United States

Executive Summary Investors Should Mind Surging US Wages Despite Western sanctions on Russia, the country’s oil exports have not collapsed. According to the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) estimates, Russia’s shipments of crude and oil products have declined by only 5% since January. The combination of relatively stable supply and downshifting global oil demand constitutes a bearish cocktail for oil prices. Odds are that oil prices will decline further and recouple with industrial and precious metal prices. Labor costs are more important than oil prices for the US core inflation outlook and, hence, for Fed policy. In the US, surging wages and easing financial conditions would make the Fed even more committed to tightening monetary policy substantially. The Fed and the stock market remain on a collision course. EM/China exports will contract, and their domestic demand will also struggle. Bottom Line: As the US dollar continues to overshoot, EM stocks will underperform DM equities, and EM credit markets will underperform US credit markets on a quality-adjusted basis. An underweight position in EM in global equity and credit portfolios is warranted. Feature The decline in oil and food prices and the easing of supply-side bottlenecks have alleviated market worries about US inflation. As a result, the S&P500 has rebounded, despite the grim inflation report last week. BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy team expects oil and industrial metal prices to drop further. Does this mean that the worst of both US inflation and the Fed’s tightening is behind us and that it is time to buy risk assets? Not really. In this report, we discuss (1) why oil prices will drop further, (2) why the worst of US monetary tightening is not over, and (3) why emerging markets are not out of the woods. In fact, EM asset prices have so far failed to advance, despite the rebound in the S&P500. This is true for EM stocks, currencies, EM credit spreads, and domestic bonds (Charts 1 and 2). Overall, our macro themes of Fed tightening amid slowing global growth, the US dollar overshooting, and China’s disappointing recovery remain intact. These factors still warrant a defensive investment strategy, despite a possible near-term rebound in the S&P 500. EMs will lag and underperform in this rebound. Chart 1No Rebound In EM Stocks And Currencies… Chart 2…Nor In EM Credit Space And Local Bonds Oil Prices Will Drop But… Chart 3Russian Oil Export Volumes Have Dropped Only By 5% Since January Odds are that crude prices have peaked and face material downside: Despite the sanctions and logistical challenges that Western governments have enforced on Russia, the country’s oil exports have not collapsed. According to the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) estimates, Russia’s shipments of crude and oil products have declined by only 5% since January (Chart 3). Even though Saudi Arabia appears to be committed to its production management policy, it cannot completely ignore US demands to raise its oil output. Odds are that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will boost their oil output in the coming months. Chart 4US And Chinese Oil Consumption Is Weak In the meantime, global oil demand is shrinking, in part due to high prices. US consumption of gasoline and other motor fuel has marginally contracted (Chart 4, top panel). In China, rolling lockdowns and weak income growth will continue to suppress the nation’s crude oil imports, which have already been depressed over the past 12 months (Chart 4, bottom panel). In the rest of EM (excluding China), high oil prices in their local currency terms are leading to demand destruction. Chart 5 illustrates that oil and food prices in local currency terms are still very elevated for EM. When various commodity prices – ranging from industrial and precious metals, to soft commodities, and oil – all drop simultaneously and precipitously, it suggests that supply is not what is dominating the price action (Chart 6). Their supply is idiosyncratic, so the concurrent fall in their prices cannot be explained by their production. Chart 5Oil And Food Prices In EM Currencies Chart 6The Simultaneous Drop In Various Commodity Prices Cannot Be Explained By Supply   Our interpretation for the synchronized decline in various commodity prices is as follows: the sanctions imposed on Russia initially led buyers to increase their precautionary and speculative purchases of various commodities, which was a tailwind for prices. However, these precautionary and speculative purchases have since been halted or reversed, causing commodity prices to plunge. From the perspective of business and financial cycles, oil prices are a lagging variable. Their turning points often occur after the peaks or bottoms in global cyclical stock prices (Chart 7). Chart 7Oil Prices Often Lag Global Cyclical Stocks In contrast with the downbeat investor sentiment on risk assets, investor sentiment on oil prices remains very elevated (Chart 8). In terms of market technicals, the outlook for oil prices and energy stocks is troublesome. Crude prices have lately formed a double top (see Chart 6 above). From a long-term perspective, oil prices and global energy share prices in SDR1 terms might have formed a triple top (Chart 9). Chances are that the recent top in crude prices and energy stocks is a major one and a protracted selloff is in the cards. Chart 8Investors Are Still Bullish On Oil Chart 9A Triple Top In Oil Prices And Global Energy Stocks   Bottom Line: Fears that sanctions on Russia would considerably reduce global oil supply have not yet materialized. Meanwhile, global oil demand is downshifting in response to both high fuel prices and weakening global growth. In addition, the US is leveraging its geopolitical power to push Gulf countries to boost oil production. These forces all constitute a bearish cocktail for oil prices. That said, a flare-up in geopolitical tensions in the Middle East around Iran is a potential risk to our view on oil, as it would push crude prices up again. …Surging Wages Will Keep US Core Inflation Elevated Chart 10Investors Should Mind Surging US Wages A drop in oil prices has brought some relief to US financial markets as US inflation expectations have dropped materially. Yet, we do not think the drop in oil or food prices – and hence in US headline inflation – will lead to a less hawkish stance from the Fed. The basis for this belief is that US inflationary pressures are genuine and have been broadening. In fact, as we have argued since late last year, the US has entered a wage-price spiral. Recent wage data from the Atlanta Fed validates this thesis – US wage growth has surged to around 7% (Chart 10). To be technically correct, unit labor costs, not wages, are key to inflation dynamics (Chart 11). Unit labor cost = (wage per hour) / (productivity). Productivity is output per hour. Chart 11Unit Labor Costs, Not Oil, Drive US Core Inflation Given that labor, not oil, is the largest cost component of US businesses, unit labor costs swell and profit margins shrink when salaries rise faster than productivity. CEOs and business owners always do their best to protect their profit margins. Thus, accelerating unit labor costs will lead them to raise their selling prices. A wage-price spiral will be unleashed if consumers accept these higher prices and go on to demand even higher wages. Chart 12US Core Inflation Is Broadening And Is Well Above The Fed's Target This is why wage costs, and more specifically unit labor costs, are the most important variable to monitor for the inflation outlook. If consumers facing high energy and food prices are able to successfully negotiate greater wage gains that surpass their productivity growth, then inflation will become more broad-based and genuine. This is what is presently occurring in the US, and a decline in oil prices will not halt this dynamic for now. Only higher US unemployment will lead to a meaningful deceleration in wage growth. Consistent with broadening US inflation, trimmed-mean and median CPIs have accelerated and reached 6-7%, even though core CPI has recently moderated (Chart 12). After having mismanaged inflation in the past 18 months, the Fed will err on the side of tighter policy. The rationale is that the US is already facing surging wages and a very tight labor market. Financial markets are currently underrating this risk. In fact, in its official statement the Fed has asserted that its commitment to bring inflation to its 2% target is unconditional. As we have written extensively, wages and inflation are lagging business cycle variables. Despite the ongoing slowdown in the US economy, it will take many months before the underlying core inflation rate drops below 3.5%. Bottom Line: We maintain that the Fed and the stock market remain on a collision course. In the US, surging wages and easing financial conditions would make the Fed even more committed to tightening policy substantially. The basis for this perspective is that, even if core inflation falls in the coming months, it will still be well above the Fed’s target of 2%. EM/China Growth Outlook Chart 13Global Trade Will Shrink In H2 2022 EM currencies will continue depreciating versus the US dollar as the Fed reinforces its hawkish stance and global growth/EM exports contract. Indicators from Korea and Taiwan that lead global trade suggest that global export volumes are heading into contraction (Chart 13). While lower oil prices are marginally positive for EM energy importers, share prices and currencies of these countries are often driven by their exports. The latter are set to shrink. EM ex-China domestic demand will decelerate because of (1) drastic monetary tightening by their central banks, (2) reduced household purchasing power due to the substantial rise in food and energy prices in their local currency earlier this year (see Chart 5 above), and (3) the unwinding of pandemic fiscal stimulus. Currency depreciation and slumping global and domestic growth will weigh on both EM share prices and credit markets. Chart 14 illustrates that EM sovereign bond yields have continued rising (shown inverted on the chart), which is consistent with lower EM non-TMT equity prices. Chart 14Rising EM USD Bond Yields (Shown Inverted) Point To Lower Share Prices With respect to China, we discussed the country’s new infrastructure stimulus in depth in last week’s report. Our assessment is that this new infrastructure funding will not result in new investments. Rather, it will largely offset the drop in local government (LG) revenues from land sales this year. As for the latest events regarding mortgage boycotts and authorities’ decision to introduce a moratorium on mortgages linked to delayed housing completions, the damage to homebuyers’ confidence has already been done. Given the ongoing turmoil in China’s property market, potential homebuyers will drag their feet. As a result, home sales will be underwhelming, real estate developers will struggle, and construction activity will contract. The top panel of Chart 15 illustrates that home sales have relapsed anew in the first two weeks of July after stabilizing in June. This implies that June’s bounce was a one-off move driven by pent-up demand after lockdowns were eased. Moreover, house prices are deflating (Chart 15, bottom panel). Consistently, Chinese property stocks and offshore corporate bond prices continue to plunge (Chart 16). Chart 15Chinese Housing: Sales And Prices Are Falling Chart 16Chinese Property Developers: Stock And Bond Prices Continue Plunging All of the above corroborates our thesis that housing construction in China will continue to contract, weighing on raw material demand and prices and, thereby, EM exports. Finally, rolling lockdowns in China will persist as long as the mainland’s stringent dynamic zero-COVID policy remains in place. The number of cities under mobility restrictions or some form of lockdown climbed during the second week of July. Putting it all together, China’s private sector sentiment remains in the doldrums. The willingness to spend or invest among households and enterprises will remain depressed. This will ensure that the multiplier effect of the fiscal and credit stimulus will be small. Bottom Line: Not only will EM/China exports contract but their domestic demand will also struggle. These dynamics, in combination with a hawkish Fed, are bearish for EM currencies, credit markets and equities. Investment Conclusions Chart 17EM Domestic Bonds: Do Not A Catch Falling Knife Global risk assets are oversold, and investor sentiment is pessimistic. In this context, a technical equity rebound cannot be ruled out. However, we do not think it will be the beginning of a major cyclical rally. As the US dollar continues to overshoot, EM will underperform DM equities, and EM credit markets will underperform US credit markets on a quality-adjusted basis. An underweight position in EM in global equity and credit portfolios is warranted. With respect to EM local currency bonds, we remain on the sidelines as near-term risks are still elevated (Chart 17). For now, we prefer to bet on yield curve flattening. Our favorite markets for flatteners are currently Mexico and Colombia. We continue to short the following currencies versus the USD: ZAR, COP, PEN, PLN, PHP, and IDR. In addition, we recommend shorting HUF vs. CZK, and KRW vs. JPY. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Special Drawing Rights are the IMF’s synthetic currency – we use it as a proxy for the global average currency.   Strategic Themes (18 Months And Beyond) Equities Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Table 1 Q2-22 reporting season is of paramount importance for investors as it may help shape market expectations into the balance of the year. After all, the multiples compression stage of the bear market, driven by entrenched inflation and monetary tightening, is likely complete. Now all eyes are on the growth and the ability of the companies to navigate the economy that is being slowed down by the Fed. The following is a quick snapshot of the results and expectations: As of July 20th, 60 S&P 500 companies have reported. According to Refinitiv, the S&P 500 EPS is expected to grow at 5.9% this quarter based on the expectations and the early results (blended). Excluding the Energy sector, the blended growth rate drops to -3.5% (Table 1). The S&P 500 blended sales growth is expected to be 11.2%. Excluding Energy, the rate falls to -3.9% (Table 1). 24 of the 60 companies that have reported are in the Financials sector, making it the only sector with a “critical mass” of results (24 out 42 in the sector). So far, the Financials sector has delivered a sales surprise of 1.3%, and an earnings surprise of 4.2% with 75% of companies beating analyst earnings expectations. The caveat here is that the bar for the sector has been set low, with analysts expecting earnings to contract by 21.7%. Some initial thoughts: Sales growth expectations by far exceed earnings growth expectations, signaling margins compression, and exacerbating trends that have started in Q1-2022. We have anticipated 2022 margins compression in the “Marginally Worse” report back in October 2021. So far corporate results have been reassuring, with a high share of companies beating both sales and earnings expectations. However, it is too early to draw far-reaching conclusions. On a positive note, the largest US banks have reported that their Net Income Margins (NIM) have expanded and describe US consumers as “healthy”. However, there are some red flags and negative guidance: Most banks have increased non-performing loan reserves which reflect their concerns about slowing growth and deteriorating credit conditions. Companies are reporting the adverse effects of withdrawing from Russia – IBM. The largest technology companies have announced hiring slowdowns on the back of the weakening demand for their products and overall concerns about the economy – Apple, Google, Amazon Companies across the board are mentioning the negative effects of dollar appreciation on their earnings from abroad – Microsoft pre-announcement, Johnson & Johnson, Pepsico, IBM, Halliburton, Netflix Slowdown in demand for chips – Micron, Nvidia Forward guidance has also been concerning. Most companies talk about deteriorating economic conditions. Chart 1 Despite the negative commentary summarized above, so far earnings have been strong. Then why are we worried about corporate earnings? First, analysts are still forecasting earnings to grow at about a 10% rate over the next 12 months despite ubiquitous negative corporate guidance. As Chart 1 highlights, most of that EPS growth is expected to come in Q3-22, which implies that over the next several months at least some of the macro headwinds (slowing growth, the hawkish Fed, stubborn inflation, energy crisis, and rising wages) will dissipate. We don’t consider this to be a high probability outcome as we are now halfway through the quarter, and macroeconomic conditions are not improving. Moreover, analysts themselves have little confidence in their own forecasts as is evident in the elevated earnings uncertainty (Chart 2). In all likelihood, downgrades are on the way. Second, our earnings growth regression model indicates that earnings growth is slowing, and earnings recession is likely within six months or so (Chart 3). Chart 2   Bottom Line: We continue to recommend that investors remain patient and prudent in the range-bound markets. Earnings growth is likely to deteriorate into the year end.  

Executive Summary We posit three conjectures about the US economy: Inflation has an easy path back to 4%, but a move to 2% will require a higher unemployment rate. It will be more difficult to raise the unemployment rate than many anticipate. The Fed will tolerate a higher unemployment rate than many anticipate. Taken together, these conjectures point to a higher fed funds rate in 2023 than is currently discounted in the market. This suggests that investors should be bearish bonds on a 12-18 month investment horizon. While we are bearish bonds in the medium-to-long term, we retain an ‘at benchmark’ portfolio duration stance for the time being because numerous indicators point to lower bond yields during the next few months. We also recommend an underweight allocation to spread product versus Treasuries, though we highlight the potential for solid near-term junk bond returns. Rate Expectations: Market Versus Fed Bottom Line: Maintain an ‘at benchmark’ portfolio duration stance. We will recommend reducing portfolio duration if the 10-year Treasury yield falls to 2.5% or if core inflation converges with our 4%-5% estimate of its underlying trend. Feature Uncertainty in bond markets remains elevated as investors seemingly can’t decide whether the US economy is in the midst of an inflationary boom or hurtling towards recession. This week’s report details our view of the current macroeconomic environment by offering three conjectures about the state of the US economy and monetary policy. We conclude by explaining how these conjectures shape our recommended investment strategy. Conjecture #1: Inflation Has An Easy Path Back To 4%, The Path To 2% Will Be More Difficult At 5.9%, core CPI inflation is running well above the Fed’s 2% target. However, we know that some portion of that 5.9% reflects supply side constraints related to the pandemic and some portion reflects an overheating of the demand side of the US economy. This distinction is important because the pandemic-related inflation will eventually subside on its own, without the need for materially slower economic growth. In contrast, a significant economic slowdown and a higher unemployment rate will be required to tame any inflation driven by strong US demand. Chart 1Estimating Trend Inflation In a recent report we looked at three different techniques for distinguishing between these two types of inflation.1First, we considered the Atlanta Fed’s decomposition of core inflation into flexible and sticky components. At present, the volatile core flexible CPI is running at an 8.4% annual rate and the core sticky CPI stands at 5.4% (Chart 1). Second, we noted that the New York Fed’s Underlying Inflation Gauge is running at 4.8% (Chart 1, bottom panel). Finally, we used wage growth net of trend productivity growth as an estimate of inflation’s underlying trend and calculated that to be 3.7% (Chart 1, bottom panel). From this analysis, our general conclusion is that core CPI inflation can fall into a range of 4%-5% just from the unwinding of pandemic-induced supply-side effects. After that, the Fed will be forced to engineer an economic slowdown to bring inflation from the stickier 4% level back down to its 2% target. Inflation Progress Report Last week’s June CPI report shows that even progress back to our 4%-5% estimate of inflation’s underlying trend is proving difficult. Core CPI rose 0.71% in June, well above expectations, and monthly trimmed mean CPI was an even stronger 0.80% (Chart 2A). Base effects led to a small drop in the annual core CPI number – from 6.0% to 5.9% - but annual trimmed mean CPI moved up to 6.9% (Chart 2B). The strong CPI print has led to increased speculation that the Fed will raise rates by 100 bps this month (see Box). Chart 2AMonthly Inflation Chart 2BYearly Inflation Turning to the three major components of core inflation, we see that shelter, goods, and services ex. shelter contributed roughly equal amounts to the June core CPI reading (Chart 3). The elevated reading from core goods inflation is particularly notable because this is one area where we have been anticipating that easing supply-side constraints will send prices lower. Car prices, specifically, have been one of the principal drivers of high inflation and they remained stubbornly high in June (Chart 4). Chart 3Monthly Core CPI Inflation By Major Component Chart 4Contribution To Month-Over-Month Core Goods CPI Chart 5Supply-Side Constraints Are Easing While it has taken much longer than expected for core goods and other pandemic-driven components of inflation to turn down, leading indicators still suggest that these prices are more likely to fall than rise during the next few months. The New York Fed’s Global Supply Chain Pressure Index has clearly rolled over and supplier delivery times, as measured by both the ISM manufacturing and non-manufacturing surveys, have shortened (Chart 5). While core goods and autos are representative of the sort of inflation that will ease naturally as supply chain constraints abate, shelter inflation is representative of the sort of inflation that will be stickier. That is, a higher unemployment rate will be required to significantly lower shelter inflation. Chart 6Shelter CPI Model Shelter inflation, currently running at 5.6%, can be modeled using the unemployment rate, rental vacancies and home prices (Chart 6). Given that shelter is such a large component of core inflation, it must fall if the Fed is going to achieve its 2% inflation target. That will certainly require a higher unemployment rate and very likely a recession. Bottom Line: Core inflation will move down in the second half of this year, as easing supply-side constraints lead to lower goods prices. Inflation’s downtrend will subside once it reaches its trend level of 4%-5%, at which point a higher unemployment rate and economic recession will be required to move it even lower, back to the Fed’s 2% target. BOX 75 bps Or 100 bps At The Next FOMC Meeting? Guidance provided by Fed Chair Jay Powell at the last meeting FOMC meeting suggested that the committee will choose between lifting rates by 50 bps or 75 bps when it meets later this month. The implication was that any negative inflation surprise would push the committee towards 75 bps. Certainly, last month’s strong employment report and hot CPI print justify a 75 bps move within Powell’s framework. But is it possible that Powell’s guidance from the June FOMC meeting is already stale? Chart B1July FOMC Expectations Investors are increasingly betting that it is, and the market is now discounting some chance of a 100 bps rate hike this month (Chart B1). The reason for this pricing is that the Fed has already backtracked on its guidance once before. Powell ruled out 75 bps rate hikes at the May FOMC press conference. Then, the committee delivered a 75 bps increase in June after core CPI came in hot. Kansas City Fed President Esther George dissented from the June decision because she objected to the Fed flip-flopping on its guidance so quickly. George explained her dissent in a recent speech by saying that “communicating the path for interest rates is likely far more consequential than the speed with which we get there.”2 Where does this leave us for the July meeting? Our expectation is that the Fed will stick to its guidance and deliver a 75 bps increase this month. However, if the market moves to fully price-in a 100 bps move then the committee may be tempted to deliver on those expectations. In other words, the Fed’s recent track record of abandoning its forward rate guidance means that both a 75 bps rate hike and a 100 bps rate hike are in play for July. Conjecture #2: The Labor Market Will Be More Resilient Than Is Widely Believed Chart 7An Extremely Tight Labor Market Our second conjecture is that it will be more difficult to lift the unemployment rate than many people think. This view stems from the fact that the labor market is incredibly tight. As Fed officials have often pointed out, there are currently almost two job openings for every unemployed worker in the country (Chart 7). Further, we noted in last week’s report that while the employment readings from both ISM surveys are in contractionary territory, respondents to those surveys were much more likely to cite concerns about the supply side of the labor market than they were to cite concerns about hiring demand.3 In other words, an economy where there are twice as many job openings as unemployed workers and where firms are complaining about a shortage of labor is not one where we are likely to see an immediate surge in layoffs, even as demand starts to soften. Conjecture #3: The Fed Will Tolerate A Higher Unemployment Rate Than Is Widely Believed Chart 8Optimal Control Monetary Policy Our final conjecture is that the Fed will persistently run a much more restrictive monetary policy than many investors anticipate. We detailed our logic in a recent report where we argued that the Fed will adopt an optimal control approach to monetary policy.4 An optimal control strategy is employed when the Fed is unlikely to perfectly hit both its full employment goal and its 2% inflation target. In such environments, Janet Yellen has argued that the Fed should set monetary policy to minimize the joint deviations of inflation from target and of the unemployment rate from estimates of its full employment level.5 Chart 8 presents an example of an optimal control loss function that consists of adding together the squared deviations of inflation from 2% and of the unemployment rate from the Congressional Budget Office’s estimate of NAIRU. Using this framework, the Fed’s goal is to minimize the output of the loss function shown in the top panel. The dashed lines in Chart 8 illustrate a scenario where core PCE inflation falls to 4% but where the output from the loss function is held flat. That scenario implies an increase in the unemployment rate from its current level of 3.6% all the way up to 6.7%! This exercise demonstrates that, under an optimal control framework, the Fed would be willing to tolerate an unemployment rate of 6.7% or lower in order to move core inflation back to 4%. We don’t see the unemployment rate hitting 6.7% any time soon. The main point of this analysis is to illustrate that Fed policy is likely to retain a restrictive bias until inflation returns to 2% or lower. It won’t move toward easing policy at the first sign of a higher unemployment rate, as has been the pattern in recent years when inflation was much more contained. Investment Implications To summarize, our three conjectures about the US economy are that: (i) a higher unemployment rate will be required to move inflation from 4% to the Fed’s 2% target, (ii) a lot of demand destruction will be required before we see a significant rise in the unemployment rate and (iii) in its pursuit of lower inflation, the Fed will tolerate a higher unemployment rate than many people expect. Taken together, these three conjectures imply that the fed funds rate will be higher in 2023 than what is currently priced in the curve. At present, the market is priced for the fed funds to peak at 3.67% in March 2023 and then fall back to 3.13% by the end of the year (Chart 9). If our three conjectures pan out, then we think it’s likely that the fed funds rate will move above 4% next year and that it will be higher than 3.13% by the end of 2023. Chart 9Rate Expectations: Market Versus Fed Portfolio Duration Chart 10High-Frequency Bond Yield Indicators Obviously, this view makes us inclined toward a ‘below-benchmark’ portfolio duration stance on a 12-18 month investment horizon. That said, we recommend keeping portfolio duration close to benchmark for now because many indicators suggest that bond yields could fall during the next few months (Chart 10). More specifically, with core CPI still above our 4%-5% estimate of its underlying trend, we see inflation as more likely to fall than rise during the next six months. At the same time, aggregate demand will be slowing as the Fed tightens policy and the unemployment rate is more likely to rise than fall. These factors will keep bond yields contained between now and the end of the year. While we recommend an ‘at benchmark’ portfolio duration stance on a 6-12 month horizon, we will reduce portfolio duration if the 10-year Treasury yield moves back to 2.5% or once core inflation converges to our 4%-5% estimate of trend. At that point, we think inflation will be stickier and it will make sense to position for higher bond yields. Spread Product Our three conjectures also imply a negative environment for spread product. Monetary policy will become increasingly restrictive, and it will be a long time before the Fed moves toward interest rate cuts – the traditional signal to pile into spread product. We therefore advocate an underweight allocation to spread product versus Treasuries in US bond portfolios. One exception to our underweight spread product allocation is that we retain a neutral allocation to high-yield. Our reasoning is that high-yield spreads are elevated and they have the potential to tighten during the next few months as inflation converges toward our estimate of trend. As inflation falls and fears of immediate recession abate, it’s conceivable that junk spreads could revert to their 2017-19 average, the level that prevailed during the previous tightening cycle (Chart 11), and such a move would lead to roughly 8.4% of excess return.6 If such a move were to occur within the next six months, then we would be inclined to reduce our junk bond exposure to underweight. A Quick Note On 2-Year TIPS Chart 11Junk Spreads Are Elevated Chart 122-Year TIPS Yield Is Positive In last week’s report we recommended upgrading TIPS from underweight to neutral relative to duration-matched nominal Treasuries. However, given that the 2-year TIPS yield was still negative, we did not close our recommendation to short 2-year TIPS or our recommended 2/10 real yield curve flattener and 2/10 inflation curve steepener positions. The 2-year real yield has continued to rise during the past week and, at +9 bps, it is now in positive territory (Chart 12). We were confident that the 2-year TIPS yield would turn positive because the Fed has implied that it is targeting positive real yields across the entire curve. But now that the yield is positive, we are no longer confident in the trade’s upside. Bottom Line: Investors should close out their short 2-year TIPS positions, as well as their 2/10 real yield curve flatteners and 2/10 inflation curve steepeners. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1     Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “No End In Sight For Fed Tightening”, dated June 21, 2022. 2     https://www.kansascityfed.org/Speeches/documents/8875/2022-George-MidAm… 3    Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “A Low Conviction US Bond Market”, dated July 12, 2022. 4    Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “When The Dual Mandates Clash”, dated June 28, 2022. 5    https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20120606a.htm 6    Return estimate assumes default losses of 1.8% and that the spread tightening occurs over a six month period.   Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns