Sectors
Executive Summary Increase In Chinese Ag Prices Has Been Much More Muted Than Globally
Increase In Chinese Ag Prices Has Been Much More Muted Than Globally
Increase In Chinese Ag Prices Has Been Much More Muted Than Globally
China’s food price inflation accelerated in April. The rising cost of global agricultural goods and domestic COVID-related disruptions in the supply-chain contributed to a sharp bump in food prices last month. China is not overly reliant on food imports. The country is also well stocked with grain reserves and should weather ongoing global food supply shortages, particularly wheat, better than most emerging economies. However, China will still be impacted by escalating prices of global agricultural products and energy. Some imported goods (e.g. soybeans and related products) that China relies on, coupled with higher energy costs and a bottoming in China’s pork prices, will continue to push up food prices and headline inflation. Higher reading in headline inflation will not change the direction of the PBoC’s monetary policy. However, more expensive food will dampen Chinese households’ spending power on non-food consumer goods, especially as income growth slows. The food and beverage sector in China’s onshore stocks will benefit from higher food costs. We are initiating a new trade: long domestic consumer staples/broad A-share market. CYCLICAL RECOMMENDATIONS (6 - 18 MONTHS) INITIATION DATE RETURN SINCE INCEPTION (%) COMMENT LONG DOMESTIC CONSUMER STAPLES/BROAD A-SHARE MARKET 05/18/2022 Bottom Line: Despite China’s solid self-sufficiency in food supplies, its food price inflation is not immune from the mounting prices of global agricultural products. Is China’s Food Price Inflation Transitory? The food component of China’s consumer price index (CPI) increased by 0.9% in April compared with the previous month, a sharp reversal from a 1.2% month-over-month decline in March. Higher food and energy prices pushed headline CPI to 2.1% in April, the fastest year-on-year growth since August 2020. China is not overly reliant on food imports and has abundant grain reserves. The country is in a better position to weather ongoing global supply shortages in grain compared with other emerging economies, such as the Middle East and North Africa. Moreover, agricultural product prices in China have been structurally higher than those traded in the global commodity market. Large margins in China’s bulk agricultural pricing provide a cushion from escalating global food prices. Nonetheless, China remains at risk for higher food prices this year. Elevated oil prices and the war in Ukraine will further lift the price of fertilizers, adding to input costs for agricultural products. A strong USD will add to the price of USD-denominated commodity imports, particularly soybeans. In addition, China’s domestic pork price may have reached its hog cycle bottom and will pick up in the second half of this year. Food Prices Are Driving Up Inflation China’s headline CPI accelerated to 2.1% in April, on a year-on-year basis, from 1.5% in the previous month. Even though pork prices plunged by 33% in April from a year ago, food prices grew by 1.9% and have been boosted by a jump in the cost of fresh food, such as vegetables (+24% year-on-year), fruit (+14%) and eggs (+12%). Prices in other food categories, such as grains and edible oil, also rose, albeit more modestly (Chart 1A and 1B). Chart 1ALarge Jump In Fresh Food Prices In April
Large Jump In Fresh Food Prices In April
Large Jump In Fresh Food Prices In April
Chart 1BOther Food Prices Also Picked Up, But More Modestly
Other Food Prices Also Picked Up, But More Modestly
Other Food Prices Also Picked Up, But More Modestly
China’s strict COVID-19 containment measures have had a broad-based impact on food supplies. Mobility restrictions, roadblocks and risk-averse truck drivers introduced significant challenges in food supplies and transportation. Lockdowns in some large urban areas also led to panic buying and stockpiling among consumers, pushing up demand. Chart 2Increase In Chinese Ag Prices Has Been Much More Muted Than Globally
Increase In Chinese Ag Prices Has Been Much More Muted Than Globally
Increase In Chinese Ag Prices Has Been Much More Muted Than Globally
Meanwhile, higher global food and energy prices have likely both directly and indirectly contributed to food price inflation in China. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Food Price Index in April this year leapt to its highest level since its inception in 1990; it is 30% higher than last year and nearly double from its trough in mid-2020. Although price increases in China’s domestic agricultural products have been more moderate, the country’s agricultural wholesale prices have jumped by 10% from a year ago (Chart 2). Bottom Line: Food accounts for about 20% of China’s CPI basket (Chart 3). Climbing food, along with energy, prices are driving up China’s headline inflation. Chart 3Food Accounts For 20% Of Chinese Household Budgets
Is China’s Food Price Inflation Transitory?
Is China’s Food Price Inflation Transitory?
China Is In A Good Position To Weather Global Food Supply Shocks … Chart 4Ex-China Food Inventories Haven’t Been Built
Is China’s Food Price Inflation Transitory?
Is China’s Food Price Inflation Transitory?
China is well stocked with food reserves and does not rely on imports for most of its agricultural supplies. Thus, the country should weather ongoing global shortages in the food supply better than most emerging economies (Chart 4). China’s food inventories are significantly higher than levels in the 2006-2008 and 2010-2012 global food price hikes (Chart 5). The nation’s inventories have been steadily building up in the past decade to avert potential food supply shortages. Corn and rice stocks are sufficient to cover consumption for nearly three quarters of a year and wheat stocks are at nearly a year’s worth of consumption. Chart 5China Has Been Building Up Inventories To Buffer Against Supply Shortfalls
Is China’s Food Price Inflation Transitory?
Is China’s Food Price Inflation Transitory?
Chart 6China Is Not Overly Dependent On Ag Imports
Is China’s Food Price Inflation Transitory?
Is China’s Food Price Inflation Transitory?
Furthermore, with the exception of soybeans, China is not overly dependent on imports for agricultural supplies (Chart 6). The country is self-sufficient in supplying rice, wheat, and corn, three major staples in China’s grain consumption basket. Less than 5% of China’s total consumption of the three staple grains comes from imports. Bottom Line: China is well stocked with agriculture products and is not overly dependent on imports for its food supplies. … But Not Immune To Food Price Hikes Worldwide Chart 7Ag Products Are Traded At Higher Prices In China Than In The Global Market
Ag Products Are Traded At Higher Prices In China Than In The Global Market
Ag Products Are Traded At Higher Prices In China Than In The Global Market
Rising global agricultural and energy prices could still push up the country’s food price inflation. In USD terms, prices of China’s domestic agricultural products have been structurally higher than those traded on global commodity markets (Chart 7). The government heavily regulates and subsidizes its agricultural procurement prices as an encouragement to domestic farmers. When global food supply shocks sharply pushed up agricultural prices worldwide, China’s domestic agricultural prices, with their large buffer versus global food prices, rose more moderately. Nonetheless, China’s domestic food prices are not insulated from worldwide price hikes. China is facing higher inflation in food prices this year for the following reasons: Pork prices, which account for 13% of China’s CPI food basket, have likely bottomed. Although pork prices remain in a deep contraction year-over-year, they rebounded sharply in April on a month-on-month basis (Chart 8). The number of sows peaked in mid-2021 and has been declining for the past 10 consecutive months. Falling sow numbers have historically led to rising pork prices (Chart 9). Chart 8Pork Prices May Have Bottomed
Pork Prices May Have Bottomed
Pork Prices May Have Bottomed
Chart 9Pork Prices Will Likely Increase In 2H22
Is China’s Food Price Inflation Transitory?
Is China’s Food Price Inflation Transitory?
Nearly 90% of China’s soybean consumption relies on imports, making the country vulnerable to external price fluctuations. Soybean prices have jumped sharply this year. A stronger USD will also add to the price of USD-denominated commodity imports. About 80% of Chinese soybeans are crushed to produce meal to feed China’s massive pork industry, which means higher soybean prices will indirectly lead to rising pork prices by boosting input costs. Given that pig output is approaching its cyclical bottom, an increase in pig livestock would mean more demand for soybeans. Chart 10Edible Oil Prices Reached Their Highest In Decades
Edible Oil Prices Reached Their Highest In Decades
Edible Oil Prices Reached Their Highest In Decades
Growing prices in soybeans and corn will lift the cost of cooking oil, which represents about 8% of China’s food CPI basket (Chart 10). Ukraine supplies 30% of China’s corn imports, and Russia and Ukraine together account for nearly 20% of China’s soybean oil imports. China ramped up corn imports from Ukraine through March despite the war and snapped up large volumes of US corn in April after supplies from Ukraine were cut off. Nonetheless, prices of soybeans and corn will likely remain elevated with no end in sight to the Russia-Ukraine war and supply shortages globally. In addition, as global travel becomes more popular and oil prices remain elevated, the demand for corn-based ethanol, which is blended with gasoline, will also expand. Wheat prices will continue to experience upward pressure in the global market, mainly due to reduced production and exports from Ukraine and Russia (these countries account for 30% of world’s wheat exports). The World Bank forecasts that wheat will be 40% more expensive this year, reaching an all-time high in nominal terms.1 Although China is about 96% self-sufficient in wheat, the upsurge in global prices has boosted China’s domestic cost for wheat; it climbed by 15% in May from a year ago (Chart 11). Higher shipping and input costs, especially for fertilizers, will exacerbate the upside price pressures on agricultural goods. China is the world’s largest exporter of phosphate fertilizer, but its domestic fertilizer prices are heavily subsidized and much cheaper than exported ones (Chart 12). However, the domestic cost of fertilizer will likely follow the lead of rising global prices for fertilizers and agricultural products. Chart 11Chinese Wheat Prices Jumped Against The Backdrop Of Global Supply Shortages
Chinese Wheat Prices Jumped Against The Backdrop Of Global Supply Shortages
Chinese Wheat Prices Jumped Against The Backdrop Of Global Supply Shortages
Chart 12China's Domestic Fertilizer Prices Will Likely Trend Up
China's Domestic Fertilizer Prices Will Likely Trend Up
China's Domestic Fertilizer Prices Will Likely Trend Up
The relationship between agricultural prices and the dollar broke down early last year (Chart 13). Historically, a strong USD would weigh down agricultural prices by encouraging ex-US producers to raise exports and boost global supplies. However, the COVID pandemic and war in Ukraine have triggered a global surge in government controls on food exports. Such broad enforcement of protectionist measures will continue to exacerbate worldwide inflationary pressures on food. Chart 13The Inverse Relationship Between Global Ag Prices And The Dollar Has Broken Down
The Inverse Relationship Between Global Ag Prices And The Dollar Has Broken Down
The Inverse Relationship Between Global Ag Prices And The Dollar Has Broken Down
Bottom Line: China’s food prices face upward pressure. Strengthening global prices in a wide range of agricultural products, coupled with higher energy costs and a bottoming in China’s pork prices, will all contribute to higher food price inflation in the country. Investment Conclusions Chart 14Core CPI Remains Subdued
Core CPI Remains Subdued
Core CPI Remains Subdued
Food price inflation should not constrain the PBoC from further easing monetary policy. As mentioned in previous reports, China’s monetary policy framework has shifted away from headline CPI and has been anchored in core CPI, which has remained subdued (Chart 14). However, China’s accelerating food and energy prices, as household income growth is slowing, will lower households’ purchasing power and curb their demand for non-food consumer goods and services. While China’s overall consumption and economy will suffer from higher food price inflation, soaring food prices will help to widen the profit margins among food processing firms (Chart 15). Furthermore, food and beverage companies in China’s onshore equity market have one of the highest ROAs and the lowest financial leverages (Chart 16). We are initiating a new trade: long Chinese onshore consumer staples/short broad A-share market. Chart 15Long Chinese Onshore Consumer Staples...
Long Chinese Onshore Consumer Staples...
Long Chinese Onshore Consumer Staples...
Chart 16...As The Sector Will Benefit From Rising Food Prices
...As The Sector Will Benefit From Rising Food Prices
...As The Sector Will Benefit From Rising Food Prices
Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The World Bank’s Commodity Markets Outlook Report, April 2022. Strategic Themes Cyclical Recommendations
Executive Summary UK Stocks Are Close To A Bottom
UK Stocks Are Close To A Bottom
UK Stocks Are Close To A Bottom
The UK economic outlook has greatly deteriorated. Weak global growth and punishing energy inflation will cause activity to contract over the next 12 months. Cost-push pressures will drag inflation above 10% in 2022. Moreover, demand-pull inflation highlights problems with the supply-side of the economy. UK yields have downside relative to those in the Euro Area. GBP/USD will bottom once global stock prices find a floor. EUR/GBP possesses more upside. UK stocks will enjoy a structural tailwind relative to their Eurozone counterparts as a result of a secular bull market in commodity prices. Nonetheless, UK equities are likely to underperform in the second half of 2022. UK small-cap stocks are massively oversold compared to large-cap shares; however, a peak in energy inflation must take place for small-cap equities to stage a rebound. TACTICAL INCEPTION DATE RETURN SINCE INCEPTION (%) COMMENT Overweight UK Gilts Within European Fixed-Income Portfolios 05/16/2022 Cyclical Buy European Healthcare Equities / Sell UK Healthcare Equities 05/16/2022 Tactical Buy European Financials Equities / Sell UK Financials Equities 05/16/2022 Tactical Bottom Line: British Gilts will outperform because of the weakness in UK economic activity, but the trade-weighted pound will remain under pressure. The performance of UK large-cap names is mostly independent from the state of the British economy. The commodity secular bull market will create a potent tailwind for this market. However, a better entry point lies ahead. The Bank of England’s (BoE) latest policy meeting was a cold shower for market participants and their aggressive interest rate pricing in the SONIA curve. Money markets expected a peak in the Bank Rate of 2.7% in 2023, but the BoE’s new Market Participants Survey is calling for it to peak at 1.75% before easing off to 1.5% in 2024. The UK economy is in trouble. Inflation is high and broad-based, which explains why investors are pricing in such an aggressive path for the Bank Rate. Yet, economic activity is weakening and could even contract in early 2023. The BoE clearly puts more weight on growth than investors do. What are the implications of the inflation, growth, and policy outlook for British assets? BCA has upgraded its view on UK bonds to overweight within global fixed income portfolios. We expect more softness in the pound versus the euro. UK large-cap stocks will continue to trade in line with energy dynamics, which means it is still too early to buy British small-cap equities. In the meantime, UK financial and healthcare names will underperform their Euro Area counterparts. Growth To Weaken Further The -0.1% month-over-month GDP contraction in March underscores that UK economic activity has already decelerated sharply. However, the deterioration is only starting. Most sectors of the economy show ominous signs for the quarters ahead. Consumer Sector The biggest hurdle facing UK consumers, like most of their European neighbors, is the surge in inflation, particularly energy and food prices. Safety nets are looser than on the continent, and UK households’ real disposable income are contracting sharply. The impact of this weakening of activity is already visible. UK consumer confidence is falling in line with the knock to real disposable income (Chart 1, top panel). Moreover, real retail sales have already slowed sharply, and the BRC Like-For-Like Retail Sales measure is contracting on an annual basis (Chart 1, bottom panel). As a result, the outlook for consumption is worsening. Ofgem, the UK gas and electricity market regulator, lifted its energy price cap by 54% on April 1st and plans to increase it again by an expected 40% in October. Consequently, the BoE anticipates the share of households’ disposable income spent on energy to hit 7.7% by the end of the year — its highest level since the early 1980s (Chart 2). Chart 1Falling Real Incomes Hurt
Falling Real Incomes Hurt
Falling Real Incomes Hurt
Chart 2Intensifying Energy Drag
Intensifying Energy Drag
Intensifying Energy Drag
The savings cushion developed during the pandemic will not be enough to prevent weaker retail sales. More than 40% of households plan to dip into their existing savings and curtail their savings rate; however, UK excess savings skew heavily toward the richer households. Poorer households with low savings are the ones who spend the largest share of their income on energy (Chart 3), and they are also the ones with a higher marginal propensity to consume. Thus, the knock to these households portends further weakness in consumption volumes. Chart 3The Poor Are Hit Harder
Is UK Stagflation Priced In?
Is UK Stagflation Priced In?
Chart 4No Salvation From Housing
No Salvation From Housing
No Salvation From Housing
Housing is unlikely to save the day. While house prices and housing transactions are robust (Chart 4, top panel), mortgage approvals are declining rapidly and average sales per chartered surveyors are also softening (Chart 4, bottom panels), which suggests housing activity will slow. Rising mortgage rates are a problem. Since January, the quoted rates on mortgages with 90% LTV and 75% LTV are up 65bps and 70bps, respectively, which is hurting housing marginal demand. Moreover, 20% of the UK’s mortgage stock carries variable rates, which further hurts aggregate demand. Business Sector The business sector is also feeling the crunch from rapidly rising energy and input costs. It also dreads the deterioration in consumer sentiment and its implication for future final demand. Chart 5Dwindling Capex Outlook
Dwindling Capex Outlook
Dwindling Capex Outlook
Business confidence is falling abruptly. The CBI Inquiry Business Optimism measure has fallen to its lowest level since the beginning of the pandemic in 2020, when the UK GDP was contracting at a 21% annualized rate (Chart 5). Unsurprisingly, the collapse in business confidence prompted a rapid slowdown in CAPEX. The BoE’s Agents Survey reports that 40% of UK firms have unsustainably low profit margins because of rising input prices and partial pass-through. As a result of financial stress, further capex weakness is likely in the coming quarters. The impact on overall activity of these expanding worries is evident. UK industrial production has slowed very sharply and is now a meager 0.7% on an annual basis. The situation will degrade. Export growth remains strong, which is helping the business sector; however, the rapid slowdown in global industrial production indicates that UK exports will follow suit (Chart 5, second panel). This will have a knock-on effect on corporate profits (Chart 5, bottom panel), which will depress capex further. Other Considerations Chart 6No Offset From The Government
No Offset From The Government
No Offset From The Government
The problems of the private sector may be encapsulated in one indicator. After a surge that boosted GDP, the UK’s nonfinancial private sector’s credit impulse is rapidly contracting (Chart 6), which confirms that risks to activity are building. The public sector will not provide an offset. According to the IMF Fiscal Monitor’s projections, the UK’s fiscal thrust will equal -3.3% of GDP in 2022 and -1.4% in 2023, even after the small giveaways from Chancellor Rishi Sunak’s Spring Statement (Chart 6, bottom panel). Together, these developments confirm our view that UK GDP may also flirt with a recession in the coming 12 months. Bottom Line: The UK economy is facing potent headwinds and activity is set to contract over the coming quarters. Surging energy costs are hurting household consumption and businesses are cutting investment. This time around, government spending is unlikely to come to the rescue, at least not until further pain is inflicted on the UK’s private sector. The BoE expects output to contract in early 2023, with which we agree. Inflation: The Worst Of Both Worlds UK headline inflation is likely to move into double digits territory before year-end. Worrisomely, it will also be more stubborn than that of the Eurozone, because it goes beyond higher food and energy input costs. Essentially, the UK suffers from both the cost-push inflation plaguing the rest of Europe and the demand-pull inflation witnessed in the US. Chart 7Continued Pass-Through
Is UK Stagflation Priced In?
Is UK Stagflation Priced In?
The UK’s cost-push inflation will worsen in the second half of the year and could lift headline CPI above 10% by Q4 2022. Its main driver will be the Ofgem’s second energy cap increase scheduled for October, which is expected to increase household energy costs by 40%. Companies will also try to pass through a greater proportion of their rising costs to their consumers to protect their depleted margins. So far, the BoE’s Agents Survey reveals that on average, UK firms have passed through 80% of their non-labor input cost increases (Chart 7, top panel). In all the sectors surveyed, expected price increases are set to accelerate compared to the past 12 month and may even reach 14% in the manufacturing sector and 8% in the consumer goods sector (Chart 7, bottom panel). Demand-pull inflation is also present in the UK, unlike the rest of Europe, with core CPI at 5.7%, high service inflation, and rapidly rising wage growth. The key problem is an overheating labor market exacerbated by labor supply problems. By the end of 2021, the UK recorded 600 thousand inactive people more than before the pandemic, or individuals who are of working age but outside of the labor force and not seeking a job. This has compressed the labor participation rate to 63%, or the lowest level since the 2011-2012 period (Chart 8). So far, not even rapid wage gains have incentivized these persons to seek employment. The impact of Brexit further curtails the supply of labor. Since the pandemic began, the size of the working age population has decreased by 100 thousand as EU citizens have moved back home (Chart 8, second panel). Labor demand, however, is not weak. Job vacancies have surged to an all-time high of 1.3 million, or a ratio of one job vacancy per unemployed worker. Moreover, according to the BoE’s Agents Survey, the proportion of firms reporting recruitment difficulties is extremely elevated (Chart 8, third panel). As a result of weak labor supply but strong labor demand, wages are rising rapidly (Chart 8, bottom panel), with the KPMG/REC Indicator of pay higher than 6%. Chart 8Labor Market Tightness
Labor Market Tightness
Labor Market Tightness
Chart 9Poor Productivity Weighs On Trend GDP
Poor Productivity Weighs On Trend GDP
Poor Productivity Weighs On Trend GDP
Rapidly increasing wages and underlying inflation are indicative of a greater malaise. UK GDP is still 3.6% below its pre-COVID trend, while US GDP has already moved past its previous peak. Yet, wages and underlying inflation are just as strong in both economies. This suggests that the UK trend GDP has slowed more than in the US and that aggregate demand is colliding more rapidly with the constraint created by a weaker potential GDP. Labor supply is not the only culprit behind the slowdown in UK’s trend GDP. Since Brexit, UK capex has been particularly weak, which has depressed productivity growth and suppressed trend GDP further (Chart 9). Bottom Line: The BoE expects UK headline CPI inflation to move above 10% before the end of the year. We agree with this assessment. Cost-push inflation will remain strong in response to additional increases in regulated energy prices this fall and greater pass-through from businesses. Meanwhile, the labor market is overheated because of weak labor supply and surging job vacancies. The UK core inflation is likely to be sticky as Brexit weighs on the country’s trend GDP, which causes aggregate demand to surpass aggregate supply easily. Investment Implications The investment implications of the UK’s weak growth and strong inflation outlook are far reaching. Fixed Income Implications BCA’s Global Fixed Income Strategy service upgraded UK government bonds to overweight from underweight in their global fixed income portfolios. We heed this message and move to overweight UK Gilts relative to German Bunds within European fixed income portfolios. Chart 10The BoE's Dovish Justification
The BoE's Dovish Justification
The BoE's Dovish Justification
The BoE’s forecast calls for a deeply negative output gap as well as a rising rate of unemployment in 2023 and 2024. According to the BoE’s model, these dynamics will weigh on headline CPI next year (Chart 10). We take the BoE at its word when it communicated a gentler pace of rate hikes than was anticipated by the SONIA curve. The BoE believes that the weakness in the UK’s trend GDP growth weighs on the country’s neutral rate of interest. Thus, there is a limited scope before higher interest rates hurt economic activity. Since the BoE already foresees a poor growth outcome and weaker inflation next year, this view of the neutral rate logically results in a shallow path of interest rate increases. In other words, the BoE is not the Fed. This view prompts our fixed income colleagues to expect the SONIA curve to move toward the gentler rhythm of interest rate hikes proposed by the BoE. As a corollary, it implies that Gilt yields have more downside. More specifically, BCA sees room for UK-German yields spreads to narrow. Investors have expected the BoE to be significantly more hawkish than the European Central Bank (ECB), and a partial convergence in expected interest rate paths is likely. Moreover, UK yields have a higher beta than German ones. As a result, the current wave of risk aversion driven by global growth fears should cause an outperformance of UK government bonds compared to German ones. Currency Market Implications The outlook for GBP/USD depends on the evolution of overall market conditions. If risk assets remain under pressure, so will Cable. Chart 11Cable And EM Stocks
Cable And EM Stocks
Cable And EM Stocks
A durable bottom in GBP/USD will coincide with a rebound in EM equities (Chart 11). The correlation between these two assets most likely reflects the UK’s current account deficit of 2.8% of GDP in 2021. Large external financing needs render the currency very sensitive to global liquidity conditions and thus, to the dollar’s trend and global risk aversion, as is the case with EM assets. Peter Berezin, BCA Chief Global Strategist, expects global stocks to rebound in the near future, which will lift EM equities in the process. Interestingly, GBP/USD does not correlate with the relative performance of EM shares. Thus, a rebound in Cable does not contradict BCA’s Emerging Market Strategy service’s view that EM stocks are likely to underperform further in the coming months. Chart 12A Big Handicap For the GBP vs the EUR
A Big Handicap For the GBP vs the EUR
A Big Handicap For the GBP vs the EUR
BCA’s Foreign Exchange strategy team sees further upside in EUR/GBP, toward the 0.9 level. 2-year yield differentials between the UK and Germany are likely to narrow in response to the downgrade of the SONIA curve. Importantly, the wide UK current account deficit necessitates higher real interest rates to prop the pound against the euro because the Eurozone current account surplus stands at 2.3% of GDP. However, neither the 2-year nor 10-year real rates are higher in the UK than they are in the Euro Area (Chart 12). Additionally, even the nominal yield premium of UK bonds vanishes once they are hedged into euros. UK hedged 2-year bonds yield 50bps less than their German counterparts, and 10-year Gilts offer 80bps less than Bunds, which limits continental inflows into the UK. Equity Market Implications UK stocks are pro-cyclical, and their absolute performance will bottom in tandem with global equities. The near-term outlook for global equities remains clouded by the confluence of global growth fears, a weaker CNY, and tighter monetary policy around the world. Meanwhile, UK stocks are very cheap, trading at a forward P/E ratio of 11. They are tactically oversold and are lagging forward earnings (Chart 13). Relative to global equities, the performance of UK stocks will continue to track that of global energy firms compared to the broad market. The heavy exposure of UK large-cap indices to oil and gas stocks has been a major asset since energy shares have become market darlings (Chart 14). Chart 13UK Stocks Are Close To A Bottom
UK Stocks Are Close To A Bottom
UK Stocks Are Close To A Bottom
Chart 14UK Large-Caps Are About Oil
UK Large-Caps Are About Oil
UK Large-Caps Are About Oil
At the time of writing, Sweden and Finland have yet to officialize their membership application to NATO, but BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy team assigns a high probability to this outcome. Russia will not stand idly by, especially as the EU threatens to cut their oil imports. Consequently, a deeper energy embargo is increasingly likely, which should prompt a temporary but violent rally in oil and natural gas prices. This process should sustain a few more weeks of outperformance from UK large-cap shares relative to the rest of the world. Chart 15The UK vs The Eurozone: Cheap But Overbought
The UK vs The Eurozone: Cheap But Overbought
The UK vs The Eurozone: Cheap But Overbought
Structurally, UK equities are likely to remain well supported. A pullback in relative performance later this year is possible once oil prices ease off as BCA’s Commodity and Energy team expects. However, the oil market will stay tight for years to come because of the investment dearth observed since 2014-2015, when OPEC 2.0 started its market-share war. According to Bob Ryan, BCA’s Chief Commodity Strategist, it will take years of high returns in the sector to attract the capital needed to lift energy capex enough to line up supply with demand. Thus, energy remains a structurally favored sector, which will boost the cheap UK market’s appeal. UK stocks enjoy a structural tailwind relative to Euro Area shares. They remain cheap, because they still trade at a significant historical discount (Chart 15). Moreover, relative earnings are moving decisively in favor of UK stocks, something that is unlikely to change, even if the UK economy contracts. Ultimately, UK large-cap names derive the bulk of their profits from overseas and the structural tailwind of a secular commodity bull market will continue to assert itself on relative profits. Nevertheless, UK shares have also become extremely overbought, which raises the risk of a pullback in the second half of the 2022 (Chart 15, third and fourth panel). The recent outperformance of UK stocks relative to those of the Eurozone has been larger than what sectoral biases explain. An equal-sector weights version of the UK MSCI has outperformed a similarly constructed Euro Area index by 9.6% year-to-date. Chart 16Waiting For Catalysts To A Eurozone Rebound
Waiting For Catalysts To A Eurozone Rebound
Waiting For Catalysts To A Eurozone Rebound
A tactical rectification of the overbought conditions in the performance of UK equities relative to those of the Euro Area will require an ebbing of stagflation fears in the Euro Area (Chart 16, top panel). This implies that investors looking to buy Eurozone equities are waiting for a stabilization in the energy market (that is, waiting for clarity about Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO decision as well as Russia’s response). It also means that the Chinese economy must stabilize, since Eurozone equities are more sensitive to the evolution of the Chinese credit impulse than UK ones (Chart 16, second panel). Nonetheless, BCA’s Global Fixed Income Strategy team’s view on UK-German spreads is consistent with an eventual tactical pull back in the relative performance of UK stocks vis-à-vis Euro Area ones (Chart 16, bottom panel). Two pair trades make attractive vehicles to bet on an underperformance of UK stocks relative to those of the Euro Area in the second half of 2022. The first one is to sell UK financials at the expense of Euro Area financials. Historically, a decline in UK Gilt yields relative to their German equivalent strongly correlates with an underperformance of UK financials (Chart 17). The second one is to sell UK healthcare names relative to those in the Eurozone. The relative performance of healthcare shares has greatly outpaced relative earnings and is now hitting a critical resistance level (Chart 18). Moreover, UK healthcare firms are exceptionally overbought relative to their Euro Area competitors. Importantly, those two trades display little correlation to the broad market trend. Chart 17Challenges To UK Financials
Challenges To UK Financials
Challenges To UK Financials
Chart 18UK Healthcare: Running Ahead Of Itself
UK Healthcare: Running Ahead Of Itself
UK Healthcare: Running Ahead Of Itself
Finally, UK small-cap stocks are becoming attractive relative to their large-cap counterparts, although the timing remains risky. Unlike the internationally focused large-cap indices, small-cap shares are a direct bet on the health of the UK domestic economy. Hence, small- and mid-cap names have massively underperformed the FTSE-100 as market participants sniffed out the poor outlook for UK economic activity (Chart 19). They are now extremely oversold relative to large-cap names and their overvaluation has been corrected. The main problem with small-cap shares is the lack of a catalyst to rectify their oversold conditions. The most likely candidate for such a reversal would be a peak in energy inflation, considering it stands at the crux of the headwinds that UK consumption and growth face. However, energy CPI will not peak until later this fall and thus, the pain on UK households will build until then. As a result, wait for a clear sign that energy inflation recedes before entering a long UK small-cap / short UK large-cap contrarian trade (Chart 20). Chart 19Bombed Out Small-Caps...
Bombed Out Small-Caps...
Bombed Out Small-Caps...
Chart 20…Need A Peak In Energy Inflation
...Need A Peak In Energy Inflation
...Need A Peak In Energy Inflation
Bottom Line: In line with our expectations that UK growth will worsen significantly in the quarters ahead, we follow the BCA Global Fixed Income team and move to overweight UK government bonds within European fixed income portfolios. While we expect GBP/USD will bottom once global risk assets find a floor, BCA’s Foreign Exchange Strategy team also anticipates Sterling to depreciate further relative to the euro. Because of their large energy and materials exposure, UK large-cap equities will enjoy a structural outperformance relative to Euro Area large-cap indices on the back of a secular bull market in commodities. However, a temporary pullback in the UK’s relative performance is likely in the second half of 2022. Selling UK financials and UK healthcare stocks relative to their Eurozone counterparts offers a compelling approach to implement this view. Finally, UK small-caps are oversold relative to large-caps, but we recommend investors wait until energy CPI peaks when a relative rebound may emerge. Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com Tactical Recommendations Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations
Executive Summary China’s Property Market: Signs Of Improvement?
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
The slump in China’s property market is nearing its cyclical end. The accelerated policy easing in the housing sector should lift the sector out of deep contraction and put it on its recovery path in the second half of this year. Policy easing had supported a quick and strong recovery in Chinese property demand during 2H2020, following the first COVID wave to hit China. This time, however, with the “three red lines” policy still in place and depressed household income growth, we expect only a moderate year-on-year growth (4-6%) in property sales during 2H2022. Chinese construction activity will also revive slightly, based on a mild recovery in project completions in 2H2022. Chinese property developers’ stocks could still have some downside in absolute terms before the pandemic situation in China stabilizes. Bottom Line: Chinese real estate market is still facing downside risks in the near term. However, accelerated policy easing from both the central government and local governments may result in a moderate recovery in Chinese property market in 2H2022. Feature Chart 1China Property Sector Woes
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
China’s aggressive housing-sector deleveraging campaign since late 2020 has triggered turmoil in the country’s property market, while this year’s COVID-induced lockdowns have exacerbated the slump. Property sales, starts, completions as well as home prices are all in deep contraction (Chart 1). Is a demand recovery on the way and how strong will it be? Compared with the 2020 episode, we believe that this time it will take longer to restore homebuyer confidence and the strength of the recovery will be considerably weaker. In 2H2020, to stimulate a pandemic-hit domestic property market, the Chinese authorities announced a set of supportive policies to encourage housing demand as well as to help domestic home developers overcome their extreme funding shortages. This led to an 11% year-on-year (YOY) growth in property sales during 2H2020. Although this year housing-sector policies have loosened more than they did in 1H2020, demand for housing has been sluggish and real estate developers’ propensity to take on more leverage and to invest has fallen to a multi-year low. The “three red lines” policy applied to property developers as well as the lending constraints imposed on banks remain in place. Furthermore, China’s zero-COVID policy will likely lead to rolling lockdowns and frequent disruptions to the economy, depressing household income growth, which has fallen over the past two years. Hence, assuming that the COVID-induced full lockdowns in China’s large cities are lifted before the end of May (COVID cases in China have gradually come down in the past couple of weeks), we expect only a moderate pickup in home sales in the second half of this year – about 4-6% YOY growth –about half of that in 2H2020. In terms of China’s housing-related construction activity, we believe it will only recover slightly in 2H2022, in line with our projection of a modest rebound in home completion. Chart 2China’s Housing Demand: Structural Headwinds
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
As we discussed in previous reports, China’s housing demand is facing major structural headwinds, as demand for properties in China has already entered a saturation phase and the country’s working-age population (15-64 years of age) is shrinking (Chart 2). Despite short-term measures to stabilize the property market, China’s top leadership will likely stick to their overarching “housing is for living not for speculation” policy mantra and continue to make efforts to reduce the housing sector’s share in the economy. As such, our longer-term view on the Chinese property market remains negative. A Mild Recovery In Home Sales Chart 3The Recovery of Chinese Property Market Relies On Home Sales
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
Home sales, which contributed to at least 50% of Chinese property developers’ funding, hold the key to the recovery of the Chinese property market (Chart 3). The core of the ongoing crisis in China’s housing market is Chinese property developers’ increasingly constrained financing due to rapidly falling home sales as well as stringent deleveraging policies. We expect a 4-6% annual growth in Chinese property sales (i.e. floor space sold in square meters) in the second half of this year. While this is a significant improvement from the 15% contraction in the past two quarters, the projected rebound will be much more muted than the 11% growth in 2H2020 and the 23% rebound in the 2016 housing-market recovery. In 2020, Chinese property sales tanked 40% YOY during January-February. After a flurry of supportive policiestook effect in March-April, the growth in home sales on a YOY basis turned positive in May 2020 and jumped to 11%YOY for the period of July-December 2020. Chart 4Slowing Household Disposable Income
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
While we think an acceleration in housing-market stimulus1 may be able to spur some rebound in demand for housing in the second half of this year, notably, economic fundamentals and household sentiment have both turned much less favorable this year than in 2020. COVID-related restrictions have exacerbated matters and have weighed heavily on the demand for housing. The growth rate of national disposable income per capita slowed by more than two percentage points (in nominal terms) in Q1 this year from the pre-pandemic era (Chart 4). Moreover, the PBoC’s quarterly urban depositor survey in Q1 showed subdued confidence in future household income (Chart 5). Household willingness to save also hit a record high and this sentiment is even more elevated than it was in early 2020; on the other hand, the propensity to invest has dropped to a multi-year low (Chart 6). Chart 5Subdued Confidence In Future Household ##br##Income
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
Chart 6More Chinese Households Intend To Save Rather Than Invest
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
There are some early signs that demand for housing, including pent-up demand that has been curbed by the ongoing COVID-induced full and partial lockdowns in China’s major cities, may see some modest rebound in 2H2022: Chart 7Banks Can Moderately Loosen Up Their Lending To The Property Sector
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
First, banks may be slowly increasing their lending to the real estate sector while complying with the real estate loan concentration management regulations (Chart 7). Second, household willingness to buy homes, although still significantly lower than a year ago, is improving somewhat. According to the Survey And Research Center For China Household Finance, the proportion of households planning to buy a house has been increasing, albeit moderately for two consecutive quarters (Chart 8). Third, we expect local governments to roll out more aggressive measures to stimulate housing demand. Land sales account for the lion’s share of the local government’s revenue but the developers’ land purchase has contracted (Chart 9). Against this backdrop, local governments will likely accelerate the implementation of supportive policies. Chart 8More Households Plan To Buy A House
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
Chart 9Local Governments Will Likely Push For More Supportive Policies To Boost Land Sales
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
Bottom Line: Property sales are likely to grow by 4-6%YOY during 2H2022. Will Developers’ Funding Conditions Improve? Real estate developers’ funding conditions are likely to improve modestly in the rest of 2022 , mainly due to improved property sales, from what was an extremely dire situation in 2H21 (Chart 3 on page 4). Property development is an asset-heavy and capital-intensive business, and the government-led deleveraging mandate and depressed home sales have massively curtailed cash flows to homebuilders. Chart 10Chinese Real Estate Investment: A Breakdown Of Funding Source
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
Chinese homebuilders generally have several ways to finance themselves. Chart 10 shows a breakdown of the source of Chinese real estate investment funding, with 12% of the total funding from domestic and foreign loans, 33% from a self-raised fund through bond and equity issuances, or retained earnings, 37% from deposits and advanced payments (e.g., down payments), and 16% from homebuyers’ mortgages in 2021. Other than some modest rebound in home sales, property developers’ alternative cash flows – which account for the other 50% of their funding – will remain under constraint for the following reasons: Regulations on leveraging among property developers have not loosened much. The “three red line" policy, implemented in July 2020, has limited Chinese property developers’ borrowing capacity and has so far remained firmly in place. Under this policy, homebuilders who breach none of the three red lines can only increase their interest-bearing borrowing by 15% at most, while failing to meet all three “red lines” may result in them being cut off from access to new loans from banks. The lending ceilings imposed on banks − the real estate loan concentration management system– which came into effect on 1 January 2021, also remain in place. Due to these stringent rules, Chart 11 shows the year-on-year growth of loans to real estate developers had dropped to zero in Q3 2021 from the 25% growth in Q3 2018. As these rules are critical to containing the high leverage of the Chinese property market from evolving into a systemic risk, the Chinese authorities are unlikely to radically change them (Chart 12). Chart 11More Loans To Property Developers, Albeit Capped By A Lending Ceiling
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
Chart 12Chinese Homebuilders’ Leverage Is Still High
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
Chart 13The Increase In Self-raising Funds Will Be Limited This Yea
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
Self-raised funds through bond and equity issuance also account for a large share of the Chinese real estate investment funding source. The recent riot in China’s stock market and the crisis in the offshore corporate bond market made such methods of raising fund less favorable. Indeed, self-raised funds have been in contraction since last September when the Evergrande default shocked investors (Chart 13). We do not see a sizeable increase in self-raised funds this year. Bottom Line: Developers’ funding conditions are likely to improve only moderately in 2H2022 as property sales see a mild rebound. The other sources of funding will continue to be constrained by the deleveraging policy. What About Housing-Related Construction Activity? China’s housing-related construction activity will revive slightly in 2H2022. Property developers may accelerate completion of their existing projects, while the deep contraction in housing starts will likely narrow in 2H22. Chart 14Homebuilders Need To Deliver Their Unfinished Projects
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
In recent years, Chinese real estate developers have raised funds by selling more newly started buildings instead of completed properties. This resulted in a divergence between property sales and completions, suggesting that there is a considerable inventory of pre-sold but unfinished projects (Chart 14). With more funding available, mainly from property sales, and to a lesser extent from bank lending, property developers will likely speed up the construction of those pre-sold but unfinished buildings. We expect property completions to grow 2-4% YOY in 2H2022, based on the following observations: The authorities repeatedly emphasized that property developers should meet their obligations by finishing and delivering their pre-sold but unfinished properties on time. They also have fine-tuned policies to support building completions by developers. New policies announced in February 2022 stated that property developers must prioritize those properties from which they have received pre-sale funds such as down payments. Meanwhile, odds are that the growth rate of property starts will stop falling in 2H2022. However, it will remain in contraction. Once property developers have some financing from property sales, they will tend to purchase land and start construction of new properties in order to generate revenue from presold properties. However, with deleveraging polices still in place, homebuilders can only increase their property starts to some extent. Some early signs of bottoming in land sales may be emerging (Chart 15). The uptick in land sales, although very small, may suggest that the deep contraction in the indicator has come to an end. Since late last year, state-owned property developers have been the main land buyers as private property developers were in a severe shortage of financing. This year, improving home sales and increasing bank lending may allow these private developers to return to the land acquisition market. Land sale transactions are highly correlated with housing starts (Chart 16). The improvement in land sales, if sustained into the coming months, suggests housing starts will improve somewhat in 2H2022. Chart 15Land Sales May Be Bottoming
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
Chart 16Land Sales Are Highly Correlated With Housing Starts
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
Chart 17Housing-related Construction Activity Will Likely Revive Moderately In 2H2022
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
Bottom Line: Housing-related construction activity will likely revive moderately on a mild recovery in project completions (Chart 17). Investment Implications Given the negative forces from rolling lockdowns and low homebuyer confidence in the property market, property developers’ stocks (both investable and A-share) could have more downside in the near term (Chart 18). In relative terms, property developers’ stocks (both investable and A-share) have outperformed their respective benchmarks (Chart 19). We are doubtful that this outperformance in property developers’ stocks will develop into a cyclical or structural bull markert since our overall outlook for the real estate sector remains downbeat beyond next 6-9 months. Chart 18Chinese Property Developers’ Stocks: No Bottom Yet Both In Absolute Terms…
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
Chart 19…And Relative To Benchmarks
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
Chart 20Neutral On Prices Of Construction-related Commodities For Now
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
China’s Property Market: Moderate Recovery Ahead
Commodity prices have already been rising significantly across the board. Even though we expect a slight pickup in China’s real estate construction activity in the remainder of this year, the improvement will be only marginally positive for the country’s demand for construction-related commodities. As such, our view on the price of construction-related commodities (steel, cement, and glass) in the rest of 2022 remains neutral (Chart 20). Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 By April 29, nearly 100 cities had rolled out favorable policies such as lowering down payment ratio, relaxing curbs on home purchases or offering subsidies or even giving out cash to homebuyers. In addition, banks in more than 100 cities have cut mortgage rates ranging between 20 basis points and 60 basis points. Strategic Themes Cyclical Recommendations
Executive Summary Ingredients For A Policy Mistake
Ingredients For A Policy Mistake
Ingredients For A Policy Mistake
The hawks on the European Central Bank Governing Council have become vocal about a July rate hike. Such a move would be a policy mistake because European growth is weak, while inflation is supply-driven and will soften meaningfully. July 2022 hike is not yet certain. A policy mistake suggests that the current interest rate pricing for June 23 is too aggressive. Buy June 2023 Euribor contract. The serious risk of a policy mistake and the uncertainty surrounding Europe’s energy security confirm that investors should maintain a defensive stance in European assets. The pronounced threats to UK growth warrant a negative view on the pound. Recommendation INCEPTION DATE RETURN SINCE INCEPTION (%) COMMENT Buy June 2023 Euribor contract 05/09/2022 Bottom Line: Stay defensive in Europe. The risk of a policy mistake is high. Only when inflation peaks should investors move into cyclical stocks. In recent weeks, a chorus of ECB hawks expressed the need to increase rates as early as July 2022. Inflation data is on their side; HICP stands at 7.5% and core CPI has reached 3.5%, levels never seen since the introduction of the euro. Markets are responding. The ESTR curve is pricing in a positive ECB deposit rate for the October 2022 Governing Council meeting. We need to examine the underlying European economic picture to address two key questions: Will the ECB lift rates as early as July? And will doing so constitute a policy mistake that would hurt European assets? Weaker Growth Let’s start with the growth outlook. European economic activity is rapidly deteriorating. Real GDP growth in the Eurozone has slowed markedly. In Q1, real GDP growth fell to 0.2% quarter-on-quarter or an annualized rate of 0.8%. Worrisomely, Italy’s GDP contracted by -0.2% over that time frame and the very economically sensitive Swedish activity contracted by -0.4%, which suggests that Europe’s deceleration is only starting. Soft data confirm the flagging economic outlook on the continent. Consumer confidence is plunging to levels that are consistent with a recession, led by the collapse in the willingness to make large purchases (Chart 1, top panel). The ZEW as well as the Ifo survey confirm that growth expectations point to a very large decline in output (Chart 1, bottom panel). The weakness is also evident in hard data. High inflation erodes real household income, which squeezes consumer spending. Retail sales across Europe are slowing sharply, only growing at an annual rate of 0.8% while contracting -0.4% on a monthly basis; on a level basis, they are lower today than they were in June 2021. Meanwhile, German retail sales volumes are falling at a -5.4% annual rate. The situation is even worse for new car registrations, which are collapsing at an annual rate of 20.2% (Chart 2). Chart 1Soft Data Point To Soft Growth...
Soft Data Point To Soft Growth...
Soft Data Point To Soft Growth...
Chart 2...So Do Hard Data
...So Do Hard Data
...So Do Hard Data
Industrial production has not been spared. Euro Area IP softened to 2% annually in February and contractions are now visible in Germany and France. Some of this weakness reflects supply difficulties, but the -3.1% annual fall in German factory orders indicates that demand is frail too and that industrial production will shrink further in the months ahead (Chart 2, bottom panel). The deterioration in the global outlook further hurts Europe economic prospects. Our global growth tax indicator, based on energy prices, the dollar, and global bond yields, points toward a further deceleration in the global and US manufacturing PMI, it suggests Euro Area PMIs could fall below 50 (Chart 3). China woes continue to reverberate throughout the global economy. Potential supply constraints will hurt industrial production, but, more importantly, the weakness in China’s marginal propensity to consume (as measured by the gap between the growth rate of M1 relative to M2) predicts a much greater deterioration in European industrial orders, which means that the demand for European capital goods will slow (Chart 3, bottom panel). Chart 3Risks To The Downside
Risks To The Downside
Risks To The Downside
Chart 4Tightening Financial Conditions
Tightening Financial Conditions
Tightening Financial Conditions
European financial conditions are also tightening significantly. The iTraxx Crossover Index is rising swiftly. European high-yield corporate spreads are now above 450bps, levels that coincide with past recessions in the Euro Area (Chart 4). Government bond markets are increasingly under duress too. Italian BTPs now yield close to 200bps above German Bunds (Chart 4, bottom panel), which accentuates the periphery’s pain. Bottom Line: The Eurozone economy is slowing sharply. While Q1 GDP avoided a contraction, soft and hard data indicators suggest that Q2 is likely to record an actual output contraction for the whole Euro bloc. High Inflation, But For How Long? At first glance, European inflation numbers scream for an ECB rate hike, preferably one yesterday. However, the picture is not that clear-cut. Supply factors predominantly drive the Eurozone’s inflation surge. Chart 5 highlights the role of energy, utilities, food, and transportation costs in the HICP and shows that these factors account for more than 80% of the 7.5% HICP rate. Moreover, the fluctuations in energy CPI continue to explain most of the gyration in headline CPI. The close relationship between energy CPI and core CPI highlights an elevated degree of pass-though, the result of higher electricity and transportation costs (Chart 6). Chart 5Energy, Food And Transport Dominate European CPI
An ECB Policy Mistake And Your Portfolio
An ECB Policy Mistake And Your Portfolio
Chart 6All About Energy
All About Energy
All About Energy
Chart 7No Demand Pull-Inflation In Europe
No Demand Pull-Inflation In Europe
No Demand Pull-Inflation In Europe
Unlike those in the US, Euro Area underlying inflation drivers are weak and inconsistent with demand-pull inflation. Wage growth in Europe stands at a paltry 1.6% annual rate, while in the US, the Atlanta Fed Wage Tracker has jumped to 4.5% (Chart 7, top panel). Moreover, Eurozone rent inflation remains stable at 1.2%, while it is a very elevated 4.5% in the US (Chart 7, bottom panel). The bifurcation in demand-driven inflation reflects vastly different output gaps between the two regions. US nominal GDP stands 2.5% above its 2014-2019 trend, while that of the Eurozone is still 5.3% below it. In the consumer durable goods sector, where the US experienced the greatest demand-supply mismatch – and therefore, the greatest inflation pressures – purchases are 25% above their 2014-2019 trend, while in Europe, they are still 9.5% below that trend (Chart 8) Year-on-year inflation prints should roll over this summer, as highlighted by weakening sequential inflation. Even if it remains elevated, the monthly Trimmed Mean CPI peaked last year. Energy inflation, moreover, is already contracting on a month-to-month basis (Chart 9). Chart 8Mind The Output Gap
Mind The Output Gap
Mind The Output Gap
Chart 9Weakening Sequential Inflation
Weakening Sequential Inflation
Weakening Sequential Inflation
Chart 10A Naive Inflation Forecast
A Naive Inflation Forecast
A Naive Inflation Forecast
Simple simulation exercises also confirm that annual inflation will peak this summer (Chart 10). Monthly headline inflation averaged 0.11% from 2010 to 2019, 0.31% in the first half of 2021, and 0.55% from mid-2021 to January 2022. If we assume that monthly inflation prints remain in line with its most recent average, annual inflation will peak by year-end at 9.1%, before falling to 6.8% by April 2023. However, if monthly inflation falls back to an historically elevated monthly average of 0.31%, annual headline inflation will peak in September and fall back to 3.8% by April 2023. Similarly, if monthly core CPI averages 0.28%, annual core CPI will peak in October before declining to 3.4% by April 2023, but it will fall to 2.1% by April 2023, if monthly core CPI averages an historically elevated 0.17%, or the average observed in the first half of 2021 (Chart 10, bottom two panels). Chart 11A Conditional Inflation Forecast
A Conditional Inflation Forecast
A Conditional Inflation Forecast
A more sophisticated exercise based on energy prices and the EUR/USD exchange rate also underlines the downside for Euro Area headline inflation. Energy inflation, which drives headline CPI, closely tracks the evolution of brent prices in euro terms and Deutsch natural gas prices. Assuming that natural gas prices average the historically very high level of €100/MWh over the next twelve months, that Brent averages US$95/bbl over that time frame (consistent with BCA’s commodity and energy team forecasts), and that the euro progressively moves back to EUR/USD1.10 by April 2023 (a weaker expectation than BCA’s Foreign Exchange Strategy team anticipates), then the Eurozone’s energy inflation will collapse to -10% by April 2023 (Chart 11). We can also assume that Russia enacts a full energy embargo on Western Europe if Sweden and Finland apply for NATO membership. In this case, Brent would spike quickly to $140/bbl and natural gas to €250/MWh. In our scenario, prices stay elevated for two months, before they ultimately normalize by early 2023. Under this scenario, energy inflation would experience a spike to 80% (!) in June 2022 before falling back sharply. In all cases, the collapse in energy inflation is consistent with a rapid decline in headline inflation toward 2% in 2023. Bottom Line: European inflation is elevated but remains mainly driven by supply factors, particularly the evolution of energy inflation. Demand-pull inflation is minimal, unlike that in the US. Additionally, both core and headline inflations are set to peak in the coming months based on the evolution of sequential monthly inflation as well as the behavior of the energy market. A July ECB rate hike would constitute a policy mistake for three reasons: (i) the ECB has no control over supply-driven inflation; (ii) Eurozone inflation is set to weaken; and (iii) economic growth will remain poor. Investment Implications Despite the noise made by the hawks, a large amount of uncertainty around the July 2022 meeting’s outcome remains. It is easy to forget that the ECB’s decisions are consensual. Influential members such as Vice-President Luis de Guindos continues to see a July 2022 hike as possible but unlikely. Others, such as Executive Board member Fabio Panetta, are very worried about the Eurozone’s economic slowdown. Moreover, ECB President Christine Lagarde has not endorsed the hawks. In the context of weak growth and a potential top in inflation, achieving consensus about an early summer hike could be difficult. Chart 12Patience Would Be Rewarded
Patience Would Be Rewarded
Patience Would Be Rewarded
The great paradox is that, if the ECB waits before pushing interest rates up, it will have an opportunity to increase rates durably next year. Wage growth is anemic today, but the decline in the Eurozone unemployment rate is consistent with a pickup in salaries in 2023 (Chart 12). Moreover, if energy inflation slows, the relative price-shock that is hurting households and domestic demand will ebb, which will allow consumption to recover. Patience would give Europe strength and the ECB a very strong basis to lift rates sustainably. The hawks will sway the council to their views. Inflation has latency, which means that its inertia may cause HICP to remain elevated beyond this summer. Moreover, the EU’s proposed ban on Russian oil imports along with Sweden’s and Finland’s likely accession-demand to NATO in the upcoming weeks could provoke Russia to strike first by cutting all its energy export to the EU to zero immediately. This would lift inflation for somewhat longer, as we showed in Chart 9. Related Report European Investment StrategyThe Three Forces Hurting European Earnings In response to the significant risk of a rate hike, we continue to recommend investors stay short cyclical stocks relative to defensive ones. Moreover, if the risk of a Russian energy cutoff increases, so does the threat of a severe recession in Europe, as a recent Bundesbank study posits (Chart 13). Capital preservation is paramount in today’s context; thus, we continue to lean on the side of prudence, especially considering Europe’s soft profit outlook. Once risks recede, we will abandon this strategy. This decision, however, would require clarification of Sweden and Finland’s decision about their membership in NATO as well as Russia’s response, a confirmation that the ECB is not hiking rates in July, and a pullback in inflation surprises, which would prove a powerful help for European equities and the cyclicals/defensive split (Chart 14). Chart 13The Russian Embargo Risk
An ECB Policy Mistake And Your Portfolio
An ECB Policy Mistake And Your Portfolio
Chart 14Wait For Inflation To Turn
Wait For Inflation To Turn
Wait For Inflation To Turn
In fact, our view that inflation will peak leads to direct implications for European markets. The periods that followed the previous four peaks in European core inflation were associated with an outperformance of small-cap stocks and cyclical stocks over the subsequent six and twelve months as well as declines in German yields and narrower credit spreads (Table 1A). The sectoral implications were not as clear, but industrials enjoyed an edge, while healthcare stocks suffered marked declines. Our conviction is strongest that energy CPI will fall. Again, this environment is associated with an outperformance of small-caps stocks and cyclicals over the following six months (Table 1B). Sector-wise, energy names suffer in this climate along with defensives, especially communication services equities. Table 1APeaks In Core CPI & Subsequent European Asset Performance
An ECB Policy Mistake And Your Portfolio
An ECB Policy Mistake And Your Portfolio
Table 1BPeaks In Energy CPI & Subsequent European Asset Performance
An ECB Policy Mistake And Your Portfolio
An ECB Policy Mistake And Your Portfolio
Looking at this period of disinflation more broadly rather than just following peaks in inflation, we find similar results. Declining core CPI is associated with an outperformance of cyclicals relative to defensives as well as strength in small-cap equities (Table 2A). This larger sample allows for a clearer view of sectors. Specifically, the performance of industrials and tech relative to the broad market improves markedly, while utilities suffer greatly. We reach roughly similar conclusions when energy CPI is contracting, except that, in this instance, energy stocks also underperform (Table 2B). Interestingly, so do financial companies. This is a surprising result, but previous instances of weaker energy CPI in the sample reflected weaker demand, not an evolving supply shock. Weaker aggregate demand always hurts financials. Table 2ADisinflation & Subsequent European Asset Performance
An ECB Policy Mistake And Your Portfolio
An ECB Policy Mistake And Your Portfolio
Table 2BEnergy Deflation & Subsequent European Asset Performance
An ECB Policy Mistake And Your Portfolio
An ECB Policy Mistake And Your Portfolio
Bottom Line: The risk of a policy mistake at the July ECB meeting is elevated. A policy mistake suggests that the current interest rate pricing for June 23 is too aggressive. Buy June 2023 Euribor contract. Moreover, Russian energy exports are still under threat. Accordingly, we continue to emphasize capital preservation and favor defensives over cyclicals. However, a buying opportunity will emerge rapidly once inflation peaks, especially if the ECB follows our base case. At this point, investors should buy small-cap and cyclical stocks. Industrials will beat energy, while all the defensive sectors will suffer. The BoE’s Tough Choice The Bank of England is stuck between a rock and a hard place. UK inflation shares characteristics of that of both the Eurozone and the US. On the one hand, energy inflation is increasing and could push headline CPI into double-digit territory around October 2022, once fuel subsidies fully expire. On the other hand, wage growth is strong as labor supply elasticity declined after Brexit. Demand-pull inflation is also rampant, which has pushed core CPI to a 5.7% annual rate. The UK’s cost push inflation, along with the growth slowdown in Europe and increasing tax rates are likely to cause a recession in the UK over the coming twelve months. The demand-pull inflation, however, will force the BoE to hike interest rates. This accentuates the downside risk to UK economic activity. Chart 15BoE's First Victim: The Pound
BoE's First Victim: The Pound
BoE's First Victim: The Pound
The obvious victim of this configuration is the pound. Weak growth will prevent the BoE from matching the pace of rate hikes of the Fed and poor economic growth will detract from investments in the UK. As a result, we see further downside in GBP/USD (Chart 15). BCA’s FX strategy team is also selling the pound versus the euro. This position is likely to generate further gains as investors will revise down their views for UK economic activity relative to the Euro Area, since they already hold much more dire expectations for the latter than the former. Bottom Line: EUR/GBP possesses more upside. The growth outlook for the Eurozone is poor, but investors currently overestimate the growth path of the UK relative to that of its southern neighbor. Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com Tactical Recommendations Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations
Executive SummaryIn this report, we look at recent macroeconomic developments through the lens of the business cycle, inflation, and Treasury yield regimes to select winning sectors and styles.The US economy is currently in the slowdown stage of the business cycle, with all of its hallmark attributes, such as slowing growth, elevated inflation, and rising rates.We find that, despite being a real asset, equity performance deteriorates when inflation is on the rise. However, once inflation goes past its apex, the equity rebound is swift.During periods when both inflation and rates are rising, the Energy and Materials sectors tend to outperform, while the Financials and Consumer Discretionary sectors lag.The market is currently in a “high inflation and rising rates” regime but is about to transition to the “inflation is high but falling” regime, and today’s winners may turn into tomorrow’s losers. The new winners are likely to be the Financials, Consumer Discretionary, and Technology sectors.Bottom Line: As inflationary regimes shift, investors can tilt the odds of positive returns in their favor by taking a granular approach to sector selection.
We Are In High Inflation / Rising Rates Regime
We Are In High Inflation / Rising Rates Regime
So far, 2022 has not been a welcoming year for investors. All at once, slowing growth, surging inflation, impending monetary tightening, soaring energy prices, lockdowns in China, and a war in the heart of Europe have been thrown at them.With so much happening, it is difficult to separate signal from noise in the cross-currents of economic data. To make sense of the markets, we will look at recent developments through the lens of macroeconomic regimes, focusing on the stages of the business cycle, level and change in inflation, and the direction of Treasury yields.The Business Cycle Is In A Slowdown StageThe business cycle is a cornerstone of any investment decision as it underpins the fundamentals, and preordains the types of assets likely to outperform based on their level of risk and sensitivity to economic growth. The stage of the business cycle is a succinct way to summarize a wide range of economic data, such as capacity utilization, growth, policy, credit conditions, and valuation (Table 1). Table 1Business Cycle Is In A Slowdown Stage
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
While we are barraged with somewhat contradictory economic data, it is still fair to say that we are currently in the middle of the slowdown stage of the business cycle. Our proprietary business cycle indicator, constructed from a mix of soft and hard data across multiple economic dimensions, is trending down, consistent with that position (Chart 1). Furthermore:Growth is slowing, albeit off high levels, and the most recent disappointing ISM PMI is just another case in point. More concerning is that the new orders-to-inventories ratio has plunged (Chart 2);Unemployment is at a 2-year low of 3.6%, and there are currently two job openings per job seeker;Capacity utilization is high;Inflation is elevated;The Fed has commenced a monetary tightening cycle. Chart 1Economic Growth Is Slowing
Business Cycle Is In A Slowdown Stage
Business Cycle Is In A Slowdown Stage
Chart 2ISM PMI Disappointed
ISM PMI Disappointed
ISM PMI Disappointed
As such, during slowdown stage of a business cycle, returns tend to be lower than during recovery and expansion, while volatility is elevated (Chart 3).Chart 3During A Slowdown, Equity Returns Are Paltry, While Volatility Is Elevated
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
If equities are set to deliver pedestrian returns, we need to be more discerning in our sector and style selection. In an environment of slowing growth, growth stocks, large caps, and defensives tend to outperform (Chart 4). However, we have all observed that Growth has not fared that well due to rapidly rising interest rates and soaring inflation. In order to better understand the implication of the macroeconomic backdrop for equities, we need to drill further down into the inflation and interest-rate regimes.Chart 4During A Slowdown, Quality, Growth, And Defensives Outperform
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
Inflation And Rates RegimesHigh Inflation: Then And NowThe recent spike in inflation came as a shock to most money managers – the last time inflation hit this level was in the 1980s, which predated their investment careers.In the wake of major oil shocks, oil prices quadrupled in 1973-74 and doubled in 1979-80. The combination of high inflation with weak economic growth, fueled by repeated supply shocks, gave rise to the phenomenon of “stagflation”, i.e., soaring inflation accompanied by stagnating economic growth and high unemployment.The high inflation we are living through now was brought about by the pandemic, which ushered in unprecedented fiscal and monetary easing, soaring demand for consumer goods, and a disrupted global supply chain. More recently, inflation has been further exacerbated by the indirect effects of the war in Ukraine, such as skyrocketing energy, food, and materials prices. Despite the challenges of the current period, economic growth is still robust, and unemployment is at historically low levels. Energy and materials prices have soared, but not to the same extent as in the 1970s. And while economic growth is slowing, and stagflation is a risk, it is hardly inevitable.To ensure a more precise study of the sector and style analysis, we will separate the 1970-1984 period and look at it as a template for the performance of equities during a stagflation regime. We will use the 1984 to 2022 period to analyze sector performance during more ordinary inflation regimes.Equities Hate ItEquities are a real asset and, theoretically, should not be affected by inflation – sales and earnings growth are reported in nominal terms, and underlying economic growth is, by far, more important than inflation.Of course, reality is often different from theory, and businesses hate inflation: Not only do they have difficulty budgeting and planning ahead, but they are also often not able to convert sales growth into earnings growth, i.e., their costs may grow faster than their revenues. According to the most recent NFIB survey, 31% of small businesses consider inflation their biggest problem compared to 1-2% in 2019.In addition, high inflation is a harbinger of a hawkish Fed and rising interest rates. Hence, on balance, high inflation is bad news for equities (Chart 5). As inflation climbs, equity returns decline, as multiples contract in anticipation of lower earnings and higher discount rates (Chart 6). Chart 5Equities Underperform In A High-Inflation Environment
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
Chart 6High Inflation Leads To Multiple Contraction
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
Investing In Periods Of High-Inflation And Rising RatesHigh inflation is often accompanied by rising rates both because of strong economic growth and imminent monetary tightening which aims to arrest growth to combat inflation. As a result, high inflation comes hand in hand with elevated risk aversion and the repricing of more economically sensitive areas of the market.Indeed, when inflation is high (>3.5%) and rates are rising, median three-month equity returns are outright negative, and positive three-months returns occur less than 50% of the time (Chart 7). To beat the market, we need to tilt the return distribution in our favor.Chart 7We Are In High Inflation / Rising Rates Regime
We Are In High Inflation / Rising Rates Regime
We Are In High Inflation / Rising Rates Regime
When inflation is elevated (above 3.5%) and Treasury yields are climbing, the most appropriate portfolio stance is a tilt toward all-weather defensive sectors like Consumer Staples and Health Care, which hold their own in an environment of slowing growth, as well as sectors that command significant pricing power (Chart 8). The following is a brief summary of the winners and losers. Chart 8Sector Performance In High Inflation / Rising Rates Regime
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
High Inflation/Rising Rate WinnersEnergy: High oil prices are often one of the culprits behind runaway inflation, with the exception of the mid-1980s episode when Saudi Arabia drowned the world in oil, causing a collapse in oil prices, while inflation was on the rise. The energy sector has significant pricing power as it is upstream of the supply chain and can pass on costs to customers (Chart 9). This sector also benefits from high operating leverage. Outperformance usually peaks when inflation turns.Health Care: Health Care stocks tend to outperform when overall consumer prices advance. The non-cyclical nature of health care services reflects their resilience against economic volatility, irrespective of the direction of pricing pressures (Chart 10). Over the past few years, health care companies have struggled, mostly because of the pressure exerted on pharma by hospitals, insurers, and the government. However, recently, the sector’s pricing power has turned because of pent-up demand for medical procedures. Chart 9The Energy Sector Wields Significant Pricing Power
The Energy Sector Wields Significant Pricing Power
The Energy Sector Wields Significant Pricing Power
Chart 10Pricing Power Of The Health Care Sector Has Picked Up Thanks To Pent-up Demand
Pricing Power Of The Health Care Sector Has Picked Up Thanks To Pent-up Demand
Pricing Power Of The Health Care Sector Has Picked Up Thanks To Pent-up Demand
Consumer Staples: Historically, Consumer Staples have outperformed during periods of high inflation (Chart 11). Just like Health Care, this is a non-cyclical sector, because the demand for necessities is inelastic. While this sector is experiencing challenges because of the rising prices of raw materials, it is able to pass on its costs to customers, who have to allocate an increasing share of their budget to necessities. It has also helped multinationals in the S&P 500 index, as they invest in brand building, which now aids them to differentiate their offerings even when consumers are under duress.Utilities: Utilities is another quintessential defensive sector, with a stable revenue stream, significant pricing power, and profitability controlled by the regulators. Of course, one might argue that this is a highly leveraged sector which may be hurt by rising borrowing costs. However, it fares well, as regulators have a target return-on-investment for utilities companies, thus allowing them to raise prices to offset rising costs. Furthermore, with high inflation, long-term debt is smaller in real terms. Chart 11Consumer Staples Companies Have Invested In Brand-building
Consumer Staples Companies Have Invested In Brand-building
Consumer Staples Companies Have Invested In Brand-building
High Inflation/Rising Rates LosersConsumer Discretionary companies underperform in an environment of high and rising inflation as inflation reduces consumers’ purchasing power and forces them to shift spending away from discretionary goods and services, and toward necessities. The high negative correlation of the sector with the Consumer Drag Indicator is a case in point (Chart 12). Further, rising interest rates often follow high inflation, and weigh on demand for durable goods that require financing.Financials: High inflation is a headwind for the sector because monetary tightening which follows on the heels of high inflation tends to flatten the yield curve, affecting banks’ Net Income Margins (NIM), or the spread between loans and deposits. Inflation also hurts S&P Financials due to the mismatch between bank assets and liabilities. A typical bank has longer maturity for its assets (loans) than for its liabilities (deposits). Consequently, as inflation rises, this reduces the future net inflow because creditors demand higher interest rates, while the returns earned by the bank on its current loan book are mostly fixed by existing contracts. Chart 12Raging Inflation Cuts Into Consumers' Discretionary Spending
Raging Inflation Cuts Into Consumers' Discretionary Spending
Raging Inflation Cuts Into Consumers' Discretionary Spending
Inflation Will Turn Soon (Hopefully), And So Will Sector PerformanceInflation is likely to fade somewhat over the coming quarters, as supply chains normalize, and consumer demand wanes because of saturation and elevated prices. Arithmetic will also help, i.e., the base effect will kick in. Also, aggressive monetary policy is likely to slow economic growth and demand for labor further. With all of that, inflation will trend down but will reach the elusive 2% only years from now.However, when it comes to inflation, it is both the level of inflation and the direction of change that matter. While, overall, high inflation is bad for equities, it is necessary to differentiate between “inflation high and rising” and “inflation high and falling” regimes (Chart 13). As such, it is likely that we are about to shift into the “inflation is above 3.5% but falling” regime, where the median three-month return is 3.0% and returns are positive 69% of the time. We do anticipate a rebound in equities once the tighter monetary regime is priced in, and inflation shows signs of abating.Chart 13When Inflation Turns, Equities Will Rebound
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
With the Fed assuming an active role, we believe that going forward, equity returns will be more of a function of the monetary tightening cycle than of inflation. However, falling inflation readings may slow the pace of monetary tightening, or even put the Fed on hold.According to our analysis of sector performance in the “inflation is above 3.5% and is falling” regime, Energy and Materials will be the first sectors to reverse recent gains. The Consumer Discretionary sector is likely to rebound as pressure on consumer purses eases. Financials will also be among sectors that outperform in this regime, since fading inflation will help with asset/liability management. Consumer Staples and Health Care are likely to keep their outperformance going as inflation will continue to be an issue.Last, while empirical analysis does not show that the Technology sector outperforms when inflation is falling, we believe this will be the case based on the simple assumption that falling inflation will imply a lower discount rate (Chart 14). In this regime, we also anticipate a rotation from Value to Growth, and from Large to Small (Chart 15). Chart 14New Inflation Regime Will Usher In New Winners
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
Chart 15Changes In Inflation Regimes Brought About Market Rotations
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
Stagflation: Magnifying Glass On The 1970sStagflation, along with a recession, is now on investors’ minds – concern about the Fed making a policy mistake. After all, the Fed is already behind the curve, and it is hard to put the inflation genie back into the bottle. What would happen then?In this case, just as in the 1970s, we will see continued growth slowdown accompanied by raging inflation (Chart 16). Back then, equities pulled back every time inflation was on the rise (Chart 17), with Energy, Materials, and Health Care outperforming.The market rebounded at the first signs of inflation abating, reversing sector performance, and turning losers into winners, i.e., Consumer Discretionary and Real Estate started outperforming (Chart 18).Chart 16In The 1970s’ Stagflation Crushed Equities
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
Chart 17Energy And Materials Were Biggest Winners In the "Inflation High And Rising" Regime...
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
Chart 18...But They Gave Back Their Gains In "Inflation High But Falling" Regime
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities
Bottom LineWe are in a slowdown stage of the business cycle, and Quality, Defensives, and Growth are expected to outperform. However, high inflation has mixed up all the cards and sent Growth into a tailspin. High inflation is unfavorable, not only for Growth but also for equities in general, even though they are a real asset. However, investors can shift the odds of positive returns in their favor by taking a granular approach to sector selection suitable for different inflation regimes.The market is currently in a “high inflation and rising rates” regime, with Energy and Materials outperforming. However, we are about to transition into the “inflation is high but falling” regime, and today’s winners may turn into losers. Defensives is the only group which holds up across all high inflation regimes, thanks to its earnings resilience even in the face of slowing growth. Irene TunkelChief Strategist, US Equity Strategyirene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com
Chart 1
PMIs Surprise To The Downside
PMIs Surprise To The Downside
Both the US and Global PMIs surprised to the downside this week with the US ISM Manufacturing PMI printing 55.4 vs 57.6 expected. The ISM PMI fell by 1.7 points from 57.1 while its employment sub-component fell by impressive 5 points (from 56 to 50.9). Worse still, the new orders-to-inventories ratio (NOI) remains in the free fall, foreshadowing further weakness in manufacturing activity (see chart). The disappointing NOI ratio is unlikely to be a one-off anomalous print considering a backdrop of the slowing demand for durable goods, falling consumer purchasing power, and surging oil prices. The NOI ratio contraction is also reminiscent of the 2004 episode – one of the few instances when the Fed tightened monetary policy into a slowing economy. Notably, 2004 marked the peak in cyclical/defensive equities for the entire pre-GFC cycle. When it comes to portfolio positioning, weak manufacturing data validates our recent rotation away from cyclical sectors and towards defensives (please see our most recent Strategy Report for a more detailed discussion). Bottom Line: We continue to recommend investors remain cautious and add defensive exposure to reduce portfolio volatility as the global manufacturing cycle slows down.
In lieu of next week’s report, I will be presenting a webcast titled ‘The 5 Big Mispricings In The Markets Right Now, And How To Profit From Them’. I do hope you can join. Executive Summary Just as the railway timetables set in train the First World War, central bank timetables for aggressive rate hikes are setting in train a global recession. Demand is already cool, so aggressive rate hikes will take it to outright cold. The risk is elevated because central banks are desperate to repair their damaged credibility on fighting inflation, and it may be their last chance. Inflationary fears and hawkishness from central banks are weighing on bonds and stocks, and it may take some weeks, or months, for inflation fears to recede. But we could be approaching a turning point. By the summer, core inflation should be receding. Furthermore, the fractal structures of the sell-offs in both the 30-year T-bond and the tech-heavy NASDAQ index are approaching points of extreme fragility that have signalled inflection points. Fractal trading watchlist: 30-year T-bond, NASDAQ, FTSE 100 versus Euro Stoxx 50, Netherlands versus Switzerland, and Petcare (PAWZ). US Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not
US Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not
US Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not
Bottom Line: Tactically cautious, but long-term investors who do not need to time the market bottom should overweight bonds and overweight long-duration defensive equities versus short-duration cyclical equities – for example, overweight US versus non-US equities. Feature The First World War, the historian AJP Taylor famously argued, was “imposed on the statesmen of Europe by railway timetables.” Taylor proposed that the railways and their timetables were so central to troop mobilisation – and specifically, the German Schlieffen Plan – that a plan once set in motion could not be stopped. “Once started the wagons and carriages must roll remorselessly and inevitably to their predestined goal.” Otherwise, the whole process would unravel, and an opportunity to demonstrate military credibility would be lost that might never come again. Today, could a global recession be imposed upon us by central bank timetables for aggressive rate hikes? Just as it was difficult to unwind the troop mobilisation that led to the Great War, it will be difficult to back down from the aggressive rate hikes that the central banks have timetabled, at least in the near term. Otherwise, an opportunity to demonstrate inflation fighting credibility would be lost that might never come again. Just as the railway timetables set in train the First World War, central bank timetables for aggressive rate hikes may set in train another global recession. Unfortunately, central banks do not have precision weapons. Quite the contrary, monetary tightening is a blunt instrument which works by cooling overall demand. But demand is already cool, as evidenced by the contraction of the US economy in the first quarter. In their zeal to repair their damaged credibility on fighting inflation, the danger is that central banks take the economy from cool to outright cold. Granted, the US economy was dragged down by a drop in inventories and net exports. But even US domestic demand – which strips out inventories and net exports – is barely on its pre-pandemic trend (Chart I-1). Meanwhile, the euro area economy is still 5 percent below its pre-pandemic trend (Chart I-2). To reiterate, by hiking rates aggressively into economies that are at best lukewarm, central banks are risking an outright recession. Chart I-1US Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not
US Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not
US Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not
Chart I-2Euro Area Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not
Euro Area Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not
Euro Area Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not
Our Three-Point Checklist For A Recession Has Three Ticks My colleague Peter Berezin has created a three-point checklist for a recession: The build-up of an imbalance makes the economy vulnerable to downturn. A catalyst exposes this imbalance. Amplifiers exacerbate the downturn. Is there a major imbalance? You bet there is. The post-pandemic 26 percent overspend on durable goods in the US constitutes one of the greatest imbalances in economic history. Other advanced economies also experienced unprecedented binges on durable goods. The catalyst that is exposing this major imbalance is the realisation that durable goods are, well, durable. So, if you overspent on durables in 2020/21, then the risk is that you symmetrically underspend in 2022/23 (Chart I-3). The post-pandemic 26 percent overspend on durable goods in the US constitutes one of the greatest imbalances in economic history. Meanwhile, a future underspend on goods cannot be countered by an overspend on services because the consumption of services is constrained by time, opportunity, and biology. There is a limit to how often you can eat out, go to the movies, or go to the doctor (Chart I-4). Indeed, for certain services, an underspend will persist, because we have made some permanent post-pandemic changes to our lifestyles: for example, hybrid office/home working and more online shopping and online medical care. Chart I-3An Overspend On Goods Can Be Corrected By A Subsequent Underspend...
An Overspend On Goods Can Be Corrected By A Subsequent Underspend...
An Overspend On Goods Can Be Corrected By A Subsequent Underspend...
Chart I-4...But An Underspend On Services Cannot Be Corrected By A Subsequent Overspend
...But An Underspend On Services Cannot Be Corrected By A Subsequent Overspend
...But An Underspend On Services Cannot Be Corrected By A Subsequent Overspend
Finally, the amplifier that will exacerbate the downturn is monetary tightening. If central banks follow their railway timetables for aggressive rate hikes, a goods downturn will magnify into an outright recession. So, in Peter’s three-point checklist, we now have tick, tick, and tick. Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not If economic demand is at best lukewarm, then what caused the post-pandemic inflation that central banks are now fighting? The simple answer is massive fiscal stimulus combined with the equally massive shift in spending to durable goods. Locked at home and flush with government supplied cash, we couldn’t spend it on services, so we spent it on goods. This created a massive shock in the distribution of demand, out of services whose supply could easily adjust downwards, and into goods whose supply could not easily adjust upwards. For example, airlines could cut back their flights, but auto manufacturers couldn’t make more cars. So, airfares didn’t collapse but used car prices went vertical! The causality from stimulus payments to durable goods spending to core inflation is irrefutable. The causality from stimulus payments to durable goods spending to core inflation is irrefutable. The biggest surges in US durable goods spending all coincided with the government’s stimulus checks (Chart I-5). And the three separate surges in month-on-month core inflation all occurred after surges in durable goods demand (Chart I-6). As further proof, core inflation is highest in those economies where the stimulus checks and furlough schemes were the most generous – like the US and the UK. Chart I-5Stimulus Checks Caused The Surges in Durable Goods Spending
Stimulus Checks Caused The Surges in Durable Goods Spending
Stimulus Checks Caused The Surges in Durable Goods Spending
Chart I-6The Surges In Durable Goods Spending Caused The Surges In Core Inflation
The Surges In Durable Goods Spending Caused The Surges In Core Inflation
The Surges In Durable Goods Spending Caused The Surges In Core Inflation
What Does All This Mean For Investment Strategy? Our high conviction view is that the pandemic’s inflationary impulse combined with the Ukraine war will turn out to be demand-destructive, and thereby ultimately morph into a deflationary impulse. Yet central banks are all pumped up to demonstrate their inflation fighting credibility. Given that this credibility is badly damaged, it may be their last opportunity to repair it before it is shattered forever. To repeat, just as the railway timetables set in train the First World War, central bank timetables for aggressive rate hikes may set in train another global recession. That said, a recession is not inevitable. The interest rate that matters most for the economy and the markets is not the policy rate that central banks want to hike aggressively, it is the long-duration bond yield. A lower bond yield can underpin both the economy and the financial markets, just as it did during the pandemic in 2020. But to the extent that the bond market is following the real economic data, we are in a dangerous phase. Because, as is typical at an inflection point, the real data will be noisy and ambiguous. Meaning it may take some weeks, or months, for inflation fears to be trumped by growth fears. On March 10th, in Are We In A Slow-Motion Crash? we predicted: “On a tactical (3-month) horizon, the inflationary impulse from soaring energy and food prices combined with the choke on growth from sanctions will weigh on both the global economy and the global stock market. As such, bond yields could nudge higher, the global stock market has yet to reach its crisis bottom, and the US dollar will rally” That prediction proved to be spot on! Recession, or no recession, we are still in a difficult period for markets because inflationary fears and hawkishness from central banks are weighing on bonds and stocks, while buoying the US dollar. As such, tactical caution is still warranted. Fractal structures of the sell-offs in both the 30-year T-bond and the tech-heavy NASDAQ index are approaching points of extreme fragility. But we could be approaching a turning point. By the summer, core inflation should be receding. Furthermore, the fractal structures of the sell-offs in both the 30-year T-bond and the tech-heavy NASDAQ index are approaching points of extreme fragility that have reliably signalled previous inflection points (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-7The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond Is Approaching Fractal Fragility
The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond Is Approaching Fractal Fragility
The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond Is Approaching Fractal Fragility
Chart I-8The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility
The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility
The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility
The advice for long-term investors who do not need to time the market bottom is: Bonds will ultimately rally. Overweight the 30-year T-bond and the 30-year Chinese bond. Equities will be conflicted between slowing growth which will weigh on cyclical profits, and falling bond yields which will buoy long-duration valuations. Therefore, overweight long-duration defensive sectors and markets versus short-duration cyclical sectors and markets. For example, overweight US versus non-US equities. Fractal Trading Watchlist As just discussed, the sell-offs in the 30-year T-bond and the NASDAQ are approaching points of fractal fragility that have signalled previous turning points. Hence, we are adding both investments to our watchlist. Also added to our watchlist is the outperformance of the FTSE100 versus Euro Stoxx 50, and the underperformance of Netherlands versus Switzerland, both of which are approaching potential reversals. Our final addition is Petcare (PAWZ). After a stellar 2020, Petcare gave back most of its gains in 2021. But this underperformance is now approaching a point of fragility which might provide a new entry point. There are no new trades this week, but the full watchlist of investments at, or approaching, turning points is available on our website: cpt.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Watchlist: New Additions A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare
A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare
A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare
FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Vulnerable To Reversal
FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Vulnerable To Reversal
FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Vulnerable To Reversal
Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Close To Exhaustion
Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Close To Exhaustion
Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Close To Exhaustion
Chart 1The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile
The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile
The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile
Chart 2The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile
The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile
The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile
Chart 3AUD/KRW Is Vulnerable To Reversal
AUD/KRW Is Vulnerable To Reversal
AUD/KRW Is Vulnerable To Reversal
Chart 4Canada Versus Japan Is Reversing
Canada Versus Japan Is Reversing
Canada Versus Japan Is Reversing
Chart 5Canada's TSX-60's Outperformance Might Be Over
Canada's TSX-60's Outperformance Might Be Over
Canada's TSX-60's Outperformance Might Be Over
Chart 6US Healthcare Providers Vs. Software At Risk of Reversal
US Healthcare Providers Vs. Software At Risk of Reversal
US Healthcare Providers Vs. Software At Risk of Reversal
Chart 7A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis
A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis
A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis
Chart 8Biotech Is A Major Buy
Biotech Is A Major Buy
Biotech Is A Major Buy
Chart 9CAD/SEK Reversal Has Started
CAD/SEK Reversal Has Started
CAD/SEK Reversal Has Started
Chart 10Financials Versus Industrials To Reverse
Financials Versus Industrials To Reverse
Financials Versus Industrials To Reverse
Chart 11Norway's Outperformance Could End
Norway's Outperformance Could End
Norway's Outperformance Could End
Chart 12Greece's Brief Outperformance To End
Greece's Brief Outperformance To End
Greece's Brief Outperformance To End
Chart 13BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point
BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point
BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point
Chart 14The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Is Vulnerable To Reversal
The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Is Vulnerable To Reversal
The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Is Vulnerable To Reversal
Chart 15The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Started To Reverse
The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Started To Reverse
The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Started To Reverse
Chart 16Cotton's Outperformance Is Vulnerable To Reversal
Cotton's Outperformance Is Vulnerable To Reversal
Cotton's Outperformance Is Vulnerable To Reversal
Chart 17US Homebuilders' Underperformance Has Reached A Potential Turning Point
US Homebuilders' Underperformance Has Reached A Potential Turning Point
US Homebuilders' Underperformance Has Reached A Potential Turning Point
Chart 18Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Has Started To End
Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Has Started To End
Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Has Started To End
Chart 19The Rally In USD/EUR Could End
The Rally In USD/EUR Could End
The Rally In USD/EUR Could End
Chart 20The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Is Vulnerable To Reversal
The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Is Vulnerable To Reversal
The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Is Vulnerable To Reversal
Chart 21A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare
A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare
A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare
Chart 22FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Vulnerable To Reversal
FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Vulnerable To Reversal
FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Vulnerable To Reversal
Chart 23Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Close To Exhaustion
Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Close To Exhaustion
Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Close To Exhaustion
Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades
Central Bank ‘Railway Timetables’ Are Dragging Us Into Recession
Central Bank ‘Railway Timetables’ Are Dragging Us Into Recession
Central Bank ‘Railway Timetables’ Are Dragging Us Into Recession
Central Bank ‘Railway Timetables’ Are Dragging Us Into Recession
6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area
Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area
Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia
Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Executive Summary More Chinese Households Intend To Save Than To Invest
More Households Intend To Save Than To Invest
More Households Intend To Save Than To Invest
The Politburo meeting last Friday signaled that China is determined to achieve the 5.5% annual growth target set earlier this year. Policymakers vowed to accelerate the implementation of existing pro-growth measures and hinted that they may scale up stimulus due to domestic challenges and external uncertainties. However, Chinese policymakers are facing an “impossible trinity” of eliminating domestic COVID cases and avoiding an overshoot as they stimulate the economy, while trying to achieve a high rate of economic expansion. The Politburo did not mention any plans to boost income and consumption via direct fiscal transfers to households, a sector that has been a weak link in China’s economy in the past two years. China’s consumption growth and demand for housing will not recover any time soon without meaningful aids to shore up household income. Bottom Line: Policy stimulus measures announced so far fall short of what is required to lift the economy. Given constraints on household consumption and the property market, China’s economic growth is set to underwhelm and Chinese stock prices will underperform their global counterparts. China’s top leaders have pledged to provide more support to the economy. The Politburo meeting last week indicated that the 5.5% growth target set for 2022 will be maintained and stimulus measures will be accelerated. Chinese stocks in both on- and offshore markets rebounded sharply following the positive rhetoric. Related Report Emerging Markets StrategyA Whiff Of Stagflation? In our view, however, Chinese authorities are facing an “impossible trinity” as they simultaneously attempt to achieve three goals: (1) pursuing a dynamic zero-Covid policy, (2) delivering decent economic growth, and (3) not resorting to “irrigation-style” massive stimulus. The pro-growth measures announced last week by the government lack the needed elements to generate a quick and strong rebound in the economy, particularly in the household and property sectors. Hence, the rebound in Chinese stock prices will unlikely progress into a cyclical rally (over a 6- to 12-month time span). We maintain our neutral allocation in Chinese onshore stocks and an underweight stance on the MSCI China Index, within a global portfolio. An “Impossible Trinity” The messages from the Politburo meeting highlight policymakers’ determination to shore up the economy. However, the authorities are not backing away from the zero-COVID policy, which is taking a heavy toll as cities are forced into lockdown to contain outbreaks. In addition, the Politburo reiterated the housing policy principle that “housing is for living, not for speculation” and did not mention concrete measures to boost household consumption. Thus, the biggest challenge for China to achieve its growth target this year is how to normalize economic activity without resorting to another round of “irrigation-style” stimulus while keeping domestic COVID cases at bay. In an environment of frequent lockdowns, monetary and fiscal easing have limited effect as the private and household sectors are averse to taking risks. China’s zero-COVID policy comes with hefty economic costs. April’s PMI showed sharp declines in a wide range of business activities due to the prolonged lockdown in Shanghai and several other cities (Chart 1). The new orders, new export orders, and imports subindexes in the manufacturing PMI and services PMI, all fell to their lowest levels since Q1 2020 when COVID first hit China (Chart 2). Chart 1April PMIs Show Widespread Declines In Business Activities
April PMIs Show Widespread Declines In Business Activities
April PMIs Show Widespread Declines In Business Activities
Chart 2PMI Subindexes Fell To Lowest Levels Since Q1 2020
PMI Subindexes Fell To Lowest Levels Since Q1 2020
PMI Subindexes Fell To Lowest Levels Since Q1 2020
Going forward, even if China manages to avoid a Shanghai-style month-long lockdown, the dynamic zero-COVID policy will have devastating ramifications on the economy. Notably, March economic data from the city of Shenzhen, China’s technology center, suggests that even a week-long lockdown has had large impact on the local economic activity. Chart 3Severe Economic Disruptions In Shenzhen Due To A Week-Long City Lockdown
Severe Economic Disruptions In Shenzhen Due To A Week-Long City Lockdown
Severe Economic Disruptions In Shenzhen Due To A Week-Long City Lockdown
In contrast with the extensive outbreak in Shanghai, Shenzhen was able to contain its COVID cases at an early stage and endured a citywide lockdown for only one week in mid-March. However, Shenzhen’s export growth contracted by 12.8% year-on-year (YoY) in March, a stark contrast from the 14.7%YoY increase in exports on a national level. The city’s imports fell by 11.9%YoY, also significantly lower than China’s total import growth, which was flat (Chart 3). Retail sales of consumer goods in Shenzhen shrank by 1.6%YoY in March and home sales plummeted by a stunning 90%YoY during the week of March 13-20. On the national level, the Politburo has called for an acceleration in infrastructure investment through frontloading local government special purpose bonds (SPB) and fast-tracking infrastructure project approvals. However, the lack of details has created questions regarding the magnitude of incremental stimulus, or whether the stepped-up policy effort will involve an increase in SPB or a general bond quota for local governments. Chart 4Construction Activity Started Softening In March, Before Shanghai Lockdown
Construction Activity Started Softening In March, Before Shanghai Lockdown
Construction Activity Started Softening In March, Before Shanghai Lockdown
The stringent COVID containment methods will also undermine the effectiveness of China’s pro-growth measures. As expected, China’s construction activity PMI tumbled in April amid the lockdowns, but the new orders and business expectations components in the construction PMI had already started to slide in March (Chart 4, top and middle panels). Moreover, employment in the labor-intensive construction sector also declined substantially in March and April (Chart 4, bottom panel). The deterioration in these indicators is consistent with our view that even short and less draconian lockdowns spark considerable disruptions in business activities. Bottom Line: There is a low likelihood that China will deviate from its existing zero-COVID policy for the rest of this year. As such, boosting the economy via stimulus will be challenging due to frequent interruptions to economic activities. No Bazooka For Consumers China’s household consumption, which accounts for about 40% of the country’s aggregate demand, has been a weak link in the economy during the past two years. Last week’s Politburo meeting pledged to stabilize employment, create new jobs and encourage hiring from small and medium enterprises (SMEs). However, there was no mention of any large-scale fiscal transfer to households via cash or subsidy payments, which suggests that pro-consumer measures are not in the stimulus package. Chart 5Retail Sales In China Have Been The Weak Link In The Economy In The Current Cycle
Retail Sales In China Have Been The Weak Link In The Economy In The Current Cycle
Retail Sales In China Have Been The Weak Link In The Economy In The Current Cycle
China’s retail sales growth has been muted in the current business cycle, a deviation from past economic recoveries when a revival in the general economy and moderate pro-consumption stimulus helped to lift household spending growth substantially above the rate of nominal GDP expansion (Chart 5). Since the pandemic, however, government stimulus to the household sector has been insufficient to revive consumption, due to the negative impact lockdowns have on both labor market demand and the service sector activities. Compared with the US and Europe, China’s fiscal transfer to the household sector has been very limited since the first wave of COVID in early 2020 (Chart 6). Local governments handed out vouchers in Q2 2020 aimed at boosting consumption, but the amounts were dismal and have had a minimal effect on the sector. Chart 6IMF Fiscal Monitor Database: Fiscal Response To The COVID-19 Pandemic
China’s Trilemma
China’s Trilemma
Presently the RMB value in direct payments to the household sector is even smaller: some cities including Shenzhen distributed consumption vouchers ahead of the May holiday week. Nonetheless, the total value of consumption vouchers this year is estimated at around RMB 2billion. The amount, even with a multiplier effect of 3 on consumption, will be less than 0.1% of China’s monthly retail sales in nominal value. Hence, the coupons are unlikely to make any significant difference to the aggregate household spending. Bottom Line: Household consumption will be severely curtailed as lockdowns wreak havoc on the economy and household income, and the government so far has not provided meaningful direct transfers to the public. Rebound In Housing Demand Doubtful The Politburo encouraged local governments to further relax local housing policies, such as lowering mortgage rates and down payment ratios, and easing restrictions on home sales and purchases. However, we do not expect that these policies alone will restore homebuyers’ confidence amid short-term factors such as COVID outbreaks/lockdowns, and longer-term factors like slowing household income growth, high household debt and poor demographics (Chart 7A and 7B). Chart 7AProperty Market Is Challenged By Slower Household Income Growth, High Household Income Debt And Poor Demographics
Property Market Is Challenged By Slower Household Income Growth, High Household Income Debt And Poor Demographics
Property Market Is Challenged By Slower Household Income Growth, High Household Income Debt And Poor Demographics
Chart 7BProperty Market Is Challenged By Slower Household Income Growth, High Household Income Debt And Poor Demographics
Property Market Is Challenged By Slower Household Income Growth, High Household Income Debt And Poor Demographics
Property Market Is Challenged By Slower Household Income Growth, High Household Income Debt And Poor Demographics
China’s household sector was struggling prior to recent lockdowns. The growth rate of national disposable income per capita slowed by more than two percentage points (in nominal terms) in Q1 this year compared with Q4 2019 (Chart 7A, top panel). In addition, the PBoC’s quarterly urban depositor survey (released before the Shanghai lockdown) in Q1 showed subdued confidence in future household income (Chart 8). Households’ willingness to save hit a record high and is even more elevated than in early 2020; on the other hand, the propensity to invest has dropped to a multi-year low (Chart 9). Chart 8Chinese Households' Subdued Confidence In Future Income
Chinese Households' Subdued Confidence In Future Income
Chinese Households' Subdued Confidence In Future Income
Chart 9More Households Intend To Save Than To Invest
More Households Intend To Save Than To Invest
More Households Intend To Save Than To Invest
Chart 10Chinese Households' Declining Appetite For Purchasing Real Estate Assets
Chinese Households' Declining Appetite For Purchasing Real Estate Assets
Chinese Households' Declining Appetite For Purchasing Real Estate Assets
Despite lower interest rates and easier monetary conditions, Chinese consumers’ medium- to long-term loans continued to trend down in Q1, which indicates a declining appetite for purchasing real estate assets and durable goods (Chart 10). COVID-related restrictions have exacerbated matters and weighed heavily on the demand for housing. Home sales from 30 Chinese cities were down by 56% in April from a year ago (Chart 11). House prices have started to deflate in tier-3 cities. Deflation will likely spread to tier-1 and -2 cities due to a pandemic-driven decline in income and confidence. Furthermore, the unemployment rate has picked up, especially among younger workers (Chart 12). Job and income dynamics normally improve after the overall economic cycle bottoms. Therefore, without any measures to boost household income, the demand for housing will remain a drag on the economy in the near term. Chart 11Home Sales Worsened In April Amid COVID Flareups In Major Cities
Home Sales Worsened In April Amid COVID Flareups In Major Cities
Home Sales Worsened In April Amid COVID Flareups In Major Cities
Chart 12Labor Market Dynamics Deteriorated Rapidly
Labor Market Dynamics Deteriorated Rapidly
Labor Market Dynamics Deteriorated Rapidly
Bottom Line: The real estate market has been vital to business cycle recoveries in China since 2009. However, the property market will not recover anytime soon without a substantial boost to household income and a normalization in social and economic activities. Investment Conclusions The policy rhetoric from the Politburo meeting helped to shore up market confidence last Friday. Nevertheless, we do not think that the stimulus measures will be sufficient to produce a rapid business cycle recovery or a sustainable stock market rally (Chart 13A and 13B). Chart 13AIt Is Too Early To Call A Bottoming In Chinese Stocks
It Is Too Early To Call A Bottoming In Chinese Stocks
It Is Too Early To Call A Bottoming In Chinese Stocks
Chart 13BIt Is Too Early To Call A Bottoming In Chinese Stocks
It Is Too Early To Call A Bottoming In Chinese Stocks
It Is Too Early To Call A Bottoming In Chinese Stocks
Given the negative forces from rolling lockdowns and shrinking demand, China’s economy requires a massive government stimulus via direct transfers to households and SMEs. Yet, Beijing is neither ready to abandon its dynamic zero-Covid policy nor provide “irrigation-type” stimulus, especially for households and the property market. The policy stimulus measures announced so far still fall short of what is required to lift the economy. In light of the constraints on household consumption and the property market, economic growth in China is set to underwhelm and stock prices will likely underperform their global counterparts. Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes Cyclical Recommendations
Executive Summary Three Problems For European EPS
Three Problems For European EPS
Three Problems For European EPS
The Chinese economic slowdown in response to COVID lockdowns represents a major headwind for European profits in 2022. Weaker global growth creates another hurdle. The energy crisis is the third major problem for European profit growth this year. European profits must be revised downward for 2022, but the impact on 2023 EPS will be small. Cyclical sectors are particularly exposed to these three headwinds, which will hurt profitability this year. The recent relative strength in industrials and materials earnings is likely to buckle in response to weaker global growth, while the defensive characteristics of healthcare and communication services will shine. Within defensive sectors, favor healthcare and communication services versus utilities and consumer staples. Bottom Line: A downward revision of European profits will constrain the ability of European equities to rally in the coming quarters; however, it does not portend another major down leg in European stocks. Nonetheless, the downward revision still points to further underperformance of cyclical equities. Within the defensive sectors, healthcare and communication services are more appealing than utilities and consumer staples shares. The earnings season has begun. According to the MSCI index, Eurozone profit margins are at a 14-year high following a sharp rebound in profits after the pandemic-induced collapse of 2020. Faced with a war in Ukraine and surging inflation, investors worry that this robust profit picture will not last. We share these worries. The near-term outlook for European profits has deteriorated significantly. While the inflation surge amplified by the Ukrainian crisis is an important problem for European firms, it is not the only one. European businesses must also cope with the effect of a growth slowdown in the US goods sector. Moreover, Chinese growth is likely to plunge in response to the tightening lockdowns across the country. As a result, we fear that current earnings estimates for 2022 are too optimistic. Nonetheless, European stocks are unlikely to collapse further. The valuation cushion amassed during the first quarter market shake-out already embeds some downside for 2022 earnings. Additionally, 2023 earnings have much more limited downside than this year’s EPS. Three Problems For European EPS Chart 1European Earnings Profile
European Earnings Profile
European Earnings Profile
Three major problems indicate that the current European earnings estimates for 2022 are too optimistic: namely, China’s economic slowdown, a global economic deterioration, and the consequences of the Ukrainian war on the European economy (Chart 1). China’s Slowdown This publication has regularly highlighted that, even if the Chinese credit impulse is already trying to bottom, the lagged effect of the previous slowdown in credit flows would continue to hurt European growth in the first half of 2022. China’s COVID outbreak and Beijing’s severe policy response only accentuate this headwind. European profits are even more sensitive to Chinese economic fluctuation than European economic activity, which points to a meaningful drag on profitability. Many relationships highlight our concerns: So far, the weakness in the Chinese credit impulse is still consistent with a rapid deterioration of forward earnings growth and could lead to a contraction in forward EPS (Chart 2, top panel). The Chinese new orders index is falling rapidly. The elevated likelihood that China endures even more lockdowns in the coming months implies a sharper drop in orders and further weakness in European EPS (Chart 2, second panel). The CNY is depreciating again, which often coincides with a deflationary shock in global industrial goods that Europe produces. Unsurprisingly, a weaker RMB correlates well with narrowing operating profit margins in the Eurozone (Chart 2, bottom panel). Korean business conditions are deteriorating in response to the softening of the Chinese economy. A weaker RMB will further hurt business sentiment in the peninsula, especially if Chinese lockdowns broaden. The Korean economy is a key barometer of global business conditions because of its high cyclicality. BCA’s EM strategy team anticipates an additional softening in Korea, which portends weaker European profits and margins (Chart 3). Chart 2China's Troubles Trouble Europe Profits
China's Troubles Trouble Europe Profits
China's Troubles Trouble Europe Profits
Chart 3Listen to Korea
Listen to Korea
Listen to Korea
Global Economic Weakness The global growth weakness goes beyond China’s troubles. US economic activity is slowing down in response to higher yields, higher inflation, and the disappearance of pent-up demand following a splurge on goods by consumers during the pandemic. As a result, Q1 GDP growth fell to -1.4% from a quarterly annualized rate of 5.5% in Q4 2021. The weakness in the ISM New Orders-to-Inventory ratio points to continued softness through Q2. EM are not immune to these vulnerabilities either. EM consumers are suffering greatly from surging food and fuel costs. Moreover, EM interest rates continue to rise briskly and the ensuing liquidity removal points to fainter growth ahead. Chart 4The Weaker ISM NOI Is Worrisome
The Weaker ISM NOI Is Worrisome
The Weaker ISM NOI Is Worrisome
The impact of weaker global economic activity on European earnings is straightforward: A falling US ISM New Orders-To-Inventories ratio is a prelude both to slower earnings growth and to narrower profit margins in the Eurozone (Chart 4). Global exports growth has collapsed to 5.5% from more than 20% prior year and is likely to deteriorate further. Historically, weaker global shipments are associated with a slowdown in European forward earnings growth (Chart 4, third panel). Global economic surprises have rebounded this year, but, as we showed two weeks ago, they are likely to move back below zero in the near future. This is a noisy series, but negative surprises often prompt downward revisions to earnings estimates. The Energy Shock Europe is facing an exceptional energy shock that is hurting the region’s growth prospects. Now that Russia is curtailing gas shipments to Poland and Bulgaria, more energy disruptions are likely, which will further hamper domestic growth prospects across the region, while simultaneously elevating the cost of goods sold for firms. However, not all countries will be hit equally by a Russian energy embargo among the major economies. Germany and Italy have the most to lose, while France and the UK are the least at risk (Chart 5). The impact of an oil supply shock on European earnings is negative. When oil prices rise because of strong global aggregate demand, European earnings handle rising energy prices well because the increasing sales volume creates a powerful offset. However, our simple model that accounts for the evolution of oil demand and global policy uncertainty highlights that we do not face a demand shock, but rather a supply shock (Chart 6), which implies that most sectors will suffer from higher energy prices. Chart 5Varying Vulnerabilities To Russia’s Energy Showdown
The Three Forces Hurting European Earnings
The Three Forces Hurting European Earnings
Chart 6Oil's Rally Is Supply-Driven
Oil's Rally Is Supply-Driven
Oil's Rally Is Supply-Driven
Chart 7European Margins Under Pressure
European Margins Under Pressure
European Margins Under Pressure
The inflation passthrough from energy to everything else is not strong enough to protect profit margins. Yes, HICP is elevated, but European PPIs are rising much more rapidly. Historically, such an inability to pass on higher production costs results in slower European profits growth and contracting operating profit margins (Chart 7). The current weakness in consumer confidence and the expected drag on business confidence underscore that pricing power will likely deteriorate from here, which will accentuate the negative impact on profits from the current energy shock. Wage Costs: Not A Problem For Now Wage costs are the one bright spot for European profit margins. European negotiated wages are expanding at a very low rate of 1.6%. Unit labor costs are only expanding at 2.4%, a rate similar to last decade when European core inflation averaged 1%. Chart 8Wages Do Not Hurt Margins
Wages Do Not Hurt Margins
Wages Do Not Hurt Margins
Historically, rising wage rates correlate with rising profitability, not declining margins (Chart 8). This relationship seems paradoxical, but European wages only increase when global aggregate demand is very strong. Due to the degree of operating leverage of European equities, the impact of robust aggregate demand on revenues swamps the impact of accelerating wage growth on production costs. Hence, it will probably take a wage growth rate much higher than the experience of the past 20 years for salaries to start hurting margins. While this is possible, we are many quarters away from this risk becoming reality. Bottom Line: European forward earnings estimates for 2022 are far too elevated in view of the headwinds European businesses are currently facing. The combination of weaker Chinese economic activity, slowing global growth, and a supply-driven energy shock will force significant downward revisions to this year’s EPS. Related Report European Investment StrategyPlenty Of Risks For Cyclical Stocks 2023 EPS should fare better. Chinese authorities are increasingly supporting their economy and this stimulus will impact activity when the lockdowns end. This process will prompt a boom later this year. Global growth will recover once the energy shock recedes. Decelerating European PPI will also help profit margins recover. Following their severe decline in the first quarter, European equities have already embedded a significant valuation cushion to compensate for the transitory shock to earnings. European stocks will not be able to advance meaningfully while 2022 earnings estimates weaken, but they are unlikely to make new lows either. Three Problems For Cyclicals vs Defensives The same three factors that hurt the outlook for European profits for 2022 also confirm that cyclical equities should underperform defensives in the near term. China’s Slowdown Cyclicals are extremely sensitive to a Chinese economic slowdown: The past weakness in the Chinese credit impulse is consistent with a further downgrade of the profit expectations for European cyclicals stocks compared to that of their defensive peers (Chart 9). A deterioration in China’s PMI New Orders heralds a period of weakness in the earnings of cyclical equities. A weak Chinese yuan leads to poor relative earnings (Chart 9). The deterioration in Korean business confidence and the poor performance of Korean equities also leads to weakness in both the earnings and profit margins of cyclical equities relative to those of defensive stocks (Chart 9). Global Growth Weakness The earnings outlook for cyclical sectors relative to defensives is negatively affected by slowing global economic activity: A deterioration in global economic surprises often results in a period of anemic cyclicals’ earnings (Chart 10). The rapidly declining ISM New Orders-to-Inventories ratio is synonymous with underperforming cyclicals’ earnings as well as a contraction in their relative profit margins because of their heightened degree of operating leverage (Chart 10). Weaker global exports confirm the continued risks to cyclicals’ earnings. Chart 9China Is A Threat To Cyclical Equities
China Is A Threat To Cyclical Equities
China Is A Threat To Cyclical Equities
Chart 10Global Growth Threatens Cyclical Stocks
Global Growth Threatens Cyclical Stocks
Global Growth Threatens Cyclical Stocks
The Energy Shock There is no clear relationship between energy prices and the outlook for the profits of cyclical equities relative to those of defensive stocks. Nonetheless, we may deduce that, if elevated energy prices hurt aggregate profits, they will also hurt cyclical profits, since the latter exacerbate the fluctuation of the former. Moreover, Europe’s elevated stagflation risk is consistent with sagging profits for cyclicals relative to those of defensives, because cyclicals experience greater pain from deteriorating economic activity than the benefit they enjoy from higher inflation. Bottom Line: The problems faced by the Chinese economy as well as the risks to global growth are consistent with an underperformance of the profits of cyclical stocks compared to those of defensive equities. Moreover, while higher energy prices are not necessarily a problem for cyclical equities, the elevated perceived stagflation risk is consistent with downward revisions for the relative earnings of cyclicals. This picture indicates that cyclical equities are still vulnerable to some downside relative to the broad market in the near term. A Look at Individual Sectors Chart 11Sectoral Degrees Of Operating Leverage
The Three Forces Hurting European Earnings
The Three Forces Hurting European Earnings
We may distill the impact of China’s problems, the global economic slowdown, and the energy shock on sectoral earnings. A simple starting point is to look at their degree of operating leverage. Based on this observation, financials and consumer discretionary stocks are the sectors most at risk from weaker revenue growth, while utilities are the least exposed (Chart 11). A more complete picture may be gleaned from each sector’s pricing power. Energy Chart 12Improving Energy Margins
Improving Energy Margins
Improving Energy Margins
The energy sector enjoys a significant margin tailwind from the oil supply shock (Chart 12). Nonetheless, this boost is long in the tooth and a pullback is likely if Brent falls toward the $94/bbl level expected by BCA’s Commodity & Energy team in the second half of 2022, and $88/bbl level in 2023. Hence, it is likely that the near-term benefits for the energy sector’s profits are already fully discounted and that the sector could suffer a significant setback in the coming quarters. Industrials The pricing power of industrials (as approximated by the gap between CPI and PPI) is still strong, which creates a tailwind for relative earnings (Chart 13). However, this robustness is under threat in the current environment in which global industrial production, global trade, and global capital goods orders are decelerating (Chart 14). Hence, a period of downgrade for the earnings of industrials relative to the broad market is likely in the coming months. Chart 13Robust Pricing Power For Industrials...
Robust Pricing Power For Industrials...
Robust Pricing Power For Industrials...
Chart 14...But For How Long?
...But For How Long?
...But For How Long?
Financials Chart 15Financials Are Under Siege
Financials Are Under Siege
Financials Are Under Siege
The relative pricing power1 of financials is rapidly deteriorating, despite the recent increase in German yields (Chart 15). Moreover, it is likely to remain weak in a context in which core CPI has yet to decrease. Finally, the potential for a European recession in 2022, or at least, a severe growth slowdown, should lift non-performing loans. As a result, this sector’s earnings could experience a significant downgrade in the near term. Tech The sector’s pricing power was in an uptrend, but it has started to deteriorate in recent quarters (Chart 16). This evolution indicates that that tech earnings and profit margins are likely to suffer relative to the broad market, especially in light of the sector’s high degree of operating leverage. Consumer Discretionary Stocks This sector is suffering from a complete collapse of its pricing power (Chart 17). Additionally, tumbling consumer confidence in Europe and around the world is a significant drag on near-term sales. Consequently, earnings growth as well as profit margins are likely to lag the overall market. Chart 16Crucial Tech Tailwind Dwindling
Crucial Tech Tailwind Dwindling
Crucial Tech Tailwind Dwindling
Chart 17A Problem For Consumer Discretionary Stocks
A Problem For Consumer Discretionary Stocks
A Problem For Consumer Discretionary Stocks
Materials European materials sector’s profit margins stand at a 19-year high compared to that of the broad market. However, relative profit growth has collapsed. The bad news for the sector is that its pricing power is rapidly deteriorating because of surging input costs. It suggests that relative profit growth will become negative as relative profit margins contract (Chart 18). Utilities The pricing power of utilities is plunging because retail electricity prices are not rising as fast as input costs. The negative impact of this adverse pricing on profit margins is consequential (Chart 19). Governments around Europe are likely to continue to pressure this sector to limit the increase in electricity prices to households, which means that utilities are likely to lag other defensive sectors. Chart 18Materials' Outlook Deteriorating Materially
Materials' Outlook Deteriorating Materially
Materials' Outlook Deteriorating Materially
Chart 19Crunch Time For Utilities
Crunch Time For Utilities
Crunch Time For Utilities
Consumer Staples Chart 20Staples Under Duress
Staples Under Duress
Staples Under Duress
The consumer staples sector is facing a similar pricing power problem to that of consumer discretionary stocks: input costs are rising rapidly relative to selling prices (Chart 20). Nonetheless, the earnings of staples will prove more resilient than that of their discretionary counterparts because the staples’ sales volumes are less sensitive to both deteriorating global consumer confidence and falling household real incomes. However, consumer staples equities have already greatly outperformed consumer discretionary stocks. Thus, much of the good news in terms of relative earnings is well discounted and the additional outperformance will be limited. Healthcare Chart 21Healthcare Stocks Still Have Pricing Power
Healthcare Stocks Still Have Pricing Power
Healthcare Stocks Still Have Pricing Power
The pricing power of the healthcare sector remains positive, but it is not as strong as it was ten years ago. Hence, profits growth has scope to improve further compared to the rest of the market (Chart 21). Beyond favorable pricing power dynamics, the industry is insulated from weaker global growth relative to the rest of the broad market. Importantly, the healthcare sector sports one of the lowest degrees of operating leverage in Europe, which will also boost its relative profitability in the current environment. Healthcare is our top defensive sector right now, despite its valuation premium. Communication Services Chart 22Telecom Will Prove Resilient
Telecom Will Prove Resilient
Telecom Will Prove Resilient
The profit growth and profit margins of the European communication services sectors are already under duress because pricing power remains negative. Nonetheless, the contraction in relative growth rates of earnings is extended (Chart 22). Telecom revenues did not benefit from a boost when the economy rebounded after the economic contraction in 2020. This stability is now an asset because the sector will not struggle from slowing global economic activity. In this context, the cheap communication services sector remains an attractive defensive play in Europe. Bottom Line: Looking at sectors individually confirms that the outlook for profit growth is worse for cyclicals than it is for defensive stocks. The recent relative strength in industrials and materials earnings is likely to buckle in response to weaker global growth, while the defensive characteristics of healthcare and communication services will shine. Utilities are under stress, as they stand at the confluence of higher energy prices and the explicit desire of politicians to limit the impact of these higher energy costs on households. Favor healthcare and communication services versus utilities and consumer staples. Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 In the case of financials, we use core CPI as a proxy for the sector’s costs. Eurostat does not publish a PPI for the sector and the main costs are related to labor costs. Tactical Recommendations Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations
Executive Summary German GeoRisk Indicator
German GeoRisk Indicator
German GeoRisk Indicator
Russia and Germany have begun cutting off each other’s energy in a major escalation of strategic tensions. The odds of Finland and Sweden joining NATO have shot up. A halt to NATO enlargement, particularly on Russia’s borders, is Russia’s chief demand. Tensions will skyrocket. China’s reversion to autocracy and de facto alliance with Russia are reinforcing the historic confluence of internal and external risk, weighing on Chinese assets. Geopolitical risk is rising in South Korea and Hong Kong, rising in Spain and Italy, and flat in South Africa. France’s election will lower domestic political risk but the EU as a whole faces a higher risk premium. The Biden administration is doubling down on its defense of Ukraine, calling for $33 billion in additional aid and telling Russia that it will not dominate its neighbor. However, the Putin regime cannot afford to lose in Ukraine and will threaten to widen the conflict to intimidate and divide the West. Trade Recommendation Inception Date Return LONG GLOBAL DEFENSIVES / CYCLICALS EQUITIES 2022-01-20 14.2% Bottom Line: Stay long global defensives over cyclicals. Feature Chart 1Geopolitical Risk And Policy Uncertainty Drive Up Dollar
Geopolitical Risk And Policy Uncertainty Drive Up Dollar
Geopolitical Risk And Policy Uncertainty Drive Up Dollar
The dollar (DXY) is breaking above the psychological threshold of 100 on the back of monetary tightening and safe-haven demand. Geopolitical risk does not always drive up the dollar – other macroeconomic factors may prevail. But in today’s situation macro and geopolitics are converging to boost the greenback (Chart 1). Global economic policy uncertainty is also rising sharply. It is highly correlated with the broader trade-weighted dollar. The latter is nowhere near 2020 peaks but could rise to that level if current trends hold. A strong dollar reflects slowing global growth and also tightens global financial conditions, with negative implications for cyclical and emerging market equities. Bottom Line: Tactically favor US equities and the US dollar to guard against greater energy shock, policy uncertainty, and risk-aversion. Energy Cutoff Points To European Recession Chart 2Escalation With Russia Weighs Further On EU Assets
Escalation With Russia Weighs Further On EU Assets
Escalation With Russia Weighs Further On EU Assets
Russia is reducing natural gas flows to Poland and Bulgaria and threatening other countries, Germany is now embracing an oil embargo against Russia, while Finland and Sweden are considering joining NATO. These three factors are leading to a major escalation of strategic tensions on the continent that will get worse before they get better, driving up our European GeoRisk indicators and weighing on European assets (Chart 2). Russia’s ultimatum in December 2021 stressed that NATO enlargement should cease and that NATO forces and weapons should not be positioned east of the May 1997 status quo. Russia invaded Ukraine to ensure its military neutrality over the long run.1 Finland and Sweden, seeing Ukraine’s isolation amid Russian invasion, are now reviewing whether to change their historic neutrality and join NATO. Public opinion polls now show Finnish support for joining at 61% and Swedish support at 57%. The scheduling of a joint conference between the country’s leaders on May 13 looks like it could be a joint declaration of their intention to join. The US and other NATO members will have to provide mutual defense guarantees for the interim period if that is the case, lest Russia attack. The odds that Finland and Sweden remain neutral are higher than the consensus holds (given the 97% odds that they join NATO on Predictit.org). But the latest developments suggest they are moving toward applying for membership. They fear being left in the cold like Ukraine in the event of an attack. Russia’s response will be critical. If Russia deploys nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad, as former President Dmitri Medvedev warned, then Moscow will be making a menacing show but not necessarily changing the reality of Russia’s nuclear strike capabilities. That is equivalent to a pass and could mark the peak of the entire crisis. The geopolitical risk premium would begin to subside after that. Related Report Geopolitical StrategyLe Pen And Other Hurdles (GeoRisk Update) However, Russia has also threatened “military-political repercussions” if the Nordics join NATO. Russia’s capabilities are manifestly limited, judging by Ukraine today and the Winter War of 1939, but a broader war cannot entirely be ruled out. Global financial markets will still need to adjust for a larger tail risk of a war in Finland/Sweden in the very near term. Most likely Russia will retaliate by cutting off Europe’s natural gas. Clearly this is the threat on the table, after the cutoff to Poland and Bulgaria and the warnings to other countries. In the near term, several companies are gratifying Russia and paying for gas in rubles. But these payments violate EU sanctions against Russia and the intention is to wean off Russian imports as soon as possible. Germany says it can reduce gas imports starting next year after inking a deal with Qatar. Hence Russia might take the initiative and start reducing the flow earlier. Bottom Line: If Europe plunges into recession as a result of an immediate natural gas cutoff, then strategic stability between Russia and the West will become less certain. The tail risk of a broader war goes up. Stay cyclically long US equities over global equities and tactically long US treasuries. Stay long defense stocks and gold. Stay Short CNY At the end of last year we argued that Beijing would double down on “Zero Covid” policy in 2022, at least until the twentieth national party congress this fall. Social restrictions serve a dual purpose of disease suppression and dissent repression. Now that the state is doubling down, what will happen next? The economy will deteriorate: imports are already contracting at a rate of 0.1% YoY. The manufacturing PMI has fallen to 48.1 and the service sector PMI to 42.0, indicating contraction. Furthermore, social unrest could emerge, as lockdowns serve as a catalyst to ignite underlying socioeconomic disparities. Hence the national party congress is less likely to go smoothly, implying that investors will catch a glimpse of political instability under the surface in China as the year progresses. The political risk premium will remain high (Chart 3). Chart 3China's Confluence Of Domestic And Foreign Risk Weighs On Stocks And Currency
China's Confluence Of Domestic And Foreign Risk Weighs On Stocks And Currency
China's Confluence Of Domestic And Foreign Risk Weighs On Stocks And Currency
While Chairman Xi Jinping is still likely to clinch another ten years in power, it will not be auspicious amid an economic crash and any social unrest. Xi could be forced into some compromises on either Politburo personnel or policy adjustments. A notable indicator of compromise would be if he nominated a successor, though this would not provide any real long-term assurance to investors given the lack of formal mechanisms for power transfer. After the party congress we expect Xi to “let 100 flowers bloom,” meaning that he will ease fiscal, regulatory, and social policy so that today’s monetary and fiscal stimulus can work effectively. Right now monetary and fiscal easing has limited impact because private sector actors are averse to taking risk. Easing policy to boost the economy could also entail a diplomatic charm offensive to try to convince the US and EU to avoid imposing any significant sanctions on trade and investment flows, whether due to Russia or human rights violations. Such a diplomatic initiative would only succeed, if at all, in the short run. The US cannot allow a deep re-engagement with China since that would serve to strengthen the de facto Russo-Chinese strategic alliance. In other words, an eruption of instability threatens to weaken Xi’s hand and jeopardize his power retention. While it is extremely unlikely that Xi will fall from power, he could have his image of supremacy besmirched. It is likely that China will be forced to ease a range of policies, including lockdowns and regulations of key sectors, that will be marginally positive for economic growth. There may also be schemes to attract foreign investment. Bottom Line: If China expands the range of its policy easing the result could be received positively by global investors in 2023. But the short-term outlook is still negative and deteriorating due to China’s reversion to autocracy and confluence of political and geopolitical risk. Stay short CNY and neutral Chinese stocks. Stay Short KRW South Koreans went to the polls on March 9 to elect their new president for a five-year term. The two top candidates for the job were Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung. Yoon, a former public prosecutor, was the candidate for the People Power Party, a conservative party that can be traced back to the Saenuri and the Grand National Party, which was in power from 2007 to 2017 under President Lee Myung-bak and President Park Geun-hye. Lee, the governor of the largest province in Korea, was the candidate for the Democratic Party, the party of the incumbent President Moon Jae-in. Yoon won by a whisker, garnering 48.6% of the votes versus 47.8% for Lee. The margin of victory for Yoon is the lowest since Korea started directly electing its presidents. President-elect Yoon will be inaugurated in May. He will not have control of the National Assembly, as his party only holds 34% of the seats. The Democratic Party holds the majority, with 172 out of 300 seats. The next legislative election will be in 2024, which means that President Yoon will have to work with the opposition for a good two years before his party has a chance to pass laws on its own. President-elect Yoon was the more pro-business and fiscally restrained candidate. His nomination of Han Duck-soo as his prime minister suggests that, insofar as any domestic policy change is possible, he will be pragmatic, as Han served under two liberal administrations. Yoon’s lack of a majority and nomination of a left-leaning prime minister suggest that domestic policy will not be a source of uncertainty for investors through 2024. Foreign policy, by contrast, will be the biggest source of risk for investors. Yoon rejects the dovish “Moonshine” policy of his predecessor and favors a strong hand in dealing with North Korea. “War can be avoided only when we acquire an ability to launch pre-emptive strikes and show our willingness to use them,” he has argued. North Korea responded by expanding its nuclear doctrine and resuming tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles with the launch of the Hwasong-17 on March 24 – the first ICBM launch since 2017. In a significant upgrade of North Korea’s deterrence strategy, Kim Yo Jong, the sister of Kim Jong Un, warned on April 4 that North Korea would use nuclear weapons to “eliminate” South Korea if attacked (implying an overwhelming nuclear retaliation to any attack whatsoever). Kim Jong Un himself claimed on April 26 that North Korea’s nuclear weapons are no longer merely about deterrence but would be deployed if the country is attacked. President-elect Yoon welcomes the possibility of deploying of US strategic assets to strengthen deterrence against the North. The hawkish turn is not surprising considering that North-South relations failed to make any substantive improvements during President Moon’s five-year tenure as a pro-engagement president. South Koreans, especially Yoon’s supporters, are split on whether inter-Korean dialogue should be continued. They are becoming more interested in developing their own nuclear weapons or at the very least deploying US nuclear weapons in South Korea. Half of South Korean voters support security through alliance with the US, while a third support security through the development of independent nuclear weapons. The nuclear debate will raise tensions on the peninsula. An even bigger change in South Korea’s foreign policy is its policy towards China. President-elect Yoon has accused President Moon of succumbing to China’s economic extortion. Moon had established a policy of “three No’s,” meaning no to additional THAAD missiles in South Korea, no to hosting other US missile defense systems, and no to joining an alliance with Japan and the United States. By contrast, Yoon’s electoral promises include deploying more THAAD and joining the Quadrilateral Dialogue (US, Japan, Australia, India). Polls show that South Koreans hold a low opinion of all of their neighbors but that China has slipped slightly beneath Japan and North Korea in favorability. Even Democratic Party voters feel more negative towards China. While negative attitudes towards China are not unique to Korea, there is an important difference from other countries: the Korean youth dislike China the most, not the older generations. Negative sentiment is less tied to old wounds from the Korean war and more related to ideology and today’s grievances. Younger Koreans, growing up in a liberal democracy and proud of their economic and cultural success, have been involved in campus clashes against Chinese students over Korean support for Hong Kong democrats. Negative attitudes towards China among the youth should alarm investors, as young people provide the voting base for elections to come, and China is the largest trading partner for Korea. Korea’s foreign policy will hew to the American side, at risk to its economy (Chart 4). Chart 4South Korean Geopolitical Risk Rising Under The Radar
South Korean Geopolitical Risk Rising Under The Radar
South Korean Geopolitical Risk Rising Under The Radar
President-elect Yoon’s policies towards North Korea and China will increase geopolitical risk in East Asia. The biggest beneficiary will be India. Both Korea and Japan need to find a substitute to Chinese markets and labor, which have become less reliable in recent years. South Korea’s newly elected president is aligned with the US and West and less friendly toward China and Russia. He faces a rampant North Korea that feels emboldened by its position of an arsenal of 40-50 deliverable nuclear weapons. The North Koreans now claim that they will respond to any military attack with nuclear force and are testing intercontinental ballistic missiles and possibly a nuclear weapon. The US currently has three aircraft carriers around Korea, despite its urgent foreign policy challenges in Europe and the Middle East. Bottom Line: Stay long JPY-KRW. South Korea’s geopolitical risk premium will remain high. But favor Korean stocks over Taiwanese stocks. Stay Neutral On Hong Kong Stocks Hong Kong’s leadership change will trigger a new bout of unrest (Chart 5). Chart 5Hong Kong: More Turbulence Ahead
Hong Kong: More Turbulence Ahead
Hong Kong: More Turbulence Ahead
On April 4, Hong Kong’s incumbent Chief Executive, Carrie Lam, confirmed that she would not seek a second term but would step down on June 30. John Lee, the current chief secretary of Hong Kong, became the only candidate approved to run for election, which is scheduled to be held on May 8. With the backing of the pro-Beijing members in the Election Committee, Lee is expected to secure enough nominations to win the race. Lee served as security secretary from when Carrie Lam took office in 2017 until June 2021. He firmly supported the Hong Kong extradition bill in 2019 and National Security Law in 2020, which provoked historic social unrest in those years. He insisted on taking a tough security stance towards pro-democracy protests. With Lee in power, Hong Kong will face more unrest and tougher crackdowns in the coming years, which will likely bring more social instability. Lee will provoke pro-democracy activists with his policy stances and adherence to Beijing’s party line. For example, his various statements to the news media suggest a dogmatic approach to censorship and political dissent. With the adoption of the National Security Law, Hong Kong’s pro-democracy faction is already deeply disaffected. Carrie Lam was originally elected as a popular leader, with notable support from women, but her popularity fell sharply after the passage of the extradition bill and National Security Law, as well as her mishandling of the Covid-19 outbreak. Her failure to handle the clashes between the Hong Kong people and Beijing damaged public trust in government. Trust never fully recovered when it took another hit recently from the latest wave of the pandemic. Putting another pro-Beijing hardliner in power will exacerbate the trend. Hong Kong equities are vulnerable not merely because of social unrest. During the era of US-China engagement, Hong Kong benefited as the middleman and the symbol that the Communist Party could cooperate within a liberal, democratic, capitalist global order. Hence US-China power struggle removes this special status and causes Hong Kong financial assets to contract mainland Chinese geopolitical risk. As a result of the 2019-2020 crackdown, John Lee and Carrie Lam were among a list of Hong Kong officials sanctioned by the US Treasury Department and State Department in 2020. Now, after the Ukraine war, the US will be on the lookout for any Hong Kong role in helping Russia circumvent sanctions, as well as any other ways in which China might further its strategic aims by means of Hong Kong. Bottom Line: Stay neutral on Hong Kong equities. Favor France Within European Equities French political risk will fall after the presidential election, which recommits the country to geopolitical unity with the US and NATO and potentially pro-productivity structural reforms (Chart 6). France is already a geopolitically secure country so the reduction of domestic political risk should be doubly positive for French assets, though they have already outperformed. And the Russia-West conflict is fueling a risk premium regardless of France’s positive developments. Chart 6France's Domestic Political Risk Will Subside But Russian War Will Keep Geopolitical Risk Elevated
France's Domestic Political Risk Will Subside But Russian War Will Keep Geopolitical Risk Elevated
France's Domestic Political Risk Will Subside But Russian War Will Keep Geopolitical Risk Elevated
The French election ended with a solid victory for the political establishment as we expected. President Emmanuel Macron gaining 58% of the vote to Marine Le Pen’s 42%. Macron beat his opinion polling by 4.5pp while Le Pen underperformed her polls by 4.5pp. A large number of voters abstained, at 28%, compared to 25.5% in 2017. The regional results showed a stark divergence between overseas or peripheral France (where Marine Le Pen even managed to get over half of the vote in several cases) and the core cities of France (where Macron won handily). Macron had won an outright majority in every region in 2017. Macron did best among the young and the old, while Le Pen did best among middle-aged voters. But Macron won every age group except the 50 year-olds, who want to retire early. Macron did well among business executives, managers, and retired people, but Le Pen won among the working classes, as expected. Le Pen won the lowest paid income group, while Macron’s margin of victory rises with each step up the income ladder. Macron’s performance was strong, especially considering the global context. The pandemic knocked several incumbent parties out of power (US, Germany) and required leadership changes in others (Japan, Italy). The subsequent inflation shock now threatens to cause another major political rotation in rapid succession, leaving various political leaders and parties vulnerable in the coming months and years (Australia, the UK, Spain). Only Canada and now France marked exceptions, where post-pandemic elections confirmed the country’s leader. The Ukraine war constitutes yet another shock but it helped Macron, as Le Pen had objective links and sympathies with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Macron’s timing was lucky but his message of structural reform for the sake of economic efficiency still resonates in contemporary France, where change is long overdue – at least compared with Le Pen’s proposal of doubling down on statism, protectionism, and fiscal largesse. The French middle class was never as susceptible to populism as the US, UK, and Italy because it had been better protected from the ravages of globalization. Populism is still a force to be reckoned with, especially if left-wing populists do well in the National Assembly, or if right-wing populists find a fresher face than the Le Pen dynasty. But the failure of populism in the context of pandemic, inflation, and war suggests that France’s political establishment remains well fortified by the economic structure and the electoral system. Whether Macron can sustain his structural reforms depends on legislative elections to be held on June 12-19. Early projections are positive for his party, which should keep a majority. Macron’s new mandate will help. Le Pen’s National Rally and its predecessors may perform better than in the past but that is not saying much as their presence in the National Assembly has been weak. Bottom Line: France is geopolitically secure and has seen a resounding public vote for structural reform that could improve productivity depending on legislative elections. French equities can continue to outperform their European peers over the long run. Our European Investment Strategy recommends French equities ex-consumer stocks, French small caps over large caps, and French aerospace and defense. Favor Spanish Over Italian Stocks Chart 7Italian And Spanish Political Risk Will Rise But Favor Spanish Stocks
Italian And Spanish Political Risk Will Rise But Favor Spanish Stocks
Italian And Spanish Political Risk Will Rise But Favor Spanish Stocks
What about Spain? It is still a “divided nation” susceptible to a rise in political risk ahead of the general election due by December 10, 2023 (Chart 7). In the past few months, a series of strategic mistakes and internal power struggles have led to a significant decline in the popularity of Spain’s largest opposition party, the People’s Party. Due to public infighting and power struggle, Pablo Casado was forced to step down as the leader of the People’s Party on February 23, as requested by 16 of the party’s 17 regional leaders. It is yet to be seen if the new party leader, Alberto Nunez Feijoo, can reboot People’s Party. The far-right VOX party will benefit from the People Party’s setback. The latter’s misstep in a regional election (Castile & Leon) gave VOX a chance to participate in a regional government for the very first time. Hence VOX’s influence will spread and it will receive greater recognition as an important political force. Meanwhile the ruling Socialist Worker’s Party (PSOE) faces anger from the public amid inflation and high energy prices. However, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez’s decision to send offensive military weapons to Ukraine is widely supported among major parties, including even his reluctant coalition partner, Unidas Podemos. The People’s Party’s recent infighting gives temporary relief to the ruling party. The Russia-Ukraine issue caused some minor divisions within the government but they are not yet leading to any major political crisis, as nationwide pro-Ukraine sentiment is largely unified. The Andalusia regional election, which is expected this November, will be a check point for Feijoo and a pre-test for next year’s general election. Andalusia is the most populous autonomous community in Spain, consisting about 17% of the seats in the congress (the lower house). The problem for Sanchez and the Socialists is that the stagflationary backdrop will weigh on their support over time. Bottom Line: Spanish political risk is likely to spike sooner rather than later, though Spanish domestic risk it is limited in nature. Madrid faces low geopolitical risk, low energy vulnerability, and is not susceptible to trying to leave the EU or Euro Area. Favor Spanish over Italian stocks. Stay Constructive On South Africa The political and economic status quo is largely unchanged in South Africa and will remain so going into the 2024 national elections. Fiscal discipline will weaken ahead of the election, which should be negative for the rand, but the global commodity shortage and geopolitical risks in Russia and China will probably overwhelm any negative effects from South Africa’s domestic policies. Rising commodity prices have propped up the local equity market and will bring in much-needed revenue into the local economy and government coffers. But structural issues persist. Low growth outcomes amid weak productivity and high unemployment levels will remain the norm. The median voter is increasingly constrained with fewer economic opportunities on the horizon. Pressure will mount on the ruling African National Congress (ANC), fueling civil unrest and adding to overall political risk (Chart 8). Chart 8South Africa's Political Status Quo Is Tactically Positive For Equities And Currency
South Africa's Political Status Quo Is Tactically Positive For Equities And Currency
South Africa's Political Status Quo Is Tactically Positive For Equities And Currency
Almost a year has passed since the civil unrest episode of 2021. Covid-19 lockdowns have lifted and the national state of disaster has ended, reducing social tensions. This is evident in the decline of our South Africa GeoRisk indicator from 2021 highs. While we recently argued that fiscal austerity is under way in South Africa, we also noted that fiscal policy will reverse course in time for the 2024 election. In this year’s fiscal budget, the budget deficit is projected to narrow from -6% to -4.2% over the next two years. Government has increased tax revenue collection through structural reforms that are rooting out corruption and wasteful expenditure. But the ANC will have to tap into government spending to shore up lost support come 2024. Already, the ANC have committed to maintaining a special Covid-19 social-grant payment, first introduced in 2020, for another year. This grant, along with other government support, will feature in 2024 and possibly beyond. Unemployment is at 34.3%, its highest level ever recorded. The ANC cannot leave it unchecked. The most prevalent and immediate recourse is to increase social payments and transfers. Given the increasing number of social dependents that higher unemployment creates, government spending will have to increase to address rising unemployment. President Cyril Ramaphosa is still a positive figurehead for the ANC, but the 2021 local elections showed that the ANC cannot rely on the Ramaphosa effect alone. The ANC is also dealing with intra-party fighting. Ramaphosa has yet to assert total control over the party elites, distracting the ANC from achieving its policy objectives. To correct course, Ramaphosa will have to relax fiscal discipline. To this outcome, investors should expect our GeoRisk indicator to register steady increases in political risk moving into 2024. The only reason to be mildly optimistic is that South Africa is distant from geopolitical risk and can continue to benefit from the global bull market in metals. Bottom Line: Maintain a cyclically constructive outlook on South African currency and assets. Tight global commodity markets will support this emerging market, which stands to benefit from developments in Russia and China. Investment Takeaways Stay strategically long gold on geopolitical and inflation risk, despite the dollar rally. Stay long US equities relative to global and UK equities relative to DM-ex-US. Favor global defensives over cyclicals and large caps over small caps. Stay short CNY, TWD, and KRW-JPY. Stay short CZK-GBP. Favor Mexico within emerging markets. Stay long defense and cyber security stocks. We are booking a 5% stop loss on our long Canada / short Saudi Arabia equity trade. We still expect Middle Eastern tensions to escalate and trigger a Saudi selloff. Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor Jesse.Kuri@bcaresearch.com Yushu Ma Research Analyst yushu.ma@bcaresearch.com Guy Russell Senior Analyst GuyR@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The campaign in the south suggests that Ukraine will be partitioned, landlocked, and susceptible to blockade in the coming years. If Russia achieves its military objectives, then Ukraine will accept neutrality in a ceasefire to avoid losing more territory. If Russia fails, then it faces humiliation and its attempts to save face will become unpredictable and aggressive. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix Geopolitical Calendar