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BCA Indicators/Model

Despite a stellar Q3 earnings print, the S&P 500 had a terrible October as EPS continues to do the hard work in lifting the market (Chart 1). Chart 1EPS Doing The Heavy Lifting EPS Doing The Heavy Lifting EPS Doing The Heavy Lifting We bought the dip,1 consistent with our view of deploying longer term oriented capital were a 10% pullback to occur, given our view of no recession for the next 9 to 12 months.2 Financials and industrials should lead the next leg up and we believe a rotation into these beaten up stocks is going to materialize in the coming months. On the flip side, as volatility is making a comeback and the fed is on a path to lift rates to 3% by June of next year, fixed income proxies and consumer discretionary stocks should be avoided and a preference for large caps over small caps should be maintained (Chart 2). Chart 2The Return Of Vol May Spoil The Party The Return Of Vol May Spoil The Party The Return Of Vol May Spoil The Party Further, a valuation reset has taken hold, pushed by the surprising rise of the equity risk premium over the course of the past two years, representing a surge in negative sentiment from investors, despite the usually tight inverse correlation with the ISM, the core sentiment indicator of the manufacturing economy (Chart 3). Chart 3ERP And The Economy Are Inversely Correlated ERP And The Economy Are Inversely Correlated ERP And The Economy Are Inversely Correlated Nevertheless, while everyone is focusing on the euphoric above trend growth of the U.S. economy, a risk lurking beneath the surface is a domestic economic soft patch.3 We have likely stolen demand from the future and brought consumption forward especially with the stock market related fiscal easing that is front loaded to 2018 and less so for next year. On that front our Economic Impulse Indicator is warning that the U.S. economy cannot grow at such a pace, unless a bipartisan divide can be crossed to deliver enough firepower to rekindle GDP growth (Chart 4). Chart 4Economic Impulse Yellow Flag Economic Impulse Yellow Flag Economic Impulse Yellow Flag Further, at least part of the blame for higher volatility rests with increasing trade uncertainty as the Trump administration has pursued an aggressive trade policy. Still, the evidence so far indicates that any trade weakness has been borne disproportionately by the rest of the world, to the U.S.' benefit (Charts 5 & 6). Chart 5U.S. Is Winning The Trade War U.S. Is Winning The Trade War U.S. Is Winning The Trade War Chart 6U.S. Has The Upper Hand U.S. Has The Upper Hand U.S. Has The Upper Hand We remain cognizant of a few key risks to our sanguine U.S. equity view. Principal among these is the rising U.S. dollar and its eventual infiltration into S&P 500 earnings, which has thus far been muted (Chart 7). Chart 7Watch The U.S. Dollar Watch The U.S. Dollar Watch The U.S. Dollar Further, a softening housing market bodes ill for U.S. economic growth. This is the first time since the GFC that residential investment's contribution to real GDP growth turned negative for three consecutive quarters (Chart 8). Chart 8Peak Housing Peak Housing Peak Housing Chris Bowes, Associate Editor chrisb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Daily Insight, "Time To Bargain Hunt," dated October 26, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "The "FIT" Market," dated October 9, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Critical Reset," dated October 29, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. S&P Financials (Overweight) Unchanged from its trajectory when we updated our cyclical indicators earlier this year, the S&P financials CMI has continued to accelerate. A historically low unemployment rate, combined with unusually resilient economic growth, underpin the surge in the CMI to its highest levels post-GFC. Further goosing the indicator, particularly with respect to the core banks sub-sector, is the recent rise in Treasury yields and a modest steepening in the yield curve both of which bode well for bank profits. However, financials have not responded to this exceptionally bullish data the way we expected, with worries over future loan growth fully offsetting the positive backdrop; financials have been falling throughout 2018. Still, inflation is threatening to rise (albeit gradually) and a selloff looms in the bond market. We highlighted earlier this fall that sectors who benefit from rising interest rates while serving as inflation hedges should outperform against this backdrop. Cue the return of S&P financials. As shown in Chart 10, the S&P financials index has shown a historically strong positive correlation with interest rates and inflation expectations and we expect the recent divergence to be closed via a catch-up in the former. As noted above, bearishness has reigned in 2018 and the result has been a steep fall in our valuation indicator (VI) to more than one standard deviation below normal while our technical indicator (TI) is deep in oversold territory. Chart 9S&P Financials (Overweight) S&P Financials (Overweight) S&P Financials (Overweight) Chart 10Financials Are Trailing Rates Financials Are Trailing Rates Financials Are Trailing Rates S&P Industrials (Overweight) S&P industrials, much like their cyclical brethren S&P financials, benefit from higher interest rates and also serve as hedges against rising inflation. As we have noted in recent research, industrials are levered to the commodity cycle and thus represent an indirect inflation hedge. This hedge only becomes problematic when industrials stocks are unable to pass these rising commodity costs through to the consumer. As shown in Chart 12, pricing power is not yet an issue for these deep cyclicals. Given the positive macro backdrop for S&P industrials, the CMI has risen to new cyclical highs. Despite the forgoing, fears over trade wars and tariff-driven higher input costs, combined with slowing global demand for capital goods, have weighed on the index. The result is that S&P industrials remain deeply oversold on a technical basis while hovering around the neutral line from a valuation perspective. We reiterate our overweight recommendation. Chart 11S&P Industrials (Overweight) S&P Industrials (Overweight) S&P Industrials (Overweight) Cjart 12Resilient Industrials Pricing Power Resilient Industrials Pricing Power Resilient Industrials Pricing Power S&P Energy (Overweight, High-Conviction) Our energy CMI has moved horizontally since our last update of the cyclical macro indicators. However, this followed a snap-back recovery from the extremely depressed levels of 2016 and 2017. Nevertheless, the S&P energy index has moved sideways in line with the CMI. Energy stocks have significantly trailed crude oil prices since the latter broke out roughly a year ago (Chart 14). Disbelief in the longevity of the increase in oil prices is the likely culprit weighing on the index, along with a bottleneck-induced steep shale oil price discount to WTI. There are high odds that a catch up phase looms, especially if BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy service's view of a looming oil price spike materializes, and we reiterate our overweight recommendation. Our VI has been hovering at one standard deviation below fair value, while our TI trending into oversold territory. Chart 13S&P Energy (Overweight, High-Conviction) S&P Energy (Overweight, High-Conviction) S&P Energy (Overweight, High-Conviction) Chart 14Crude Prices Are Still Leading The Way Crude Prices Are Still Leading The Way Crude Prices Are Still Leading The Way S&P Consumer Staples (Overweight) Unchanged from our previous update, our consumer staples CMI has moved sideways, near a depressed level. However, share prices have finally been staging the recovery we have anticipated for several years on the back of firm consumer data, solid sector profitability and an overall cyclical rotation into staples. Despite the recent outperformance, both from an earnings and market perspective, consumer staples remain a deeply unloved sector. With respect to the former, earnings growth has outstripped the market's reaction by a wide margin. This is reflected on our VI which only recently rose from one standard deviation below fair value while our TI has only just begun a retreat from oversold territory. Staples' share of retail sales have arrested their steep declines from 2014-2016, which we view as a precursor to a rebound in weak industry sales (top panel, Chart 16). Exports of consumer staples have already been staging a comeback, despite the strengthening of the U.S. dollar which has historically presaged a relative earnings outperformance (middle panel, Chart 16). Considering the already-strong industry return on equity, any relative earnings gains should result in a valuation rerating (third panel, Chart 16). We reiterate our outperform rating on this cyclically defensive index. Chart 15S&P Consumer Staples (Overweight) S&P Consumer Staples (Overweight) S&P Consumer Staples (Overweight) Chart 16Staples Are Making A Comback Staples Are Making A Comback Staples Are Making A Comback S&P Health Care (Neutral) In a mid-summer report , we upgraded the S&P pharma and biotech indexes to neutral which, considering their ~50% weight of the S&P health care index, took our overall recommendation on S&P health care to neutral. In the report, we proffered five reasons why the S&P pharma and biotech indexes were set for a rebound following their precipitous decline from 2016 onwards. These were: firming operating metrics, late cycle dynamics, likelihood of pricing power regulatory relief, the rising U.S. dollar and investor and analyst capitulation. Our timing has proved prescient as the S&P pharma index has been dramatically outperforming since the upgrade (top panel, Chart 18). With respect to pharma's operating metrics, our pharma productivity proxy (industrial production / employment) has been soaring, implying that earnings should surge (second panel, Chart 18). This seems particularly likely as the pace of improvement in drug shipments exceeds inventory growth by a fairly wide margin (third and bottom panels, Chart 18). Despite the upbeat backdrop for pharma, our health care CMI has declined modestly, though remains at a neutral level relative to history. Further, the pharma recovery has taken our VI from undervalued to a neutral position, a reading which is echoed by our TI. Chart 17S&P Health Care (Neutral) S&P Health Care (Neutral) S&P Health Care (Neutral) Chart 18Pharma Strength Is Lifting Health Care Pharma Strength Is Lifting Health Care Pharma Strength Is Lifting Health Care S&P Technology (Neutral) The stratospheric rise of tech profits, particularly in the past two years, have done most of the heavy lifting in pulling the S&P 500's profit margin ever higher (second panel, Chart 20) as well as pushing the index itself to new all-time highs in September. The San Francisco Fed's tech pulse index - an index of coincident indicators of technology sector activity - suggests more profit growth is in the offing (third panel, Chart 20), an intimation repeated by our technology CMI. However, we remain cognizant of three material risks to bullishness in tech. First, the tech sector garners 60% of its revenues from abroad and thus the appreciating U.S. dollar is a significant profit headwind (bottom panel, Chart 20). Second, a rising U.S. inflation backdrop along with the related looming selloff in the bond market should knock the wind out of the tech sector's sails. Third, leading indicators of emerging Asian demand are souring rapidly and were the trade war to re-escalate, EM economic data would retrench further. Lastly, neither our VI nor our TI send particularly compelling messages, as both are on the expensive side of neutral, despite the recent tech selloff. We sustain a barbell portfolio within the sector by recommending an overweight position in the late-cyclical and capex-driven technology hardware, storage & peripherals and software indexes while recommending an underweight position in the early-cyclical semi and semi equipment indexes. Chart 19S&P Technology (Neutral) S&P Technology (Neutral) S&P Technology (Neutral) Chart 20Tech Is King But Beware The U.S. Dollar Tech Is King But Beware The U.S. Dollar Tech Is King But Beware The U.S. Dollar S&P Materials (Neutral) Our materials CMI has recently plumbed new lows, a result of tightening monetary policy and the accompanying selloff in the bond market. As a reminder, the heavyweight chemicals component of the materials index typically sees earnings (and hence stock prices) underperform as real interest rates are moving higher. Despite this negative backdrop, chemicals fundamentals have remained surprisingly resilient. Pricing power has stayed in its multi-year uptrend (second panel, Chart 22) while productivity gains have accelerated, coinciding with an erosion of sell-side bearishness (third panel, Chart 22). Still, chemical production has clearly rolled over (bottom panel, Chart 22) which could lead to a quick reversal of the gains in our productivity proxy and a faltering in rebounding EPS estimates. Combined with BCA's view of rising real interest rates for the next year, this is enough to keep us on the fence. Our VI too shows a neutral reading, though our TI has declined steeply into an oversold position. Chart 21S&P Materials (Neutral) S&P Materials (Neutral) S&P Materials (Neutral) Chart 22Fundamentals In Chemicals Have Improved Fundamentals In Chemicals Have Improved Fundamentals In Chemicals Have Improved S&P Utilities (Underweight) Our utilities CMI is at a 25-year low, driven down by the ongoing backup in interest rates. Such a move is predictable, given that utilities stocks are the closest to perfect fixed income proxies in the equity space. The S&P utilities sector has been enjoying a relative resurgence recently, driven by spiking natural gas prices and a supportive electricity demand backdrop from a roaring economy (ISM survey shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 24) and, more than anything, a general market retreat into safe haven assets. We recently trimmed our exposure to the sector from neutral to underweight because the S&P utilities sector was yielding 3.5% and the competing risk free asset was near 3.2% and investors would prefer to shed, at the margin, riskier high-yielding equities and park the proceeds in U.S. Treasurys (top panel, Chart 24). Since the run up in S&P utilities without a corresponding decline in Treasury yields, that spread has narrowed. Neither our VI nor our TI send compelling messages as both are in neutral territory, though our bearish thesis on utilities has less to do with their valuation relative to themselves or other equities than to bonds. Chart 23S&P Utilities (Underweight) S&P Utilities (Underweight) S&P Utilities (Underweight) Chart 24Utilities Should Still Be Avoided Utilities Should Still Be Avoided Utilities Should Still Be Avoided S&P Real Estate (Underweight) Our real estate CMI has reversed a recent recovery to set a new decade low; the only time it has shown a lower reading was during the Great Financial Crisis. Excluding the inflating of the property bubble in advance of the GFC, REITs have had a very tight inverse correlation with UST yields; the resulting downward pressure on the S&P REITs index is thus very predictable (top panel, Chart 26). Much like the S&P utilities sector in the previous section, and in the context of BCA's higher interest rate view, we continue to avoid this sector. The rate-driven downward pressure could be overlooked if all was well on an operating basis but this is not the case. Non-residential construction continues to rise (albeit more slowly than last year) in the face of higher borrowing rates (second panel, Chart 26). Further, demand looks slack as occupancy rates clearly crested at the beginning of last year (bottom panel, Chart 26). As well, on the residential front, multi-family housing starts remain elevated which should prove deflationary to rents. Our VI suggests that REITs are fairly valued, which is somewhat surprising given the negative backdrop, while our TI echoes a neutral view. Chart 25S&P Real Estate (Underweight) S&P Real Estate (Underweight) S&P Real Estate (Underweight) Chart 26A Bearish Backdrop For REITs A Bearish Backdrop For REITs A Bearish Backdrop For REITs S&P Consumer Discretionary (Underweight) While we remain constructive on financials that benefit from higher rates, we continue to recommend investors avoid the consumer discretionary sector - the other early cyclical - that suffers when interest rates rise. The second panel of Chart 28 depicts this inverse correlation consumer discretionary equities have with interest rates, especially the fed funds rate. Most discretionary equites are levered off of floating rates and thus any increase in the fed funds rates gets reflected immediately in banks' prime lending rate. Also, most consumer debt is floating rate debt and thus tighter monetary conditions, at the margin, dampen consumer debt uptake and as a knock off on effect, weigh on discretionary consumer outlays. Not only are higher interest rates anchoring consumer discretionary stocks but rising energy prices are also dealing a blow to this sector. We show our Consumer Drag Indicator (CDI, comprising mortgage rates and energy prices) in the bottom panel of Chart 28. Historically, our CDI has been an excellent leading indicator of relative share price momentum. Currently, the message is clear: the sinking CDI signals that a bear market in consumer discretionary stocks has likely commenced. All of this is captured by our CMI which has been sinking since the beginning of the year. Meanwhile, our VI has broken out to nearly its highest level ever which we believe is largely a function of the decreasing diversification of the S&P consumer discretionary index as AMZN now represents more than 30% of its market value following the redistribution of the media indexed to the new S&P communication services index. Our TI has been falling from overbought territory recently and now sends a neutral message. Chart 27S&P Consumer Discretionary (Underweight) S&P Consumer Discretionary (Underweight) S&P Consumer Discretionary (Underweight) Chart 28Higher Rates Spell Declines For Consumer Discretionary Higher Rates Spell Declines For Consumer Discretionary Higher Rates Spell Declines For Consumer Discretionary S&P Communication Services (Underweight) As the newly-minted communication services has little more than a month of existence, we do not have adequate history to create a cyclical macro indicator. However, we have created Chart 29 below with a number of valuation indicators, though we caution that they too are less reliable than the other indicators presented in the preceding pages, owing to a dearth of history. Rather, we refer readers to our still-fresh initiation of coverage on the sector and look forward to being able to deliver something more substantive in the future. Chart 29S&P Communication Services (Underweight) S&P Communication Services (Underweight) S&P Communication Services (Underweight) Size Indicator (Favor Large Vs. Small Caps) Our size CMI has been hovering near the boom/bust line, as it has for most of the last two years. Despite the neutral CMI reading, we downgraded small caps earlier this year , and moved to a large cap preference, based on the diverging (and unsustainable) debt levels of small caps vs. their large cap peers (top and second panels, Chart 31). We expect the divergence in leverage and stock price to be rationalized as it usually has: via a fall in the latter. Considering the dramatic valuation gap that has opened between large and small caps, particularly on a Shiller P/E (or cyclically adjusted P/E, CAPE) basis (bottom panel, Chart 31), no space remains for any small cap profit mishaps. Our VI is trending towards small caps being undervalued, though without conviction while our TI is hovering in the neutral zone. Chart 30Size Indicator (Favor Large Vs. Small Caps) Size Indicator (Favor Large Vs. Small Caps) Size Indicator (Favor Large Vs. Small Caps) Chart 31Too Much Debt And High Valuations Should Hurt Small Caps Too Much Debt And High Valuations Should Hurt Small Caps Too Much Debt And High Valuations Should Hurt Small Caps
Yesterday’s FOMC press statement was largely unchanged from the previous release. The Fed left rates unchanged as expected, but is likely to deliver another hike in December. Despite October’s market turbulence, Fed officials still view interest rates as…
Highlights Did October's equity rout ... : Before bouncing back in its final two sessions, October was the S&P 500's 12th-worst month of the postwar era. ... represent a watershed for financial markets?: Shaken investors have begun asking if the equity bull market is finally over, and if Treasury yields are in the process of making their cyclical highs. Not according to the macro backdrop, which still supports risk assets, ... : There is no recession in sight. An earnings contraction sufficient to induce an equity bear market, or a meaningful pickup in defaults, isn't imminent. ... or our rates checklist, which still supports a bearish take: Inflation may be taking its time, but nothing on our rates checklist calls for increasing duration in a bond portfolio. Feature U.S. equity investors were relieved to close the books on October, which was a notably bad month for the S&P 500. Its 7% loss was good for 33rd-worst in the postwar record books, and just missed being a -2 standard-deviation event. Had the month ended before its robust bounce in the final two sessions, it would have been the 12th-worst, two-and-a-half standard deviations below the mean (Chart 1). At its lowest point, a half-hour before the October 29th close, the index was down a whopping 10.5% for the month. Chart 1Standing Out From The Crowd Standing Out From The Crowd Standing Out From The Crowd The price action understandably unnerved investors. Monthly declines of this magnitude are almost always associated with bear markets; just seven of the thirty-two larger declines occurred outside of bear markets, two of them by the skin of their teeth. Decomposing the equity returns into changes in earnings estimates and changes in forward multiples shows that sharp multiple contraction is a feature of nearly every bad month (Table 1). Table 1Worst Postwar Monthly Declines Checking In On Our Rates View Checking In On Our Rates View It is estimate growth - a robust 0.8% - that makes October something of an outlier among the S&P 500's worst months, and we expect growing forward earnings will keep the S&P out of a bear market for another year, especially now that its multiple is more than 15% off its peak. Earnings growth should also keep spread product out of trouble for the time being. Although we recommend no more than an equal weight in corporate bonds, modest spread widening has boosted their total return prospects. Too Legit To Quit We expect that earnings will keep growing because they rarely contract in a meaningful way outside of recessions. With monetary accommodation likely reinforcing certain fiscal stimulus over the coming year, it is hard to see how the next U.S. recession will occur before 2020. As our U.S. bond strategists pointed out last week, the ongoing market implications of last month's equity decline depend on what precipitated it.1 Was it a simple correction sparked by a valuation reset, or has the market begun to sniff out an economic slowdown? With forward four-quarter earnings growing by an annualized 9.5% in October, it appears that the selloff was nothing more than a valuation reset. As our bond strategists point out, the picture was much different when the S&P 500 corrected in the summer of 2015 and the winter of 2015-16. Those corrections unfolded against the backdrop of a global manufacturing recession (Chart 2). The U.S. economy is not bulletproof, and slowing global growth and tighter financial conditions will eventually bring it to heel, but we think the next recession is still too far down the line for markets to begin selling off in advance of it. Chart 2The Fundamentals Are Much Improved From 2015-16 The Fundamentals Are Much Improved From 2015-16 The Fundamentals Are Much Improved From 2015-16 Checking In With Our Rates Checklist If macro conditions really did change for the worse last month, our bearish rates view may no longer apply, and we would have to rethink our underweight Treasury and below-benchmark-duration calls. We introduced our rates checklist in September to identify and track the key series that could trigger a view change. We review it now to see if perceptions of the Fed, inflation measures, labor-market developments, or financial-market excesses suggest that rates may be at a turning point (Table 2). Table 2Rates View Checklist Checking In On Our Rates View Checking In On Our Rates View Market Perceptions Of The Fed We continue to scratch our head over markets' refusal to take the FOMC's terminal-rate projections seriously. The overnight index swap (OIS) curves are calling for a measly two hikes over the next 12 months ... and the next 18 months ... and the next 24 as well (Chart 3). That would leave the terminal fed funds rate for this tightening cycle at a mere 2.75%. The median projection among FOMC voters is 3 1/8%, and we're looking for anywhere from 3.5 to 4%. We will have to start backing off once the gap between our expectations and the market's expectations begins to close, but it's only widened since we established the checklist. Chart 3Stubbornly Staying Behind The Curve Stubbornly Staying Behind The Curve Stubbornly Staying Behind The Curve We get to our 3.5-4% estimate on the premise that measured inflation will pick up enough to force the Fed to keep hiking beyond its own expectations in a bid to keep inflation from getting out of hand. Client meetings suggest that investors find our inflation call hard to swallow. Some eye-rolling when we mention the Phillips Curve is understandable, but our view is ultimately based on capacity constraints. Tepid investment in the years following the crisis have left the economy's productive potential ill-suited to meet the surge in aggregate demand provoked by tax cuts and fiscal stimulus. An inverted curve would indicate that the bond market has begun to anticipate that rate hikes will soon stifle the economy's momentum. For all the hand-wringing in the media about flattening over the 2-year/10-year segment of the curve, our preferred 3-month/10-year measure remains nowhere near inverting (Chart 4). The yield curve tends to invert way ahead of a recession, so we would look for other indicators to corroborate its message before we changed our big-picture take. We also note that a bear flattening would support below-benchmark-duration positioning. Chart 4The Fed Hasn't Gone Too Far Yet The Fed Hasn't Gone Too Far Yet The Fed Hasn't Gone Too Far Yet Bottom Line: The bond market remains well behind the Fed, and the Fed may well wind up behind the economy. A broad repricing of the Treasury curve awaits. Inflation Measures Inflation's slow creep has gotten a little slower since we initially rolled out the checklist. Headline PCE and CPI have hooked downward, though their uptrends remain intact (Chart 5). Looking forward, continued tightening of the output gap should boost inflation (Chart 6), though long-term expectations have stalled for now (Chart 7). Inflation is the only section of the checklist that has backslid since September, but not by nearly enough to justify checking any of the boxes. Chart 5Two Steps Forward, One Step Back Two Steps Forward, One Step Back Two Steps Forward, One Step Back Chart 6An Economy Running Hot ... An Economy Running Hot ... An Economy Running Hot ... Chart 7... Will Eventually Produce Inflation ... Will Eventually Produce Inflation ... Will Eventually Produce Inflation Labor Market Indicators The first item on our list of labor-market indicators is the unemployment gap, the difference between the unemployment rate and NAIRU. NAIRU (the Non-Accelerating-Inflation Rate of Unemployment), is the estimate of the lowest sustainable unemployment rate. The actual rate fell below NAIRU in early 2017, and the gap has been getting steadily more negative ever since (Chart 8, top panel). A negative gap is associated with higher compensation, but the wage response has been muted so far (Chart 8, bottom panel). Chart 8Supply And Demand Supply And Demand Supply And Demand Friday's October employment report pointed to further downward pressure on the unemployment gap. The three-month moving average of net payroll additions came in at 218,000, keeping job growth for the last seven years at around 200,000/month (Chart 9). If the trend were to continue for another twelve months, and population growth and the labor force participation rate (Chart 10, middle panel) were to remain constant, the Atlanta Fed Jobs Calculator2 projects that the unemployment rate will fall to 3%. Chart 9A Steady, Job-Rich Recovery A Steady, Job-Rich Recovery A Steady, Job-Rich Recovery Chart 10As 'Hidden' Unemployment Shrinks ... As "Hidden" Unemployment Shrinks … As "Hidden" Unemployment Shrinks … We understand investors' impatience with the Phillips Curve. We admit to being surprised that compensation growth hasn't shown more life to this point (Chart 11). Just because wage gains have been sluggish out of the gate, however, doesn't mean they won't speed up in the future. Ancillary indicators like the broader definition of unemployment that includes discouraged and involuntary part-time workers (Chart 10, top panel), and the ratio of workers voluntarily leaving their jobs (Chart 10, bottom panel), reinforce the unemployment rate's signal that the labor market is on its way to becoming as tight as a drum. Chart 11... Wages Should Rise ... Wages Should Rise ... Wages Should Rise Broader Indications Of Instability The final three items on our checklist are meant to flag factors that could bump the Fed off its gradual rate-hiking pace. Overheating would encourage the Fed to move more quickly, but there is nothing in the main cyclical elements of the economy that stirs concern (Chart 12). The Fed might move faster if its third mandate - preserving financial stability - dictated it, but the Fed has been quiet about financial-sector imbalances since Governor Brainard expressed concern about corporate lending two months ago. Finally, the Fed is not oblivious to economic strain in the rest of the world, but conditions in even the most vulnerable emerging markets are far from triggering some sort of "EM put." Chart 12No Sign Of Overheating Yet No Sign Of Overheating Yet No Sign Of Overheating Yet Investment Implications We remain constructive on the economy and markets in the absence of a near-term catalyst to cut off the expansion, the credit cycle and/or the equity bull market. Like our bond strategists, we simply think the U.S. economy is too healthy to merit revising our bearish view on rates. The implication for investors with a balanced mandate is to continue to underweight Treasuries. Within fixed-income portfolios, investors should continue to maintain below-benchmark duration. No investment stance is forever, and we are counting on our checklist to help keep us alert to an approaching inflection point in rates, but the coast is clear for now. Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "What Kind Of Correction Is This?," published October 30, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 2https://www.frbatlanta.org/chcs/calculator.aspx?panel=1
Dear Client, Next week, I am on the road in the Middle East visiting clients and teaching the BCA Academy Principles of Global Macro course. There will be no regular Weekly Report on November 9th. Instead, we will be sending you a Special Report on November 6th written by my colleague Rob Robis, who runs BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy service. In this piece, Rob will be discussing the outlook for Euro Area monetary policy and its implications for rate markets and the euro. This is an especially relevant topic as the end of the ECB's Asset Purchase Program is scheduled to soon materialize. I trust you will find this report both interesting and informative. Best regards, Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy Highlights Uncovered Interest Rate Parity still works for currencies. However, it needs to be based on a combination of short- and long-term real rates. Currencies are also affected by global risk appetite, as approximated by corporate spreads and commodity prices. Based on our timing models, the dollar is now fairly valued on short-term basis. However, slowing global growth and robust U.S. activity suggest that the dollar has room to rally further, with our models pointing to a move in the greenback's favor. These conflicting forces suggest the dollar's easy gains are behind us, and any further dollar rally will prove much more volatile. Feature In July 2016, in a Special Report titled, "In Search Of A Lost Timing Model," we introduced a set of intermediate-term models to complement our long-term fair value models for various currencies.1 These groups of models provide additional discipline - a sanity check if you will - to our regular analysis. Additionally, these models can help global equity investors manage their currency exposure, thanks to their ability to increase the Sharpe ratio of global equity portfolios vis-Γƒ -vis other hedging strategies, and also for a host of base-currencies.2 In this report, we review the logic underpinning these intermediate-term models and provide commentary on their most recent readings for the G10 currencies vis-Γƒ -vis the USD. UIP, Revisited The Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP) relationship is at the core of this modeling exercise. This theory suggests that an equilibrium exchange rate is what will make an investor indifferent between holding the bonds of Country A or Country B. This means that as interest rates rise in Country A relative to Country B, the currency of Country B will fall today in order to appreciate in the future. These higher expected returns are what will drive investors to hold the lower-yielding bonds of Country B. There has long been debate as to whether investors should focus on short rates or long rates when looking at exchange rates through the prism of UIP. This debate has regained vigor in the past six months as the dollar has greatly lagged the levels implied by 2-year rate differentials (Chart 1). Research by the Federal Reserve and the IMF suggests that incorporating longer-term rates to UIP models increase their accuracy.3 This informational advantage works whether policy rates are or aren't close to their lower bound.4 Chart 1Interest Rate Parity: Generally Helpful, But... Interest Rate Parity: Generally Helpful, But... Interest Rate Parity: Generally Helpful, But... Incorporating long-term rates as an explanatory variable increases the performance of UIP models because exchange rate movements not only reflect current interest rate conditions, but currency market investors also try to anticipate the path of interest rates over many periods. By definition, long-term bonds do just that, as they are based on the expected path of short rates over their maturity - as well as a term premium, which compensates for the uncertain nature of future interest rates. There is another reason why long-term rate differential changes improve the power of UIP models. Since UIP models are based on the concept of indifference among investors between assets in two countries, changes in the spreads between 10-year bonds in these two countries will create more volatility in the currency pair than changes in the spreads between 3-month rates. This is because an equivalent delta in the 10-year spread will have a much greater impact on the relative prices of the bonds than on the short-term paper, courtesy of their much more elevated duration. To compensate for these greater changes in prices, the currency does have to overshoot its long-term PPP to a much greater extent to entice investors trading the long end of the curve. Bottom Line: The interest rate parity relationship still constitutes the bedrock of any shorter-term currency fair value model. However, to increase its accuracy, both long-term and short-term rates should be used. Real Rates Really Count Another perennial question regarding exchange rate determination is whether to use nominal or real rate differentials. At a theoretical level, real rates are what matter. Investors can look through the loss of purchasing power created by inflation. Therefore, exchange rates overshoot around real rate differentials, not nominal ones. On a practical level, there are additional reasons to believe that real rates should matter, especially when trying to explain currency moves beyond a few weeks. Indeed, various surveys and studies on models used by forecasters and traders show that FX professionals use purchasing power parity as well as productivity differential concepts when setting their forex forecasts.5 Indeed, as Chart 2 illustrates, real rate differentials have withstood the test of time as an explanatory variable for exchange rate dynamics, albeit with periods where rate differentials and the currency can deviate from one another. Chart 2Real Rates Work Better Over The Long Run Real Rates Work Better Over The Long Run Real Rates Work Better Over The Long Run It is true that very often, nominal rate differentials can be used as a shorthand for real rate differentials, as both interest rate gaps tend to move together. However, regularly enough, they do not. In countries with very depressed inflation expectations (Japan immediately comes to mind), nominal and real rate differentials can in fact look very different (Chart 3). With the informational cost of incorporating market-based inflation expectations being very low, we find the shorthand unnecessary when building UIP-based models. Chart 3Real And Nominal Rate Spreads Can Differ Real And Nominal Rate Spreads Can Differ Real And Nominal Rate Spreads Can Differ Finally, it is important to remark that in environments of high inflation, inflation differentials dominate any other factor when it comes to exchange rate determination. However, the currencies discussed in this report currently are not like Zimbabwe or Latin America in the early 1980s. Bottom Line: When considering an intermediate-term fair value model for exchange rates, investors should focus on real - not nominal - long-term rate differentials. Global Risk Aversion And Commodity Prices Global risk appetite is also a key factor in trying to model exchange rates. Risk-aversion shocks tend to lead to appreciation in the U.S. dollar, which benefits from its status as the global reserve currency.6 Much literature has focused on the use of the VIX as a gauge for global risk appetite. Our exercise shows stronger explanatory power with options-adjusted spreads on junk bonds (Chart 4). Chart 4The Dollar Benefits From Global Stresses The Dollar Benefits From Global Stresses The Dollar Benefits From Global Stresses Commodity prices, too, play a key role. Historically, commodity prices have displayed a very strong negative correlation with the dollar.7 This correlation is obviously at its strongest for commodity-producing nations, as rising natural resources prices constitute a terms-of-trade shock for them. However, this relationship holds up for the euro as well, something already documented by the European Central Bank.8 The Models The models for each cross rate are built to reflect the insight gleaned above. Each cross is modeled on three variables, with the model computed on a weekly timeframe. Real rates differentials: We use the average of 2-year and 10-year real rates. The rates are deflated using inflation expectations. Global risk appetite approximated by junk OAS. Commodity prices: We use the Bloomberg Continuous Commodity Index. For all countries, the variables are statistically highly significant and of the expected signs. These models help us understand in which direction the fundamentals are pushing the currency. We refer to these as Fundamental Intermediate-Term Models (FITM). We created a second set of models, based on the variables above, which also include a 52-week moving average for each cross. The real rates differentials, junk spreads and commodity prices remain statistically very significant and of the correct sign. They are therefore trend- and risk-appetite adjusted UIP-deviation models. These models are more useful as timing indicators on a three- to nine-month basis, as their error terms revert to zero much faster. We refer to these as Intermediate-Term Timing Models (ITTM). Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com The U.S. Dollar To model the dollar index (DXY), we used two approaches. In the first one, we took all the deviation from fair value for the pairs constituting the index, based on their weights in the DXY. In the second approach, we ran the model specifically for the DXY, using the three variables described above. U.S. real rates were compared to an average of euro area, Japanese, Canadian, British, Swiss and Swedish real rates, weighted by their contribution to the DXY. We then averaged both approaches, which gave us very similar results to begin with. Currently, there is no evident mispricing in the USD, as it trades near fair value when compared to both the FITM (Chart 5) and ITTM. While this means that the easy part of the dollar rally is behind us, it does not imply that the rally is over. As Chart 6 illustrates, periods of dollar strength tend to end when the dollar trades at a 5% premium to the ITTM. This would imply that a move to 102 on the DXY is likely over the coming months. Moreover, the widening interest rate differential between the U.S. and the rest of the world, as well the bout of rising volatility the world is experiencing, should continue to push the fair values of both the FITM and ITTM higher. Chart 5Fundamentals Continue To Help The Dollar Fundamentals Continue To Help The Dollar Fundamentals Continue To Help The Dollar Chart 6More Upside Is Possible More Upside Is Possible More Upside Is Possible The Euro As a mirror image to the DXY, there is no evident mispricing in EUR/USD. Currently, based on both the FITM and the ITTM, the euro trades at a small premium to fair value (Chart 7). However, the sell signal generated by the deviation from the ITTM in 2017 is still in place, as periods of overvaluation tend to be followed by periods of undervaluation (Chart 8). This indicator will only generate a buy signal for the euro once EUR/USD falls 5% below equilibrium, or to a level of 1.06. Moreover, this target is a moving one. European growth and inflation continue to disappoint, as the euro area feels the drag of a slowing China and decelerating global growth. This means that interest rate differentials are likely to continue to move in a euro-bearish fashion in the coming months. Hence, the flattening in the FITM that materialized in 2018 is at risk of becoming an outright deterioration. Chart 7Fundamentals For The Euro Are Deteriorating Fundamentals For The Euro Are Deteriorating Fundamentals For The Euro Are Deteriorating Chart 8EUR/USD Is Not Cheap EUR/USD Is Not Cheap EUR/USD Is Not Cheap The Yen In an environment of rising global bond yields, the FITM for the yen continues to trend south, as Japanese rates lag well behind U.S. interest rates (Chart 9). This means the yen is once again trading at a small premium to its FITM, implying that even if global risk assets sell off further, the upside for the yen against the dollar may prove limited. However, the picture for the yen against the ITTM is more benign. The yen is at equilibrium on this basis (Chart 10). However, due to the design of the ITTM, previous periods of overvaluations tend to be followed by periods of undervaluation. As a result, on the basis of this model, the yen could continue to experience downside against the dollar over the coming three to six months. This will be even truer if U.S. bond yields can continue to rise. Chart 9Rate Differentials Continue To Hurt The Yen Rate Differentials Continue To Hurt The Yen Rate Differentials Continue To Hurt The Yen Chart 10More Downside Ahead If U.S. Yields Keep Rising More Downside Ahead If U.S. Yields Keep Rising More Downside Ahead If U.S. Yields Keep Rising The British Pound The GBP/USD has deteriorated in recent weeks, a move that was mimicked by cable itself. As a result, the pound does not show any evident mispricing on this basis against the USD (Chart 11). The ITTM corroborates this message, as GBP/USD trades at a marginal 1% discount to this indicator (Chart 12). This upholds our analysis of September 7, which showed there was little risk premium embedded in the pound to compensate investors for the risks associated with the Brexit negotiations and the cloudy British political climate.9 Since British politics remain a minefield, this lack of valuation cushion suggests that the GBP is likely to continue to swing widely. As a result, a strategy to be long volatility in the pound, or to bet on the reversal of both large upside and downside weekly moves in the GBP, remains our preferred approach. Chart 11Cable Is At Equilibrium Cable Is At Equilibrium Cable Is At Equilibrium Chart 12Small Valuation Cushion Could Be Problem If Political Risk Increases Small Valuation Cushion Could Be Problem If Political Risk Increases Small Valuation Cushion Could Be Problem If Political Risk Increases The Canadian Dollar Despite the softening evident in the Loonie's FITM, the Canadian dollar continues to trade at a substantial discount to this fair value model (Chart 13). However, the FITM for the CAD is at risk of weakening further as oil prices have begun to be engulfed in the weakness that has gripped EM and risk assets globally. Mitigating this message, on the eve of the announcement of the USMCA trade deal, which essentially kept in place the trade relationships that existed between the U.S. and Canada under NAFTA, the Loonie was trading at a 1.5 sigma discount to the ITTM, a level normally constituting a buy signal (Chart 14). As a result, we expect the Canadian dollar to not be as sensitive to commodity price weakness as would have been the case had the CAD traded at a premium to its ITTM. This is one factor explaining why the Canadian dollar remains one of our favorite currencies outside the USD for the coming three to six months. The second favorable factor for the CAD is that the Bank of Canada is likely to hike interest rates at the same pace as the Fed. Hence, unlike with other currencies, interest rate differentials are unlikely to move against the CAD. Chart 13Loonie Trades At A Big Discount To Fundamentals... Loonie Trades At A Big Discount To Fundamentals... Loonie Trades At A Big Discount To Fundamentals... Chart 14...Which Will Help The CAD Mitigate A Fall In Oil Prices ...Which Will Help The CAD Mitigate A Fall In Oil Prices ...Which Will Help The CAD Mitigate A Fall In Oil Prices The Swiss Franc Like the euro, the Swiss franc trades in line with both its FITM and ITTM fair values (Chart 15). Moreover, the CHF has been hovering around its fair value for nearly a year now, which means there is less of a case for an undershoot of the ITTM fair value than for currencies that have experienced recent overshoot (Chart 16). Moreover, if volatility in financial markets remains elevated, and volatility within the bond market picks up, the fair value of the Swissie could experience some upside. However, this is where the positives for the Swiss franc end. The Swiss economy remains mired by underlying deflationary weaknesses, reflecting the lack of Swiss pricing power as well as the tepid growth of Swiss wages. As a result, the interest rate differential components of the models are likely to continue to represent a headwind for the CHF, especially as the Swiss National Bank remains firmly dovish and wants to keep real interest rates at low levels in order to weigh on the franc and also stimulate domestic demand. Based on these bifurcated influences, while we remain negative on the CHF against both the dollar and the euro on a cyclical basis, EUR/CHF may remain under downward pressure over the coming three to six months. Chart 15No Valuation Mismatch... No Valuation Mismatch... No Valuation Mismatch... Chart 16...Implies That The CHF Will Be At The Mercy Of Central Banks ...Implies That The CHF Will Be At The Mercy Of Central Banks ...Implies That The CHF Will Be At The Mercy Of Central Banks The Australian Dollar While the Australian dollar continues to trade at a significant premium against long-term models, it now trades at an important discount against both its FITM and ITTM equilibria (Chart 17). However, the problem for the AUD is that the FITM estimates continue to trend lower as Australian interest rates are lagging U.S. rates, especially in real terms. This is a direct consequence of the Reserve Bank of Australia maintaining the cash rate at multi-generational lows, while the Fed keeps hiking its own policy benchmark. With real estate prices sagging in both Melbourne and Sydney, as well as with a lack of wage growth and inflationary pressures, this down-under dichotomy is likely to remain in place and further weigh on the AUD. Meanwhile, while it is true that the AUD is also trading at a discount to its ITTM, historically, the Aussie has bottomed at slightly deeper levels of undervaluation (Chart 18). When all these factors are taken in aggregate, they suggest that for the AUD to fall meaningfully from current levels, we need to see more EM pain, more Chinese economic weaknesses, and commodity prices following these two variables lower. While this remains BCA's central scenario for the coming three to six months, if this scenario does not pan out the AUD could experience a sharp rebound over that timeframe. Chart 17Discount In AUD Emerging... Discount In AUD Emerging... Discount In AUD Emerging... Chart 18...But Not Yet Large Enough ...But Not Yet Large Enough ...But Not Yet Large Enough The New Zealand Dollar The NZD now trades at an even greater discount to both its FITM and ITTM equilibria than the AUD (Chart 19). In fact, so large is this discount that the ITTM is flashing a buy signal for the kiwi (Chart 20). This further confirms the view that we espoused 3 weeks ago that the NZD was set to rebound. As a result, we remain comfortable with our tactical recommendation of buying NZD/USD and selling GBP/NZD. The long NZD/USD position is definitely the riskier one of the two, as the NZD's upside may be limited if EM markets sell off further. In fact, NZD/USD traded at an even greater discount to its ITTM fair value when EM markets were extremely weak in late 2015 and early 2016. However, EM spreads are narrower and EM equities today trade well above the levels that prevail in those days, implying a margin of safety exists for the NZD. Meanwhile, short GBP/NZD is less likely to be challenged by weak EM asset prices, especially as in a post-Brexit environment the U.K. needs global risk aversion to stay low and global liquidity to remain ample in order to finance its large current account deficit of 3.3% of GDP. Chart 19NZD Is Now So Cheap... NZD Is Now So Cheap... NZD Is Now So Cheap... Chart 20...That It Is A Buy ...That It Is A Buy ...That It Is A Buy The Norwegian Krone The Norwegian krone continues to trade at a large discount to its FITM. However, this pair often experiences large and persistent deviations from this model (Chart 21). Nonetheless, it is important to note that as real interest rate differentials between the U.S. and Norway continue to widen, the fundamental drivers of the NOK are set to deteriorate further. By construction, the ITTM has proven to be a more reliable indicator for the Norwegian krone. While the NOK is currently at fair value on this metric, it is concerning that the upward trend in the ITTM has ended and that the equilibrium value for this currency has begun to deteriorate (Chart 22). As such, if oil prices are not able to find a floor at current levels, USD/NOK is likely to experience additional upside. This is because on a three- to six-month basis, there is not enough of a valuation cushion embedded in the NOK at current levels to prevent the Norwegian krone from experiencing deleterious effects in a weak energy price environment. Chart 21The NOK Fundmentals's Are Still Pointing South The NOK Fundmentals's Are Still Pointing South The NOK Fundmentals's Are Still Pointing South Chart 22...And The NOK Remains Vulnerable Versus The USD ...And The NOK Remains Vulnerable Versus The USD ...And The NOK Remains Vulnerable Versus The USD The Swedish Krona The very easy monetary policy conducted by the Riksbank is the key factor explaining why the Swedish krona remains so weak. Indeed, despite a robust economy, Swedish real interest rates are lagging well behind U.S. rates, which is putting strong downward pressure on the SEK's FITM (Chart 23). Meanwhile, despite the SEK's prodigious weakness, this currency only trades at a modest, statistically insignificant discount to its ITTM (Chart 24). This picture suggests that for the SEK to appreciate, the Riksbank needs to become much more aggressive. It is true that the Swedish central bank has flagged an imminent rise in interest rates, but the pace of increase will continue to lag far behind the Fed's own tightening. Moreover, the weakness in global trade is likely to hamper Swedish growth as Sweden is a small, open economy very influenced by gyrations in global industrial activity. As a result, the current slowdown in global trade may well give the Riksbank yet another excuse to only timidly remove monetary accommodation. This suggests that both the FITM and ITTM for the SEK have downward potential. Chart 23The Riskbank Still Hurts The SEK The Riskbank Still Hurts The SEK The Riskbank Still Hurts The SEK Chart 24...And The Krona Needs To Build A Greater Valuation Cushion ...And The Krona Needs To Build A Greater Valuation Cushion ...And The Krona Needs To Build A Greater Valuation Cushion 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy / Global Investment Strategy Special Report titled, "Assessing Fair Value In FX Markets", dated February 26, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com and gis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy / Global Asset Allocation Special Reports titled, "Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors", dated September 29, 2017, and "Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors (Part II)", dated October 13, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com and gaa.bcaresearch.com 3 Ravi Balakrishnan, Stefan Laseen, and Andrea Pescatori, "U.S. Dollar Dynamics: How Important Are Policy Divergence And FX Risk Premiums?" IMF Working Paper No.16/125 (July 2016); and Michael T. Kiley, "Exchange Rates, Monetary Policy Statements, And Uncovered Interest Parity: Before And After The Zero Lower Bound," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2013-17, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (January 2013). 4 Michael T. Kiley (January 2013). 5 Please see Yin-Wong Cheung and Menzie David Chinn, "Currency Traders and Exchange Rate Dynamics: A Survey of the U.S. Market," CESifo Working Paper Series No. 251 (February 2000); and David Hauner, Jaewoo Lee, and Hajime Takizawa, "In which exchange rate models do forecasters trust?" IMF Working Paper No.11/116 (May 2010) for revealed preference approach based on published forecasts from Consensus Economics. 6 Ravi Balakrishnan, Stefan Laseen, and Andrea Pescatori (July 2016) 7 Ravi Balakrishnan, Stefan Laseen, and Andrea Pescatori (July 2016) 8 Francisco Maeso-Fernandez, Chiara Osbat, and Bernd Schnatz, "Determinants Of The Euro Real Effective Exchange Rate: A BEER/PEER Approach," Working Paper No.85, European Central Bank (November 2001). 9 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled "Assesing The Geopolitical Risk Premium In the Pound", dated September 7, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of October 31, 2018. The quant model downgraded U.S. and Italy to underweight from overweight while upgrading Canada to a slight overweight from underweight, largely due to changes in technical and valuation conditions. Now the model is overweight 5 countries (Netherland, Germany, Spain, Switzerland and Canada) and underweight 7 countries (Japan, U.S., U.K., France, Australia, Sweden and Italy), as shown in Table 1. Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates As shown in Table 2 and Chart 1, Chart 2 and Chart 3, both Level 1 and Level 2 of the model system outperformed in October by 6bps and 57 bps, respectively, resulting in an outperformance of 24 bps from the overall model. Since going live, the overall model has outperformed its benchmarks by 44 bps, driven by Level 2 outperformance of 121 bps and Level 1 outperformance of 2bps. Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD %) GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1) GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1) GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) Please see also the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see Special Report, "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing The Developed Markets Country Allocation Model," dated January 29, 2016, available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Please note that the overall country and sector recommendations published in our Monthly Portfolio Update and Quarterly Portfolio Outlook use the results of these quantitative models as one input, but do not stick slavishly to them. We believe that models are a useful check, but structural changes and unquantifiable factors need to be considered too in making overall recommendations. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model Dear Client, As advised last month, we have suspended the GAA Equity Sector Selection Model due to the significant changes in the GICS sector classifications, implemented at the end of September. We will rebuild the model using the newly constituted sectors once full back data is available from MSCI, which we understand will be in December. We thank you for your understanding.
As part of our mandate to make the platform flexible and adaptable to the needs of our clients, we are pleased to announce version 2.7 of ETS. The highlight of this release is a new 'Custom Metrics' feature that allows you to define your own metrics based on transformations to existing ETS metrics. Custom metrics integrate seamlessly into the rest of the platform so that they can be used for screening and comparing stocks, or as part of a Backtest strategy. With this feature in place, you now have the ability to setup useful metrics such as one month change in Global BCA Score, or one year percent change in EPS, for example. Defining Custom Metrics The Settings page is your starting point for defining custom metrics. Using the form provided in the 'Custom Metrics' widget, you will enter the name, base metric, and the operation to apply to the base metric (Figure 1). Currently, there are three operations that can be applied to existing metrics1 - change, percent change, and logarithm. Change metrics will require you to specify the time interval of the change in months.2 For instance, to setup a metric defined as the three month change in Global BCA Score you will enter '3M' into the interval input field. You can also replace the 'M' with 'Y' to denote a time interval in years, e.g., '3Y' equivalent to '36M'. Figure 1Custom Metric Form Version 2.7 - Release Notes Version 2.7 - Release Notes For convenience, you can add multiple metrics at once by clicking the 'Add New' button and then clicking 'Commit Changes' so that your metrics are available for use. All custom metrics are listed under 'My Metrics' within the various dropdown menus throughout the platform. You can delete or edit custom metrics at any time and these changes will be reflected immediately throughout the app. Using Custom Metrics If you are comfortable with using the classic ETS metrics then custom metrics will be a breeze. As mentioned previously, simply find the metric under the category heading 'My Metrics' and proceed as usual. This means that we can use custom metrics wherever filters are permitted (Figure 2A) and wherever we can add custom columns (Figure 2B). In addition, custom metrics are also available on the Compare page. Figure 2ACustom Metric Used As Screener Filter Version 2.7 - Release Notes Version 2.7 - Release Notes Figure 2BAdding Custom Metric As Watchlist Column Version 2.7 - Release Notes Version 2.7 - Release Notes We trust you will find this new feature useful, and as usual, we welcome your feedback so that we can continue to make ETS work for you. Spencer Moran, Senior Analyst Equity Trading Strategy spencerm@bcaresearch.com 1 At the time of writing, all existing metrics, i.e., those from Factor Value, Factor Score, and Factor Component categories are valid base metrics, except for your custom BCA Score, which is excluded for performance reasons. 2 For consistency, we define one month as 21 trading days.
Highlights Duration Strategy: The recent market turmoil was a long overdue risk asset correction that does not change any fundamental underpinnings for rising global bond yields. Stay below-benchmark on overall global duration exposure, concentrated in an underweight stance on U.S. Treasuries. Country Allocations: Continue allocating duration risk for global government bond portfolios in favor of countries where central banks will have difficulty raising interest rates (Australia, U.K., Japan core Europe) relative to countries where rate hikes are more necessary and likely to happen (U.S., Canada). Feature Repricing "Central Banker Puts" Can Be Painful By a quirk of our scheduling, we have not published a regular Weekly Report since September, during what became a period of more turbulent global financial markets. While we trust that our clients have enjoyed the Special Reports that we have published instead, we are certain that many are asking an obvious question: have the more jittery markets triggered any change in BCA's views on global fixed income? The answer is "no". Just like the sharp "Vol-mageddon" risk asset selloff back in early February, the origin of the recent volatility spike was soaring U.S. Treasury yields driven by a rapid upward revision of Fed rate hike expectations (Chart of the Week). We had been expecting such an adjustment based on our positive assessment of the underlying momentum of both economic growth and inflation in the U.S. This remains a critical underpinning for our below-benchmark call on U.S. duration exposure, and our increased caution on U.S. spread product. Chart of the WeekRisk Assets Struggling As Bond Yields Rise Risk Assets Struggling As Bond Yields Rise Risk Assets Struggling As Bond Yields Rise There is more to the story than just the Fed, however. Throughout the course of 2018, we have been warning that global central banks moving away from accommodative monetary policies would be the greatest threat to market stability. This is not only a story of Fed rate hikes. A reduction in the pace of asset purchases by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of Japan (BoJ), combined with outright contraction of the Fed's swollen balance sheet, has created a backdrop more conducive to volatile spikes - especially if the global economy is losing upward momentum at the same time. The OECD leading economic indicator has been steadily declining throughout 2018, a reflection of the more challenging backdrop for non-U.S. growth. It is no coincidence that, without the support from accelerating liquidity or positive economic momentum, many of last year's best performing investments (Italian government bonds, the Turkish lira, Emerging Market (EM) hard currency corporate debt) have been some of 2018's worst (Chart 2). Investors were willing to ignore the poor structural fundamentals underlying those markets when times were good, but have been much more cautious in 2018 with a less supportive macro environment. Chart 2The Darlings Of 2017 Are The Duds Of 2018 The Darlings Of 2017 Are The Duds Of 2018 The Darlings Of 2017 Are The Duds Of 2018 While there have been numerous political headlines that have caused bouts of market turbulence in the past few months - the escalating U.S.-China "tariff war", the Italian fiscal debate with the European Union - the short-term impact of these moves is magnified when global monetary policy is being tightened and global growth is cooling. The reason why central banks have been forced to turn more hawkish (or at least less dovish) is that diminished economic slack has forced their hands. For policymakers with an inflation-targeting mandate, the Phillips curve framework remains the primary analytical framework. When they see low unemployment, they get nervous. When they see low unemployment AND rising inflation, then become hawkish. Three-quarters of OECD countries now have an unemployment rate below the estimate of the full-employment NAIRU - the highest level in a decade - and realized inflation rates are accelerating in the major developed economies (Chart 3). Our own Central Bank Monitors are signaling the need for tighter monetary policy in most countries, while yields at the front-ends of government bond curves are steadily rising. Chart 3Central Bankers Still Believe In The Phillips Curve Central Bankers Still Believe In The Phillips Curve Central Bankers Still Believe In The Phillips Curve Looking ahead, we continue to see more upward pressure on global bond yields in the next 6-12 months. Market pricing for the future policy actions of the major central bank did not move much even with the surge in volatility earlier this month. The markets now understand that the "policymaker put" that central bankers have implicitly sold to investors has a much lower strike price when labor markets are tight and inflation is accelerating. It will take much larger selloffs to cause central banks to become less hawkish. We still see the decisions we made in late June, moving to a more cautious recommended stance on overall risk in fixed income portfolios, as appropriate. Staying below-benchmark on overall global duration risk, while underweighting those countries where the central banks are under the greatest pressure to tighten policy, is the most sensible way to allocate a fully-investment government bond portfolio. That means underweighting the U.S. and Canada and overweighting Japan, Australia and the U.K. (Chart 4). In terms of credit, we are maintaining an overall neutral stance, but favoring the U.S. versus European equivalents and a maximum underweight on EM credit. Chart 4Interest Rates Remain Unfazed By More Jittery Markets Interest Rates Remain Unfazed By More Jittery Markets Interest Rates Remain Unfazed By More Jittery Markets Bottom Line: The recent market turmoil was a long-overdue risk asset correction that does not change any fundamental underpinnings for rising global bond yields. Stay below-benchmark on overall global duration exposure, concentrated in an underweight stance on U.S. Treasuries. The Most Important Charts For Our Most Important Country Duration Views When determining our recommended fixed income country allocation, there are a few critical indicators we are watching to assess if those views should be maintained. We now go over each of those indicators for the most important developed economy bond markets: U.S. (Underweight): Watch TIPS Breakevens & The Employment/Population Ratio U.S. Treasuries have been the one major government bond market this year that has seen a rise in both inflation expectations and real yields. The breakeven inflation rate implied by the spread between 10-year nominal Treasuries and TIPS has gone up from 1.97% to 2.10% since the start of 2018, while the real 10-year TIPS yield has climbed from 0.44% to 1.09% over the same period. The rise in inflation expectations has occurred alongside an acceleration of U.S. economic growth and a generalized rise in inflation pressures. Reliable cyclical leading indicators like the ISM Manufacturing index and the New York Fed's Underlying Inflation Gauge are pointing to an acceleration of U.S. core CPI inflation towards the 2.5-3% range over the next year (Chart 5). This would be enough to push 10-year TIPS breakevens comfortably into the 2.3-2.5% range that we deem consistent with the Fed's price stability target (core PCE inflation at 2%). Chart 5U.S.: Both Real Yields & Inflation Expectations Are Rising U.S.: Both Real Yields & Inflation Expectations Are Rising U.S.: Both Real Yields & Inflation Expectations Are Rising Any larger move in inflation expectations would only occur if the Fed were to accommodate it by not continuing to hike rates at the current 25bps/quarter pace. That is unlikely with the strength of the U.S. labor market suggesting that the Fed is behind the curve on rate hikes. The U.S. employment/population ratio for prime age (25-54 years old) workers has almost returned back to the peak levels of the mid-2000s near 80% (bottom panel). The Fed had to push the real funds rate to over 3% during that cycle to get policy to a restrictive setting above the Fed's estimate of the r-star neutral real rate. While it is unlikely that the Fed will need to push the real funds rate to as high a level as in the mid-2000s, the current real rate has not even caught up to the Fed's r-star estimate, which is starting to slowly increase alongside the stronger U.S. economy. That implies a higher nominal funds rate would be needed to push up the real rate to neutral levels, with even more nominal increases needed if inflation continues to accelerate. With only 62bps of rate hikes over the next year currently discounted in the USD Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve, there is scope for Treasury yields to rise further over the next 6-12 months. Core Europe (Underweight): Watch Realized Inflation Relative to ECB Forecasts In the euro area, the evolution of unemployment, wage growth and core inflation compared to the ECB's positive forecasts will be the critical driver of the future direction of government bond yields. In its latest set of economic projections published last month, the ECB expects the overall euro area unemployment rate to be 8.3% in 2018, 7.8% in 2019 and 7.4% in 2020.1 With the actual unemployment rate falling to 8.1% in August, the realized outcomes are already exceeding the ECB's forecasts (Chart 6). The same can be said for euro area wages, where the growth in compensation per employee (2.45%) is already running above the 2018 ECB projection of 2.2%. The ECB expects no acceleration of wage growth in 2019 (2.2%), but a further ratcheting up in 2020 (2.7%). Chart 6Euro Area: Expect Higher Yields If ECB Forecasts Materialize Euro Area: Expect Higher Yields If ECB Forecasts Materialize Euro Area: Expect Higher Yields If ECB Forecasts Materialize In a recent Special Report, we identified a leading relationship between wage growth and core HICP inflation in the euro area of around nine months.2 This would suggest that core HICP inflation should rise towards 1.5% within the next six months based on the current acceleration of wage growth (second panel). This would be above the ECB's current projection for 2018 (1.1%), but in line with the 2019 forecast (1.5%). Core inflation is projected to rise to 1.8% in 2020. If unemployment and inflation even just match the ECB's forecasts, there is likely to be a material repricing of core European bond yields through higher inflation expectations. At 1.7%, 10-year EUR CPI swaps are well below the +2% levels that occurred during the past two ECB rate hike cycles in the mid-2000s and 2010-11 (third panel). Both wage and core price inflation in the euro area were around the ECB's current 2019-2020 projections during both of those prior tightening episodes, suggesting that the past may indeed be prologue when it comes to inflation expectations. Given growing U.S.-China trade tensions, and uncertainties over the future path for Chinese economic growth, there is a risk that the ECB's growth and unemployment forecasts are too optimistic. The euro area economy remains highly levered to exports, and to Chinese demand in particular. Furthermore, the ECB continues to provide very dovish forward guidance, with no rate hikes expected until at least September 2019. Yet with a mere 12bps of rate hikes over the next year currently discounted in the EUR OIS curve, there is scope for core European bond yields to rise further over the next 6-12 months if euro area inflation surprises to the upside. Italy (Underweight): Watch Non-Italian Bond Spreads & The Euro The Italian budget battle with the European Union has been a gripping drama for investors in recent months. Italian bond yields have been under steady upward pressure, with the benchmark 10-year yield getting as high as 3.78%. Yet the story remains as much about sluggish Italian growth as it is about Italian fiscal policy. The populist Italian government has pushed for larger deficits, but has toned down the anti-euro language that dominated the election campaign earlier this year. This is why there has been very minimal contagion from higher Italian bond yields into other Peripheral European bond yields or euro area corporate bond spreads, or into the euro itself which remains very firm on a trade-weighted basis (Chart 7). Chart 7Italy: A Story Of Weak Growth, Not Euro Break-Up Italy: A Story Of Weak Growth, Not Euro Break-Up Italy: A Story Of Weak Growth, Not Euro Break-Up We continue to view Italian government bonds as a growth-sensitive credit instrument, like corporate bonds. In other words, faster Italian economic growth implies greater tax revenues, smaller budget deficits and a less worrisome trajectory for Italy's debt/GDP ratio. The opposite holds true when Italian economic growth is slowing. This is why there is a reliable directional relationship between Italy-Germany bond yield spreads and the OECD's leading economic indicator (LEI) for Italy (top panel). With the Italy LEI still in a downtrend, we do not yet see a cyclical case for shifting away from an underweight stance on Italian government bonds. Yet if the 10-year Italian yield were to reach 4%, the implied mark-to-market loss would wipe out the capital of Italy's banks, who own large quantities of government bonds. In that scenario, the ECB would likely get involved to stem the crisis, possibly by further delaying rate hikes of ramping up asset purchases. This would especially be likely if there was significant widening of non-Italian credit spreads and a sharply weaker euro. Hence, watch those markets for signs that the Italy fiscal crisis could trigger a monetary policy response. U.K. (Overweight): Watch Real Wage Growth & Business Confidence In the U.K., our non-consensus call to stay overweight Gilts has not been based on any long-run value considerations. Real yields remain depressed and the Bank of England (BoE) has kept monetary policy settings at extremely accommodative levels. The BoE continues to expect that a rise in real wage growth is likely due to the very tight U.K. labor market. This would support consumer spending and eventually require higher interest rates. The only problem is that this is happening very slowly. The annual growth in U.K. wage growth is now up to 3.1%, the fastest rate since 2008. This is above the pace of headline CPI inflation of 2.5%, thus real wages are finally starting to perk up (Chart 8). A continuation of this trend would feed into faster consumer spending and, eventually, trigger BoE rate hikes. Chart 8U.K.: Brexit Uncertainty + Middling Inflation = BoE Doing Little U.K.: Brexit Uncertainty + Middling Inflation = BoE Doing Little U.K.: Brexit Uncertainty + Middling Inflation = BoE Doing Little One other big impediment to the BoE turning more hawkish is the uncertainty over the U.K. government's Brexit negotiations with the EU. The extended Brexit drama has weighed on both U.K. business and consumer confidence, both of which have struggled since the 2016 Brexit vote (third panel). With the March 2019 deadline for the U.K. "officially" leaving the EU fast approaching, the odds of no deal being reached in time are increasing. U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May is desperately trying to avoid a no-deal Brexit, but such an outcome would create further instability in U.K. financial markets and close any near-term window of opportunity for the BoE to try and hike rates. For now, we see the depressed confidence from Brexit uncertainty offsetting the bump up in real wage growth, leaving Gilts on a path to continue modestly outperforming as they have throughout 2018 (bottom panel). An announcement of a Brexit deal would be a likely trigger for us to downgrade Gilts to neutral, and perhaps even to underweight given the developing uptrend in real wage growth. Bottom Line: Continue allocating duration risk for global government bond portfolios in favor of countries where central banks will have difficulty raising interest rates (Australia, U.K., Japan core Europe) relative to countries where rate hikes are more necessary and likely to happen (U.S., Canada). Robert Robis, CFA, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.ecbstaffprojections201809.en.pdf 2 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy/Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Will Rising Wages Cause An Imminent Change In Policy Direction In Europe And Japan?", dated October 5th 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com and gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Expect More Volatility, More Often Expect More Volatility, More Often Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
As promised in early September, this is the third installment of our four part Indicators series. In this Special Report, we follow a similar script to Part II but instead of sectors, we now cover the S&P 500, non-financial equities, cyclicals/defensives, small/large and growth/value, and document the most important Indicators in the same four broad categories (where applicable): earnings, financial statement reported data, valuations and technicals. Once again this is by no means exhaustive, but contains a plethora of Indicators we deem significant in aiding us in our decision making process of setting/changing a view on the overall market, cyclicals/defensives portfolio bent, and size and style preference. As a reminder, the charts in this Special Report are also available through BCA's Analytics platform for seamless continual updates. Finally, we are still aiming before the end of 2018, to conclude our Indicators series with Part IV that would feature our most sought after Macro Indicators per the eleven GICS1 S&P 500 sectors, along with value/growth, small/large and cyclicals/defensives. We trust you will find this comprehensive Indicator chartbook useful and insightful. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com Dulce Cruz, Senior Analyst dulce@bcaresearch.com S&P 500 Chart 1S&P 500: Earnings Indicators S&P 500: Earnings Indicators S&P 500: Earnings Indicators Chart 2S&P 500: Earnings Indicators S&P 500: Earnings Indicators S&P 500: Earnings Indicators Chart 3S&P 500: ROE And Its Components S&P 500: ROE And Its Components S&P 500: ROE And Its Components Chart 4S&P 500: Financial Statement Indicators S&P 500: Financial Statement Indicators S&P 500: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 5S&P 500: Financial Statement Indicators S&P 500: Financial Statement Indicators S&P 500: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 6S&P 500: Valuation Indicators S&P 500: Valuation Indicators S&P 500: Valuation Indicators Chart 7S&P 500: Technical Indicators S&P 500: Technical Indicators S&P 500: Technical Indicators Non-Financial Broad Market Chart 8U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: ROE And Its Components U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: ROE Ant Its Components U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: ROE Ant Its Components Chart 9U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Financial Statement Indicators U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Financial Statement Indicators U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 10U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Financial Statement Indicators U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Financial Statement Indicators U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 11U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Valuation Indicators U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Valuation Indicators U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Valuation Indicators Chart 12U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Technical Indicators U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Technical Indicators U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Technical Indicators S&P Cyclicals Vs. Defensives Chart 13Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Earnings Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Earnings Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Earnings Indicators Chart 14Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Earnings Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Earnings Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Earnings Indicators Chart 15Cyclicals Vs Defensives: ROE And Its Components Cyclicals Vs Defensives: ROE And Its Components Cyclicals Vs Defensives: ROE And Its Components Chart 16Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Financial Statement Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Financial Statement Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 17Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Financial Statement Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Financial Statement Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 18Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Valuation Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Valuation Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Valuation Indicators Chart 19Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Technical Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Technical Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Technical Indicators S&P 600 Vs. S&P 500 Chart 20S&P 600 Vs.S&P 500: Earnings Indicators S&P 600 Vs S&P 500: Earnings Indicators S&P 600 Vs S&P 500: Earnings Indicators Chart 21S&P 600 Vs.S&P 500: Earnings Indicators S&P 600 Vs S&P 500: Earnings Indicators S&P 600 Vs S&P 500: Earnings Indicators Chart 22S&P 600 Vs.S&P 500: Valuation Indicators S&P 600 Vs S&P 500: Valuation Indicators S&P 600 Vs S&P 500: Valuation Indicators Chart 23S&P 600 Vs.S&P 500: Technical Indicators S&P 600 Vs S&P 500: Technical Indicators S&P 600 Vs S&P 500: Technical Indicators S&P 500 Growth Vs. Value Chart 24S&P 500 Growth Vs.Value: Earnings Indicators S&P 500 Growth Vs Value: Earnings Indicators S&P 500 Growth Vs Value: Earnings Indicators Chart 25S&P 500 Growth Vs.Value: Earnings Indicators S&P 500 Growth Vs Value: Earnings Indicators S&P 500 Growth Vs Value: Earnings Indicators Chart 26S&P 500 Growth Vs Value: Valuation Indicators S&P 500 Growth Vs Value: Valuation Indicators S&P 500 Growth Vs Value: Valuation Indicators Chart 27S&P 500 Growth Vs.Value: Technical Indicators S&P 500 Growth Vs Value: Technical Indicators S&P 500 Growth Vs Value: Technical Indicators Table 1S&P 500 Growth/S&P 500 Value Sector Comparison Table White Paper: U.S. Equity Market Indicators (Part III) White Paper: U.S. Equity Market Indicators (Part III) Table 2S&P 600/S&P 500 Sector Comparison Table White Paper: U.S. Equity Market Indicators (Part III) White Paper: U.S. Equity Market Indicators (Part III)
Highlights Our October house view meeting was mostly uneventful, ... : The backup in bond yields has so far proceeded in line with our expectations, and the BCA consensus is that they have not risen enough to pose a fundamental threat to equities. ... in contrast to the action in global equities: Single-day declines of 3-4% in headline equity indexes around the world gave investors a jolt, and revived the too-far/too-long talk about equity gains with a new intensity. We do not believe that the end of the U.S. equity bull market is at hand, ... : The components of our recession indicator do not suggest that a recession, or a bear market, is on the horizon. It appears that the fiscal stimulus package will keep the expansion going into 2020. ... but thinking through the factors that would lead us to downgrade equities will help put the ongoing data flow into context: In addition to the elements of our bear-market/recession indicator, we consider items that could pressure earnings, spur inflation, or indicate the presence of widespread exuberance. Feature BCA's strategists held their October View Meeting last Tuesday. The monthly meeting gathers all of the editorial staff together to determine the firm's internal consensus on the future direction of markets. The results are published in the form of our House View Matrix, and the discussion and debate of the rationales underpinning our views inform the content of the individual services' publications. The agenda this month focused squarely on interest rates, and consisted of two basic questions: 1) Why are Treasury yields rising, and what does it mean for other asset classes? 2) How worried should we be about the surge in Italian bond yields? Neither question provoked much disagreement. The room broadly agreed that Treasury yields have been rising for the welcome reason that robust U.S. growth calls for higher rates. The Fed has been doing its part at the short end via its gradual quarter-point-per-quarter rate-hike pace, and the bond market got into the act two weeks ago, breaking out to a new seven-year high on robust data releases and Chairman Powell's "long-way-from-neutral" remark (Chart 1). Our bond strategists expect that the Fed will walk back Powell's seemingly off-the-cuff comment, but its substance meshes easily with our assessment of a burgeoning economy that may well overheat in the face of supply constraints. Chart 1Breakout Breakout Breakout As we have recently argued, the implications for equities depend much more on the level of rates than on their direction. Until real rates begin to squeeze the economy, history suggests that their impact on stocks will be benign. All else equal, higher real rates are a by-product of a stronger economy, and increased economic strength has helped stocks more than the larger haircuts on future cash flows, mandated by a higher discount rate, have hurt them. Using real potential GDP as a proxy for the level at which higher rates would slow the economy, we estimate that the bull market won't meet its demise until the 10-year Treasury yield reaches 3.75-4%.1 Consensus was quickly reached on the Italian question. Although the situation bears close monitoring, BCA does not deem Italy to be a flash point for global financial markets. Our base case is that bond markets can easily handle the deficit back-and-forth between Rome and Brussels, and that the more worrisome outcome - Italy's exit from the Eurozone - is increasingly remote. A bond selloff could become self-perpetuating, but our Global Investment Strategy service believes that European policy makers would intervene if Italian sovereign yields broke above 4%.2 Some strategists expressed interest in downgrading the equity view to underweight. Although a considerable majority voted to maintain BCA's neutral stance, the final stages of the meeting were devoted to debating the merits of a more bearish take. That discussion led us to think about the factors that might encourage us to downgrade our view on equities. The rest of this week's report lays out those factors in the form of an equity-downgrade checklist to accompany the rates checklist we rolled out last month. Together, the two checklists will provide a real-time guide to the evolution of our key asset-allocation views. Our Base-Case Bull-Market Denouement While U.S. Investment Strategy has been slightly more constructive than the BCA consensus, we joined in the house-view downgrade of global equities in June without lament. We did so on the grounds that the latter stages of expansions and bull markets can be treacherous, and significant geopolitical uncertainties could make the current iteration especially so. Last week's swoon, and its remarkable intra-day equity volatility, revealed the wisdom of staying within sight of the shore. We nonetheless believe that it is too early to underweight equities and spread product. We remain constructive on the outlook because we expect the monetary policy cycle, the business cycle, and the credit cycle have yet to run their course. All three will continue to provide an equity tailwind for roughly another year, while allowing spread product to generate excess returns over Treasuries for another quarter or two. Our base case is that the cycles will turn once aggregate demand, ginned up by fiscal stimulus, runs into capacity constraints, stoking inflation pressures and compelling the Fed to impose more restrictive policy settings. Once tight policy is in place, the equity bull market will come to an end, followed by the expansion. The Equity Downgrade Checklist Recessions and bear markets regularly coincide (Chart 2), as multiple de-rating is typically not enough to effect a 20% decline on its own. Earnings have to contract as well, and they typically only do so within the context of a recession. The three components of our recession indicator3 - an inverted yield curve (Chart 3); year-over-year contraction in the index of leading economic indicators (Chart 4); and tight policy, defined as a target fed funds rate greater than the equilibrium fed funds rate (Chart 5) - comprise the first three items on our checklist (Table 1). We round out the recession section by watching for an uptick in the headline unemployment rate, which has led, or coincided with, every postwar recession (Chart 6). Chart 2Bear Markets And Recessions Tend To Coincide Bear Markets And Recessions Tend To Coincide Bear Markets And Recessions Tend To Coincide Chart 3The Yield Curve Has Called 8 Of The Last 7 Recessions... The Yield Curve Has Called 8 Of The Last 7 Recessions... The Yield Curve Has Called 8 Of The Last 7 Recessions... Chart 4... And So Have Leading Economic Indicators ... And So Have Leading Economic Indicators ... And So Have Leading Economic Indicators Chart 5Recessions Only Occur When Monetary Policy Is Tight Recessions Only Occur When Monetary Policy Is Tight Recessions Only Occur When Monetary Policy Is Tight Table 1Equity Downgrade Checklist Introducing Our Equity Downgrade Checklist Introducing Our Equity Downgrade Checklist Chart 6Beware An Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Beware An Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Beware An Uptick In The Unemployment Rate There is more to equity investing than trying to skirt bear markets, however. Our checklist therefore also focuses on elements that could induce corrections (declines of at least 10% that don't reach the 20% bear-market threshold). We focus on three broad categories of variables: those that could pressure earnings growth by undermining revenues, profit margins or both; those that promote uncomfortably high inflation; and those that indicate unsustainable investor over exuberance. We do not have any preconceptions about which, or how many, boxes would have be checked to inspire a downgrade; we are simply trying to obtain a holistic sense of the equity outlook. Earnings Headwinds Employee compensation constitutes the single largest component of corporate expenses, making wage increases a direct threat to profit margins. We view the employment cost index, including benefits, as offering the most comprehensive and accurate insight into companies' wage bill. It has been rising, albeit slowly, and the Fed would like to see it rise even more to ensure that the expansion's gains are shared more broadly across the income spectrum (Chart 7). It would seemingly be happy with wage growth in the mid-3% range, but anything beyond that, if not supported by an uptick in productivity, could lead to faster and/or larger rate hikes.4 Chart 7The Fed Wants Wages Higher, But Not Too Much Higher The Fed Wants Wages Higher, But Not Too Much Higher The Fed Wants Wages Higher, But Not Too Much Higher A stronger dollar makes American goods less competitive in the global marketplace. Extended advances confront U.S.-based multinationals with an unpalatable choice: cut prices to maintain share, or accept lesser share to maintain margins. Currency moves impact corporate profits with a lag, however, so the initial effects of the dollar's 7% advance since mid-February should only begin to surface in the third-quarter earnings season that kicked off on Friday. S&P 500 constituents have been dining out for a year on the dollar's 14% 2017 slide, and a march to 100 and beyond will give rise to a multi-quarter headwind (Chart 8). Chart 8From Tailwind To Headwind From Tailwind To Headwind From Tailwind To Headwind Interest accounts for a meaningful share of corporate expenses, especially given the post-crisis rise in corporate debt outstanding. Using BBB-rated bonds as a proxy for overall corporate indebtedness, we view 4.8 to 5%, a level corporations last contended with eight years (and a considerable amount of issuance) ago, as a range that might cause some indigestion (Chart 9). Chart 9Debt Service Costs Are Rising Debt Service Costs Are Rising Debt Service Costs Are Rising Rising wages squeeze profit margins, but they won't necessarily cut into profits if top-line growth is robust enough to overcome the cost increase. Wage gains have the potential to set off a virtuous circle in which spending increases enough to promote expanded payrolls and capital expenditures, leading to more spending, and so on. An elevated savings rate suggests that households have the capacity to help fuel the fire (Chart 10). If they decide to save that money instead, perhaps with an eye on the metastasizing pile of student debt, it could dampen the multiplier effect of higher wages. Chart 10Plenty Of Dry Powder For Consumption Plenty Of Dry Powder For Consumption Plenty Of Dry Powder For Consumption We do not have a hard-and-fast preconception for the point at which deterioration in the emerging markets would be felt in the U.S. Given the relatively closed U.S. economy - the oceans bordering it are big - we expect that the EM distress would have to be quite acute. Full-on decoupling is a chimera, however, even for the fairly insulated U.S., and weakened global demand will eventually make itself felt here. A major credit event or two in some of the larger EM economies would likely accelerate the process. Inflation Now that full employment has been achieved, and then some, the price-stability element of the Fed's mandate will come to the fore as the binding policy constraint. The Fed is still trying to nudge realized inflation and inflation expectations higher, to be sure, but its bias could turn on a dime. Force-feeding sizable fiscal stimulus to an economy already operating at capacity is a recipe for fueling upward inflation pressures. We expect that the Fed will eventually be obliged to hike rates at faster than a gradual pace to get the inflation genie back into the bottle. The Fed's 2% inflation target applies to the core PCE deflator, and growth above the top of the 2.5% range that's held for 20-plus years might make it uneasy if the inflation slope proves to be as slippery as we expect (Chart 11). Regarding inflation expectations, we are keeping a close eye on the long-maturity TIPS break-evens, the expected level of inflation implied by the difference in yields on nominal and inflation-protected Treasuries. Our bond strategists peg 2.3-2.5% as the break-even level consistent with the Fed's 2% inflation target, and expect that the Fed will turn more hawkish if break-evens breach the top end of the range (Chart 12). Inflation matters to the investing public, as well, and earnings multiples would surely contract if inflation fears break out among the general populace. Headline CPI growth that looked like it could persist in the mid-3s could easily spark a correction (Chart 13). Chart 11Mission Impossible(?): Limit Inflation ... Mission Impossible(?): Limit Inflation ... Mission Impossible(?): Limit Inflation ... Chart 12... While Nudging Inflation Expectations Higher ... While Nudging Inflation Expectations Higher ... While Nudging Inflation Expectations Higher Chart 13CPI Matters, Too CPI Matters, Too CPI Matters, Too Irrational Exuberance It is not easy to recognize over exuberance in real time, but it is a regular feature of cycle peaks. In a bull market that is already the longest in the postwar era, and an expansion that's on track to establish a postwar longevity record of its own, it would be surprising if things didn't ultimately get silly. We will have to rely on judgment to assess the overall climate of recklessness, but we can objectively track valuation levels relative to history. We are not troubled by a 15- or 16-handle forward P/E multiple (Chart 14). While other standard valuation metrics are elevated (Chart 15), they typically only compel our attention at +/- 2-standard-deviation extremes. Chart 14Nothing Irrational About P/E ... Nothing Irrational About P/E ... Nothing Irrational About P/E ... Chart 15... Or Other Valuation Metrics, On Balance ... Or Other Valuation Metrics, On Balance ... Or Other Valuation Metrics, On Balance Investment Implications There is a natural tension between market forecasts and investment strategy. The future is unknowable, and it is rarely prudent to position portfolios all-in based on necessarily uncertain forecasts. The divergence should be especially wide in the latter stages of a cycle, when a reversal could be right around the corner. Even though we are constructive on the economic and policy backdrops, we are positioned conservatively, equal-weighting equities, underweighting fixed income, and overweighting cash. We have created a checklist to track what it would take to make us turn bearish on equities because our inclination is to lean bullish, and try to capture what may be the last outsized returns for a while. Markets are never one-way, however, and we could flip back to overweight upon a 10-15% peak-to-trough decline if nothing altered our view about the bull market's remaining lifespan. We could also return to an equity overweight at current levels if Chinese policymakers were to pursue stimulus with the pedal-to-the-metal urgency that characterized their efforts in 2008 and 2016. We could even try to play a melt-up, with tight stops, if we thought one was about to take hold. We are keeping an open mind, as an investor always should. Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the September 24, 2018 U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report, "When Will Higher Rates Hurt Stocks?" available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see the October 12, 2018 Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Bond Bears Maul Goldilocks," available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see the August 13, 2018 U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report, "How Much Longer Can The Equity Bull Market Last?" available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Fed Chair Jay Powell recently said that wage growth should approximately equal the sum of inflation and productivity gains. Given the 2% inflation target, and 1% trend productivity growth, the FOMC would likely be content with wage gains modestly above 3%.
Highlights U.S. data keep surging, ... : The September ISM surveys, and the latest employment situation report, demonstrated that the economy has considerable momentum. ... and the Fed has taken note, ... : Chairman Powell and other FOMC speakers reiterated that they see no reason to de-escalate their tightening campaign. ... so we still see rates going higher, ... : Conditions do not justify checking any of the boxes on our checklist of items that might lead us to change our below-benchmark duration view. Only the international-duress box has moved closer to being checked, but nothing short of dire EM conditions will deter the Fed from following its intended path. ... and expect that concerns about the yield curve will abate for a while: The strong data and Powell's comment potentially implying a higher terminal rate promoted a bear steepening all along the yield curve. Feature It is a testament to how smoothly U.S. equities have been rising that Thursday's and Friday's 1% intraday S&P 500 declines inspired CNBC to frame the screen in fire-engine red, accompanied by a Market Sell-Off graphic. We all have to make a living, though, and it's easy to sympathize with a desperate producer. Episode after episode of Goldilocks is hardly must-see TV. Friday's employment situation report provided no relief. September payroll additions fell well short of the consensus estimate, but upward revisions for July and August more than offset the headline disappointment. The three-month moving average of 190,000 net additions is squarely within the tight range that has prevailed for several years. Forward guidance has been leached of any sort of drama as everyone on the Fed is singing from the same sheet - the economy's great; risks are balanced; and we're doing a fantastic job, if we do say so ourselves - and pointing to a continuation of the gradual pace. The market story will become more lively when inflation comes on much more strongly than either markets or the Fed seem to imagine it could, but that is next year's business (at the earliest), and we remain constructive in the meantime. More Strong Data (Yawn) The narrative that fiscal stimulus will keep the economy humming throughout this year and next is old news. Additionally, fiscal stimulus delivers the most bang for the buck when an economy is operating below potential; now that the output gap is closed, the odds are tilted against material positive surprises. Against that backdrop, last week's non-manufacturing ISM survey was startlingly robust. According to the Institute for Supply Management, the 61.6 reading, just off of the series' all-time high, corresponds to 4.6% real GDP growth. The components of the survey were strong across the board (Chart 1), with employment activity making a new all-time high (Chart 1, second panel). The prices-paid and supplier-delivery series, which provide insight into margin pressures, are contrary indicators once they get too strong, but each has yet to break out (Chart 1, bottom two panels). The September manufacturing ISM survey cooled a bit from August, but remains around 60, in the neighborhood of last cycle's high. Taken together, the two ISM surveys indicate that businesses are feeling flush, despite the deceleration in the rest of the developed world (Chart 2). Chart 1Firing On All Cylinders Firing On All Cylinders Firing On All Cylinders Chart 2American Exceptionalism American Exceptionalism American Exceptionalism The September employment report suggests that households should remain optimistic as well. Payroll growth has churned steadily ahead for seven years, and our payrolls model is calling for a pronounced uptick through the first quarter of 2019 (Chart 3). Expressed as a share of the labor force, initial claims continue to melt (Chart 4, top panel), and even after incorporating continuing claims, it looks like there's a job for everyone who wants one (Chart 4, bottom panel). A pessimist would say there's only one way that initial claims can go from here, but as the gaps between the circles and the shading show, there's typically a decent lag between the trough in claims and the onset of a recession. Chart 3The Employment Outlook Is Strong ... The Employment Outlook Is Strong ... The Employment Outlook Is Strong ... Chart 4... Given Initial Claims' Ongoing Collapse ... Given Initial Claims' Ongoing Collapse ... Given Initial Claims' Ongoing Collapse The bottom line is that U.S. demand is poised to remain strong. Data from the ISM and NFIB surveys, and the consumer confidence series, indicate that businesses and households are both feeling their oats. Payrolls should keep expanding, and the tight-as-a-drum labor market will keep wages nosing higher. With an elevated savings rate providing ample dry powder for additional consumption (Chart 5), the expansion should sail right through 2019. Chart 5Plenty Of Dry Powder For Consumption Plenty Of Dry Powder For Consumption Plenty Of Dry Powder For Consumption "A Long Way From Neutral" Fed officials have kept up an especially busy schedule of appearances since the latest FOMC meeting two weeks ago. Despite the potential for cacophony, the speakers have been singing the same tune. All agree that the economy is strong, and that the Fed has been meeting its dual mandate with unusual aplomb. The victory laps are off-putting socially, but their economic import could be far greater than their social import if they signal some institutional complacency about inflation. Potential future challenges aside, the FOMC is clearly united in its near-term course. Dovish Chicago President Evans, who has publicly agonized in recent years about the dangers of too-low inflation while pleading with his colleagues not to move too fast, has made his peace with the committee's gradual rate-hike pace. In a speech last Wednesday, he stated that, "I am more comfortable with the inflation outlook today than I have been for the past several years." In a subsequent interview with Bloomberg, he said, "Getting policy up to a slightly restrictive setting - 3, 3ΒΌ% - would be consistent with the strong economy and good inflation that we are looking at. ... I'm quite comfortable with the expected path." The week before, New York Fed President Williams was effusive in his praise of the economy's health and the Fed's role in sustaining it. "[T]he U.S. economy is doing very well overall. From the perspective of the Fed's dual mandate ..., quite honestly, this is about as good as it gets. ... The Fed has attained its dual-mandate objectives of maximum employment and price stability about as well as it ever has." Williams' speech may have been most interesting in its downplaying of the usefulness of the neutral-rate concept. The co-developer of the preeminent Laubach-Williams neutral-interest-rate model, Williams now says the idea is overblown, having "gotten too much attention in commentary about Fed policy. Back when interest rates were well below neutral, r-star [the estimate of the neutral rate] appropriately acted as a pole star for navigation. But, as we have gotten closer to the range of estimates of neutral, what appeared to be a bright point of light is really a fuzzy blur, reflecting the inherent uncertainty in measuring r-star. More than that, r-star is just one factor affecting our decisions[.]" Williams' pivot would seem to suit Chairman Powell, who has shown little enthusiasm for neutral-rate models. His speech Tuesday on the Phillips curve relationship between inflation and unemployment was mostly anodyne, though he did repeatedly stress the importance of keeping inflation expectations anchored. His interview at a public forum on Wednesday was more revealing. While he continually expressed the view that he thinks the risks to the economy are balanced, he had much more to say about not hiking enough than he did about hiking too much. Now we've come to a situation where unemployment is close to a 20-year low and headed lower, by all accounts, and the really extraordinarily accommodative, low interest rates we needed when the economy was quite weak, we don't need those any more, they're not appropriate any more. We need interest rates to be gradually, very gradually, moving back toward normal, and that's what we've been doing now, for basically three years, and interest rates have just now, in real terms, moved above zero. Interest rates are still accommodative, but we're gradually moving to a place where they will be neutral. Not that they'll be restraining the economy - we may go past neutral, but we're a long way from neutral at this point, probably.1 Our Rates Checklist Treasuries sold off sharply on Wednesday on the non-manufacturing ISM release and reports of Powell's "long way from neutral" remark. The sell-off was in line with the key pillar of our bearish duration view: the Fed will hike more than markets currently expect. Higher bond yields last week suggest the divergence between our view and the markets' view is converging in our favor. Despite the backup in yields, though, market expectations of the terminal rate are still below 3%, indicating that market participants don't expect the 25-bps-a-quarter pace to continue beyond next June. The market still has a ways to go to catch up to our 3.5-4% terminal rate forecast (Chart 6), so we are not yet close to checking the first box of the checklist (Table 1). Chart 6Fighting The Fed Fighting The Fed Fighting The Fed Table 1Rates View Checklist Staying The Course Staying The Course From the inflation section of the checklist, inflation break-evens have drifted higher. They are moving in line with our rates view, but not so swiftly that it no longer applies (Chart 7). All of the labor market indicators support the view that rates are going higher. The unemployment rate remains on course to decline, ancillary indicators of the labor market remain quite healthy, and average hourly earnings kept the beat in the September employment release (Chart 8). Chart 7Bonds Have Yet To Adjust ... Bonds Have Yet To Adjust ... Bonds Have Yet To Adjust ... Chart 8... To Building Inflation Pressures ... To Building Inflation Pressures ... To Building Inflation Pressures Duress in selected EM economies is the only item that has moved against our rates view since we rolled out the rates checklist last month. It is nowhere near acute enough to show up in the United States, however, so we are still a long way from checking the box. The bottom line is that strength in the U.S. economy should support higher real rates and push up inflation pressures, while the market has yet to revise its terminal-rate estimates upward. The combination supports higher rates three to twelve months down the road, even if lopsided below-benchmark positioning argues for near-term retracement. Investment Implications Expansions do not die of old age, they die because the Fed murders them. While we agree with many bond bulls that the Fed will eventually tighten monetary conditions enough to induce a recession, we do not think it will do so any time soon. BCA's modeled estimate of the equilibrium fed funds rate has been creeping higher, in line with a terminal rate somewhere between 3.5 and 4%. Given the median FOMC member terminal-rate projection of 3 3/8%, and Chicago President Evans' view that the terminal rate is somewhere around 3%, the Fed's not prepared to choke off the expansion just yet. Only rising inflation, and/or rising inflation expectations, will push the Fed to tighten policy enough to really squeeze the economy. We expect that inflation pressures will begin to show themselves over the next twelve to eighteen months as capacity bottlenecks emerge, and the Phillips curve relationship finally asserts itself. Treasuries will be an overweight once the Fed intervenes forcefully to counteract those inflation pressures, but they will be an underweight for a while first. In other words, we think long yields have to rise before they can fall. In line with the BCA house view, we remain equal weight equities, underweight fixed income, and overweight cash. We remain somewhat more constructive than our colleagues on risk assets, however, so we tweak the equity recommendation to say that investors should maintain at least an equal-weight position. Bull markets tend to sprint to the finish line, and underweighting equities too soon could prove hazardous to a manager's relative performance. Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com 1 October 3rd interview with Judy Woodruff at The Atlantic Festival. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lEPcPIYTMY0 Quoted passage runs from 7:26 to 8:06.