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Commodities & Energy Sector

Highlights Bulk commodity markets – chiefly iron ore and steel – could see sharp rallies once Chinese authorities give the all-clear on COVID-19 (the WHO’s official name for the coronavirus). These markets rallied sharply Tuesday, as President Xi vowed China would achieve its growth targets this year, which, all else equal, likely will require additional monetary and fiscal stimulus. China accounts for ~ 70% of the global trade in iron ore, and ~ 50% of global steel supply and demand. COVID-19-induced losses have hit Chinese demand for steel hard, forcing blast furnaces to sharply reduce output. However, this partly is being countered by transitory weather- and COVID-19-related disruptions that are reducing iron ore exports from Brazil and delaying Australian shipments. Iron ore inventories could be drawn hard in 2Q and 2H20 to meet demand as steelmakers rebuild stocks and construction and infrastructure projects restart (Chart of the Week). The Chinese Communist Party celebrates its 100th anniversary next year. To offset the COVID-19-induced drag on domestic growth this year, which could take GDP growth below 5%, and a weak GDP performance next year additional stimulus is an all-but-foregone conclusion. Feature When policymakers really want to jumpstart GDP growth, their playbook typically turns to the real economy via policies that encourage construction, infrastructure development and manufacturing. There is a compelling case a strong rally in iron ore and steel will accompany the containment of COVID-19, reversing the 14% and 4% declines in both since the start of the year (Chart 2). Chief among the drivers of the rally will be the increase in fiscal and monetary stimulus required to restore Chinese GDP growth disrupted by the COVID-19 outbreak, which could reduce annual growth closer to 5% than the ~ 6% rate policymakers were targeting. Chart of the WeekLow Iron Ore Stocks Setting Up A Rally Low Iron Ore Stocks Setting Up A Rally Low Iron Ore Stocks Setting Up A Rally Chart 2Policy Stimulus Will Reverse Declines In Iron Ore And Steel Prices Policy Stimulus Will Reverse Declines In Iron Ore And Steel Prices Policy Stimulus Will Reverse Declines In Iron Ore And Steel Prices There are a number of reasons for expecting this. 2020 marks the terminus of the decade-long policy evolution that was supposed to end with the realization of the “Chinese Dream.” Chief among the goals that were to be realized by the end of this year – which will usher in the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021 – are a doubling of per capita income and of GDP.1 The Communist Party in China has numerous policy levers it can pull to respond to worse-than-expected growth and economic shocks. These policies consume a lot of bulk commodities and base metals. When policymakers really want to jump-start GDP growth, their playbook typically turns to the real economy via policies that encourage construction, infrastructure development and manufacturing. This was clearly seen following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008-09 (Chart 3). Even before the COVID-19 outbreak, policymakers made it clear they wanted to stabilize growth following the Sino-US trade war at the conclusion of the Central Economic Work Conference (CEWC) in December. Nominal wages and per capita income growth had been falling since 3Q18, imperilling one of the principal goals of the “Chinese Dream.” Chart 3Policy Stimulus Will Lift GDP And Iron Ore And Steel Prices Policy Stimulus Will Lift GDP And Iron Ore And Steel Prices Policy Stimulus Will Lift GDP And Iron Ore And Steel Prices Policymakers will aim for annualized quarterly growth of ~ 6.5% in 2Q- 4Q20 if their goal is simply to achieve 6% p.a. growth this year. Following that CEWC meeting, our colleagues at BCA’s China Investment Strategy (CIS) anticipated policymakers would announce growth targets at the National People’s Congress (NPC) meeting next month in the range of 5.8 and 6.2% p.a. growth, noting, “the Chinese economy needs to increase by 6% in 2020 to double its size from the 2010 level in real terms.”2 The growth rate required to put the economy on track to deliver on the “Chinese Dream” is now much higher following the COVID-19 outbreak, which could shave ~1% or more off China’s growth this year alone. This suggests policymakers will aim for annualized quarterly growth of ~ 6.5% in 2Q-4Q20 if their goal is simply to achieve 6% p.a. growth this year. This predisposes us to expect significant monetary and fiscal stimulus this year after the all-clear is sounded and the economy can return to its day-to-day activities. In addition – and by no means least of the concerns driving policymakers’ decisions – the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CCP will be celebrated next year, something policymakers at all levels have been looking forward to showcase the success of their revolution. A Boon For Bulks As monetary policy eases, the construction growth trajectory should pick up smartly. China accounts for ~ 70% of the global trade in iron ore. It is expected to import ~ 1.1 billion MT this year and next, based on estimates published by the Australian government’s Department of Industry, Innovation and Science in its December 2019 quarterly assessment (Chart 4). China will account for ~ 50% of global steel supply and demand, or roughly 900mm MT/yr in 2020 and 2021. The COVID-19 outbreak reduced utilization rates at the close to 250 steel mills monitored by Mysteel Global in China to 78%, a drop of 2.3pp.3 Platts estimates refined steel production could fall by 43mm MT by the end of February.4 Most of China’s steel output goes into commercial and residential construction (~ 35%), infrastructure (~20%), machinery (~ 20%), and automobile production (~ 7%), based on S&P Global Platts estimates.5 Residential construction began to recover last year, and residential housing inventories were declining relative to sales (Chart 5). In our view, once the COVID-19 infection rate falls outside Hubei Province – the epicenter of the outbreak – markets will begin pricing in a revival of commercial and residential construction in China. As monetary policy eases, the construction growth trajectory should pick up smartly (Chart 6). Chart 4China Dominates Iron Ore, Steel Markets Iron Ore, Steel Poised For Rally Iron Ore, Steel Poised For Rally   Chart 5Resumption Of Construction Will Lift Demand For Bulks Resumption Of Construction Will Lift Demand For Bulks Resumption Of Construction Will Lift Demand For Bulks Chart 6Easier Money And Credit Policy Will Revive Construction Easier Money And Credit Policy Will Revive Construction Easier Money And Credit Policy Will Revive Construction Infrastructure spending already was on track to increase prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, based on our CIS colleagues’ reading of the CEWC statement issued in December, which “suggests fiscal support to the economy will mainly focus on infrastructure, and listed transportation, urban and rural development, and the 5G networks to be the government’s main investment projects next year.”6 This fiscal push will be supported by additional spending at the local government level, and by the issuance of special-purpose bonds by these governments with proceeds earmarked for infrastructure development (Chart 7). “A bigger fiscal push by the central government, coupled with a frontloading of 2020 local government special-purpose bond issuance, will likely boost infrastructure spending to around 10% in the first two quarters, doubling the growth in the first eleven months of 2019,” according to our CIS colleagues. Chart 7Pump Priming Will Boost Infrastructure Spending Pump Priming Will Boost Infrastructure Spending Pump Priming Will Boost Infrastructure Spending Bottom Line: Infrastructure fixed asset investment will be supported by easier credit and fiscal policy in China. Whether it rises at double-digit growth rates remains to be seen, however. Expect Chinese Consumers To Come Out Spending Infrastructure fixed asset investment will be supported by easier credit and fiscal policy in China. Prior to the outbreak of COVID-19, consumer confidence was running high (Chart 8), and employment prospects have bottomed and turned higher, although they still indicate contraction. (Chart 9). This boded well for consumer-spending expectations, particularly for autos (Chart 10). Chart 8Consumer Confidence Was High Prior to COVID-19 Outbreak ... Consumer Confidence Was High Prior to COVID-19 Outbreak ... Consumer Confidence Was High Prior to COVID-19 Outbreak ... Chart 9... And Job Prospects Were Improving ... ... And Job Prospects Were Improving ... ... And Job Prospects Were Improving ... At ~ 7%, China’s automobile production remains a marginal contributor to overall steel consumption. Nonetheless, a meaningful pickup in automobile production following the depressed growth rate of the past 15 months would move steel demand upward. China’s share of world auto sales is ~30% (Chart 11). Chart 10... Thus Lifting Prospects For Chinese Auto Sales ... Thus Lifting Prospects For Chinese Auto Sales ... Thus Lifting Prospects For Chinese Auto Sales   Chart 11Policy Stimulus Will Revive Chinese Auto Sector Policy Stimulus Will Revive Chinese Auto Sector Policy Stimulus Will Revive Chinese Auto Sector Accommodative monetary and fiscal policies in China point toward higher growth for the auto sector. However, it is important to note the revival in auto production needs to be driven by consumer demand – if it is led simply by restocking, the rebound will not be sustainable. The recovery we are expecting will support steel and metal consumption at the margin, but the outlook for infrastructure and construction remains key due to their higher weight in total steel consumption. Bottom Line: Auto consumption and production were recovering in late 2019; however, the strength of the recovery did not match previous stimulus programs (2009 and 2016). The recovery we are expecting this year will support steel and metal consumption at the margin, but the outlook for infrastructure and construction remains key due to their higher weight in total steel consumption. If these other sectors remain constructive for metal demand (or at least are not contracting or slowing drastically), the boost from the auto sector will meaningfully contribute to higher iron ore and steel prices.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com     Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight Oil prices halted their decline and rose 1% on Tuesday as the number of daily confirmed cases of the Wuhan coronavirus decelerated in China. As of Tuesday, the daily growth in cases dropped to 5%, down from 6% the previous day. Investors will closely monitor this number for any sign of a durable slowdown in daily confirmed cases. Separately, the US Energy Information Administration revised down its global demand growth estimates for 2020 to 1.0mm b/d from 1.3mm b/d last month, reflecting the effects of the coronavirus and warmer-than-expected January temperatures in the northern hemisphere. We will be updating our global oil balances next week. Base Metals: Neutral Iron ore prices fell 14% since the COVID-2019 outbreak in January. Investors are assessing how the iron ore market will balance weaker demand expectations in China amid lower supply – largely a result of falling Brazilian ore exports. Brazil’s total iron ore exports fell ~19% y/y in January due to heavy rainfall and lower production at Brazilian miner Vale. The company’s output never fully recovered from the 2019 dam incident and remains a risk to iron ore supply in 1Q20. Vale lowered its March sales guidance by 2mm MT. Low Chinese port inventories raise prices’ vulnerability to supply disruptions (Chart 12). Precious Metals: Neutral Gold remains well bid despite a strong US dollar, fueled by safe-haven demand. The yellow metal’s price fell slightly on Tuesday as investors’ concerns over the coronavirus eased. Based on our fair-value model, prices averaged $55/oz above our estimate in January. Investors – i.e. global ETF holders and net speculative positions reported by the US CFTC – have been important contributors to the latest gold rally. Investors’ total holding of gold reached a record high 113mm oz last week. Nonetheless, we believe there is still opportunity for this group to further support prices: the share of gold allocation vs. world equity-market capitalization is still low at 0.24%, vs. its peak of 0.42% in 2012 (Chart 13). Ags/Softs:  Underweight March wheat futures were down 1.8% at Tuesday’s close, settling at the lowest level of the year after the USDA called for ‘stable supplies’ of the grain for the 2019/2020 U.S. marketing year. For corn, ending stocks were unchanged relative to the January projection, while world production was revised slightly upwards. March corn futures finished 2¢ lower at $3.7975/bu. The USDA also estimated higher soybean exports on the back of increased sales to China. However, soybean price gains were limited by higher production and ending stocks abroad. Chart 12Low Iron Ore Inventory Raises Exposure To Supply Disruptions Low Iron Ore Inventory Raises Exposure To Supply Disruptions Low Iron Ore Inventory Raises Exposure To Supply Disruptions Chart 13A Higher Share Of Gold Holdings Could Support Prices Further A Higher Share Of Gold Holdings Could Support Prices Further A Higher Share Of Gold Holdings Could Support Prices Further   Footnotes 1     The “Chinese Dream” is a phrase coined by President Xi Jinping, following the 18th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, when the overarching goal of transforming China into a “moderately well-off society” was memorialized in writing. These goals were crystalized in terms of progress expected in per capita income and GDP, both of which were to be doubled in the decade ending this year. Please see Why 2020 Is a Make-or-Break Year for China published by thediplomat.com February 13, 2015. 2     Please see A Year-End Tactical Upgrade, published by BCA Research’s China Investment Strategy December 18, 2019, for an in-depth analysis of policy guidance coming out of the Economic Work Conference last December. It is available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3    Please see WEEKLY: China’s blast furnace capacity use drops to 78% published by Mysteel Global February 10, 2020. 4    Please see China steel consumption to plunge by up to 43 mil mt in February due to coronavirus published February 6, 2020, by S&P Global Platts. 5    Please see China Macro & Metals: Steel output falls, but property creates bright spots published by S&P Global Platts December 6, 2019. 6    Please see footnote 2 above. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q4 Iron Ore, Steel Poised For Rally Iron Ore, Steel Poised For Rally Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2020 Summary of Closed Trades Iron Ore, Steel Poised For Rally Iron Ore, Steel Poised For Rally
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Highlights Base metals appear to be pricing the impact of the Chinese 2019-nCoV coronavirus in line with the 2003 SARS outbreak. We expect an earlier peak in reported (ex-Hubei) cases than is currently discounted by markets, implying Asian economies – and base metals – will recover sooner than expected, perhaps by end-February. We estimate the marginal impact of 2019-nCoV on global oil demand implied by the recent sell-off translates to a loss of ~ 800k b/d over February-July 2020. This leads us to expect OPEC 2.0’s technical committee will recommend additional cuts of 500k b/d for 2Q-4Q20 to the full coalition, following their meetings in Vienna. This would be bullish, if Asian economies recover as quickly as we expect. Safe-haven assets – chiefly gold and the USD – rallied but do not signal an exodus from risky assets. After breaching $1,580/oz last week, gold traded lower, while the broad trade-weighted USD index rallied 1%, mildly reversing a decline begun at the end of 2019. Risky-asset markets are anticipating monetary accommodation by systemically important central banks will remain in place this year; fiscal stimulus in China and EM economies is likely. This remains supportive of commodity demand. Feature Our view differs from the markets’, which makes us relatively more bullish base metals prices. There is a tight relationship between Asian economic activity and base metals prices, which provides a window on how markets currently expect the 2019-nCoV outbreak will impact aggregate demand in Asia (Chart of the Week). Our view differs from the markets’, which makes us relatively more bullish base metals prices. Chief among the assumptions driving our view is our expectation markets will stage a recovery once the number of 2019-nCoV cases peaks outside the epicenter of the outbreak in Wuhan, a city of 11mm people in Hubei Province, which remains locked down per Chinese containment efforts.1 This is our House view, as well. Alert: The peak in cases ex-Wuhan could come sooner than expected. Our colleagues at BCA’s China Investment Strategy (CIS) note, “New cases outside of the epicenter continue to rise, but a peak may be in sight. Our sense is that financial markets are likely to bottom earlier than the consensus expects. The economic impact on China from the outbreak will be large, but manufacturing activities in the majority of Chinese cities should resume by the end of February.”2 Chart of the WeekBase Metals Prices Lead Changes in Asian Economies Base Metals Prices Lead Changes in Asian Economies Base Metals Prices Lead Changes in Asian Economies This will be important for base metals demand. China accounts for ~ 50% of global supply and demand for refined base metals (Chart 2). These markets are exquisitely attuned to the decisions of Chinese policymakers, so much so that they resemble a vertically integrated system: Policymakers allocate and direct credit to industries and projects – creating a demand signal – and the supply side, which includes numerous state-owned enterprises, responds. What cannot be consumed domestically is exported to neighboring economies. Chart 2China Dominates Base Metals Metals Pricing To SARS-Type Demand Shock Metals Pricing To SARS-Type Demand Shock This largely explains why base metals are so entwined with Chinese economic activity, and with Asian activity generally. Our research indicates base-metals prices lead our Asia Economic Diffusion index, reflecting the information-processing capacity of these markets vis-à-vis the evolution of the regional economies.3 This is one reason we use base-metals markets as information sources in conjunction with our proprietary models and indicators. At present, it appears base metals markets are pricing in a recovery trajectory similar to what was seen during the 2003 SARS episode. Chart 3Markets Price Metals Hit Similar To SARS Metals Pricing To SARS-Type Demand Shock Metals Pricing To SARS-Type Demand Shock At present, it appears base metals markets are pricing in a recovery trajectory similar to what was seen during the 2003 SARS episode (Chart 3), when the LMEX fell 9% from February to April, then fully recovered by year end (Chart 4). Also noteworthy is the fact that most commodity markets were processing this information and reflecting it in their own trajectories, as seen in the path taken by our proprietary Global Commodity Factor (Chart 4, bottom panel). Chart 4Once SARS Infection Peaked, Base Metals Recovered Quickly Once SARS Infection Peaked, Base Metals Recovered Quickly Once SARS Infection Peaked, Base Metals Recovered Quickly The market call from our CIS colleagues implies base metals – summarized by the LMEX – will begin to rally this month as the odds of a peak in 2019-nCoV cases outside Hubei increases. We expect this rally will be aided by increased fiscal stimulus in China (e.g., infrastructure and construction spending), and monetary stimulus (Chart 5), which will renew the lift in manufacturing that appeared toward the end of 2019 (Chart 6).4 Chart 5Higher China Policy Stimulus Expected Higher China Policy Stimulus Expected Higher China Policy Stimulus Expected Chart 6Early 2019-nCoV Peak Would Revive China's Growth Early 2019-nCoV Peak Would Revive China's Growth Early 2019-nCoV Peak Would Revive China's Growth Oil Marches To A Different Drummer Oil markets primarily are pricing to expectations of a deep hit to crude oil demand, driven by 2019-nCoV’s impact on China’s consumption.5 Based on our modeling, we estimate the marginal impact of 2019-nCoV on global oil demand priced into WTI and Brent prices earlier in the week translates to a loss of ~ 800k b/d over February-July 2020. This leads us to expect OPEC 2.0’s technical committee will recommend additional cuts of 500k b/d for 2Q-4Q20, following meetings in Vienna this week. These cuts would be in addition to the 1.7mm b/d cuts agreed by the coalition at its November 2019 meeting, for the January to March 2020 period. OPEC’s (the old cartel) crude oil production in January fell 640k b/d from December levels to 28.35mm b/d, as the additional cuts of 1.7mm b/d agreed in November kicked in, according to Reuters. Additionally, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states over-complied on their cuts. Output from Libya also is down by ~ 1mm b/d since last month. Importantly, the latest OPEC output levels are ~ 1.3mm b/d below average 2019 production, which Platts estimates at 29.66mm b/d – the lowest output since 2011. We will be updating our balances and price forecasts in two weeks, which will reflect these data more fully. This will allow us to include more information on the demand destruction in China, the evolution of 2019-nCoV, and OPEC 2.0 supply decisions. Additional production cuts by OPEC 2.0 as demand recovers – along with the likely acceleration of the slow-down in US shale-oil production following the recent oil price rout and continued parsimony in capital markets – also would allow backwardation to return to the oil forward curves. Although China’s share of global oil demand amounts to ~ 14% – far less than its share of base metals’ supply and demand – the fact that more than 70% of its 10.2mm b/d of imports comes from OPEC 2.0 is focusing the coalition on the need to restrain supply (Chart 7).6 If, as discussed above, 2019-nCoV cases peak sooner than expected, Asia’s economies likely will recover sooner than expected, which will rally oil prices sooner than expected. Additional production cuts by OPEC 2.0 as demand recovers – along with the likely acceleration of the slow-down in US shale-oil production following the recent oil price rout and continued parsimony in capital markets – also would allow backwardation to return to the oil forward curves (Chart 8). Chart 7China's Share Of Global Oil Demand China's Share Of Global Oil Demand China's Share Of Global Oil Demand Chart 8An Early Peak In 2019-nCoV Cases Would Restore Backwardation To Oil An Early Peak In 2019-nCoV Cases Would Restore Backwardation To Oil An Early Peak In 2019-nCoV Cases Would Restore Backwardation To Oil Based on this assessment, we are getting long 4Q20 WTI vs. Short 4Q21 WTI at tonight’s close, in expectation of a return to backwardation. Bottom Line: Base metals markets could rally sharply if, as we expect, 2019-nCoV cases peak sooner than expected outside the epicenter of Wuhan. This also will lift oil demand in China and Asia. Lastly, it will restore backwardation in the benchmark crude oil curves – Brent and WTI – which is why we are going long 4Q20 WTI vs. short 4Q21 WTI at tonight’s close. Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight Uncertainty around the potential impact of the new coronavirus in China pushed WTI prices down to $49.6/bbl as of Tuesday’s close, a 22% drop since the onset of the outbreak. Oil speculators are rapidly exiting the market; non-commercial long WTI positions fell to 564k from 626k on January 7, 2020. On the supply side, OPEC’s oil production dropped to 28.4mm b/d in January, according to Bloomberg, in line with Reuters estimate. This partly reflects the collapse in Libya’s oil production following the closure of its main export terminals by forces loyal to General Khalifa Haftar. Production there was estimated at 204k b/d – the lowest level since the uprising against Muammar Qaddafi in 2011 – vs. an average of 1.1mm b/d in 2019. Base Metals: Neutral China’s net export of steel products declined throughout 2019 amid strong production growth and range-bound inventories. This suggests steel consumption in China remained buoyant, supported by strong new property starts and infrastructure investments (Chart 9). Our commodity-demand indicators suggest most metals’ fundamentals turned constructive in late 2019. However, the coronavirus outbreak will delay the rebound in prices we expected. Over the medium term, we continue to expect prices to pick up, fueled by accommodative monetary policy, and stronger-than-expected monetary and fiscal stimulus in China to offset the negative effect of the 2019-nCoV. Precious Metals: Neutral Fears of wider contagion of the coronavirus are keeping gold above $1,550/oz despite the rise in the US dollar powered by upbeat US manufacturing data. Over the long term, periods of elevated uncertainty are associated with rising households’ precautionary demand for savings as future income becomes increasingly uncertain. This pushes up asset prices as total savings increase, and specifically safer assets, such as gold, until uncertainty abates. This high savings rate acted as a floor to gold prices in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and is currently a crucial contributor to its elevated price (Chart 10). Ags/Softs:  Underweight Abating fears of a pandemic spread of the 2019-nCoV lifted CBOT March corn futures to $3.8225/bu on Tuesday, reversing some of the damage done by disappointing export reports from the USDA and favorable crop conditions in South America supporting expectations for a large corn harvest there. Strong sales of soybeans to Egypt and favorable export inspections helped beans reverse last week's negative trend. USD strength on the back of the 2019-nCoV, particularly against the Brazilian real, remains a headwind to bean prices. Chart 9China's Steel Consumption Remained Buoyant In 2019 China's Steel Consumption Remained Buoyant In 2019 China's Steel Consumption Remained Buoyant In 2019 Chart 10Uncertainty Drives Demand For Safe Havens Uncertainty Drives Demand For Safe Havens Uncertainty Drives Demand For Safe Havens     Footnotes 1     It is important to note this is a highly speculative call, and that even the public-health experts are groping for understanding on the trajectory of 2019-nCoV at this point. It is possible the virus is not contained and extinguished as SARS was in 2003, but becomes a recurrent feature of the flu season globally. Please see Experts envision two scenarios if the new coronavirus isn’t contained, published by Stat February 4, 2020. Stat is a life sciences and medical news service produced by Boston Globe Media. 2     Please see Recovery, Temporarily Interrupted, published by BCA Research’s China Investment Strategy February 5, 2020. It is available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3    Our Asia Economic Diffusion index was developed by BCA Research’s Global Investment Strategy team. The “information” we refer to here is the actual buying and selling of base metals, and contracting for services related to the economic activity accompanying a revival in manufacturing, infrastructure buildouts and construction that drives that demand. This will show up in various measures of economic activity, among them BCA’s Asia Economic Diffusion index and different gauges used by the IMF and World Bank. In other words, base metals prices lead the Asia Economic Diffusion index based on our analysis of Granger causality. This is valuable because the metals price in real time. In earlier research, we showed that, among commodity markets, base metals prices – via copper prices, the LMEX, and the IMF’s metals index – can be used to confirm the signals from our econometric indicators and models of EM and global economic activity. Please see World Bank Lowers Growth Forecast; Commodity Demand Will Pick Up, published January 16, 2020, and Godot … Trade Deal … Wait For It … Base Metals Are Primed For A Rally, published November 28, 2019, by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy. They are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4    Iron ore and steel prices also will revive on the back of this economic recovery; we will be looking into this next week. 5    Earlier this week, Bloomberg reported the initial hit to oil demand in China amounted to 3mm b/d – the largest such hit since the Global Financial Crisis. This represented ~ 20% of daily Chinese oil demand. 6    We discuss China’s position in the global oil market – and, importantly, in the global air-transportation markets – in last week’s publication, Expect OPEC 2.0 To Cut Supply In Response to Demand Shock. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q4 Metals Pricing To SARS-Type Demand Shock Metals Pricing To SARS-Type Demand Shock Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades Metals Pricing To SARS-Type Demand Shock Metals Pricing To SARS-Type Demand Shock
Copper has suffered from the combined assault of a strong dollar, weak global manufacturing activity and, most recently, the dreaded impact on growth from nCoV-2019. However, an opportunity to buy the red metal is emerging. Construction and manufacturing…
  Feature Everyone’s asset-allocation plans for the year have been disrupted by the novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV). Our view is that, while the virus is serious and will hurt the Chinese and global economy in the short term, it does not change the 12-month structural outlook for financial markets. Once the epidemic is under control (which it is not yet), there will be an excellent buying opportunity for risk assets and for the most affected asset classes. Many commentators have pointed to the lessons from SARS in 2003. Markets bottomed around the time that new cases of the disease peaked (Chart 1). But there are risks with such a simplistic comparison. The US invasion of Iraq happened at the same time – between 19 March and 1 May 2003 – with arguably a bigger impact on global markets. The Chinese economy was much less significant: China represented only 4% of global nominal GDP in 2003 (versus 17% now), 7% of global car sales (35% now), and 10-20% of commodity demand (50-60%). And it is still unclear how similar 2019-nCoV is to SARS: it appears to be spreading more rapidly (Chart 2) but (so far, at least) is less deadly, with a mortality rate of about 2%, compared to 10% for SARS. Recommended Allocation Monthly Portfolio Update: Going Viral Monthly Portfolio Update: Going Viral Chart 1The Lesson From Sars The Lesson From Sars The Lesson From Sars Chart 2But Is Novel Coronavirus Different? Monthly Portfolio Update: Going Viral Monthly Portfolio Update: Going Viral     Nonetheless, the basic theory that markets should bottom around the time that new cases and deaths peak is likely to prove correct. With the number of deaths still growing, however, that is not yet the case. Our advice to investors would be not to sell at this point. The hedges we have in our portfolio (overweight cash and gold) should help to cushion any further downside. But, within a few weeks, assets such as EM equities, airline stocks, commodities, or the Australian dollar should look very attractive again (Chart 3). For the next few months, economic data, particularly from China, will be hard to interpret. In 2003, Chinese GDP was reduced by 1.1% because of SARS, according to estimates by the Brookings Institute.1 The global economy is likely to be more heavily impacted this time, given today’s closely integrated supply chains. On the other hand, most academic research shows that consumption and production lost during an epidemic are later made up. Additionally, the Chinese government is likely to respond with easier fiscal and monetary policy. Once the air clears, we think our thesis that the manufacturing cycle bottomed in late 2019 will remain intact. The data over the past few weeks supports this. In Asia, in particular, PMIs for the major emerging economies are back above 50 (Chart 4). Europe’s rebound has lagged a little but, in the key German economy, indicators of business and investor sentiment have bottomed. Demand in the auto sector, crucial for Europe and Japan, is clearly starting to recover. Data in Europe and EM have generally surprised to the upside recently (Chart 5). Chart 3Some Assets May Soon Look Attractive Some Assets May Soon Look Attractive Some Assets May Soon Look Attractive   Chart 4Asian And European Data Picking Up Asian And European Data Picking Up Asian And European Data Picking Up Chart 5Positive Surprises Positive Surprises Positive Surprises The theory that markets should bottom around the time that new cases and deaths peak is likely to prove correct. To a degree, the new virus gave investors an excuse to take profits in some over-bought markets. The US equity market, in particular, looked expensive at the start of the year, with a forward PE of 19x. But we would dismiss the common view that investors had become too optimistic. The bull-bear ratio is not elevated (Chart 6), with only 37% of US individual investors at the start of January believing that the stock market would go up over the next six months, not particularly high by historical standards – it has fallen now to 32%. Last year, investors took money out of equity funds, despite strong returns from stocks. In the past – for example 2012 and 2016 – when this happened, it was followed by further gains for equities, as investors belatedly bought into the rally (Chart 7).   Chart 6Retail Investors Aren't So Bullish... Retail Investors Aren't So Bullish... Retail Investors Aren't So Bullish... Chart 7...Indeed, They Have Been Selling Stocks ...Indeed, They Have Been Selling Stocks ...Indeed, They Have Been Selling Stocks     On a 12-month investment horizon, therefore, we remain overweight risk assets such as equities and credit, albeit with some hedges. The upside to global growth remains underestimated: the economists’ consensus is for only 1.8% GDP growth in the US and 1.0% in the euro area this year. A combination of accelerating global growth and central banks that will stay dovish should allow equities to outperform bonds over the next 12 months (Chart 8). Chart 8If PMIs Pick Up, Equities Will Outperform If PMIs Pick Up, Equities Will Outperform If PMIs Pick Up, Equities Will Outperform   Chart 9First Signs Of US Equity Underperformance? First Signs Of US Equity Underperformance? First Signs Of US Equity Underperformance? Equities:  In December, we moved underweight US equities and recommended shifting into more cyclical markets: overweight the euro zone, and neutral on EM, the UK, and Australia. Before the outbreak of 2019-nCoV, this had worked in EM, but less well in Europe (Chart 9). Once the effects of the virus have cleared, we still believe this allocation will outperform as the global manufacturing cycle picks up. But we have a couple of concerns. (1) The recent US/China trade deal will require China to increase imports from the US by a highly unrealistic 83% year-on-year in 2020 (Chart 10). Our China strategists don’t expect this target to be fully met, but think any increase will come from substitution.2 This would hurt exporters in Europe and Asia. (2) The outperformance of euro area equities is very much determined by how banks fare. The headwinds against them continue: the ECB recently decreed that six major banks fall below required capital ratios; loan growth to corporates in the euro area has fallen to 3.2% year-on-year. Much, though, depends on the yield curve (Chart 11). If it steepens, as a result of stronger growth this year, as we expect, bank stocks should outperform, especially since they remain very cheap (the average price/book ratio of euro area banks is currently only 0.65).   Chart 10China’s Import Targets Are Unrealistic Monthly Portfolio Update: Going Viral Monthly Portfolio Update: Going Viral Chart 11Bank Performance Depends On The Yield Curve Bank Performance Depends On The Yield Curve Bank Performance Depends On The Yield Curve Once the air clears, we think our thesis that the manufacturing cycle bottomed in late 2019 will remain intact. Fixed Income: Government bond yields have fallen in recent weeks as investors sought cover, with the US Treasury 10-year yield dropping to 1.55%. While it may test last September’s low of 1.46%, we do not see much further room for global yields to fall. They tend to be highly correlated with manufacturing PMIs, which we expect to rise over the next 12 months (Chart 12). Also, we see the Fed staying on hold this year, not cutting rates twice, as the market is now pricing in. This mildly hawkish surprise should push up rates (Chart 13). We continue to prefer credit over government bonds. Our global fixed-income strategists consider that, from a valuation standpoint, US high yield, and UK investment grade and high yield are the most attractive (Chart 14).3 Chart 12Rates Move In Line With PMIs Rates Move In Line With PMIs Rates Move In Line With PMIs Chart 13What If The Fed Doesn't Cut Rates? What If The Fed Doesn't Cut Rates? What If The Fed Doesn't Cut Rates? Chart 14US Junk Looks Most Attractive Monthly Portfolio Update: Going Viral Monthly Portfolio Update: Going Viral Currencies:  Defensive currencies such as the yen, Swiss franc, and US dollar have benefitted from the recent risk-off move. We see this as temporary. Once investors refocus on growth, the US dollar should start to depreciate again (the DXY index did fall by 3% between September and early January). The dollar is a counter-cyclical currency. It is 15% overvalued relative to PPP (Chart 15). It is also very momentum-driven – and, since December, momentum has pointed to depreciation and continues to do so (Chart 16).  Chart 15Dollar Is 15% Overvalued... Dollar Is 15% Overvalued... Dollar Is 15% Overvalued... Chart 16...And Momentum Has Moved Against USD ...And Momentum Has Moved Against USD ...And Momentum Has Moved Against USD Commodities: Industrial metals prices had started to pick up over the past few months, reflecting the stabilization of Chinese growth (Chart 17). How they fare from now will depend on: (1) how sharply Chinese growth slows as a result of 2019nCoV, and (2) how much stimulus the Chinese government rolls out to offset this. Given the degree of decline in some commodity prices (zinc down by 16% since mid-January, and copper by 9%, for example), there should be an attractive buying opportunity in these assets over coming weeks. Gold has proved to be a handy hedge against geopolitical risks (Iran) and unexpected tail risks (the coronavirus), rising by 4% year-to-date. We continue to believe it has a useful place in investors’ portfolios as a diversifier and hedge, particularly in a world of very low interest rates where cash is unattractive (Chart 18). The oil price has been hit by the disruption to air travel in January, but supply remains tight (and OPEC is likely to cut supply further in response to the demand shock).4 As long as economic growth picks up later this year, we see the crude oil price recovering over the coming months. Chart 17Metals Reflect Chinese Growth Chinese Slowdown Will Weigh On Metal Prices Metals Reflect Chinese Growth Chinese Slowdown Will Weigh On Metal Prices Metals Reflect Chinese Growth Chart 18Gold Attractive With Bond Yields So Low Gold Attractive With Bond Yields So Low Gold Attractive With Bond Yields So Low Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist garry@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Please see Globalization and Disease: The Case Of SARS, Jong-Wha Lee and Warwick J. McKibbin, Brookings Discussion Paper No. 156, available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20040203-1.pdf 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Managing Expectations,” dated 22 January 2020, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report “How To Find Value In Corporate Bonds,” dated 21 January 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report “Expect OPEC 2.0 To Cut Supply In Response to Demand Shock,” dated 30 January 2020, available at ces.bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation  
Highlights Collective market signals suggest a low but non-negligible probability of a dollar spike due to the coronavirus. Stay long the yen as a portfolio hedge. Short CHF/JPY bets also make sense.  Our limit sell on the gold/silver ratio was triggered at 90. Place a stop at 95, with an initial target of 80. Feature Chart I-1Watching Market Signals Watching Market Signals Watching Market Signals Investors can generally be classified in two camps. There are those who are predisposed to being risk averse. As such, capital preservation trumps the desire for outsized returns. For such investors, defensive equities such as staples and utility stocks, fixed-income assets, or even gold tend to be the favored vehicles over time. At the opposite end of the spectrum are the investors who desire hopping on and riding the next growth unicorn. Their favored investment universe can include technology and biotech concerns, but can also span industries such as automotive and food. The key, however, is that their inherent disposition is to multiply returns rather than preserve capital. There is a crucial difference between this bias and a risk-on/risk-off environment. For example, in a risk-on environment, the more prudent investor might choose high-yielding government bonds, while the high flyer will be in the S&P 500 or private equity. In the currency world, the “preservationist” might choose the euro as an anti-dollar play despite negative yields, while the “high flyer” would rather be in the New Zealand dollar or the Norwegian krone. The oscillation between these two bipolar universes can be measured in various ways, but one that has been prescient in gauging the direction for currency markets is the ratio between the S&P 500 index and gold prices. In general, whenever the S&P 500 has been outperforming gold, the dollar has tended to soar, and vice versa (Chart I-1). As a closed economy, US markets are generally more defensive. So even in a risk-off environment, this ratio can capture the preference for capital preservation versus growth. The collective signals from financial markets suggest there is a low probability of a dollar spike. The SPX/Gold ratio hit a peak of 2.5 in the last quarter of 2018 and has since been exhibiting a bearish pattern of lower highs, with the latest rise peaking a nudge below 2.2. Our belief is that it is less a story of greed versus fear, and more an indication of a powerful underlying preference for investors being revealed in asset prices. Gauging FX Market Signals The coronavirus outbreak has been dominating market headlines in recent weeks. We are not infectious disease specialists, so cannot provide any insight on the potential impact on growth and/or the probability for the virus to become much more widespread. However, the collective signals from financial markets suggest there is a low probability of a dollar spike. The rise in the dollar has been relatively on par with the SARS experience of 2002 (Chart I-2A and Chart I-2B). Back then, the Chinese economy had a much smaller effect on global growth, and so far, the number of reported cases is outpacing the SARS experience. So, it is possible that given the dollar bull market of the last decade or so, there is a dearth of new buyers in the greenback. Chart I-2ARun Of The Mill Virus ? (1) Run Of The Mill Virus ? (1) Run Of The Mill Virus ? (1) Chart I-2BRun Of The Mill Virus ? (2) Run Of The Mill Virus ? (2) Run Of The Mill Virus ? (2) The most recent fall in the S&P 500 index versus gold is definitely a sign of risk aversion, but the much broader peak almost two years ago might be signaling an outright shift in the investment universe. In other words, capital preservation might now be best sought outside US bourses. If this is the case, cheap and unloved value stocks will provide better shelter compared to the growth champions of the last decade. It is interesting that emerging market cyclical stocks (where the epicenter of the crisis is) have not underperformed defensives in a meaningful way during the latest riot (Chart I-3). The typical narrative is that the dollar is now a high-yielding currency within the G10. That means it has now become the object of carry trades. Should the investment universe be shifting to one of prudence, it is plausible though not probable that the greenback will provide both functions. Chart I-3Mixed Message From Cyclicals Versus Defensives Mixed Message From Cyclicals Versus Defensives Mixed Message From Cyclicals Versus Defensives Chart I-4Correlation Break Down Or Unsustainable Gap? Correlation Break Down Or Unsustainable Gap? Correlation Break Down Or Unsustainable Gap? The absolute collapse in the gold-to-bond ratio further confirms that after almost a decade of underperformance, hard money might be coming back into favor versus yield plays (Chart I-4). Gold was a monetary aggregate for centuries, and continues to stand as a viable threat to dollar liabilities. This is not only visible in the rampant accumulation of gold by foreign central banks, notably Russia and China, but also by the breakout in gold in almost every currency, including safe-havens like the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen (Chart I-5). The absolute collapse in the gold-to-bond ratio further confirms that after almost a decade of underperformance, hard money might be coming back into favor. Data from the US Treasury confirms that foreign entities have been fleeing US bond markets at among the fastest pace in recent years. On a rolling 12-month total basis, the US saw an exodus of about US$250 billion in Treasurys from foreigners, one of the largest on record (Chart I-6). Foreign private investors are still net buyers of US Treasurys, but the downtrend in purchases in recent years is evident. In addition, this helps explain why gold has also outperformed Treasurys over this period. Chart I-5Soft Versus Hard ##br##Money Soft Versus Hard Money Soft Versus Hard Money Chart I-6Official Data Shows Less Preference For Treasurys Official Data Shows Less Preference For Treasurys Official Data Shows Less Preference For Treasurys The US dollar’s reserve status remains intact for now. But subtle shifts in this exorbitant privilege are worth monitoring. If balance-of-payment dynamics continue to head in the wrong direction, as  they are now, this will favor hard money and non-US assets, while accelerating divestment out of US Treasurys. This is irrespective of whether we enter a risk-on versus risk-off environment. A good proxy for whether the US government was prudent or profligate over the past four decades can be measured by the gap between unemployment relative to NAIRU (the so-called unemployment gap) and the corresponding budget deficit. In simple terms, full employment should be accompanied by balanced budgets, while governments can step in during recessions to put a floor under aggregate demand. Not surprisingly, using this simple rule, sound fiscal policies in the US were usually accompanied by a strong dollar, and vice versa. Chart I-7The Risk To Long Dollar Positions The Risk To Long Dollar Positions The Risk To Long Dollar Positions Over the next five years, the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the US budget deficit will swell to 4.6% of GDP. Assuming the current account deficit remains stable, this will pin the twin deficits at 7.2% of GDP. This assumes no recession, which would have the potential to boost the deficit even further. In the last forty years, there has not been any prolonged period where twin deficits in the US have been expanding while the dollar has been in a bull market (Chart I-7).  In a nutshell, even though the coronavirus is dominating headlines, the lack of a more pronounced greenback strength can be pinpointed to a rising number of negative market signals. Our bias is that when this eventually rolls over and global growth picks up in earnest, dollar bulls may be forced to capitulate. Bottom Line: We are not downplaying the potential impact of the coronavirus, but are skeptical of its ability to catapult the dollar higher. We are short the DXY index, with a target of 90 and a stop at 100. Stick with it. Bullish Both Gold And Silver, But Go Short The GSR If we are right, then both gold and silver will tend to rise in an environment where the dollar is falling. That said, the gold/silver ratio (GSR) hit a three-decade high of 93.3 last summer, opening up an arbitrage opportunity. The history of these reversals is that they tend to be powerful, quick, and extremely volatile (Chart I-8). This not only paves the way for an excellent entry point to short gold versus silver, but provides important information on the battleground between easing financial conditions and a pick-up in economic (or manufacturing) activity. The ratio of the velocity of money between the US and China has tended to track both the gold/silver ratio and the dollar closely.  Just like gold, silver benefits from low interest rates, plentiful liquidity, and the incentive for fiat money debasement. However, the gold/silver ratio is sitting near two standard deviations above its mean. Meanwhile, over the past century, the peak in GSR has been around 100. The gold/silver ratio tends to rally ahead of an economic slowdown, but then peaks when growth is still weak but liquidity conditions are plentiful enough to affect the outlook for future growth. This appears to be the case today. The simple reason is that silver has more industrial uses than gold (Chart I-9). Chart I-8GSR At A Speculative Extreme GSR At A Speculative Extreme GSR At A Speculative Extreme Chart I-9No Recession = Buy Silver No Recession = Buy Silver No Recession = Buy Silver The ratio of the velocity of money between the US and China has tended to track both the gold/silver ratio and the dollar closely (Chart I-10). A falling ratio signifies that the number of times money is changing hands in China is outpacing that number in the US. This also tends to coincide with a preference for US versus non-US assets, since animal spirits (as measured by money velocity) tend to be pronounced in places where returns on capital are higher.  Silver is a more volatile metal than gold. Part of the reason is that the silver market is thinner, with future open interest that is about one-third that of gold. As such, silver tends to rise faster than gold during precious metal bull markets (Chart I-11). Chart I-10Falling GSR = Rising Manufacturing Activity Falling GSR = Rising Manufacturing Activity Falling GSR = Rising Manufacturing Activity Chart I-11Silver Is More Volatile Than Gold Silver Is More Volatile Than Gold Silver Is More Volatile Than Gold This brings us to the sweet spot for silver. Even if global growth remains tepid over the next few months, due to a rise in infections from the coronavirus, a lot of the bad news is already reflected in a high GSR. This means the potential for upside will have to be nothing short of a deep recession. Relative speculative positioning favors gold, which is positive from a contrarian standpoint. Ditto for relative sentiment. More often than not, a positive signal from both these indicators has been a good timing tool for a selloff in the GSR. If global growth bottoms, then the rise in silver prices could be explosive. Silver fabrication demand benefits from new industries such as solar and a flourishing “cloud” industry that are capturing the new manufacturing landscape. Meanwhile, we are also entering a window where any pickup in demand could lead to a sizeable increase in the physical silver deficit. Bottom Line: A falling GSR provides important information about the battleground between easing financial conditions and a pickup in economic activity. We remain bullish on both gold and silver, but a trading opportunity has opened up for a short GSR position. Housekeeping Chart I-12AUD Will Follow Asian Currencies AUD Will Follow Asian Currencies AUD Will Follow Asian Currencies Our limit buy on the Australian dollar was triggered at 68 cents. We discussed the Aussie at length in our report dated  January 17.1 Place an initial target at 0.75 cents and a tight stop at 0.66. The near-term risk to this trade is any escalation in virus infections that will collectively send Asian currencies into a tailspin (Chart I-12).     Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "On AUD And CNY," dated January 17, 2020, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar   Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been positive: The Markit manufacturing PMI fell to 51.7 while the services component increased to 53.2 in January. The Dallas Fed manufacturing index improved from -3.2 to -0.2 in January. Moreover, the Richmond Fed manufacturing index soared to 20 in January. Durable goods orders increased by 2.4% month-on-month in December. The trade deficit widened further to $68.3 billion from $63 billion in December. Annualized GDP growth was unchanged at 2.1% year-on-year in Q4. Initial jobless claims fell to 216K from 223K for the week ended January 24th. The DXY index appreciated by 0.1% this week. While the coronavirus spurred worries about a further slowdown in the global economy, the impact on the US remains to be seen. On Wednesday, the Fed committee voted unanimously to keep interest rates on hold at 1.75% and concluded that the current rate is appropriate to support sustained expansion of the US economy. Report Links: Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been mostly positive: The Markit manufacturing PMI jumped to 47.8 in January while the services PMI fell slightly to 52.2. The German IFO current assessment index increased to 99.1 from 98.8 in January, while expectations component fell to 92.9. The economic sentiment indicator increased to 102.8 from 101.3 in January. The unemployment rate fell further to 7.4% in December from 7.5% the prior month. The euro has been flat against the US dollar this week. Though the German IFO expectations component disappointed, the overall assessment has shown tentative signs of recovery. More importantly, changes in the manufacturing PMI indices, especially in Germany, are staging the V-shaped recovery we have been expecting. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been positive: Consumer confidence was unchanged at 39.1 in January. Services PPI increased by 2.1% year-on-year in December. Headline inflation increased to 0.8% year-on-year from 0.5% in December. Both manufacturing and services PMIs increased to 49.3 and 52.1, respectively in January. The Japanese yen appreciated by 0.6% against the US dollar this week. The flare up in risk aversion was a very potent catalyst, given the yen had become unloved and under owned. Persistent global risks, including Mid East tensions, and more recently, the spread of coronavirus, all warrant holding the Japanese yen as a portfolio hedge. Our last weekly report discussed why we prefer the Japanese yen to the Swiss franc as portfolio insurance. Report Links: Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been solid: Both Markit manufacturing and services PMIs soared to 49.8 and 52.9 respectively in January. Nationwide housing prices increased by 1.9% year-on-year in January, compared with 1.4% the previous month. The saucer-shaped bottom in home prices is becoming more and more evident. The British pound has been flat against the US dollar this week. On Thursday, the BoE decided to leave interest rates unchanged at 0.75%. The fact that there were only two dissenters, in line with the previous month, suggests that rising bets for a rate cut were misplaced. The UK is due to leave the EU as of January 31st and enter a transition period that is supposed to last until December 31st 2020. The immediate aftermath of the exit will be business as usual. Trading strategy on the pound should be a buy on dips. We will continue to explore opportunities in GBP in upcoming reports. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been mixed: The NAB business conditions index fell to 3 from 4 in December. Moreover, the business confidence index decreased to -2 from 0. Headline inflation increased to 1.8% year-on-year from 1.7% in the fourth quarter. Import prices increased by 0.7% quarter-on-quarter, while export prices plunged by 5.2% quarter-on-quarter in Q4. The Australian dollar fell by 2.1% against the US dollar this week, triggering our limit buy position at AUD/USD 0.68. Despite temporary challenges from the bushfires and the coronavirus, we continue to hold our base case view that global growth is likely to rebound in the next 12-to-18 months, which is bullish for the Aussie dollar. Report Links: On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been positive: Headline inflation increased to 1.9% year-on-year in Q4, compared with 1.5% the previous quarter. It also beat expectations of 1.8%. The trade balance shifted to a surplus of NZ$547 million in December. Goods exports rose by 4.8% year-on-year to NZ$5.5 billion, while imports fell by 5.4% year-on-year to NZ$5 billion. Shortly after the rise along with inflation data, the New Zealand dollar fell by more than 2% this week, amid growing risk aversion. New Zealand, as a chief exporter of agricultural products, bore a good brunt of speculative selling. Assuming infections peak in the coming weeks, we remain positive on the kiwi as the Chinese government is likely to inject more stimulus into the economy. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been mostly positive: Retail sales increased by 0.9% month-on-month in November. The Bloomberg Nanos confidence index rose to 56.5 from 56.1 for the week ended January 24th. The Canadian dollar fell by 0.6% against the US dollar this week. As a petrocurrency, the risk of much reduced travel hit the loonie. We have written at length in various reports about the loonie, but the bottom line is that Canada benefits less than other petrocurrencies in oil bull markets. Ergo, the underperformance of short CAD/NOK and long AUD/CAD positions this week is expected. In other news, Trump has signed the new USMCA bill into law this week, leaving Canada the only member of the trilateral deal that has yet to ratify the agreement. Report Links: The Loonie: Upside Versus The Dollar, But Downside At The Crosses Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been mixed: The trade surplus narrowed for a fourth consecutive month in December, falling to CHF 2 billion. Real exports decreased by 3.4% month-on-month while real imports grew by 0.2% month-on-month. The ZEW expectations index fell to 8.3 from 12.5 in January. The KOF leading indicator jumped to 100.1 from 96.2 in January. The Swiss franc has been more or less flat against the US dollar this week. The fall in exports of chemical and pharmaceutical production was the main driver behind the decrease in the Swiss trade balance in December. The SNB is walking a fine line. The improvement in the KOF leading indicator, along with rising inflation and PMI data is definitely a source of comfort, but the surge in EUR/CHF will hurt competitiveness and warrant stealth intervention. Buy EUR/CHF at 1.06. Report Links: Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Notes On The SNB - October 4, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been negative: Retail sales fell by 2% month-on-month in December. The Norwegian krone fell by 1.9% against the US dollar this week. The WTI crude oil price plunged by 20% since the peak earlier this month, due to a combination of falling global travel demand, eased Iran tensions and a bearish EIA inventory report. That being said, our Commodity & Energy strategists continue to be bullish energy prices and expect the WTI crude oil price to reach $63/bbl in 2020, based on recovering global demand and supply constraints. This should eventually lift the Norwegian krone. OPEC is scheduled to meet early March, and plunging prices could be a catalyst for the cartel to cut production. Report Links: On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been mixed: Producer prices increased by 1.3% year-on-year in December. The trade surplus shrank to SEK 0.3 billion from SEK 2.7 billion in December. Retail sales grew by 3.4% year-on-year in December. Consumer confidence marginally fell to 92.6 from 94.7 in January, while business confidence jumped to 97.4 in January, the highest in seven months. The Swedish krona fell by 1.3% against the US dollar this week. Recent Swedish data has been disappointing given the steep decline during the trade war, but we are beginning to see second-derivative improvements. The trade surplus is rising on a year-on-year basis. Particularly noteworthy was the improvement in business confidence, which has historically led the Swedbank PMI index tick for tick. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades
Highlights The intense focus on the weakening of global oil demand expected in the wake of another coronavirus outbreak in China – dubbed 2019-nCoV – obscures likely supply-side responses by OPEC 2.0. The producer coalition likely will rebalance markets by extending production cuts from end-March to at least the end of June when it meets in Vienna March 5-6.  OPEC 2.0 producers will be exquisitely sensitive to Asian refiner demand. They will use it as a gauge for how severe 2019-nCoV’s impact will be on EM demand, and adjust production and exports accordingly. On the demand side, it is difficult to analogue the 2019-nCoV outbreak to the 2003 SARS outbreak, given all the conflicting fundamentals at play at that time.  Forward curves for the principal benchmark crude oils – Brent and WTI – remain backwardated, in spite of the 2019-nCoV-related sell-off. Longer-dated WTI (out to December 2023) traded below $50/bbl earlier in the week, roughly in line with shale-breakeven costs reported by the Dallas Fed earlier this month. This likely will continue to pressure capex in the US shales, keeping future supply growth constrained. Feature Forward curves for the principal benchmark crude oils – Brent and WTI – remain backwardated, in spite of the 2019-nCoV-related sell-off. Chart of the WeekChina's Oil Demand Drives Global Growth China's Oil Demand Drives Global Growth China's Oil Demand Drives Global Growth Oil markets are rightly focused on the demand implications of the 2019-nCoV outbreak in China.1 Since 2000, China has accounted for 42% of annual oil-demand growth worldwide (Chart of the Week). China is second only to the US in oil demand, accounting for 14% of total global demand of 100.7mm b/d at the end of 2019; its oil imports averaged more than 10mm b/d last year, and are expected to remain strong as it continues to build out its refining sector. Chart 2Asian Air Travel Hit Hard By SARS Expect OPEC 2.0 To Cut Supply In Response to Demand Shock Expect OPEC 2.0 To Cut Supply In Response to Demand Shock Historical analogues for 2019-nCoV are difficult. The immediate analogue is the SARS coronavirus outbreak identified in China in February 2003, which lasted six months and hit Asian air travel especially hard (Chart 2). During the height of the SARS outbreak in April 2003, air-travel passenger demand in Asia plunged 45%, according to the International Air Transport Association (IATA). This pushed jet fuel prices lower in Asia and in other key markets, along with distillate prices generally (Chart 3).2 Chart 3Fundamental Supply-Demand Balances Support Higher Crude Oil Prices Fundamental Supply-Demand Balances Support Higher Crude Oil Prices Fundamental Supply-Demand Balances Support Higher Crude Oil Prices China now is an extremely large share of global jet fuel consumption. Chart 4BCA Models, Base Metals Prices Suggest SARS Effect Was Short-Lived BCA Models, Base Metals Prices Suggest SARS Effect Was Short-Lived BCA Models, Base Metals Prices Suggest SARS Effect Was Short-Lived The industry now is more reliant on Chinese travelers. Since 2003, the number of annual air passengers has more than doubled, with China growing to become the world’s largest outbound travel market. In 2003, close to 7mm passengers from China traveled on international flights. By 2018, that number had grown close to 64mm people, according to China’s aviation authority.  As Chart 2 demonstrates, China now is an extremely large share of global jet fuel consumption. Still, oil is a global market – the avoidance of China during the SARS outbreak in 2003 would have impacted global air travel, and, as a result, global jet-fuel prices. Our proprietary EM commodity-demand models and the behavior of base metals prices, which were and remain heavily influenced by China’s economy, suggest China’s GDP growth slowed in 2003 (mainly 1H03) because of the SARS outbreak (Chart 4).  The LME’s base metals index fell 9% between February and July 2003, while copper prices fell 11%. By year-end, these markets had fully recovered. Oil-Supply Management Drives Price Evolution In the modern era of the oil market beginning roughly around 2000, there have been numerous demand shocks requiring a supply response from OPEC.  During the SARS outbreak in 2003, oil-market fundamentals at the time were complicated by the sudden loss of Venezuelan output in December 2002 to a general strike, which lasted three months and removed more than 2mm b/d from the market, and the US invasion of Iraq on March 2003. Both of these supply-side shocks hit markets just as demand was being hit by SARS. This makes it difficult to extract a pure price response on the demand side to the SARS episode. In the modern era of the oil market beginning roughly around 2000, there have been numerous demand shocks requiring a supply response from OPEC. These including the 9/11 terror attacks in the US in 2001; the SARS outbreak in late 2002-03; the Global Financial Crisis in 2007-08; and the euro debt crisis in 2011-12 (Chart 5).3 Chart 5Demand Shocks Abound In 21st Century Demand Shocks Abound In 21st Century Demand Shocks Abound In 21st Century Chart 6OPEC Lost Key Members' Output During SARS Outbreak OPEC Lost Key Members' Output During SARS Outbreak OPEC Lost Key Members' Output During SARS Outbreak   OPEC 2.0’s goal – similar to OPEC’s goal before it – is to avoid an unintended inventory accumulation. Importantly, these demand shocks were accompanied by supply shocks – Venezuela's general strike; the US invasion of Iraq continues to play havoc with global supply; the BP Macondo blowout in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010; the Arab Spring and the loss of Libyan output in 2011 – all of which complicated OPEC’s decision making (Chart 6). Much of OPEC’s adjustment then and now is made by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), which functions as the central bank of the global oil market increasing and decreasing production to balance markets (Chart 7). Chart 7KSA Primarily Balances Markets During Supply, Demand Shocks Expect OPEC 2.0 To Cut Supply In Response to Demand Shock Expect OPEC 2.0 To Cut Supply In Response to Demand Shock OPEC 2.0’s goal – similar to OPEC’s goal before it – is to avoid an unintended inventory accumulation, which would push prices lower and severely alter the forward curves for the principal crude oil pricing benchmarks, WTI and Brent (Chart 8). Chart 8OPEC 2.0’s Goal: Avoid Unintended Inventory Accumulation Expect OPEC 2.0 To Cut Supply In Response to Demand Shock Expect OPEC 2.0 To Cut Supply In Response to Demand Shock Navigating The 2019-nCoV Outbreak Oil prices – like all commodity prices – are a function of supply and demand, which clear the market instantaneously (here and now), and across time as buyers and sellers contract for forward delivery. The relentless focus on the demand-side consequences of the 2019-nCoV outbreak is not helpful in determining how oil prices will trade going forward. Oil prices – like all commodity prices – are a function of supply and demand, which clear the market instantaneously (here and now), and across time as buyers and sellers contract for forward delivery. The discussion above is meant to highlight this, by recalling OPEC’s production management during various demand shocks, not just the SARS outbreak in 2003. OPEC then, and OPEC 2.0 now, is not forced to produce oil and export regardless of the physical realities it confronts. It can adjust production and exports in response to direct demand indications from its refinery buyers and traders lifting its crude oil. Demand slowdowns, all else equal, typically will show up in falling crack-spread differentials between refined products and crude oil prices (Chart 9).4 Chart 9Crack Spreads Inform Crude Oil Production Decisions Crack Spreads Inform Crude Oil Production Decisions Crack Spreads Inform Crude Oil Production Decisions It still is too early to gauge the extent of the fall-off in demand arising from 2019-nCoV, but it will become apparent in cracks and in OPEC 2.0 producers’ responses to lower refiner demand. Falling crack spreads inform crude oil producers they need to throttle back on production – refiners are not able to profitably run all the crude being made available to them and crude and product are backing up in inventory.  It still is too early to gauge the extent of the fall-off in demand arising from 2019-nCoV, but it will become apparent in cracks and in OPEC 2.0 producers’ responses to lower refiner demand, which will determine how much production they need to cut in order to balance the market. This will be done against a backdrop of supply concerns that are not too dissimilar to those prevailing during the 2003 SARS crisis – e.g., instability in Iraq and Iran that could threaten production, and the loss of Venezuelan exports. Bottom Line: Markets still are in the process of assessing how damaging 2019-nCoV will be for industrial commodity demand – oil, bulks and base metals, in particular. As has been the case in all such demand shocks, OPEC’s supply response (and now OPEC 2.0’s) will determine how deeply and for how long prices are impacted.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight Brent prices fell 8% since last Monday amid the coronavirus outbreak in China. The number of confirmed cases is rapidly expanding, reaching more than 6,000 as of Wednesday which surpasses the trajectory of SARS in the first month of the outbreak in 2003. Nonetheless, the fatality rate remains below that of SARS, estimated at less than 3% vs. ~ 10% for SARS. Separately, the WCS discount to WTI averaged -$23/bbl this month. This is in line with our view that the discount would drop below -$20/bbl in 1Q20. This level is appropriate to incentivize additional rail transportation to the US. We expect the discount will remain close to current levels and for crude-by-rail volumes to pick up this year (Chart 10). Base Metals: Neutral Base metals have been severely impacted this week by the coronavirus outbreak – copper, aluminum, zinc, and lead are down 9%, 4%, 9%, and 5%. A prolonged slowdown in China’s economic activity – the driver of the global industrial activity recovery we expect – would plunge metals’ prices. China’s base metal consumption more than doubled since 2003. Thus, the potential impact of 2019-nCoV is much larger compared to SARS and market participants are pricing in the probability of damaging scenarios to global growth. This explains the pronounced decline in metals’ prices this year vs. 2003. Precious Metals: Neutral Gold was one of the few commodities in the green since last week. The yellow metal rose 1% since last Monday, supported by renewed safe-haven demand flows. Gold and the USD have been rising simultaneously amid the virus outbreak, which is typical of uncertain periods. The spectrum of possible outcomes is wide and negatively skewed. This warrants protection through safe-haven assets. We remain strategically long gold as a portfolio hedge. Our recommendation is up 28% since inception. Ags/Softs: Underweight Corn markets focused on USDA reports of rising exports, highlighted by the sale of 124,355 MT to Mexico. CBOT March corn futures were up 6% Tuesday, reversing earlier losses Monday. Beans remain under pressure, as traders await tangible evidence that China will go ahead with purchases announced in the so-called phase-one deal negotiated between the US and China (Chart 11).  Chart 10WCS Discount Under Pressure WCS Discount Under Pressure WCS Discount Under Pressure Chart 11Markets Waiting For China Demand Expect OPEC 2.0 To Cut Supply In Response to Demand Shock Expect OPEC 2.0 To Cut Supply In Response to Demand Shock   Footnotes 1     The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s 2019-nCoV website highlights the marked differences between China’s response to the current coronavirus outbreak vs the 2003 SARS outbreak. One notable response by the Chinese government this time around – besides the rapid lockdown on travel – has been the alacrity with which officials posted the genome for the virus to a global research database, which allowed US researchers to quickly compare it to the strain they isolated. Separately, Reuters reported Australian researchers were able to grow the virus in a lab, which could accelerate development of a vaccine.  2     Distillates comprise the so-called middle of the refined barrel, and include jet fuel, diesel fuel and heating oil (also known as gasoil). These are primarily associated with industrial markets – mining and transportation, e.g. – and are key barometers of economic activity generally.  3     The "modern" era for oil began roughly in 2000, when oil prices became a random walk. WTI prices were mean-reverting from 1986 to roughly 2000, then became a random walk. Please see Helyette Geman, (2007), "Mean Reversion versus Random Walk in Oil and Natural Gas Prices," in Advances in Mathematical Finance, Birkhäuser, Boston; and Haidar, I. and C.R. Wolff, "Forecasting crude oil price (revisited)," The proceeding of the 30th USAEE Conference, Washington , D.C. USA. 9-12 October, 2011. 4     The “crack spread” is the USD/bbl difference between refined-product prices and crude-oil prices. It represents the gross margin of refiners.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q4 Expect OPEC 2.0 To Cut Supply In Response to Demand Shock Expect OPEC 2.0 To Cut Supply In Response to Demand Shock Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades Expect OPEC 2.0 To Cut Supply In Response to Demand Shock Expect OPEC 2.0 To Cut Supply In Response to Demand Shock
Highlights The liquidity-driven rally will soon be followed by an acceleration in global growth. The economic recovery will bump up expectations of long-term profit growth. The dollar has downside, but the euro will not benefit much. Overweight stocks relative to bonds and bet on traditional cyclical sectors and commodities. The potential for outperformance of value relative to growth favors European equities. The probability of a tech mania is escalating: how should investors factor an expanding bubble into their portfolios? Feature Chart I-1A Bull Market In Stocks And Volatility? A Bull Market In Stocks And Volatility? A Bull Market In Stocks And Volatility? Despite all odds, the nCoV-2019 outbreak is barely denting the S&P 500’s frenetic rally. Plentiful liquidity, thawing Sino-US trade relations and improving economic activity in Asia, all have created ideal conditions for risk assets to appreciate on a cyclical basis. Stocks may look increasingly expensive and are primed to correct, but the bubble will expand further. After lifting asset valuations, monetary policy easing will soon boost worldwide economic activity. Consequently, earnings in the US and Europe will improve. As long as central bankers remain unconcerned about inflation, investors will bid up stocks. Investors should remember we are in the final innings of a bull market. Stocks can deliver outsized returns during this period, but often at the cost of elevated volatility, and the options market is not pricing in this uncertainty (Chart I-1). Moreover, timing the ultimate end of the bubble is extremely difficult. Hence, we prefer to look for assets that can still benefit from easy monetary conditions and rebounding growth, but are not as expensive as equities. Industrial commodities fit that description, especially after their recent selloff. The dollar remains a crucial asset to gauge the path of least resistance for assets. If it refuses to swoon, then it will indicate that global growth is in a weaker state than we foresaw. The good news is that the broad trade-weighted dollar seems to have peaked. Accommodative Monetary Conditions Are Here To Stay Easy liquidity has been the lifeblood of the S&P 500’s rally. The surge in the index coincided with the lagged impact of the rise in our US Financial Liquidity Index (Chart I-2). Low rates have allowed stocks to climb higher, yet earnings expectations remain muted. For example, since November 26, 2018, the forward P/E ratio for the S&P 500 has increased from 15.2 to 18.7, while 10-year Treasury yields have collapsed from 3.1% to 1.6%. Meanwhile, expectations for long-term earnings annual growth extracted from equity multiples using a discounted cash flow model have dropped from 2.4% to 1.2%. Historically, easier monetary policy pushes asset prices higher before it lifts economic activity. Historically, easier monetary policy pushes asset prices higher before it lifts economic activity. Yet, stocks and risk assets normally continue to climb when the economy recovers. Even without any additional monetary easing, as long as policy remains accommodative, risk assets will generate positive returns. Expectations for stronger cash flow growth become the force driving asset prices higher. Policy will likely remain accommodative around the world. Within this framework, peak monetary easing is probably behind us, even though liquidity conditions remain extremely accommodative. Nominal interest rates remain very low, and real bond yields are still falling. Unlike in 2018 and 2019, dropping TIPs yields reflect rising inflation expectations (Chart I-3). Those factors together indicate that policy is reflationary, which is confirmed by the gold rally. Chart I-2A Liquidity Driven Rally A Liquidity Driven Rally A Liquidity Driven Rally Chart I-3Today, Lower TIPS Yields Are Reflationary Today, Lower TIPS Yields Are Reflationary Today, Lower TIPS Yields Are Reflationary   Chart I-4Economic Activity To Respond To Liquidity Economic Activity To Respond To Liquidity Economic Activity To Respond To Liquidity Based on the historical lags between monetary easing and manufacturing activity, the global industrial sector is set to mend (Chart I-4). Moreover, the liquidity-driven surge in stock prices, combined with low yields and compressed credit spreads, has eased financial conditions, which creates the catalyst for an industrial recovery. Where will the growth come from? First, worldwide inventory levels have collapsed after making negative contributions to growth since mid-2018 (Chart I-5). Thus, there is room for an inventory restocking. Secondly, auto sales in Europe and China have rebounded to 18.5% from -23% and to -0.1% from -16.4%, respectively. Thirdly, China’s credit and fiscal impulse has improved. The uptick in Chinese iron ore imports indicates that the pass-through from domestic reflation to global economic activity will materialize soon (Chart I-6). Finally, following the Phase One Sino-US trade deal, global business confidence is bottoming, as exemplified by Belgium’s business confidence, Switzerland KOF LEI, Korea's manufacturing business survey, or US CFO and CEO confidence measures. The increase in EM earnings revisions shows that US capex intentions should soon re-accelerate, which bodes well for investment both in the US and globally (Chart I-7). Chart I-5Room For Inventory Restocking Room For Inventory Restocking Room For Inventory Restocking Chart I-6China Points To Stronger Global Growth China Points To Stronger Global Growth China Points To Stronger Global Growth   Construction activity, a gauge of the monetary stance, is looking up across the advanced economies. In the US, housing starts – a leading indicator of domestic demand – have hit a 13-year high. A pullback in this volatile data series is likely, but it should be limited. Vacancies remain at a paltry 1.4%, household formation is solid and affordability is not demanding (Chart I-8). In Europe, construction activity has been relatively stable through the economic slowdown. Even in Canada and Australia, housing transactions have gathered steam quickly following declines in mortgage rates (Chart I-9). Chart I-7Capex Is Set To Recover Capex Is Set To Recover Capex Is Set To Recover Chart I-8US Housing Is Robust US Housing Is Robust US Housing Is Robust Chart I-9Even The Canadian And Australian Housing Markets Are Stabilizing Even The Canadian And Australian Housing Markets Are Stabilizing Even The Canadian And Australian Housing Markets Are Stabilizing Consumers will remain a source of strength for the global economy. The dichotomy between weak manufacturing PMIs and the stable service sector reflects a healthy consumer spending. December retail sales in Europe and the US corroborate this assessment. The stabilization in US business confidence suggests that household incomes are not in as much jeopardy as three months ago. As household net worth and credit growth improve further, a stable outlook for household income will underwrite greater gains in consumption. Policy will likely remain accommodative around the world. For the time being, US inflationary pressures are muted. The New York Fed’s Underlying Inflation Gauge has rolled over, hourly earnings growth has moved back below 3%, our pipeline inflation indicator derived from the ISM is weak, and core producer prices are flagging (Chart I-10). This trend is not US-specific. In the OECD, core consumer price inflation is set to decelerate due to the lagged impact of the manufacturing slowdown. Central banks are also constrained to remain dovish by their own rhetoric. The Fed's statement this week was a testament to this reality. Central banks are increasingly looking to set symmetrical inflation targets. After a decade of missing their targets, a symmetric target would imply keeping policy easier for longer, even if realized inflation moves back above 2%. A rebound in global growth and weak inflation should create a poisonous environment for the US dollar. Finally, fiscal policy will make a small positive contribution to growth in most major advanced economies in 2020, particularly in Germany and the UK (Table I-1). Chart I-10Limited Inflation Will Allow The Fed To Remain Easy Limited Inflation Will Allow The Fed To Remain Easy Limited Inflation Will Allow The Fed To Remain Easy Table I-1Modest Fiscal Easing In 2020 February 2020 February 2020   The Dollar And The Sino-US Phase One Deal At first glance, a rebound in global growth and weak inflation should create a poisonous environment for the US dollar (Chart I-11). As we have often argued, the dollar’s defining characteristic is its pronounced counter-cyclicality. Chart I-11A Painful Backdrop For The Greenback February 2020 February 2020 Deteriorating dollar fundamentals make this risk particularly relevant. US interest rates are well above those in the rest of the G10, but the gap in short rates has significantly narrowed. Historically, the direction of rates differentials and not their levels has determined the trend in the USD (Chart I-12). Moreover, real differentials at the long end of the curve support the notion that the maximum tailwinds for the dollar are behind us (Chart I-12, bottom panel). Furthermore, now that the US Treasury has replenished its accounts at the Federal Reserve, the Fed’s addition of excess reserves in the system will likely become increasingly negative for the dollar, especially against EM currencies. Likewise, relative money supply trends between the US, Europe, Japan and China already predict a decline in the dollar (Chart I-13). Chart I-12Interest Rate Differentials Do Not Favor The Dollar... Interest Rate Differentials Do Not Favor The Dollar... Interest Rate Differentials Do Not Favor The Dollar... Chart I-13...Neither Do Money Supply Trends ...Neither Do Money Supply Trends ...Neither Do Money Supply Trends   Chart I-14The Phase One Deal Is Ambitious February 2020 February 2020 The recent Sino-US trade agreement obscures what appears to be a straightforward picture. According to the Phase One deal signed mid-January, China will increase its US imports by $200 billion in the next two years vis-à-vis the high-water mark of $186 billion reached in 2017. This is an extremely ambitious goal (Chart I-14). Politically, it is positive that China has committed to buy manufactured goods and services in addition to commodities. However, the scale of the increase in imports of US manufactured goods is large, at $77 billion. China cannot fulfill this obligation if domestic growth merely stabilizes or picks up just a little, especially now that the domestic economy is in the midst of a spreading illness. It will have to substitute some of its European and Japanese imports with US goods. A consequence of this trade deal is that the euro’s gains will probably lag those recorded in normal business cycle upswings. Historically, European growth outperforms the US when China’s monetary conditions are easing and its marginal propensity to consume is rising (Chart I-15). However, given the potential for China to substitute European goods in favor of US ones, China’s economic reacceleration probably will not benefit Europe as much as it normally does. China may not ultimately follow through with as big of US purchases as it has promised, but it is likely, at least initially, to show good faith in the agreement. The euro’s gains will probably lag those recorded in normal business cycle upswings. While the trade agreement is a headwind for the euro, it is a positive for the Chinese yuan. The US output gap stands at 0.1% of potential GDP and the US labor market is near full employment. The US industrial sector does not possess the required spare capacity to fulfill additional Chinese demand. To equilibrate the market for US goods, prices will have to adjust to become more favorable for Chinese purchasers. The simplest mechanism to achieve this outcome is for the RMB to appreciate. Meanwhile, the euro is trading 16% below its equilibrium, which will allow European producers to fulfill US domestic demand. A widening US trade deficit with Europe would undo improvements in the trade balance with China. The probability that US equities correct further in the short-term is elevated. The implication for the dollar is that the broad trade-weighted USD will likely outperform the Dollar Index (DXY). The euro represents 18.9% of the broad trade-weighted dollar versus 57.6% of the DXY. Asian currencies, EM currencies at large, the AUD and the NZD, all should benefit from their close correlation with the RMB (Chart I-16). Chart I-15Europe Normally Wins When China Recovers Europe Normally Wins When China Recovers Europe Normally Wins When China Recovers Chart I-16EM, Asian, And Antipodean Exchange Rates Love A Strong RMB EM, Asian, And Antipodean Exchange Rates Love A Strong RMB EM, Asian, And Antipodean Exchange Rates Love A Strong RMB   Obviously, before the RMB and the assets linked to it can appreciate further, the panic surrounding the coronavirus will have to dissipate. However, the economic damage created by SARS was short lived. This respiratory syndrome resulted in a 2.4% contraction Hong-Kong’s GDP in the second quarter of 2003. The economy of Hong Kong recovered that loss quickly afterward. Investment Forecasts BCA continues to forecast upside in safe-haven yields. Global interest rates remain well below equilibrium and a global economic recovery bodes poorly for bond prices (Chart I-17). However, inflation expectations and not real yields will drive nominal yield changes. The dovish slant of global central banks and the growing likelihood that symmetric inflation targets will become the norm is creating long-term upside risks for inflation. Moreover, if symmetric inflation targets imply lower real short rates in the future, then they also imply lower real long rates today. Investors should begin switching their risk assets into industrial commodity plays, especially after their recent selloff. Easy monetary conditions, decreased real rates and an improvement in economic activity are also consistent with an outperformance of assets with higher yields. High-yield bonds, which offer attractive breakeven spreads, will benefit from this backdrop (Chart I-18). Furthermore, carry trades will likely continue to perform well. In addition to low interest rates across most of the G10, the low currency volatility caused by an extended period of easy policy will continue to encourage carry-seeking strategies. Chart I-17Bonds Are Still Expensive Bonds Are Still Expensive Bonds Are Still Expensive Chart I-18Where Is The Value In Credit? Where Is The Value In Credit? Where Is The Value In Credit?   An environment in which growth is accelerating and monetary policy is accommodative argues in favor of stocks. Our profit growth model for the S&P 500 has finally moved back into positive territory. As earnings improve, investors will likely re-rate depressed long-term growth expectations for cash flows (Chart I-19). The flip side is that equity risk premia are elevated, especially outside the US (Chart I-19). Hence, as long as accelerating growth (but not tighter policy) drives up yields, equities should withstand rising borrowing costs. The use of passive investing and the prevalence of “closet indexers” accentuates the risk that a tech mania could blossom. The 400 point surge in the S&P 500 since early October complicates the picture. The probability that US equities correct further in the short-term is elevated, based on their short-term momentum and sentiment measures, such as the put/call ratio (Chart I-20). Foreign equities will continue to correct along US ones, even if they are cheaper. Chart I-19Elevated Stock Multiples Reflect Low Yields, Not Growth Exuberance Elevated Stock Multiples Reflect Low Yields, Not Growth Exuberance Elevated Stock Multiples Reflect Low Yields, Not Growth Exuberance Chart I-20Tactical Risks For Stocks Tactical Risks For Stocks Tactical Risks For Stocks   Chart I-21Buy Commodities/Sell Stocks? Buy Commodities / Sell Stocks? Buy Commodities / Sell Stocks? The coronavirus panic seems to be the catalyst for such a correction. When a market is overextended, any shock can cause a pullback in prices. Moreover, as of writing, medical professionals still have to ascertain the virus’s severity and potential mutations. Therefore, risk assets must embed a significant risk premium for such uncertainty, even if ultimately the infection turns out to be mild. However, that risk premium will likely prove to be short lived. During the SARS crisis in 2003, stocks bottomed when the number of reported new cases peaked. The tech sector has plentiful downside if the correction gathers strength. As indicated in BCA’s US Equity Sector Strategy, Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon and Facebook account for 18% of the US market capitalization, which is the highest market concentration since the late 1990s tech bubble. Investors should begin switching their risk assets into industrial commodity plays, especially after their recent selloff. Commodity prices are trading at a large discount to US equities. Moreover, the momentum of natural resource prices relative to stocks has begun to form a positive divergence with the price ratio of these two assets (Chart I-21). Technical divergences such as the one visible in the ratio of commodities to equities are often positive signals. Low real rates, an ample liquidity backdrop, a global economic recovery, a weak broad trade-weighted dollar and a strong RMB, all benefit commodities over equities. Tech stocks underperform commodities when the dollar weakens and growth strengthens. Moreover, our positive stance on the RMB justifies stronger prices for copper, oil and EM equities (Chart I-22). Chart I-22The Winners From A CNY Rebound February 2020 February 2020 Our US Equity Strategy Service has also reiterated its preference for industrials and energy stocks, and it recently upgraded materials stocks to neutral.1 All three sectors trade at significant valuation discounts to the broad market and to tech stocks in particular. They are also oversold in relative terms. Finally, their operating metrics are improving, a trend which will be magnified if global growth re-accelerates. Do not make these bets aggressively. A weakening broad trade-weighted dollar would allow for a rotation into foreign equities and an outperformance of value relative to growth stocks. The share of US equities in the MSCI All-Country World Index is a direct function of the broad trade-weighted dollar (Chart I-23). Moreover, since 1971, the dollar and the relative performance of growth stocks versus value stocks have exhibited a positive correlation (Chart I-24). Thus, the dollar’s recent strength has been a key component behind the run enjoyed by tech stocks. Chart I-23Global Stocks Love A Soft Dollar Global Stocks Love A Soft Dollar Global Stocks Love A Soft Dollar Chart I-24Value Stocks Needs A Weaker Dollar To Outperform Growth Stocks Value Stocks Needs A Weaker Dollar To Outperform Growth Stocks Value Stocks Needs A Weaker Dollar To Outperform Growth Stocks Despite the risks to the euro discussed in the previous section, European equities could still outperform US equities. Such a move would be consistent with value stocks beating growth equities (Chart I-24, bottom panel). This correlation exists because the euro area has a combined 17.7% weighting to tech and healthcare stocks compared with a 37.1% allocation in US benchmarks. Moreover, a cheap euro should allow European industrials and materials to outperform their US counterparts. Finally, the recent uptick in the European credit impulse indicates that an acceleration in European profit growth is imminent, a view that is in line with our preference for European financials (Chart I-25).2 Chart I-25Euro Area Profits Should Improve Euro Area Profits Should Improve Euro Area Profits Should Improve Bottom Line: The current environment remains favorable for risk assets on a 12-month investment horizon. As such, we expect stocks and bond yields to continue to rise in 2020. Moreover, a pick-up in global growth, along with a fall in the broad trade-weighted dollar, should weigh on tech and growth stocks, and boost the attractiveness of commodity plays, industrial, energy and materials stocks, as well as European and EM equities. Forecast Meets Strategy Liquidity-driven rallies, such as the current one, can carry on regardless of the fundamentals. As Keynes noted 90 years ago: “Markets can remain irrational longer than you can stay solvent.” The gap between forecast and strategy can be great. The use of passive investing and the prevalence of “closet indexers” accentuates the risk that a tech mania could blossom. We assign a substantial 30% probability to the risk of another tech mania. Outflows from equity ETFs and mutual funds have been large. Investors will be tempted to move back into those vehicles if stocks continue to rally on the back of plentiful liquidity and improving global growth (Chart I-26). In the process, the new inflows will prop up the over-represented, over-valued, and over-extended tech behemoths. Chart I-26Depressed Equity Flows Should Pick Up Depressed Equity Flows Should Pick Up Depressed Equity Flows Should Pick Up The current tech bubble can easily run a lot further. Based on current valuations, the NASDAQ trades at a P/E ratio of 31 compared with 68 in March 2000 (Chart I-27). Moreover, momentum is becoming increasingly favorable for the NASDAQ and other high-flying tech stocks. The NASDAQ is outperforming high-dividend stocks and after a period of consolidation, its relative performance is breaking out. Momentum often performs very well in liquidity-driven rallies. Chart I-27Where Is The Bubble? Where Is The Bubble? Where Is The Bubble? Chart I-28Debt Loads Are Already High Everywhere Debt Loads Are Already High Everywhere Debt Loads Are Already High Everywhere A full-fledged tech mania would make our overweight equities / underweight bonds a profitable call, but it would invalidate our sector and regional recommendations. Moreover, with a few exceptions in China and Taiwan, the major tech bellwethers are listed in the US. A tech bubble would most likely push our bearish dollar stance to the offside. Bubbles are dangerous: participating on the upside is easy, but cashing out is not. Moreover, financial bubbles tend to exacerbate the economic pain that follows the bust. During manic phases, capital is poorly invested and the economy becomes geared to the sectors that benefit from the financial excesses. These assets lose their value when the bubble deflates. Moreover, bubbles often result in growing private-sector indebtedness. Writing off or paying back this debt saps the economy’s vitality. Making matters worse, today overall indebtedness is unprecedented and central banks have little room to reflate the global economy once the bubble bursts (Chart I-28). Finally, US/Iran tensions will create additional risk in the years ahead. Matt Gertken, BCA’s Geopolitical Strategist, warns that the ratcheting down of tensions following Iran’s retaliation to General Soleimani’s assassination is temporary.3 As a result, the oil market remains a source of left-handed tail-risk. Section II discusses other potential black swans lurking in the geopolitical sphere. We continue to recommend that investors overweight industrials and energy, upgrade materials to neutral, Europe to overweight, and curtail their USD exposure as long as US inflation remains well behaved and the US inflation breakeven rate stays below the 2.3% to 2.5% range. However, do not make these bets aggressively. Moreover, some downside protection is merited. Due to our very negative view on bonds, we prefer garnering these hedges via a 15% allocation to gold and the yen. The yen is especially attractive because it is one of the few cheap, safe-haven plays (Chart I-29). Chart I-29The Yen Offers Cheap Portfolio Protection The Yen Offers Cheap Portfolio Protection The Yen Offers Cheap Portfolio Protection Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst January 30, 2020 Next Report: February 27, 2020   II. Five Black Swans In 2020 Our top five geopolitical “Black Swans” are risks that the market is seriously underpricing. With the “phase one” trade deal signed, Chinese policy could become less accommodative, resulting in a negative economic surprise. The trade deal may fall victim to domestic politics, raising the risk of a US-China military skirmish. A Biden victory at the Democratic National Convention or a Democratic takeover of the White House could trigger social unrest and violence in the US. A pickup in the flow of migrants to Europe would fundamentally undermine political stability there. Russia’s weak economy will add fuel to domestic unrest, risking an escalation beyond the point of containment. Over the past four years, BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy service has started off each year with their top five geopolitical “Black Swans.” These are low-probability events whose market impact would be significant enough to matter for global investors. Unlike the great Byron Wien’s perennial list of market surprises, we do not assign these events a “better than 50% likelihood of happening.” We offer risks that the market is seriously underpricing by assigning them only single-digit probabilities when we think the reality is closer to 10%-15%, a level at which a risk premium ought to be assigned. Some of our risks below are so obscure that it is not clear how exactly to price them. We exclude issues that are fairly probable, such as flare-ups in Indo-Pakistani conflict. The two major risks of the year – discussed in our Geopolitical Strategy’s annual outlook – are that either US President Donald Trump or Chinese President Xi Jinping overreaches in a major way. But what would truly surprise the market would be a policy-induced relapse in Chinese growth or a direct military clash between the two great powers. That is how we begin. Other risks stem from domestic affairs in the US, Europe, and Russia. Black Swan 1: China’s Financial Crisis Begins Chart II-1A Crackdown On Financial Risk Could Cause China's Economy To Derail A Crackdown On Financial Risk Could Cause China's Economy To Derail A Crackdown On Financial Risk Could Cause China's Economy To Derail The risk of Xi Jinping’s concentration of power in his own person is that individuals can easily make mistakes, especially if unchecked by advisors or institutions. Lower officials will fear correcting or admonishing an all-powerful leader. Inconvenient information may not be relayed up the hierarchy. Such behavior was rampant in Chairman Mao Zedong’s time, leading to famine among other ills. Insofar as President Xi’s cult of personality successfully imitates Mao’s, it will be subject to similar errors. If President Xi overreaches and makes a policy mistake this year, it could occur in economic policy or other policies. We begin with economic policy, as we have charted the risks of Xi’s crackdown on the financial system since early 2017 (Chart II-1). This year is supposed to be the third and final year of Xi Jinping’s “three battles” against systemic risk, pollution, and poverty. The first battle actually focuses on financial risk, i.e. China’s money and credit bubble. The regime has compromised on this goal since mid-2018, allowing monetary easing to stabilize the economy amid the trade war. But with a “phase one” trade deal having been signed, there is an underrated risk that economic policy will return to its prior setting, i.e. become less accommodative (Chart II-2). When Xi launched the “deleveraging campaign” in 2017, we posited that the authorities would be willing to tolerate an annual GDP growth rate below 6%. This would not only cull excesses in the economy but also demonstrate that the administration means business when it says that China must prioritize quality rather than quantity of growth. While Chinese authorities are most likely targeting “around 6%” in 2020, it is entirely possible that the authorities will allow an undershoot in the 5.5%-5.9% range. They will argue that the GDP target for 2020 has already been met on a compound growth rate basis (Chart II-3), as astute clients have pointed out. They may see less need for stimulus than the market expects. Chart II-2Easing Of Trade Tensions May Re-Incentivize Tighter Policy Easing Of Trade Tensions May Re-Incentivize Tighter Policy Easing Of Trade Tensions May Re-Incentivize Tighter Policy Chart II-3Chinese Authorities Might Tolerate A Growth Undershoot In 2020 Chinese Authorities Might Tolerate A Growth Undershoot In 2020 Chinese Authorities Might Tolerate A Growth Undershoot In 2020   Similarly, while urban disposable income is ostensibly lagging its target of doubling 2010 levels by 2020, China’s 13th Five Year Plan, which concludes in 2020, conspicuously avoided treating urban and rural income targets separately. If the authorities focus only on general disposable income, then they are on track to meet their target (Chart II-4). This would reduce the impetus for greater economic support. The Xi administration may aim only for stability, not acceleration, in the economy. There are already tentative signs that Chinese authorities are “satisfied” with the amount of stimulus they have injected: some indicators of money and credit have already peaked (Chart II-5). The crackdown on shadow banking has eased, but informal lending is still contracting. The regime is still pushing reforms that shake up state-owned enterprises. Chart II-4Lower Impetus For Economic Support Due To Improvements In National Income? Lower Impetus For Economic Support Due To Improvements In National Income? Lower Impetus For Economic Support Due To Improvements In National Income? Chart II-5Has China's Stimulus Peaked? chart 5 Has China's Stimulus Peaked? Has China's Stimulus Peaked?   An added headwind for the Chinese economy stems from the currency. The currency should track interest rate differentials. Beijing’s incremental monetary stimulus, in the form of cuts to bank reserve requirement ratios (RRRs), should also push the renminbi down over time (Chart II-6). However, an essential aspect of any trade deal with the Trump administration is the need to demonstrate that China is not competitively devaluing. Hence the CNY-USD could overshoot in the first half of the year. This is positive for global exports to China, but it tightens Chinese financial conditions at home. A stronger than otherwise justified renminbi would add to any negative economic surprises from less accommodative monetary and fiscal policy. Conventional wisdom says China will stimulate the economy ahead of two major political events: the centenary of the Communist Party in 2021 and the twentieth National Party Congress in 2022. The former is a highly symbolic anniversary, as Xi has reasserted the supremacy of the party in all things, while the latter is more significant for policy, as it is a leadership reshuffle that will usher in the sixth generation of China’s political elite. But conventional wisdom may be wrong – the Xi administration may aim only for stability, not acceleration, in the economy. It would make sense to save dry powder for the next US or global recession. The obvious implication is that China’s economic rebound may lose steam as early as H2 – but the black swan risk is that negative surprises could cause a vicious spiral inside of China. This is a country with massive financial and economic imbalances, a declining potential growth profile, and persistent political obstacles to growth both at home and abroad. Corporate defaults have spiked sharply. While the default rate is lower than elsewhere, the market may be sniffing out a bigger problem as it charges a much higher premium for onshore Chinese bonds (Chart II-7). Chart II-6CNY/USD Overshoot Would Tighten Chinese Financial Conditions CNY-USD Overshoot Would Tighten Chinese Financial Conditions CNY-USD Overshoot Would Tighten Chinese Financial Conditions Chart II-7Is China's Bond Market Sniffing Out A Problem? Is China's Bond Market Sniffing Out A Problem? Is China's Bond Market Sniffing Out A Problem?   Bottom Line: Our view is that China’s authorities will remain accommodative in 2020 in order to ensure that growth bottoms and the labor market continues to improve. But Beijing has compromised its domestic economic discipline since 2018 in order to fight trade war. The risk now, with a “phase one” deal in hand, is that Xi Jinping returns to his three-year battle plan and underestimates the downward pressures on the economy. The result would be a huge negative surprise for the Chinese and global economy in 2020. Black Swan 2: The US And China Go To War In 2013, we predicted that US-China conflict was “more likely than you think.” This was not just an argument for trade conflict or general enmity that raises the temperature in the Asia-Pacific region – we included military conflict. At the time, the notion that a Sino-American armed conflict was the world’s greatest geopolitical threat seemed ludicrous to many of our clients. We published this analysis in October of that year, months after the Islamic State “Soldier’s Harvest” offensive into Iraq. Trying to direct investors to the budding rivalry between American and Chinese naval forces in the South China Sea amidst the Islamic State hysteria was challenging, to say the least. Chart II-8Americans’ Attitudes Toward China Plunged… February 2020 February 2020 The suggestion that an accidental skirmish between the US and China could descend into a full-blown conflict involved a stretch of the imagination because China was not yet perceived by the American public as a major threat. In 2014, only 19%of the US public saw China as the “greatest threat to the US in the future.” This came between Russia, at 23%, and Iran, at 16%. Today, China and Russia share the top spot with 24%. Furthermore, the share of Americans with an unfavorable view of China has increased from 52% to 60% in the six intervening years (Chart II-8). The level of enmity expressed by the US public toward China is still lower than that toward the Soviet Union at the onset of the Cold War in the 1950s (Chart II-9). However, the trajectory of distrust is clearly mounting. We expect this trend to continue: anti-China sentiment is one of the few sources of bipartisan agreement remaining in Washington, DC (Chart II-10). Chinese sentiment toward the United States has also darkened dramatically. The geopolitical rivalry is deepening for structural reasons: as China advances in size and sophistication, it seeks to alter the regional status quo in its favor, while the US grows fearful and seeks to contain China. Chart II-9…But Not Yet To War-Inducing Levels February 2020 February 2020 Chart II-10Distrust Of China Is Bipartisan February 2020 February 2020   Chart II-11Newfound American Concern For China’s Repression February 2020 February 2020 One example of rising enmity is the US public’s newfound concern for China’s domestic policies and human rights, specifically Beijing’s treatment of its Uyghur minority in Xinjiang. A Google Trends analysis of the term “Uyghur” or “Uyghur camps” shows a dramatic rise in mentions since Q2 of 2018, around the same time the trade war ramped up in a major way (Chart II-11). While startling revelations of re-education camps in Xinjiang emerged in recent years, the reality is that Beijing has used heavy-handed tactics against both militant groups and the wider Uyghur minority since at least 2008 – and much earlier than that. As such, the surge of interest by the general American public and legislators – culminating in the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2019 – is a product of the renewed strategic tension between the two countries. The same can be said for Hong Kong: the US did not pass a Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in 2014, during the first round of mass protests, which prompted Beijing to take heavy-handed legal, legislative, and censorship actions. It passed the bill in 2019, after the climate in Washington had changed. Why does this matter for investors? There are two general risks that come with a greater public engagement in foreign policy. First, the “phase one” trade deal between China and the US could fall victim to domestic politics. This deal envisions a large step up in Sino-American economic cooperation. But if China is to import around $200 billion of additional US goods and services over the next two years – an almost inconceivable figure – the US and China will have to tamp down on public vitriol. This is notably the case if the Democratic Party takes over the White House, given its likely greater focus on liberal concerns such as human rights. And yet the latest bills became law under President Trump and a Republican Senate, and we fully expect a second Trump term to involve a re-escalation of trade tensions to ensure compliance with phase one and to try to gain greater structural concessions in phase two. Second, mounting nationalist sentiment will make it more difficult for US and Chinese policymakers to reduce tensions following a potential future military skirmish, accidental or otherwise. While our scenario of a military conflict in 2013 was cogent, the public backlash in the United States was probably manageable.3 Today we can no longer guarantee that this is the case. The “phase one” trade deal risks falling victim to domestic politics due to greater public engagement in foreign policy. China has greater control over the domestic narrative and public discourse, but the rise of the middle class and the government’s efforts to rebuild support for the single-party regime have combined to create an increase in nationalism. Thus it is also more difficult for Chinese policymakers to contain the popular backlash if conflict erupts. In short, the probability of a quick tamping down of public enmity is actively being reduced as American public vilification of China is closing the gap with China’s burgeoning nationalism at an alarming pace. Another of our black swan risks – Taiwan island – is inextricably bound up in this dangerous US-China dynamic. To be clear, Washington will tread carefully, as a conflict over Taiwan could become a major war. Nevertheless Taiwan’s election, as we expected, has injected new vitality into this already underrated geopolitical risk. It is not only that a high-turnout election (Chart II-12) gave President Tsai Ing-wen a greater mandate (Chart II-13), or that her Democratic Progressive Party retained its legislative majority (Chart II-14). It is not only that the trigger for this resounding victory was the revolt in Hong Kong and the Taiwanese people’s rejection of the “one country, two systems” formula for Taiwan. It is also that Tsai followed up with a repudiation of the mainland by declaring, “We don’t have a need to declare ourselves an independent state. We are an independent country already and we call ourselves the Republic of China, Taiwan.” Chart II-12Tsai Ing-Wen Enjoys A Greater Mandate On Higher Turnout… February 2020 February 2020 Chart II-13…Popular Support… February 2020 February 2020 Chart II-14…And A Legislative Majority February 2020 February 2020 This statement is not a minor rhetorical flourish but will be received as a major provocation in Beijing: the crystallization of a long-brewing clash between Beijing and Taipei. Additional punitive economic measures against Taiwan are now guaranteed. Saber-rattling could easily ignite in the coming year and beyond. Taiwan is the epicenter of the US-China strategic conflict. First, Beijing cannot compromise on its security or its political legitimacy and considers the “one China principle” to be inviolable. Second, the US maintains defense relations with Taiwan (and is in the process of delivering on a relatively large new package of arms). Third, the US’s true willingness to fight a war on Taiwan’s behalf is in doubt, which means that deterrence has eroded and there is greater room for miscalculation. Bottom Line: A US-China military skirmish has been our biggest black swan risk since we began writing the BCA Geopolitical Strategy. The difference between then and now, however, is that the American public is actually paying attention. Political ideology – the question of democracy and human rights – is clearly merging with trade, security, and other differences to provoke Americans of all stripes. This makes any skirmish more than just a temporary risk-off event, as it could lead to a string of incidents or even protracted military conflict. Black Swan 3: Social Unrest Erupts In America There are numerous lessons that one can learn from the ongoing unrest in Hong Kong, but perhaps the most cogent one is that Millennials and Generation Z are not as docile and feckless as their elders think. Images of university students and even teenagers throwing flying kicks and Molotov cocktails while clad in black body armor have shocked the world. Perhaps all those violent video games did have a lasting impact on the youth! What is surprising is that so few commentators have made the cognitive leap from the ultra-first world streets of Hong Kong to other developed economies. Perhaps what is clouding analysts’ minds is the idiosyncratic nature of the dispute in Hong Kong, the “one China” angle. However, Hong Kong youth are confronted with similar socio-economic challenges that their peers in other advanced economies face: overpriced real estate and a bifurcated service-sector labor market with few mid-tier jobs that pay a decent wage. There is a risk of rebellion from Trump’s most ardent supporters if he loses the White House. In the US, Millennials and Gen Z are also facing challenges unique to the US. First, their debt burden is much more toxic than that of the older cohorts, given that it is made up of student loans and credit card debt (Chart II-15). Second, they find themselves at odds – demographically and ideologically – with the older cohorts (Chart II-16). Chart II-15Younger American Cohorts Plagued By Toxic Debt February 2020 February 2020 Chart II-16Younger And Older Cohorts At Odds Demographically February 2020 February 2020   Chart II-17Massive Turnout To The 2016 Referendum On Trump February 2020 February 2020 The adage that the youth are apolitical and do not turn out to vote may have ended thanks to President Trump. The 2018 midterm election, which the Democratic Party successfully turned into a referendum on the president, saw the youth (18-29) turnout nearly double from 20% to 36% (the 30-44 year-old cohort also saw a jump in turnout from 35.6% to 48.8%). The election saw one of the highest turnouts in recent memory, with a 53.4% figure, just two points off the 2016 general election figure (Chart II-17). Despite the high turnout in 2018, the-most-definitely-not-Millennial Vice President Joe Biden continues to lead the Democratic Party in the polls. His probability of winning the nomination is not overwhelming, but it is the highest of any contender. In recent polls, Biden comes third place in Millennial/Gen-Z vote preferences (Chart II-18). Yet he is hardly out of contention, especially for the 30-44 year-old cohort. The view that “Uncle Joe” does not fit the Democratic Party zeitgeist has become so entrenched in the Democratic Party narrative that it became conventional wisdom last year, pulling oddsmakers and betting markets away from the clear frontrunner (Chart II-19). Chart II-18Biden Unpopular Among Young American Voters February 2020 February 2020 Chart II-19Bookies Pulled Down 'Uncle Joe’s' Odds, Capturing Democratic Party Zeitgeist February 2020 February 2020     As such, a Biden victory at the Democratic National Convention in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on July 13-16 may come as an affront to the left-wing activists who will surely descend on the convention. This will particularly be the case if Biden wins despite the progressive candidates amassing a majority of overall delegates, which is possible judging by the combined progressive vote share in current polling (Chart II-20). He would arrive in Milwaukee without clearing the 1990 delegate count required to win on the first ballot. On the second ballot, his presidency would then receive a boost from “superdelegates” and those progressives who are unwilling to “rock the boat,” i.e. unify against an establishment candidate with the largest share of votes. This is also how Mayor Michael Bloomberg could pull off a surprise win. Chart II-20Progressives Come Closest To Victory February 2020 February 2020 Such a “brokered” – or contested – convention has not occurred since 1952. However, several Democratic Party conventions came close, including 1968, 1972, and 1984. The 1968 one in Chicago was notable for considerable violence and unrest. Even if the Milwaukee Democratic Party convention does not produce unrest, it could sow the seeds for unrest later in the year. First, a breakout Biden performance in the primaries is unlikely. As such, he will likely need to pledge a shift to the left at the convention, including by accepting a progressive vice-presidential candidate. Second, an actual progressive may win the primary. Chart II-21Zealots In Both Parties Perceive Each Other As A National Threat February 2020 February 2020 It is likely that either of the two options would be seen as an existential threat to many of Trump’s loyal supporters across the United States. President Trump’s rhetoric often paints the scenario of a Democratic takeover of the White House in apocalyptic terms. And data suggests that the zealots in both parties perceive each other as a “threat to the nation’s wellbeing” (Chart II-21). The American Civil War in the nineteenth century began with the election of a president. This is not just because Abraham Lincoln was a particularly reviled figure in the South, but because the states that ultimately formed the Confederacy saw in his election the demographic writing-on-the-wall. The election was an expression of a general will that, from that point onwards, was irreversible. Given demographic trends in the US today, it is possible that many would see in Trump’s loss a similar fait accompli. If one perceives progressive Democrats as an existential threat to the US constitution, rebellion is the obvious and rational response. Bottom Line: Year 2020 may be a particularly violent one for the US. First, left wing activists may be shocked and angered to learn that Joe Biden (or Bloomberg) is the nominee of the Democratic Party come July. With so much hype behind the progressive candidates throughout the campaign, Biden’s nomination could be seen as an affront to what was supposed to be “the big year” for left-wing candidates. Second, investors have to start thinking about what happens if Biden – or a progressive candidate – goes on to defeat President Trump in the general election. While liberal America took Trump’s election badly, it has demographics – and thus time – on its side. Trump’s most ardent supporters may conclude that his defeat means the end of America as they know it. Black Swan 4: Europe’s Migration Crisis Restarts It is a testament to Europe’s resilience that we do not have a Black Swan scenario based on an election or a political crisis set on the continent in 2020. Support for the common currency and the EU as a whole has rebounded to its highest since 2013. Even early elections in Germany and Italy are unlikely to produce geopolitical risk. The populists in the former are in no danger of outperforming whereas the populists in the latter barely deserve the designation. But what if one of the reasons for the surge in populism – unchecked illegal immigration – were to return in 2020? Chart II-22Decline In Illegal Immigration Dampened European Populism February 2020 February 2020 The data suggests that the risk of migrant flows has massively subsided. From its peak of over a million arrivals in 2015, the data shows that only 125,472 migrants crossed into Europe via land and sea routes in the Mediterranean last year (Chart II-22). Why? There are five reasons that we believe have checked the flow of migrants: Supply: The civil wars in Syria, Iraq, and Libya have largely subsided. Heterogenous regions, cities, and neighborhoods have been ethnically cleansed and internal boundaries have largely ossified. It is unlikely that any future conflict will produce massive outflows of refugees as the displacement has already taken place. These countries are now largely divided into armed, ethnically homogenous, camps. Enforcement: The EU has stepped up border enforcement since 2015, pouring resources into the land border with Turkey and naval patrols across the Mediterranean. Individual member states – particularly Italy and Hungary – have also stepped up border enforcement policy. While most EU member states have publicly chided both for “draconian” policies, there is no impetus to force Rome and Budapest to change policy. Libyan Imbroglio: Conflict in Libya has flared up in 2019 with military warlord Khalifa Haftar looking to wrest control from the UN-backed Government of National Accord led by Fayez al-Serraj. The Islamic State has regrouped in the country as well. Ironically, the conflict is helping stem the flow of migrants as African migrants from sub-Saharan countries dare not cross into Libya as they did in 2015 when there was a brief lull in fighting. Turkish benevolence: Ankara is quick to point out that it is the only thing standing between Europe and a massive deluge of migrants. Turkey is said to host somewhere between two and four million refugees from various conflicts in the Middle East. Fear of the crossing: If crossing the Mediterranean was easy, Europe would have experienced a massive influx of migrants throughout the twentieth century. Not only is it not easy, it is costly and quite deadly, with thousands lost each year. Furthermore, most migrants are not welcomed when they arrive to Europe, many are held in terrible conditions in holding camps in Italy and Greece. Over time, migrants who made it into Europe have reported these dangers and conditions, reducing the overall demand for illegal migration. We do not foresee these five factors changing, at least not all at once. However, there are several reasons to worry about the flow of migrants in 2020. US-Iran tensions have sparked outright military action, while unrest is flaring up across Iran’s sphere of influence. Going forward, Iran could destabilize Iraq or fuel Shia unrest against US-backed regimes. Second, Afghanistan has been the source of most migrants to Europe via sea and land Mediterranean routes – 19.2%. The conflict in the country continues and may flare up with President Trump’s decision to formally withdraw most US troops from the country in 2020. Third, a break in fighting in Libya may encourage sub-Saharan migrants to revisit routes to Europe. Migrants from Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, and the Democratic Republic of Congo make up over 10% of migrants to Europe. Finally, Turkish relationship with the West could break up further in 2020, causing Ankara to ship migrants northward. We highly doubt that President Erdogan will risk such a break, given that 50% of Turkish exports go to Europe. A European embargo on Turkish exports – which would be a highly likely response to such an act – would crush the already decimated Turkish economy. Bottom Line: While we do not see a return to the 2015 level of migration in 2020, we flag this risk because it would fundamentally undermine political stability in Europe. Black Swan 5: Russia Faces A “Peasant Revolt” Our fifth and final black swan risk for the year stems from Russia. This risk may seem obvious, since the US election creates a dynamic that revives the inherent conflict in US-Russian relations. Russia could seek to accomplish foreign policy objectives – interfering in US elections, punishing regional adversaries. The Trump administration may be friendly toward Russia but Trump is unlikely to veto any sanctions passed by the House and Senate in an election year, should an occasion for new sanctions arise. Conversely Russia could anticipate greater US pressure if the Democrats win in November. Yet it is Russia’s domestic affairs that represent the real underrated risk. Putin’s fourth term as president has been characterized by increased focus on domestic political control and stability as opposed to foreign adventurism. The creation of a special National Guard in 2016, reporting directly to Putin and responsible for quelling domestic unrest, symbolizes the shift in focus. So too does Russia’s adherence to the OPEC 2.0 regime of production control to keep oil prices above their budget breakeven level. Meanwhile Putin’s courting of Europe for the Nordstream II pipeline, and his slight peacemaking efforts with Ukraine, has suggested a slightly more restrained international posture. Strategically it makes little sense for Russia to court negative attention at a time when the US and Europe are at odds over trade and the Middle East, the US is preoccupied with China and Iran, and Russia itself faces mounting domestic problems. The domestic problems are long in coming. The central bank has maintained a stringent monetary policy for the better part of the decade. Despite cutting interest rates recently, monetary and credit conditions are still tight, hurting domestic demand. Moscow has also imposed fiscal austerity, namely by cutting back on state pensions and hiking the value added tax. Real wage growth is weak (Chart II-23), retail sales are falling, and domestic demand looks to weaken further, as Andrija Vesic of BCA Emerging Markets Strategy observes in a recent Special Report. The effect of Russia’s policy austerity has been a drop in public approval of the administration (Chart II-24). Protests erupted in 2019 but were largely drowned out by the larger and more globally significant protests in Hong Kong. These were met by police suppression that has not removed their underlying cause. Putin’s first major decision of the new year was to reshuffle the government, entailing Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev’s transfer to a new post and the appointment of a new cabinet. This move reveals the need to show some accountability to reduce popular pressure. While Moscow now has room to cut interest rates and ease fiscal policy, it is behind the curve and the weak economy will add fuel to domestic unrest. Chart II-23Sluggish Wage Growth Threatens Russian Stability Sluggish Wage Growth Threatens Russian Stability Sluggish Wage Growth Threatens Russian Stability Chart II-24Austerity Weighed On The Administration's Popularity In Russia Austerity Weighed On The Administration's Popularity In Russia Austerity Weighed On The Administration's Popularity In Russia   Meanwhile Putin’s efforts to alter the Russian constitution so he can stay in power beyond current term limits, effectively becoming emperor for life, like Xi Jinping, should not be dismissed merely because they are expected. They reflect a need to take advantage of Putin’s popular standing to consolidate domestic political power at a time when the ruling United Russia party and the federal government face discontent. They also ensure that strategic conflict with the United States will take on an ideological dimension. Russia's recent cabinet shakeup is positive from the point of view of economic reform. And the country's monetary and fiscal room provide a basis for remaining overweight equities within EM, as our Emerging Markets Strategy recommends. However, Russian equities have rallied hard and the political risk is understated. Chart II-25Russian Political Risk Is Unsustainably Low Russian Political Risk Is Unsustainably Low Russian Political Risk Is Unsustainably Low Bottom Line: It is never easy predicting Putin’s next international move. Our market-based indicators of Russian political risk have hit multi-year lows, but both the domestic and international context suggest that these lows will not be sustained (Chart II-25). A new bout of risk can emanate from Putin, or from changes in Washington, or from the Russian people themselves. What would take the world by surprise would be domestic unrest on a larger scale than Russia can easily suppress through the police force. Housekeeping We are closing our long European Union / short Chinese equities strategic trade with a 1.61% loss since inception on May 10, 2019. Dhaval Joshi of BCA’s European Investment Strategy downgraded the Eurostoxx 50 to underweight versus the S&P 500 and the Nikkei 225 this week. He makes the point that the Euro Area bond yield 6-month impulse hit 100 bps – a critical technical level – and will be a strong headwind to growth. We will look to reopen this trade at a later date when the euphoria over the “phase one” trade deal subsides, as we still favor European equities and DM bourses over EM. We will reinstitute our long Brent crude H2 2020 versus H2 2021 tactical position, which was stopped out on January 9, 2020. We remain bullish on oil fundamentals and expect Middle East instability to add a political risk premium. China's stimulus and the oil view also give reason for us to reinitiate our long Malaysian equities relative to EM as a tactical position. The Malaysian ringgit will benefit as oil prices move higher, helping Malaysian companies make payments on their large pile of dollar-denominated debt and improving household purchasing power. Higher oil prices also correlate with higher equity prices, while China's stimulus and the US trade ceasefire will push the US dollar lower and help trade revive in the region. Marko Papic Chief Strategist, Clocktower Group Matt Gertken Geopolitical Strategist   III. Indicators And Reference Charts The S&P 500 rally looks increasingly vulnerable from a tactical perspective. The US benchmark is overbought, and the percentage of NYSE stocks above their 30-week and 10-week moving averages is rolling over at elevated levels. Additionally, the number of NYSE new highs minus new lows has moved in a parabolic fashion and has hit levels that in previous years have warned of an imminent correction. The spread of nCoV-2019 is likely to be the catalyst to a pullback that could cause the S&P 500 to retest its October 2019 breakout. An improving outlook for global growth, limited inflationary pressures and global central banks who maintain an accommodative monetary stance bode well for stocks. Therefore, the anticipated equity correction will not morph into a bear market. For now, our Monetary Indicator remains at extremely elevated levels. Furthermore, our Composite Technical Indicator has strengthened. Additionally, our BCA Composite Valuation index suggests that stocks are expensive, but not so much as to cancel out the supportive monetary and technical backdrop. Finally, our Speculation Indicator is elevated, but is not so high as to warn of an imminent market top. This somewhat muted level of speculation is congruent with the expectation of low long-term growth rates for profits embedded in equity prices. In contrast to our Revealed Preference Indicator, our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) is moving in accordance with our constructive cyclical stance for stocks. Indeed, the WTP for the US, Japan and Europe continues to improve. The WTP indicator tracks flows, and thus provides information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. This broad-based improvement therefore bodes well for equities. Meanwhile, net earnings revisions appear to be forming a trough. 10-year Treasury yields remain extremely expensive. Moreover, according to our Composite Technical Indicator, T-Note prices are losing momentum. The fear surrounding the spread of the new coronavirus has cause bonds to rally again, but this is likely to be the last hurrah for the Treasury markets before a major reversal takes hold. The rising risk premia linked to the coronavirus is also helping the dollar right now, but signs that global growth is bottoming, such as the stabilization in the global PMIs, the pick-up in the German ZEW and Belgium’s Business Confidence surveys, or the improvement in Asia’s export growth, point to a worsening outlook for the counter-cyclical US dollar. Moreover, the dollar trades at a large premium of 24.5% relative to its purchasing-power parity equilibrium. Additionally, the negative divergence between the dollar and our Composite Momentum Indicator suggests that the dollar is technically vulnerable. In fact, the very modest pick-up in the dollar in response to the severe fears created by the spreading illness in China argues that dollar buying might have become exhausted. Finally, commodity prices have corrected meaningfully in response to the stronger dollar and the growth fears created by the spread of the coronavirus. However, they have not pulled back below the levels where they traded when they broke out in late 2019. Moreover, the advance/decline line of the Continuous Commodity Index remains at an elevated level, indicating underlying strength in the commodity complex. Natural resources prices will likely become the key beneficiaries of both the eventual pullback in virus-related fears and the weaker dollar.   EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings US Earnings US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations US Treasurys And Valuations US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market US Labor Market US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption US Consumption US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing US Housing US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China   Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   Footnotes 1 Please see US Equity Strategy Weekly Report "Three EPS Scenarios," dated January 13, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com; US Equity Strategy Insight Report "Bombed Out Energy," dated January 8, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com; US Equity Strategy Special Report "Industrials: Start Your Engines," dated January 21, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 2  Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report "January 2020," dated December 20, 2019 available at bca.bcaresearch.com; The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report "OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game," dated November 22, 2019 available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Geopolitical Strategy "A Reprieve Amid The Bull Market In Iran Tensions," dated January 8, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 4 Observe how little attention the public paid to US-China saber-rattling around China’s announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea that year.
Highlights The US election cycle is an understated risk to US equities – and the risk of a left-wing populist outperforming in the Democratic primary election is frontloaded in February. The US-Iran conflict is unresolved and remains market-relevant. Iraq is at the center of the conflict and oil supply disruption there or elsewhere in the region is a substantial risk. Even if war does not erupt, Iran has the potential to give President Trump’s foreign policy a black eye and thus could marginally impact the election dynamic. Feature Stocks have rallied mightily since our August report on Trump’s “tactical trade retreat,” but new headwinds face the market. In this report we call attention to four hurdles arising from US election uncertainty. Then we focus on the status of Iran and Iraq in the wake of this month’s hostilities, which brought the US and Iran to the brink of outright war. We maintain that the Iran risk is unresolved and will remain market-relevant in advance of the US election. Primarily due to the US Democratic primary election, we urge caution on US equities in the near term, along with our Global Investment Strategy, despite our cyclically bullish House View. Four Hurdles In The US Election Cycle The US election cycle is the chief political risk to the bull market this year – and geopolitical risks largely radiate from it. There are four immediate hurdles that financial markets are underestimating: Risks to Trump's re-election: Global investors have come around to our view since 2018 that Trump is slightly favored to win re-election (Chart 1). Bets on the related question of which party will hold the White House have flipped from Democratic to Republican (Chart 2). Everyone now recognizes that Trump will not be removed from office through impeachment. Chart 1Trump Re-election Odds Add To Risk-On Trump Re-election Odds Add To Risk-On Trump Re-election Odds Add To Risk-On Chart 2Republicans Now Favored For White House Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Yet, anecdotally, investors may be becoming complacent about Trump’s chances. He is not a shoo-in. Subjectively we have argued that his odds of victory are 55%. Our quantitative election model shows that Wisconsin has shifted to the Republican camp since November, but it places the odds of winning that state (and Pennsylvania) at less than 52% (Chart 3). This gives Trump 289 electoral votes, only 19 more than necessary. If both of these states tipped in the opposite direction then investors would be facing a major policy reversal in the United States. Chart 3Our US 2020 Election Model Shows Trump Win With 289 Electoral College Votes Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Chart 4The US Economy Is Still A Risk To Trump The US Economy Is Still A Risk To Trump The US Economy Is Still A Risk To Trump Trump’s low approval rating remains a liability – and in this sense impeachment is still relevant, in that it can either help or hurt his approval, or prompt him to seek distractions abroad that could deliver negative surprises. Moreover the US manufacturing sector and labor market are not out of the woods yet (Chart 4). In short, the election is still ten months away and a lot can happen between now and then. We see Trump as only slightly favored. Moreover other hurdles are more immediate than the benefits of policy continuity upon a Trump win. 2. Risks to Biden's nomination: Throughout last year we maintained that former Vice President Joe Biden was the frontrunner for the Democratic nomination, albeit with very low conviction. In particular, after Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders’s poor showing in the third debate and subsequent heart attack, we expected Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren to consolidate the progressive vote and trigger a policy-induced selloff in US equities. This never occurred because Biden held firm, Sanders recovered, and Warren fell. The risk to equities from a left-wing populist Democratic nominee is frontloaded in February and March. Now, however, the risk to equities is back. The Democratic Party faces a last-ditch effort from its left or “progressive” wing and anti-establishment voters to oppose Biden. With the primary election now upon us – the Iowa Caucus is February 3 – national opinion polls show that Sanders is pushing up against Biden (Chart 5). It is less clear if Sanders is breaking through in the primary polling state-by-state, where multiple candidates remain competitive (Chart 6). But online gamblers are reasserting Biden over Sanders at just the moment when progressives are set to launch their biggest push (Chart 7). Meanwhile New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg is finally gaining some traction – and he eats away at Biden’s support from centrist voters. Everything is in flux, which warrants caution. Chart 5Biden Is The Frontrunner, But Sanders Is Challenger Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Chart 6Biden Not A Shoo-In For Early Democratic Primary States Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Biden is still favored to win the nomination, but he has not clinched it. The market faces volatility during the period when Democrats get “cold feet” about nominating another establishment candidate. Moreover the fundamental knock against Sanders – that he is not as “electable” as Biden – is debatable, judging by head-to-head polls against Trump (Chart 8). This means that a shift in momentum – for instance, if Biden lurches from disappointments in early states to underperformance in his bulwark of South Carolina – would have legs. Ultimately a “contested convention” is not impossible. This would be a negative surprise to market participants currently assuming that the world faces the relatively benign choice of two known quantities: an establishment Democrat or a continuation of Trump policies. Chart 7Betting Markets Overlooking Party 'Cold Feet' Over Biden Betting Markets Overlooking Party 'Cold Feet' Over Biden Betting Markets Overlooking Party 'Cold Feet' Over Biden Chart 8Electability Fears May Not Stop Sanders Rally Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Risks to the Republican Senate: Assuming Biden clinches the nomination, he has a 45% chance of winning the election – and in that case, his chance of bringing the Senate over to the Democrats is higher than investors realize. This is another risk that the market will awaken to later this year. Chart 9Democrats Underestimated In Senate Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran The consensus holds that Republicans will hold the Senate, particularly with Republican senators in Maine and Iowa leading their Democratic challengers in polling. The problem is that for Democrats to unseat an incumbent president they will necessarily have generated strong turnout from key demographic groups: young people, suburbanites, women, and minorities. If that is the case, then the election will not be as tight as expected and Republicans will be less likely to hold the Senate. This would require rising unemployment or some other blow that fundamentally damages the Trump administration’s popular support in key swing states. At least until it becomes clear that the manufacturing sector is out of the woods, the Democrats should be seen as far more likely to take the Senate than the Republicans are to retake the House of Representatives – yet this goes against the consensus (Chart 9). Rising odds of a Senate victory would mean that even a “centrist” Democrat like Biden would have fewer political constraints in office – he would pose a greater threat of increasing taxes, minimum wages, and passing legislative regulation than the market currently expects. In short, Biden would be pulled to the left of the political spectrum by his party and expectations of an establishment Democrat posing a minimal threat to corporate profits would be greatly disappointed. Risks of Trump's second term: Finally, assuming the manufacturing sector rebounds and that Trump’s odds of re-election rise above 55%, market complacency becomes an even bigger concern for a long-term investor. For in his second term Trump would become virtually unshackled with regard to economic and financial constraints, since he cannot run for office again. He would still face the senate, the Supreme Court, and other constraints, but these would certainly not preclude a doubling down on trade war (or confrontations with nuclear-aspirants like Iran or North Korea). We have argued that Trump will not instigate a trade war with Europe, at least until the economy has clearly rebounded, and most likely not until his second term. But we fully expect chapter two of the trade war to begin in 2021 – and this could mean China, Europe, or even a two-front war. Re-election could go to Trump’s head and prompt him to overreach on the global stage. Hence we expect the relief rally on Trump’s re-election to be short-lived and would be looking to sell the news. But the S&P 500 faces more immediate hurdles anyway, and that is why we urge caution in the very near term. Iran is still a major geopolitical risk this year. Bottom Line: None of these hurdles are insurmountable, but the US election cycle is now an understated risk to the equity bull market. We agree with our Global Investment Strategy that it is prudent to shift to a neutral position tactically on US equities, especially for the February and March period when uncertainty rises over the Democratic Party primary. This does not change our view that the underlying global economy is improving, largely on China’s rebound, and that the cyclical outlook is positive. Don’t Bet On Regime Collapse In Iran (Yet) The January 8 Iranian attack on US bases in Iraq was intended to serve as a breather for Iranian leaders. It was meant to put on pause the rapid escalation in US-Iran tensions – allowing Iranian leaders to recover from the assassination of top military commander Qassem Suleimani – all the while appeasing the public through a public show of revenge. As fate would have it, however, the Iranian regime was granted no such respite. Days later, domestic unrest descended on the Islamic Republic as protesters returned to the streets across the country, criticizing the regime’s downing of a civilian airliner and re-stating their long-running complaints against the regime. Civil strife is not uncommon in Iran (Table 1). Economic inefficiencies, corruption, and discriminatory policies which serve to reward regime loyalists while suppressing the private sector are only some of the grievances faced by Iranians.1 Table 1Civil Strife Ongoing Problem In Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Today’s strife is relevant, however, because it is fueled by US-imposed “maximum pressure” sanctions that have created an even bleaker economic reality. Iranian exports were down 37% in 2019 following an 18% decline the previous year. Oil exports fell to 129 thousand barrels per day in December 2019, down from an average 2.1 million barrels per day in 2017 (Chart 10). Households are facing the brunt, experiencing a 17% unemployment rate and a whopping 36% inflation rate (Chart 11). Chart 10US 'Maximum Pressure' Sanctions On Iranian Oil Exports US 'Maximum Pressure' Sanctions On Iranian Oil Exports US 'Maximum Pressure' Sanctions On Iranian Oil Exports Chart 11Iranian Households Bear Brunt Of Economic Shock Iranian Households Bear Brunt Of Economic Shock Iranian Households Bear Brunt Of Economic Shock The 2020-21 budget, released in December and described as a weapon of “resistance against US sanctions,” intends to plug the deficit using state bonds and state property sales (Chart 12). However Iran’s fiscal condition is shaky. The International Monetary Fund estimates a fiscal breakeven oil price of $194.6 per barrel for Iran, more than 3 times higher than current oil prices. Chart 12Iran’s Fiscal Condition Is Shaky Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Chart 13Iran Avoiding Devaluation Under Trump Iran Avoiding Devaluation Under Trump Iran Avoiding Devaluation Under Trump Chart 14Iranians Also Blame Their Government For Malaise Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran The solution of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the populist hawk who led the government during the US’s previous round of sanctions, was to devalue the official exchange rate. The weaker rial raised local currency revenues for each barrel of exported oil and encouraged import substitution in other industries. However devaluation came at a steep political cost and sparked riots and protests. So far President Hassan Rouhani has eschewed this strategy, instead maintaining a stable official exchange rate, used as the reference for subsidized basic goods and medicine (Chart 13). Nevertheless, the unofficial market rate has weakened 68% since the beginning of 2018. It is no surprise then that Iranians all over the country are taking to the streets. The latest bout of unrest is significant in size, geographic reach, and in that protesters are calling on Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to step down as supreme leader. Despite US sanctions, Iranian protesters are partially blaming Khamenei and the government for the country’s malaise (Chart 14). Even prior to the US withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA), Iranians were angry about economic mismanagement. Nevertheless, according to our checklist for an Iranian revolution, the regime is not yet at risk of collapse (Table 2). Although the street movement is picking up pace, it is not organized or unified. There is no alternative being offered against the all-powerful supreme leader, and the political elite are mostly united in preserving the current system. Table 2Iran Regime Stability Checklist Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran The regime has two main options going forward: seek immediate economic relief through negotiations with the United States, or hunker down and wait to see whether President Trump is reelected and able to sustain his campaign of maximum pressure, and go from there. We fully expect the latter. Domestic dissent can still be suppressed for the time being. The parliamentary – or Majlis – elections scheduled for February 21 could in theory offer Iranians an opportunity to voice their discontent through the ballot box. However this democratic exercise conceals the known political reality that the supreme leader holds supreme authority, even in the selection of parliament or the president (Diagram 1). Thus the election result will not drive major policy change. Diagram 1Supreme Leader Controls Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran A case in point was the regime’s 2016 strategy in the parliamentary election. At that time, the conservative-dominated Guardian Council, responsible for screening potential candidates, rejected well-known reformist applicants (Chart 15). As a result, the reformists who were able to win seats were either lesser-known figures or unaligned with liberals in the reformist movement. Thus while the reformist presence in parliament nominally surged, these lawmakers were ineffective, reneging on campaign promises or collaborating with the conservative faction. The 2016 election serves as a blueprint for what to expect in the upcoming elections in February. The Guardian Council ruled that out of around 15,000 candidates, only 60 (relatively unknown) reformist candidates were qualified to run for the election.2 The elections will not change anything, but this means the grievances of the population will fester in the coming years, especially if the US does not change policies. This is where the medium-term risk to regime stability – namely through elite divisions – becomes apparent. The impending leadership succession is a major source of uncertainty. Supreme Leader Khamenei is the main barrier to political change. At 80 years old and reportedly suffering from poor health, a change in leadership is imminent. However, no one has been officially endorsed as his successor. This is an immense source of uncertainty in the coming years. There are several possibilities for the succession.3 A successor is appointed by the Assembly of Experts. Because we exclude Rouhani as a candidate for supreme leader, the potential candidates for Iran’s top position listed below ascribe to Khamanei’s hardline ideology: Hojjat ol-Eslam Ebrahim Raisi, head of judiciary and of the Imam Reza shrine since March 2019. Raisi is reportedly Khamenei’s favorite for succession. He is a hardliner who lost the May 2017 presidential election to Rouhani.4 Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani, the conservative former head of the judiciary and current chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council, which is responsible for resolving disputes among government branches. Larijani is also a member of the Guardian Council.5 Ayatollah Ahmad Khatemi, hardline Tehran Friday prayer leader and senior member of the Assembly of Experts. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – a military force with immense influence in the regime – may choose to rule itself. We assign a low likelihood of this occurring. The IRGC is more likely to ensure that Khamenei’s successor is someone who supports its hardline ideology and vision for Iran. Some moderate clerics are advocating a change in structure, whereby the position of supreme leader is abolished. This school of thought argues that political leaders should be selected based on popular election rather than appointment.6 We do not assign high odds to this scenario. Until the Assembly of Experts selects the successor, a three-member council made up of the Iranian president, the head of judiciary, and a theologian of the Guardian Council, will assume the functions of supreme leader. Such a “triumvirate” could last longer than expected, or could even be formally decided as an alternative to a new supreme leader. In the context of such extreme uncertainty for the regime’s leadership in the coming decade, it is highly unlikely that the current political leaders will engage in negotiations with President Trump until they are sure of his staying power (Chart 16). First, the Iranians will continue to refuse talks prior to the US election. They will seek to undermine the Trump administration, yet without crossing red lines on the nuclear program (one year till nuclear breakout) or militant activities (killing American citizens). Chart 15Iran’s Guardians Vet Election Candidates Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Second, if Trump wins, then the shift to negotiations may or may not come, but the subsequent diplomatic process will be prolonged. Trump will have to gain the full cooperation of Europe, Russia, and China – and any new US-Iran deal is an open question and will involve tensions flaring up more than once. Chart 16Iranians Opposed To Talks With Trump Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Third, even if the Democrats win, the regime will play “hard to get” and will not immediately return to status quo ante Trump, although eventually there could be a restoration of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or something like it. This process could also involve saber-rattling despite the Democrats’ more dovish disposition toward Iran. Bottom Line: The US maximum pressure campaign is not aimed at regime change in Iran, but if it brings any political change it will be a shift in a more hawkish direction as the regime faces immense internal and external pressures and an uncertain succession in the coming years. Iran’s leaders will continue to suppress unrest and can probably succeed in the near term. The confrontation with the US discredits any political actors who advocate negotiations. The path toward reform and improved relations with the West is closed until after the US election at minimum. Since Iran will seek to undermine both President Trump and the US presence in the Middle East in the meantime, US-Iran tensions remain a market-relevant source of risk in 2020. Iraq Still Poses An Oil Supply Risk Chart 17Iraqis Suffering From Poor Governance Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Iraq is ground zero for the US-Iran showdown, since the two powers have eschewed direct military confrontation. Iraqis have also been suffering the consequences of an ill-functioning political system (Chart 17). Corruption has prevented the trickle down of oil revenues, resulting in endemic poverty and inequality (Chart 18). Yet unlike its neighbor, Iraq is not ruled by a supreme leader who controls a powerful armed forces to which anger can be directed. Instead, protesters have been blaming the deep seated influence of the Iranian regime, which often results in what Iraqis’ argue to be a prioritization of foreign – i.e. Iranian – objectives over national ones. The demonstrations were successful in forcing the resignation of Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi and the passing of a new electoral law. However Iraq remains in a state of chaos as Iraqis have vowed to remain on the street until all their conditions are met, including the appointment of an acceptable prime minister and early elections. Chart 18Poverty, Inequality, Corruption Plague Iraq Poverty, Inequality, Corruption Plague Iraq Poverty, Inequality, Corruption Plague Iraq This batch of reforms has been challenging for politicians to execute. For one, there is a lack of clarity as to which political group holds the majority of seats in Iraq’s Council of Representatives. Both the Iran-backed al-Binaa bloc as well as the al-Islah coalition led by Muqtada al-Sadr claim this position (Chart 19). A list of candidates for the temporary position of prime minister until early elections are held, proposed by Binaa in December, was rejected by President Barham Salih on grounds that it did not include anyone who would possess the support of the demonstrators. Chart 19Iraqi Parliamentary Control Up For Grabs Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Iraqi protesters have consistently reiterated their desire for a sovereign state, free from both American and Iranian interference. However, this nationalistic call has been disrupted and overshadowed by the US-Iran conflict. Importantly, the protest movement has now lost its most influential backer within the Iraqi political system: Sadr of the Islah bloc. This year’s Iran tensions and the parliamentary resolution to eject US troops from Iraq have unified the warring Shia political blocs. Sadr has called on the Mahdi army – a notoriously anti-American force also known as the Peace Brigades – to re-assemble. On January 13, in what can only be interpreted as a rapprochement among the main Shia political factions, Sadr met with paramilitary leaders making up the Popular Mobilization Forces in the Iranian city of Qom. They discussed the creation of a “united resistance” and the need jointly to expel foreign troops. Sadr also called for a “million-man march” against US troops in Iraq.7 Sadr’s pivot to Iran has not gone down well in Iraq’s streets, where protesters are accusing him of putting aside national goals for his own personal aspirations. While the protest movement will keep going, it is now largely headless and competing with the unified priorities of the Shia parties. This state of affairs weakens the odds of a sovereign Iraq that curbs Iranian regional influence. The political class is more likely to turn a blind eye to the repression of protesters, which is likely to increase as the system notches up its crackdown on dissent. A return to the status quo ante in Iraq is also now more likely. A new government may be elected. It may include more technocratic politicians in a nod to the protestors, but the pro-Iranian faction has fortified its position as kingmaker. Meanwhile, Sadr has decided that reform should be postponed for a later day. Iraqis who have been camping out on the streets for nearly four months, risking their lives, are unlikely to be easily put down. Instead their frustrations will manifest in more aggressive forms, such as through violence and the sabotage of infrastructure. Saudi Arabia may or may not seek to interfere in Iraq to maintain the pressure on Iranian interests. If it does so, it risks escalating the situation and provoking retaliation from Iran. Iraqi efforts to force a US troop withdrawal will clash with US interests. President Trump wants to reduce commitments but does not want to risk anything remotely resembling a Saigon-style evacuation during an election year. As such, some form of sanctions against Iraq is possible. The US administration may pass up imposing sanctions on oil sales and instead target USD flows to Iraq’s central bank. Blocking or reducing access to Iraqi accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York – to which all revenues from Iraqi oil sales are directed – would debilitate the economy and amplify the risk to stability and hence oil flows. Washington’s decision whether to renew waivers allowing Iraq to import Iranian gas – set to expire mid-February – will signal whether the events earlier this year changed the US’s calculus. Iraq is extremely dependent on Iranian gas to generate power. A decision not to extend the waivers would cause greater friction between the Iraqi street and the ruling elite.8 Bottom Line: Baghdad is getting dragged deeper into chaos. Alignment with Iran, and delays in government formation and economic reform, will aggravate tensions between the street and the political class. Dissent may take on more violent forms going forward. Middle Eastern oil supply will remain vulnerable to instability and sabotage in Iraq and the broader Persian Gulf. Investment Conclusions In the very near term we expect US equities to encounter headwinds due to the over extension of the rally and immediate risks from the US election cycle. We also see global risk appetite suffering due to US uncertainty, as well as to fears about the new coronavirus. These may reach a crescendo in the wake of Chinese New Year travel season. However, China’s stimulative policy trajectory will ultimately be reinforced due to the economic threat from the outbreak. And China’s economy is showing signs of rebounding. This reinforces our constructive view on the global business cycle overall, on commodities, and on select emerging markets that produce oil or are undertaking structural reforms. The US-Iran conflict is ongoing and we expect it to continue injecting a risk premium into oil markets. The two sides are effectively playing Russian roulette.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The IRGC and bonyads – para-governmental organizations that provide funding for groups supporting the Islamic Republic – have access to subsidies, favorable contracts, and cheap loans. Together they run a considerable part of the economy. 2 Questions Loom In Iran As Reformist Factions Lose Hope In Elections," dated January 23, 2020, available at en.radiofarda.com. 3 In an interview with Fars news agency in June 2019, Ayatollah Mohsen Araki, a prominent member of the Assembly of Experts, mentioned that a committee of three members from the Assembly of Experts were working on a list of prospective supreme leaders, which they will present to the full AE when necessary. Please see "Is Iran’s Next Supreme Leader Already Chosen?," dated June 18, 2019, available at en.radiofarda.com. 4 Please see "Ebrahim Raisi: The Cleric Who Could End Iranian Hopes For Change," dated January 5, 2019, available at aljazeera.com. 5 Please see “A Right-Wing Loyalist, Sadeq Larijani, Gains More Power in Iran,” dated January 8, 2019, available at atlanticcouncil.org. 6 Mohsen Kadivar, an unorthodox cleric who was forced to flee Iran due to his political views, and is now an instructor at Duke University is a critic of the system of Velayet-e Faqih, or clerical rule. He claims that since the death of Khomeini, a majority of Iran’s religious scholars hold a “secretive belief” that supreme clerical rule should be abolished as it only leads to despotism. 7 In response to Sadr’s call for a “million man march”, Ayatollah al-Sistani repeated his warning against “those who seek to exploit the protests that call for reforms to achieve certain goals that will hurt the primary interests of the Iraqi people and are not in line with their true values.” 8 The last time Iran reduced electricity exports to Iraq resulted in mass protests in Iraq in July 2018. Thus if the sanction waivers are not renewed the cutoff of gas risks a greater clash between the Iraqi street and government, especially during the hot summer months.