Policy

Highlights Yield Curve & Fed: The yield curve will not invert until inflation has first recovered to the Fed's target. This means that a period of curve steepening is likely, driven either by rising inflation or a more dovish Fed. Corporate Sectors: Expect less extra compensation from increasing the riskiness of corporate bond portfolios in 2018. The Energy, Communications, Basic Industry, Financial and Technology sectors offer the best risk-adjusted value. Economy & Inflation: All signs are that economic growth has accelerated in recent months. Decelerating consumer credit growth and rising consumer delinquency rates do not yet pose a risk to future spending. Feature Long-term interest rates have trended lower in recent months even as the Federal Reserve has raised the level of the target federal funds rate by 150 basis points. This development contrasts with most experience, which suggests that, other things being equal, increasing short-term interest rates are normally accompanied by a rise in longer-term yields. [...] The broadly anticipated behavior of world bond markets remains a conundrum. - Alan Greenspan, February 20051 By the end of the week the Fed will have raised interest rates by 125 basis points since December 2015, yet the 10-year Treasury yield has risen only 7 bps (Chart 1). But unlike in 2005, there is no bond conundrum. On the contrary, the reason for low long-maturity Treasury yields is easily understood. Chart 1What Conundrum? Quite simply, the Federal Reserve has been lifting interest rates in-line with its projections for rising inflation, but markets are trading off the fact that this inflation has yet to materialize. The compensation for inflation protection embedded in 10-year yields is only 1.88%. Historically, when core inflation is close to the Fed's 2% target, compensation for inflation protection has traded in a range between 2.4% and 2.5%. Essentially, Fed rate hikes have lifted short-maturity yields but low inflation is keeping long-maturity yields depressed. The result is that the 2/10 Treasury slope has flattened all the way down to 58 bps from 128 bps in December 2015 (Chart 1, bottom panel). What should be clear is that the current paths of inflation and the yield curve are unsustainable. If the Fed continues to hike rates but inflation fails to rise, then the yield curve will invert in the coming months - a signal that bond investors anticipate a recession - and the Fed will have not achieved its inflation target. Such an obvious policy error will not be permitted to occur, which leaves us with three possible outcomes for Fed policy and the Treasury curve during the next six months. 1) The Fed Is Right In this scenario inflation starts to rebound in the coming months, pushing the compensation for inflation protection embedded in long-dated bond yields higher (Chart 2). This would certainly cause long-maturity nominal yields to increase and would probably impart a steepening bias to the yield curve, depending on how quickly the Fed lifts rates.2 BCA's Outlook for 2018 makes the case for why inflation is likely to bottom in the coming months, and we view the "Fed is Right" scenario as the most likely outcome.3 Chart 2Fed Expects Higher Inflation 2) The Fed Is Proactive In this scenario the Fed recognizes there is a risk of tightening the yield curve into inversion - and the economy into recession - if inflation stays low. It therefore proactively adopts a more dovish policy stance to prevent the yield curve from inverting. The likely first step would be signaling a slower pace of rate hikes in this week's Summary of Economic Projections. The yield curve would also steepen in this scenario, but this time a bull-steepening where short-maturity yields fall more than long-maturity yields. At least one FOMC member already seems worried enough to take this sort of action. St. Louis Fed President James Bullard said two weeks ago that: "Given below-target U.S. inflation, it is unnecessary to push normalization to such an extent that the yield curve inverts".4 But other policymakers are less concerned. Cleveland Fed President Loretta Mester downplayed the flat yield curve in a recent interview.5 We view this outcome as the least likely of our three scenarios. With economic growth accelerating (see Economy & Inflation section below), the Fed will likely cling to its forecast that inflation will move higher. If inflation fails to respond, then risky assets will eventually sell off. This brings us to the final scenario. 3) The Fed Is Reactive The Fed does not have a strong track record of proactively responding to low inflation readings, but it does have a strong track record of reacting to tighter financial conditions and risk off periods in equities and credit markets. What's more, if the yield curve continues to flatten, then we are very likely to see credit spreads widen and equities sell off quite soon. At that point the Fed would almost certainly respond by signaling a slower pace of rate hikes. That would steepen the curve and ease the pressure on risky assets. We view this third scenario as more likely than the one where the Fed is proactive. In fact, we observe that the yield curve is already flat enough that the chances of a sell-off in High-Yield corporate bonds relative to Treasuries are high. Using monthly data going back to 1988, we see that a flatter 2/10 Treasury slope is consistent with lower monthly excess returns from High-Yield (Chart 3). We also see that a flatter yield curve is consistent with more frequent risk-off periods (Chart 4). Chart 3Junk Monthly Excess Returns & ##br##Yield Curve (1988-Present) Chart 4% Of Months With Negative High-Yield ##br##Excess Returns (1988- Present) This makes sense intuitively. An inverted yield curve is a well-known recession indicator. This means that when the yield curve is very flat investors are obviously nervous that any new piece of bad news could tip the curve into inversion and signal an end to the economic recovery. In other words, a risk-off episode in junk bonds, like the one witnessed in early November, would be less likely to occur if the yield curve were steeper.6 We would recommend buying the dips on any near-term correction in junk bonds, because the Fed would then be forced to get more dovish and support the credit markets. But unless inflation returns and steepens the Treasury curve from current levels, the risk of just such an episode is high. Corporate Sector Year-In-Review With 2017 nearly in the books, this week we take a quick look back at the performance of the 10 main investment grade corporate bond sectors during the year. Chart 5 shows the excess return for each sector relative to its duration-times-spread (DTS) from the beginning of the year. DTS is a common measure of risk for corporate bonds, and can be thought of much like an equity's beta. When the overall corporate bond market is rallying, then high-DTS sectors tend to perform better. Conversely, when corporate bonds underperform Treasuries, then high-DTS sectors tend to lose more than the low-DTS alternatives. As can be seen in Chart 5, given that 2017 was a risk-on year, high-DTS sectors tended to outperform low-DTS sectors with a few exceptions. The Basic Industry sector and Financials performed much better than their DTS alone would have predicted, while the Communications sector performed much worse than its DTS would have predicted. Looking ahead into 2018, we make the following observations: Excess returns for investment grade corporate bonds are likely to be lower in 2018 than in 2017.7 In turn, this means that the Credit Risk Premium - the extra return earned for taking an additional unit of DTS risk - will also be lower. We calculated the Credit Risk Premium for each year since 2000 by performing a regression of annual excess returns for each of the 10 major sectors versus their beginning-of-year DTS. The beta from that regression represents the additional return earned that year from taking an extra unit of DTS risk. Chart 6 shows that this Credit Risk Premium is an increasing function of excess returns for the overall corporate sector. Logically, if the year ahead is likely to deliver lower excess returns for the overall index, then we should also expect less additional return from increasing the DTS risk of our corporate bond portfolios. Chart 52017 Corporate Sectors ##br##Excess Returns* Vs DTS** Chart 6Excess Returns* Vs ##br##Credit Risk Premium Second, we use our corporate sector model - a model that adjusts each sector's spread by its average credit rating and duration - to identify sectors that have the potential to outperform their DTS in the coming months. This model is updated each month in our Portfolio Allocation Summary.8 The most recent update shows that the high-DTS Energy, Basic Industry and Communications sectors are all attractively valued. The most attractive low-DTS sectors are Financials and Technology (Chart 7). Chart 7Risk-Adjusted Value In Corporate Sectors* Bottom Line: Expect less extra compensation from increasing the riskiness of corporate bond portfolios in 2018. The Energy, Communications, Basic Industry, Financial and Technology sectors offer the best risk-adjusted value. Economy & Inflation Does Consumer Credit Growth Put The Recovery At Risk? Last week's employment report showed a sharp increase in aggregate hours worked and suggests that U.S. economic growth has indeed shifted into a higher gear. We use a combination of year-over-year growth in aggregate hours worked and average quarterly productivity growth since 2012 to get a rough tracking estimate for U.S. real GDP growth. After last Friday's report this proxy is up to a healthy 3.1% (Chart 8). Last Friday's Consumer Sentiment data also suggest that consumer spending, the largest component of U.S. GDP, will stay firm in the coming months (Chart 9). While consumer credit growth has started to slow (Chart 9, panel 2) and consumer delinquencies are starting to rise (Chart 9, bottom panel), we are not yet inclined to view those trends as risks to the economic recovery. Chart 8Growth Tracking Well Above Trend Chart 9Credit Growth Falling & Delinquencies Rising First, notice that prior to the onset of recession, consumer spending growth tends to decline while consumer credit growth accelerates. It is only well after the recession begins that consumer credit growth follows spending growth lower. This chain of events is highly logical. In the late stages of the recovery households first start to see their incomes decline and then turn to credit to support their spending needs. Eventually, banks make consumer credit less available and consumer credit growth also decelerates, but we are already well into the recession by then. Chart 10Bank Lending Standards In fact, judging by the patterns observed in the lead up to the last two recessions, the warning sign for the economic recovery would be if consumer credit growth is rising while consumer spending growth is falling. So far this pattern has not been observed. Potentially more troubling is the increase in the consumer credit delinquency rate. Delinquencies do tend to rise prior to the onset of recession, although at the moment delinquencies are rising off an extremely low base. It is possible that after having kept lending standards very stringent for several years after the Great Recession, an uptick in delinquencies off historically low levels simply reflects a return to "business-as-usual" for banks. In fact, the Federal Reserve's Senior Loan Officer Survey showed a large tightening of consumer lending standards during the crisis, but then a moderate easing from 2010 until quite recently (Chart 10). Further, the most recent Senior Loan Officer Survey showed an increase in banks' willingness to extend consumer installment loans. Historically, this has been associated with falling consumer delinquency rates (Chart 10, bottom panel). Bottom Line: All signs are that economic growth has accelerated in recent months. Decelerating consumer credit growth and rising consumer delinquency rates do not yet pose a risk to future spending. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/2005/february/testimony.htm 2 For a look at what different combinations of Fed rate hikes and long-maturity yields mean for the slope of the yield curve please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "2018 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income", dated November 28, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see BCA Special Report, "Outlook 2018: Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course", dated November 20, 2017, available at www.bcaresearch.com 4 https://www.stlouisfed.org/from-the-president/speeches-and-presentations/2017/assessing-yield-curve 5 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-01/fed-s-mester-shrugs-off-flattening-yield-curve-in-call-for-hikes 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Junk Bond Jitters", dated November 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "2018 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income", dated November 28, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 For the most recent update please see U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "A Higher Gear", dated December 5, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights The November jobs report keeps the Fed on track. Despite rising government debt levels, crowding out is not a significant threat. Capex as a share of GDP rises the year before a tax cut and falls in the year after. Holiday spending on track, boosted by tax bill. Feature Last week, investors assessed the ramifications of the OPEC meeting and the Senate's passage of the tax plan. The dollar was noticeably higher, and oil moved lower during the week, but other financial markets ended little changed. Chart 1 shows that the Trump trades are making a comeback, providing ample opportunity for investors who may have missed the trade the first time around. In this week's report, we examine the impact of the tax bill on the debt, deficit, and capital spending and more importantly on corporate balance sheets and financial markets. BCA's view is that the risk that rising government debt levels will crowd out private borrowing is low and that the tax cut will provide a tiny boost to an already robust capital spending environment. We also examine what signal the equity markets are sending about household spending in the holiday season. Chart 1Markets Responding To GOP Tax Plan Living In Paradise The November employment report, released last Friday, paints a Goldilocks-type macro environment for U.S. assets. Strong economic growth, muted inflation, and a go-slow Fed should prolong the bull market in U.S. equities. The economy added 228K in net new jobs, and the unemployment rate held steady at 4.1% in November. With the average work week rising by 0.1 hours, aggregate hours worked rose by a solid 0.5% m/m. Even if hours worked hold flat in December, the average for Q4 will be up 2.6% at an annualized rate from Q3. The November payroll data are easily consistent with about 3.5% GDP growth in Q4. BCA expects above-potential real GDP growth to persist well into 2018. Despite the strong growth and tight labor market, wage pressures remain contained. Average hourly earnings rose just 0.2% m/m in November, which followed a downwardly revised 0.1% m/m decline last month. Annual wage inflation is running at 2.5% (Chart 2). Last week's report will not dissuade the Fed from raising rates again next week. As long as GDP growth remains above trend and the labor market is tightening, the Fed will remain somewhat confident that wages will accelerate and inflation will gradually return to the target level. However, there is no reason yet for the Fed to turn more aggressive for fear of falling behind the curve. Chart 2November Jobs Report Keeps Fed On Track It's Getting Mighty Crowded The recently passed U.S. Senate tax reform bill has to be reconciled with the House bill, but it appears that the Republicans may meet their Christmas deadline after all. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service has consistently expected a tax package to pass by the end of Q1 2018 at the latest.1 Although some technical differences between the two versions remain, the two bills are close enough that compromise should not be difficult. The Republicans are under pressure to deliver a "win" ahead of the 2018 mid-term elections. Most of the tax adjustments will occur early next year, except for a reduction in the corporate tax rate that may be delayed until 2019. The Senate version, if passed, would decrease individual taxes by about $680 billion over 10 years, trim small business taxes by just under $400 billion, and reduce corporate taxes by roughly the same amount (including the offsetting tax on currently untaxed foreign profits). The direct effect of all the tax cuts will probably boost real GDP growth in 2018 by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points. However, much depends on the ability of the tax changes and immediate capital expensing to lift animal spirits in the business sector and bring forward investment spending. The total impact - at this stage - is difficult to estimate. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), by the end of 2027 the legislation will add $1 trillion to the debt, including the effects of dynamic scoring. Without the boost from faster economic activity due to the tax changes, the deficit is expected to be $1.4 trillion higher than the CBO's baseline projection for 2027. While nominal economic growth would increase under the plan, the debt-to-GDP ratio would climb to 95% of GDP by 2027, up from 91% under current law (Chart 3). Chart 3Federal Debt As A Share Of GDP Set To Rise Sharply In Coming Decades So far, the Treasury market has shown little reaction to the passage of the Senate bill. Fixed-income investors do not appear to be overly concerned about the implications of the size of the public debt and do not believe that the tax changes alter the Fed's calculations. BCA is also not concerned about the size of public debt in the near term but thinks the tax changes will alter the Fed's forecasts. Nonetheless, more government red ink is likely to raise equilibrium bond yields in the long term. The Fed estimates that the equilibrium 10-year bond yield would rise on a structural basis by 3-4 basis points for each percentage point increase in the Federal government's debt-to-GDP ratio, and by 25 basis points for every percentage point increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio.2 The implication is that if the GOP plan becomes law, then the 10-year yield will be 12-16 bps higher than under current legislation. Nonetheless, there is only a modest risk that mounting U.S. government debt will crowd out private borrowing and choke off investment on a 12-month horizon. Crowding out occurs when soaring government debt sparks competition between the public and private sectors for available savings. Increased demand for private credit, a narrowing output gap, and elevated interest payments as a percentage of GDP, are all preconditions for crowding out. While the output gap has closed, demand for private credit is mixed, at best, and federal interest payments will remain in check. Private credit demand has rebounded from the recession, but it is still tepid. At 2% of corporate sales, nonfinancial corporate borrowing is at the lower end of its post-crisis range and has downshifted since 2015 (Chart 4). Before the 2007-2009 financial crisis, there was a tight relationship between corporate demand for funds and Treasury yields. Since 2009, the link has weakened; credit demand snapped back, but Treasury yields stayed low. Soft C&I loan demand also indicates less of a risk for crowding out (panel 3). Interest payments on the Federal debt are expected to climb, but remain well below all-time highs set in the early 1990s (Chart 5). The CBO's baseline projects that interest payments on the debt as a share of nominal GDP will more than double from 1.4% in 2017 to 2.9% in 2027. These payments will triple in absolute terms from $300 billion in 2017 to more than $800 billion in 2027. The GOP tax plan will boost the 2027 projection, but the CBO has not yet released a new estimate. In a study prepared prior to the passage of the tax bill, the OECD forecast that the federal government's interest payments would climb to 2.9% by 2019. Chart 4Private Credit Demand Has Rebounded,##BR##But Remains Tepid Chart 5Gradual Rise in Net Interest Payments##BR##Not A Crowding Out Threat Moreover, the Tax Policy Center, a center-left think tank, also concluded that interest costs will move up under the new tax law.3 On balance, interest payments on federal debt obligations as a share of the economy are expected to escalate in the next 10 years to 2.5-3%. This reading is in line with the average in the past 20 years, but is still below the 4-4.5% average reached in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the 3.5-4% range observed from 1970-2000. If nothing else changes, higher federal interest payments would absorb funds that could instead be used for areas that add to the productive capacity of the economy, such as education, training and technical innovation. That said, the impact on long-term growth from "crowding out" may only represent a partial offset to the supply-side benefits of the fiscal package to the extent that the business sector lifts capex spending as a result of a lower corporate tax rate and immediate expensing (see below). Bottom Line: Tax cuts are bond bearish but support our overweight stance on equities on the surface. The effective corporate tax rate could decline by about two percentage points, which would boost after-tax cash flows by roughly 2½%. While this is not trivial, much of the good news already appears to be discounted in the S&P 500. Moreover, to the extent that faster growth in 2018 may bring forward hikes in the Fed funds rate, the equity market will have to contend with rising bond yields next year. Investors are also wondering about the tax plan's potential impact on capital spending and corporate balance sheets. Tiny Steps As discussed above, the fiscal package has the potential to generate significant supply side benefits, to the extent that the business sector turns on the capex taps. The JCT estimates that the tax bill will boost U.S. capital stock by 1.1% in 2027, an increase of about 0.1% a year. However, it is uncertain if corporations will permanently boost capex due to increased allowances for capital spending or if the tax shift will merely bring forward future spending. BCA's view is closer to the latter. We expect higher budget and trade deficits in the coming decade as a result of the Senate plan. These deficits will limit the ability of domestic saving to fund needed capital spending projects. Foreign saving will fill the gap. U.S. domestic saving is below the low end its 1960-2008 range (Chart 6). Chart 7 shows that since 1960, there have been four distinct periods of expanding net saving by foreigners. Nominal 10-year Treasury yields rose in three of the four intervals. However, real yields declined in the 1960s, rose in the mid-1970s and early 1980s as foreign saving increased, and then fell in the 1990s and 2000s. Moreover, a rise in the share of foreign saving led to higher capex in the mid-1960s and 1980s, but lower business expenditures in the 1990s (Chart 8). Chart 6Foreigners Will Finance Capex As##BR##Domestic Saving Declines Chart 7Interest Rates As##BR##Foreign Saving Rises Setting aside who will finance the spending, history suggests that business capital spending tends to climb faster in the 12 months prior to a period of rising fiscal thrust than it does in the 12 months following (Chart 9 and Tables 1 and 2). Note that our analysis shows that recessions occurred in five of the seven episodes of pro-cyclical fiscal policy. Chart 8Capex And Rising Foreign Saving Chart 9Capex During Periods Of Fiscal Stimulus In addition, as fiscal thrust escalates, stocks in the industrial and technology sectors underperform the broad market. Small caps generally beat large caps. Since 2000, the fed funds rate fell during periods of fiscal stimulus. Prior to that, the Fed both eased and tightened policy during these episodes (not shown). Table 1Business Spending 12 Months Before Pro-Cyclical Fiscal Policy Table 2Capex In The Year After Stimulative Fiscal Policy Is Enacted BCA's Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) has a tendency to improve during phases of increased fiscal thrust; Chart 10 shows that the CHM improved in five of the seven periods. Free cash flow and return on capital are the best performers during these intervals. In contrast, corporate leverage is apt to shoot up as fiscal policy takes hold. Chart 10Stimulative Fiscal Policy And The Corporate Health Monitor Our fiscal thrust measure includes both personal and corporate tax cuts, and along with increases in government spending. We use fiscal thrust as a proxy because there are a very limited number (just 3 since 1970) of corporate tax cuts to analyze. The paragraphs below covers the impact of corporate tax cuts on capital spending, capital spending-related financial metrics and corporate balance sheets. Capital spending is inclined to rise faster in the 12 months before a corporate tax cut than in the year afterward. The caveat is that there have been only 3 corporate tax cuts in the past 50 years. Charts 11 and 12 and Tables 3 and 4 examine the impact of previous corporate tax reductions on nonresidential fixed investment (and its components) as a share of GDP and on several capex-related metrics in the financial market. Chart 11Corporate Tax Cuts And Capital Spending Chart 12Corporate Tax Cuts And Financial Markets Moreover, industrial stocks underperform the broad market after a tax cut, while tech stocks outperform (Chart 12 again). Small-cap performance is mixed. Both the Fed funds rate and the 10-year Treasury yield rise after corporate tax decreases take effect. Table 3Capex The Year Before A Corporate Tax Cut Table 4Capex In The Year After A Corporate Tax Cut Corporate health weakens in the year before a business tax cut is enacted, but then it improves modestly in the ensuing year. Chart 13 and Tables 5 and 6 examine the significance of previous corporate tax cuts on BCA's Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) and several of its components. The interest coverage ratio deteriorates, on average, both before and after a corporate tax reduction, but leverage increases substantially in the 12 months following a corporate tax cut. Free cash flow deteriorates in the year prior to a drop in the business tax rate, but is little changed in the subsequent year. Chart 12Corporate Tax Cuts And Financial Markets Chart 13Corporate Tax Cuts And The Corporate Health Monitor Bottom Line: Business capital spending was already on the upswing and the output gap was already closed before the tax cut was passed. Accelerated depreciation allowance may pull capex ahead, but not materially change its trajectory over the long term. Corporate tax cuts and fiscal stimulus, in general, boost capex and corporate health, and support BCA's view that credit will outperform Treasuries in 2018. Table 5BCA's Corporate Health Monitor A Year Before A Corporate Tax Cut... Table 6...And In The 12 Months After Boxing Day The critical holiday spending season is in full bloom. Holiday retail sales make up the bulk of total consumer spending, representing about 20% to 30% of total annual retail sales (and about 40% of total personal consumption expenditures). Moreover, according to the National Retail Federation (NRF), although 54% of consumers surveyed expect to spend the same amount in this year's holiday season as in 2016, 24% are prepared to spend more. The NRF forecasts that holiday sales will increase between 3.6% and 4.0%, exceeding last year's 3.6% rate and the 5-year average forecast of 3.5%. Holiday retail sales have faded in nominal and real terms from an average of 4.9% in the 1993-1999 period to 3.7% pre-2008 (2000-2007) and to an average of 3.3% post-2008 GFC (2009-2016). However, the baseline trend, based on average annual growth rates, remains stable at 3%, with upside potential of as much as 6% during robust economic growth phases(mid 2000s) and downside risk to as low as -4% in recessions (2008) (Chart 14). Chart 14Holiday Sales: Strong Tailwinds Intact Holiday sales this season may just get an unexpected boost from stout consumer finances. The implication is that U.S. economic growth should remain above potential well into 2018. Solid consumer balance sheets remain a tailwind even at this late stage of the business cycle. Household balance sheets have been repaired in an optimal way and household net worth continues to soar to new highs. The implication is that households are much less likely to forego holiday spending this season than in periods where household net worth is under downward pressure. Furthermore, stock market returns for the U.S. consumer discretionary sector, measured between the mid-September to mid-December period, are well correlated with holiday spending trends (Chart 15). The 8.6% rise in the consumer discretionary sector since mid-September heralds another healthy holiday spending season. However, global consumer discretionary retailers are a better predictor of holiday sales than domestic consumer discretionary retailers. Prices here are up 6.6% since mid-September. Chart 15Trends Of Holiday Sales And Equity Returns Furthermore, expectations of tax reform legislation becoming law by the end of the year will incentivize low income households to spend more this holiday season. This cohort is apt to pay for holiday purchases with cash. The NRF has likened the benefit of the tax plan to a "free Christmas".4 The NRF suggests that the cumulative savings from the tax package for an average household will offset the $967.13 projected to be spent this year by the average household in the holiday season. Moreover, a 2016 Fed study finds that the financing for holiday spending varies by income. Low income households have a tendency to source holiday spending from savings/income rather than borrowing, and if access to credit is not readily available, they simply will not spend on holiday shopping.5 To ensure that a majority of U.S. households contribute towards a robust holiday spending season, strong employment growth alongside stable wage growth (and higher real income expectations) and sturdy consumer confidence is required. With an already tight labor market and the underemployment rate (U-6) close to pre-recession lows, solid consumer fundamentals remain intact. Bottom Line: A robust holiday shopping season is likely in 2017, supported by stout consumer balance sheets, the new tax bill, and rising wages and incomes. The 8.6% run up in consumer discretionary stocks also suggests that a happy holiday for retailers is in prospect. BCA's U.S. Equity Strategy service has a neutral rating on the Consumer Discretionary sector, but recommends an overweight the advertising, home improvement retail and leisure products industry groups. Additionally, BCA maintains an overweight to the holiday-sensitive Air Freight and logistics industry within the Industrial sector.6 Strong personal spending will support above potential GDP growth in Q4 and into 2018, eliminate the output gap, push the unemployment rate further below NAIRU and push up inflation and ultimately bond yields. Stay short duration. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Jizel Georges, Senior Analyst jizelg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Xi Jinping: Chairman Of Everything," October 25, 2017. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 "New Evidence on the Interest Rate Effects of Budget Deficits and Debt", Thomas Laubach, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May 2003. https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2003/200312/200312pap.pdf 3 http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication/148841/2001606-macroeconomic-analysis-of-the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-as-passed-by-the-house-of-representatives_1.pdf 4 https://nrf.com/media/press-releases/retailers-say-senate-passage-of-tax-reform-could-give-shoppers-free-christmas 5 https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2016/holiday-spending-and-financing-decisions-in-2015-survey-of-household-economics-and-decisionmaking-20161201.html 6 https://uses.bcaresearch.com/trades/recommendations

Special Report

Highlights The House and Senate have passed similar tax cut bills; passage of a compromise version seems all but certain; Combined with the Trump administration's de-regulation efforts, fundamentals point ever higher for U.S. earnings; The under-reported change, in both versions of the bill, to the expensing of capital investments could have far-reaching implications; All of these support the ongoing healthy sector rotation; The lion's share of upside from the capex upcycle should go to industrials, followed closely by financials. Feature Chart 1Republicans Are Not Fiscally Responsible BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has maintained a high-conviction view since November 9, 2016 that Congress would pass budget-busting tax cuts.1 With the Senate Republicans passing their version of the bill on December 2, the odds that a final version of the bill will pass into law are now very high. What should investors expect from the new tax legislation? Much as our geopolitical team faced considerable resistance to their political forecast, investors are now skeptical that there will be any stimulative economic effect from tax cuts. While we admit that the direct effect on the economy will be moderate, tax cuts have the potential to sustain the healthy sector rotation and supercharge the ongoing capex cycle. In this Special Report, we explain why. Why Did We Get Tax Cuts Right? What did our geopolitical team get right about tax cuts? First, in November 2016, right after the election, we reminded clients that the Republican Party has a spotty record on fiscal conservativism. There is no empirical evidence that GOP policymakers are actually fiscally conservative (Chart 1), nor that Republican voters have a stable preference for fiscally conservative policies (Chart 2). As such, there was not going to be a popular revolt against tax cuts. Second, in April 2017, we saw that Obamacare repeal's failure actually increased the probability of tax cuts passing. Put simply, tax cuts are about motivating the Republican base to come out and vote in the upcoming midterms, not about satisfying the median American voter. Polling currently suggests that Republicans face an uphill battle to retain majority in the House of Representatives (Chart 3). Should investors fear that the ongoing Mueller investigation will scuttle tax cuts? The short answer is no. First, former National Security Adviser Michael Flynn lied to the FBI and has been charged with that offense, but what he did for the Trump administration in the interim between the election and the inauguration is likely not illegal. Chart 2Republican Desire For Smaller Government Wanes When In Power Chart 3Republicans Losing Popular Support Second, White House scandals and intrigue have rarely mattered to the market. Chart 4A and Chart 4B show that both the Tea Pot Dome scandal (the greatest in U.S. history at the time) and the Lewinsky affair occurred amidst the two greatest bull markets. While the Watergate scandal appears to have shaken the markets, it also escalated simultaneously with the historic 1973 oil shock and the onset of the 1973-75 recession. Besides, why would investors turn negative on the S&P 500 if President Trump - a highly unorthodox, unpredictable, and impulsive politician - looked to be replaced by Vice President Mike Pence? Earnings fundamentals drive the market, not political intrigue. Thus, we would fade impeachment risk and stick to getting the fundamentals right. Chart 4AMassive Bull Markets... Chart 4B...Attended Massive Scandals What about upside potential? Is there any left now that the market has begun to fully price in tax cuts, or will it be a reason to sell and crystalize profits? It is difficult to say, but our sense is that the healthy rotation out of tech (U.S. Equity Strategy is underweight) and into financials (overweight) and industrials (overweight) will gain steam. Also high-effective-tax-rate stocks and mostly domestically focused small caps have likely turned the corner (Chart 5), and the "Fed Spread" (2-year yield minus the fed funds rate) continues to point toward brisk economic growth in coming quarters (Chart 6). While the S&P 500 is up 18% year-to-date, synchronized global economic growth and robust earnings explain half the rise, the other half is forward multiple expansion. Were a 5%-10% pullback to materialize after all the tax-related dust settled, we would deem it a healthy development and a reset that would propel equities higher on the back of firm EPS growth next year. Furthermore, the market has cheered Trump's de-regulation drive, which, unlike tax cuts, has been concrete policy from day one of his administration (Chart 7). Chart 5Market Has Doubted Tax Reform Chart 6Growth Prospects Still Good Chart 7Market Has Cheered De-Regulation De-regulation is likely to continue in parallel with lower taxes. For example, in a potentially huge blow to the enforcement powers of the federal bureaucracy, Trump's Justice Department has switched sides in a lawsuit that may shortly come before the Supreme Court (Lucia v Securities and Exchange Commission). The DOJ is now backing the plaintiffs instead of supporting the SEC as the Obama administration had. If the plaintiffs win their argument that the SEC's "administrative law judges" were unconstitutionally appointed by bureaucrats (instead of by the president, the courts, or the head of an executive department), then all of the prior decisions and penalties enforced by these judges (and their peers in other bureaucracies) may be legally invalidated, weakening the enforcement mechanisms of the federal bureaucracy.2 Bottom Line: Tax cuts are coming while the deregulation drive is set to continue. Both are bullish for the market from a cyclical time perspective. What about the economy and equity-sector-specific winners? To this question we now turn. Lighting The Afterburners On The Capex Cycle With the eye-popping numbers involved, it is no surprise that the media's analysis to date of the impact of the impending tax reform has been focused on the reduction of the corporate tax rate and the repatriation of foreign earnings. However, the impact of those headline-grabbing reforms on changing consumption behavior and, as a result, delivering real economic growth remains hotly debated. We think more attention should be paid to the provision in the versions from both chambers of Congress allowing the immediate expensing of capital investment. Unlike the reductions in tax rate (Table 1), U.S. firms only benefit from this change when they deploy capital on qualified property and equipment at home, an unambiguously stimulative change. Table 1Sector Tax Rates And Pro Forma EPS Changes From Tax Reform We believe most market observers have overlooked this reform as it is simply a "time value of money" shift. The IRS already allows significantly accelerated depreciation of capex (please see the Appendix on page 12 for more detailed information); this reform merely brings it forward. Our analysis suggests that the impact of bringing it forward could, at the margin, change spending behavior for firms and drive the next up-leg for the capex cycle in 2018. In our analysis, we use the example of a railroad. The current tax code allows the firm to depreciate the cost of a locomotive over 7 years, roughly the average for all assets under the depreciation schedule published by the IRS. This already incents the firm to deploy capex aggressively because fleet ages are well in excess of 7 years. Further, as long as the asset is new and to be used in the U.S., the company can depreciate a bonus 40% in the first year.3 Assume this railroad is paying the new marginal tax rate in the U.S. of 20% and has the same cost of capital as the U.S. government, approximating 2.4%. If the railroad purchases a locomotive for $10,000, the current regime offers a present value tax benefit of $1,919 (Table 2). The proposed tax reform allows the railroad to collect that benefit immediately (at least for the next 5 years), yielding a present value 4.2% greater than the current regime. Using an estimate of the S&P 500's weighted average cost of capital (8.5%) as a discount rate (an obviously more realistic scenario), and this advantage climbs to 14.2% (Table 3). Table 2Tax Shield Implications Are Modest With A Low Discount Rate... Table 3...But Grow Substantially As Discount Rates Rise In theory, any profit maximizing firm should alter their capital budgets such that returns are adjusted to incorporate a significantly higher tax shield. We, thus, expect tax reform to drive significant new order growth in the near term as foreseeable capex is pulled forward. A case could be made that this reform changes the math sufficiently that U.S. firms will add capacity that is incremental to existing plans, hinging on a positive feedback loop from the new order growth the pull-forward effect noted above. Who Wins? While our cyclical view of an ongoing EPS upcycle morphing into a virtuous broad-based capex upcycle remains intact (Chart 8)4, there are two sectors that will almost immediately benefit from the tax bill getting signed into law. The greatest, and perhaps most obvious, beneficiary of any capital largesse that will follow this reform will be S&P industrials (overweight) as the principal destination for increases in capital deployment. We expect higher capex to lead to higher sales growth courtesy of firm end-demand and high operating leverage, flow-through to the bottom line, which boosts EPS and sustains the virtuous upcycle. True, wage growth would also get a bump mildly denting profit margins. However, at this stage of the business cycle and given accelerating pricing power (Chart 9), capital goods producers will likely succeed in passing through wage inflation. S&P financials (overweight) too should be significant beneficiaries via a step function higher in loan growth to finance the outsized demand for capital and generalized lift in animal spirits (Chart 10), though they have a partial offset arising from the reduction in value of their net operating loss (NOL) tax assets. A sustained push for more bank deregulation, along with shareholder-friendly activities will also boost the allure of financials equities. Chart 8Earnings Are The Critical Capex Driver Chart 9Capex Upcycles Drive Industrial EPS... Chart 10...And Boost Loan Demand Bottom Line: S&P industrials and financials sectors get an early Christmas present in the form of demand-enhancing tax reform, combined with corporate tax cuts that allow them to keep their profits. The result should be outstanding EPS growth and rising stock prices. The S&P industrials and financials sectors remain core portfolio overweights. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Chris Bowes, Associate Editor U.S. Equity Strategy chrisb@bcaresearch.com Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy & anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "U.S. Election: Outcomes & Investment Implications," dated November 9, 2016, and "Constraints & Preferences Of The Trump Presidency," dated November 30, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 We thank our colleague Matt Conlan, of BCA's Energy Sector Strategy, for the tip on this crucial court case. 3 First year depreciation is set to step down to 40% from 50% in 2018, according to the phasing out of the bonus depreciation under the 2015 PATH Act. 4 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy, "Top 5 Reasons To Favor Cyclicals Over Defensives," dated October 16, 2017, and "Later Cycle Dynamics," dated October 23, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Appendix: Why Does Accelerated Depreciation Matter? Accelerated depreciation is a tax incentive for firms to invest in capital assets. In essence, the IRS provides depreciable lives of assets that are shorter than useful lives, allowing firms to gain the tax benefit of the depreciation expense earlier in the asset's life. Assuming tax reforms are passed as currently written, firms will be able to deduct 100% of the capital cost of new equipment in the first year. Using our railroad example from earlier in this report, the capital cost was $10,000 and, with a tax rate of 20%, the tax shield is thus $2,000. Continuing with that example, imagine the locomotive has an estimated useful life of 10 years. In the absence of any accelerated depreciation (including that which is already on the books), the tax shield would be roughly half of what accelerated depreciation allows (Table 4). Note that the gross tax benefit is unchanged, it is merely shifted from the future to the present. Table 4Straight Line Depreciation Halves Tax Shield

Dear Client, I recorded a webcast with my colleague Caroline Miller earlier this week. Caroline and I discussed the recent tax legislation in the U.S. and other key investment topics. I hope you will find the time to listen in. I am also happy to announce that going forward, in addition to sending you my regular reports, I will be sharing my thoughts on the economy and markets through Twitter. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Some profit taking is likely over the next few weeks as U.S. equities discount a more realistic assessment of how lower tax rates will affect corporate cash flows. The cyclical picture for the U.S. and the global economy remains bright, implying that any correction will be short-lived. History suggests that the 7th and 8th innings of business-cycle expansions are often the most profitable for equity investors. With another recession still at least a year away, it is too early to get bearish on stocks and other risk assets. Feature Tax Cuts Arrive Early We had expected the Republicans in Congress to deliver on their pledge to cut taxes, but thought that the legislative process would drag on for longer than it did. In the end, the Senate was able to pass a hastily negotiated bill, giving Donald Trump his first major political victory. The question is where things go from here. The Senate and House bills still need to be reconciled. We do not anticipate much drama in that regard, given the broad similarities between the two versions. The bigger issue is how the legislation will affect the economy and markets. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated in mid-November that the original Senate version of the bill would raise the level of real GDP by an average of 0.8% over the ten-year budget window.1 It is reasonable to assume that the final bill will boost GDP by a similar amount. The impact on growth is likely to be somewhat front-loaded, given that several provisions will either expire or be phased out after five years. We expect real GDP growth to be 0.2%-to-0.3% higher in 2018 and 2019 as a result of the legislation. This is not a particularly large effect, which explains why the bond market reaction has been fairly muted. The impact on corporate profits will be more pronounced, but even here, one should keep things in perspective. The final bill is likely to reduce corporate taxes by about $350 billion over the next ten years. The JCT's baseline assumes corporate tax receipts of $3.9 trillion over the next decade. Thus, the bill will probably reduce the effective corporate tax rate by a bit less than two percentage points, taking it down from 19% to 17%. This, in turn, implies an increase in after-tax corporate cash flows of about 2.5% (i.e., 83 divided by 81). The market ran up a lot more than that over the past few months. Thus, we would not be surprised to see some profit-taking over the coming weeks. Cyclical Picture Still Bright If such a stock market correction occurs, it would represent a buying opportunity. Historically, recessions and bear markets have gone hand in hand (Chart 1). Right now, none of our recession indicators are warning of an imminent downturn (Chart 2). Chart 1Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Chart 2ANo Imminent Risk Of A U.S. Recession Chart 2BNo Imminent Risk Of A U.S. Recession This reassuring conclusion is consistent with the signal from our forthcoming MacroQuant Model, which we will be discussing in greater detail in the months ahead. This ground-breaking model examines dozens of variables, including a number of BCA's proprietary indicators, in order to consistently and accurately project returns across the key asset classes, geographies, and time horizons. Currently, the model is flagging a somewhat elevated risk of a temporary pullback, but continues to give a highly bullish reading on the cyclical (6-to-12 month) outlook (Chart 3). Chart 3BCA's MacroQuant Model Still Likes Equities The model's auspicious assessment largely stems from the strength of recent economic data in the U.S. and around the world. Global growth estimates continue to grind higher (Chart 4). In the U.S., the new orders component of the ISM manufacturing index rose to 64 in November, while the inventory component sank to 47. We have found that the gap between the two is a powerful predictor of stock market returns (Chart 5). The current gap is in the 87th percentile of its historic range. By the same token, core durable goods orders, initial unemployment claims, capex intentions, consumer and business confidence, global PMIs, and most other leading indicators paint a fairly upbeat picture. Chart 4Global Growth Projections Are Trending Higher Chart 5ISM As A Predictor Of Market Returns The euro area and Japan also continue to grow at a robust pace (Chart 6). Somewhat worryingly, China has seen growth tick down a notch in recent months (Chart 7). However, the evidence so far suggests that growth has merely slowed from an above-trend pace back towards potential. Nominal GDP rose by 11.2% year-over-year in Q3 2017, up from 6.4% in Q4 2015. Producer price inflation has gone from as low as negative 5.9% in September 2015 to 6.9% at present. Core CPI inflation has also accelerated, rising to 2.3% in October (Chart 8). In this light, recent efforts by the authorities to expedite structural reforms are coming at an opportune time. Chart 6Positive Growth Momentum ##br##In The Euro Area And Japan Chart 7Growth Has Ticked Down##br## In China... Chart 8... But Merely From##br## An Above-Trend Pace Too Early To Bail Out Of Stocks Table 1Stocks And Recessions: Case-By-Case All good things must come to an end. As we discussed in our latest Strategy Outlook, the global economy is likely to fall into recession in late 2019.2 Markets will sniff out a recession before it happens, but in general, the lag time between when markets peak and when recessions begin does not tend to be very long. Table 1 shows that the lag has averaged seven months during the post-war era, with the past three recessions featuring an average gap of only four months. In fact, history suggests that the 7th and 8th innings of business-cycle expansions are often the most profitable for investors. The S&P 500 has delivered an average annualized real total return of 14.2% since 1950 in the 13-to-24 months prior to past U.S. recessions (Table 2). This exceeds the average return of 10.1% during business-cycle expansions. The S&P has returned 8% at an annualized pace in the 7-to-12 months prior to past recessions. While this is below the average return during past expansions, it is still well above the average return on bonds and cash during the corresponding periods. Moreover, the performance of stocks in the 7-to-12 month period preceding recessions has improved sharply over the past few business cycles. The S&P 500 generated an annualized real total return of 22.2%, 20%, and 13.6% in the 7-to-12 months prior to the beginning of the 1990-91, 2001, and 2007-09 recessions, respectively. Table 2How Have Stocks Performed Prior To Recessions? Stocks only begin to underperform in a meaningful way in the six months before the recession and continue to underperform in the initial phase of the downturn. Thus, even if one had known with complete certainty that a recession was coming, getting out of stocks more than six months in advance of the downturn would have been a mistake. Bottom line: With another recession still at least a year away, it is too early to get bearish on equities and other risk assets. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Macroeconomic Analysis Of The "Tax Cut And Jobs Act" As Ordered Reported By The Senate Committee On Finance On November 16, 2017," The Joint Committee On Taxation, U.S. Congress (November 30, 2017). 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Outlook, "A Timeline For The Next Five Years," dated December 1, 2017. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights The growth momentum of China's recent mini-cycle has peaked, but the ongoing slowdown is likely to continue to remain benign in nature. A return to 2015-like conditions is not the most likely outcome over the coming year. Chinese policymakers are likely to increase their focus on reform efforts next year, but the pace will have to be modulated to avoid a repeat of the significant slowdown that occurred in 2014/2015. The risk of a policy mistake is a key theme to watch for 2018. Chinese ex-tech stocks have room to re-rate next year in a benign slowdown scenario. Investors should stay overweight Chinese investable equities vs EM and global stocks. Feature BCA recently published its special year end Outlook report for 2018,1 which described the macro themes that are likely to drive global financial markets over the coming year. In this week's China Investment Strategy report we expand on the Outlook, by reviewing our three key themes for China over the coming year. Key Theme # 1: A Benign End To China's Recent Mini-Cycle We presented our case that the cyclical slowdown of the Chinese economy will likely be benign in our October 12 Weekly Report. Chart 1 presents a stylized view of the Chinese economy over the past three years that was published in that report, which illustrated our framework of how cyclical growth conditions have evolved over this "mini-cycle". It also highlighted three possible scenarios for the coming 6-12 months, and noted that our bet was on scenario 2: A re-acceleration of the economy and a continuation of the V-shaped rebound profile A benign, controlled deceleration and settling of growth into the "stable" growth range, and An uncontrolled and sharp deceleration in the economy that threatens a return to the conditions that prevailed in early-2015 (or worse) Chart 1A Stylized View Of China's Recent "Mini-Cycle" Since we presented this framework, incoming evidence has been consistent with our call. Chart 2 shows that the Li Keqiang index has now decisively rolled over, but that economic conditions remain well away from their mid-2015 lows. We sketched out the basis for our benign slowdown view in our October 12 piece, but we followed up more formally in a two-part report that addressed the main factors arguing against a return to 2015-like conditions.2 Our view is grounded in the perspective that economic conditions in 2015 were not "normal", and we showed in these reports how a sharp slowdown in the economy was caused by an extremely weak external demand environment and overly tight monetary policy. On the trade front, Chart 3 highlights how Chinese export growth is likely to moderate over the coming several months, which argues against the re-acceleration scenario described above. Since mid-2011, Chinese export growth has lagged what most economic indicators would have predicted, and we noted in part I of our 2015 vs today comparison that this can be traced largely to two factors: a decline in global import intensity and, to a lesser extent, a decline in China's export "market share". Chart 2An Economic Slowdown In China##br## Is Now Underway Chart 3Chinese Export Growth Likely To##br## Converge To Global IP Growth Our analysis in that report suggested that China's 2018 export growth will converge to that of global industrial production, which implies a modest deceleration in the months ahead. Still, export growth of +4% would be a far cry from the significant contraction of exports that occurred in late-2015 / early-2016, which is consistent with a benign growth slowdown. On the monetary policy front, we showed how a monetary conditions approach captured the tightness of China's policy stance from 2012 to early-2015, which led to a material decline in China's industrial sector (Chart 4). Our Special Report last week further supported the view that monetary conditions matter enormously for China's economy; out of 40 macro data series that we tested to reliably predict the Chinese business cycle, only measures of money & credit passed our criteria.3 An aggregate indicator of these 6 series has a similar profile to the Bloomberg Monetary Conditions Index that we have shown in the past (Chart 4, panel 2), and neither suggests that a sharp further slowdown in China's economy is imminent. We will be watching these indicators closely in 2018 for signs of a more aggressive decline than we currently expect. Recently, some investors have pointed to a sharp rise in China's corporate bond yields as a sign that the monetary policy stance is, in fact, tighter than a standard monetary conditions approach would imply. Indeed, China's 5-year AA corporate bond yield has risen 230 bps since late-October 2016, from 3.6% to 5.9%, with most of this rise having occurred due to a rise in government bond yields. Corporate bond spreads have also risen, but relative to spreads on similarly-rated U.S. credit, the rise appears to reflect a rebound from extremely low levels late last year and is not (yet) symptomatic of major concerns over defaults (Chart 5). Chart 4The Ongoing Slowdown Is Likely ##br##To Be Benign Chart 5China's Corporate Bond Spreads ##br##Do Not Yet Look Onerous We are not complacent of the potential risk posed by rising corporate bond yields, and a further significant rise in 2018 could change our view that a benign economic slowdown is the most likely outcome. But for now, the fact that the stock of corporate bond issuance accounts for only 10% of ex-equity social financing suggests that the rise in yields this year is not likely to have an outsized impact on the economy in 2018, beyond the impact that monetary tightening has had on overall average interest rates (which, for now, is material but has not returned rates back to their 2015 levels). Chart 6The Rise In CPI Will Likely Soon Peak Finally, the 85 bps rise in Chinese core consumer price inflation that has occurred over the past year has also fed investor concerns that monetary policy will become even tighter next year. To us, this risk is probably overblown, given that demand-driven inflation lags growth (which has clearly peaked). Chart 6 shows the year-over-year change in Chinese core CPI vs that of the Li Keqiang index, and clearly suggests that the acceleration in core prices is likely to soon abate. Poor communication from the PBOC means that it is not clear how prominently core inflation features into the central bank's reaction function, but given that tighter monetary conditions have already caused a peak in both house prices and growth momentum, we doubt that policymakers will see the recent rise in consumer prices as a basis to aggressively tighten further. Bottom Line: The growth momentum of China's recent mini-cycle has peaked, but a return to 2015-like conditions is not the most likely outcome over the coming year. Key Theme # 2: Monitoring The Pace Of Renewed Structural Reforms We have written several reports concerning China's 19th Communist Party Congress over the past three months, both in the lead-up to the event and as a post-mortem.4 The Congress was significant because it likely heralds stepped-up reform efforts in 2018 and beyond. By "reforms", our Geopolitical Strategy team specifically means deleveraging in the financial sector accompanied by a more intense anti-corruption campaign focused on the shadow-banking sector, as well as ongoing restructuring in the industrial sector. Table 1 presents our geopolitical team's assessment of the likely reform scenarios and probabilities over the coming year. It should be clearly noted that the "reform reboot" scenario as described in Table 1 is likely negative for emerging market equities and other plays on China's industrial sector (such as industrial metals). Table 1Post-Party Congress Scenarios And Probabilities We agree that the "status quo" scenario of no significant reforms is highly unlikely given that President Xi has succeeded in amassing tremendous political capital and that he has an agenda for reform. But the intensity of reforms pursued over the coming year will have to be closely monitored by policymakers, to avoid a repeat of the significant slowdown that occurred in 2014/2015. As such, the view of BCA's China Investment Strategy service is that the reform efforts over the coming year will be structured at a pace that is sufficient to avoid a meaningful deceleration in China's industrial sector and is conducive to the outperformance of Chinese ex-technology stocks. However, the potential for a brisk pace of reforms to cause a more acute decline in industrial activity in 2018 is a risk to our view that China's ongoing economic slowdown is likely to be benign and controlled. We presented our framework for monitoring this risk in our November 16 Weekly Report,5 specifically our BCA China Reform Monitor (Chart 7). The monitor is calculated as an equally-weighted average of four "winner" sectors that outperformed the investable benchmark in the month following the Party Congress relative to an equally-weighted average of the remaining seven sectors. Significant underperformance of "loser" sectors could become a headwind for broad MSCI China outperformance (especially ex-tech), and we will be watching in 2018 for signs that our monitor is rising largely due to outright declines in the denominator. Chart 7Our Reform Monitor Will Help Us Judge ##br##Whether The Pace Of Reforms Becomes Too Burdensome For now, there is no indication that reform risk is affecting the performance of the MSCI China index. Panel 2 of Chart 7 highlights that recent movements in our Reform Monitor have been driven by the "winner" sectors, with the recent selloff largely reflecting a modest correction in global technology stocks sparked by the passage of the U.S. Senate's tax reform plan.6 But we will be watching the monitor closely in 2018, and will adjust it as needed in reaction to additional reform announcements over the coming months. Finally, next year's reform announcements will be highly significant not just because of the "what", but also the "how". It is difficult to see how China's leadership can aggressively pare back heavy-polluting industry and deleverage the financial sector without destabilizing the economy in the near term, but their goal to significantly raise China's per capita GDP and escape the "middle income trap" over the long-term is equally nebulous. We have noted in previous reports that a country's income level is fundamentally determined by its productivity, which is in turn determined by the level and sophistication of its capital stock. Chart 8 shows a clear positive correlation between a country's per capita output, a measure of productivity, and its per capita capital stock. In general, industrialized countries enjoy much higher levels of per capita capital stock than developing economies, leading to much higher productivity, income, and living standards. Therefore, the process of industrialization is fundamentally a process of accumulation of capital stock through investment. As shown in Chart 9, despite some remarkable achievements, the productivity level of the average Chinese worker is still just a fraction of the level in more advanced countries. Conventional economics would suggest that if China wishes to keep progressing on the productivity and income ladder, that it should remain on the path of growing the capital stock through savings and investment. If, however, it abandons its current growth model and "rebalances" towards a consumption-driven one, the risk that the country will stagnate and fail to advance beyond the "middle income trap" looms large. Chart 8Productivity Is Positively Correlated ##br##With Capital Stock Chart 9China's Catchup Process ##br## Has A Lot Further To Run Chart 10 makes this point from a different perspective. At root, China's leadership is describing the desire to rapidly transition towards an economy with a much higher level of tertiary industry (services) as a share of GDP, but the U.S. experience suggests that this is a long process that is not investment-oriented. The chart shows the evolution of U.S. investment in private services excluding real estate as a share of total private fixed assets since 1947, when the U.S. had only a slightly higher level of real per capita GDP than China today. It has taken almost 70 years for the share of private services ex real estate to rise by 16 percentage points in the U.S., and it has yet to account for the majority of private fixed investment.7 Services activity/investment also typically requires a highly educated workforce as an input, and rate of China's post-secondary educational attainment appears to be too low to fit the bill (Chart 11). In short, crucial details about China's reform plan should hopefully emerge in 2018, which are likely to have both near-term and multi-year implications. Bottom Line: Chinese policymakers are likely to increase their focus on reform efforts next year, but the pace will have to be modulated to avoid a repeat of the significant slowdown that occurred in 2014/2015. The risk of a policy mistake is a key theme to watch for 2018. Chart 10China Cannot Easily Replace 'Hard' Investment Chart 11China's Workforce Is Not Well Equipped To Transition To Services Key Theme # 3: The Relative Re-Rating Of Chinese Investable Ex-Tech Stocks Over the past several years, this publication argued strongly that the valuation discount applied to Chinese equities was unjustified. For the investable benchmark, the past two years of material outperformance vs emerging market and global stocks has removed a significant portion of this discount, and we noted in our August 31 Weekly Report that Chinese equities are no longer "exceptionally cheap".8 However, a good portion of this revaluation has been isolated to the tech sector. Chart 12 shows that while the 12-month forward P/E ratio for Chinese tech stocks is 70% higher than the global average, ex-tech shares still trade at a 37% relative discount. Chart 13 echoes this conclusion by showing the ex-tech price-to-book ratio for every country in MSCI's All Country World index; by this metric China's ex-tech cheapness currently ranks in the 85th percentile, behind only Israel, Colombia, Italy, Jordan, Korea, Russia, and Greece. Chart 12China: Expensive Tech, Extremely Cheap Ex-Tech Chart 13China's Ex-Tech P/B Ratio Among The Lowest In The World Charts 12 and 13 are weighted simply by the remaining market capitalization in each country's market after excluding the technology sector, meaning that the deep discount applied to Chinese banks wields a disproportionate influence (financials would make up 40% of China's MSCI ex-tech "index", if one officially existed). Although we agree that the magnitude of the rise in debt over the past several years warrants somewhat of a P/B discount, we would argue that the risk is more earnings and dilution-related rather than solvency-related. It is highly unlikely that the Chinese government would allow large banks to fail outright in the event of a serious financial crisis, but the potential for a rise in provisioning and significant new capital raising suggests that the risk premium for these stocks should be somewhat higher than what would otherwise be normal. Chart 14China's Banks Can Re-Rate ##br##In A Benign Slowdown Scenario Still, either the Chinese bank risk premium is excessive, or the banking sectors of several major DM countries are significantly overvalued. For example, Chinese investable banks trade at a P/B ratio of 0.8, but Canadian, Australian, and Swedish banks trade at an average P/B ratio of 1.7. If the concern over credit excesses is the source of the higher risk premium applied to Chinese banks, Chart 14 suggests that there is a major inconsistency in pricing; an equally-weighted average of Canadian, Australian, and Swedish private sector debt-to-GDP is higher than that of China's, at 214% vs 211% as of Q2 this year. Our bet is the former: In a world where outsized returns are scarce and U.S. equities are overvalued, a benign growth deceleration and a modulated pace of reforms favor a lessening of the substantial valuation discount currently applied to China's investable ex-tech stocks. Barring a more pronounced slowdown in China's economy than we currently expect, investors should stay overweight the MSCI China investable index in 2018, within both an emerging markets and global equity portfolio. Bottom Line: Chinese ex-tech stocks have room to re-rate in a benign slowdown scenario. Investors should stay overweight Chinese investable stocks in 2018. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Special Report, "2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course," dated November 20, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Reports "China's Economy - 2015 Vs Today (Part I): Trade", dated October 26, 2017, and "China's Economy - 2015 Vs Today (Part II): Monetary Policy", dated November 9, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle", dated November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Reports, "China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer", dated September 14, 2017, "How To Read Xi Jinping's Party Congress Speech", dated October 18, 2017, and BCA Special Report "China: Party Congress Ends ... So What?", dated November 2, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Messages From The Market, Post-Party Congress", dated November 16, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 6 The Senate bill that was passed this week unexpectedly retained 20% alternative minimum tax (AMT) for corporations, which would disproportionately impact U.S. technology companies. Indications currently suggest that the final tax cut bill to be approved by both houses of Congress will repeal the AMT. 7 In 2016, real estate investment accounted for roughly 29% of total private investment in fixed assets, and the sum of primary and secondary industry (agriculture, mining, utilities, construction, and manufacturing) accounted for about 28%. 8 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Closer Look At Chinese Equity Valuations", dated August 31, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights A more bearish backdrop for bonds, led by the U.S.: Faster global growth, with rebounding inflation expectations, will trigger tighter overall global monetary policy. This will be led by Fed rate hikes and, later in 2018, ECB tapering. Global bond yields will rise in response, primarily due to higher inflation expectations. Growth & policy divergences will create cross-market bond investment opportunities: Global growth in 2018 will become less synchronized compared to 2016 & 2017, as will individual country monetary policies. Government bonds in the U.S. and Canada, where rate hikes will happen, will underperform, while bonds in the U.K. and Australia, where rates will likely be held steady, will outperform. The most dovish central banks will be forced to turn less dovish: The ECB and BoJ will both slow the pace of their asset purchases in 2018, in response to strong domestic economies and rising inflation. This will lead to bear-steepening of yield curves in Europe, mostly in the latter half of 2018. The BoJ could raise its target on JGB yields, but only modestly, in response to an overall higher level of global bond yields. The low market volatility backdrop will end through higher bond volatility: Incremental tightening by central banks, in response to faster inflation, will raise the volatility of global interest rates. This will eventually weigh on global growth expectations over the course of 2018, and create a more volatile backdrop for risk assets in the latter half of the year. Feature BCA's annual Outlook report, outlining the main investment themes that will drive global asset markets in 2018, was sent to all clients in late November.1 In this Weekly Report, we drill down into the specific implications of those themes for global bond markets over the next year. In a follow-up report to be published in two weeks, we will discuss how to piece together those implications into an effective fixed income portfolio for 2018. A More Bearish Backdrop For Bonds, Led First By The U.S., Then By Europe The first major takeaway for bond investors from the BCA Outlook is that the current bullish global backdrop of easy monetary policy, solid growth and low inflation is going to change in the coming year. A robust global economy with broadening inflation pressures will force the major central banks to continue incrementally moving away from extraordinarily accommodative monetary policy settings. This will set up an eventual collision between policy and the markets, the latter of which have benefitted so much from the support of the former during the current bull run for risk assets. The changing monetary backdrop will essentially split 2018 into two halves. The current pro-risk backdrop will be maintained in the first half of the year, with continued above-potential global growth and higher realized inflation in the major developed economies at a time when monetary policy is still too accommodative (Chart 1). This will put upward pressure on global bond yields. There is potential for a significant move higher, as real yields now are too low relative to robust global growth and market-based inflation expectations remain well below central bank inflation targets (Chart 2). Chart 1Central Banks Are##BR##Lagging The Cycle Chart 2Both Global Real Yields AND Inflation##BR##Expectations Are Too Low The trend of rising bond yields will be most acute in the U.S., at least in the first half of 2018. The economy is already operating above potential (Chart 3), and this is before factoring in any impact from the tax cut plan currently being finalized in the U.S. Congress. This fiscal stimulus risks overheating the U.S. economy and will likely encourage the Fed to hike interest rates in 2018 by at least as much as it is currently projecting (75bps after the almost certain rate hike later this month). A faster growth trajectory, combined with a rebound in realized inflation after the 2017 slump, will restore investors' belief that U.S. inflation can move back to the Fed's 2% target. The latter can boost the inflation expectations component of the benchmark 10-year U.S. Treasury yield by as much as 60bps next year. The Fed will feel more emboldened to continue delivering rate hikes if inflation expectations are closer to the central bank's target, thus providing an additional boost to Treasury yields. We project that the 10-year Treasury yield can rise up into the 2.9-3% range, well above the current market forwards. The pressure on global bond yields will not only come from the U.S., according to the BCA Outlook. The booming European economy, freed from the years of fiscal austerity after the Euro Debt Crisis and supported by hyper-easy monetary policy from the European Central Bank (ECB), will continue to grow at an above-trend pace in 2018. Japan is enjoying a very powerful cyclical move (by its own modest post-bubble standards) that should continue given very easy monetary policy, robust profit growth and a historically tight labor market. While China is expected to slow on the back of tighter monetary policy and less fiscal stimulus, growth is still expected to be above 6% in 2018. For all of these economies, inflation is expected to rise alongside growth (to varying degrees) given tight labor markets and diminished levels of global spare capacity. Higher oil prices will also boost global inflation and raise the inflation expectations component of global bond yields, given BCA's above-consensus view on oil prices in 2018 (Chart 4). This will also put bear-steepening pressure on many developed market government bond yield curves as inflation expectations increase, particularly with so many countries operating without much economic slack. This argues for being long inflation protection (i.e. inflation-linked bonds vs. nominals or CPI swaps) in 2018, particularly in the U.S., Euro Area and Japan where inflation expectations are well below central bank targets. Chart 3The Global Output Gap Is Closed Chart 4Rising Oil Will Boost Inflation Expectations The BCA Outlook noted that government bond valuations are poor in most countries, with inflation-adjusted (real) yields well below long-run historical averages (Chart 5). We see higher inflation expectations translating directly into higher global bond yields next year, with little room for real yields to decline as an offset. Chart 5Valuation Ranking Of Developed Bond Markets The latter half of 2018 will see increased worries about future U.S. growth after the Fed has delivered a few more rate hikes and U.S. monetary policy potentially shifts into restrictive territory. At the same time, the strength in global growth and, especially, inflation will cast doubts on the need for continued aggressive bond buying by the ECB and the Bank of Japan (BoJ). Unlike last year, the ECB will be unable to wiggle its way out of the politically difficult decision to begin tapering its asset purchases when the latest program ends in September. Even the BoJ may be forced to alter its current "yield curve control" strategy by raising the target on longer-term JGB yields in response to pressures from better domestic growth and rising global bond yields. Thus, the pressures for higher bond yields will rotate away from the U.S. in the latter half of 2018 towards Europe and possibly Japan. Other developed economy central banks, like the Bank of England (BoE), the Bank of Canada (BoC), the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and the Swedish Riksbank will also be faced with decisions on dialing back monetary accommodation in 2018. Although we anticipate that only the BoC and the Riksbank could credibly deliver on monetary tightening given robust growth and, in the case of Sweden, rapidly rising inflation. Which leads to the second major takeaway from the BCA 2018 Outlook ..... Growth & Policy Divergences Will Create Cross-Market Bond Investment Opportunities The BCA Outlook noted that growth expectations for 2018 still look too cautious in many countries. For example, the IMF is forecasting growth in the developed economies will slow from 2.2% to 2% next year, led by decelerations in the Euro Area, Japan, the U.K., Canada and Sweden (Table 1). At the same time, growth in the emerging economies is optimistically projected to accelerate to a 4.9% pace in 2018, even as China's economy cools to 6.5%. Inflation is expected to modestly increase across most of the world, but remain below central bank targets in many countries. So upside growth surprises, particularly in the U.S. and Europe, will continue to be a major investment theme in 2018. Table 1IMF Global Growth & Inflation Forecasts For 2018 Are Too Pessimistic The growth trends, however, may be more divergent than seen in 2017. This leads to potential cross-market bond trading opportunities by playing relative central bank expectations. The OECD's leading economic indicators are accelerating in the U.S., Europe and Japan; potentially peaking at a very high level in Canada; and outright slowing in the U.K. and Australia (Chart 6). When looking at our central bank discounters, which measure the amount of interest rate changes that are currently priced into money market curves, there are some notable discrepancies with the leading indicators (Chart 7). Chart 6More Divergent##BR##Growth... Chart 7...Will Lead To More Divergent##BR##Monetary Policies The market is now pricing in multiple rate hikes in 2018 from the Fed and BoC, modest increases from the BoE and RBA, and no move from the ECB and BoJ. Given the trends in the leading indicators, rate hikes from the Fed and the BoC are likely, while the BoE and RBA will be hard pressed to raise rates at all next year. Thus, U.S. Treasuries and Canadian government bonds are likely to underperform in 2018, while U.K. Gilts and Australian government bonds can be relative outperformers against a backdrop of rising global bond yields. The outlook for the ECB and BoJ, and the implications for bond yields in Europe and Japan, are a special case that represents the third major takeaway from the BCA Outlook ... The Most Dovish Central Banks Will Be Forced To Turn Less Dovish Chart 8ECB Will Fully Taper By The End Of 2018 The BCA Outlook noted that growth in both the Euro Area and Japan has done very well versus the U.S. over the past four years, essentially matching U.S. growth on a per capital basis (i.e. adjusting for faster population growth in the U.S.). In the Euro Area, an end to the painful fiscal austerity after the 2011-13 sovereign debt crisis was a big driver of the economic strength. The BCA Outlook noted that the drag from tighter fiscal policy during the crisis years was equivalent to around 10% of GDP in Greece and Portugal and 7% of GDP in Ireland and Spain. There has been little fiscal tightening in the following three years, which allowed growth in those economies to catch up rapidly. Add in extremely easy financial conditions - low borrowing rates, a cheap euro, and booming European equity and credit markets - and it is no surprise that the Euro Area economy has enjoyed robust growth over the past couple of years. Looking ahead to 2018, the outlook for Euro Area growth still looks very positive. The OECD leading indicator is rising steadily (Chart 8, top panel). The stock of non-performing loans that has clogged up banking systems in the Peripheral European economies is being whittled down - even in Italy where efforts to fix the many problems of its banks are starting to bear fruit (second panel). At the same time, there will be continued upward pressure on Euro Area inflation in 2018. This will mostly come from higher headline inflation related to higher oil prices (third panel), but also from a grind higher in core inflation and wage growth with the Euro Area unemployment rate already at the OECD's estimate of full employment (bottom panel). The Euro Area economy is likely to expand at an above-potential pace over 2% in the first half of 2018, while headline inflation is set to accelerate back towards the ECB's 2% target. This means that the ECB will have to go through another long conversation with the markets about the future of the asset purchase program. Only the outcome will be different than in 2017 as the economic and inflation arguments for continuing with ECB bond buying will be much harder to justify - especially to the hard money core of the ECB led by Germany. Already, the reduced pace of ECB bond buying set for next year, with the monthly purchases cut in half to €30bn/month, implies a significant slowing of Euro Area monetary liquidity (Chart 9). This will put upward pressure on German Bund yields, but with the move being more concentrated in the latter half of the year as the talk of a true ECB taper, perhaps as soon as the end of 2018, builds. Thus, we see Euro Area government debt being an outperformer in the first half of 2018 and an underperformer in the second half. A move in the benchmark 10-year German Bund yield to the 0.8-1.0% range by year-end is a reasonable target. This would reflect the rise in global bond yields that we expect (i.e. the 10-year U.S. Treasury pushing close to 3%), more normalization in Euro Area inflation expectations and the market pulling forward the timing of future ECB rate hikes. Our base case is still that the ECB will not hike policy interest rates until late 2019, however, which will limit the upside for Euro Area yields next year to some degree. In Japan, the BoJ will continue with its current yield curve targeting regime, aiming to cap 10-year JGBs yields through its bond purchases. This is the most effective way to try and boost Japanese inflation through a weaker yen (Chart 10). The BoJ hopes that this will then lead to rising wage growth as workers demand more pay in response to higher realized inflation. Only if there is a pickup in core/wage inflation in Japan can the BoJ have any chance of reaching its 2% inflation target. Chart 9ECB Tapering Will Put European Yields##BR##Under Upward Pressure Chart 10BoJ Will Keep Rates Low To Boost Inflation##BR##Through A Weaker Yen The current BoJ yield target is around 0% on the 10-year JGB. There has been talk of late from some BoJ officials that the yield target could be raised in response to the strengthening Japanese economy. This is likely just talk to placate BoJ board members who were against the yield curve targeting regime in the first place (it was a very close 5-4 vote to implement the new policy framework in September 2016). Yet the BoJ could conceivable raise the yield target by a modest amount in the context of a bigger move higher in global bond yields. According to a simple econometric model of the 10-year JGB yield unveiled by the BoJ in 2016, a 10bp move higher in the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield would raise the fair value of the JGB yield by 2.7bps (Table 2).2 That model currently shows that JGB yields are about 8bps above fair value (around 0%) at the moment. If the 10yr U.S. Treasury yield were to rise to 3%, however, the current level of the JGB yield would be 7bps too low, which would represent the limit of "overvaluation" on this model since 2013 (Chart 11). Under such a scenario, the BoJ raising the yield target to 0.2%, for example, would not be an unusual response - and it would still be consistent with keeping yield differentials wide enough to generate a weaker yen. Table 2Bank Of Japan 10-Year##BR##JGB Yield Model Chart 11BoJ Could Face Pressure To Raise##BR##The Yield Target If UST Yields Rise In any event, the boost to global monetary liquidity from the asset purchases of the ECB and BoJ will fade next year as both central banks will buy a smaller number of bonds than in 2017. Which brings us to the final main takeaway from the 2018 BCA Outlook .... The Low Market Volatility Backdrop Will End Through Higher Bond Volatility The Outlook noted that the conditions underpinning the growth and liquidity driven bull markets for risk assets will start to turn more negative by mid-2018. Tightening financial conditions, especially as the Fed delivers more rate hikes, will eventually start to weigh on global growth expectations. There is even a very real possibility that the Fed will engineer a U.S. recession in 2019 through tighter monetary policy. At the same time, the Fed will be in the process of its balance sheet runoff, while the ECB and BoJ will be buying smaller amounts of bonds. As we have noted many times this year in Global Fixed Income Strategy reports, a slower growth rate of central bank balance sheets will weigh on the performance of risk assets in 2018 (Chart 12). Add in the risk of growth expectations starting to deteriorate in response to tighter monetary policy in the U.S. (and in China, as well), and markets may become increasingly more volatile later next year - starting with more volatile government bond yields (Chart 13). Chart 12Central Bank Liquidity Tailwind To##BR##Risk Assets Will Fade In 2018 Chart 13The Low Market Vol Backdrop Will End##BR##Through Rising Bond Vol A higher volatility backdrop raises the risk for so many global fixed income markets that have benefitted from investors stretching for yield in order to try and achieve adequate returns. In Chart 14, we show the historical range of yields for global government bonds and spread product (using the benchmark indices for each country or sector) dating back to 2000. The gray dots in the chart represent the current yield for each fixed income category and shows how yields are at historic lows in all markets. Chart 14Historical Range Of Bond Yields For Various Fixed Income Markets, 2000-2017 In Chart 15, we present the historic range of volatility-adjusted yields (the same yields from the previous chart, divided by the trailing 12-month realized index total return volatility of each sector). In this chart, the gray dots again represent the current readings. The blue squares show how volatility-adjusted yields would look if the median volatility of each asset class since 2000 was used in the denominator instead of the latest low level of volatility. Chart 15Historical Range Of VOLATILITY-ADJUSTED Bond Yields##BR##For Various Fixed Income Markets, 2000-2017 As can be seen in the chart, many of the sectors that currently have reasonably attractive volatility-adjusted yields, like U.S. Investment Grade, U.S. High-Yield, and hard-currency Emerging Market debt, will look much less compelling if volatility were to increase to more "normal" levels. The market response will be typical in such a higher volatility environment, as yields would increase to compensate for the greater volatility of returns. The current low volatility regime will end when higher inflation and less accommodative central banks raise interest rate volatility and, eventually, future growth uncertainty. We see that inflection point occurring sometime next year, leading to a more challenging environment for global fixed income "carry trades" that are also focused on global growth, like developed market corporate bonds and emerging market debt. In terms of the investment strategy implications, we end this report with a quote taken directly from the 2018 BCA Outlook: "Given our economic and policy views, there is a good chance that we will move to an underweight position in risk assets during the second half of 2018." Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the December 2017 edition of The Bank Credit Analyst, "Outlook 2018 - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course", available at bca.bcaresearch.com and gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 The model can be found in this report: https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2016/rel160930d.pdf The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Special Report

Dear Client, This is the second of a two-part Special Report imagining a hypothetical timeline of key economic and financial events spanning the next five years. Last week's report covered the period from the present to the brewing crisis in October 2019. This week's report examines the subsequent three years. Broadly speaking, the events described in these two reports correspond with our view that the global economy will continue to expand into the second half of 2019, before succumbing to a recession and a decade of stagflation in the 2020s. This warrants an overweight position in risk assets for the next 6-to-12 months, but a much more cautious stance thereafter. Charts 1-4 provide a visual representation of how we see the main asset classes evolving over the coming years. In addition to this report, we are publishing our monthly Tactical Asset Allocation table and supporting indicators today. These can be accessed directly from our website. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist III. The Reckoning Continued from last week... October 25, 2019: All hell breaks loose. North Korea's state broadcaster announces that Kim Jong-un has been "incapacitated". It later turns out that the tubby tyrant was killed by a group of military officers. Having not slept for days, Kim had become increasingly erratic and paranoid. Convinced that he was surrounded by spies and that Trump had deployed a secret weapon to read his mind, he ordered the execution of many people in his inner circle. Fearing for their lives, his henchmen decided to strike first. October 31, 2019: North Korea's new military rulers signal a desire for closer relations with China and a less belligerent posture towards the South. Over the coming decades, historians will debate whether Trump's tactics were a reckless gambit that luckily paid off, or the work of a master strategist playing 3D chess while everyone else was playing backgammon. Trump himself wastes no time in taking credit for ousting the Kim dynasty. November 4, 2019: The relief investors feel from the ebbing of tensions in the Korean Peninsula does not last long. The turmoil in emerging markets intensifies. A series of high-profile defaults rock the Chinese corporate debt market. Copper and iron ore prices nosedive. Brent swoons to $39/bbl. November 5, 2019: The head of Brazil's central bank resigns after the government pressures it to increase its holdings of government bonds in an effort to ward off an imminent default. The Brazilian real falls to nearly 6 against the dollar. Other EM currencies plunge. The Turkish lira is particularly badly hurt. December 6, 2019: The pain on Wall Street finally spreads to Main Street. U.S. payrolls rise by only 19,000 in November. Subsequent revisions ultimately show a drop of 45,000 for that month. The NBER will eventually go on to declare November as the start of the recession. December 11, 2019: Having raised rates just three months earlier, the FOMC cuts rates by 25 basis points and signals that it is willing to keep easing if economic conditions deteriorate further. December 16, 2019: Markets initially cheer the prospect of lower rates, but the euphoria is quickly forgotten. Credit spreads soar as investors price in an increasingly bleak economic outlook. Commercial real estate prices fall. Banks further tighten lending standards. IV. A Global Recession December 19, 2019: The recession spreads around the world. The ECB ditches plans to raise rates. The U.K., Sweden, Norway, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand all cut rates. In the emerging world, Korea, Taiwan, and Poland reduce interest rates, but a number of other countries - most notably, Turkey, South Africa, and Malaysia raise rates in a desperate bid to prop up their currencies so as to keep the local-currency value of their foreign-currency obligations from spiraling out of control. December 31, 2019: The S&P 500 closes at 2194, down 21% for the year. Most other bourses fare even worse. The U.S. dollar, which peaked against the euro at $1.02 just six weeks earlier, finishes at $1.07. The 10-year Treasury yield closes at 2.37%, down 68 basis points on the year. The 10-year German bund yield falls back to 0.5%. January 11, 2020: In a surprise twist, WikiLeaks reveals that the CIA has found no credible evidence that Russia had any material influence over the 2016 elections, but that Putin has been trying to cultivate the impression that it did. The document disparagingly notes that "Putin has relished the U.S. media's characterization of him as a master political manipulator with global reach, when in fact he is just the ruler of an impoverished, demographically depleted, militarily overextended country." The Mueller probe fizzles out. January 27, 2020: Voting in the Democratic primaries begins. Kamala Harris, Elizabeth Warren, and Sherrod Brown lead a crowded field of hopefuls. Bernie Sanders and Joe Biden choose not to run. Brown enjoys the biggest lead against Trump in head-to-head polls, but his support among primary voters is weighed down by his status as a cisgendered white male. January 28, 2020: On the other side of the Atlantic, the U.K. holds another referendum - this one to ratify the separation agreement reached with the EU. The terms of the agreement are widely regarded as being highly unfavorable to the U.K. Prime Minister Corbyn, having formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats and the SNP following elections in late 2018, makes it clear that a rejection of the deal is tantamount to a vote to stay in the EU. With the British economy in the doldrums, 53% of voters reject the deal. The U.K. remains in the EU. EUR/GBP falls to 0.84. January 29, 2020: The Fed cuts rates by another 25 basis points. Hiking rates once per quarter was good enough when unemployment was falling. However, now that the economy is on the rocks, the Fed reverts to a more aggressive loosening cycle, cutting rates once per meeting. Even so, a growing chorus of voices both inside and outside the Fed argue that it is not doing enough. February 17, 2020: Kamala Harris and Elizabeth Warren pull out ahead in the Democratic primaries. Similar to the Clinton/Sanders duel in 2016, Warren polls best among younger, whiter voters, while Harris leads among minorities and establishment Democrats. March 10, 2020: Donald Trump, seeing his poll numbers tank after the post-Korea bump, unilaterally raises trade barriers across a wide variety of industries. Foreign producers retaliate, leading to a contraction in global trade. April 26, 2020: Warren's relentless characterization of Harris as a shill for moneyed interests pays off. The Massachusetts senator secures the Democratic nomination. Hollywood celebrities line up to support Warren. Taylor Swift's silence on the matter is deafening, leading to a further increase in her album sales. June 5, 2020: The U.S. unemployment rate surges to 5.1%. Corporate America sees a wave of business closings, with the retail sector being particularly badly hit. July 21, 2020: The bellwether German IFO index falls to a multi-year low. Germany's manufacturing sector feels the pinch from the collapse in demand for capital equipment, especially from emerging markets. Merkel's popularity plummets after it is revealed that she tried to suppress data that more than half of asylum seekers classified as children were actually adults. Support for the Alternative for Deutschland Party, which by this time has greatly moderated its anti-EU rhetoric, rises sharply. August 17, 2020: The trade-weighted yen continues to strengthen, pushing Japan deeper into recession. In response, the Japanese government announces a major new stimulus package. In the clearest attempt yet to link fiscal with monetary policy, the authorities pledge to start issuing consumption vouchers to households, the value of which will be incrementally increased until long-term inflation expectations rise to the Bank of Japan's 2% target. The policy proves to be a smashing success. September 9, 2020: The U.S. presidential campaign ends up being even more divisive than the one in 2016. Unlike four years earlier, equities rally at any glimmer of hope that Trump will win. However, with unemployment rising, such moments prove few and far between. September 22, 2020: Senator Warren states on the campaign trail that she will not renominate Jay Powell in 2022 for a second term as Fed chair if she is elected president. Lael Brainard's name is floated as a likely replacement. V. The Return Of Stagflation October 13, 2020: Green shoots appear in the U.S. economy, marking the end of the recession. The unemployment rate rises for another two months, peaking at 6.8% in December. Other economies also begin to turn the corner. November 3, 2020: The tentative improvement in U.S. economic data happens too late to bail out Trump. Elizabeth Warren wins the presidential election. Warren loses Ohio but picks up Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin. An influx of Democratic voters from Puerto Rico puts her over the top in Florida. The Democrats take back control of the Senate. November 4, 2020: The S&P 500 barely moves the day after the election, having already priced in the outcome months earlier. Still, at 2085, the index is 26% below its February 2019 peak. December 2, 2020: President-elect Warren pledges to introduce a major spending package after she is inaugurated. She brushes off concerns from some economists that fiscal stimulus is coming too late, noting that the unemployment rate is more than three points higher than it was one year earlier. Stocks rally on the news. January 27, 2021: The FOMC votes to keep rates on hold at 1%. Lael Brainard dissents, arguing that further monetary stimulus is necessary. March 19, 2021: The Chinese government shifts more bad loans from commercial banks into specially-designed state-owned asset management companies. The banks generally receive well above-market prices for their loans. Chinese bank shares move higher. April 2, 2021: Congress proposes to significantly raise taxes on higher-income earners and corporations with more than 500 employees and use the proceeds to fund an expansion of the Affordable Care Act. It also promises to introduces a "Tobin tax" on financial transactions. The post-election stock market rally fades. June 8, 2021: In a seminal speech, Lael Brainard argues that current inflation measures fail to adequately correct for technological improvements and other methodological issues. She suggests that this leads to an overstatement of the true level of inflation. The implication, she concludes, is that an inflation target of 2.5%-to-3% would be consistent with the Fed's existing mandate. September 24, 2021: Many Trump-era deregulation measures are rolled back. Anti-trust efforts are also ramped up. Despite an improving economy, the S&P 500 sinks to 2031, marking a five-year low. November 17, 2021: A wave of panic selling grips Wall Street. The S&P 500 crashes to 1969, down 31% from its February 2019 peak. As is often the case, this marks the bottom of the equity bear market. The subsequent recovery, however, proves to be tepid and prone to numerous setbacks. January 31, 2022: Thanks to ample fiscal stimulus, inflation in Japan rebounds from its recession lows. Aggregate income growth slows as more Japanese workers exit the labor force, but spending holds up as health care expenditures continue to climb. Japan's current account moves into a structural deficit position. February 16, 2022: Lael Brainard succeeds Jay Powell as Fed chair. The decision by Republicans in 2013 to reduce the number of senators necessary to approve appointments to the Fed board from 60 to 51 ensures smooth sailing for Brainard during congressional hearings and the confirmation of a slew of highly dovish candidates over the subsequent two years. April 6, 2022: China belatedly introduces modest financial incentives to encourage couples to have more children. The public jokingly dubs this as the new "at least one child policy". It ends up having little effect. Future Chinese scholars will end up describing China's failure to arrest the decline in its population as its greatest geopolitical blunder. July 20, 2022: The U.S. becomes the latest country to introduce strict restrictions on the use of bitcoin. Although the U.S. government never says so, fears that bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies will eat into the $75 billion in seigniorage revenue that the Treasury earns every year underpins the decision. The price of bitcoin falls to $550, down 95% from its all-time high. September 29, 2022: Japan officially abandons its yield-curve targeting regime. The 30-year yield rises to 2.5%. Faced with onerous long-term debt-servicing costs and stagnant tax revenues, the government starts refinancing much more of its debt through short-term borrowings. The Bank of Japan obliges, keeping short-term rates near zero. The combination of negative short-term real rates and higher inflation allows Japan to reduce its debt-to-GDP ratio over time. This proves to be the modus operandi for Japan and many other fiscally-challenged governments over the coming decades. October 18, 2022: Productivity growth in most developed economies continues to disappoint. For the first time in modern history, the flow of new workers entering the labor force are no better skilled or educated than the ones leaving. With potential GDP growing at a lackluster pace, output gaps disappear, setting in motion the acceleration in inflation over the remainder of the decade. The U.S. 10-year Treasury yield rises to 4%. It will be over 6% by the middle of the decade. November 22, 2022: The price of gold surpasses its previous high of $1895/oz. The 2020s turn out to be an excellent decade for bullion. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Chart 1Market Outlook: Equities Chart 2Market Outlook: Bonds Chart 3Market Outlook: Currencies Chart 4Market Outlook: Commodities Tactical Global Asset Allocation Recommendations Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Dear Client, In this report, we image a hypothetical timeline of key economic and financial events spanning the next five years. The events described in the report correspond with our view that the global economy will continue to expand into the second half of 2019, before succumbing to a recession and a decade of stagflation in the 2020s. This warrants an overweight position in risk assets for the next 6-to-12 months, but a much more cautious stance thereafter. Charts 1-4 provide a visual representation of how we see the main asset classes evolving over the coming years. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Feature I. The Blow-Off Phase December 4, 2017: U.S. stocks fall by 1.7% on reports that Mitch McConnell does not have enough votes to get the tax bill through the Senate. A sell-off in high-yield markets and a tightening of financial conditions in China aggravate the situation. December 13, 2017: The Fed hikes rates by 25 basis points, taking the Fed funds target range to 1.25%-to-1.5%. December 14, 2017: Global equities continue to weaken. The S&P 500 suffers its first 5% correction since June 2016. December 15, 2017: The correction ends on news that the Senate will consider a revised bill which trims the size of corporate tax cuts and uses the savings to finance a temporary reduction in payroll taxes. President Trump and House leaders promise to go along with the proposal. The PBoC also injects fresh liquidity into the Chinese financial system. December 29, 2017: Global equities rally into year-end. The S&P 500 hits 2571 on December 29, placing it just shy of its November high. The dollar also strengthens, with EUR/USD closing at 1.162. The 10-year Treasury yield finishes the year at 2.42%. January 10, 2018: The global cyclical bull market in stocks continues. European and Japanese indices power higher. Both the NASDAQ and the S&P 500 hit fresh record highs. EM stocks move up but lag their DM peers, weighed down by a stronger dollar. January 12, 2018: U.S. retail sales surprise on the upside. Department store stocks, having been written off for dead just a few months earlier, end up rising by an average of 40% between November 2017 and the end of January. February 14, 2018: The euro area economy continues to grow at an above-trend pace. Nevertheless, inflation stays muted due to high levels of spare capacity across most of the region and the lagged effects of a stronger euro. The 2-year OIS spread between the U.S. and the euro area widens to a multi-year high. February 26, 2018: China's construction sector cools a notch, but industrial activity remains robust, spurred on by a cheap currency, strong global growth, and rising producer prices. Chinese H-shares rise 13% year-to-date, beating out most other EM equity indices. March 14, 2018: The U.S., Canada, and Mexico reach a last-minute deal to preserve NAFTA. The Canadian dollar and Mexican peso breathe a sigh of relief. March 16, 2018: In a surprise decision, Donald Trump nominates Kevin Hassett as Fed vice-chair. Trump cites the "tremendous job" Hassett did in selling the GOP's tax cuts. A number of Fed appointments follow. Most of the picks turn out to be more hawkish than investors had expected. This gives the greenback further support. March 18, 2018: Pro-EU parties do better than anticipated in the Italian elections. Italian bond spreads compress versus the rest of Europe. March 21, 2018: The Fed raises rates again, bringing the fed funds target range up to 1.50%-to-1.75%. April 8, 2018: Bank of Japan governor Kuroda is granted another term in office. He pledges to remain single-mindedly focused on eradicating deflation. April 11, 2018: Chinese core CPI inflation reaches 2.9%. Producer price inflation stays elevated at 6%. A major market theme in 2018 turns out to be how China went from being a source of global deflationary pressures to a source of inflationary ones. April 30, 2018: U.S. core PCE inflation jumps 0.3% in March, reaching 1.7% on a year-over-year basis. Goods and service inflation both pick up, while the base effects from lower cell phone data charges in the prior year drop out of the calculations. May 17, 2018: Oil prices continue to rise on the back of ongoing discipline from OPEC and Russia, smaller-than-expected shale output growth, and production disruptions in Libya, Iraq, Nigeria, and Venezuela. June 13, 2018: Strong U.S. growth in the first half of the year, a larger-than-projected decline in the unemployment rate, and higher inflation keep the Fed in tightening mode. The FOMC hikes rates again. June 25, 2018: Global capital spending accelerates further. Global industrial stocks go on to have a banner year. June 27, 2018: Wage growth in the U.S. accelerates to a cycle high. Donald Trump takes credit, stating that "this wouldn't have happened" without him or his tax cuts. July 31, 2018: The Japanese labor market tightens further. The unemployment rate falls to 2.6%, 1.2 percentage points below 2007 levels, while the ratio of job vacancies-to-applicants moves further above its early-1990s bubble high. A number of high-profile companies announce plans to raise wages. August 2, 2018: A brief summer sell-off sees global equities dip temporarily, but strong global earnings growth keeps the cyclical bull market in stocks intact. August 28, 2018: The London housing market continues to weaken, with home prices falling by 9% from their peak. The rest of the U.K. economy remains fairly resilient, however. EUR/GBP closes at 0.87. August 31, 2018: The Greek bailout program ends and a new one begins. Greece's economy continues to recover, but Tsipras fails to obtain debt relief from creditors. September 7, 2018: The U.S. unemployment rate falls to a 49-year low of 3.7%, nearly a full percentage below the Fed's estimate of NAIRU. September 26, 2018: The Fed raises rates again. By now, the market has gone from pricing in only two hikes for 2018 at the start of the year to pricing in almost four. September 27, 2018: Profit growth in the U.S. moderates somewhat as higher wage costs take a bite out of earnings. Nevertheless, stock market sentiment remains buoyant. Retail participation, which had been dormant for years, takes off. CNBC sees a surge in viewers. Micro cap stocks go wild. October 7, 2018: The outcome of Brazil's elections shows little appetite for major structural reforms. Economic populism lives on. October 31, 2018: Realized inflation and inflation expectations continue grinding higher in Japan, triggering market speculation that the BoJ will abandon its yield-curve targeting policy. The resulting rally in the yen is short-lived, however. At its monetary policy meeting, the Bank of Japan indicates that it has no near-term plans to modify its existing strategy. November 6, 2018: The Democrats narrowly regain control of the House but fail to recapture the Senate. Investors shrug off the results, figuring correctly that a Republican Senate will keep Trump's corporate tax cuts in place and that Democrats will agree to extend the expiring payroll tax cut and other tax measures that benefit the middle class. December 7, 2018: The U.S. unemployment rate falls to 3.5%. Donald Trump tweets "You're welcome, America". December 19, 2018: The Fed raises rates for the fourth time that year - one more hike than it had signaled in its December 2017 "dot plot" - taking the fed funds target range to 2.25%-2.5%. December 31, 2018: The MSCI All-Country Index finishes up 12% for the year (in local-currency terms), led by the euro area and Japan. U.S. stocks gain 8%. EM equities manage to rise 6%. Small caps edge out large caps, value stocks beat growth stocks, and cyclical stocks outperform defensives. December 31, 2018: The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield finishes the year at 3.05%. German bund yields reach 0.82%, U.K. gilt yields rise to 1.7%, Canadian yields hit 2.3%, and Australian yields back up to 3%. Japanese 10-year yields remain broadly flat, but the 20-year yield moves up 40 basis points to nearly 1%. Credit spreads finish the year close to where they started, providing a modest carry pick-up over high-quality government bonds. December 31, 2018: The DXY index rises 4% to 98. EUR/USD closes at 1.11, USD/JPY at 123, GBP/USD at 1.31, and AUD/USD at 0.76. The Canadian dollar manages to edge up against the greenback on the year, with CAD/USD finishing at 0.81. The Chinese yuan also strengthens to 6.4 versus the dollar. December 31, 2018: Brent and WTI spot prices finish the year at $65 and $63, respectively. Copper and metal prices are broadly flat for the year, having faced the dueling forces of a stronger dollar (a negative) and above-trend global growth (a positive). Gold sinks to $1,226. II. The Clouds Darken February 22, 2019: The global economy starts to decelerate. The slowdown is led by China, where the government's crackdown on shadow banking activities begins to take a bigger toll on growth. Most measures of U.S. economic activity also soften somewhat in the first two months of the year. Investors take heart in the hope that the economy will achieve a soft landing, allowing the Fed to moderate the pace of rate hikes. February 27, 2019: In an otherwise mundane day, the S&P 500 edges up 0.3% to 2832. Little do investors know that this marks the cyclical peak in the U.S. stock market. March 13, 2019: Hopes that the Fed can take its foot off the brake are dashed when the Bureau of Labor Statistics reveals that inflation rose by more than expected in February. U.S. core CPI inflation increases to 2.9% while the core PCE deflator accelerates to 2.4%. Market chatter turns from whether the Fed can slow the pace of rate hikes to whether it needs to start hiking more rapidly than once-per-quarter. The S&P falls 2.1% on the day. March 20, 2019: The Fed lifts the funds rate target range to 2.5%-to-2.75% and signals a readiness to keep hiking rates. The 10-year Treasury yield rises to 3.3%. EUR/USD sinks to 1.08. The first quarter of 2019 marks a watershed of sorts. In 2018, the Fed raised rates because of stronger growth; in 2019, it kept raising them because of brewing inflation. As it turned out, risk assets were able to tolerate the former, but not the latter. March 29, 2019: The U.K. does not leave the EU two years after Britain invoked Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. The EU votes to prolong negotiations given growing political support within Britain for the country to remain part of the European bloc. April 5, 2019: The S&P 500 sinks further and is now 10% below its February high, returning close to where it was at the start of 2018. The increasingly sour mood on Wall Street does not appear to be hurting Main Street very much, however. The U.S. unemployment rate edges down further to 3.4%. Euro area growth remains resilient. May 31, 2019: The Brazilian government announces that the fiscal deficit will come in larger than originally expected. USD/BRL slips to 3.45. June 4, 2019: Jens Weidmann, who had gone out of his way to soften his hawkish rhetoric over the preceding months, is chosen to succeed Mario Draghi, whose term expires in October. Nevertheless, the euro still strengthens on the news. June 6, 2019: Markets temporarily regain their composure. The S&P 500 gets back to within 4% of its all-time high. The reprieve does not last long, however. June 12, 2019: The Fed hikes rates, taking the fed funds target range to 2.75%-to-3%. The FOMC cites inflation as its primary concern. July 8, 2019: Global risk assets weaken anew as a fiscal crisis grips Brazil. Turkey, South Africa, and a number of other emerging markets show increasing signs of fragility. August 20, 2019: Korean exports, a leading indicator of the global business cycle, decelerate once again. Global PMIs sag, as do most measures of business confidence. September 25, 2019: Despite a slowing U.S. economy, the Fed hikes rates again, bringing the fed funds target range to 3%-to-3.25%. The FOMC justifies the decision based on the fact that the unemployment rate is below NAIRU, core inflation is above the Fed's 2% target, and real rates are less than 1%. To assuage markets, Jay Powell suggests that the Fed could keep rates on hold in December. This turns out to be more prescient than he realizes. It will be another three years before the Fed raises rates again. By then, Powell is no longer the Fed chair. September 30, 2019: Commodity prices tumble, further adding to the pressure facing emerging markets. The U.S. yield curve inverts for the first time during this business cycle. The dollar, which previously strengthened due to a hawkish Fed, now starts strengthening on flight-to-safety flows back into the U.S. The yen appreciates even more than the greenback. October 15, 2019: The bottom falls out of the Canadian housing market. Home sales dry up and prices begin to sink. The Canadian dollar, which peaked back in February at 83 cents, falls to 74 cents against the U.S. dollar. October 19, 2019: A failed North Korean launch lands a missile 80 kilometres from Japanese shores. Prime Minister Abe pledges swift retaliation. October 21, 2019: The negative feedback loop between a rising dollar, falling commodity prices, and EM stress intensifies. Sentiment towards emerging markets deteriorates dramatically. Rumours begin to swirl that Brazil will miss a debt payment. October 23, 2019: Trump tweets "Dopey Rocketman thinks he is so smart, but we know where all his hideouts are. Sweet dreams!" October 24, 2019: News reports are abuzz about a massive buildup of troops on the North Korean side of the border. Panic grips Seoul. Asian bourses sell-off, taking global stock markets down with them. III. The Reckoning October 25, 2019: All hell breaks loose. North Korea's state broadcaster announces that Kim Jong-un has been "incapacitated". It later turns out that the tubby tyrant was killed by a group of military officers. Having not slept for days, Kim had become increasingly erratic and paranoid. Convinced that he was surrounded by spies and that Trump had deployed a secret weapon to read his mind, he ordered the execution of many people in his inner circle. Fearing for their lives, his henchmen decided to strike first. October 31, 2019: North Korea's new military rulers signal a desire for closer relations with China and a less belligerent posture towards the South. Over the coming decades, historians will debate whether Trump's tactics were a reckless gambit that luckily paid off, or the work of a master strategist playing 3D chess while everyone else was playing backgammon. Trump himself wastes no time in taking credit for ousting the Kim dynasty. November 4, 2019: The relief investors feel from the ebbing of tensions in the Korean Peninsula does not last long. The turmoil in emerging markets intensifies. A series of high-profile defaults rock the Chinese corporate debt market. Copper and iron ore prices nosedive. Brent swoons to $39/bbl. November 5, 2019: The head of Brazil's central bank resigns after the government pressures it to increase its holdings of government bonds in an effort to ward off an imminent default. The Brazilian real falls to nearly 6 against the dollar. Other EM currencies plunge. The Turkish lira is particularly badly hurt. December 6, 2019: The pain on Wall Street finally spreads to Main Street. U.S. payrolls rise by only 19,000 in November. Subsequent revisions ultimately show a drop of 45,000 for that month. The NBER will eventually go on to declare November as the start of the recession. December 11, 2019: Having raised rates just three months earlier, the FOMC cuts rates by 25 basis points and signals that it is willing to keep easing if economic conditions deteriorate further. December 16, 2019: Markets initially cheer the prospect of lower rates, but the euphoria is quickly forgotten. Credit spreads soar as investors price in an increasingly bleak economic outlook. Commercial real estate prices fall. Banks further tighten lending standards. IV. A Global Recession December 19, 2019: The recession spreads around the world. The ECB ditches plans to raise rates. The U.K., Sweden, Norway, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand all cut rates. In the emerging world, Korea, Taiwan, and Poland reduce interest rates, but a number of other countries - most notably, Turkey, South Africa, and Malaysia raise rates in a desperate bid to prop up their currencies so as to keep the local-currency value of their foreign-currency obligations from spiraling out of control. December 31, 2019: The S&P 500 closes at 2194, down 21% for the year. Most other bourses fare even worse. The U.S. dollar, which peaked against the euro at $1.02 just six weeks earlier, finishes at $1.07. The 10-year Treasury yield closes at 2.37%, down 68 basis points on the year. The 10-year German bund yield falls back to 0.5%. January 11, 2020: In a surprise twist, WikiLeaks reveals that the CIA has found no credible evidence that Russia had any material influence over the 2016 elections, but that Putin has been trying to cultivate the impression that it did. The document disparagingly notes that "Putin has relished the U.S. media's characterization of him as a master political manipulator with global reach, when in fact he is just the ruler of an impoverished, demographically depleted, militarily overextended country." The Mueller probe fizzles out. January 27, 2020: Voting in the Democratic primaries begins. Kamala Harris, Elizabeth Warren, and Sherrod Brown lead a crowded field of hopefuls. Bernie Sanders and Joe Biden choose not to run. Brown enjoys the biggest lead against Trump in head-to-head polls, but his support among primary voters is weighed down by his status as a cisgendered white male. January 28, 2020: On the other side of the Atlantic, the U.K. holds another referendum - this one to ratify the separation agreement reached with the EU. The terms of the agreement are widely regarded as being highly unfavorable to the U.K. Prime Minister Corbyn, having formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats and the SNP following elections in late 2018, makes it clear that a rejection of the deal is tantamount to a vote to stay in the EU. With the British economy in the doldrums, 53% of voters reject the deal. The U.K. remains in the EU. EUR/GBP falls to 0.84. January 29, 2020: The Fed cuts rates by another 25 basis points. Hiking rates once per quarter was good enough when unemployment was falling. However, now that the economy is on the rocks, the Fed reverts to a more aggressive loosening cycle, cutting rates once per meeting. Even so, a growing chorus of voices both inside and outside the Fed argue that it is not doing enough. February 17, 2020: Kamala Harris and Elizabeth Warren pull out ahead in the Democratic primaries. Similar to the Clinton/Sanders duel in 2016, Warren polls best among younger, whiter voters, while Harris leads among minorities and establishment Democrats. March 10, 2020: Donald Trump, seeing his poll numbers tank after the post-Korea bump, unilaterally raises trade barriers across a wide variety of industries. Foreign producers retaliate, leading to a contraction in global trade. April 26, 2020: Warren's relentless characterization of Harris as a shill for moneyed interests pays off. The Massachusetts senator secures the Democratic nomination. Hollywood celebrities line up to support Warren. Taylor Swift's silence on the matter is deafening, leading to a further increase in her album sales. June 5, 2020: The U.S. unemployment rate surges to 5.1%. Corporate America sees a wave of business closings, with the retail sector being particularly badly hit. July 21, 2020: The bellwether German IFO index falls to a multi-year low. Germany's manufacturing sector feels the pinch from the collapse in demand for capital equipment, especially from emerging markets. Merkel's popularity plummets after it is revealed that she tried to suppress data that more than half of asylum seekers classified as children were actually adults. Support for the Alternative for Deutschland Party, which by this time has greatly moderated its anti-EU rhetoric, rises sharply. August 17, 2020: The trade-weighted yen continues to strengthen, pushing Japan deeper into recession. In response, the Japanese government announces a major new stimulus package. In the clearest attempt yet to link fiscal with monetary policy, the authorities pledge to start issuing consumption vouchers to households, the value of which will be incrementally increased until long-term inflation expectations rise to the Bank of Japan's 2% target. The policy proves to be a smashing success. September 9, 2020: The U.S. presidential campaign ends up being even more divisive than the one in 2016. Unlike four years earlier, equities rally at any glimmer of hope that Trump will win. However, with unemployment rising, such moments prove few and far between. September 22, 2020: Senator Warren states on the campaign trail that she will not renominate Jay Powell in 2022 for a second term as Fed chair if she is elected president. Lael Brainard's name is floated as a likely replacement. V. The Return Of Stagflation October 13, 2020: Green shoots appear in the U.S. economy, marking the end of the recession. The unemployment rate rises for another two months, peaking at 6.8% in December. Other economies also begin to turn the corner. November 3, 2020: The tentative improvement in U.S. economic data happens too late to bail out Trump. Elizabeth Warren wins the presidential election. Warren loses Ohio but picks up Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin. An influx of Democratic voters from Puerto Rico puts her over the top in Florida. The Democrats take back control of the Senate. November 4, 2020: The S&P 500 barely moves the day after the election, having already priced in the outcome months earlier. Still, at 2085, the index is 26% below its February 2019 peak. December 2, 2020: President-elect Warren pledges to introduce a major spending package after she is inaugurated. She brushes off concerns from some economists that fiscal stimulus is coming too late, noting that the unemployment rate is more than three points higher than it was one year earlier. Stocks rally on the news. January 27, 2021: The FOMC votes to keep rates on hold at 1%. Lael Brainard dissents, arguing that further monetary stimulus is necessary. March 19, 2021: The Chinese government shifts more bad loans from commercial banks into specially-designed state-owned asset management companies. The banks generally receive well above-market prices for their loans. Chinese bank shares move higher. April 2, 2021: Congress proposes to significantly raise taxes on higher-income earners and corporations with more than 500 employees and use the proceeds to fund an expansion of the Affordable Care Act. It also promises to introduces a "Tobin tax" on financial transactions. The post-election stock market rally fades. June 8, 2021: In a seminal speech, Lael Brainard argues that current inflation measures fail to adequately correct for technological improvements and other methodological issues. She suggests that this leads to an overstatement of the true level of inflation. The implication, she concludes, is that an inflation target of 2.5%-to-3% would be consistent with the Fed's existing mandate. September 24, 2021: Many Trump-era deregulation measures are rolled back. Anti-trust efforts are also ramped up. Despite an improving economy, the S&P 500 sinks to 2031, marking a five-year low. November 17, 2021: A wave of panic selling grips Wall Street. The S&P 500 crashes to 1969, down 31% from its February 2019 peak. As is often the case, this marks the bottom of the equity bear market. The subsequent recovery, however, proves to be tepid and prone to numerous setbacks. January 31, 2022: Thanks to ample fiscal stimulus, inflation in Japan rebounds from its recession lows. Aggregate income growth slows as more Japanese workers exit the labor force, but spending holds up as health care expenditures continue to climb. Japan's current account moves into a structural deficit position. February 16, 2022: Lael Brainard succeeds Jay Powell as Fed chair. The decision by Republicans in 2013 to reduce the number of senators necessary to approve appointments to the Fed board from 60 to 51 ensures smooth sailing for Brainard during congressional hearings and the confirmation of a slew of highly dovish candidates over the subsequent two years. April 6, 2022: China belatedly introduces modest financial incentives to encourage couples to have more children. The public jokingly dubs this as the new "at least one child policy". It ends up having little effect. Future Chinese scholars will end up describing China's failure to arrest the decline in its population as its greatest geopolitical blunder. July 20, 2022: The U.S. becomes the latest country to introduce strict restrictions on the use of bitcoin. Although the U.S. government never says so, fears that bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies will eat into the $75 billion in seigniorage revenue that the Treasury earns every year underpins the decision. The price of bitcoin falls to $550, down 95% from its all-time high. September 29, 2022: Japan officially abandons its yield-curve targeting regime. The 30-year yield rises to 2.5%. Faced with onerous long-term debt-servicing costs and stagnant tax revenues, the government starts refinancing much more of its debt through short-term borrowings. The Bank of Japan obliges, keeping short-term rates near zero. The combination of negative short-term real rates and higher inflation allows Japan to reduce its debt-to-GDP ratio over time. This proves to be the modus operandi for Japan and many other fiscally-challenged governments over the coming decades. October 18, 2022: Productivity growth in most developed economies continues to disappoint. For the first time in modern history, the flow of new workers entering the labor force are no better skilled or educated than the ones leaving. With potential GDP growing at a lackluster pace, output gaps disappear, setting in motion the acceleration in inflation over the remainder of the decade. The U.S. 10-year Treasury yield rises to 4%. It will be over 6% by the middle of the decade. November 22, 2022: The price of gold surpasses its previous high of $1895/oz. The 2020s turn out to be an excellent decade for bullion. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Chart 1Market Outlook: Equities Chart 2Market Outlook: Bonds Chart 3Market Outlook: Currencies Chart 4Market Outlook: Commodities Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights Idea 1: Long Eurodollar, short Euribor - December 2022 interest rate futures contracts. Alternatively just go outright long the Eurodollar contract. Idea 2: Long EUR/USD Idea 3: Underweight Basic Materials equities versus market. Alternative expressions are to go short the LMEX index, or underweight Norway (OMX) versus Ireland (ISE). Idea 4: Long Norwegian 10-year bonds, short German 10-year bunds. Idea 5: Long U.K. 10-year gilts, short Irish 10-year bonds. Feature Question 1: Where Is The Worrying Imbalance? Last week, in the Quantum Theory Of Finance,1 we pointed out that when bond yields reach ultra-low levels, the payoff profile from bonds becomes highly asymmetric. When yields approach a lower bound, they cannot fall much further but they can rise a lot. Meaning that bond prices have very limited potential for gains, but have great potential for sudden and deep losses. Chart of the WeekThe Norway Versus Euro Area Bond Yield Spread Is Too Wide The unattractive asymmetric payoff profile - known as negative skew - applies to both nominal and real returns. This is because negative skew is concerned about deep nominal losses over a relatively short period. In which case, a deep nominal loss will be a deep real loss too.2 As equity returns always possess negative skew we can say that at ultra-low bond yields, bond risk becomes equity-like. Given this risk equalization, equities no longer justify a risk premium over bonds. And the lower prospective return required from equities means that today's equity valuations and prices become a lot richer. But the new delicate balance of valuations is conditional on bond yields remaining ultra-low. This is because the unattractive negative skew on a 10-year bond's returns disappears when its yield moves up into the 'high 2s' (Chart I-2). At this point, risk is no longer equalized and the equity risk premium must fully re-emerge - requiring today's equity market valuation and price to drop, perhaps substantially. However, the ensuing fight to havens would then once again pull bond yields back down from the 'high 2s'. It follows that the rise in expected interest rates is self-limiting. Any policy interest rate expectation already in the 'high 2s' - such as the Eurodollar December 2022 contract - cannot sustainably rise much further, whereas those that are still some way below - such as the Euribor December 2022 contract - can (Chart I-3). Which leads to our first investment idea. Chart I-2Bonds Become Much More ##br##Risky At Ultra-Low Yields Chart I-3The Euro Area/U.S. Interest Rate Expectation ##br##Spread Is Too Wide Investment idea 1: Long Eurodollar, short Euribor - December 2022 interest rate futures contracts. Alternatively just go outright long the Eurodollar contract. Question 2: Which Is The Safest Currency To Hold? Chart I-4Euro/Dollar Just Tracks ##br##The Bond Yield Spread To reiterate, at ultra-low bond yields, bond returns offer a highly unattractive payoff profile. Put simply, you can quickly lose a lot more money - in both nominal and real terms - than you can make! Now observe that the payoff profile for a foreign exchange rate just tracks the bond yield spread (Chart I-4). This means that when a central bank has already taken bond yields close to their lower bound, its currency possesses a highly attractive payoff profile called positive skew. In essence, as the ECB is at the realistic limit of ultra-loose policy, the direction of policy rate expectations cannot go significantly lower. Conversely, policy rate expectations for the Federal Reserve (for 2022) are not far from our upper bound of the 'high 2s'. So these expectations cannot go significantly higher without threatening a risk-asset selloff. On this basis, EUR/USD has more scope to gap up than to gap down. Investment idea 2: Long EUR/USD But be aware that investment ideas 1 and 2 are highly correlated with each other! Question 3: Where Are We In The Global Growth Mini-Cycle? Global growth experiences remarkably consistent - and therefore predictable - 'mini-cycles', with half-cycle lengths averaging 8 months. As the current mini-upswing started in May we can infer that it is likely to end in early 2018. So one surprise in 2018 could be that global growth slows in the first half rather than in the second half - contrary to what the consensus is expecting. That said, half-cycle lengths do have some degree of variation: the current upswing might be a few months longer or shorter than the average. So how can we avoid positioning too early or too late for the next turn? The answer is to focus on investments that have already fully priced the current upswing, so that timing becomes less of an issue. On this basis, we propose that the rally in industrial metals and Basic Materials equities is already extended. Our technical indicator which captures herding and groupthink correctly identified the trough at the end of 2015, the mini-peak at the end of 2016, and is now signalling that the latest rally is likely to fade (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). Chart I-5Metals Have Fully Priced ##br##The Mini-Upswing... Chart I-6...And The Metal Rally Is Reaching##br## Its Technical Limit Investment idea 3: Underweight Basic Materials equities versus market. Alternative expressions are to go short the LMEX index, or underweight Norway (OMX) versus Ireland (ISE). Question 4: Will Inflation Lift Off? The ECB's continued indulgence with ultra-loose monetary policy would make you think that the euro area is on the edge of a deflationary abyss. In fact, inflation has been running comfortably within a 0-2% band for almost two years. Will inflation edge closer to the ECB's 2% point target? Given our view on the growth mini-cycle, not immediately. In the first half of 2018, inflation may even edge lower within the 0-2% band, but this global dynamic will affect inflation in all jurisdictions, not just in the euro area. There is nothing wrong with inflation running comfortably within a 0-2% band. Now that we know that nominal interest rates can go slightly negative, a 0-2% inflation band even permits negative real interest rates. The big mistake is to aim for an arbitrary point target, like 2%. This is because inflation is a non-linear phenomenon, and a defining characteristic of a non-linear phenomenon is that it cannot hit an arbitrary point target.3 It is our high conviction expectation that the major central banks will eventually change their point targets for inflation into target bands such as 0-2% or 1-3%. But afraid to lose credibility, they will not change tack abruptly. In the meantime, we notice that the Norges Bank is undershooting its 2.5% inflation target by considerably more than the ECB is undershooting its 2% target (Chart I-7). Yet the yield spread between Norwegian and euro area bonds has not caught up with this reality (Chart of the Week). Chart I-7The Norges Bank Is Undershooting Its Inflation Target By More Than The ECB Investment idea 4: Long Norwegian 10-year bonds, short German 10-year bunds. Question 5: Will Political Risk Re-emerge? Political events have had a hand in three of the sharpest recent moves in financial markets. The vote for Brexit catalysed a 15% decline in the pound; the vote for Trump triggered an 80 bps spike in the 10-year T-bond yield, and the vote for Macron unleashed a 10% rally in the euro. Political change disrupts markets if it dislocates the long-term expectations embedded in economic agents and financial prices. The vote for Brexit changed expectations about the U.K.'s long-term trading relationships; the election of Trump changed expectations about fiscal stimulus, the tax structure, and protectionism (perhaps unrealistically); and the election of Macron exorcised the potential chaos of a Le Pen presidency. Chart I-8The U.K. Versus Ireland Bond ##br##Yield Spread Is Too Wide In contrast, the recent (disputed) vote for independence in Catalonia, and the breakdown of coalition discussions in Germany barely moved the markets - because neither event changed expectations of long-term economic outcomes. As investors, this is the test we should apply to all political events. In 2018, the evolution of Brexit has the potential to move markets. This is because hard Brexiters and the EU27 are on a collision course. Specifically, the issue of the Irish border is insoluble. It is Brexit's Gordian knot. Theresa May has promised the hard Brexiters that the U.K. will leave the EU customs union and single market. She has also promised the Northern Ireland Unionists - who are propping up May's minority government - that there will be no hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland or the rest of the U.K. But these promises are irreconcilable. The Republic of Ireland will veto a border that threatens the Good Friday peace agreement; the Northern Ireland Unionists will not tolerate the border moving to the Irish Sea, which would effectively take Northern Ireland into the EU customs union and single market; and the EU27 will block a Hong Kong type 'free port' status for Northern Ireland - as this would remove the integrity of harmonized standards across the EU. Eventually, the impenetrable Irish border problem is likely to be the roadblock to a hard Brexit. But first there needs to be a collision. And the collision could move markets. With the yield spread between U.K. 10-year gilts and Irish 10-year bonds near a 2-year wide (Chart I-8), this leads us to our fifth investment idea. Investment idea 5: Long U.K. 10-year gilts, short Irish 10-year bonds. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report 'The Quantum Theory Of Finance' November 23 2017 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 2 For example if the nominal return over 3 months was a very painful -10%, and inflation was running at -10% per annum, the real return over 3 months would be a still very painful -7.5%. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report 'Three Mantras For Investors' August 17 2017 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model* Ahead of the OPEC meeting on November 30, the WTI crude oil price is vulnerable to any disappointment - because its rally is technically very extended. This week's trade recommendation is to expect a retracement of 7.5% with a symmetrical stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Chart I-9 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions.Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations