, and heralded market turbulence, with varying lags. The point is that when financial conditions tighten enough to undermine the cyclical growth outlook but fail to dent conviction in the long-term outlook, it is a signal of overconfidence. The good news is that financial conditions have remained historically easy and should only tighten gradually, such that the risk of a policy-induced slowdown is not acute. In sum, we expect the tactical consolidation phase to persist, especially if economic momentum cools. Exuberant expectations argue for a digestion phase, which should continue to broadly support defensive over cyclical sector positioning, a stance that has paid off nicely since late last year. We may look to selectively increase cyclical and financial sector exposure in the coming weeks if the U.S. dollar remains tame and inflation expectations perk back up, but for now, we are making a tactical addition to the defensive side of the ledger. Utilities Are Powering Up We booked sizable gains in the S&P utilities index and downgraded to neutral last summer, because of our view that bond yields were bottoming on the back of economic stabilization. Since then, relative performance collapsed by 20%, but it has recently started showing some signs of life. Is it time to re-enter this overweight position on a tactical basis? The short answer is yes. There are five reasons to buy utilities at the current juncture with a tactical (1-3 month) time horizon. A possible cooling in economic momentum will redirect capital into the sector. Last week we highlighted that the economically-sensitive transportation index may be heralding mean reversion in key activity gauges, such as the ISM manufacturing index (Chart 4). If the run of positive economic surprises reverses, utilities stocks should receive a sizeable relative performance boost. Transport stock underperformance typically means utility stock outperformance (Chart 4, bottom panel). A cycle-on-cycle analysis of relative utilities performance and the ISM manufacturing survey reveals that is pays to overweight utilities when the latter hits the current level. This has occurred seven times since the early 1990s, and the S&P utilities sector outperformed in the subsequent 3 and 6 months by an average of 3 and 5%, respectively. Only one period generated negative returns (Table 2). Chart 4Utilities Win When Transports Lose Table 2Contrary Alert: Buy Utilities Market-based inflation expectations have crested, aided by the dip in oil prices. Relative share prices have been inversely correlated with inflation expectations, owing to the link to long-dated Treasury yields. Importantly, the University of Michigan's survey inflation expectations, both short and long term, have been drifting lower signaling that the recent backup in CPI headline inflation will likely prove transitory (inflation expectations shown inverted, Chart 5). The flattening yield curve is also sending a tactical buy signal for utilities stocks (shown inverted, Chart 5). Natural gas prices are strengthening. Nat gas prices are the marginal price setter for non-regulated utilities, and the recent price spike has boosted utilities pricing power. Sell-side analysts have taken notice, aggressively ratcheting EPS numbers higher. Nevertheless, the relative EPS growth bar still remains low, signaling that a relative profit outperformance period looms (Chart 6). Chart 5External Support As... Chart 6... Earnings Recover One risk to our tactically bullish utilities view is stagnant electricity generation growth. However, if overall output growth recedes in the next quarter or two, then the non-cyclical power demand profile will shine through, offsetting low utility utilization rates in absolute terms. Bottom Line: There is scope for a playable relative performance rally in the coming one-to-three months. Boost the niche S&P utilities sector to overweight. Soft Drinks Are About To Pop Indiscriminate selling of all consumer staples immediately after the Trump victory restored value in a number of defensive consumer groups. They have stealthily outperformed for most of this year. Chart 7 shows a number of valuation yardsticks. Soft drink stocks are yielding more than both 10-year Treasurys and the broad market. Similarly, the relative P/S and P/E ratios have dipped comfortably below their respective historical means. From a technical standpoint, relative share price momentum has been pushed to a bearish extreme (Chart 7). Against this valuation and technical backdrop, any whiff of operating traction should trigger a playable outperformance phase. Industry pricing power has rebounded smartly, exiting the deflation zone (Chart 8). This firming in selling prices appears to be demand driven. Growth in relative consumer outlays on food and non-alcoholic beverages has improved. Actual industry sales growth has returned to positive territory and beverage output growth is outpacing other non-durable goods industries (Chart 8). While export trends have been a sore spot for beverage companies, the tide should soon turn. The greenback has depreciated versus emerging market (EM) currencies since mid-December, permitting EM central banks to ease monetary policy. That heralds a recovery in consumer goods exports and a reversal of negative translation FX effects (Chart 9, middle panel). Chart 7Cheap And Washed Out Chart 8Inflection Point Chart 9Export Drag Should Reverse The improvement in top-line leading indicators is particularly noteworthy given that cost inflation remains muted. Food input prices are contracting and ethylene prices, a primary packaging ingredient, are also deflating. With headcount under control (Chart 9, bottom panel), there is scope for margin expansion at a time when overall profit margins face a steady squeeze from rising wage inflation. This brightening backdrop, especially in relative terms, has not yet been embraced by the analyst community. Not only are earnings slated to trail the broad market by 7% in the coming year, but 5-year relative EPS growth has plummeted to all-time lows. Such pessimism is unwarranted. All of this implies that while recent beverage shipment growth has been soft, a recovery is likely as the year progresses. That will set the stage for a series of positive surprises, supporting share price outperformance. Bottom Line: The compellingly valued S&P soft drinks index has troughed and has a very attractive reward/risk profile. Were we not already overweight, we would lift exposure to above benchmark today. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P soft drinks index are: BLBG: S5SOFD-KO, PEP, MNST, DPS. Consumer Finance: Cast Aside, But For No Good Reason Like all financials, consumer finance stocks have underperformed the broad market in recent weeks. High intra-financial sector correlations are understandable early in a corrective phase, especially given the magnitude of the initial post-election rally. However, as time passes, correlations should recede because significant discrepancies exist among industry profit drivers. For instance, any meaningful broad market correction could undermine capital markets activity via reduced appetite for new equity issues, less M&A activity and smaller trading fees, taking a bite out of investment banking profits. Elsewhere, banks have been riding hopes for higher net interest margins and an easing regulatory burden. However, without any corresponding improvement in credit growth they are now giving back those gains because bond yields have stalled, the yield curve has narrowed and expectations for deregulation are being watered down to a dilution of terms These factors justify the pullback in both banks and capital markets stocks, even if temporary. On the flipside, the consumer finance group has also been dragged down, even though leading indicators of profitability have continued to improve. As shown in past research, the credit card interest rate spread has low sensitivity to shifts in the yield curve. As such, receivables growth matters more to profits than the slope of the yield curve. Whether consumers embark on debt-financed consumption is heavily dependent on job security, debt-servicing costs, and household wealth. When consumer comfort rises, the personal savings rate tends to decline, indicating a greater propensity to spend. Household net worth has set a new all time high on the back of buoyant financial markets and recovery in house prices (Chart 10). Debt service payments remain historically depressed as a share of disposable income, underscoring that the means to re-leverage exist (Chart 10). Typically credit card charge-offs stay muted until well after debt servicing requirements hit a much higher level, either through reduced incomes or higher interest rates, or a combination of the two. At the moment, both are working in favor of credit quality, not against it. In fact, house prices have reaccelerated sharply in the past few months, which heralds share price outperformance (Chart 11, top panel). Moreover, the steady increase in housing starts bodes well for additional gains in outlays on durable goods, a positive omen for consumer credit demand. Chart 10Credit Quality Remains Strong Chart 11Bullish Leading Indicators The latter is already growing at a solid clip, in contrast with other lending categories such as C&I loan growth (Chart 11), which is weak and dragging down total bank credit. The surge in consumer income expectations points to an expanded appetite for debt (Chart 11). Consequently, the sell-off in the S&P consumer finance index should be treated as indiscriminate contagion from the rest of the financials sector rather than a reflection of deteriorating fundamentals. Recent value creation represents a buying opportunity. Bottom Line: Stick with a high-conviction overweight in the S&P consumer finance index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P consumer index are: BLBG: S5CFINX-AXP, COF, DFS, SYF, NAVI. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.

Highlights Renewed deflationary pressures indicate that the Hong Kong dollar may have once again become expensive. The currency peg will stay and domestic prices will adjust as a release valve. Developing deflationary pressures and slowing rent growth may reinforce one other. Rising risk free interest rate calls for higher rental yield, which can only be achieved via lower home prices. Remain short HK government bonds relative to US Treasurys; Remain short HK property investors relative to benchmark. More evidence that China's profit cycle is in an upturn. Feature The election of Hong Kong's Chief Executive this past weekend garnered little coverage among the global mainstream media. Carrie Lam easily beat her competitors, purportedly with blessings from Beijing. However, she will face an uphill battle to reunite the citizens of Hong Kong, who have become increasingly divided in recent years. As a regional financial hub heavily exposed to global forces, local politics barely matter for Hong Kong's economy and financial markets. Nonetheless, the significance of politics has clearly been on an upward trajectory in recent years, which could impact investors' long-term risk perceptions for a market that has historically been largely viewed as an "apolitical" Laissez Faire system. On the economic front, also largely ignored has been Hong Kong's inflation statistics released early last week, which showed that headline consumer price inflation dropped by 0.1% in February, the first negative reading since August 2009. While one single data point certainly does not denote a trend, odds are high that deflationary forces are re-emerging in Hong Kong, with important implications for asset prices, particularly for the currency and local real estate market. Budding Deflation... Chart 1Deflation Is Coming Back The negative February CPI reading was largely attributed to some poverty relief factors, declining vegetable prices and the base effect due to the Chinese New Year holiday. However, headline CPI has been decelerating since the peak of 2011 (Chart 1). Indeed, after briefly dipping below zero at the height of the global financial crisis and then roaring back in the aftermath on improving growth, consumer prices in Hong Kong have been in a prolonged period of disinflation. In fact, February's negative CPI figure is just a continuation of a well-established trend rather than an anomaly caused by one-off factors. Moreover, falling inflation and developing deflation is rather broad-based. It is true that the nosedive in fresh food prices has clearly played a role in dragging down headline CPI. However, price inflation has been trending lower in almost all major components of the consumption basket such as housing, eating out and other miscellaneous services (Chart 1, bottom panel). Meanwhile, consumer durable goods inflation has been stuck in negative territory for more than 10 years. Interestingly, amid strengthening global growth momentum, most major economies have been experiencing bouts of reflation, particularly in sectors associated with commodities prices - intensifying disinflationary/deflationary pressures in Hong Kong are a notable exception. It means that inflation dynamics in Hong Kong are likely rooted in unique domestic factors. ...Indicates An Expensive Hong Kong Dollar In our view, a key factor behind Hong Kong's budding deflationary pressure is the exchange rate. As the Hong Kong dollar is pegged to the U.S. dollar, the relative shift in price levels between Hong Kong and the rest of the world cannot be adjusted through a change in the nominal exchange rate. Therefore, the adjustment must be achieved in real terms through price changes. Chart 2 shows that prior to 1983 when the currency board system was established, Hong Kong inflation largely followed that in the U.S., while the exchange rate fluctuated against the dollar. Since the 1983 currency peg, Hong Kong inflation has been swinging around the U.S. level, with the economy alternating between inflationary booms and deflationary busts. A new factor that has also become increasingly important in Hong Kong's inflation dynamics is China's price levels, which also relates to the exchange rate. Chart 3 shows Hong Kong headline inflation has outpaced Chinese inflation since 2013, and the RMB's depreciation against the Hong Kong dollar in recent years has put further downward pressure on local Hong Kong price levels. Chart 2Exchange Rate And Inflation Tango Chart 3Hong Kong Inflation: The China Factor In short, renewed deflationary pressures indicate that the Hong Kong dollar may have once again become expensive, and therefore domestic price levels have begun to adjust as the release valve. It remains to be seen how long the adjustment process will last. From investors' point of view, a few observations are in order: There is little risk that the Hong Kong dollar peg will break, unless it is a voluntary policy choice by the authorities. Hong Kong's solid banking sector is not prone to financial crises, and its massive fiscal and foreign exchange reserves give the government plenty of fire powder to defend the exchange rate in the event of a speculative attack, let alone the mighty official reserves held in mainland China (Chart 4). We remain convinced that Hong Kong's ultra-low interest rates compared with the U.S. are unjustified and unsustainable (Chart 5). Hong Kong 10-year government bond yields are still 84 basis points lower than their U.S. counterparts, which probably reflects upward pressure on the Hong Kong dollar to appreciate against the U.S. dollar, partially driven by Chinese capital outflows. In this vein, budding deflationary pressures in Hong Kong further diminish the odds of an upward move of the HKD against the U.S. dollar. Remain short Hong Kong government bonds against U.S. Treasurys with comparable durations. Historically Hong Kong's flexible and largely Laissez Faire system has been able to stomach drastic swings in domestic price levels induced by the currency peg. The rising grassroots anti-establishment movement in recent years suggests the side effects of the Hong Kong system may have become increasingly unpopular. It will be interesting to see if any deflationary growth downturn in Hong Kong triggers a populist backlash that leads to a change in Hong Kong's exchange rate scheme. Chart 4Ample Resources To Defend HKD Peg Chart 5HK Rates Should Move Higher Real Estate: Sky's The Limit? Another key reason behind Hong Kong's falling CPI inflation is rent, which has also turned sharply lower in recent months (Chart 1, bottom panel). This is in stark contrast to home prices, which have continued to rally strongly. After a temporary pullback last year, Hong Kong real estate prices have roared back to new record highs. Looking forward, the outlook for Hong Kong's real estate sector looks decisively bearish. First, Hong Kong's real estate market has become increasingly detached from economic fundamentals. Home prices have dramatically outpaced household income, in greater proportion than the previous housing bubble peak in the late 1990s (Chart 6). Therefore, it is not surprising that both transactions and construction activity have declined substantially to near-record lows. Thinning transaction activity suggests that ordinary local households may have been priced out, underscoring frothy market conditions. The saving grace is that the dramatic increase in prices has not led to euphoria in housing demand and transactions, which should limit financial sector risk should home prices decline. Second, developing deflationary pressures and slowing rent growth may reinforce one other, potentially creating a downward spiral. Meanwhile, risk-free interest rates, driven by Federal Reserve policy, will likely edge higher. This is an especially poor combination for Hong Kong real estate investors. Historically, higher risk-free yields should lead to higher rental yields (Chart 7). With falling rents, the only way for rental yields to go up is via lower prices. Chart 6Housing Market: Soaring Prices, Falling Volume Chart 7Rental Yield Will Be Pushed Higher From a big-picture vantage point, Hong Kong deflation and Fed tightening will lead to much higher real interest rates in Hong Kong, which amounts to significant tightening in monetary conditions. This will create further headwinds for both the Hong Kong domestic economy and property prices. The bottom line is that the risk in Hong Kong home prices is tilted to the downside. The market may have been boosted by an influx of capital from the mainland, which may sustain the bubble for a while longer. However, investors should not chase the market. Chart 8The Widening Valuation Gap Budding deflationary pressures also bode poorly for profits and equity prices. However, Hong Kong stocks are more heavily exposed to China and the global cycle than local business conditions, and therefore should not be impacted materially. Moreover, Hong Kong stock multiples historically have tracked their U.S. counterparts closely - the valuation gap has widened sharply since 2013 (Chart 8). This should further limit the downside in Hong Kong stocks. Meanwhile, we expect property owners such as REITs to underperform the broader market. A Word On Chinese Profits The latest numbers show Chinese industrial profits jumped by over 30% in the first two months of the year compared with a year ago, a sharp acceleration from recent months, as predicted by our model (Chart 9). The strong profit recovery has important implications. For equity earnings, the upturn in the profit cycle is also confirmed by bottom-up analysts. Net earnings revisions have been lifted, which has historically led to acceleration in forward earnings growth (Chart 10). Remain positive on Chinese H shares. From a macro perspective, rising earnings should lead to stronger investment, especially in the manufacturing and mining sectors. This should further boost domestic demand and prolong the ongoing mini cycle upturn. The profit recovery also helps alleviate financial stress in the banking system, as it will reduce the pace of accumulation of non-performing loans (NPL). Importantly, profits are rising particularly strongly in some of the hardest hit sectors in previous years, such as steelmakers and coal miners, which were precisely where the increase in NPLs were the most rampant. We will follow up on this issue in upcoming reports. Chart 9China's Profit Cycle Upturn Chart 10Chinese Equity Earnings Will Accelerate Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights EM equity valuations are neutral. Relative to the U.S., EM share prices do offer some value, but this primarily reflects elevated valuations within the S&P 500. According to the cyclically-adjusted P/E ratio, EM stocks are cheap for investors with a long-term time horizon - longer than two to three years. Corporate profits are much more important than equity valuations in driving share prices in the next 12 months. Our outlook for EM EPS is downbeat for the next 12 months. Maintain a defensive posture and an underweight allocation in EM stocks versus DM. A new trade: go long Russian energy stocks / short global energy ones. Feature Chart I-1EM P/E Ratio And EPS There is ongoing debate in the investment community concerning whether emerging markets (EM) equities are or are not cheap, in both absolute terms and relative to developed markets (DM). In this week's report we review various equity valuation indicators and reiterate that EM stocks are neither cheap nor expensive in absolute terms. For example, the average of trailing and forward P/E ratios is slightly above its historical mean (Chart I-1, top panel). Relative to the U.S., EM share prices do offer value, but this reflects elevated valuations within the S&P 500. Despite this, we recommend underweighting EM vs U.S./DM because the cyclical growth dynamics is much better in DM than EM. EM stocks are cheap if one assumes a strong earnings recovery (Chart I-1, bottom panel). If earnings per share (EPS) begin contracting anew, as we expect, then the current rally will be reversed sooner than later. Overall, we continue to recommend a defensive posture for absolute-return investors and maintaining an underweight allocation in EM stocks versus DM for asset allocators. Valuation Perspectives Below we consider several valuation ratios: The equal-sector weighted trailing P/E ratio is 17.7 for EM (Chart I-2). Table I-1 displays equal-sector weighted P/E ratio, price-to-book value ratio and dividend yields for major equity markets globally. This is an apples-to-apples comparison, as it assigns equal weights to each of the 10 MSCI sectors - i.e., it removes sector biases. Chart I-2Equal-Sector Weighted Trailing P/E Ratio Table I-1Equal-Sector Weighted Valuation Ratios Across EM And DM Hence, on a comparable basis, EM equities are only slightly cheaper than DM stocks as is evident in Table I-1. Besides, the composite valuation indicator based on equal-sector weighted trailing and forward P/E, price-to-book value, price-to-cash earnings ratios and dividend yield indicate that EM stocks are fairly valued (Chart I-3). The cyclically-adjusted P/E (CAPE) ratio. The CAPE ratio is a structural valuation measure, i.e. it matters in the long run. Importantly, it assumes that real (inflation-adjusted) EPS will revert to its historical mean or trend. In short, the CAPE ratio tells us what the P/E ratio would be if EPS were to revert to its historical trend. Chart I-4 illustrates the EM CAPE ratio. If EM EPS in inflation-adjusted U.S. dollar terms reaches its historical time trend, one can safely assume that EM stocks are cheap and currently worth buying. In a nutshell, the current CAPE ratio of 15 assumes that EM EPS should rise by about 30% in nominal U.S. dollar terms over an investor's time horizon. Chart I-3EM Equities Valuations Are Neutral Chart I-4EM CAPE Ratio Given that our time horizon is 12 months, the assumption that EM EPS will surge by about 30% in U.S. dollar terms is in our view ambitious. Therefore, we posit that EM share prices do not offer compelling value at all in the next 12 months. If one's investment horizon were two-to-three years or longer, the assumption that EPS will rise by 30% or more in U.S. dollar terms is much more plausible. In this sense we would concur that EM share prices offer decent value from a longer-term perspective. Our methodology of calculating the CAPE ratio for EM varies from the well-known Robert Shiller's CAPE ratio for the U.S.1 However, even when applying our CAPE methodology to U.S. equities, the resulting ratio is not very different from Shiller's CAPE (Chart I-5). Trimmed-mean equity valuation ratios. Chart 6 illustrates 20% trimmed-mean trailing and forward P/E, price-to-book value, price-to-cash earnings ratios and dividend yields for the EM equity universe. A 20% trimmed-mean ratio excludes the top 10% and bottom 10% of industry groups, and then calculates the average. All calculations are based on 50 EM industry group data available from MSCI. Why look at trimmed-mean valuation ratios? Because by removing the top and bottom 10% of industry groups, this measure excludes outliers and provides a better perspective on valuation. A few observations are in order: First, according to the trimmed-mean valuation ratios, EM equities are not cheap. The trimmed-mean ratios are close to their historical mean (Chart I-6). Second, the trimmed-mean ratios are well above their market cap ones. This indicates that there are a few industry groups with large market caps that pull EM multiples lower. In other words, market-cap weighted multiples are skewed to the downside by a few large industry groups. There are reasons why some sectors and countries have low or high equity multiples. It makes sense to exclude them. Finally, the composite valuation indicator based on trimmed-mean trailing and forward P/Es, PBV and price-to-cash earnings ratios and dividend yield demonstrates that EM equity valuations are neutral (Chart I-7). Chart I-5U.S. CAPE Ratios Chart I-6EM Stocks Are Close to Fair Value Chart I-7EM Equities Have Neutral Value Bottom Line: EM equities by and large command a neutral valuation. According to the CAPE ratio, EM equities are cheap for investors with a long-term time horizon, say two-to-three years or longer. Profits Hold The Key Valuations are not a good timing tool. For low equity valuations to be realized, i.e., to produce solid price gains, corporate profits should grow. The reverse is also true: for an overvalued market to decline, company earnings should contract, or at least disappoint. When valuations are neutral - as they currently are for the EM equity benchmark - a recovery in EPS should entail higher share prices, while EPS shrinkage should lead to a selloff. EM EPS will continue to recover in the next three to six months, given the rally in commodities prices in 2016, amelioration in China's business cycle and the technology sector boom in Asia. However, this moderate and short-lived EPS recovery is already priced in. For the market to rally further, EPS will need to expand beyond the next three to six months. Remarkably, there has been little improvement in EM ex-China domestic demand. Besides, the risk to bank loan growth remains to the downside both in China and EM ex-China. Slower loan growth and the need to recognize and provision for potentially large NPLs will pressure banks' profits in many EM countries. Finally, we expect oil and industrial metals prices to decline considerably over the course of this year. If and as this view plays out, energy and materials stocks will fall. Energy and materials share prices correlate not with their past or current profits but rather with underlying commodities prices. One area where we remain bullish is the technology sector. Even though tech share prices are overbought and could correct in absolute terms in the months ahead, they will continue to outperform the benchmark. Bottom Line: Corporate profits are much more important in driving share prices in the next 12 months than equity valuations. Our outlook for EM EPS is downbeat for the next 12 months or so, even though EPS will continue to recover in the next three to six months. Timing Reversal: Watch Credit Quality Spreads Chart I-8Credit Quality Spreads: ##br##A Correction Or Reversal? Following are some of the indicators we are monitoring to gauge a reversal in EM share prices. EM corporate spreads have widened a notch relative to EM sovereign spreads (Chart I-8, top panel). Similarly, Chinese off-shore corporate spreads have widened versus Chinese sovereign spreads (Chart I-8, middle panel). Credit quality spreads - the gap between B- and BAA-grade corporate bonds - have widened slightly in the U.S. (Chart I-8, bottom panel). These moves are still very small, and do not constitute a definite sign of a major trend reversal. Nevertheless, such widening in credit quality spreads is an important development. If they persist, they will certainly sound the alarm for the reflation trade. Interestingly, this is the first time a simultaneous widening in credit quality spreads has occurred since the risk assets rally began in early 2016. Bottom Line: Major equity market selloffs will occur when lower quality credit begins to persistently underperform better quality credit. There have been budding signs of quality spread widening that are worth being monitored. Identifying Relative Value Within the EM equity universe, valuation ratios differ greatly. For example, banks trade at a trailing P/E of 9.7, while consumer staple stocks trade at 24.8. Table I-2 portrays the trailing P/E ratio and its historical mean as well as 12-month forward EPS growth and the forward P/E ratio for each sector - as well as average of trailing and forward P/E ratios. Table I-3 shows the same valuation measures but for EM countries. Table I-2Stock Valuation Snapshot: EM Sectors Table I-3Equity Valuation Snapshot: EM Countries It is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions from these tables. On a general level, a simplistic approach to investing based on trailing and forward P/E ratios would not have produced great outcomes in EM in recent years. When analyzing EM stock valuations, we prefer to use the trailing rather than forward P/E ratio because historically, EM forward EPS have had a very poor record forecasting actual EPS. One of our favorite ways to identify relative value is to compare the PBV ratio and return on equity (RoE) across countries/sectors. Chart I-9 plots RoE on the X-axis and the PBV ratio on the Y axis. Countries and sectors located in the bottom right corner (at the low end of the shaded area) have a low PBV ratio compared to their RoE. In contrast, in the north-west side of the distribution (at the upper end of the shaded zone), these have an elevated PBV ratio, taking into account their RoE. Chart I-9Searching For Relative Value Among countries, Korea, Russia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and China appear cheap, while Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Colombia, Malaysia and Poland are on the expensive side. Chart I-10EMS's Recommended ##br##Equity Portfolio Performance Concerning equity sectors, utilities and financials/banks are cheap, yet consumer staples and consumer discretionary, health care, telecom and materials appear expensive in relative terms. Our recommended country equity allocation is based on a qualitative assessment of many variables including but not limited to valuation. Chart I-10 displays the performance of our fully invested EM Equity Portfolio Model versus the EM benchmark. Our overweights presently include: Korea, Taiwan, India, China, Thailand, Russia and central Europe. Our underweights are Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia and Peru. We are neutral on Mexico, Chile, Colombia, South Africa and the Philippines. The lists of our country allocation and other equity investment recommendations are presented each week at the end of our reports. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Bet On Russia's Non-Compliance With OPEC Odds of Russia's compliance with the OPEC agreement to cut oil output by 300k b/d in the next two months are low. This poses downside risk to oil prices. Russia has so far done only 120k b/d cuts. Hence, in the next two months it should reduce its output by 180k b/d which amounts to 1.6% of the nation's oil output. One way to bet on Russia's non-compliance, regardless the direction of oil prices, is to go long Russian energy stocks / short global energy ones (Chart II-1). There are a number of political, economic and financial motives why Russia might care less about lower oil prices than Saudi Arabia in the next 12-18 months or so. As a result, Russia might not cut as much as it is expected by the OPEC agreement. Russia is able to increase oil production due to a cheaper ruble and technology advances. BCA's Energy Sector Strategy team has been highlighting that there have been concerted efforts by Russia's largest producers to employ horizontal drilling and multi-zone hydraulic fracturing in Western Siberia.2 These have stemmed declines from those aging fields and allowed production to rise (Chart II-2). Chart II-1Long Russia Energy / ##br##Short Global Energy Stocks Chart II-2Russian Oil ##br##Production Will Increase Russia will not shy away from being opportunistic and increase its market share when it can ramp up oil production. A rising global oil market share will allow Russian companies to outperform their global peers regardless the direction of oil prices. There are major cyclical divergences between Russian and Saudi economies. Russia's economy is gradually picking up while there is less certainty about Saudi's growth recovery. The reason is that Russia has allowed the ruble to depreciate and act as a shock absorber. Meanwhile, Sa­­­­udis have stuck to the currency peg. ­­­Oil prices are down by 27% from their top in rubles and 55% in Saudi riyals (Chart II-3). This has reflated Russia's fiscal revenues and the economy, while Saudi Arabia is still struggling with the consequences of low ­oil prices. On the fiscal front, Russia went through a notable fiscal squeeze and its budget deficit is projected to be 3.2% of GDP in 2017 (Chart II-4). In contrast, the Saudi Arabian fiscal deficit in 2016 reached an outstanding 17% of GDP, accounting for the drawdown in reserves by our estimates.3 Chart II-3Ruble's Depreciation ##br##In 2014-15 Made a Difference Chart II-4Fiscal Deficit: Small In ##br##Russia & Large In Saudi More importantly, Russia's federal budget for 2017 was constructed on the oil price assumption of $40/bbl. The 2017 Saudi budget assumes oil price of $50/bbl.4 Therefore, Russia would not mind if oil prices drop toward or slightly below $40 in the second half of this year. Therefore, Saudis care much more about sustaining oil prices at a higher level than Russians do. Finally, Rosneft has already conducted its IPO while Aramco's IPO has not taken place yet. As such, the need for higher oil prices is much greater in Saudi Arabia - to justify a higher value of their oil giant - than in Russia. Bottom Line: Odds are considerable that Russia will not comply with the OPEC deal and this could cause oil prices to selloff more. Regardless of direction of oil prices, we expect the Russian energy sector to outperform their global peers due to Russia's rising market share in the global oil market. Go long Russian energy stocks / short global ones. Stephan Gabillard, Research Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 For more detailed discussion on our methodology of CAPE, please refer to January 20, 2016 Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled "EM Equity Valuations: A CAPE Model", available at ems. bcaresearch.com 2 Please refer to the Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Russian Oil Production: Surpassing Expectation", dated December 14, 2016, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com 3 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled, "Saudi Arabia: Short-Term Gain, Long-Term Pain", dated February 1, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 4 https://mof.gov.sa/en/budget2017/Documents/The_National_Budget.pdf Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Internal dynamics warn that a broad market consolidation phase has begun. The jump in growth vs. value stocks has provided an opportunity to shift to a neutral style bias. Transports have sold off sharply, but downside risks have not yet been fully expunged, especially for the airline group. Recent Changes Growth Vs. Value - Shift to a neutral stance. Table 1Sector Performance Returns (%) Feature The perceived dovish Fed shift and doubts about the achievability of Trump's policy goals are causing equity market consternation. To the extent that the run up in stocks has largely reflected an improvement in sentiment and other 'soft' economic data, the lack of follow through in 'hard' data has created a validation void. While a weaker U.S. dollar, lower oil prices and less hawkish Fed imply easier monetary conditions, which are ultimately positive for growth, profits and the stock market, a digestion phase still looms. Financials, and banks in particular, had been market leaders, driven up by hopes for a meaningful upward shift in the yield curve and unleashing of animal spirits. But these assumptions are being challenged and there is limited fundamental support. Indeed, bank lending growth remains non-existent and there is no tailwind from improving credit quality. Our view remains that banks carry the most downside risk of all financial groups (please see the March 6 Weekly Report for more details). Regional banks are now down on a year-to-date relative performance basis (Chart 1). In fact, our newly constructed gauge of the equity market's internal dynamics suggests that additional tactical broad market turbulence lies ahead. A composite of relative bank stock, relative transport, small/large cap and industrials/utilities share prices has been a good coincident to leading market indicator in recent years (Chart 2). While no indicator is infallible, the message is that overall market risk is elevated and a choppy period lies ahead, reinforcing our defensive vs. cyclical bias. Nevertheless, it will be important to put any corrective action into a longer-term context. Over the years, we have kept an eye on several qualitative 'unconventional indicators' that have helped time major market turning points. They are meant to augment rather than replace fundamental factors. Chart 1Market Leaders Are Stumbling Chart 2A Yellow Flag From Internal Dynamics Below we highlight five critical variables to gauge whether a correction will devolve into a sustained sell-off. Each of the indicators measures either; profits; business confidence; investor confidence; and/or reflects how liquidity conditions are impacting market dynamics. Investor confidence can be measured through margin debt. While extremely elevated (Chart 3), there is no concrete sign that access to funds is being undermined by the modest backup in interest rates. When the cost of borrowing becomes too onerous, it will manifest in reduced margin debt and forced selling, which will be a serious threat to stocks given that leverage is challenging levels experienced at prior peaks, as a share of nominal income. M&A activity is losing momentum (Chart 4). A peak in merger activity typically coincides with a rising cost of capital. If corporate sector capital availability becomes a pressing issue, then M&A activity will decline further, signaling that the corporate sector is facing growth headwinds. Economic signals are mostly positive. Durable goods orders have tentatively perked back up (Chart 5), reinforcing that profits and confidence have improved after a soft patch. Temporary employment continues to rise (Chart 5). When temp workers shrink, it is often an early warning sign that companies are entering retrenchment mode, given the ease and low cost of reducing this source of labor costs. If temporary employment falls at the same time as share prices, that would be a red flag. The relative performance of consumer discretionary to consumer staples can provide a read on purchasing power and/or the marginal propensity to spend. This share price ratio does not suggest any consumption concerns exist (Chart 4, bottom panel). If consumer staples begin to outperform, then it would warn of a more daunting economic outlook. Chart 3Borrowing Costs Are Not Yet Restrictive Chart 4M&A Is Starting To Labor Chart 5Economic Signals Are Decent In all, these indicators suggest that any pullback will be corrective rather than a trend change. If the profit cycle continues to improve and the Fed has no inflationary need to become restrictive, then any broad market correction could provide an opportunity to selectively add cyclical exposure to portfolios in the coming weeks. In the meantime, we are revisiting our growth vs. value view and providing an update on transports. Growth Vs. Value: Shifting To Neutral Our last style bias update in the December 19 Weekly Report concluded that we would likely recommend moving to a neutral stance over the coming weeks/months from our current growth vs. value (G/V) stance, but expected to do after growth stocks had staged a comeback. That recovery is now well underway and so we are revisiting the outlook. Growth indexes have outperformed value since the depths of the Great Recession. The preference for growth reflected central bank interest rate suppression, which boosted the multiple investors were willing to pay for perceived growth at a time when growth was scarce. In addition, the composition of the growth index is much longer duration than that of the value space. The surge in long-term earnings growth expectations suggests that investors have increased conviction in the durability of the expansion, which has aided the G/V recovery (Chart 6). That monetary experiment has recently begun to pay off, as global economic growth has finally demonstrated evidence of self-reinforcing traction, led by developed countries. As a result, most central banks are well past the point of maximum thrust, which would mean the loss, albeit not a reversal, of the primary support for the secular advance in growth vs. value indexes. Keep in mind that growth benchmarks have a massive technology sector weight, at just over 1/3 of the total index capitalization. Value indices carry only a 7% weight. As shown in previous research, the technology sector underperforms when economic growth is fast enough to create inflationary pressure and therefore, the interest rate structure. Furthermore, value benchmarks have more than 25% of their weight in the financials sector vs. less than 5% for growth indexes. The upshot is that a meaningful interest rate increase would pad the profits of financials-rich value indices while having little to no impact on growth benchmarks by virtue of their tech-dependence. It is no surprise that the G/V ratio trends with technology/financials relative sector performance (Chart 7). The latter has clearly peaked, with an assist from the renormalization in Fed policy. Chart 6Time To Shift Chart 7Two Key Sector Influences These sector discrepancies mean that a critical question for the style decision is what is the path for government bond yields? The U.S. economy is exhibiting signs of self-reinforcing behavior. The small business sector's hiring plans have surged, and the ISM employment index remains solid (Chart 8). Chart 8Economy No Longer Favors Growth Chart 9A Mixed Bag While at least a modest employment slowdown is probable given that the corporate sector is feeling the profit margin pinch from higher wage costs, these gauges do not suggest a major crunch is imminent. The personal savings rate is drifting lower, supporting consumption growth (Chart 8). Value indexes have a higher economic beta than growth benchmarks, owing to their exposure to shorter duration sectors. The gap between growth and value operating margins tends to close when the economy enjoys a meaningful acceleration (Chart 8). Chart 10Volatility Is A Style Driver Other markers of global economic growth are more mixed. The global manufacturing PMI survey is very strong, but oil and other commodity prices have started to diverge negatively (Chart 9). That may soon change if the U.S. dollar has crested, which would provide a much needed fillip to emerging markets and remove a source of deflationary pressure. Real global bond yields are grinding higher, suggesting that in all, economic prospects have improved, and alleviating a major constraint on value stocks. Against this backdrop, it is timely to shift to a neutral style preference after the sharp rebound in the G/V ratio since late last year. Why not a full shift into value indexes? Developing countries are conspicuously lagging developed countries, which caps the outlook for commodities and their beneficiaries. EM capital spending is still very weak in real terms. Deep cyclical sectors are much more heavily-weighted in value benchmarks. A global recovery that has a greater thrust from consumption than investment, at least at the outset, argues against expecting value stocks to outperform. Moreover, the fallout from potentially protectionist U.S. trade policies remains unknown, which could restrain economic growth momentum and unleash volatility in the equity markets. The latter has been incredibly muted in recent months. In fact, BCA's VIX model, which incorporates corporate sector health and interest rate expectations, is heralding a higher VIX. Clearly, elevated volatility has supported the G/V ratio over meaningful periods of time (Chart 10). Bottom Line: Shift to a neutral style bias. A full shift to a value preference would require BCA to forecast a much weaker U.S. dollar and/or demand-driven inflationary pressure. Transports: Stuck In Neutral The S&P transports index peaked in mid-December versus the broad market, the first major sub-group to fizzle after the post-election sugar high (Chart 11). The recent setback has been broad-based. We had been overweight both the rails and air freight & logistics industry sub-groups, but booked gains in both prior to their respective pullbacks. Is it time to get back in? Transportation equities are ultra-sensitive to swings in global economic growth. Chart 12 shows that the relative share price ratio is an excellent leading indicator of both the ISM manufacturing survey and Citi's economic surprise index. The message is that at least a mild mean reversion in both of these indexes looms in the coming months, i.e. beware of some form of economic cooling. Chart 11Transports Have Cracked... Chart 12... Signaling Economic Cooling Ahead Against this backdrop, we are revisiting our last remaining underweight, the S&P airlines index. While rails and air freight & logistics stocks are directly linked to global trade, the same does not hold true for the S&P airlines index. Business and consumer travel budgets are the key drivers of industry demand. A revival in animal spirits and a healthy U.S. consumer could be clear positives for air travel. Moreover, the recent pullback in fuel costs should cushion profit margins for unhedged airline operators (Chart 13). Finally, renowned investor Warren Buffett has recently become a major shareholder in the U.S. airline industry, raising its profile. While betting against Buffett is always fraught with risk, our cautious take on the airline industry boils down to our view that excess capacity will continue to hold back profitability. If the overall transport index is accurately signaling that some loss of economic momentum looms, then a rapid expansion in business and travel spending may not be quick to materialize. A pricing war has already gripped the industry, as airlines are scrambling to fill up planes. Revenue-per-available-seat-mile and U.S. CPI airfare are contracting (Chart 14), reflecting a fight for market share. That is a serious impediment to profit margins. Chart 13Airlines Are Losing Altitude... Chart 14... As Price Wars Persist The headwinds extend beyond the U.S. Chart 15 shows that global airfare deflation also bodes ill for top line industry growth. The lags from previous U.S. dollar strength could compound this source of drag. Absent a decisive recovery in total travel spending, there does not appear to be any catalysts to reverse deflationary conditions. Carriers are still allocating an historically high portion of cash flow to capital spending. While upgrading aging fleets to become more fuel-efficient in an era of low interest rates is a long-term positive, the payback period may be extended. Revenue has failed to keep up with the increase in capital expenditures (Chart 16, bottom panel), suggesting that capacity growth continues to outpace industry demand, a recipe for ongoing pricing pressure. Chart 15Deflation Is Global Chart 16Too Much Capacity This difficult backdrop has begun to infect analyst earnings estimates. Net earnings revisions have nosedived. Relative performance momentum is tightly lined with the trend in earnings estimates (Chart 16). The message is that the breakdown in cyclical momentum has further to run. Indeed, the 52-week rate of change rarely troughs until it reaches much lower levels, warning of additional downside relative performance risks. Bottom Line: The S&P transports group is heralding a period of economic cooling, but the airline sub-component has not yet fully discounted such an outcome. Stay underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P airlines index are: UAL, AAL, DAL, LUV & ALK. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Contrary to popular perception, non-cyclical sectors have led the market so far this year, while deep cyclical sectors are breaking down, in relative performance terms. Our models point to more of the same ahead. The oversold rebound in the pharmaceutical group may soon run into resistance so we recommend trimming positions to neutral. Put the proceeds into restaurants, a quasi-defensive group that enjoys a brightening sales outlook without pharma's political and regulatory risk. Recent Changes S&P Pharmaceuticals - Downgrade to neutral. S&P Restaurants - Upgrade to overweight. Table 1 Feature Equities are exhibiting signs of mild fatigue. Breadth has begun to narrow, and new highs have sagged compared with new lows (Chart 1). Both of these technical developments have warned of previous tactical pullbacks. The recent reset in oil prices may also test investor nerves. Oil prices have been a critical macro variable, because they influence inflation expectations and the corporate bond market (high yield bond spreads shown inverted, Chart 1). Crude oil price corrections have accurately timed equity retreats (Chart 1), and general risk aversion phases. To be sure, the global economy is no longer on a deflationary precipice, suggesting that weaker oil prices may not foreshadow a soft patch, but they may be a good enough excuse for profit taking in the equity market after a good run. Contrary to popular perception, cyclical sectors have not led the broad market so far in 2017. In fact, energy, materials and industrials have all broken down in relative performance terms (Chart 2), after peaking in mid-December. Only the technology sector has stayed resilient. Chart 1Short-Term Fatigue Chart 2Cyclicals Have Broken Down Chart 3Overshoot Renormalization Insipid cyclical sector performance has occurred within the context of a synchronized lift in global economic growth and recovering corporate sector pricing power. So why are cyclical sectors lagging? It may simply be a digestion phase. However, a different interpretation is that a number of key macro factors fail to confirm the durability of last year's outperformance, suggesting that defensive outperformance could last. Concerns that the current global inventory cycle may not morph into a broad-based upturn in global final demand continue to linger: the global credit impulse remains anemic, the Fed and China are tightening monetary policy and commodity markets are cracking (Chart 3). The lack of any meaningful improvement in Chinese loan demand signals that the economy may be quick to cool as the authorities tap the breaks on credit growth. It would take a decisive depreciation in the U.S. dollar to boost the relative profit fortunes of capital spending-dependent cyclical sectors on a sustainable basis. On a more positive note, the Fed's benign forward guidance last week bears close attention. If the U.S. dollar loses upside support, particularly with the ECB contemplating a retreat from full throttle easing, it could change the investment landscape. By reminding markets that their inflation target is symmetric, the Fed signaled it will be willing to tolerate a modest inflation overshoot, which is positive for risk assets in the short run. A softer U.S. dollar would take the pressure off of developing countries, support commodity prices, and bolster our cyclical sector sales models and Cyclical Macro Indicators. However, Chart 4 shows that the objective message from our models remains consistent with continued defensive sector outperformance. With a more protectionist U.S. Administration, we remain reluctant to position exclusively for a much weaker dollar. The ongoing underperformance of emerging market equities relative to U.S. and global benchmarks reinforces that foreign-sourced profit growth continues to lag (Chart 5). Positioning for cyclical sector earnings outperformance requires healthier profits abroad, to spur a new capital investment cycle. Chart 4Heeding The Message From Our Models... Chart 5... And The Markets We will look to selectively add cyclical exposure when the objective message from our Indicators provides confirmation that earnings-driven outperformance lies ahead. At the moment, there is no such confirmation. In fact, the elevated reading in the SKEW index continues to signal that a defensive posture will optimize portfolio performance (Chart 5). In sum, we continue to characterize the broad market's current momentum as an overshoot phase, with additional technical upside potential, but the rally is starting to fray around the edges. In this environment, holding a mostly defensive basket with selective beta exposure is still recommended. Importantly, within the defensive universe, there are tweaks to be made, especially if the U.S. dollar stops rising. Fade The Pharmaceuticals Rebound Health care has been the second strongest of the eleven broad sectors year-to-date, contrary to popular perception. That is in line with the flattening yield curve, cresting in inflation expectations and a modest correction in oil prices (Chart 6), all of which have revived the allure of non-cyclical sectors. Moreover, our Cyclical Macro Indicator (CMI) for the health care sector remains firm, supported by the ongoing large pricing power advantage. Relative value is the most attractive it has been in five years. While the latter provides little timing help, it indicates low risk, especially with technical conditions still deeply oversold (Chart 7). Chart 6Health Care Is Storming Back Chart 7Still Cheap And Oversold The heavyweight pharmaceutical group has led the sector's tactical charge, recouping the ground lost, in relative performance terms, leading up to the U.S. election. While we were caught off guard by the severity of the pullback last September/October, we refrained from selling into an oversold market and noted our intention to lighten positions whenever the inevitable relief rally occurred. The time has come to execute on this thesis. Pharmaceutical stocks are very cheap and have discounted a hostile regulatory environment. The relative forward P/E is well below its historic mean, even though both 12-month and 5-year relative forward earnings growth expectations are depressed (Chart 8). Typically, the latter would serve to artificially inflate valuations. These conditions exist even though free cash flow growth remains strong; merger activity has been solid, albeit ebbing in recent months; and companies have used excess capital to reduce total shares outstanding (Chart 8). In other words, relative forward earnings would have to decline substantially to validate these expectations. Is this plausible? Much depends on the regulatory environment. While details of the U.S. Administration's proposal to replace the Affordable Care Act have started to leak out, final details are still elusive and legislative action is not imminent. So far, it appears as if a worst case scenario would see an increase in the number of uninsured Americans, with a rising cost of insurance (to the benefit of managed care companies). According to the Department of Health & Human Services, the uninsured rate of the U.S. population nearly halved from 16% in 2010 to 9% in 2015. That led to a lift in the number of procedures performed and bolstered hospital bottom lines. Hospitals are a major pharmaceutical buying group. Higher utilization rates fed increased pharmaceutical demand for a number of years. However, drug spending growth has dropped off, and if the legion of uninsured patients rises anew in the coming years, then hospital utilization rates will decline, taking drug consumption growth down with it. Moreover, Trump wants to streamline the FDA's approval process, which would ultimately boost the number of high margin new drugs coming to market. Drug stocks boomed back in the mid-1990s, the last time FDA approval rates accelerated meaningfully (Chart 9). Chart 8Full Capitulation Chart 9Full Capitulation But at the same time, if government is given leeway to negotiate drug prices directly with drug companies, then pricing power will continue to converge down toward overall corporate sector pricing power, especially if drug consumption rates ease (Chart 9). At the moment, drug consumption growth remains above the rate of overall consumption growth, but that is much slower than during the boom following the introduction of the Affordable Care Act. Retail sales at pharmacies are growing robustly, and hospitals are still adding staff, signaling that they continue to position for expansion, i.e. rising procedure volumes (Chart 10). On the downside, the strong U.S. dollar is a big drag on top-line growth. Drug imports exceed exports by a wide margin, resulting in a negative trade balance and a drag on U.S. drug company profits, all else equal. The combination of a sales growth deceleration and adequate channel inventories has capped drug output growth (Chart 10). That is a productivity and profit margin headwind. Against this background, the industry will need an external assist to deliver profit outperformance. Relative profit estimates rise when disinflationary forces reign supreme, as measured by the NFIB planned price hikes series (shown inverted, Chart 11). This measure of future corporate pricing power intentions has rolled over, but broader measures of inflation are creeping higher. Ergo, drug earnings forecasts may be challenged to keep pace with the overall corporate sector. Chart 10... But Growth Rates Are Slowing Chart 11Mixed Signals The good news is that even though U.S. dollar strength is an export drag, the negative drug trade balance suggests that it will hurt other industries more. Indeed, a rising currency often coincides with profit outperformance (Chart 11). There is not enough evidence that exogenous factors will offset slowing domestic drug consumption growth. In all, the case for a further and sustained relative performance recovery has weakened, and we are taking advantage of this year's oversold bounce to move to the sidelines. Bottom Line: Trim the S&P pharmaceuticals index to neutral. This position was deep in the money initially, but last year's downdraft pushed it into a loss position of 10%. BLBG: S5PHARX-JNJ, PFE, MRK, BMY, LLY, AGN, ZTS, MYL, PRGO, MNK. Restaurants: Increasing Appetite The broad consumer discretionary sector has been treading water, largely owing to fears that a border adjustment tax (BAT) will undermine the retailing sub-component. This consolidation has restored value and created an attractive technical entry point (Chart 12, bottom panel). Importantly, industry earnings fundamentals are on the upswing. Our consumer discretionary sector Cyclical Macro Indicator has perked up (Chart 12), supported by an increase in wages, and more recently, the decline in oil prices. The latter is freeing up disposable income, which consumers have an incentive to spend given that household net worth (HNW) has climbed to all-time highs as a percent of disposable income (Chart 13). Chart 12A Good Place To Shop Chart 13Piggyback The Wealth Effect While we remain overweight housing related equities (homebuilders and home improvement retailers) in addition to our upbeat view on the media and advertising complex, a buying opportunity has surfaced in the neglected S&P restaurants index. We booked gains on an underweight position and lifted exposure to neutral back in late-October. Since then, value has improved further, while leading sales indicators continue to firm. Stronger consumer finances should flow into the casual dining industry. Sales have already started to reaccelerate, and should climb further based on the leading message from HNW (Chart 14). The lower income, $15K-$35K, cohort is also feeling increasingly confident, according to the latest Conference Board survey data (Chart 14). Meanwhile, the National Association of Restaurants Performance Index has regained momentum (Chart 15), signaling increased activity and rising confidence among restaurateurs. While the gap between the cost of dining out and dining in remains wide, it has begun to narrow, which is a plus for store traffic, all else equal. Chart 14Buy Into Weakness Chart 15At A Turning Point Domestically... Chart 16... And Globally? Our restaurants profit margin proxy (comprising restaurants CPI versus a blend of the industry's wage bill and food commodity costs) is trending higher. That is notable because it has a good track record in leading relative earnings growth estimates (Chart 15). Nevertheless, it is not all good news. International exposure remains a headache. Typically, soft EM currencies warn of translation drags on foreign sourced revenue (Chart 16). This cycle, there is an offset, as EM interest rates have come down, which is a plus for domestic demand (Chart 16). Thus, the headwind from outside the U.S. should abate as the year progresses. Adding it all up, factors are falling into place for a playable rally in the under-owned and unloved S&P restaurants index. This group offers attractive quasi-cyclical defensive exposure to replace the S&P pharmaceuticals index, without the political and regulatory risks. Bottom Line: Redeploy funds from the pharma downgrade and boost the S&P restaurants index to overweight. BLBG: S5REST-MCD, YUM, CMG, SBUX, DRI. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps. Favor growth over value (downgrade alert).

Highlights Portfolio Strategy A relapse in the global financials sector threatens to spill into U.S. financials as credit growth sinks. Bank equities are the most vulnerable to such a phase, given their reliance on rising interest rate expectations rather than increased lending. Take profits in the S&P health care facilities index and downgrade to neutral. Recent Changes S&P Health Care Facilities - Take profits of 12% and downgrade to neutral. Table 1Sector Performance Returns (%) Feature Momentum continues to trump all else, with the equity market surging to new all-time highs last week. However, in the background, the Fed is becoming steadily more hawkish, and the odds of a March rate hike have risen substantially. This should be cause for some trepidation. Chart 1Multiples Are Headed##br## Lower As The Fed Hikes The market advance since November has been supported primarily by valuation expansion, along with some improvement in corporate profits. The forward P/E has climbed to 18, its highest level in well over a decade. The scope for further expansion is limited. Importantly, if a transition to an earnings-led rally is in the offing, Fed funds expectations likely need to be ratcheted higher. Chart 1 shows that valuation multiples contract during Fed tightening cycles, using cycle-on-cycle analysis. Thus, the valuation expansion is inconsistent with a significant upgrade in the economic and profit outlook, particularly with return on equity so weak (Chart 1). In other words, the economy has good momentum, but that is not translating one for one to the corporate sector. Keep in mind that even a small two P/E multiple point decline requires 11% earnings growth for the market just to hold its ground. That is a tall order given the squeeze on profit margins from labor cost inflation and a strong U.S. dollar. Ironically, high multiples would be more durable if economic data softened enough for the Fed to hold its fire. Against this background, it is not surprising that a stealthy flight to safety has developed, although it is not uniform across asset classes. For instance, gold has outperformed most major currencies (note we recently upgraded the gold shares group as a portfolio hedge); global government yields have eased back while sovereign bond spreads have widened (Chart 2). In the U.S., the economically-sensitive transport group has rolled over in line with the yield curve narrowing (Chart 2), the equity SKEW index remains historically elevated, and a defensive vs. cyclical portfolio bias has outperformed handily since early December (Chart 2, bottom panel), on broad-based non-cyclical sector participation. These shifts, on the margin, signal that some investors are bracing for a bout of volatility. On the flipside, U.S. junk bond spreads have narrowed back to 2014 lows, and emerging market corporate bond spreads are testing similarly tight levels. The global purchasing manager survey recorded yet another monthly gain (Chart 3). Chart 2Contrarian##br##Alert... Chart 3... Defensives Can Outperform##br## When Growth Is Good Ergo, a systemic economic threat is not the main obstacle to further asset price appreciation. Rather, it is that expectations in some assets and sectors have become divorced from reality. Indeed, we have noted for the last two months the disturbing downtrend in bank credit growth and the unprecedented gap between strong 'soft' and pedestrian 'hard' economic data. Mixed economic and financial market messages suggest that any equity turbulence may be marked by a mostly rotational correction rather than a savage drawdown in the broad averages. Still, the latter cannot be ruled out given the high degree of complacency and buoyant profit and economic expectations. It is notable that defensive equities embarked on a massive outperformance phase when both U.S. and EM bond spreads were just as low as they are currently, i.e. they hit 'as good as it gets' levels (Chart 3). Any widening in corporate bond spreads would tighten financial conditions, spurring a slowdown in growth down the road. In sum, the odds of an equity market sweet spot extension beyond the very near run have diminished as a consequence of ongoing strong economic data, which reflects the easing in financial conditions a year ago. In terms of positioning portfolios, there is still a mismatch between developed and developing markets, as measured by the relative ISM indexes (Chart 3, fourth panel). The upshot is that defensives will continue to generate much more cash than their cyclical counterparts (Chart 3, bottom panel), supporting the nascent relative share price recovery. The financial sector could also be due for a correction. Financials And Banks: Where To Next? The global financials sector has cheered the firming in leading economic indicators and back up in bond yields since last autumn, but that celebration is likely drawing to a close. Euro area financials have rolled over, in line with renewed weakness in German government bond yields (Chart 4). Continued slippage in global yields could cap U.S. yields, thereby flattening the yield curve (Chart 5). U.S. financials are much more expensive than their euro area counterparts (Chart 5, bottom panel), suggesting heightened vulnerability. Chart 4Are EMU Financials ##br##Sending A Warning Signal? Chart 5Watch The##br## Yield Curve In our view, the S&P bank index contains the most downside vulnerability, in relative performance terms, of all the financial sector sub-components, especially if regulatory reform disappoints and/or is slow to evolve. True, as outlined in a Special Report published on October 3, 2016, interest rate expectations have a checkered history of predicting bank stock relative performance. When they do drive bank stocks, it is typically because most other profit drivers are lacking, as is currently the case (Chart 5, top panel). This cycle, interest rate spreads have been unduly suppressed by the zero lower bound. Under normal circumstances, when short-term interest rates are well above zero lower bound, banks can target a spread between rates on assets and liabilities. But when the fed funds rate is at zero, the spread is compressed, because banks generally cannot charge customers a penalty implied by negative interest rates on deposits (at least in the U.S.). As the Fed pushes interest rates back upward, banks may be able to return their spreads to their target levels, by raising deposit rates more slowly than loan rates. However, this dynamic has been fully priced in over the last few months and the risk is that higher net interest margins will not offset the lack of credit creation and/or that Fed funds rate expectations will level off if economic data start to disappoint. After all, Chart 6 shows that net interest margins can both widen and narrow when the Fed is hiking interest rates. Moreover, the yield curve is narrowing, after peaking two months ago. If rising fed interest rate expectations are the primary factor driving bank stock performance, then it follows that market expectations must continue to price in a much more hawkish rate environment in order to extend any rally in bank share prices. However, the global credit impulse is still negative, albeit less so, reflecting capital constraints and deleveraging. The Bank of International Settlements global credit impulse indicator has been an excellent leading indicator of relative bank profitability, and it is premature to expect earnings outperformance (Chart 7). U.S. credit data are also inconsistent with a major upshift in Fed funds interest rate expectations. Total loan growth is contracting, led by commercial & industrial loans (Chart 8). Commercial real estate loan growth has also turned lower. Chart 6Net Interest Margins And The Fed Chart 7Don't Chase Without Profit Support Chart 8Shrinking Balance Sheets The most recent Fed Senior Loan Officer Survey showed that banks are tightening lending standards in most categories, with the exception of mortgages (Chart 9). The number of banks reporting increased loan demand has also softened. Since the credit crisis, banks have shifted their balance sheet exposure toward businesses and away from consumers and residential mortgages, underscoring that a decent housing market is unlikely to provide an offset to lackluster corporate credit demand. Only mortgages have experienced an uptick in loan demand and availability of funds (Chart 9). This credit backdrop is not conducive to a much more aggressive Fed, reinforcing that it would be dangerous to discount a sustained and meaningful uptrend in net interest margins. To further confound the bank stock reward/risk profile, bank employment continues to rise steadily (Chart 10), even though balance sheet expansion is no longer a sure thing. We have shown in past Reports that bank stocks have almost always underperformed when bank employment is rising. Chart 9Credit Standars Are Tightening Chart 10Sagging Productivity The current combination of fading credit creation and rising employment has done a number on our bank productivity proxy. The latter is now contracting on a rate of change basis, warning that the expansion in bank stock valuations is due for a squeeze (Chart 10). Bottom Line: The run in bank stocks over the past few months is on the cusp of a reversal, based on the leading message from the euro area, sinking productivity and punk credit demand. Our financial sector preference remains skewed toward areas not dependent on credit creation, such as asset managers. Book Profits In Health Care Facilities We bought the S&P health care facilities index last December after a steep post-election sell-off created a valuation and technical undershoot relative to the fundamental outlook. The doomsday concern was that President Trump would tear up the Affordable Care Act (ACA), potentially leaving millions without insurance: treating the uninsured is the bane of any hospital's existence. At the time of purchase, the 52-week rate of change was diverging positively from the share price ratio after hitting deeply oversold levels, often a harbinger of a playable rally (Chart 11). That was particularly true given an historically high short position. The index has outperformed by 12% since then, encouraged by a jump in analyst net profit revisions following upbeat profit results and guidance from industry heavyweights such as HCA Holdings (Chart 11), and a realization that any ACA action is likely to be more of a rework than a total rebuild. Valuations remain appealing, but a technical breakout above key resistance levels requires increased confidence in the durability of profit outperformance. Is such a phase forthcoming? Our conviction level has decreased a notch. Our concern is primarily revenue based, rather than fear that provisions for doubtful accounts will suddenly deteriorate as a consequence of treating uninsured patients. Instead, the main push from the surge in the insured population and increase in procedures on the back of rising consumer confidence/job security is likely to peter out. Consumer spending on hospitals has already rolled over decisively on a growth rate basis (Chart 12, third panel), and is contracting compared with total consumer spending. The same is true of spending on physician visits. Fewer doctor visits mean a reduction in procedures performed at hospitals. Chart 11Hitting Resistance Chart 12Top-Line Trouble Ahead? Health care is a labor-intensive industry. Health care facilities staff up when they get busy and prune when capacity utilization slips. As such, slowing growth in hospital employment reinforces that patient volume growth is likely to ebb (Chart 12). In fact, the contraction in hospital hours worked signals the same ahead for hospital sales (Chart 12, bottom panel). The good news is that labor costs remain in check, as measured by the employment cost index for hospitals (Chart 13). Other input costs, such as the cost of medical equipment and supplies, have perked up (Chart 13), which may require increased pricing power in order to sustain profit margins. However, the revenue trends noted above suggest that hospitals may not experience a sufficient rise in patient volumes to the extent that restores pricing power to a more solid footing. Chart 14 shows that the consumer price index for hospitals is losing momentum relative to overall inflation. Durable outperformance phases require accelerating relative pricing power, in addition to a cooling in overall economic growth, as proxied by the ISM manufacturing index (see shading, Chart 14). Those conditions provide a durable competitive profit advantage. Chart 13A Mixed Picture For Costs Chart 14Shaky Long-Term Support Chart 15Macro Headwinds In addition, the ideal macro conditions for hospital stocks exist when consumer spending on overall health care services is accelerating relative to total spending. That implies that the providers of health care services have an advantage over those that pay for them, such as insurers. Total medical care spending is steadily decelerating (Chart 15), underscoring that investors are better off targeting investments in other parts of the sector. In sum, the forces required to sustain the oversold rally in the S&P 1500 health care facilities index are losing clout, so we recommend booking profits. Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P 1500 health care facilities index to neutral, locking in a 12% profit since inception in December 2016. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps. Favor growth over value (downgrade alert).

Highlights Since the 1950s, the trends in margins and earnings growth have been one and the same: as profit margins decline, so does earnings growth. The decline in profit margins that began in early 2015 has gone on hiatus for the past two quarters. But this rebound in margins is unlikely to be sustained. However, even if profit margins turn lower on a sustained basis, there is scope for equity returns to stay positive, based on historical precedent. Similar to a broad-based profit margin decline, further currency strength will be an earnings headwind, but not a show-stopper for profit growth. All in all, with forward multiples now at multi-decade highs, there is lots of room for earnings growth to disappoint, but the conditions for an equity bear market are not in place. Feature Equity prices continue to march higher and the S&P 500 made another all-time high last week. Q4 earnings reporting is now nearly complete, with about two-thirds of companies surprising to the upside. According to FactSet, the share of Q4 surprises is below the 5-year average, while the size of surprises (2.9% above the estimate) is also a smaller margin than the "average surprise" in the past five years (Chart 1). Nonetheless, that has not stopped analysts from getting even more bulled up about 2017 earnings. Analysts' consensus for S&P 500 operating earnings is 10.2% for the calendar year, and the forward multiple now stands at 17.5x, its highest level since 2004 (Chart 2). Chart 1Q4 Earnings Surprises: Better, ##br##But Not That Surprising Chart 2Forward P/E At ##br##Decade Highs A 10% rise in earnings within the year would not be an unprecedented move - there are numerous historical re-accelerations of operating earnings of that size. However, it would be unprecedented for earnings growth to move consistently higher over the next year without an upward trend in profit margins. As Charts 3A and 3B shows, the turning points in earnings growth always correspond with turning points in profit margins. True, there have been 13 minor episodes whereby profit margins have declined but earnings growth accelerated. But these periods were very short-lived, never lasting more than three months at a time. In the majority of these episodes, equity investors saw through the blip down in margins; equity prices continued to rally higher and returns for the year were larger than average. Chart 3AProfit Growth And Margins: An Iron Link Chart 3B There have been far more one-quarter episodes whereby earnings growth decelerates and profit margins continue to rise (39 times since 1951). In these cases, equities exhibit below average returns. Chart 4Slow Growth Will Stay A Profit Headwind The key takeaway is that when profit margins and earnings growth temporarily fail to pull in the same direction, investors have tended to focus on earnings growth. However, the caveat to the above analysis is that we rely on data going back to 1951. The current cycle is unique in that potential GDP growth has never been this low (Chart 4). In a low-growth environment, it is harder for volume expansion to compensate for any fall in margins. We believe that understanding the profit margin backdrop in this environment will remain particularly important. The Outlook For Profit Margins The trend in profit margins is determined largely by the relative growth rates of selling prices, compensation and productivity. Unit labor costs (ULC), which is compensation divided by productivity, account for about 60% of production expenses: the ratio of selling price to unit labor costs is a good proxy for profit margins (Chart 5). In terms of the denominator, unit labor costs have been choppy, but have nonetheless been on a rising trend since the beginning of the recovery. Since the early 1990s, unit labor costs tended to rise throughout the business expansion, and then fall sharply once businesses retrenched during recessions. If this cycle follows historical patterns, then unit labor costs could push higher toward 3%. In other words, labor expenses may not accelerate quickly, but it is highly unlikely that profits will benefit from a fall in ULC growth at this stage of the expansion. In a recent Special Report,1 we made the case that the economy is at full employment and there would be cyclical pressure for wages to rise, despite some structural headwinds. We do not anticipate a surge in labor costs, rather a slow creep higher. Chart 5Can Selling Prices ##br##Catch Up To Labor Cost? Chart 6Businesses Will Find It Hard ##br##To Pass On Price Increases Our major concern is whether or not selling prices (i.e. the numerator in our proxy) can keep up with even mild cost pressures. Traditionally, the conditions that allow companies to raise prices are also associated with rising costs of inputs and labor, and higher inflation prompts the Fed to impose monetary restraint. Thus, profit margins - and therefore equity prices - have generally done better when price inflation is low. However, the concern today is that inflation (corporate selling prices) is too low and that it is difficult for firms to pass on rising input costs, i.e. that a margin squeeze occurs because businesses cannot sufficiently pass on rising labor costs, as consumers have become conditioned to entrenched deflation, particularly at the retail level. We have written extensively in recent publications about inflation. Our bias is to expect broad-based inflation (PCE and CPI measures) as well as corporate selling price inflation (i.e. businesses pricing power) to rise slowly this cycle. The key points are as follows: Inflation expectations are extremely well anchored (Chart 6). True, there is a gap that has opened between survey and market-based inflation expectations. But as we explained in our January 9 Weekly Report, there are several reasons why market-based measures are likely overstating the rise in inflation expectations. Even so, these measures remain well below historic averages and continue to signal that even if the trend is up, the rate of inflation remains very benign. If survey-based inflation expectations are correct, then this business cycle could be a mirror opposite of the 1970s/80s. In that cycle, strong inflation expectations became self-fulfilling/self-reinforcing and lead to higher realized inflation. Today, after a long period of fearing deflation and experiencing massive price discounting at the retail level (Chart 6), consumers have become conditioned to expect prices will never go up. Even once the output gap is fully closed, it could take several years for inflation to gain traction. A strong dollar argues for constant drag on 30% of consumer price inflation (i.e. tradable goods and services). This will keep a lid on inflation for the foreseeable future. Overall, wage costs have outpaced pricing power since 2014, with the exception of the prior two quarters. We do not have a strong view on whether profit margins are finally in a sustained mean-reverting phase, but the above framework suggests that due to a very solid anchoring of inflation expectations, businesses could be faced with a tough pricing backdrop much later than is typical in the business cycle. Flat/falling margins are historically not enough to derail the bull market at this stage of the expansion. However, as we highlighted above, equities are now trading at sky-high forward valuations and have become extremely vulnerable to earnings disappointment. What About The Dollar? A frequent question from clients is about the role of the dollar in U.S. earnings and how enthusiastic can one be about earnings growth if the dollar is rising? As our U.S. Equity Strategy team has pointed out in the past, there are two distinct camps on the impact of U.S. dollar strength on equities.2 Bulls believe that dollar strength will depress commodity and import prices, tamping down inflation pressures and allowing the Fed to avoid monetary tightening. Therefore, the net monetary conditions impact will be positive for the U.S., which is a relatively closed economy. Under these conditions, capital would continue to flow into stocks. Bears see the currency as undermining profitability, given that foreign translation will take a hit along with income from foreign affiliates selling into weaker demand abroad (Chart 7). In other words, the rest of the world is exporting deflationary pressures to the U.S. via currency depreciation. This threatens the earnings outlook, particularly relative to still lofty growth expectations. Chart 7Dollar Headwind Our take is somewhere in between these two extremes. It is certainly true that a strong dollar helps contain inflation pressures, and allows for a prolonged business cycle. But as highlighted above, in an economy still struggling to grow much above 2%, inflation pressures are not an overly large concern to begin with. Meanwhile, hedging means that the currency translation effect on financial performance is not immediate. And the impact of any dollar strength surely depends on the conditions under which it is strengthening: dollar strength in a period of weak global growth will be more detrimental to returns than a dollar that is rising due to exceptionally strong domestic conditions. We are currently at neither one of these extremes (Chart 8). Chart 8U.S. And Global Economy: Not Hot, Not Cold Our Bank Credit Analyst service recently presented a matrix of different scenarios for the dollar and economic growth applied to a model for EPS growth. The key finding was that the effect of even small changes in growth assumptions dominate the effect of much larger moves in the dollar. A 10% dollar appreciation from current levels would shave about 2% from profits, assuming no change to the GDP growth outlook. The bottom line is that the recent improvement in margins has helped earnings recover from last year's profit recession. However, it is unlikely that margins have entered a lasting uptrend; firms lack pricing power and the labor market is now tight enough that unit labor costs will rise on a sustained basis. As profit margins trend lower in the coming years, this will present a headwind for profit growth. Similarly, our expectation that the currency will continue to appreciate over the next 12-18 months is a headwind to earnings growth. Current sky-high equity valuations leave little room for these risks. We expect that disappointments will eventually cause an equity price reset, but timing is uncertain. As we wrote last week, technical indicators do not currently suggest an important pullback is imminent. Looking further out, the overall backdrop of slowly building inflation, a go-slow Fed, and a mild pickup in nominal GDP growth, is a positive backdrop for long-term stocks. Lenka Martinek, Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report "U.S. Wage Growth: Paid In Full?", dated November 28, 2016, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Service Special Report, “Equity Sectors And The Soaring U.S. Dollar,” dated November 3, 2014, available at uses.bcaresearch.com

Special Report

Feature Chart I-1Corporate Leverage Situation##br## Has Continued To Improve This week we are updating our China Industry Watch thematic chartpack to present a visual presentation of the changing situation in China's corporate sector, and its relevance to broader stock market performance. Overall, the Chinese corporate sector's financial situation has improved modestly since mid-last year, as measured by BCA's Corporate Health Monitors1 (Box on page 3). The improvement is fairly broad based across sectors, but some highly cyclical sectors have witnessed sharper rebounds. Broadly speaking, several observations can be made (Appendix starting on page 4). First, the Chinese corporate sector's debt situation has improved, both in terms of leverage ratio and debt sustainability. The liabilities-to-asset ratio for all industries has continued to decline (Chart I-1). Even in some highly levered sectors such as coal producers and steelmakers, the debt ratios have rolled over after years of deterioration. Moreover, interest coverage ratio has increased across the board, particularly within the asset-heavy metals and energy sectors, due to a dramatic increase in profits. This stands in stark contrast to widely held concerns among investors over China's corporate leverage situation, discussed in detail in some of our recent Special Reports.2 Meanwhile, profit growth has also accelerated for all sectors due to a combination of higher revenue and wider margins. The profit picture has recovered strongly for coal mines, steelmakers and non-ferrous metals producers from deeply depressed starting points. The government's supply-side constraints on these sectors in the past year reduced production, which together with recovering demand led to a massive increase in prices and a drastic recovery in profitability. Profitability for most other sectors has also risen, albeit more moderately. In terms of efficiency, inventory turnover has improved across most industries, underscoring the de-stocking process of the corporate sector. Asset turnover has also stopped deteriorating, while there has not been much recovery in receivable turnover ratios in most industries. However, enterprise surveys have shown some notable improvement in fund turnover of late, which we suspect will soon show up in corporate financial statements (Chart I-2). Overall, our efficiency measures are showing some encouraging signs. Finally, the growth rate of total assets of all firms has continued to decelerate, consistent with the weak fixed asset investment (FAI) figures in recent years (Chart I-3). Decelerating asset growth is visible across the board, but is most pronounced in mining- and manufacturing-related sectors such as coal mines, metals producers and machinery manufacturers. The sharp turnaround in profitability and improving corporate health should begin to support capital spending in these sectors, which will likely support investment in the overall economy.3 Chart I-2Receivable Turnover Is On The Mend Chart I-3Capital Spending Slowdown Has Become Advanced BCA China Industry Watch includes four categories of financial ratios to monitor a sector's leverage, profitability, growth and efficiency, respectively. Some of these ratios, as shown in Table I-1, are slightly tweaked from conventional definitions due to data availability. The financial data in our exercise are from the official statistics on overall industrial firms, of which the listed companies are a subset, but most financial ratios based on the two sets of data are very similar, especially for the heavy industries that dominate the Chinese stock markets - both onshore and offshore. The financial ratios on leverage, growth and profitability are almost identical for some sectors, while some other sectors that are not well represented in the stock market, such as technology, healthcare and consumer sectors, show notable divergences. As the Chinese equity universe continues to expand, we expect that the two sets of data will increasingly converge. Table I-1The China Industry Watch Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Introducing The BCA China Industry Watch," dated February 10, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Reports, "Chinese Deleveraging? What Deleveraging!" dated June 15, 2016, and "Rethinking Chinese Leverage," dated October 27, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Be Aware Of China's Fiscal Tightening," dated February 16, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Appendix: China Industry Watch All Firms Chart II-1, Chart II-2, Chart II-3, Chart II-4, Chart II-5, Chart II-6 Chart II-1Non-Financial Firms: ##br##Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart II-2Non-Financial Firms: ##br##Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart II-3Non-Financial Firms: Leverage Indicators Chart II-4Non-Financial Firms: Growth Indicators Chart II-5Non-Financial Firms: Profitability Indicators Chart II-6Non-Financial Firms: Efficiency Indicators Oil&Gas Sector Chart II-7, Chart II-8, Chart II-9, Chart II-10, Chart II-11, Chart II-12 Chart II-7Oil&Gas Sector: ##br##Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart II-8Oil&Gas Sector:##br## Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart II-9Oil&Gas Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart II-10Oil&Gas Sector: Growth Indicators Chart II-11Oil&Gas Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart II-12Oil&Gas Sector: Efficiency Indicators Coal Sector Chart II-13, Chart II-14, Chart II-15, Chart II-16, Chart II-17, Chart II-18 Chart II-13Coal Sector: ##br##Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart II-14Coal Sector: ##br##Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart II-15Coal Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart II-16Coal Sector: Growth Indicators Chart II-17Coal Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart II-18Coal Sector: Efficiency Indicators Steel Sector Chart II-19, Chart II-20, Chart II-21, Chart II-22, Chart II-23, Chart II-24 Chart II-19Steel Sector: ##br##Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart II-20Steel Sector: ##br##Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart II-21Steel Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart II-22Steel Sector: Growth Indicators Chart II-23Steel Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart II-24Steel Sector: Efficiency Indicators Non Ferrous Metals Sector Chart II-25, Chart II-26, Chart II-27, Chart II-28, Chart II-29, Chart II-30 Chart II-25Non Ferrous Metals Sector: ##br##Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart II-26Non Ferrous Metals Sector: ##br##Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart II-27Non Ferrous Metals Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart II-28Non Ferrous Metals Sector: Growth Indicators Chart II-29Non Ferrous Metals Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart II-30Non Ferrous Metals Sector: Efficiency Indicators Construction Material Sector Chart II-31, Chart II-32, Chart II-33, Chart II-34, Chart II-35, Chart II-36 Chart II-31Construction Material Sector: ##br##Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart II-32Construction Material Sector: ##br##Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart II-33Construction Material Sector: ##br##Leverage Indicators Chart II-34Construction Material Sector: ##br##Growth Indicators Chart II-35Construction Material Sector: ##br##Profitability Indicators Chart II-36Construction Material Sector:##br## Efficiency Indicators Machinery Sector Chart III-37, Chart III-38, Chart III-39, Chart III-40, Chart III-41, Chart III-42 Chart III-37Machinery Sector: ##br##Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart III-38Machinery Sector: ##br##Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart III-39Machinery Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart III-40Machinery Sector: Growth Indicators Chart III-41Machinery Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart III-42Machinery Sector: Efficiency Indicators Automobile Sector Chart III-43, Chart III-44, Chart III-45, Chart III-46, Chart III-47, Chart III-48 Chart III-43Automobile Sector: ##br##Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart III-44Automobile Sector: ##br##Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart III-45Automobile Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart III-46Automobile Sector: Growth Indicators Chart III-47Automobile Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart III-48Automobile Sector: Efficiency Indicators Food&Beverage Sector Chart III-49, Chart III-50, Chart III-51, Chart III-52, Chart III-53, Chart III-54 Chart III-49Food&Beverage Sector: ##br##Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart III-50Food&Beverage Sector:##br## Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart III-51Food&Beverage Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart III-52Food&Beverage Sector: Growth Indicators Chart III-53Food&Beverage Sector: ##br##Profitability Indicators Chart III-54Food&Beverage Sector:##br## Efficiency Indicators Information Technology Sector Chart III-55, Chart III-56, Chart III-57, Chart III-58, Chart III-59, Chart III-60 Chart III-55Information Technology Sector: ##br##Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart III-56Information Technology Sector: ##br##Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart III-57Information Technology Sector: ##br##Leverage Indicators Chart III-58Information Technology Sector: ##br##Growth Indicators Chart III-59Information Technology Sector: ##br##Profitability Indicators Chart III-60Information Technology Sector: ##br##Efficiency Indicators Utilities Sector Chart III-61, Chart III-62, Chart III-63, Chart III-64, Chart III-65, Chart III-66 Chart III-61Utilities Sector: ##br##Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart III-62Utilities Sector: ##br##Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart III-63Utilities Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart III-64Utilities Sector: Growth Indicators Chart III-65Utilities Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart III-66Utilities Sector: Efficiency Indicators Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Bank Credit Analyst

Highlights Nervousness and uncertainty abound within the investment community, but greed is overwhelming fear as the U.S. equity market breaks out and other stock markets test the upside. Technical conditions are stretched and a correction is overdue, but investors can at least take some comfort that earnings are rebounding and that the economic data are surprising to the upside. Upbeat leading indicators and survey data are now being reflected in a synchronized upturn of the "hard" economic data across the major economies. History shows that the risk of recession increases when the U.S. unemployment rate falls below its full employment level. Nonetheless, for extended "slow burn" expansions like the current one, inflation pressure accumulates only slowly. These late cycle phases can last for years and can be rewarding for equity investors. Stock markets are also benefiting from an earnings recovery from last year's profit recession in some of the major economies. Importantly, it is not just an energy story and is occurring even in the U.S., where companies are dealing with a strong dollar. The U.S. Administration and Congressional Republicans are considering some radical changes to the tax code and not all of them are positive for risk assets. The probability of a watered-down border tax being passed as part of a broader tax reform package is higher than the market believes. Overall, tax reform should be positive for growth and profits in the medium term, but is likely to cause near-term turbulence in financial markets. Eurozone breakup risk has re-entered investors' radar screen. Most of the political events this year will end up being red herrings. However, we are quite concerned about Italy, where support for the euro is slipping. Our Duration Checklist supports our short-duration recommendation. The FOMC will hike three times this year, while the European Central Bank and the Bank of England will adopt a more hawkish tone later in 2017 (assuming no political hiccups). The policy divergence backdrop remains positive for the U.S. dollar. Technical and valuation concerns will be a headwind, but will not block another 5-10% appreciation. The Trump Administration is very limited in its ability to engineer a weaker dollar. The robust upturn in the economic and profit data keeps us positive on the stock-to-bond total return ratio for the near term. Investors should maintain an overweight allocation to stocks versus bonds within global portfolios. The backdrop could become rockier in the second half of the year. We will be watching political trends in Italy, our leading economic indicators, and U.S. core inflation for a signal to trim risk. Feature U.S. equity markets have broken out and stock indexes in the other major markets are flirting with the top end of their respective trading ranges. Nervousness and uncertainty abound within the investment community, but greed is overwhelming fear. The latter is highlighted by the fact that our Complacency-Anxiety Indictor hit a new high for the cycle (Chart I-1). Chart I-1Complacency Indicator Signals Equity Vulnerability It is disconcerting that there has been no 15-20% equity correction for six years and that technical conditions are stretched. Nonetheless, investors can at least take some comfort that earnings are rebounding and that the economic data are surprising to the upside. As we highlight in this month's Special Report, beginning on page 22, upbeat leading indicators and survey data are now being reflected in a synchronized upturn of the "hard" economic data across the major economies. The economic and profit data are thus providing stocks with a solid tailwind at the moment. Unfortunately, the noise surrounding the Trump/GOP fiscal policy agenda is no less than it was a month ago. Investors are also dealing with another bout of euro breakup jitters ahead of upcoming elections. While most of the European pressure points will turn out to be red herrings in our view, Italy is worrisome (see below). Investors are also concerned that, even if the geopolitical risks fade and Trump's protectionist proposals get watered down, the U.S. is nearing full employment. This means that any growth acceleration this year could show up in rising U.S. wages, a more aggressive Fed and a margin squeeze. In other words, the benefits of growth could go to Main Street rather than to Wall Street. This month we research past cycles to shed some light on this concern. We remain overweight stocks versus bonds, but are watching Italy's political situation, U.S. core inflation and our leading economic indicators for signs to take profits. On a positive note, we are not concerned that the U.S. is "due" for a recession just because it has reached full employment. Late Cycle Economic And Equity Dynamics Previous economic cycles are instructive regarding the recession and margin pressure concerns. In our December 2016 issue, we presented some research in which we split U.S. post-1950 economic cycles into three sets based on the length of the expansion phase: short (about 2 years), medium (4-6 years) and long (8-10 years). What distinguishes short from medium and long expansions is the speed at which the most cyclical parts of the economy accelerated, and the time it took unemployment to reach a full employment level. Long expansions were characterized by a drawn-out rise in the cyclical parts of the economy and a very slow return to full employment, similar to what has occurred since the Great Recession. Chart I-2 and Chart I-3 compare the current cycle to the average of two of the long cycles (the 1980s and the 1990s). We excluded the long-running 1960s expansion because the Fed delayed far too long and fell well behind the inflation curve. Chart I-2Long Expansion Comparison (I) Chart I-3Long Expansion Comparison (II) We define the 'late cycle' phase to be the time period from when the economy first reached full employment to the subsequent recession (shaded portions in Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). The average late-cycle phase for these two expansions lasted almost four years, highlighting that reaching full employment does not necessarily mean that a recession is imminent. Some studies have demonstrated that the probability of recession rises once full employment is reached. We agree with this conclusion when looking across all the post-war cycles.1 However, recessions are almost always triggered by Fed tightening into rising inflationary pressures. Such pressures are slower to emerge in 'slow burn' recoveries, allowing the Fed to proceed gradually. The Fed waited an average of 25 months to tighten policy after reaching full employment in these two long expansions, in part because core CPI inflation was roughly flat (not shown). Wage growth accelerated in both cases, but healthy productivity growth kept unit labor costs in check. The result was an extended late-cycle phase that allowed profits to continue growing. Earnings-per-share for S&P 500 companies expanded by an average of 18% in inflation-adjusted terms during the two late-cycle phases, despite the twin headwinds of narrowing profit margins and a strengthening dollar (the dollar appreciated by an average of 23% in trade-weighted terms). The stock market provided an impressive average real return of 25%. Of course, no two cycles are the same. Both the 1980s and 1990s included a financial crisis in the second half that interrupted the Fed's tightening timetable, which likely extended the expansion phases (the 1987 crash and the 1998 LTCM financial crisis). Today, unit labor costs are under control, but wage and productivity growth rates are significantly lower. The implication is that nominal GDP is expanding at a significantly slower underlying pace in this cycle, limiting the upside for top line growth in the coming years. In terms of valuation, stocks are more expensive today than they were in the second half of the 1980s. Stocks were even more expensive in the late 1990s, but that provides little comfort because the market had entered the 'tech bubble' that did not end well. We are not making the case that the current late-cycle phase will be as long or rewarding for equity holders as it was for the two previous slow-burn expansions. Indeed, fiscal stimulus this year could lead to overheating and a possible recession in late 2018 or 2019. Our point is that reaching full employment does not condemn the equity market to flat or negative returns. Indeed, the previous cycles highlight that earnings growth can be decent even with the twin headwinds of narrowing margins and a strengthening dollar. The Earnings Mini-Cycle Another factor that distinguishes the current late-cycle phase from the previous two is that the main equity markets endured an earnings recession last year that did not coincide with an economic recession. Since the mid-1980s, there have been three similar episodes (shaded periods in Chart I-4). Bottom-up analysts failed to see the profit recession coming in each case, such that actual EPS fell well short of expectations set 12 months before (the 12-month forward EPS is shown with a 12-month lag to facilitate comparison). In each case, forward EPS estimates trended sideways while actual profits contracted. Chart I-4Market Dynamics During Previous Profit Recessions (But No Economic Recession) This was followed by a recovery in profit growth that eventually closed the gap again between actual and (lagged) 12-month forward EPS. This 'catch up' phase coincided with some multiple expansion and a total return to the S&P 500 of about 8% in the late 1990s and 20% in 2013/14.2 The starting point for the forward P/E is elevated today, which means that double-digit returns may be out of reach. Nonetheless, stocks are likely to outperform bonds on a 6-12 month view. A Bird's Eye View Of The Trump Agenda The U.S. Administration and Congressional Republicans are considering some radical changes to the tax code and not all of them are positive for risk assets. We have no doubt that some sort of tax bill will be passed in 2017. The GOP faces few constraints to cutting corporate taxes and there is every reason to believe it will occur quickly. The major question is whether a broader tax reform will be passed. Trying to understand all the moving parts to tax reform is a daunting task. In order to simplify things, Table I-1 lists the main policies that are being considered, along with the economic and financial consequences of each. Some policies on their own, such as ending interest deductibility, would be negative for the economy and risk assets. However, the top three items in the table will likely be combined if a broad tax reform package is passed. Together, these three items define a destination-based cash-flow tax, which some Republicans would like to replace the existing corporate income tax. The aim is to promote domestic over foreign production, stimulate capital spending and remove a bias in the tax system that favors imports over exports. Table I-1A Bird's Eye View Of The Implications Of The Trump/GOP Fiscal Policy Agenda Table I-1A Bird's Eye View Of The Implications Of The Trump/GOP Fiscal Policy Agenda Perhaps the most controversial aspect is the border-adjustment tax (BAT), which would tax the value added of imports and rebate the tax that exporters pay. We will not get into the details of the BAT here, but interested readers should see two recent BCA reports for more details.3 The implications of the BAT for the economy and financial markets depend importantly on the dollar's response. In theory, the dollar would appreciate by enough to offset the tax paid by importers and the tax advantage gained by exporters, leaving the trade balance and the distribution of after-tax corporate profits in the economy largely unchanged. This is because a full dollar adjustment would nullify the subsidy on exports, while reducing import costs by precisely the amount necessary to restore importers' after-tax profits. A 20% border tax, for example, would require an immediate 25% jump in the dollar to level the playing field. In reality, much depends on how the Fed and other countries respond to the BAT. We believe the dollar's rise would be less than fully offsetting, but would still appreciate by a non-trivial 10% in the event of a 20% border tax. If the dollar's adjustment is only partially offsetting, then it would have the effect of boosting exports and curtailing imports, thereby adding to GDP growth and overall corporate profits. It would make it more attractive for U.S. multinational firms to produce in the U.S., rather than produce elsewhere and export to the U.S. A partial dollar adjustment would also be inflationary because import prices would rise. The smaller the dollar appreciation, the more inflationary the impact. The result would be dollar strength coinciding with higher Treasury yields, breaking the typical pattern in recent years. The impact on the U.S. equity market is trickier. To the extent that dollar strength is not fully offsetting, then the resulting economic boost will lift corporate earnings indirectly. However, the BAT will reduce after-tax profits directly. One risk is that the FOMC slams the brakes on the economy in the face of rising inflation. Another is that, with the economy already operating close to full employment, faster growth might be reflected in accelerating wage inflation that eats into profit margins. However, our sense is that the labor market is not tight enough to immediately spark cost-push inflation. As noted above, it usually takes some time for wage inflation to get a head of steam once the labor market gap is closed in a slow-burn expansion. Full employment is not a hard threshold beyond which the economy suddenly changes. Moreover, the Phillips curve has been quite flat in this recovery, suggesting that it will require significant levels of excess demand to move the dial on inflation. More likely, a slow upward creep in core PCE inflation will allow the Fed to err on the side of caution. Unintended Consequences There are a number of risks and unintended consequences associated with the border tax. One major drawback of the BAT is that, to the extent that the dollar appreciates, it reduces the dollar value of the assets that Americans hold abroad. We estimate that a 25% appreciation, for example, would impose a whopping paper loss of about 13% of GDP. Moreover, a partial dollar adjustment could devastate the profits of importers, while generating a substantial negative tax rate for exporters. It would also be disruptive to multinational supply chains and to the structure of corporate balance sheets (debt becomes more expensive relative to equity finance). Partial dollar adjustment would also be bad news for countries that rely heavily on exports to the U.S. to drive growth, especially emerging economies that have piled up a lot of dollar-denominated debt. An EM crisis cannot be ruled out. Finally, it is unclear whether or not a border tax is consistent with World Trade Organization Rules. At a minimum, it will be seen as a protectionist act by America's trading partners and could trigger a trade war. President Trump has sent conflicting views on the BAT and there has been a wave of criticism from sectors that will lose from such legislation. However, the House GOP leaders signaled a greater flexibility in drafting the law so as to win over various stakeholders. Our Geopolitical Strategy team believes that Trump will ultimately hew to the Republican Party leadership on tax reform, largely because his protectionist and mercantilist vision is fundamentally aligned with the chief aims of the BAT. Critics will be won over by the use of carve-outs and/or phased implementation for key imports like food, fuel and clothing. Interestingly, the sectors that suffer the most from the import tax also tend to pay higher effective tax rates and thus stand to benefit from the rate cuts (Chart I-5). Finally, the BAT would raise revenue that can be used to offset the corporate tax cuts, helping to sell the package to Republican deficit hawks. Chart I-5Cuts In Tax Rates Mitigate A New Import Tax Somewhat But even if the border adjustment never sees the light of day, there will certainly be tax cuts for both corporations and households, along with specific add-ons to deal with concerns like corporate inversions and un-repatriated corporate cash held overseas. An infrastructure plan and cuts to other discretionary non-defense government spending also have a high probability, although the amounts involved may be small. An outsourcing tax has a significant, though less than 50%, chance of occurring in the absence of a border tax. On its own, an outsourcing tax would be negative for growth, profits and equity returns. We place a 50/50 chance on a broad tax reform package that includes the border adjustment. We believe that a broad tax reform package will ultimately be positive for the bottom line for the corporate sector as a whole, although unintended consequences will complicate the path to higher stock prices. Eurozone: Breakup Risk Resurfaces Investors have lots to consider on the other side of the Atlantic as well. The European election timetable is packed and plenty is at stake. Could we see a wave of populism generate game-changing political turmoil in the E.U., as occurred in the U.S. and U.K.? Our geopolitical strategists believe that European risks are largely red-herrings for 2017. Investors are overestimating most of the inherent risks:4 In the Netherlands, the Euroskeptic Party for Freedom is set to capture about 30 out of 150 seats in the March election. However, that is not enough to win a majority. Dutch support for the euro is at a very high level, while voters lack confidence in the country's future outside of the EU. Support for the euro is also elevated in France, limiting the chance that Le Pen will win the upcoming presidential election. Even if she is somehow elected, it is unlikely that she would command a majority of the National Assembly. Exiting the Eurozone and EU would necessitate changing the constitution, possibly requiring a referendum that Le Pen would likely lose. That said, these constraints may not be clear to investors, sparking a market panic if Le Pen wins the election. The German public is not very Euroskeptic either and anti-euro parties are nowhere close to governing. Markets may take a Merkel loss at the hands of the SPD negatively at first. However, the new SPD Chancellor candidate, Martin Schulz, is even more supportive of the euro than Merkel and he would be less insistent on fiscal austerity in the Eurozone. A handover of power to Schulz would ultimately be positive for European stocks. The Catlan independence referendum in September could cause knee-jerk ripples as well. Nonetheless, without recognition from Spain, and no support from EU and NATO member states, Catlonia cannot win independence with a referendum alone. Greece faces a €7 billion payment in July, by which time the funding must be released or the government will run out of cash. The IMF refuses to be involved in any deal that condones Greece's unsustainable debt path. If a crisis emerges, the likely outcome would be early elections. While markets may not like the prospect of an election, the pro-euro and pro-EU New Democratic Party (NDP) is polling well above SYRIZA. The NDP would produce a stable, pro-reform government that would be positive for growth and financial markets. It is a different story in Italy, where an election will occur either in the autumn or early in 2018. Support for the common currency continues to plumb multi-decade lows, while Italian confidence in life outside the EU is perhaps the greatest on the continent (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). Euroskeptic parties are gaining in popularity as well. The possibility of a referendum on the euro, were a Euroskeptic coalition to win, would obviously be very negative for risk assets in Europe and around the world. Chart I-6Italians Turning Against The Euro Chart I-7Italians Confident In Life Outside The EU The implication is that most of the risks posed by European politics should cause no more than temporary volatility. The main exception is Italy. We will be watching the Italian polls carefully in the coming months, but we believe that the widening in French/German bond spreads presents investors with a short-term opportunity to bet on narrowing.5 Bond Bear Market Is Intact These geopolitical concerns and uncertainty over President Trump's policy priorities put the cyclical bond bear market on hold early in the New Year, despite continued positive economic surprises. Even Fed Chair Yellen's hawkish tone in her recent Congressional testimony failed to move long-term Treasury yields sustainably higher, after warning that "waiting too long to remove accommodation would be unwise." In the money markets, expectations priced into the overnight index swap curve have returned to levels last seen on the day of the December 2016 FOMC meeting (Chart I-8). The market is priced for 53 basis points of rate increases between now and the end of the year, with a 26% chance that the next rate hike occurs in March. March is too early to expect the next FOMC rate hike. One reason is that core PCE inflation has been stuck near 1.7% and we believe it will rise only slowly in the coming months. Even though the strong January core CPI print seemed to strengthen the case for a March hike, the details of the report show that only a few components accounted for most of the gains. In fact, our CPI diffusion index fell even further below the zero line. With both our CPI and PCE diffusion indexes in negative territory, inflation may even soften temporarily in the coming months. This would take some heat off of the FOMC (Chart I-9). Chart I-8Fed Rate Expectations Shift Toward Dots Chart I-9U.S. Inflation May Soften Temporarily Second, Fed policymakers will want to see how the Trump policy agenda shakes out in the next few months before moving. We still expect three rate hikes this year, beginning in June. The stance of central bank policy is on our Duration Checklist, as set out by BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy service (Table I-2). We will not go through all the items on the checklist, but interested readers are encouraged to see our Special Report.6 Table I-2Stay Bearish On Bonds Naturally, leading and coincident indicators for global growth feature prominently in the Checklist. And, as we highlight in this month's Special Report, a synchronized global growth acceleration is underway that is broadly based across economies, consumer and business sectors, and manufacturing and services industries. Our indicators for private spending suggest that real GDP growth in the major countries accelerated sharply between 2016Q3 and the first quarter of 2017, to well above a trend pace. In the Euro Area, jobless rate has been declining quickly and reached 9.6% in January, the lowest level in nearly eight years. Even if economic growth is only 1½% in 2017 (i.e. below our base case), the unemployment rate could reach 9% by year-end, which would be close to full employment. Core inflation already appears to be bottoming and broad disinflationary pressures are abating. When the ECB re-evaluates its asset purchase program around the middle of this year, policymakers could be faced with rising inflation and an economy that has exhausted most of its excess slack. At that point, possibly around September, ECB members will begin to hint that the asset purchases will be tapered at the beginning of 2018. Moreover, the annual growth rate of the ECB's balance sheet will peak by around mid-year and then trend lower (Chart I-10). This inflection point, along with expectations that the ECB will taper further in 2018, will place upward pressure on both European and global bond yields. The Bank of England (BoE) may become more hawkish as well. At the February BoE meeting, policymakers re-iterated that they are willing to look through a temporary overshoot of the inflation target that is related to pass-through from the weak pound and higher oil prices. However, the BoE has its limits. The Statement warned that tighter policy may be necessary if wage growth accelerates and/or consumer spending growth does not moderate in line with the BoE's projection. In the absence of Brexit-related shocks, the BoE is unlikely to see the growth slowdown it is expecting, given healthy Eurozone economic activity and the stimulus provided by the weak pound. Investors should remain positioned for Gilt underperformance of global currency-hedged benchmarks (Chart I-11). Chart I-10Bond Strategy And ##br## The ECB Balance Sheet Chart I-11Gilts To Underperform Outside of central bank policy, a majority of items on the Duration Checklist are checked at the moment, indicating that investors with a 3-12 month view should maintain below-benchmark duration within bond portfolios. That said, technical conditions are a headwind to higher yields in the very near term. Oversold conditions and heavy short positioning suggest that yields will have a tough time rising quickly as the market continues to consolidate last year's sharp selloff. Can Trump Force Dollar Weakness? Chart I-12Trump Can't Weaken ##br## Dollar With Tweets For Long The U.S. dollar appears to have recently decoupled from shifts in both nominal and real interest rate differentials this year (Chart I-12). The dollar is expensive, but we do not believe that valuation is a barrier to an extended overshoot given the backdrop of diverging monetary policies between the U.S. and the other major central banks. The dollar's recent stickiness appears to be driven by recent comments from the new Administration that the previous 'strong dollar' policy is a relic of the past. Let us put aside for the moment the fact that expansionary fiscal policy, higher import tariffs and/or a border tax would likely push the dollar even higher. "Tweeting" that the U.S. now has a 'weak dollar' policy will have little effect beyond the near term. A lasting dollar depreciation would require changes in the underlying macro fundamentals and policies. President Trump would have to do one of the following: Force the Fed to ease policy rather than tighten. However, the impact may be short-lived because accelerating inflation would soon force the Fed to tighten aggressively. Convince the other major central banks to tighten their monetary policies at a faster pace than the Fed (principally, the People's Bank of China, the BoJ, the ECB, Banco de Mexico, and the Bank of Canada). Again, the impact on the dollar would be fleeting because premature tightening in any of these economies would undermine growth and investors would conclude that policy tightening is unsustainable. Convince these same countries to implement very expansionary fiscal policies. This has a better chance of sustainably suppressing the dollar, but foreign policy would have to be significantly more stimulative than U.S. fiscal policy. The U.S. Administration will not be able to force the Fed's hand or convince other countries to change tack. President Trump has an opportunity to stack the FOMC with doves if he wishes next year, given so many vacant positions. Nonetheless, Trump's public pronouncements on monetary policy have generally been hawkish. It will be difficult for him to make a complete U-turn on the subject, especially since Congressional Republicans would likely resist. This means that the path of least resistance for the dollar remains up. Dollar valuation is stretched and market technicals are a headwind to the rally. However, valuation signals in the currency market have a poor track record at making money on a less than 2-year horizon. The dollar is currently about 8% overvalued by our measure, which is far from the 20-25% overvaluation level that would justify short positions on valuation grounds alone (Chart I-13). What is more concerning for dollar bulls is that there is near universal unanimity on the trade. Nonetheless, both sentiment and net speculative positions are not nearly as stretched as they were at the top of the Clinton USD bull market (Chart I-14). Moreover, it took six years of elevated bullishness and long positioning to prompt the end of the bull market in 2002. We believe that the dollar will appreciate by another 5-to-10% in real trade-weighted terms by the end of the year, despite lopsided market positioning. The appreciation will be even greater if a border tax is implemented. Chart I-13Dollar is Overvalued, But Far From an Extreme Chart I-14In The 1990s, The Concensus Was Right Conclusions Many investors, including us, have been expecting an equity market correction for some time. But the longer that the market goes without a correction, the "fear of missing out" forces more investors to throw in the towel and buy. This market backdrop means that now is not the best time to commit fresh money to stocks, but we would not recommend taking profits either. On a positive note, the U.S. economy is not poised on the edge of recession just because it has reached full employment. Indeed, a synchronized growth acceleration is underway across the major countries that is broadly based across industries. Inflationary pressure is building only slowly in the U.S., which gives the Fed room to maneuver. Moreover, the Trump Administration has not labelled China a currency manipulator, and has sounded more conciliatory toward NATO and the European Union in recent days. This is all good news, but the direction of U.S. fiscal policy remains highly uncertain. Moreover, investors must navigate a host of geopolitical landmines in Europe this year, most important of which is an Italian election that may occur in the autumn. The ECB and the BoE will likely become more hawkish in tone later this year. The impressive upturn in the economic and profit data keeps us positive on the stock-to-bond total return ratio for the near term. Investors should maintain an overweight allocation to stocks versus bonds within global portfolios. The backdrop could become rockier for risk assets in the second half of the year. We will be watching political trends in Italy, our leading economic indicators, and U.S. core inflation among other factors for a signal to trim risk. Our other recommendations include: Maintain below-benchmark duration within bond portfolios. Overweight Eurozone government bonds relative to the U.S. and U.K. in currency-hedged portfolios. Overweight European and Japanese equities versus the U.S. in currency-hedged portfolios. Be defensively positioned within equity sectors to temper the risk associated with overweighting stocks versus bonds. In U.S. equities, maintain a preference for exporting companies over those that rely heavily on imports. Overweight investment-grade corporate bonds relative to government issues, but stay underweight high-yield where value is very stretched. Within European government bond portfolios, continue to avoid the Periphery in favor of the core markets. Fade the widening in French/German spreads. Overweight the dollar relative to the other major currencies. Stay cautious on EM bonds, stocks and currencies. Overweight small cap stocks versus large in the U.S. market, on expected policy changes that will disproportionately favor small companies. We are bullish on oil prices in absolute terms on a 12-month horizon, and recommend favoring this commodity relative to base metals. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst February 23, 2017 Next Report: March 30, 2017 1 Indeed, this must be true by definition. 2 The S&P 500 contracted during 1987 because of the market crash. 3 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy "U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue for 2017," dated January 20, 2017. Also see: BCA Geopolitical Strategy "Will Congress Pass The Border Adjustment Tax?", dated February 8, 2017. 4 Please see Global Political Strategy Special Report, "Climbing The Wall Of Worry In Europe," dated February 15, 2017. 5 Please see Global Political Strategy Special Report, "Our Views On French Government Bonds," dated February 7, 2017. 6 Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "A Duration Checklist For U.S. Treasurys And German Bunds," dated February 15, 2017. II. Global Growth Pickup: Fact Or Fiction? Risk assets have discounted a lot of good economic news. There is concern that the growth impulse evident in surveys of business activity and confidence has been slow to show up clearly in the "hard" economic data related to final demand. If the optimism displayed in the survey data is simply reflecting "hope" for less government red tape, tax cuts and infrastructure spending in the U.S., then risk assets are highly vulnerable to policy disappointment. After a deep dive into the economic data for the major countries, we have little doubt that a tangible growth acceleration is underway. Momentum in job creation has ebbed, but retail sales, industrial production and capital spending are all showing more dynamism in the advanced economies. Evidence of improving activity is broadly-based across countries and industrial sectors (including services). Orders and production are gaining strength for goods related to both business and household final demand. Inventory rebuilding will add to growth this year, but this is not the main story. The energy revival is not the main driver either. Indeed, energy production has lagged the overall pick-up in industrial production growth. The bottom line is that investors should not dismiss the improved tone to the global economic data as mere "hope". Our models, based largely on survey data, point to a significant acceleration in G7 real GDP growth in early 2017. Our sense is that 'animal spirits' are finally beginning to stir, following many years of caution and retrenchment. A return of animal spirits could prolong a period of robust growth, even if President Trump's growth-boosting policies are delayed or largely offset by spending cuts. This economic backdrop is positive for risk assets and bearish for bonds. Admittedly, however, we cannot point to concrete evidence that this current cyclical upturn will be any more resilient and enduring than previous mini-cycles in this lackluster expansion. Much depends on U.S. policy and European politics in 2017. The so-called Trump reflation trades lost momentum in January, but the dollar and equity indexes are on the rise again as we go to press. A lot of recent volatility is related to the news flow out of Washington, as investors gauge whether President Trump will prioritize the growth-enhancing aspects of his policy agenda over the ones that will hinder economic activity. Much is at stake because it appears that risk assets have discounted a lot of good economic news. Investors have taken some comfort from the fact that leading indicators are trending up across most of the Developed Markets (DM) and Emerging Markets (EM) economies. In the major advanced economies, only the Australian leading indicator is not above the boom/bust mark and rising. Our Global Leading Economic Indicator is trending higher and it will climb further in the coming months given that its diffusion index is well above 50 (Chart II-1). The Global ZEW indicator and the BCA Boom/Bust growth indicator are also constructive on the growth outlook (although the former ticked down in February). Consumers and business leaders are feeling more upbeat as well, both inside and outside of the U.S. (Chart II-2). The improvement in sentiment began before the U.S. election. Surveys of business activity, such as the Purchasing Managers Surveys (PMI), are painting a uniformly positive picture for near-term global output in both the manufacturing and service industries. Chart II-1A Consistent, Positive ##br## Message On Growth Chart II-2Surging Confidence, ##br## Production Following Suit While this is all good news for risk assets, there is concern that a growth impulse has been slow to show up clearly in the "hard" economic data related to final demand. Could it be that the bounce in confidence is simply based on faith that U.S. fiscal policy will be the catalyst for a global growth acceleration? Could it be that, beyond this hope, there is really nothing else to support a brighter economic outlook? Is it the case that the improved tone in the survey data only reflects the end of an inventory correction and a rebound in energy production? If the answer is 'yes' to any of these questions, then equity and corporate bond markets are highly vulnerable to U.S. policy disappointment. This month we take deep dive into the economic data for the major economies. The good news is that there is more to the cyclical upturn than hope, inventories or energy production. The improved tone in the forward-looking data is now clearly showing up in measures of final demand. The caveat is that there is no evidence yet that the cyclical mini up-cycle in 2017 is any less vulnerable to negative shocks than was the case in previous upturns since the Great Recession. The Hard Data First, the bad news. There has been a worrying loss of momentum in job creation, although the data releases lag by several months in the U.K. and the Eurozone, making it difficult to get an overall read on payrolls into year-end (Charts II-3 and II-4).1 Job gains have accelerated in recent months in Japan, Canada and Australia. The payroll slowdown is mainly evident in the U.S. and U.K. This may reflect supply constraints as both economies are near full employment, but it is difficult to determine whether it is supply or demand-related. The good news is that the employment component of the global PMI has rebounded sharply following last year's dip, suggesting that the pace of job creation will soon turn up. Chart II-3Global Employment Growth Cooling Off (I) Chart II-4Global Employment Growth Cooling Off (II) On the positive side, households are opening their wallets a little wider according to the retail sales data (Chart II-5 and Chart II-6). Year-over-year growth of a weighted average of nominal retail sales for the major advanced economies (AE) has accelerated to about 3%, and the 3-month rate of change has surged to 8%. Sales growth has accelerated sharply in all the major economies except Australia. The retail picture is less impressive in volume terms given the recent pickup in headline inflation, but the consumer spending backdrop is nonetheless improving. The major exception is the U.K., where inflation-adjusted retail sales have lost momentum in recent months. Chart II-5On Your Mark, Get Set, Shop!! (I) Chart II-6On Your Mark, Get Set, Shop!! (II) Similarly, business capital spending is finally showing some signs of life following a rocky 2015 and early 2016. An aggregate of Japanese, German and U.S. capital goods orders2 is a good leading indicator for G7 real business investment (Chart II-7). Order books began to fill up in the second half of 2016 and the year-over-year growth rate appears headed for double digits in the coming months. The pickup is fairly widespread across industries in Germany and the U.S., although less so in Japan. The acceleration of imported capital goods for our 20 country aggregate corroborates the stronger new orders reports (Chart II-7, bottom panel). Recent data on industrial production show that the global manufacturing sector is clearly emerging from last year's recession. Short-term momentum in production growth has accelerated over the past 3-4 months across most of the major advanced economies (Chart II-8 and Chart II-9). Chart II-7Global Capex Cycle Turning Positive... Chart II-8...Driving A Global Manufacturing Upturn Chart II-9Global Manufacturing Upturn The fading of the negative impacts of the oil shock and last year's inventory correction are playing some role in the manufacturing rebound, but there is more to it than that. The production upturn is broadly-based across sectors in Japan and the U.K., although less so in the Eurozone and the U.S. Industrial output related to both household and capital goods is showing increasing signs of vigor in recent months (Chart II-10). Interestingly, energy-related production is not a driving force. Indeed, energy production is lagging the overall improvement in industrial output growth, even in the U.S. where the shale oil & gas sector is tooling up again (Chart II-11). Chart II-10A Broad-Based Acceleration Chart II-11Energy Is Not The Main Driver The Boost From Inventories And Energy Some inventory rebuilding will undoubtedly contribute to the rebound in industrial production and real GDP growth in 2017. The inventory contribution has been negative for 6 quarters in a row for the major advanced economies, which is long for a non-recessionary period (Chart II-12). We estimate that U.S. industrial production growth will easily grow in the 4-5% range this year given a conservative estimate of manufacturing shipments and a flattening off in the inventory/shipments ratio (which will require some inventory restocking; Chart II-13). Chart II-12Global Inventory Correction Is Over Chart II-13U.S. Manufacturing Outlook Is Bullish Nonetheless, the inventory cycle is not the main story for 2017. The swing in inventories seldom contributes to annual real GDP growth by more than a tenth of a percentage point for the major countries as a whole outside of recessions. Moreover, inventory swings generally do not lead the cycle; they only reinforce cyclical upturns and downturns in final demand. U.S. industrial production growth this year will undoubtedly exceed the 4-5% rate discussed above because that estimate does not include a resurgence of capital spending in the energy patch. BCA's Energy Sector Strategy service predicts that energy-related capex will surge by 40% in 2017, largely in the shale sector (Chart II-13, bottom panel). Even if energy capital spending outside the U.S. is roughly flat, as we expect, this would be a major improvement relative to the 15-20% contraction last year. According to Stern/NYU data, energy-related investment spending currently represents about a quarter of total U.S. capital spending.3 Thus, a 40% jump in energy capex would boost overall U.S. business investment in the national accounts by an impressive 10 percentage points. This is a significant contribution, but at the moment the upturn in manufacturing production is being driven by a broader pickup in business spending. The acceleration in production and orders related to consumer goods in the major countries suggests that household final demand is also showing increased vitality, consistent with the retail sales data. Soft Survey Data Notwithstanding the nascent upturn in the hard data, some believe that the soft data are sending an overly constructive signal in terms of near-term growth. The soft data generally comprise measures of confidence and surveys of business activity. One could discount the pop in U.S. sentiment as simply reflecting hope that election promises to cut taxes, remove red tape and boost infrastructure spending will come to fruition. Nonetheless, improved sentiment readings are widespread across the major countries, which means that it is probably not just a "Trump" effect. Moreover, there is no reason to doubt the surveys of actual business activity. Surveys such as the PMIs, the U.K. CBI Business Survey, the German IFO current conditions index and the Japanese Tankan survey all include measures of activity occurring today or in the immediate future (i.e. 3 months). There is no reason to believe that these surveys have been contaminated by "hope" and are sending a false signal on actual spending. We analyzed a wide variety of survey data and combined the ones that best lead (if only slightly) consumer and capital spending into indicators of private final demand (Chart II-14 and Chart II-15). A wide swath of confidence and survey data are rising at the moment, with few exceptions. Moreover, the improvement is observed in both the manufacturing and services sectors, and for both households and businesses. We employed these indicators in regression models for real GDP in the four major advanced economies and for the G7 as a group (Chart II-16). The models predict that G7 real GDP growth will accelerate to 2½% on a year-over-year basis in the first quarter, from 1½% in 2016 Q3. We expect growth of close to 3% in the U.S. and about 2½% in the Eurozone, although the model for the latter has been over-predicting somewhat over the past year. Japanese growth should accelerate to about 1.7% in the first quarter based on these indicators. Chart II-14Our Consumer Indicators Have Turned Up... Chart II-15...Our Capex Indicators Too Chart II-16Real Growth To Accelerate The outlook is less impressive for the U.K. While the survey data have revealed the biggest jump of the major countries in recent months, this represents a rebound from last years' Brexit-driven plunge. Nonetheless, current survey levels are consistent with continued solid growth. The implication is that the survey data are not sending a distorted message; underlying growth is accelerating even though it is only now showing up in the hard economic data. Turning for a moment to the emerging world, output is picking up on the back of an upturn in exports. However, we do not see much evidence of a domestic demand dynamic that will help to drive global growth this year. The main exception is China, where private sector capital spending growth has clearly bottomed. Infrastructure spending in the state-owned sector is slowing, but overall industrial capital spending growth has turned up because of private sector activity. An easing in monetary conditions last year is lifting growth and profitability which, in turn, is generating an incentive for the business sector to invest. There are also budding signs of recovery in housing-related investment. Stronger Chinese capital spending in 2017 will encourage imports and thereby support activity in China's trading partners, particularly in Asia. Will The Growth Impulse Have Legs? The cyclical dynamics so far appear a lot like the rebound in global growth following the 2011/12 economic soft patch and inventory correction (Chart II-17). That mini cycle was caused by a second installment of the Eurozone financial crisis. The damage to confidence and the tightening in financial conditions sparked a recession on the European continent and a loss of economic momentum globally. The financial situation in Europe began to improve in 2013. Consumer spending growth in the major advanced economies was the first to turn up, followed by capital spending, industrial production and, finally, hiring. Then, as now, the upturn in the surveys led the hard data. Unfortunately, the growth surge was short-lived because the 2014/15 collapse in oil prices undermined confidence and tightened financial conditions once again. The result was a manufacturing recession and inventory correction in 2016. There are reasons to believe that the cyclical upturn will have legs this time. It is good news that the growth impetus is observed in both the manufacturing and service sectors, and that it is widespread across the major advanced economies. Fiscal policy will likely be less restrictive this year than in 2014/15, and our sense is that some of the lingering scar tissue from the Great Recession is beginning to fade. The latter is probably most evident in the case of the U.S.; a Special Report from BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy service highlighted that the U.S. expansion has become more self-reinforcing.4 In the U.S. business sector, it appears that "animal spirits" have been stirred by the promise of less government red tape, lower taxes and protection from external competitive pressures. Regional Fed surveys herald a surge in capital spending plans in the next six months (Chart II-18). The rebound in corporate profitability also bodes well for capital spending. Chart II-17Consumers Usually Lead At Turning Points... Chart II-18...But Capex Appears To Be Leading Now Conclusions: We have little doubt that a meaningful global growth acceleration is underway. It is possible that consumer and business confidence measures are contaminated by hopes of policy stimulus in the U.S., but there is widespread verification from survey data of current spending that real final demand growth accelerated in 2016Q4 and 2017Q1. In terms of the hard data, evidence of improving manufacturing output and capital spending is broadly-based across industrial sectors and countries, suggesting that there is more going on than the end of an inventory correction and energy rebound. The bottom line is that investors should not dismiss the improved tone to the global economic data as mere "hope". Our sense is that 'animal spirits' are finally beginning to stir, following many years of caution and retrenchment. CEOs appear to have more swagger these days. Since the start of the year there have been a slew of high-profile announcements of fresh capital spending and hiring plans from companies such as Amazon, Toyota, Walmart, GM, Lockheed Martin and Kroger. A return of animal spirits could prolong a period of stronger growth, which would be positive for risk assets and the dollar, but bearish for bonds. Admittedly, however, we cannot point to concrete evidence that this cyclical upturn will be any more enduring than previous mini-cycles in this lackluster expansion. The economy may be just as vulnerable to shocks as was the case in 2014. As discussed in the Overview, there are numerous risks that could truncate the economic and profit upswing. On the U.S. policy front, tax cuts and some more infrastructure spending would be positive for risk assets on their own. However, the addition of the border tax or the implementation of other trade restrictions would disrupt international supply chains, abruptly shift relative prices and possibly generate a host of unintended consequences. And in Europe, markets have to navigate a minefield of potentially disruptive elections this year. Any resulting damage to household and business confidence could short-circuit the upturn in growth. For now, we remain overweight equities and corporate bonds relative to government bonds in the major countries, but political dynamics may force a shift in asset allocation as we move through the year. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst 1 Note that where only non-seasonally adjusted data is available, we have seasonally-adjusted the data so that we can get a sense of short-term momentum via the annualized 3-month rate of change. 2 Machinery orders used for Japan. 3 Please see http://www.stern.nyu.edu/ 4 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report "The State Of The Economy In Pictures," dated January 30, 2017. III. Indicators And Reference Charts The breakout in the S&P 500 over the past month has further stretched valuation metrics. The Shiller P/E is very elevated, and the price/sales ratio is almost back to the tech bubble peak. However, our composite valuation indicator is still slightly below the one sigma level that marks significant overvaluation. This composite indicator comprises 11 different measures of value. The monetary indicator is slightly negative, but not dangerously so for stocks. Technical momentum is positive, although several indicators suggest that the equity rally is stretched and long overdue for a correction. These include our speculation indicator, composite sentiment and the VIX. Forward earnings estimates are still rising, although it may be a warning sign that the net earnings revisions ratio has rolled over. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicators continue to send a positive message for stock markets. These indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Investors often say they are bullish but remain conservative in their asset allocation. The WTP indicators have turned up for the Japanese, Eurozone and U.S. markets, although only the latter is sending a particularly bullish message at the moment. The U.S. WTP has risen above the 0.95 level that historically provides the strongest bullish signal for the stock-to-bond total return ratio. The WTP indicator suggests that, after loading up on bonds last year, investors still have "dry powder" available to buy stocks as risk tolerance improves. Bond valuation is roughly unchanged from last month at close to fair value, as long-term yields have been stuck in a trading range. The Treasury technical indicator suggests that oversold conditions have not yet been fully unwound, suggesting that the next leg of the bear market may take some time to develop. The dollar is extremely expensive based on the PPP measure shown in this section. However, other measures suggest that valuation is not yet at an extreme (see the Overview). Technically overbought conditions are still being unwound according to our dollar technical indictor. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-5U.S. Earnings Chart III-6Global Stock Market ##br## And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-7Global Stock Market ##br## And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-8U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-9U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-10Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1110-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-12U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-13Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-14Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-15U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-17U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-18Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-19Euro Technicals Chart III-20Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-22Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-23Commodity Prices Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Sentiment Chart III-26Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-27U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-28U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-29U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-30U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-31U.S. Labor Market Chart III-32U.S. Consumption Chart III-33U.S. Housing Chart III-34U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-35U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-36Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: China