Commodities & Energy Sector

Highlights The miserable performance of commodities as an asset class post-GFC (since 2010) has disincentivized investment in oil and metals, which means growth in supply will lag demand going forward (Chart of the Week). Energy: Bullish. OPEC 2.0’s massive spare capacity supports its production-management strategy, and will keep crude-oil forward curves in backwardation. Base Metals: Bullish. With supply growth flat to negative year-on-year (y/y), copper and aluminium will post physical deficits as demand ex-China recovers. This will keep their forward curves backwardated as well. Precious Metals: Bullish. We expect the Fed’s ultra-accommodative policy to keep US real rates low, and return the USD to a bear market. This will be bullish for gold. Ags/Softs: Neutral. Ag markets remain balanced, punctuated by periodic weather-related rallies. A weaker USD also will be bullish for grains. In line with our expectation for stronger prices, continued backwardation in industrial commodities and a weaker USD, we are getting long the iShares GSCI Commodity Dynamic Roll Strategy ETF (COMT) at tonight’s close. This will broaden our exposure to commodities as an asset class. Risks due to COVID-19 persistence and a higher USD demand remain. The balance of risk, however, is to the upside. Feature Commodities as an asset class performed miserably post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC), as the Chart of the Week demonstrates. Partly this is due to the erratic-but-ultimately-accommodative monetary policies globally coming out of the GFC, which went into hyperdrive during the COVID-19 pandemic and supercharged demand for financial assets. During this period, industrial commodities suffered from periodic surpluses resulting from overproduction set off by high prices at the beginning of the 2000s when China set off a global commodity super-cycle. In the post-GFC world, producers brought commodities to market almost oblivious to the state of demand. This over-investment on the supply side led to market-share wars in oil and bulks like iron ore, which were ruinous to producers. Endogenous factors were not the only source of under-performance for commodities post-GFC. Stop-and-go fiscal stimulus in EM markets, which made base metals demand difficult to forecast; massive crop harvests and carry-over stocks year after year; highly erratic trade policy that distorted the flow of ags and manufactured products with out-of-the-blue tariffs, and a once-in-a-century pandemic that wiped out ~ 10% of global oil demand, all contributed to weak and volatile market conditions. Chart of the WeekCommodities As An Asset Class Performed Miserably Post-GFC The Case For A Strategic Allocation To Commodities As An Asset Class The Case For A Strategic Allocation To Commodities As An Asset Class Commodity producers, too, incentivized investors to seek greener pastures over this period, owing to their inability to earn returns in excess of their cost of capital, let alone anything even close to the returns available in the tech-heavy growth sector of equities markets. Producers’ difficulties have been compounded by the growing importance of ESG investing (Environmental, Social, and Governance), which, over time will increase the cost of producing commodities compliant with consumers’ and investors’ stated preferences for sustainable and equitable business practices. Investors, as is their wont, made it perfectly clear they have no interest investing in firms that cannot produce commodities profitably in line with ESG goals. There are too many opportunities elsewhere to invest in firms that can deliver goods and services profitably, regardless of how important commodities might be to the global economy. Industrial commodity markets, particularly oil and metals, now are under-resourced on the supply side, just as demand ex-China recovers in the wake of massive fiscal and monetary stimulus – with more on the way in the US. The Return Of Commodity-Index Investing For investors in long-only commodity-index instruments that provided a source of uncorrelated returns at the turn of the 21st century, the post-GFC period was long and painful. However, the balance of risks in these instruments – given the underlying fundamentals in the largest sectors of the asset class – is decidedly to the upside. Returns from long-only commodity indexes are derived from price appreciation of the index, so-called roll-yields, and the return on collateral used to post margin to support futures and exchange-cleared swaps comprising the index.1 In the industrial commodities, price gains have come from tightening markets – i.e., demand levels exceed supply levels, pushing prices higher. In oil, OPEC 2.0’s production-management strategy has been remarkably successful in reducing the supply overhang that has plagued markets on and off for the entire post-GFC period (Chart 2). Chart 2Oil Demand Will Exceed Supply Per OPEC 2.0 Strategy Oil Demand Will Exceed Supply Per OPEC 2.0 Strategy Oil Demand Will Exceed Supply Per OPEC 2.0 Strategy On the metals side, production growth has flattened in copper (Chart 3) and aluminum (Chart 4) as demand ex-China starts to recover. We expect physical deficits this year and next. Chart 3Copper's Physical Deficits Will Keep Futures Bacwardated Copper's Physical Deficits Will Keep Futures Bacwardated Copper's Physical Deficits Will Keep Futures Bacwardated Chart 4Flat To Backwardated Aluminum Forwards Expected Flat To Backwardated Aluminum Forwards Expected Flat To Backwardated Aluminum Forwards Expected In the case of copper, this will extend a two-year stretch of zero supply growth that has forced inventories to draw globally. Prices have rallied sharply on the back of these deficits, but will have to be sustained at these levels – and go higher – to spark investment in new supply necessary to support a revival of global economic growth; the buildout of renewable generation and new grids, and consumer-driven electric vehicles (EVs) demand. The only market that we are not bullish on due to tightening fundamentals is ags. While global grain and soybean inventories are falling (Chart 5), it’s a mixed picture. Global bean stocks are down (Chart 6), as are corn stocks (Chart 7). Wheat stocks are moving higher (Chart 8), while rice stocks remain roughly flat y/y (Chart 9). Chart 5Global Grain Balances Tightening Slightly Global Grain Balances Tightening Slightly Global Grain Balances Tightening Slightly Chart 6Global Bean Stocks Are Falling... Global Bean Stocks Are Falling... Global Bean Stocks Are Falling... Chart 7...As Are Corn's Fundamentals ...As Are Corn's Fundamentals ...As Are Corn's Fundamentals Chart 8Global Wheat Stocks Are Rising... Global Wheat Stocks Are Rising... Global Wheat Stocks Are Rising... Chart 9...While Rice Stocks Remain Balances ...While Rice Stocks Remain Balances ...While Rice Stocks Remain Balances Roll Yields From Industrial Commodities In addition to supply-demand fundamentals being supportive of industrial commodities’ price levels, we continue to expect a weakening of the USD, which will provide a strong tailwind to commodity price levels particularly gold, which we model primarily as a function of financial variables including the dollar and US real rates (Chart 10). A weaker USD also will be supportive of oil price levels, which have been in a long-term equilibrium with the dollar since 2000, when oil became a random-walking commodity (Chart 11).2 Metals also will get a lift from a weaker USD (Chart 12), as will ags (Chart 13), which remain balanced and well-supplied. This overall support to demand from the weaker dollar will, all else equal, put pressure on inventories and force them lower. Chart 10Weaker USD Will Boost Gold... Weaker USD Will Boost Gold... Weaker USD Will Boost Gold... Chart 11...Provide Oil A Tailwind... ...Provide Oil A Tailwind... ...Provide Oil A Tailwind... Chart 12...Lift Metals... ...Lift Metals... ...Lift Metals... Chart 13...And Ags ...And Ags ...And Ags This is particularly important for commodity-index investing, since falling inventories lead to backwardated forward curves, which are the principal source of roll yields in long-only index products.3 For long-only commodity index investors, the periods when commodities outperformed equities were characterized by backwardated forward curves, and, typically but not always, rising prices. Of the two factors driving commodity returns, backwardation is the most persistent and long-lived. Price increases (and decreases) often result from shocks. The market responds to a shock, finds a new level, and then oscillates randomly around it. Investment Implications We believe we are entering a period that will be characterized by tighter supply-demand balances for industrial commodities. The result of this will be lower inventories for oil and base metals, which will keep price levels well bid and forward curves flat to backwardated. A weaker USD will support industrial commodities, gold and ag prices. These are ideal conditions for long-only commodity-index investors. While there are numerous vehicles available to investors to express this view, we believe a dynamic portfolio approach – which chooses exposure for individual index components based on their backwardation – is best suited to current market conditions, given that we expect these markets to be in asynchronous bull markets over the next couple of years.4 At the close of business tonight, we will be getting long the iShares GSCI Commodity Dynamic Roll Strategy ETF (COMT), in order to broaden our exposure to commodities as an asset class. This index is maintained by S&P Dow Jones Indices.5 Separately, in a housekeeping note, we were stopped out of our tactical nickel position with a loss of 15.8%, following a sudden sell-off Friday. Based on reporting from forbes.com, China’s Tsingshan Holding Group took the market by surprise with its news release that it is producing “a battery-grade form of nickel from low-grade saprolite ore, a technical breakthrough which threatens to flood the nickel market.”6 We will continue to evaluate this development vis-à-vis re-entering our tactical nickel position in the near term.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     Roll yield refers to the gain from a commodity spread trade. A useful way to understand this is to imagine a market in which the forward curve is flat, i.e., the prompt futures contract for delivery next month is trading at the same price as a deferred futures contract specifying delivery in the following month. Assume an investor buys the prompt contract and the holds this position until it has to be either liquidated or rolled forward and its price has gone up, while the deferred contract’s price is unchanged. The investor can sell the prompt contract and use those proceeds to buy the deferred contract, which is still trading unchanged. The investor can either buy more of the contract with the proceeds from this trade, or invest it elsewhere. The gain from this transaction is referred to as the “roll yield.” In a backwardated market – this process can be repeated (buying at a low price and selling at a higher price as the futures contract rolls up the curve and gets closer to delivery), which is an ongoing source of yield. Of course prompt prices can fall below where the deferred contract was purchased, resulting in a loss, but typically the roll yield in a backwardated market is persistent. The opposite holds for contango market, which results in negative returns for investors buying, holding, and rolling futures seeking to earn roll yields. These spread trades are the commodity markets’ analog to the curve-steepeners and curve-flatteners in fixed income markets (e.g., the 2s-10s spread in U.S. Treasuries). 2     Please see Helyette Geman, (2007), "Mean Reversion versus Random Walk in Oil and Natural Gas Prices,“ in Advances in Mathematical Finance, Birkhäuser, Boston. 3    Please see Commodities As An Asset Class V. 3.0, a Special Report we published 21 August 2014. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4    We develop this thesis in last week’s Special Report entitled Industrial Commodities Super-Cycle Or Bull Market?, which is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5    Please see S&P GSCI Dynamic Roll, particularly its Methodology, which was published by S&P Global in January 2021. 6    Please see Nickel Price Falls By 16% But That Might Not Help EV Makers published by forbec.com 8 March 2021.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in Summary of Closed Trades Higher Inflation On The Way Higher Inflation On The Way

Highlights The recent backup in bond yields could cause stocks to fall further in the near term. However, history suggests that as long as yields remain low in absolute terms, as they are now, equities will recover. Market angst that the Fed is about to turn more hawkish is unwarranted. Central banks around the world have both the tools and the inclination to keep bond yields from rising excessively. Despite the jump in bond yields, the forward earnings yield is 540 basis points above the real bond yield in the US. Outside the US, the forward earnings yield is 615 basis points above the real bond yield. In 2000, the earnings yield was below the real bond yield. Just as value stocks began to outperform growth stocks in mid-2000, the end of the pandemic will herald a similar period of value-oriented outperformance. Commodity producers and banks will lead the way. Some Parallels Between Today And 2000… Stock prices have buckled in recent weeks, raising concerns that global bourses are at risk of a major crash, just like they were in early 2000. There are certainly some notable similarities between 2000 and the present: In both cases, the preceding rise in stock prices was fueled by the Federal Reserve’s desire to prevent an exogenous shock from causing a major recession (Chart 1). Last year, the shock was the pandemic. In 1998, it was the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM). The Connecticut-based hedge fund imploded shortly after Russia defaulted on its debt, leading to a gut-wrenching 22% decline in the S&P 500. The brewing crisis prompted the Fed to cut rates by a total of 75 basis points. Spurred on by fears of Y2K, the Fed also injected vast amounts of liquidity into the financial system. Tech stocks led the market higher both in the late 1990s and last year. The NASDAQ Composite rose 68% between its intra-day low in October 1998 and March 2000. In 2020, the NASDAQ outperformed the S&P 500 by 24% and returned 44% overall. Chart 1The NASDAQ's 1999 Surge Followed The 1998 “Insurance Cuts” And Coincided With The Fed’s Balance-Sheet Expansion The NASDAQ's 1999 Surge Followed The 1998 "Insurance Cuts" And Coincided With The Fed's Balance-Sheet Expansion The NASDAQ's 1999 Surge Followed The 1998 "Insurance Cuts" And Coincided With The Fed's Balance-Sheet Expansion Chart 2Low-Priced Stocks Have Been The Winners In The First Quarter Shades Of 2000 Shades Of 2000 The speculative mania in the 1990s spread from large-cap tech stocks to small-cap companies. We saw the same pattern earlier this year, with prices and trading volumes exploding among smaller, low-priced stocks (Chart 2). As was the case in the late 1990s, retail investors – this time armed with “stimmy” checks and access to zero-commission trading accounts – plowed into the market. Chart 3Some Pockets Of Bullish Equity Sentiment Shades Of 2000 Shades Of 2000 Chart 4Some Pockets Of Bullish Equity Sentiment Shades Of 2000 Shades Of 2000 Bullish equity investor sentiment was rampant at the peak of the stock market in 2000. Although not quite to the same extent as back then, most measures of investor sentiment turned bullish prior to the recent selloff (Chart 3). Like most investors, analysts were wildly optimistic on stocks in the late 1990s (Chart 4). Long-term earnings growth projections are very optimistic today, a potentially ominous signal given that (unlike in the late 1990s), productivity growth is now more anemic. Rising stock prices in the late 1990s allowed corporate insiders to cash in their options, while enabling new companies to go public. Recently, we have seen a flurry of companies list their shares, in some cases through dubious SPAC vehicles (Chart 5). Valuations reached nosebleed levels in 2000. While the forward P/E ratio on the S&P 500 is somewhat below its 2000 peak, other valuation measures such as price-to-sales, Tobin’s Q, and enterprise value-to-EBITDA are above where they were in 2000 (Chart 6). Chart 5Renewed Interest In Listing Stocks Shades Of 2000 Shades Of 2000 Chart 6Stretched Valuations, Then And Now Shades Of 2000 Shades Of 2000 … But One Important Difference Despite the parallels between today and 2000, there is an important difference: The Federal Reserve. Having cut rates in 1998, the Fed reversed course in mid-1999, eventually taking the fed funds rate up to 6.5% in May 2000. The yield curve inverted in February of that year, shortly after the 10-year yield reached a high of 6.79%. Chart 7What Happens To Equities When Treasury Yields Rise? Shades Of 2000 Shades Of 2000 Bond yields have risen briskly over the past six months. However, they remain very low in absolute terms. While rising yields can produce a temporary stock market correction, they need to move into restrictive territory in order to trigger a recession and an accompanying bear market in equities. Chart 7 highlights some research that Garry Evans and BCA’s Global Asset Allocation team recently produced. It shows eight episodes since 1990 of a sharp rise in the 10-year Treasury yield. On every occasion (except in 1993-94, when the Fed unexpectedly raised rates in February 1994), equities performed strongly while rates were rising (Table 1). Today, the forward earnings yield on the S&P 500 is 540 basis points above the real yield. In 2000, the real bond yield was higher than the earnings yield (Chart 8). The gap between earnings yields and real bond yields is even greater outside the US, where valuations are generally more attractive. By the same token, the S&P 500 dividend yield was well below the bond yield in 2000. Today, they are roughly the same. Even if one were to pessimistically assume that US companies are unable to raise nominal dividend payments at all for the next decade, the S&P 500 would need to fall by 21% in real terms for equities to underperform bonds. Many other stock markets would have to decline by more than that (Chart 9). Table 1As Long As Bond Yields Don't Rise Into Restrictive Territory, Stocks Will Recover Shades Of 2000 Shades Of 2000 Chart 8Relative To Bonds, Stocks Are More Favorably Valued Now Than in 2000 Relative Valuations Favor Equities Relative Valuations Favor Equities Chart 9Stocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds Stocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds Stocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds Central Banks Will Lean Against Rising Bond Yields Stocks sold off earlier today on the perception that Jay Powell had failed to push back forcefully against the recent increase in bond yields. We think this angst is unwarranted. As Powell noted, most of the rise in bond yields reflected economic optimism. If yields were to continue rising in the absence of further economic improvements, the Fed would dial up the rhetoric, stressing its ability to buy bonds in unlimited quantities in order to support the economy. Despite all the fiscal stimulus, the unemployment rate remains elevated – perhaps as high as 10% according to some Fed measures. The prime-age employment-to-population ratio is four percentage points below where it was before the pandemic (Chart 10). Moreover, many stimulus measures will expire towards the end of the year. With the prospect of a “fiscal cliff” in 2022, we expect the Fed to want to tread carefully in withdrawing monetary support. What would really rattle investors is if long-term inflation expectations were to rise above the Fed’s comfort zone. However, considering the 5-year/5-year forward inflation breakevens are still below where they were in 2012-13, this is not an imminent risk (Chart 11). Chart 10The Fed Will Remain Accommodative To Aid The Labor Market Recovery The Fed Will Remain Accommodative To Aid The Labor Market Recovery The Fed Will Remain Accommodative To Aid The Labor Market Recovery Chart 11Inflation Expectations Have Recovered But Are Still Low Shades Of 2000 Shades Of 2000 Like the Fed, the ECB wants to keep financial conditions highly accommodative. On Tuesday, ECB Executive Board member Fabio Panetta, echoing comments made by other senior ECB officials, said that higher yields were “unwelcome and must be resisted.” He noted that “We are already seeing undesirable contagion from rising US yields into the euro area yield curve,” adding that the ECB “should not hesitate” to increase the pace of bond purchases. The ECB’s threat is credible. Already, its purchases have deviated significantly from its capital key, revealing Frankfurt’s willingness to act where and when it is needed. In the same spirit, the Reserve Bank of Australia boosted its government bond purchases earlier this week after the 10-year yield backed up from 0.7% last October to over 1.9% late last week. The RBA also reaffirmed its intent to maintain the current 3-year Yield Curve Control target at 0.1%, stating that “The Board will not increase the cash rate until actual inflation is sustainably within the 2-to-3 percent target range. For this to occur, wages growth will have to be materially higher than it is currently. This will require significant gains in employment and a return to a tight labour market. The Board does not expect these conditions to be met until 2024 at the earliest.” The RBA’s determination to keep bond yields down is noteworthy given that the neutral rate of interest is higher in Australia than in most other developed economies.1  If the RBA does not intend to raise rates for the next three years, it may take even longer for other central banks to take away the punch bowl. Will Value Stocks Begin To Outperform As They Did Starting In Mid-2000? There is another potential parallel with 2000 that is worth mentioning. This was the year that the outperformance of growth stocks came to a halt and value stocks began to shine. In fact, outside of the tech sector, the S&P 500 did not peak until May 2001 (Chart 12). Value continued to outperform right through to 2007. Since February 12th of this year, the price of the highly liquid Vanguard Growth ETF (VUG, market cap of $143 billion) has fallen by 8.9% while the price of the Vanguard Value ETF (VTV, market cap of $97 billion) has risen 0.5%. Despite the nascent outperformance of value names, they still remain relatively cheap. According to a simple valuation measure that combines price-to-earnings, price-to-book, and dividend yields, value stocks are more than three standard deviations cheap relative to growth stocks – a bigger valuation gap than seen at the height of the dotcom bubble (Chart 13). Chart 12The Non-Tech Portion Of The Stock Market Peaked More Than A Year After The Tech Bubble Burst The Non-Tech Portion Of The Stock Market Peaked More Than A Year After The Tech Bubble Burst The Non-Tech Portion Of The Stock Market Peaked More Than A Year After The Tech Bubble Burst Chart 13The Tech Bust Of 2000 Also Marked The Start Of A Multi-Year Outperformance By Value The Tech Bust Of 2000 Also Marked The Start Of A Multi-Year Outperformance By Value The Tech Bust Of 2000 Also Marked The Start Of A Multi-Year Outperformance By Value The Outlook For Commodity Stocks And Bank Shares Commodity producers are overrepresented in value indices. Strong global growth against a backdrop of tight supply should heat up the commodity complex over the next 12-to-18 months. Chart 14 shows that capital investment in the oil and gas sector has fallen by more than 50% since 2014. BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service, led by Robert Ryan, expects crude oil demand to outstrip supply over the remainder of this year (Chart 15). Chart 14Oil + Gas Capex Collapses In COVID-19’s Wake Shades Of 2000 Shades Of 2000 Chart 15Crude Oil Demand To Outstrip Supply Over The Remainder Of This Year Shades Of 2000 Shades Of 2000 A physical deficit in the metals markets – particularly for copper and aluminum – should also persist this year (Charts 16A & 16B). While the boom in electric vehicle (EV) production represents a long-term threat to oil, it is manna from heaven for many metals. A battery-powered EV can contain more than 180 pounds of copper compared with 50 pounds for conventional autos. By 2030, the demand from EVs alone should amount to close to 4mm tonnes of copper per year, a big slug of demand in a market that consumes about 26mm tonnes per year. Chart 16ACopper Will Be In Physical Deficit... Copper Will Be In Physical Deficit... Copper Will Be In Physical Deficit... Chart 16B...As Will Aluminum ...As Will Aluminum ...As Will Aluminum Ongoing strong demand for metals from China should also buoy metals prices. While trend GDP growth in China has slowed, the economy is much bigger than it was in the 2000s. China’s annual aggregate consumption of metals is five times as high as it was back then. The incremental increase in China’s metal consumption, as measured by the volume of commodities consumed, is also double what it was 20 years ago (Chart 17). As we discussed in our report To Deleverage Its Economy, China Needs MORE Debt, the Chinese government has no choice but to continue to recycle persistently elevated household savings into commodity-intensive capital investment. This will ensure ample commodity demand from China for years to come. Chart 17China Keeps Buying More And More Commodities Chinese Consumption Of Most Metals Continues To Rise China Keeps Buying More And More Commodities Chinese Consumption Of Most Metals Continues To Rise China Keeps Buying More And More Commodities Chart 18Credit Growth Has Been Recovering Credit Growth Has Been Recovering Credit Growth Has Been Recovering Along with commodity producers, financials helped propel value indices during the 2000s. While credit growth is unlikely to revert to its pre-GFC days, it has been trending higher in both the US and Europe (Chart 18).   Analysts are starting to take note of improving bank earnings prospects. EPS estimates for banks are rising more quickly than for tech companies on both sides of the Atlantic (Chart 19). Not only is the “E” in the P/E ratio for banks likely to rise, the ratio itself will increase. Currently, US and European banks are trading at 14 and 10-times forward earnings, respectively, a huge discount to the broad market in general, and tech stocks in particular (Chart 20).  Chart 19EPS Estimates For Banks Are Rising More Quickly Than For Tech Companies (I) EPS Estimates For Banks Are Rising More Quickly Than For Tech Companies (I) EPS Estimates For Banks Are Rising More Quickly Than For Tech Companies (I) Chart 19EPS Estimates For Banks Are Rising More Quickly Than For Tech Companies (II) EPS Estimates For Banks Are Rising More Quickly Than For Tech Companies (II) EPS Estimates For Banks Are Rising More Quickly Than For Tech Companies (II) Chart 20Banks Are Cheap Banks Are Cheap Banks Are Cheap   Bottom Line: Despite near-term uncertainty, investors should overweight stocks on a 12-month horizon, while pivoting away from last year’s winners (growth stocks) towards last year’s losers (value stocks).   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  According to RBA’s estimates, the neutral rate of interest in Australia is at the high end of developed market estimates. Specifically, Australia’s R-star is higher than the average of the US and euro area R-stars and is slightly lower than the average of the Canadian and UK neutral rates. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Shades Of 2000 Shades Of 2000 Special Trade Recommendations Shades Of 2000 Shades Of 2000 Current MacroQuant Model Scores Shades Of 2000 Shades Of 2000

Dear client, In addition to this week’s abbreviated report, we are also sending you a Special Report on currency hedging, authored by my colleague Xiaoli Tang. Xiaoli’s previous work mapped out a dynamic hedging strategy for developed market equity investors in various home currencies. In this report, she extends the work to emerging market exposure. I hope you will find the report insightful. Next week, in lieu of our weekly report on Friday, we will be sending you a joint Special Report on the UK on Tuesday, together with our Global Fixed Income colleagues. Kind regards, Chester Highlights The DXY index is up for the year, but further gains will be capped at 2-3% from current levels. Long yen positions are offside amid the dollar rally. This should wash out stale longs, and underpin the bull case. Lower the limit-sell on the gold/silver ratio to 68. We were stopped out of our short AUD/MXN position amidst a broad-based selloff in EM currencies. We are reinitiating the trade this week. Feature Chart I-1The Dollar Has Been Strong In 2021 The Dollar Has Been Strong In 2021 The Dollar Has Been Strong In 2021 The DXY index has once again kissed off the 90 level and is gaining momentum in March. Year-to-date, the DXY index is up 1.1%. This performance has been particularly pronounced against other safe haven currencies, such as the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen. GBP and AUD have fared rather well in this environment (Chart I-1). As the “anti-dollar,” the euro has also suffered.  Our technical indicators continue to warn that the dollar still has upside. Net speculative positions are at very depressed levels, consistent with many sentiment indicators that are bearish USD. However, this time around, any dollar rally could be capped at 2-3%, in sharp contrast to the bounce we witnessed in March 2020.  The Message From Dollar Technical Indicators Our dollar capitulation index has bounced from very oversold levels, and is now sitting above neutral territory (Chart I-2). The index comprises a standardized measure of sentiment, net speculative positioning and momentum. It is very rare that a drop in this index below the -1.5 level does not trigger a rebound in the dollar. This time around, the bounce has been rather muted. Chart I-2BCA Dollar Capitulation Index Suggests Some Upside BCA Dollar Capitulation Index Suggests Some Upside BCA Dollar Capitulation Index Suggests Some Upside Part of the reason has been concentration around dollar short positions. Investors throughout most of the pandemic executed their bearish dollar bets through the euro, yen and the Swiss franc (countries that already had negative interest rates). Positioning on risk on currencies such as the Australian dollar and the Mexican peso were neutral. This also explains the underperformance of the yen, as the dollar rises. From a sizing standpoint, ever since the dollar peaked in March 2020, counter-trend moves have been in the order of 2-3%. We expect this time to be no different. What To Do About The Yen The yen has been one of our core holdings on three fundamental pillars: it is cheap, it tends to rise during dollar bear markets and the economy in Japan is more hostage to deflation than the US. This bodes well for real rates in Japan, relative to the US. Over the last month, our long yen position has been put offside. First, demand for safe havens has ebbed as US interest rates have gapped higher (Chart I-3, panel 1). King dollar has once again become the safe haven of choice. As Chart I-1 illustrates, low beta currencies such as the Swiss franc and yen, that tend to do relatively well when the dollar is rallying, have underperformed.  Yield curve control (YCC) in Japan is also negative for the yen as interest rates rise (panel 2). Economic momentum in Japan is also rolling over (panel 3). Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s mulling to extend the state of emergency in the Tokyo region could further cripple any Japanese economic recovery. Chart I-3A Healthy Reset In The Yen A Healthy Reset In The Yen A Healthy Reset In The Yen Chart I-4USD/JPY Support Should Hold USD/JPY Support Should Hold USD/JPY Support Should Hold For short-term investors, USD/JPY is very overbought and is approaching strong resistance (Chart I-4). In our view, a washing out of stale shorts would provide a healthy reset for the bear market to resume. Meanwhile, USD/JPY and the DXY change correlations during risk-off periods, where the yen appreciates versus the dollar.  Therefore, a market reset is also positive for the yen.     Housekeeping Chart I-5Remain Short AUD/MXN Remain Short AUD/MXN Remain Short AUD/MXN We were stopped out of our short AUD/MXN trade last week for a loss of 6.1%. We are reinitiating the trade this week. The case for the trade, made a month ago, remains intact. A short-term recovery in the US economy, relative to the rest of the world, argues for an AUD/MXN short. In fact, a divergence has occurred between the BRL/MXN and the AUD/MXN exchange rate (Chart I-5). Domestic factors have certainly tempered the Brazilian real, but the underperformance of metal prices relative to oil in recent months is also a factor. We expect some convergence to occur, with MXN appreciating much faster than the AUD.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have stepped up: Personal income rose by 10% in January, while personal spending rose by 2.4% month-on-month. The ISM report was stellar. The manufacturing PMI improved from 58.7 to 60.8 in February. Prices paid rose to 86. Factory orders were slightly above expectations at 2.6% month-on-month in January.   The DXY index rose by 165 bps this week.  The narrative of a counter-trend reversal in the DXY index isn playing out. As the story unfolds, it will be important to establish targets. Our bias is that the DXY stalls before 93-94 is reached.  Report Links: Are Rising Bond Yields Bullish For The Dollar? - February 19, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Sizing A Potential Dollar Bounce - January 15, 2021 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Recent data from the euro area remain weak: Core CPI in the Eurozone came in at 1.1%, in line with expectations. The unemployment rate declined from 8.3% to 8.1% in January. January retail sales were weak at -6.4% year-on-year. The euro fell by 1.7%% against the US dollar this week. It will be almost impossible for the euro to rise in an environment where the dollar is in a broad-based decline. Given elevated sentiment on the euro, a healthy reset is necessary for the bull market to resume. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 The Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data from Japan has been marginally positive: The employment report was positive, with the unemployment rate dipping to 2.9% and an improvement in the jobs-to-applicants ratio in January. Consumer confidence in February is rebounding from very low levels. The Japanese yen fell by 1.5% against the US dollar this week. The recovery in the Japanese economy is fragile, and tentative signs of a renewed lockdown will knock down confidence. In this transition phase, yen long positions could be hostage to losses. Longer-term, the yen is cheap and will benefit from a broad-based dollar decline. Report Links: On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Recent data out of the UK have been in line: Mortgage approvals rose 99K in January, in line with expectations. The construction PMI rose from 49.2 to 53.3 in February. Nationwide house prices are soaring, rising 6.9% in February on a year-on-year basis. The pound fell by 0.8% against the dollar this week. It is however the best performing currency this year. Our short EUR/GBP trade has benefited from faster vaccination in the UK (that could give way to a faster reopening of the economy) and a nice valuation starting point. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia was robust: Home lending remained in an uptrend. Owner-occupied loans increased by 11% in January, while investor loans increased by 9.4%. Terms of trade are soaring, rising 24% year-on-year in February. The current account surplus came in near a record A$14.5 billion in Q4. GDP grew by 3.1% QoQ in Q4. The Aussie fell by 1.8% his week. Terms of trade will continue being a tailwind for the AUD/USD. We also like the AUD/NZD cross, as a valuation and terms-of-trade bet. However, we expect that any positive surprises in the US will hurt AUD relative to the Americas. One way to play this is by shorting AUD/MXN. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Australia: Regime Change For Bond Yields & The Currency? - January 20, 2021 An Update On The Australian Dollar - September 18, 2020 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 There was scant data out of New Zealand this week: Terms of trade rose by 1.3% in Q4. CoreLogic home prices rose 14.5% in February. The New Zealand dollar fell by 2.4% against the US dollar this week. The kiwi ranks as the most unattractive currency in our FX framework. For one, it has catapulted itself to the most expensive currency in our PPP models. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 Recent data from Canada was positive: The Nanos confidence index rose from 58.2 to 59.4 in February. Annualized 4Q GDP came in at 9.6%, above expectations. Building permits rose 8.2% month-on-month in January. The Canadian dollar fell 0.4% against the US dollar this week. Oil prices remain very much in an uptrend, which is underpinning the loonie. Better US economic performance in the near term should also help the CAD. Report Links: Will The Canadian Recovery Lead Or Lag The Global Cycle? - February 12, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 Recent data out of Switzerland have been improving: Swiss GDP rose by 0.3%  quarter-on-quarter in 4Q. The KOF leading indicator rose from 96.5 to 102.7 in February. The February manufacturing PMI rose from 59.4 to 61.3. Switzerland remains in deflation, with the core CPI that came in at -0.3% year-on-year in February. The Swiss franc fell by 2.6% against the US dollar this week. Safe -haven currencies continue to be laggards, as rates rise and gold falls to the wayside. This is bullish on  procyclical currencies, and negative the Swiss franc. We are long EUR/CHF on this basis, but short USD/JPY purely as portfolio insurance. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 The data out of Norway has been robust: The unemployment rate fell from 4.4% to 4.3% The manufacturing PMI increased from 51.8 to 56.1 in February. The current account balance was robust in Q4. It should increase significantly in Q1 this year given the large trade balance in January. Being long the Norwegian krone is one of our high-conviction bets in the FX portfolio. The Norwegian krone fell by 1% against the US dollar this week, but outperformed the euro, amongst other currencies. The NOK ticks all the boxes of an attractive currency – cheap valuations, a liquidity discount, and primed to benefit from a global growth rebound. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 Most Swedish data releases were in line with expectations: GDP came in at -0.2% quarter-on-quarter, below expectations. Retail sales rose 3.1% year-on-year, above expectations. The trade balance came in at a surplus of SEK 5.2 billion  in January. The manufacturing PMI remained elevated at 61.6 in February. The Swedish krona fell by 2.4% against the US dollar this week. Manufacturing data is improving in Sweden but the economy remains hostage to COVID-19, compared to Norway. That is weighing on the krona. That said, Sweden is a highly levered play on the global cycle. Therefore, once the pandemic is behind us, the SEK will outperform. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights The Biden administration will not attempt a major diplomatic “reset” with Russia. The era of engagement is over. Russia faces rising domestic political risk and rising geopolitical risk at the same time. A war in the Baltics is possible but unlikely. Putin has benefited from taking calculated risks and wants to keep the US and Europe divided. The Russian economy is weighed down by structural flaws as well as tight policy. Investors focused on absolute returns should sell Russian assets. For EM-dedicated investors, our Emerging Markets Strategy recommends a neutral allocation to Russian stocks and local currency bonds and an overweight allocation to US dollar-denominated sovereign and corporate debt. Feature “We will not hesitate to raise the cost on Russia.” – US President Joseph R. Biden, State Department, February 4, 2021 The Biden presidency will differ from its predecessors in that there will not be a major attempt to engage Russia at the outset. Previous US presidents sought to reach out to their Russian counterparts to create room for maneuver. This was true of Presidents Reagan, Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Trump. Even Biden has shown a semblance of reengagement by extending an arms reduction pact. But investors should not be misled. The United States and the Democratic Party have shifted their approach to Russia since the failure of the diplomatic “reset” that occurred in 2009-11 and Washington will take a fundamentally more hawkish approach. Russia is not Biden’s top foreign policy focus – that would be Iran and China. But as with China, engagement has given way to Great Power struggle and hence there will not be a grace period before geopolitical tensions re-escalate. Tensions will keep the risk premium elevated for Russia’s currency and assets. The same is true of emerging European markets that get caught up in any US-Russia conflicts. Putin, Biden, And Grand Strategy Understanding US-Russia relations in 2021 requires a brief outline of both the permanent and temporary strategies of the United States and Russia. Russia’s grand strategy over the centuries has focused on establishing a dominant central government, controlling as large of a frontier as possible, and maintaining a high degree of technological sophistication. The nightmare of the Russian elite consists of foreign powers manipulating and weaponizing the country’s extremely diverse peoples and territories against it, reducing the world’s largest nation-state to its historical origin as a geographically indefensible and technologically backward principality. Chart 1Russia's Revival In Perspective Russia's Revival In Perspective Russia's Revival In Perspective Russia can endure long stretches of austerity in order to undermine and outlast rival states in this effort to achieve defensible borders. Russia’s strategy since the rise of President Vladimir Putin has focused on rebuilding the state and military after the collapse of the Soviet Union so as to restore internal security and re-establish political dominance in the former Soviet space (Chart 1). Partial invasions of Georgia and Ukraine and a military buildup along the border with the Baltic states show Russia’s commitment to prevent American or US-allied control of strategic buffer spaces. Expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union poses an enduring threat to Putin’s strategy. Putin has countered through conventional and nuclear deterrence as well as the use of “hybrid warfare,” trade embargoes, cyberattacks, and disinformation. To preempt challengers within the former Soviet space Russia also maintains a “veto” over geopolitical developments outside that space, as with nuclear proliferation (Iran), civil wars (Syria, Libya), or resource production (OPEC 2.0). The evident flaw in Putin’s strategy is the decay of the economy, the long depreciation of the ruble, and the drop in quality of life and labor force growth. See the macro sections below for a full discussion of these negative trends. Compare the American strategy: America’s grand strategy is to control North America, dominate the oceans, prevent the rise of regional empires, and maintain the leading position in technology and talent. A nightmare for American policymakers would be a collapse of the federal union among the disparate regions and the rise of a secure foreign empire that could supplant the US’s naval preponderance. This is especially true if the rival empire were capable of supplanting US supremacy in technology, since then the US would not even be safe within North America. America’s strategy under the Biden administration is to mitigate internal political divisions through economic growth, maintain its global posture by refurbishing alliances, and reassert its technological primacy by encouraging immigration and trade. The status quo of strong growth and rising polarization has been beneficial for US technology but not for foreign and defense policy (Chart 2). Political polarization has prevented the US from executing a steady long-term strategy for over 30 years. As a result, Russia has partially rebuilt the Soviet sphere of influence and China is constructing a sphere of its own. A few conclusions can be drawn from the above. First, China poses a greater challenge to the US than Russia from a strategic point of view. China is capable of creating a regional empire that can one day challenge the US for technological leadership. Modern Russia must summon all its strength to carve out small pieces of its former empire – it is not a contender for supremacy in technology or in any regions other than its own. Second, however, Russia’s resurgence under Putin poses a secondary challenge to American grand strategy. Russia can undermine US strategy very effectively. The effect today is to aid the rise of China, on which Russia’s economy increasingly depends (Chart 3). Chart 2US Tech Boom Coincided With Disinflation, Polarization US Tech Boom Coincided With Disinflation, Polarization US Tech Boom Coincided With Disinflation, Polarization Chart 3Russia’s Turn To The Far East Biden And Russia: No Diplomatic "Reset" This Time Biden And Russia: No Diplomatic "Reset" This Time Unlike the US, Russian leadership has not changed over the past year – and Vladimir Putin’s tactics are likely to be consistent. These were underscored by the constitutional revisions approved by popular vote in September 2020. Not only will Putin be eligible to remain president till 2036 but also Russia reaffirmed its willingness to intervene militarily into neighboring regions by asserting its right to defend Russian-speaking peoples everywhere. Finally, Russia ensured there would be no giving away of territories, thus ruling out a solution on Ukraine over Crimea.1 Bottom Line: The US-Russia conflict will continue under the Biden administration, even though Biden’s primary concern will be China. Biden’s Foreign Policy Intentions It is too soon to draw conclusions about Biden’s foreign policy “doctrine” as he has not yet faced any major challenges or taken any major actions. Biden’s first two foreign policy speeches and interim national security strategy guidance establish his foreign policy intentions, which will have to be measured against his administration’s capabilities.2 His chief intentions are to revive the economy and court US allies: First, Biden asserts that every foreign action will be taken with US working families in mind, co-opting Trump’s populism and emphasizing that US international strength rests on internal unity which flows from a strong economy. This goal will largely be met as the administration is already passing a major economic stimulus and is likely to pass a second bill with long-term investments by October. The impact on Russia is mixed but the Biden administration is largely correct that a strong recovery in the US economy and reduction in political polarization will be a major asset in its dealings with Russia and other rivals. Second, Biden asserts that diplomacy will be the essence of his foreign policy. He aims to create or rebuild an alliance of democracies that spans from the UK and European Union to the East Asian democracies. The two goals of economy and diplomacy are connected because Biden envisions the democracies working together to make “historic investments” in technology, setting global standards and rules of trade, and defending against hacking and intellectual property theft. This goal will have mixed success: the EU and US will manage their own trade tensions reasonably well but they will disagree on how to handle Russia and especially China. Biden explicitly sets up this alliance of democracies against autocracies. He calls China the US’s “most serious competitor” but also highlights Russia: “The challenges with Russia may be different than the ones with China, but they’re just as real.”3 Table 1 shows the Biden administration’s notable comments and actions on Russia so far. What is clear is that the US will not seek an extensive new diplomatic engagement with Russia.4 The failure of the Obama administration’s “diplomatic reset” with Russia has disabused the Democratic Party of the notion that strategic patience and outreach are the right approaches to Putin’s regime. The reset and its failure are described in detail in Box 1. Table 1Biden Administration's First 100 Days: Key Statements And Actions On Russia Biden And Russia: No Diplomatic "Reset" This Time Biden And Russia: No Diplomatic "Reset" This Time Box 1: What Was The US-Russia Diplomatic Reset? What Comes Next? Most American presidents open their foreign policy with overtures to Russia to create space to maneuver, given that Russia is capable of undermining US aims in so many areas. The Barack Obama administration made a notable effort at this in 2009, which was dubbed the “diplomatic reset.” It was a rest because relations had collapsed over Russia’s use of natural gas pipelines as a weapon against Ukraine and especially its invasion of Georgia in 2008. Then Vice President Joe Biden led the reset. President Putin had stepped aside in accordance with constitutional term limits, putting his protégé Dmitri Medvedev in the presidential seat, which supported the reset because Medvedev had at least some desire to reform Russia’s economy. The reset lasted long enough for Washington and Moscow to agree on the need for a strategic settlement on the question of Iran – which would culminate in the 2015 nuclear deal – as well as to admit Russia to the World Trade Organization (WTO). But the aftermath of the financial crisis proved an inauspicious time for a reset. Along with the Arab Spring, popular unrest emerged in Moscow in 2011 and western influence crept into Ukraine – all of it allegedly fomented by Washington. Putin feared he would lose central control at home and frontier control abroad. He also sensed an opportunity given that commodity prices were filling state coffers while the US was focused on domestic policy, increasingly polarized, and unwilling to make the sacrifices necessary to solidify its influence in eastern Europe. Russia’s betrayal of the reset resulted in a string of losses for the US and its European allies: the Edward Snowden affair, the invasion of Ukraine, the intervention in Syria, the meddling in the 2016 US election, and most recently the SolarWinds hack. The Obama administration refrained from a strong reaction over Crimea partly to seal the Iran deal. But Russia pressed its advantage after that. It is doubtful that Russia’s influence decided the 2016 election but, regardless, the Democratic Party fell from power and then watched in dismay as the Trump administration revoked the Iran deal. Now that the Democrats are back in power they will seek to retaliate not only for the SolarWinds hack but also for the betrayal of the reset. However, retaliation will come at a time of Washington’s choosing. Bottom Line: The Biden administration’s foreign policy will emphasize alliances of democracies in opposition to autocracies like Russia and China. Biden is planning a more hawkish approach to Russia than previous recent administrations. Biden’s Foreign Policy Capabilities There are a few clear limitations on Biden’s foreign policy goals. First, his administration will largely be focused on domestic priorities. In foreign affairs there is at best the chance to salvage the Obama administration’s foreign policy legacy. Second, Biden’s dealings with China will take up most of his time and energy. China’s fourteenth five-year plan contains a state-driven technological Great Leap Forward that will frustrate any attempt by Biden to reduce tensions. Biden will not be able to devote much attention to Russia if he pursues China with the attention it deserves, i.e. to secure US interests yet avoid a war.5 Third, Biden will be limited by allied risk aversion and the need for consensus on difficult decisions. If his diplomacy with Europe is successful then China and Russia will face steeper costs for any provocative actions. If it fails then European risk aversion will prevail, the allies will remain divided, and China and Russia will faces few costs for maintaining current policies. Table 2Russia’s Pipeline Export Capacity Biden And Russia: No Diplomatic "Reset" This Time Biden And Russia: No Diplomatic "Reset" This Time The Nordstream Two pipeline will be a key test of European willingness to follow the US’s lead even if it means taking on greater risks: Nordstream Two is a major expansion of Russian-EU energy cooperation but contrary to America’s national interest. German Chancellor Angela Merkel still backs the project despite Russia’s poisoning and imprisonment of dissident Alexei Navalny and forceful suppression of protests. However, Merkel is a lame duck and there is some evidence that German commitment to the project is fraying.6 Biden has not tried to halt the pipeline project, but he still could. There are only 100 miles left to the pipeline. Construction resumed in January after a hiatus last year due to US sanctions. The project will take five months to complete at the rate of 0.6 miles per day. The Biden administration still has time to halt the project through sanctions. If it does, the Russians will react harshly to this significant loss of economic and strategic influence over Europe (Table 2). Biden will have a crisis on his hands in Europe. If Biden does nothing on Nordstream, then Russia will conclude that his administration is not serious and take actions that undermine the Biden administration in accordance with Putin’s established strategy. This would prompt Biden to act on his pledge to stand up to Putin’s provocations. Whereas if Biden imposes sanctions to halt Nordstream, Russia will retaliate. Elsewhere it is possible that Biden will be too confrontational with Russia for Europe’s liking. Biden plans to increase support for Ukraine, which will prompt an increase in military conflict this spring.7 The US will promote democracy across eastern Europe, including Belarus, and it is possible that Russia could overreact to this threat of turning peripheral regimes against Russia. The EU is on the front lines in the conflict with Russia and will not want the US to act aggressively – but the US is specifically seeking to “raise the cost” on Russia for its aggression.8 Bottom Line: Russia is not Biden’s priority. But his pledge both to promote democracy and retaliate against Russian provocations sets the US up for a period of higher tensions. US-Russia Engagement On Iran? Will the US not need to engage Russia to achieve various policy goals? Specifically, while highlighting competition, Biden says he will engage Russia and China on global challenges, namely the pandemic, climate change, cybersecurity, and nuclear proliferation. Nuclear proliferation is the only one of these areas where US-Russia cooperation might matter. After all, there is zero chance of cybersecurity cooperation. Whereas on nuclear issues, the US and Russia immediately extended the New START arms reduction treaty through 2026 and could also work together on Iran. Biden is determined to restore the Obama administration’s 2015 nuclear deal. Moscow does not have an interest in a nuclear-armed Iran so there is some overlap of interest. The Iranian issue will require Biden to consider whether he is willing to make major concessions to Russia: Compromise the hard line on Russia: A new Iranian administration takes office in August. Biden is likely to have to rush a return to the 2015 nuclear deal before that time if he wants a deal with Iran. Otherwise it would take years for Biden and the Europeans to reconstitute the P5+1 coalition with Russia and China and negotiate an entirely new deal. Biden would have to make major concessions to Russia and China. His stand against autocracy would be compromised from the get-go. Maintain the hard line on Russia: The alternative is for Biden to rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal with a flick of his wrist, with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani signing off by August. Biden would extract promises from the Iranians to keep talking about a broader deal in future. In this case Biden would not need to give the Russians or Chinese any new concessions. Chart 4China Enforces Iran Sanctions China Enforces Iran Sanctions China Enforces Iran Sanctions The Biden administration will be keen to make sure that Russia does not exploit the US eagerness for a deal with Iran as it did with the original deal in 2014-15. Iran has an individual interest in restoring the deal, which is to gain sanction relief and avoid air strikes. The Europeans have helped Iran keep the deal alive. China is at least officially enforcing sanctions (Chart 4). Russia is also urging a return to the deal and would be isolated if it tried to sabotage the deal. This could happen but it would escalate the conflict between the US and Russia. Otherwise, if a deal is agreed, the US will continue putting pressure on Russia in other areas. Bottom Line: The Biden administration is likely to seal an Iranian nuclear deal without any major concessions to Russia. Tail Risk – A War In The Baltics? It is well established that the Putin regime will use belligerent foreign adventures to distract from domestic woes. Just look at poor opinion polling tends to precede major foreign invasions (Chart 5). With the eruption of social unrest in the wake of COVID-19 and the imprisonment of opposition leader Alexei Navalny, it is entirely possible that Russia will activate this tool again. The implication is a new crisis in Ukraine, a larger Russian military presence in Belarus, or further escalation of hybrid warfare or cyberwar in other areas. What about an invasion of the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia? Unlike other hotspots in Russia's periphery this is a perennial "black swan" risk that would equate with a geopolitical earthquake in Europe. A Baltic war is conceivable based on Russia’s geographic proximity, military superiority, and military buildup on the border and in the Kaliningrad exclave. The combined military spending of NATO dwarfs that of Russia but NATO is extremely vulnerable in this far eastern flank (Chart 6). However, Europe would cutoff Russia’s economy and join the US in countermeasures while Russia would be left to occupy hostile countries.9 Chart 5Putin Lashes Out When Popularity Falls Putin Lashes Out When Popularity Falls Putin Lashes Out When Popularity Falls The Baltic states are members of NATO and thus an attack on one is theoretically an attack on all. President Trump ultimately endorsed Article V of the NATO treaty on collective self-defense and President Biden has enthusiastically reaffirmed it. The guarantee is meaningless without greater military support to enforce it, so NATO could try to reinforce its forward presence there. This could provoke Russia to retaliate, likely with measures short of full-scale war. Chart 6Russia Would Be Desperate To Invade Baltics Biden And Russia: No Diplomatic "Reset" This Time Biden And Russia: No Diplomatic "Reset" This Time Since the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, US rivals have observed that the American public lacks the willingness to fight small wars. It responded weakly to Russia’s invasion of Crimea and China’s encroachments in the South China Sea and Hong Kong. However, foreign rivals do not know whether the unpredictable US leadership and public are willing to fight a major war. Hence Russia and China are likely to continue to focus on incremental gains and calculated risks rather than frontal challenges. Based on the Biden administration’s moderate political capital (very narrow electoral and legislative control), the US will continue to be divided and distracted. Russia, China, and other powers will test the administration and make an assessment before they attempt any major foreign adventures. The testing period is imminent, however, and thus holds out negative surprises for investors. It is also possible that Biden could make the first move – particularly on Russia, where retaliation for the 2020 SolarWinds hack should be expected. Bottom Line: A full-scale war in the Baltics is possible but unlikely as the Russians have succeeded through calculated risks whereas they face drastic limitations in a major war against the NATO alliance. Growth Weighed Down By Tight Policy We now turn to Russia’s domestic economic conditions. Here, Russia also faces major challenges. Authorities are determined to keep a tight lid on both monetary and fiscal policies. In particular, high domestic borrowing costs and negative fiscal thrust will weigh down domestic demand over the next six-to-12 months. There are three reasons authorities will maintain tight monetary and fiscal policies: First, concerns about high inflation are deeply entrenched among consumers, enterprises, and policymakers. Russian consumers and businesses tend to have higher-than-realized inflation expectations. This is due to the history of high inflation as well as stagflation in Russia. A recent consumer poll reveals that rising prices are the number one concern among households (Table 3). Remarkably, the poll was conducted in August amid the height of the pandemic and high unemployment. This suggests that households do not associate growth slumps with lower inflation but rather fear inflation even amid a major recession (i.e., worry about stagflation). Table 3Fear Of Inflation Prevalent Amongst Consumers’ Expectations Biden And Russia: No Diplomatic "Reset" This Time Biden And Russia: No Diplomatic "Reset" This Time Second, Central Bank of Russia Governor Elvira Nabiullina is one of the most hawkish central bankers in the world. Her early tenure was characterized by the 2014-15 currency crisis and a major inflation spike. To combat structural inflation and bring down persisting high inflation expectations, the central bank has adopted a very hawkish policy stance since 2014. There is no sign that the central bank is about to change its hawkish policy. Specifically, monetary authorities have been syphoning liquidity from the banking system. With relatively tight banking system liquidity and high borrowing costs, private credit growth will fail to accelerate from current levels. Third, the government still projects an austere budget for 2021. The fiscal thrust will be -1.7% of GDP this year (Chart 7). While a moderate spending increase is likely, it will not be sufficient to boost materially domestic demand. There are no signs yet that the fiscal rule10 will be further relaxed, potentially releasing more funds for the government to spend this year. The fiscal rule has become an important gauge of the country’s ability to weather swings in energy prices. In addition to the points listed above, policymakers’ inflation worries stem from the economy’s structural drawbacks: Despite substantial nominal currency depreciation in recent years, Russia runs a current account deficit excluding energy. When a country runs a chronic current account deficit, including periods of major domestic demand recessions and currency devaluations, it is a symptom of a lack of productivity gains. Real incomes grew at a quick pace from the mid-1990s, largely driven by the resource boom in the 2000s. Yet rising real incomes were not complemented by expanding domestic manufacturing capacity to produce consumer and industrial goods. As such, imports of consumer goods and services rose alongside real incomes. Russia has been underinvesting. Gross fixed capital formation excluding resources industries and residential construction has never surpassed 10% of GDP in either nominal or real terms (Chart 8). Chart 7Russia: Fiscal Policy Will Remain Austere In 2021 Russia: Fiscal Policy Will Remain Austere In 2021 Russia: Fiscal Policy Will Remain Austere In 2021 Chart 8Russia: Underinvestment Within Domestic Sectors Russia: Underinvestment Within Domestic Sectors Russia: Underinvestment Within Domestic Sectors Geopolitical tensions with the West have discouraged FDI inflows and hindered Russian companies’ ability to raise capital externally. This has inhibited capital spending and ”know-how” transfer and, hence, bodes ill for productivity gains. Russian domestic industries are highly concentrated and, in some cases, oligopolistic in nature. This allows incumbents to raise prices. The number of registered private enterprises has fallen below early 2000s levels (Chart 9). Despite chronic currency depreciation, Russian resource companies have failed to grab a large share of their respective export markets. For instance, Russia’s oil market share of total global oil production has been flat for over a decade and the nation has been losing market share in the global natural gas industry. A shrinking labor force due to poor demographics and meager immigration complements Russia’s sluggish productivity growth and caps its potential GDP growth (Chart 10). Chart 9Russia: Increasing Industry Concentration Russia: Increasing Industry Concentration Russia: Increasing Industry Concentration Some positive signs are appearing in the form of import substitution. Since the Ukraine conflict in 2014 and the resulting Western sanctions, the government has enacted various laws and decrees to incentivize domestic production, and with it providing substitutions for imported goods. Their impact is noticeable in certain sectors. Chart 10Russia: Poor Potential Growth Outlook Russia: Poor Potential Growth Outlook Russia: Poor Potential Growth Outlook In particular, the country has invested heavily in the food industry, as food imports are 16% of overall imports. Agricultural sector output has been rising while imports of key food categories have declined. Recent decrees on industrial goods will likely boost domestic production of some goods and processed resources. Around 40% of Russian imports are concentrated in machinery, industrial equipment, transportation parts, and vehicles. Hence, raising competitiveness in production of industrial goods is essential for Russia to reduce reliance on imports. In short, fewer imports of goods for domestic consumption will make inflation less sensitive to fluctuations in the exchange rate. The current trend is mildly positive, but its pace remains slow. Bottom Line: Russia needs to raise its productivity and labor force growth and, hence, potential GDP growth to deliver reasonable high-income growth without raising inflation. The Cyclical OutLook: Worry About Growth, Not Inflation Cyclically, high domestic borrowing costs and lackluster fiscal spending will weigh down domestic growth and cap inflation for the next 12 months. Russia’s real borrowing costs are among the highest in the EM space. High borrowing costs are causing notable financial stress amongst corporate and household debtors. Commercial banks’ NPLs and provisions are high and rising (Chart 11). Unwilling to take on more credit risk, banks have shunned traditional lending and have instead expanded their assets into financial securities. This trend will likely persist and corporate and consumer credit will fail to boost investment and consumption. The recent pickup in inflation was primarily due to rising food prices and the previous currency depreciation pass-through. Chart 12 illustrates the recent currency appreciation heralds a rollover in core inflation. Chart 11Russia: High Borrowing Costs Are Leading To Higher Credit Stress Russia: High Borrowing Costs Are Leading To Higher Credit Stress Russia: High Borrowing Costs Are Leading To Higher Credit Stress Chart 12Russia: Inflation Will Rollover Due To Stable RUB Russia: Inflation Will Rollover Due To Stable RUB Russia: Inflation Will Rollover Due To Stable RUB In fact, a broad range of inflation indicators suggest that core inflation remains within the central bank target (Chart 13). These measures of inflation are less correlated with the ruble movements. Chart 13Russia: Inflation Is At Central Bank Target Of 4% Russia: Inflation Is At Central Bank Target Of 4% Russia: Inflation Is At Central Bank Target Of 4% Chart 14Russia: Tame Recovery In Domestic Activity Russia: Tame Recovery In Domestic Activity Russia: Tame Recovery In Domestic Activity High-frequency data suggest that consumer spending and business activity remain tame (Chart 14). Bottom Line: The latest uptick in Russia’s core CPI is likely transitory. Cyclical conditions for a material rise in inflation and hence monetary tightening are not in place. Investment Takeaways Chart 15Russia Underperforms Amid Commodity Bull Run Russia Underperforms Amid Commodity Bull Run Russia Underperforms Amid Commodity Bull Run Russia’s sluggish economy and austere policy backdrop suggest that the fires of domestic political unrest will continue to burn. While political instability may force the Kremlin to ease fiscal policy, the easing so far envisioned is slight. The implication is that Russia faces rising domestic political risk simultaneously with the rise in international, geopolitical risk stemming from the Biden administration’s efforts to promote democracy in Russia’s periphery and push back against its regional and global attempts to undermine the US-led global order. So far the totality of Russia’s risks have outweighed the benefits of the global economic recovery as Russian assets are trailing the rally in commodity prices (Chart 15). The ruble is above the lows reached at the height of the Ukraine crisis, whether compared to the GBP or the EUR, suggesting further downside when US-Russia tensions spike (Chart 16). The currency is neither cheap nor expensive at present (Chart 17). Chart 16Ruble Will Fall Further On Geopolitical Risk But Floor Not Far Ruble Will Fall Further On Geopolitical Risk But Floor Not Far Ruble Will Fall Further On Geopolitical Risk But Floor Not Far Chart 17Russia: The Ruble Is Fairly Valued Russia: The Ruble Is Fairly Valued Russia: The Ruble Is Fairly Valued   Chart 18Geopolitical Risk Will Revive Despite Apparent Top Geopolitical Risk Will Revive Despite Apparent Top Geopolitical Risk Will Revive Despite Apparent Top Our Geopolitical Risk Indicator for Russia is forming a bottom, implying that global investors believe the worst has passed. This is a mistake and we expect the indicator to change course and price in new risk. The result will weigh on Russian equities, which are fairly well correlated with this indicator (Chart 18). Overall, we recommend investors who care about absolute returns to sell Russian assets. For dedicated EM equity as well as EM local currency bond portfolios, BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy recommends a neutral stance on Russia (Chart 19). Rising bond yields in the US will continue weighing especially on high-flying growth stocks. The low market-cap weight of technology/growth stocks in the Russian bourse makes the latter less vulnerable to rising global bond yields. Concerning local rates, we see value in 10-year swap rates, as tight monetary and fiscal policies will keep a lid on inflation. With the central bank unlikely to hike rates anytime soon, a steep yield curve offers good value in the long end of the curve for fixed income investors. Finally, orthodox macro policies will benefit fixed-income investors on the margin. In regard to EM credit (USD bonds) portfolio, the Emerging Markets Strategy team recommends overweighting Russia (Chart 20). The government has little local currency debt and minimal US dollar debt. Not surprisingly, Russia has been a low-beta credit market and it will outperform its EM peers in a broad sell off. Chart 19Russia: Move To Neutral Local Currency Bond Allocation Russia: Move To Neutral Local Currency Bond Allocation Russia: Move To Neutral Local Currency Bond Allocation Lastly, the Emerging Markets Strategy is moving Ukrainian local currency government bonds to underweight and closing the 5-year local currency bond position. Risks of military confrontation on the Ukraine front have escalated. Chart 20Russia: Remain Overweight On USD Credit Russia: Remain Overweight On USD Credit Russia: Remain Overweight On USD Credit     Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Andrija Vesic Associate Editor Emerging Markets Strategy AndrijaV@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 See Pavlo Limkin et al, “Putin’s new constitution spells out modern Russia’s imperial ambitions,” Atlantic Council, September 10, 2020, atlanticcouncil.org. 2 See White House, “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World,” February 4, 2021, and “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference,” February 19, 2021, whitehouse.org. 3 See “Remarks … at the … Munich Security Conference” in footnote 2 above. 4 We first outlined this US-Russia disengagement in our last joint special report on Russia, “US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet),” July 3, 2020, bcaresearch.com. 5 See Margarita Assenova, “Clouds Darkening Over Nord Stream Two Pipeline,” Jamestown Foundation, February 1, 2021, Jamestown.org. 6 Biden’s “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,” White House, March 3, 2021, whitehouse.org, reinforces this point by focusing most of its attention on China and largely neglecting Russia. 7 See “Kremlin concerned about rising tensions in Donbass,” Tass, March 4, 2021, tass.com. 8 One way in which this could transpire would be a carbon border tax. The EU says imposing a tariff on carbon-intensive imports will proceed unilaterally if there is not a UN agreement in November because it is a “matter of survival” for its industry as it raises green regulation. The Biden administration also promised in its campaign to levy a “carbon adjustment fee.” Russia, which is exposed as a fossil fuel exporter that does not have a carbon pricing scheme, says such a fee would go against WTO rules. See Kate Abnett, “EU sees carbon border levy as ‘matter of survival’ for industry,” Reuters, January 18, 2021, reuters.com; Sam Morgan, “Moscow cries foul over EU’s planned carbon border tax,” Euractiv, July 27, 2020, euractiv.com. 9 See Heinrich Brauss and Dr. András Rácz, “Russia’s Strategic Interests and Actions in the Baltic Region,” German Council on Foreign Relations, DGAP Report, January 7, 2021, dgap.org; Christopher S. Chivvis et al, “NATO’s Northeastern Flank: Emerging Opportunities for Engagement,” Rand Corporation, 2017. 10 The rule stipulates that a portion of oil and gas revenues that the government can spend is determined by a fixed oil price benchmark. Currently, the benchmark oil price stands at $42 per barrel. The fiscal rule also encompasses constraints on the National Welfare Fund withdrawals in oil prices below $42 per barrel.

Highlights OPEC 2.0’s production-management strategy and physical supply deficits in base metals will keep growth in demand above that of supply into 2022 (Chart of the Week). Over the next decade, markets will have to reconcile sustaining oil and gas supplies during the low-carbon transition and incentivizing investment in metals used in renewable energy grids. Electric vehicle sales will rise, particularly in China, which has built a commanding position in global EV supply chains. This supports China’s goal of reducing dependence on imported oil, but increases supply-chain concentration risk ex-China. Investors will expect sustainable returns from energy and metals producers and lower CO2 emissions. Otherwise, capital markets will remain parsimonious and investment will be delayed. This will increase price volatility. The investment required to transition to renewables almost surely will result in higher oil and metals prices. If this transition increases CO2, GHGs and atmospheric particulates, producers will confront more regulation and higher costs. Differing supply-demand drivers in oil and metals will result in separate, asynchronous bull markets for each, not a global commodity super-cycle. Successful technology work-arounds – e.g., carbon capture, use and storage – would keep oil and gas competitive, provided the sector can attract funding. Feature Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina   Every commodity market is different in its own way. Over the short term – to the end of 2022 – oil and base metals will appear to be in the early stages of a commodity super-cycle. But, upon closer examination, it is apparent the fundamental drivers for each are, and will remain, different. These markets are entering asynchronous bull markets driven by different fundamentals. The key driver of these cycles is the demand side: Oil demand will rise slightly or remain flat to declining over the next decade, while base metals demand will be rising as a function of actual spending on renewables and EVs. This means the supply side in oil and metals will have entirely different demand expectations to plan for when allocating capex going forward. Chart of the WeekDemand Will Recover Faster Than Supply Demand Will Recover Faster Than Supply Demand Will Recover Faster Than Supply Chart 2OPEC 2.0 Production Management Keeps Level Of Demand Above Supply OPEC 2.0 Production Management Keeps Level Of Demand Above Supply OPEC 2.0 Production Management Keeps Level Of Demand Above Supply Oil markets will be in physical deficits this year and next by design over the next couple of years, with the level of supply maintained below that of demand. This is the result of a deliberate strategy by OPEC 2.0, the producer coalition formed in late 2016 following the disastrous market-share war launched by the old OPEC cartel in 2014 (Chart 2).1 Metals markets – particularly copper and aluminum, which are critical for the transition to renewable generation – likely will be in physical deficits this year and next as well, with the level of demand above that of supply. Copper demand was exceptionally strong in the wake of a construction boom in China last year, which drew inventories from around the world (Chart 3).2 Aluminum demand in China also moved higher last year and likely will continue this year (Chart 4). We expect the global recovery this year ex-China to pick up the slack resulting from a slowdown in China in 2H21, which will keep these markets tight. Chart 3Copper Will Be In Physical Deficit... Copper Will Be In Physical Deficit... Copper Will Be In Physical Deficit... Chart 4...As Will Aluminum ...As Will Aluminum ...As Will Aluminum As the decade progresses, oil and base metals fundamentals will continue to diverge, becoming increasingly different it their own ways. Asynchronous Bull Markets: Oil First Oil demand’s rate of growth will slow as the decade progresses, but we believe OPEC 2.0’s production management strategy will continue to keep supply at a level that supports a Brent crude oil price range that accommodates both Saudi and Russian goals. Saudi Arabia’s preferred price range for Brent crude oil is, we believe, in a range of $70-$75/bbl, which allows the Kingdom to fund its diversification away from oil exports as the dominant source of GDP growth. Russia's goal is to keep price incentives for US shale producers at a minimum. Its ideal price range is between $50-$55/bbl. Neither the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) nor Russia benefits from launching another internecine price war. Both states have endured repeated policy-induced shocks – e.g., the imposition of sanctions on Iranian crude oil exports in 2018, which was followed by waivers to Iran’s eight largest importers just before this export ban went into effect, then removed the waivers – and the pandemic demand shock this past year. Neither do they benefit from pushing Brent prices too far above $75/bbl over the next couple of years, given the fragile state of the global economy. Besides putting a dent in demand, it also would incentivize US shale production, which can ramp quickly, or encourage EV sales. This could even encourage a push to find alternatives in a market where supply chains for battery materials – chiefly cobalt and graphite – and copper are dominated by China. OPEC 2.0’s preferred range likely will be widened out to $65-$80/bbl for Brent by 2025. Given the trajectory we expect for global demand – global demand returns to pre-COVID-19 levels in 2023 – OPEC 2.0 should be able to continue with its strategy until 2024-25, making use of its spare capacity and low-cost production (Chart 5). Our demand estimates are driven by GDP estimates from the World Bank and the IMF, and we assume, at least until 2025, OPEC 2.0 will maintain its level of supply just below the level required to completely offset demand, to keep inventories from registering another round of unintended growth. This will, per the OPEC 2.0 strategy we believe is in place, keep the forward Brent curve – and by extension the WTI and other benchmark forward curves – in backwardation, which will limit the level at which producers outside the coalition can hedge forward revenues. We do not believe OPEC 2.0 wants to aggressively invest in increasing crude-oil production capacity, given the diversification goals of its core producers – i.e., those states capable of actually maintaining current production levels and increasing them if needs be.3 Chart 5OPEC 2.0 Will Match Production To Consumption OPEC 2.0 Will Match Production To Consumption OPEC 2.0 Will Match Production To Consumption Beyond 2025 and out to 2030, the supply side of the oil market becomes more cloudy. We believe core-OPEC 2.0 will be able to source capital without significant constraint, unlike the US shale producers at present. However, core-OPEC 2.0 alone cannot keep the market balanced out of its production alone, nor does it wish to launch 20- to 30-year projects when it becomes more uncertain by the year how much oil and gas is going to be needed by the market once renewables kick into high gear. OPEC 2.0 will need the US shales to increase production, along with Canada, Brazil and the North Sea, once it has exhausted its spare capacity and low-cost production that is readily available. At that point, availability of capital becomes critical, particularly following the capex reductions in the wake of the OPEC market-share war from 2014-16, the Trump waivers, and the short-lived market-share war launched by Russia in March 2020, following the breakdown of OPEC 2.0 negotiations last year to extend production cuts. The International Energy Forum (IEF), a transnational study group headquartered in Riyadh comprised of representatives from energy producer and consumer states, released a report in December showing global oil and gas capex fell 34% y/y in 2020 (Chart 6), and likely will fall another 20% in 2021 to ~ $200 billion (Chart 7). By 2030, the IEF estimates an additional $225 billion will be required in capex -- in addition to its previous estimate of close to $300 billion by then -- “to stave off a crisis.” If capital remains scarce, oil-price volatility will increase as supply growth contracts and prices move higher. At that point, prices will not be moving sharply higher per OPEC 2.0's production-management strategy. Chart 6Oil + Gas Capex Collapses In COVID-19’s Wake Industrial Commodities Super-Cycle Or Bull Market? Industrial Commodities Super-Cycle Or Bull Market? Chart 7Global Oil + Gas Capex Will Require A Sharp Boost By 2030 Industrial Commodities Super-Cycle Or Bull Market? Industrial Commodities Super-Cycle Or Bull Market? Base Metals’ Decade Spending on renewable energy last year was ~ $700 billion, according to the IEA.4 This could go to $3.4 trillion by 2030, of which $2.7 trillion could be spent on solar and wind power.5 The growth in solar and wind will require sharply higher volumes of tradeable metals important to investors, i.e., aluminum, copper, and nickel (Charts 8 & ​​​​​​9). Chart 8Solar Investment Will Soar… Solar Investment Will Soar Solar Investment Will Soar Chart 9…Along With Investment In Wind Energy Wind Investment Will Soar Wind Investment Will Soar Aluminum and copper will account for ~ 85% and 11% of solar inputs respectively; iron will account for close to 85% of wind inputs (mostly the towers), with copper making up more than 4%; nickel will account for almost 60% of inputs into new geothermal renewable generation, according to the World Bank.6 The other big slug of base metals demand comes from EVs. A battery-powered EV can contain more than 180 pounds of copper vs up to 50 pounds for conventional autos. By 2030, the demand from EVs alone would amount to close to 4mm tons of copper per year, if demand for these vehicles grows in line with the IEA’s aspirational goals (44mm units/yr). Even if that growth is delayed, this still is a significant share of total demand in a market that consumes ~ 26mm tons/yr. Nickel demand also will surge if EV demand grows in line with IEA projections. By 2040, nickel-intensive battery technology could lift demand by close to 300%, to 2.6mm tons, according to Roskill Information Services. By 2050, nickel demand could increase by as much as 3.7mm tons (Chart 10).7 Chart 10Nickel Demand Could Rise Parabolically Nickel Demand Could Rise Parabolically Nickel Demand Could Rise Parabolically Bull Markets, But Not A Super-Cycle … Yet It is true oil and base metals markets are tight, and likely will get tighter over the next couple of years. As the global economy recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic, demand for these commodities will rise, and supply will be constrained. However, it is important to note the supply-side constraints are idiosyncratic – different in their own ways: Oil supply will remain tight as a consequence of OPEC 2.0’s production-management strategy. Base metals – particularly copper and aluminum – will be tight owing to actual supply constraints in the face of strong demand. Over the course of the next decade, we will see asynchronous bull markets for each, not a global commodity super-cycle. Oil will behave like a commodity in its sunset phase, regardless of whether that is true: Firms in the industry are turning toward renewables and away from oil (e.g., Shell and BP). Base metals, because of their criticality to renewables and EVs, will behave like a commodities in their early-growth phase. The evolution of base metals demand as renewables and EV demand increases is difficult to estimate without solid metrics re spending, output goals and timelines. Of course, higher metals output will require higher capex to meet increasing demand for renewable energy and EVs. Just how much output will have to rise is completely unclear: Governments have yet to fully specify their goals or the budgets that will be supporting renewables demand. Whether EV demand meets the IEA’s aspirational goals is anyone’s guess, particularly as the concentration risk in the EV battery supply chain remains acute. The Biden administration appears poised to direct significant investment to reducing US exposure to battery supply chains’ concentration risks – e.g., ~ 80% of EV batteries supply chains are controlled by China – and other exposures.8 Oil output will require higher capex to maintain production to the point where it can meet declining demand. Successful technology work-arounds – e.g., carbon capture, use and storage – would keep oil and gas competitive, provided they attract funding. Bottom Line: The investment required to transition to renewables almost surely will result in higher oil and metals prices. If this transition increases CO2, GHGs and atmospheric particulates, producers will confront more regulation and higher costs. We remain bullish and retain our exposure to oil and base metals. While our recommendations are meant to be strategic, managing these exposures will require tactical agility.     Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1    Please see Oil Markets Steady, Despite Weather; Brent Forecast Back At $65/bbl For 2021, published 18 February 2021, for additional discussion of OPEC 2.0’s production-management strategy. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2    Please see Copper Surge Welcomes Metal Ox Year, which we published 11 February 2021. 3    These core producers, in our estimation, are KSA, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait and the UAE. Others like Nigeria, Iraq and Libya are capable of increasing production, but their output is volatile. The other member states either are managing to a flat or declining profile. 4    Please see World Energy Investment 2020 (p. 8), published by the IEA in 27 May 2020. 5    Please see $3.40 Trillion to be Invested Globally in Renewable Energy by 2030, Finds Frost & Sullivan. 6    Please see our 26 November 2020 report entitled Renewables, China's FYP Underpin Metals Demand for further discussion. 7    Please see Nickel's Decade-Long Rally Is Underway, which we published last week. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 8    Please see Nickel, cobalt price: 10 charts show China’s grip on battery supply chain to last decades published by mining.com 26 February 2021.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Summary of Closed Trades Higher Inflation On The Way Higher Inflation On The Way

Underweight Last December when we penned the 2021 high-conviction calls Strategy Report, we put global gold miners in the “also rans” section as we did not have the courage to go underweight despite our view of an economic reopening. But it is better late than never, and in this Monday’s Strategy Report we pulled the trigger and downgraded this niche materials sub-sector to a below benchmark allocation. The economic reopening theme remains healthy and still dominates the market as is evident in 5-year/5-year forward real yields that have been soaring year-to-date signaling that investors should shy away from gold miners (Chart 1). Not only is the real economy standing on its own two feet, but the financial economy is also being propelled higher thanks to the Fed, ECB, BoJ, and a plethora of other central banks (CBs) including EM ones. CBs are still embarking on QE, effectively engineering a “risk on” asset price inflation phase that melts away the global equity risk premium and reduces the allure of the safe haven global gold mining industry (Chart 2). Chart 1Avoid Gold Miners Avoid Gold Miners Avoid Gold Miners Chart 2Avoid Gold Miners Avoid Gold Miners Avoid Gold Miners   Bottom Line: Downgrade global gold miners to underweight. This move also pushes the S&P materials sector back to the neutral zone.  

Highlights Portfolio Strategy The selloff in the long end of the Treasury bond market and related yield curve steepening, rising loan growth and a turnaround in bank net interest margins, all signal that a durable re-rating phase is in the offing in the beaten down financials sector. Soaring real and nominal yields on the back of a US economic reopening, sinking policy uncertainty, and the specter of a countertrend USD rally, all undermine global gold mining stocks. Downgrade to underweight. We deem there is an exploitable opportunity within the reopening theme and we reiterate our recent pair trade recommendation: long USES “Laggards” basket/short USES “Overshooters” basket (excluding the GICS1 sectors). Recent Changes Downgrade the global gold mining index to underweight, today. This move also pushes the S&P materials sector to a neutral allocation. Last week our rolling 2.5% stop was triggered and we booked gains of 17% in the deep cyclicals/defensives portfolio bent that is now on even keel. On February 10, we closed the S&P consumer staples and the S&P homebuilding high-conviction underweights for 8% and -11% returns, respectively, since the December 7 inception. On February 11, we rolled over the synthetic long SPY options structure from March expiry (long $390/$410 call spread/short $340 put) to June expiry (long $400/$420 call spread/short $340 put) netting gains of $5.41/contract or 676% since the January 12 inception. Feature While stocks swiftly gyrated last week and the selloff in Treasury bonds dominated the news flow, the corporate bond market remained as placid as ever. This eerie calmness is slightly unnerving as junk spreads, all the way out to the CCC poor-quality spectrum, have been steadily sinking. But, resurging commodities likely confirm that there is no real reason to panic as global growth remains on an upward trajectory courtesy of pent-up demand that will get unleashed in the back half of the year as the global economy reopens (Chart 1). We recently reinitiated the long “Back-To-Work” basket as the expense of our “COVID-19 Winners” basket and this trade is already up another 21.3% since the second inception on Feb 3, 2021. With regard to monetary policy that remains a key pillar of equity euphoria, the Fed has vociferously signaled that they will not be backing down from QE and their ZIRP policy. The FOMC is not even thinking about thinking about tapering asset purchases, despite a looming inflation spike in the coming months due to base effects and bottlenecks that they vehemently deem transitory. Chart 1Eerie Calm? Eerie Calm? Eerie Calm? Importantly, Charts 2 & 3 show that both the ISM’s manufacturing prices paid index and a sideways move in retail gasoline prices predict a surge in headline CPI in the April/May time frame as we first showed in a recent Special Report. Chart 2The Bond Market Is Already… The Bond Market Is Already… The Bond Market Is Already… Chart 3…Testing The Fed …Testing The Fed …Testing The Fed Tack on a plethora of anecdotes regarding shortages and price hikes in a slew of industries and an inflationary spurt is already here. In more detail, an inflationary impulse is not only evident in chip and car shortages and in container freight shipping rates, but also in dry bulk transport rates. Drilling beneath the surface of the Baltic Dry Index, and looking beyond Capesize carriers, reveals that Panamax and Handysize vessel freight rates are on a tear, probing 11-year highs and more than quadrupling since the March lows (Chart 4). These smaller ships are more nimble and rarely take voyage empty as recent container ships have been when returning to China to reload. Thus, the sizable increase in Handysize and Panamax shipping rates suggests that commodity demand is robust, especially industrial commodities. Returning to US shores, the most recent retail sales report also caused a jump in the Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow and the NY Fed’s Nowcast forecasts for Q1 near double digit real GDP growth. For calendar 2021, according to daily data from Bloomberg, economists expect US real GDP growth north of 4.9% (Chart 5). More blow out quarters are in the offing courtesy of the inoculation of the population, the reopening of the economy and persistent government largesse. Chart 4Look Beneath The Surface… Look Beneath The Surface… Look Beneath The Surface… Chart 5…And The Economic Recovery Is Gaining Steam… …And The Economic Recovery Is Gaining Steam… …And The Economic Recovery Is Gaining Steam… Crudely put, while consumers will not buy 10 coffees or eat 10 meals at a restaurant all at once when the economy fully reopens, they may choose to fly business on their next vacation and indulge on a more lavish hotel. Add on that the hospitality industry specifically has aggressively shut down capacity and an inflationary impulse is likely as consumer purse strings will loosen very quickly. Thus, trust in the Fed’s ultra-dovishness represents the biggest equity market risk in the coming months as the FOMC allows the economy to run hot and there are high odds that the bond market will continue to test the Fed’s resolve. Our sense is that the Fed will initially ignore the spike in inflation, at least until the summer, thus refraining from removing the proverbial “punch bowl”. However, if the market detects any signs of a “less dovish” Fed, especially if high inflation prints persist for whatever reason, risk premia will get repriced a lot higher (Chart 6). Chart 6…But A Lot Of Good News Is Baked In …But A Lot Of Good News Is Baked In …But A Lot Of Good News Is Baked In Staying on the topic of interest rates, we have a long-held rule of thumb that stocks cannot stomach more than 100-125bps tightening via a selloff in the 10-year US Treasury bond in a less than a year time frame basis. In other words, were the 10-year US Treasury yield to surpass and stay over 1.55% by March, 2.05% by June, and 1.75% by August, then the equity market will likely suffer a pullback, especially given the absence of a valuation cushion. In fact, last Thursday the 10-year US Treasury yield cleared the 1.6% hurdle and stocks sold off violently. In more detail, we examined data from 2009 onward, therefore only covering the QE era, which would increase the applicability of our analysis. Importantly, the 2009-2011 iterations provide the closest parallels as to what will likely take root this cycle as those instances occurred in a post recessionary environment, which is similar to today. The 2009-2011 period also best aligns with the main reason for having this rule of thumb in the first place: to gauge the risk of interest rates undermining the market by weighing on forward multiples and/or via an economic slowdown because of tightening in monetary conditions. Our analysis shows that while the exact timing and size of the stock market drawdown varies from episode to episode, it is generally consistent with a roughly 10% pullback in the S&P 500 albeit with a 1-2 month lag following the trigger in our rule1 (Chart 7). Chart 7Monitoring Our 100-125bps Rule Of Thumb Monitoring Our 100-125bps Rule Of Thumb Monitoring Our 100-125bps Rule Of Thumb Keep in mind that such a pullback is consistent with historical precedents when the Fed is actively engaged in QE, with the most recent example being last September’s/October’s 10% drawdown. Our sense is that the ongoing bond market selloff will serve as a catalyst for a continuation/acceleration of the reopening/rotation/reflation trade out of highly valued tech stocks and into more compellingly valued deep and early cyclicals. Such a transition typically proves tumultuous. This week, we update our sanguine view on an early-cyclical sector, and act on the downgrade alert to a deep cyclical sector via downgrading a safe haven commodity index to a below benchmark allocation. Financials Are On Fire Within the GICS1 universe, the most levered sector to interest rates is the S&P financials sector. Given that the bond selloff has staying power, we reiterate our overweight stance on this early-cyclical sector that we fist boosted to an above benchmark allocation on November 16, 2020. Following up from the 100-125bps bond market tightening rule of thumb, adding another layer of complexity via bringing in the yield curve (YC) is instructive. This analysis corroborates our rule of thumb and suggests that not only do 10-year US Treasury yields have more room to rise, but also so does the S&P financials sector, especially given that it is hovering at an extremely depressed level relative to the S&P 500 (Chart 8). Chart 8V-Shaped Recovery? V-Shaped Recovery? V-Shaped Recovery? Historically the yield curve peaks at a range of 150 to 250 bps. In the past 7 cycles, this range was in place with only one exception: the first leg of the double dip recession in the early 80s. This represents a stellar track record of where the YC peters out based on empirical evidence. Even in the post GFC world, the YC steepened north of 250bp (thrice) and during the early stages of that recovery. The implication is that if history at least rhymes, then the yield curve can steepen a lot more. Were it to revisit the 250bps level, the YC could nearly double from current levels (Chart 9A). Practically, given that the Fed will pin the 2-year US Treasury yield near zero with a near-term max value of roughly 50bps, this equates to a tentative early-cycle peak 10-year Treasury yield range of 2% to 3%.   Chart 9AYield Curve Can Steepen A Lot More Yield Curve Can Steepen A Lot More Yield Curve Can Steepen A Lot More Putting this in perspective, at current levels, the 10-year US Treasury yield is roughly where it stood right after Brexit in mid-2016, which was last cycle’s trough, and still deeply in overvalued territory according to BCA bond valuation model (Chart 9B). Importantly, back then, as now, yields have been late comers to the equity rally. As a reminder, during the manufacturing recession the SPX troughed on Feb 15, 2016 – the day the Royal Dutch Shell / BG Group merger closed – while interest rates bottomed in the first week of July 2016. One key driver of the positive impact of rising interest rates on relative financials share prices will be the end to the banking sector’s hemorrhaging net interest margins (Chart 10). Chart 9BBonds Remain Extremely Overvalued Bonds Remain Extremely Overvalued Bonds Remain Extremely Overvalued Chart 10NIM Turnaround Looms NIM Turnaround Looms NIM Turnaround Looms   Financial services companies represent the nervous system of every economy and a vibrant economy is synonymous with firming loan growth (bottom panel, Chart 11). Beyond the recovery in the broad non-financial corporate sector, the overheating residential housing market in particular is another vital area that is propping up the financials sector (top panel, Chart 11).  All of this suggests that relative profitability will pick up steam this year, a message that our macro-driven relative EPS models also corroborate (second panel, Chart 12). This stands in marked contrast to sell-side analysts’ profit expectations and represents an exploitable trading opportunity: the earnings hurdle is so low for financials that even a modest beat of suppressed EPS growth expectations will go a long way in breathing fresh life into this neglected early-cyclical sector (third & bottom panels, Chart 12). Tack on pent up financials sector buyback demand and a 40bps dividend yield carry versus the SPX and the profit outlook brightens further for this interest rate-sensitive sector. Chart 11Financials Rising Alongside The Economy Financials Rising Alongside The Economy Financials Rising Alongside The Economy Finally, relative valuations are bombed out on any metric used (middle, fourth & bottom panels, Chart 13). Granted, relative technicals are not as alluring as last November, however our Technical Indicator is still below overbought levels that have marked prior relative performance peaks (second panel, Chart 13). Chart 12Green Light On Earnings Green Light On Earnings Green Light On Earnings Chart 13Financials Are Cheap No Matter How You Cut It Financials Are Cheap No Matter How You Cut It Financials Are Cheap No Matter How You Cut It Adding it all up, the selloff in the long end of the Treasury bond market and the associated yield curve steepening, rising loan growth and a turnaround in bank net interest margins signal that a durable re-rating phase looms for the beaten down financials sector. Bottom Line: Continue to overweight the S&P financials sector. Are Gold Miners Losing Their Luster? Last December when we penned the 2021 high-conviction calls Strategy Report, we put global gold miners in the “also rans” section as we did not have the courage to go underweight despite our view of an economic reopening and selloff in the bond market. It is never too late. Today, we use the downgrade alert we issued on the S&P materials sector to trim the sector to neutral via downgrading the global gold mining index to a below benchmark allocation. As a reminder, in mid-January we had put the materials sector on our downgrade watch list as a way to express the move of the cyclicals/defensives portfolio bent back down to even keel. The stock-to-bond (S/B) ratio has broken out to at least a three decade high because stocks are near all-time highs and bonds are selling off violently. This represents an explosive cocktail for gold stocks and is warning that there is ample downside for relative share prices (S/B ratio shown inverted, Chart 14). Chart 14Sell Gold Miners… Sell Gold Miners… Sell Gold Miners… This is largely due to the definitive reopening of the US economy in the coming quarters (bottom panel, Chart 15). It is also evident in 5-year/5-year forward real yields that have been soaring year-to-date signaling that investors should shy away from gold miners (real yields shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 15). Even nominal yields underscore that the path of least resistance for global gold mining equities points lower, especially given that the recent bond market selloff is driven by the real (i.e. growth) not inflation component. As a reminder, gold bullion and gold miners yield next to nothing thus when real rates rise, the opportunity cost to hold gold and gold miners skyrockets and investors abandon gold miners for higher yielding assets (top panel, Chart 16). The recent fall in the share of global negative yielding bonds by over $4tn also weighs on the prospects of gold miners (bottom panel, Chart 16). Importantly, while we are not calling for the Fed to raise rates any time soon, the 12-month forward fed funds rate discounter (as backed out of the OIS curve) has jumped back to the zero line, opening a wide gap with relative share prices. This is unsustainable and our sense is that this gulf will narrow via a drop in the latter in the coming months (fed funds rate discounter shown inverted and advanced, middle panel, Chart 16). Chart 15…When The Economy Is Roaring …When The Economy Is Roaring …When The Economy Is Roaring Another source of worry for gold stocks is the USD. Historically, a rising greenback pushes gold bullion and gold equities lower and vice versa. If the US economy will rebound at a faster clip than the euro area as the Fed is explicitly taking inflation risk and is allowing the economy to run hot, then at some point the US dollar may start to flex its muscles. Granted, this will likely be a countertrend rally in the context of a USD bear market that commenced last spring, especially given the still lopsided US dollar positioning (Chart 17). Chart 16Rising Rates Are bearish Bullion Rising Rates Are bearish Bullion Rising Rates Are bearish Bullion Chart 17Mighty USA = Countertrend Rally In The USD Mighty USA = Countertrend Rally In The USD Mighty USA = Countertrend Rally In The USD In addition, US and global policy uncertainties are melting as the US/Sino trade war has been in hibernation, the US elections are behind us and a “Blue Wave” sweep is certain to deliver mega fiscal easing packages, thus exerting downward pressure on the safe haven status of gold bullion and gold mining equities (Chart 18). Finally, the global equity risk premium is in freefall as not only the Fed, but also the ECB, the BoJ, and a plethora of other CB including EM ones are doing QE effectively engineering a “risk on” asset price inflation phase (Chart 18). Nevertheless, our bearish gold mining equity thesis has to contend with oversold conditions and bombed out relative valuations. We will be closely monitoring these two risks and stand ready to act and cut losses in case value oriented buyers come out of left field (Chart 19). Chart 18Mind The Catch Down Phase Mind The Catch Down Phase Mind The Catch Down Phase Chart 19Two Risks To Monitor Two Risks To Monitor Two Risks To Monitor Netting it all out, soaring real and nominal yields on the back of a US economic reopening, sinking policy uncertainty, and the specter of a countertrend USD rally, all undermine global gold mining stocks. Bottom Line: Downgrade the global gold mining index to underweight today. This move also pushes the S&P materials sector back to the neutral zone. A Few Words On The “Back-To-Work” Trade Last year we created two baskets of stocks to capture the economic reopening theme by constructing a long/short pair trade. This year, we crystallized 21.5% in gains from that pair trade and subsequently reopened it and it is already up another 21.3% since the second inception on February 3, 2021. Two weeks ago, we took a fresh look at the economic reopening theme and pitted “Back-To-Work” laggards against leaders. First, we filtered for well-behaved cyclical industries among all the sectors and sub-sectors we cover. We define a well-behaved cyclical industry as one that trailed the SPX from February 19, 2020 to March 23, 2020; and then outpaced the broad market from March 23, 2020 to today (all computations are in relative to SPX terms). Such filtering excluded all of the defensive & cyclical industries that outperformed the market during the recession, and it also excluded those industries that were too damaged by the pandemic and could not recover above the March 23 trough level (for example, airlines) always in relative terms. Chart 20 is a stylized depiction of our analysis. In total 27 industries survived the filtering. We then computed what is the minimum percentage increase required in order for each group to recover to its February 19 level, and then calculated the difference between that required increase and the one that actually materialized. A positive value signifies that the sector climbed above its February 19 level, whereas a negative value means that the sector still has not recovered. Chart 20Stylized Depiction Of “Back-To-Work” Sectors To Buy And To Avoid… Blind Trust Blind Trust Chart 21 displays the results. Our rationale is as follows: should the economic recovery and normalization themes continue unabated as we expect, then the risk/reward trade-off of owning the “laggards” is greater than the “overshooters”: the former have ample upside potential left, whereas the latter are already discounting a lot of good news. Chart 22 plots the ratio of the two baskets against the ISM manufacturing prices paid sub-component and the 10-year US Treasury yield and supports our rationale that the “laggards” have a long runway ahead versus the “overshooters”. Chart 21…Buy The Laggards / Sell The Overshooters Blind Trust Blind Trust Chart 22Inflation Impulse Beneficiaries Inflation Impulse Beneficiaries Inflation Impulse Beneficiaries Bottom Line: We deem there is an exploitable opportunity within the reopening theme and we reiterate our recent pair trade recommendation: long USES “Laggards” basket/short USES “Overshooters” basket (excluding the GICS1 sectors). As a proxy for this trade we include tickers for the largest stock in each sub-sector (excluding GICS1). Laggards: V, BLK, HCA, MCD, HON, AXP, JPM, COP, PSX, MAR, SLB. Overshooters: EMR, BLL, LIN, NUE, UNP, HD, DHI, CAT, MS, J, TSLA, AMAT. We are aware of some minor conflicts between the “Overshooters” and the “Back-To-Work” basket and also versus our current recommendations table, but we still recommend investors stick with this pair trade.   Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     A quick note on the taper tantrum and the 2016 iterations. During those periods the S&P 500 actually fell at the same time as yields rose (not after the rule was triggered), so technically we should not have counted that as a valid iteration on our chart.     Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations Overdose? Overdose? Size And Style Views February 24, 2021 Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives January 12, 2021  Stay neutral small over large caps June 11, 2018 Long the BCA Millennial basket  The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, ABNB, V). January 22, 2018 Favor value over growth