Middle East & North Africa

Following drone attacks on critical oil infrastructure in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) over the weekend, which removed ~ 5.7mm b/d of output, the U.S. is likely to conduct a limited retaliatory strike. In addition, the U.S. will continue to build up forces in the Persian Gulf to deter Iran and prepare for a larger response if necessary. After this initial response, the Trump administration will likely seek to contain tensions, as neither Trump nor the United States has an immediate interest in launching a large-scale conflict with Iran. But that does not mean that one will not happen – indeed, the odds are now higher that this risk could materialize. If the oil-price shock caused by these attacks becomes prolonged and unmanageable – either because of additional attacks against Saudi Arabian or other regional infrastructure, or direct Iranian action to restrict the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf – the negative impact on the global and U.S. economy will grow. Faced with a recession – which is not our base case but is possible – the incentive for Trump to engage war with Iran will rise sharply. Attack On KSA Will Prompt U.S. Retaliation If Iran is confirmed as the base, it will limit Trump’s options and ensure that any retaliation leads to a greater escalation of tensions. Over the weekend, Houthi rebels in Yemen claimed responsibility for attacks on two critical oil assets in Saudi Arabia, removing ~ 5.5% of world crude output – a historic shock to global oil supply, and the largest unplanned outage ever recorded (Chart 1).1 U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo accused Iran of being behind the attacks and said there was no evidence that Houthis launched them from Yemen. As we go to press, neither Saudi Arabian officials nor President Trump have confirmed Iran was the culprit, although the sophistication of the attack’s targeting and execution suggest that they will. President Trump said the U.S. is “locked and loaded depending on verification” and offered U.S. support to KSA in a call to Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman.2 Chart 1Oil Supply Disruption + Volume Lost A direct missile strike from Iran is the least likely source, as the Iranians have sought to act through proxies this year, in staging attacks to counter U.S. sanctions, precisely in order to maintain plausible deniability and avoid provoking a full-blown American retaliation. If Iran is confirmed as the base, it will limit Trump’s options and ensure that any retaliation leads to a greater escalation of tensions, relative to a situation where militant groups in Iraq or Yemen (or even in Saudi Arabia) are found to be responsible. Assuming the strike came from outside Iran, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia would presumably retaliate against its proxies in those locations – e.g., the Houthis in Yemen, or the Shia militias in Iraq. Washington is certain to dial up its military deterrent in the region and use the attacks to gain greater worldwide support for a tighter enforcement of sanctions to isolate Iran. This deterrence includes a multinational naval fleet in the Strait of Hormuz, at the entrance to the Gulf, where ~ 20% of the world’s crude oil supply transits daily. Electoral Constraints Facing Trump There are several reasons President Trump will not rush to a full-scale conflict with Iran. First, the attack did not kill U.S. troops or civilians. Miraculously, not even a single casualty is reported in Saudi Arabia. Yet, unlike the Iranian shooting of an American drone, which nearly brought Trump to launch air strikes on June 21, the latest attack clearly impacted critical infrastructure in a way that threatens global stability, making it more likely that some retaliation will occur. Second, Trump faces a significant electoral constraint from high oil prices. True, the U.S. economy is not as exposed to oil imports as it was (Chart 2). Also, global oil producers and strategic reserves including the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) can handle the immediate short-term loss from KSA (Chart 3). However, the duration of the cut-off is unknown and further disruptions will occur if the U.S. retaliates and Iranian-backed forces attack yet again. Third, there is still a chance to show restraint in retaliation, contain tensions over the coming months, limit oil supply loss and price spikes, and thus keep an oil-price shock from tanking the U.S. economy. Chart 2U.S. Imports Continue Falling But as tensions escalate in the short term, they could hit a point of no return at which the economic damage becomes so severe that President Trump can no longer seek re-election based on his economic record (Chart 4). At that point the incentive is to confront Iran directly – and run in 2020 as a “war president” intent on achieving long-term national security interests despite short-term economic pain. Chart 3Key SPRs Are Still Adequate Chart 4An Oil Price Shock Lowers Trump's Re-Election Chances U.S.’s Volatile Attempt At Diplomacy What triggered the attack and what does it say about the U.S. and Iranian positions going forward? Ever since Trump backed away from air strikes in June, he has become more inclined to de-escalate the conflict he began with Iran by withdrawing from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as terrorists, and imposing crippling sanctions to bring Iran’s oil exports to zero. Even as Rouhani and Trump publicly mulled a summit and negotiations, Rouhani insisted that any negotiations with the United States would require Trump to rejoin the JCPOA and remove all sanctions. What prompted this backtracking was Iran’s demonstration of a higher pain threshold than Trump expected. President Hassan Rouhani, and his Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, were personally invested in the 2015 nuclear deal with the Obama administration, which they negotiated despite grave warnings from the regime’s conservative factions that they would be betrayed. Trump’s reneging on that deal confirmed their opponents’ expectations, while his sanctions have sent the economy into a crushing recession (Chart 5). Chart 5U.S. Sanctions Hammer Iran's Economy With Iranian parliamentary elections in February 2020, and a consequential presidential election in 2021 in which Rouhani will seek to support a political ally, the Rouhani administration needed to respond forcefully to Trump’s sanctions. Iran staged several provocations in the Strait of Hormuz to warn the U.S. against stringent sanctions enforcement (Map 1). And recently, even as Rouhani and Trump publicly mulled a summit and negotiations, Rouhani insisted that any negotiations with the United States would require Trump to rejoin the JCPOA and remove all sanctions, a very high bar for talks. Map 1Abqaiq Is At The Very Core Of Global Oil Supply Realizing the large appetite for conflict in Tehran, and the ability to sustain sanctions and use proxy warfare damaging global oil supply, Trump took a step back – he withheld air strikes in late June, discussed a diplomatic path forward with French President Emmanuel Macron, and subsequently fired his National Security Adviser John Bolton, a known war hawk on Iran who helped mastermind the return to sanctions. The proximate cause of Bolton’s ouster was reportedly a disagreement about sanctions relief that would have been designed to enable a meeting with Rouhani at the United Nations General Assembly next week. Such a summit could possibly have led to a return to the pre-2017 U.S.-Iran détente. If Trump had compromised, Iran could have gone back to observing the 2015 nuclear pact provisions, which it has only gradually and carefully violated. Moreover the French proposal to convince Iran to rejoin talks by offering a $15 billion credit line for sanctions relief was gaining traction. Apparently these recent moves toward diplomacy posed a threat to various actors in the region that benefit from U.S.-Iran conflict and sanctions. Hardliners in Iran want to weaken the Rouhani administration and prevent further Rouhani-led negotiations (i.e. “surrender”) to American pressure. On August 29, three days after Rouhani hinted that he might still be willing to talk with Trump, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s weekly publication warned that “negotiations with the U.S. are definitely out of the question.”3 The IRGC and others continue to benefit from black market activity fueled by sanctions. And Iranian overseas militant proxies have their own reasons to fear a return to U.S.-Iran détente. Saudi Arabia and Israel also worry that President Trump will follow in President Obama’s footsteps with Iran and strategic withdrawal from the Middle East, which has considerable popular support in the United States (Chart 6). Both the Saudis and Israelis have been emboldened by the Trump administration’s support and have expanded their regional military targeting of Iranian-backed forces, prompting Iranian pushback. The hard-line factions know that a full-fledged American attack would be devastating to Iranian missile, radar, and energy facilities and armed forces. The Iranians remember the devastating impact on their navy from Operation Praying Mantis in 1988. But with the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” sanctions cutting oil exports nearly to zero, Iran’s economy is getting strangled and militant forces may feel they have no choice. Chart 6Americans Do Not Support War With Iran Moreover Trump’s electoral constraint – his need to make deals in order to achieve foreign policy victories and lift his weak approval ratings ahead of the election – means that foreign enemies have the ability to drive up the price of a deal. This is what the Iranians just did. But negotiations may be impossible now before 2020. Rouhani may be forced to play the hawk, Supreme Leader Khamenei is opposed to talks, and the hard-line faction is apparently willing to court conflict with America to consolidate its power ahead of the dangerous and uncertain period that awaits the regime in the near future, when Khamenei’s inevitable succession occurs. Bottom Line: We argued in May that the risk of U.S. war with Iran stood as high as 22%, on a conservative estimate of the conditional probability that the U.S. would engage in strikes if Iran restarted its nuclear program outside of the provisions of the JCPOA. Recent events make the risk even higher. This does not mean that Rouhani and Trump cannot make bold diplomatic moves to contain tensions, but that the risk of widening conflict is immediate. Supply Risk Will Remain Front And Center The risk to supply made manifest in these drone attacks will remain with markets for the foreseeable future. They highlight the vulnerability of supply in the Gulf region, and, importantly, the now-limited availability of spare capacity to offset unplanned production outages. There’s ~ 3.2mm b/d of spare capacity available to the market, by the International Energy Agency’s reckoning, some 2mm b/d or so of which is in KSA (Chart 7). These drone attacks highlight the need to risk-adjust this spare capacity. When the infrastructure needed to deliver it to markets comes under attack, its availability must be adjusted downward. Chart 7Limited Availability Of Spare Capacity To Offset Outages Chart 8Commercial Inventories Will Draw ... In the immediate aftermath of the temporary loss of ~ 5.7mm b/d of KSA crude production to the drone attacks, we expect commercial inventories to be drawn down hard, particularly in the U.S., where refiners likely will look to increase product exports to meet export demand (Chart 8). This will backwardate forward crude oil and product curves – i.e., promptly delivered oil will trade at a higher price than oil delivered in the future (Chart 9). Chart 9... Deepening Forward-Curve Backwardations We expect the U.S. SPR to monitor this evolution closely. It is near impossible to handicap the level of commercial inventories – or backwardation – that will trigger the U.S. SPR release, given the unknown length of the KSA output loss, however. Worth noting is the fact that U.S. crude-export capacity is limited to ~ 1mm b/d of additional capacity. Thus, the SPR cannot be directly exported to cover the entire loss of KSA barrels. Other members of OPEC 2.0 will be hard-pressed to lift light-sweet exports, which, combined with constraints on U.S. export capacity, mean the light-sweet crude oil market could tighten. Interestingly, these attacks come as the U.S. has been selling down its SPR. The sales to date have been to support modernization of the SPR, but, for a while now, the Trump administration has been signalling it no longer believes they are critical to U.S. security. That likely changes with these events. The EIA estimates net crude-oil imports in the U.S. are running at 3.4mm b/d. The SPR is estimated at 645mm barrels. There are 416mm barrels of commercial crude inventories in the U.S., giving ~ 1.06 billion barrels of crude oil in the SPR and commercial inventory in the U.S. This translates into about 312 days of inventory in the U.S. when measured in terms of net crude imports. China has been building its SPR, which we estimated at ~ 510mm barrels. As a rough calculation using only China imports of ~ 10mm b/d, and production of ~ 3.9mm b/d, net crude-oil imports are probably around 6mm b/d. With SPR of ~ 510mm barrels, the public SPR (i.e., state-operated stocks) equates to roughly 85 days of imports.4 Members of the IEA – for the most part OECD states – are required to have 90 days of oil consumption on hand. The IEA estimates its SPR totals 1.54 billion barrels, which consists of crude oil and refined products. Together, the IEA’s SPRs plus spare capacity likely could cover the loss of KSA’s crude exports, but the timing and coordination of these releases will be tested. KSA has ~ 190mm b/d of crude oil in storage as of June, the latest data available from the Joint Organizations Data Initiative (JODI) Oil World Database. If the 5.7mm b/d of output removed from the market by these oil attacks persists, these stocks would be exhausted in 33 days. Based on press reports, repairs to the KSA infrastructure will take weeks – perhaps months – which means the longer it takes to repair these facilities the tighter the global oil market will become. This is exacerbated if additional pipelines or infrastructure in KSA come under attack or are damaged. Critical Next Steps How the U.S. follows up Pompeo’s accusations against Iran will be critical. The next steps here are critical: Tactically, the Houthis or other Iranian proxies could continue with drone attacks aimed at KSA infrastructure. They’ve obviously figured out how to target Abqaiq, which is the lynchpin of KSA’s crude export system (desulfurization facilities there process most of the crude put on the water in the Eastern province). The Abqaiq facility has been hardened against attack, but these attacks show the supporting infrastructure remains vulnerable. In addition, militants could target KSA’s western operations on the Red Sea, which include pipelines and refineries. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait at the bottom of the Red Sea empties into the Arabia Sea. More than half the 6.2mm b/d of crude oil, condensates and refined-product shipments transiting the strait daily are destined for Europe, according to the U.S. EIA.5 In addition, the 750-mile East-West pipeline running across KSA terminates on the Red Sea at Yanbu. The Kingdom is planning to increase export capacity off the pipeline from 5mm b/d to 7mm b/d, a project that will take some two years to complete.6 During a July visit to India, former Energy Minister Khalid al-Falih stated importers of Saudi crude and products, “have to do what they have to do to protect their own energy shipments because Saudi Arabia cannot take that on its own.” On top of all this, Iran could ramp up its threats to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz once again. These actions could put the risk to supply into sharp relief in very short order. Even Iranian rhetoric will have a larger impact in this environment. In the immediate aftermath of the drone attacks on critical KSA infrastructure, markets will be hanging on every announcement coming from the Kingdom regarding the duration of the outage. How the U.S. follows up Pompeo’s accusations against Iran will be critical. Whether the deal being brokered with France – and the $15 billion oil-for-money loan from the U.S. that goes with it – is now DOA, or is put on a fast track to reduce tensions in the region will be telling. It is entirely possible the U.S. launches an attack on Yemen to take out these drone bases and to neutralize the threat there. If Iraq is identified as the source of the attacks, the U.S., along with Iraqi forces, likely would stage a special-forces operation to take out the bases used to launch the drone attacks. The U.S. has significant forces in theater right now: The U.S. 5th Fleet is in Bahrain, with the Abe Lincoln aircraft carrier and its strike force on station at the Strait of Hormuz; and the USS Boxer Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) are on patrol in the Red Sea under the command of the U.S. 5th Fleet (Map 2). In addition, the U.S. also deployed B52s earlier this year to Qatar to have this capability in theater. Map 2U.S. Navy Carrier Battle Group Disposition, 9 September 2019 Bottom Line: In the immediate aftermath of the drone attacks on critical KSA infrastructure, markets will be hanging on every announcement coming from the Kingdom regarding the duration of the outage that removed 5.7mm b/d of crude-processing capacity from the market and damaged one Saudi Arabia’s largest oil fields. We expect the U.S. will conduct a limited retaliatory strike, and will continue to build up forces in the Persian Gulf to prepare for a larger response if necessary. While neither President Trump nor the United States has an immediate interest in a large-scale conflict with Iran, the risk of such an outcome has increased. If the oil-price shock caused by these attacks becomes unmanageable – either because of additional attacks against Saudi Arabian or other regional infrastructure, or direct Iranian action to restrict the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf – the risk of recession increases. While this is not our base case, it could push Trump to adopt a “war president” strategy going into the U.S. general election next year.   Matt Gertken, Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      The massive 7-million-barrel-per-day processing facility at Abqaiq and the Khurais oil field, which produces close to 2mm b/d, were attacked on Saturday, September 14, 2019.  Since then, press reports claim the attack could have originated in Iraq or Iran, and could have included cruise missiles – a major escalation in operations in the region involving Iran, KSA and their respective allies – in addition to drones.  Please see Suspicions Rise That Saudi Oil Attack Came From Outside Yemen, published by The Wall Street Journal September 14, 2019. 2      Please see "Houthi Drone Strikes Disrupt Almost Half Of Saudi Oil Exports", published September 14, 2019, by National Public Radio (U.S.). 3      See Omer Carmi, "Is Iran Negotiating Its Way To Negotiations?" Policy Watch 3172, The Washington Institute, August 30, 2019, available at www.washingtoninstitute.org. 4      China is targeting ~500mm bbls by 2020, and is aiming to have 90 days of import oil cover in its SPR. 5      Please see The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a strategic route for oil and natural gas shipments, published by the EIA August 27, 2019. 6      Please see "Saudi Arabia aims to expand pipeline to reduce oil exports via Gulf," published by reuters.com July 25, 2019.

Special Report

Following drone attacks on critical oil infrastructure in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) over the weekend, which removed ~ 5.7mm b/d of output, the U.S. is likely to conduct a limited retaliatory strike. In addition, the U.S. will continue to build up forces in the Persian Gulf to deter Iran and prepare for a larger response if necessary. After this initial response, the Trump administration will likely seek to contain tensions, as neither Trump nor the United States has an immediate interest in launching a large-scale conflict with Iran. But that does not mean that one will not happen – indeed, the odds are now higher that this risk could materialize. If the oil-price shock caused by these attacks becomes prolonged and unmanageable – either because of additional attacks against Saudi Arabian or other regional infrastructure, or direct Iranian action to restrict the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf – the negative impact on the global and U.S. economy will grow. Faced with a recession – which is not our base case but is possible – the incentive for Trump to engage war with Iran will rise sharply. Attack On KSA Will Prompt U.S. Retaliation If Iran is confirmed as the base, it will limit Trump’s options and ensure that any retaliation leads to a greater escalation of tensions. Over the weekend, Houthi rebels in Yemen claimed responsibility for attacks on two critical oil assets in Saudi Arabia, removing ~ 5.5% of world crude output – a historic shock to global oil supply, and the largest unplanned outage ever recorded (Chart 1).1 U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo accused Iran of being behind the attacks and said there was no evidence that Houthis launched them from Yemen. As we go to press, neither Saudi Arabian officials nor President Trump have confirmed Iran was the culprit, although the sophistication of the attack’s targeting and execution suggest that they will. President Trump said the U.S. is “locked and loaded depending on verification” and offered U.S. support to KSA in a call to Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman.2 Chart 1Oil Supply Disruption + Volume Lost A direct missile strike from Iran is the least likely source, as the Iranians have sought to act through proxies this year, in staging attacks to counter U.S. sanctions, precisely in order to maintain plausible deniability and avoid provoking a full-blown American retaliation. If Iran is confirmed as the base, it will limit Trump’s options and ensure that any retaliation leads to a greater escalation of tensions, relative to a situation where militant groups in Iraq or Yemen (or even in Saudi Arabia) are found to be responsible. Assuming the strike came from outside Iran, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia would presumably retaliate against its proxies in those locations – e.g., the Houthis in Yemen, or the Shia militias in Iraq. Washington is certain to dial up its military deterrent in the region and use the attacks to gain greater worldwide support for a tighter enforcement of sanctions to isolate Iran. This deterrence includes a multinational naval fleet in the Strait of Hormuz, at the entrance to the Gulf, where ~ 20% of the world’s crude oil supply transits daily. Electoral Constraints Facing Trump There are several reasons President Trump will not rush to a full-scale conflict with Iran. First, the attack did not kill U.S. troops or civilians. Miraculously, not even a single casualty is reported in Saudi Arabia. Yet, unlike the Iranian shooting of an American drone, which nearly brought Trump to launch air strikes on June 21, the latest attack clearly impacted critical infrastructure in a way that threatens global stability, making it more likely that some retaliation will occur. Second, Trump faces a significant electoral constraint from high oil prices. True, the U.S. economy is not as exposed to oil imports as it was (Chart 2). Also, global oil producers and strategic reserves including the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) can handle the immediate short-term loss from KSA (Chart 3). However, the duration of the cut-off is unknown and further disruptions will occur if the U.S. retaliates and Iranian-backed forces attack yet again. Third, there is still a chance to show restraint in retaliation, contain tensions over the coming months, limit oil supply loss and price spikes, and thus keep an oil-price shock from tanking the U.S. economy. Chart 2U.S. Imports Continue Falling But as tensions escalate in the short term, they could hit a point of no return at which the economic damage becomes so severe that President Trump can no longer seek re-election based on his economic record (Chart 4). At that point the incentive is to confront Iran directly – and run in 2020 as a “war president” intent on achieving long-term national security interests despite short-term economic pain. Chart 3Key SPRs Are Still Adequate Chart 4An Oil Price Shock Lowers Trump's Re-Election Chances U.S.’s Volatile Attempt At Diplomacy What triggered the attack and what does it say about the U.S. and Iranian positions going forward? Ever since Trump backed away from air strikes in June, he has become more inclined to de-escalate the conflict he began with Iran by withdrawing from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as terrorists, and imposing crippling sanctions to bring Iran’s oil exports to zero. Even as Rouhani and Trump publicly mulled a summit and negotiations, Rouhani insisted that any negotiations with the United States would require Trump to rejoin the JCPOA and remove all sanctions. What prompted this backtracking was Iran’s demonstration of a higher pain threshold than Trump expected. President Hassan Rouhani, and his Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, were personally invested in the 2015 nuclear deal with the Obama administration, which they negotiated despite grave warnings from the regime’s conservative factions that they would be betrayed. Trump’s reneging on that deal confirmed their opponents’ expectations, while his sanctions have sent the economy into a crushing recession (Chart 5). Chart 5U.S. Sanctions Hammer Iran's Economy With Iranian parliamentary elections in February 2020, and a consequential presidential election in 2021 in which Rouhani will seek to support a political ally, the Rouhani administration needed to respond forcefully to Trump’s sanctions. Iran staged several provocations in the Strait of Hormuz to warn the U.S. against stringent sanctions enforcement (Map 1). And recently, even as Rouhani and Trump publicly mulled a summit and negotiations, Rouhani insisted that any negotiations with the United States would require Trump to rejoin the JCPOA and remove all sanctions, a very high bar for talks. Map 1Abqaiq Is At The Very Core Of Global Oil Supply Realizing the large appetite for conflict in Tehran, and the ability to sustain sanctions and use proxy warfare damaging global oil supply, Trump took a step back – he withheld air strikes in late June, discussed a diplomatic path forward with French President Emmanuel Macron, and subsequently fired his National Security Adviser John Bolton, a known war hawk on Iran who helped mastermind the return to sanctions. The proximate cause of Bolton’s ouster was reportedly a disagreement about sanctions relief that would have been designed to enable a meeting with Rouhani at the United Nations General Assembly next week. Such a summit could possibly have led to a return to the pre-2017 U.S.-Iran détente. If Trump had compromised, Iran could have gone back to observing the 2015 nuclear pact provisions, which it has only gradually and carefully violated. Moreover the French proposal to convince Iran to rejoin talks by offering a $15 billion credit line for sanctions relief was gaining traction. Apparently these recent moves toward diplomacy posed a threat to various actors in the region that benefit from U.S.-Iran conflict and sanctions. Hardliners in Iran want to weaken the Rouhani administration and prevent further Rouhani-led negotiations (i.e. “surrender”) to American pressure. On August 29, three days after Rouhani hinted that he might still be willing to talk with Trump, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s weekly publication warned that “negotiations with the U.S. are definitely out of the question.”3 The IRGC and others continue to benefit from black market activity fueled by sanctions. And Iranian overseas militant proxies have their own reasons to fear a return to U.S.-Iran détente. Saudi Arabia and Israel also worry that President Trump will follow in President Obama’s footsteps with Iran and strategic withdrawal from the Middle East, which has considerable popular support in the United States (Chart 6). Both the Saudis and Israelis have been emboldened by the Trump administration’s support and have expanded their regional military targeting of Iranian-backed forces, prompting Iranian pushback. The hard-line factions know that a full-fledged American attack would be devastating to Iranian missile, radar, and energy facilities and armed forces. The Iranians remember the devastating impact on their navy from Operation Praying Mantis in 1988. But with the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” sanctions cutting oil exports nearly to zero, Iran’s economy is getting strangled and militant forces may feel they have no choice. Chart 6Americans Do Not Support War With Iran Moreover Trump’s electoral constraint – his need to make deals in order to achieve foreign policy victories and lift his weak approval ratings ahead of the election – means that foreign enemies have the ability to drive up the price of a deal. This is what the Iranians just did. But negotiations may be impossible now before 2020. Rouhani may be forced to play the hawk, Supreme Leader Khamenei is opposed to talks, and the hard-line faction is apparently willing to court conflict with America to consolidate its power ahead of the dangerous and uncertain period that awaits the regime in the near future, when Khamenei’s inevitable succession occurs. Bottom Line: We argued in May that the risk of U.S. war with Iran stood as high as 22%, on a conservative estimate of the conditional probability that the U.S. would engage in strikes if Iran restarted its nuclear program outside of the provisions of the JCPOA. Recent events make the risk even higher. This does not mean that Rouhani and Trump cannot make bold diplomatic moves to contain tensions, but that the risk of widening conflict is immediate. Supply Risk Will Remain Front And Center The risk to supply made manifest in these drone attacks will remain with markets for the foreseeable future. They highlight the vulnerability of supply in the Gulf region, and, importantly, the now-limited availability of spare capacity to offset unplanned production outages. There’s ~ 3.2mm b/d of spare capacity available to the market, by the International Energy Agency’s reckoning, some 2mm b/d or so of which is in KSA (Chart 7). These drone attacks highlight the need to risk-adjust this spare capacity. When the infrastructure needed to deliver it to markets comes under attack, its availability must be adjusted downward. Chart 7Limited Availability Of Spare Capacity To Offset Outages Chart 8Commercial Inventories Will Draw ... In the immediate aftermath of the temporary loss of ~ 5.7mm b/d of KSA crude production to the drone attacks, we expect commercial inventories to be drawn down hard, particularly in the U.S., where refiners likely will look to increase product exports to meet export demand (Chart 8). This will backwardate forward crude oil and product curves – i.e., promptly delivered oil will trade at a higher price than oil delivered in the future (Chart 9). Chart 9... Deepening Forward-Curve Backwardations We expect the U.S. SPR to monitor this evolution closely. It is near impossible to handicap the level of commercial inventories – or backwardation – that will trigger the U.S. SPR release, given the unknown length of the KSA output loss, however. Worth noting is the fact that U.S. crude-export capacity is limited to ~ 1mm b/d of additional capacity. Thus, the SPR cannot be directly exported to cover the entire loss of KSA barrels. Other members of OPEC 2.0 will be hard-pressed to lift light-sweet exports, which, combined with constraints on U.S. export capacity, mean the light-sweet crude oil market could tighten. Interestingly, these attacks come as the U.S. has been selling down its SPR. The sales to date have been to support modernization of the SPR, but, for a while now, the Trump administration has been signalling it no longer believes they are critical to U.S. security. That likely changes with these events. The EIA estimates net crude-oil imports in the U.S. are running at 3.4mm b/d. The SPR is estimated at 645mm barrels. There are 416mm barrels of commercial crude inventories in the U.S., giving ~ 1.06 billion barrels of crude oil in the SPR and commercial inventory in the U.S. This translates into about 312 days of inventory in the U.S. when measured in terms of net crude imports. China has been building its SPR, which we estimated at ~ 510mm barrels. As a rough calculation using only China imports of ~ 10mm b/d, and production of ~ 3.9mm b/d, net crude-oil imports are probably around 6mm b/d. With SPR of ~ 510mm barrels, the public SPR (i.e., state-operated stocks) equates to roughly 85 days of imports.4 Members of the IEA – for the most part OECD states – are required to have 90 days of oil consumption on hand. The IEA estimates its SPR totals 1.54 billion barrels, which consists of crude oil and refined products. Together, the IEA’s SPRs plus spare capacity likely could cover the loss of KSA’s crude exports, but the timing and coordination of these releases will be tested. KSA has ~ 190mm b/d of crude oil in storage as of June, the latest data available from the Joint Organizations Data Initiative (JODI) Oil World Database. If the 5.7mm b/d of output removed from the market by these oil attacks persists, these stocks would be exhausted in 33 days. Based on press reports, repairs to the KSA infrastructure will take weeks – perhaps months – which means the longer it takes to repair these facilities the tighter the global oil market will become. This is exacerbated if additional pipelines or infrastructure in KSA come under attack or are damaged. Critical Next Steps How the U.S. follows up Pompeo’s accusations against Iran will be critical. The next steps here are critical: Tactically, the Houthis or other Iranian proxies could continue with drone attacks aimed at KSA infrastructure. They’ve obviously figured out how to target Abqaiq, which is the lynchpin of KSA’s crude export system (desulfurization facilities there process most of the crude put on the water in the Eastern province). The Abqaiq facility has been hardened against attack, but these attacks show the supporting infrastructure remains vulnerable. In addition, militants could target KSA’s western operations on the Red Sea, which include pipelines and refineries. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait at the bottom of the Red Sea empties into the Arabia Sea. More than half the 6.2mm b/d of crude oil, condensates and refined-product shipments transiting the strait daily are destined for Europe, according to the U.S. EIA.5 In addition, the 750-mile East-West pipeline running across KSA terminates on the Red Sea at Yanbu. The Kingdom is planning to increase export capacity off the pipeline from 5mm b/d to 7mm b/d, a project that will take some two years to complete.6 During a July visit to India, former Energy Minister Khalid al-Falih stated importers of Saudi crude and products, “have to do what they have to do to protect their own energy shipments because Saudi Arabia cannot take that on its own.” On top of all this, Iran could ramp up its threats to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz once again. These actions could put the risk to supply into sharp relief in very short order. Even Iranian rhetoric will have a larger impact in this environment. In the immediate aftermath of the drone attacks on critical KSA infrastructure, markets will be hanging on every announcement coming from the Kingdom regarding the duration of the outage. How the U.S. follows up Pompeo’s accusations against Iran will be critical. Whether the deal being brokered with France – and the $15 billion oil-for-money loan from the U.S. that goes with it – is now DOA, or is put on a fast track to reduce tensions in the region will be telling. It is entirely possible the U.S. launches an attack on Yemen to take out these drone bases and to neutralize the threat there. If Iraq is identified as the source of the attacks, the U.S., along with Iraqi forces, likely would stage a special-forces operation to take out the bases used to launch the drone attacks. The U.S. has significant forces in theater right now: The U.S. 5th Fleet is in Bahrain, with the Abe Lincoln aircraft carrier and its strike force on station at the Strait of Hormuz; and the USS Boxer Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) are on patrol in the Red Sea under the command of the U.S. 5th Fleet (Map 2). In addition, the U.S. also deployed B52s earlier this year to Qatar to have this capability in theater. Map 2U.S. Navy Carrier Battle Group Disposition, 9 September 2019 Bottom Line: In the immediate aftermath of the drone attacks on critical KSA infrastructure, markets will be hanging on every announcement coming from the Kingdom regarding the duration of the outage that removed 5.7mm b/d of crude-processing capacity from the market and damaged one Saudi Arabia’s largest oil fields. We expect the U.S. will conduct a limited retaliatory strike, and will continue to build up forces in the Persian Gulf to prepare for a larger response if necessary. While neither President Trump nor the United States has an immediate interest in a large-scale conflict with Iran, the risk of such an outcome has increased. If the oil-price shock caused by these attacks becomes unmanageable – either because of additional attacks against Saudi Arabian or other regional infrastructure, or direct Iranian action to restrict the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf – the risk of recession increases. While this is not our base case, it could push Trump to adopt a “war president” strategy going into the U.S. general election next year.   Matt Gertken, Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      The massive 7-million-barrel-per-day processing facility at Abqaiq and the Khurais oil field, which produces close to 2mm b/d, were attacked on Saturday, September 14, 2019.  Since then, press reports claim the attack could have originated in Iraq or Iran, and could have included cruise missiles – a major escalation in operations in the region involving Iran, KSA and their respective allies – in addition to drones.  Please see Suspicions Rise That Saudi Oil Attack Came From Outside Yemen, published by The Wall Street Journal September 14, 2019. 2      Please see "Houthi Drone Strikes Disrupt Almost Half Of Saudi Oil Exports", published September 14, 2019, by National Public Radio (U.S.). 3      See Omer Carmi, "Is Iran Negotiating Its Way To Negotiations?" Policy Watch 3172, The Washington Institute, August 30, 2019, available at www.washingtoninstitute.org. 4      China is targeting ~500mm bbls by 2020, and is aiming to have 90 days of import oil cover in its SPR. 5      Please see The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a strategic route for oil and natural gas shipments, published by the EIA August 27, 2019. 6      Please see "Saudi Arabia aims to expand pipeline to reduce oil exports via Gulf," published by reuters.com July 25, 2019.

Special Report

Dear Client, Instead of our regular report, this week we are sending you a Special Report penned by Matt Gertken, Chief Geopolitical Strategist of our sister Geopolitical Strategy service, titled “The Polybius Solution.” In this report Matt argues that a full-fledged cold war with China would put a cap on American political polarization, putting China at a disadvantage. By contrast, a U.S. war with Iran would exacerbate polarization, giving China a huge strategic opportunity. We trust that you will find this Special Report useful and insightful. Best regards, Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist Highlights So What? U.S.-Iran risk is front-loaded, but U.S.-China is the greater risk overall. A full-fledged cold war with China will put a cap on American political polarization, putting China at a disadvantage. By contrast, a U.S. war with Iran would exacerbate polarization, giving China a huge strategic opportunity. War with Iran or trade war escalation with China are both ultimately dollar bullish – even though tactically the dollar may fall.  Feature The idea of the “Thucydides Trap” has gone viral in recent years – for good reason. The term, coined by Harvard political scientist Graham Allison, refers to the ancient Greek historian Thucydides (460-400 BC), author of the seminal History of the Peloponnesian War. The “trap” is the armed conflict that most often develops when a dominant nation that presides over a particular world order (e.g. Sparta, the U.S.) faces a young and ambitious rival that seeks fundamental change to that order (e.g. Athens, China).1 This conflict between an “established” and “revisionist” power was highlighted by the political philosopher Thomas Hobbes in his translation of Thucydides in the seventeenth century; every student of international relations knows it. Allison’s contribution is the comparative analysis of various Thucydides-esque episodes in the modern era to show how today’s U.S.-China rivalry fits the pattern. The implication is that war (not merely trade war) is a major risk. We have long held a similar assessment of the U.S.-China conflict. It is substantiated by hard data showing that China is gaining on America in various dimensions of power (Chart 1). Assuming that the U.S. does not want to be replaced, the current trade conflict will metastasize to other areas. If the U.S. and China really engage in an epic conflict, American political polarization should fall. There is an important but overlooked corollary to the Thucydides Trap: if the U.S. and China really engage in an epic conflict, American political polarization should fall. Polarization fell dramatically during the Great Depression and World War II and remained subdued throughout the Cold War. It only began to rise again when the Soviet threat faded and income inequality spiked circa 1980. Americans were less divided when they shared a common enemy that posed an existential threat; they grew more divided when their triumph proved to benefit some disproportionately to others (Chart 2). Chart 1China Is Gaining On The U.S. Chart 2U.S. Polarization Falls During Crisis   If the U.S. and China continue down the path of confrontation, a similar pattern is likely to emerge in the coming years – polarization is likely to decline. China possesses the raw ability to rival or even supplant the United States as the premier superpower over the very long run. Its mixed economy is more sustainable than the Soviet command economy was, and it is highly integrated into the global system, unlike the isolated Soviet bloc. As long as China’s domestic demand holds up and Beijing does not suppress its own country’s technological and military ambitions, Trump and the next president will face a persistent need to respond with measures to limit or restrict China’s capabilities. Eventually this will involve mobilizing public opinion more actively. Further, if the U.S.-China conflict escalates, it will clarify U.S. relations with the rest of the world. For instance, Trump’s handling of trade suggests that he could refrain from trade wars with American allies to concentrate attention on China, particularly sanctions on its technology companies. Meanwhile a future Democratic president would preserve some of these technological tactics while reinstituting the multilateral approach of the Barack Obama administration, which launched the “Pivot to Asia,” the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and intensive freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. These are all aspects of a containment strategy that would reinforce China’s rejection of the western order. Bottom Line: If the White House, any White House, were to pursue a consistent strategy to contain China, the result would be a major escalation of the trade conflict that would bring Americans together in the face of a common enemy. It would also encourage the U.S. to form alliances in pursuit of this objective. So far these things have not occurred, but they are logical corollaries of the Thucydides Trap and they will occur if the Thucydides thesis is validated. How Would China Fare In The Thucydides Trap? China would be in trouble in this scenario. The United States, if the public unifies, would have a greater geopolitical impact than it currently does in its divided state. And a western alliance would command still greater coercive power than the United States acting alone (Chart 3). External pressure would also exacerbate China’s internal imbalances – excessive leverage, pollution, inefficient state involvement in the economy, poor quality of life, and poor governance (Chart 4). China has managed to stave off these problems so far because it has operated under relative American and western toleration of its violations of global norms (e.g. a closed financial system, state backing of national champions, arbitrary law, censorship). This would change under concerted American, European, and Japanese efforts. Chart 3China Fears A Western 'Grand Alliance' Chart 4China's Domestic Risks Underrated Concerted external pressure would make it harder for China to manage its internal imbalances. How would the Communist Party respond? First, it could launch long-delayed and badly needed structural reforms and parlay these as concessions to the West. The ramifications would be negative for Chinese growth on a cyclical basis but positive on a structural basis since the reforms would lift productivity over the long run – a dynamic that our Emerging Markets Strategy has illustrated, in a macroeconomic context, in Diagram 1. This is already an option in the current trade war, but China has not yet clearly chosen it – likely because of the danger that the U.S. would exploit the slowdown. Diagram 1Foreign Pressure And Structural Reform = Short-Term Pain For Long-Term Gain Alternatively the Communist Party could double down on confrontation with the West, as Russia has done. This would strengthen the party’s grip but would be negative for growth on both a cyclical and structural basis. The effectiveness of China’s fiscal-and-credit stimulus would likely decline because of a drop in private sector activity and sentiment – already a nascent tendency – while the lack of “reform and opening up” would reduce long-term growth potential. This option makes structural reforms look more palatable – but again, China has not yet been forced to make this choice. None of the above is to say that the West is destined to win a cold war with China, but rather that the burden of revolutionizing the global order necessarily falls on the country attempting to revolutionize it. Bottom Line: If the Thucydides Trap fully takes effect, western pressure on China’s economy will force China into a destabilizing economic transition. China could lie low and avoid conflict in order to undertake reforms, or it could amplify its aggressive foreign policy. This is where the risk of armed conflict rises. Introducing … The Polybius Solution The problem with the above is that there is no sign of polarization abating anytime soon in the United States. Extreme partisanship makes this plain (Chart 5). Rising polarization could prevent the U.S. from responding coherently to China. The Thucydides Trap could be avoided, or delayed, simply because the U.S. is distracted elsewhere. The most likely candidate is Iran. A lesser known Greek historian – who was arguably more influential than Thucydides – helps to illustrate this alternative vision for the future. This is Polybius (208-125 BC), a Greek who wrote under Roman rule. He described the rise of the Roman Empire as a result of Rome’s superior constitutional system. Polybius explains domestic polarization whereas Thucydides explains international conflict. Polybius took the traditional view that there were three primary virtues or powers governing human society: the One (the king), the Few (the nobles), and the Many (the commons). These powers normally ran the country one at a time: a dictator would die; a group of elites would take over; this oligarchy would devolve into democracy or mob-rule; and from the chaos would spring a new dictator. His singular insight – his “solution” to political decay – was that if a mixture or balance of the three powers could be maintained, as in the Roman republic, then the natural cycle of growth and decay could be short-circuited, enabling a regime to live much longer than its peers (Diagram 2). Diagram 2Polybius: A Balanced Political System Breaks The Natural Cycle Of Tyranny And Chaos In short, just as post-WWII economic institutions have enabled countries to reduce the frequency and intensity of recessions (Chart 6), so Polybius believed that political institutions could reduce the frequency and intensity of revolutions. Eventually all governments would decay and collapse, but a domestic system of checks and balances could delay the inevitable. Needless to say, Polybius was hugely influential on English and French constitutional thinkers and the founders of the American republic. Chart 6Orthodox Economic Policy Has Made Recessions Less Frequent And Less Acute What is the cause of constitutional decay, according to Polybius? Wealth, inequality, and corruption, which always follow from stable and prosperous times. “Avarice and unscrupulous money-making” drive the masses to encroach upon the elite and demand a greater share of the wealth. The result is a vicious cycle of conflict between the commons and the nobles until either the constitutional system is restored or a democratic revolution occurs. Compared to Thucydides, Polybius had less to say about the international balance of power. Domestic balance was his “solution” to unpredictable outside events. However, states with decaying political systems were off-balance and more likely to be conquered, or to overreach in trying to conquer others. Bottom Line: The “Polybius solution” equates with domestic political balance. Balanced states do not allow the nation’s leader, the elite, or the general population to become excessively powerful. But even the most balanced states will eventually decline. As they accumulate wealth, inequality and corruption emerge and cause conflict among the three powers. Why Polybius Matters Today It does not take a stretch of the imagination to apply the Polybius model to the United States today. Just as Rome grew fat with its winnings from the Punic Wars and decayed from a virtuous republic into a luxurious empire, as Polybius foresaw, so the United States lurched from victory over the Soviet Union to internal division and unforced errors. For instance, the budget surplus of 2% of GDP in the year 2000 became a budget deficit of 9% of GDP after a decade of gratuitous wars, profligate social spending and tax cuts, and financial excesses. It is on track to balloon again when the next recession hits – and this is true even without any historic crisis event to justify it. U.S. polarization is contaminating foreign policy. The rise in polarization has coincided with a rise in wealth inequality, much as Polybius would expect (Chart 7). In all likelihood the Trump tax cuts will exacerbate both of these trends (Chart 8). Even worse, any attempts by “the people” to take more wealth from the “nobles” will worsen polarization first, long before any improvements in equality translate to a drop in polarization. Chart 7Polarization Unlikely To Drop While Inequality Rises Chart 8Trump Tax Cuts Fuel Inequality Most importantly, from a global point of view, U.S. polarization is contaminating foreign policy. Just as the George W. Bush administration launched a preemptive war in Iraq, destabilizing the region, so the Obama administration precipitously withdrew from Iraq, destabilizing the region. And just as the Obama administration initiated a hurried détente with Iran in order to leave Iraq, the Trump administration precipitously withdrew from this détente, provoking a new conflict with Iran and potentially destabilizing Iraq. Major foreign policy initiatives have been conducted, and revoked, on a partisan basis under three administrations. And a Democratic victory in 2020 would result in a reversal of Trump’s initiatives. In the meantime Trump’s policy could easily entangle him in armed conflict with Iran – as nearly occurred on June 21. Iranian domestic politics make it very difficult, if not impossible, to go back to the 2015 setting. Despite Trump’s recent backpedaling, his administration runs a high risk of getting sucked into another Middle Eastern quagmire as long as it enforces the sanctions on Iranian oil stringently. China would be the big winner if such a war occurred, just as it was one of the greatest beneficiaries of the long American distraction in Afghanistan and Iraq. It would benefit from another 5-10 years of American losses of blood and treasure. It would be able to pursue regional interests with less Interference and could trade limited cooperation with the U.S. on Iran for larger concessions elsewhere. And a nuclear-armed Iran – which is a long-term concern for the U.S. – is not in China’s national interest anyway. Bottom Line: The U.S. is missing the “Polybius solution” of balanced government; polarization is on the rise. As a result, the grand strategy of “pivoting to Asia” could go into reverse (Chart 9). If that occurs, the conflict with China will be postponed or ineffective. Chart 9Will The Pivot To Asia Reverse? Iran Is The Wild Card If the U.S. gets bogged down in the Middle East yet again, the “Pivot To Asia” will go into reverse and the “Thucydides Trap” with China will be delayed. A war with Iran manifestly runs afoul of the Trump administration’s and America’s national interests, whereas a trade war with China does not. First, although an Iranian or Iranian-backed attack on American troops would give Trump initial support in conducting air strikes, the consequences of war would likely be an oil price shock that would sink his approval rating over time and reduce his chances of reelection (Chart 10). We have shown that such a shock could come from sabotage in Iraq as well as from attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran could be driven to attack if it believes the U.S. is about to attack. Second, not only would Democrats oppose a war with Iran, but Americans in general are war-weary, especially with regard to the Middle East (Chart 11). President Trump capitalized on this sentiment during his election campaign, especially in relation to Secretary Hillary Clinton who supported the war in Iraq. Over the past two weeks, he has downplayed the Iranian-backed tanker attacks, emphasized that he does not want war, and has ruled out “boots on the ground.” Chart 10Carter Gained Then Lost From Iran Oil Shock Third, it follows from the above that, in the event of war, the United States would lack the political will necessary to achieve its core strategic objectives, such as eliminating Iran’s nuclear program or its power projection capabilities. And these are nearly impossible to accomplish from the air alone. And U.S. strategic planners are well aware that conflict with Iran will exact an opportunity cost by helping Russia and China consolidate spheres of influence. The wild card is Iran. President Hassan Rouhani has an incentive to look tough and push the limits, given that he was betrayed on the 2015 deal. And the regime itself is probably confident that it can survive American air strikes. American military strikes are still a serious constraint, but until the U.S. demonstrates that it is willing to go that far, Iran can test the boundaries. In doing so it also sends a message to its regional rivals – Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Arab monarchies, and Israel – that the U.S. is all bark, no bite, and thus unable to protect them from Iran. This may lead to a miscalculation that forces Trump to respond despite his inclinations. The China trade war, by contrast, is less difficult for the Trump administration to pursue. There is not a clear path from tariffs to economic recession, as with an oil shock: the U.S. economy has repeatedly shrugged off counter-tariffs and the Fed has been cowed. While Americans generally oppose the trade war, Trump’s base does not, and the health of the overall economy is far more important for most voters. And a majority of voters do believe that China’s trade practices are unfair. Strategic planners also favor confronting China – unlike Trump they are not concerned with reelection, but they recognize that China’s advantages grow over time, including in critical technologies. Bottom Line: While the media and market focus on China and Iran risks can alternate in the short run, the Trump administration is likely to continue downgrading the conflict with Iran and upgrading the conflict with China over the next six-to-18 months. Neither politics nor grand strategy support a war with Iran, whereas politics might support a trade war with China and grand strategy almost certainly does. China Could Learn From Polybius Too China also lacks the Polybius solution. It suffers from severe inequality and social immobility, just like the Latin American states and the U.S., U.K., and Italy (Chart 12). But unlike the developed markets, it lacks a robust constitutional system. Political risks are understated given the emergence of the middle class, systemic economic weaknesses, and poor governance. Over the long run, Xi Jinping will need to step down, but having removed the formal system for power transition, a succession crisis is likely. China’s imbalances could cause domestic instability even if the U.S. becomes distracted by conflict in the Middle East. But China has unique tools for alleviating crises and smoothing out its economic slowdown, so the absence of outside pressure will probably determine its ability to avoid a painful economic slump. China also lacks the “Polybius solution” of balanced government – and it even lacks a robust constitutional system. This helps to explain China’s interest in dealing with the U.S. on North Korea. President Xi Jinping’s first trip to Pyongyang late last month helped pave the way for President Trump to resume negotiations with the North’s leader Kim Jong Un at the first-ever visit of an American president north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). China does not want an unbridled nuclear North Korea or an American preventative war on the peninsula. If Beijing could do a short-term deal with the U.S. on the basis of assistance in reining in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, it could divert U.S. animus away from itself and encourage the U.S. to turn its attention toward the next rogue nuclear aspirant, Iran. It would also avoid structural economic concessions. Of course, a smooth transition today means short-term gain but long-term pain for Chinese and global growth. Productivity and potential GDP will decline if China does not reform (Diagram 3). But this kind of transition is the regime’s preferred option since Beijing seeks to minimize immediate threats and maintain overall stability. Diagram 3Stimulus And Delayed Reforms = Socialist Put = Stagflation If Chinese internal divisions do flare up, China’s leaders will take a more aggressive posture toward its neighbors and the United States in order to divert public attention and stir up patriotic support. Bottom Line: China suffers from understated internal political risk. While U.S. political divisions could lead to a lack of coherent strategy toward China, a rift in China could lead to Chinese aggression in its neighborhood, accelerating the Thucydides Trap. Investment Conclusions If the U.S. reverses the pivot to Asia, attacks Iran, antagonizes European allies, and exhausts its resources in policy vacillation, its budget deficit will balloon (Chart 13), oil prices will rise, and China will be left to manage its economic transition without a western coalition against it. The implication is a weakening dollar, at least initially. But the U.S. is nearing the end of its longest-ever business expansion and an oil price spike would bring forward the next recession, both of which will push up the greenback. Much will depend on the extent of any oil shock – whether and how long the Strait of Hormuz is blocked. Beyond the next recession, the dollar could suffer severe consequences for the U.S.’s wild policies. Chart 13An Iran War Will Bust The Budget Persian Gulf risks are coming to the fore. But over the next six-to-18 months, U.S.-China conflict will be the dominant marketmover. If the U.S. continues the pivot to Asia, and the U.S. and China proceed with tariffs, tech sanctions, saber-rattling, diplomatic crises, and possibly even military skirmishes, China will be forced into an abrupt and destabilizing economic transition. The U.S. dollar will strengthen as global growth decelerates. Developed market equities will outperform emerging market equities, but equities as a whole will underperform sovereign bonds and other safe-haven assets. Our highest conviction call on this matter is that any trade deal before the U.S. 2020 election will be limited in scope. It will fall far short of a “Grand Compromise” that ushers in a new era of U.S.-China engagement – and hence it will be a disappointment to global equities. Our trade war probabilities, updated on July 26, can be found in Diagram 4. The combined risk of further escalation is 60% -- meaning that the U.S. will either implement the final batch of tariffs or refuse to renew Huawei’s trade license, or both. We are maintaining our risk-off trades: long JPY/USD, long gold, long Swiss bonds, and long USD/CNY. Diagram 4U.S.-China Trade War Decision Tree (Updated July 26, 2019)   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 See Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are The U.S. And China Headed For War?” The Atlantic, September 24, 2015, and Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).

Oil price volatility will remain elevated, as markets transition from a pronounced demand slowdown in 1H19, which is apparent in actual consumption data, to stronger growth. We expect global fiscal and monetary accommodation will arrest and reverse this slowdown in 2H19, and spur oil demand growth in 2020. Consistent with BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy, we are not expecting a resolution to the Sino – U.S. trade war that boosts demand; however, we could see a limited deal by 2H20 that partially addresses tariff barriers and boosts trade in the short run.1 In line with the EIA’s and IEA’s weaker 1H19 oil-consumption assessments, we now expect global demand to grow 1.25mm b/d this year, and 1.50mm b/d next year. These expectations are down 100k b/d and 50k b/d, respectively, from our June estimates. Chart of the WeekOPEC 2.0’s Storage Strategy Continues To Drive Production Supply – demand factors combine to push our 2019 Brent forecast to $70/bbl from $73/bbl last month. We are holding our 2020 Brent forecast at $75/bbl. On the supply side, we continue to expect OPEC 2.0’s production strategy to be driven by its primary goal – reducing global oil inventories – which means it will maintain production discipline this year and possibly into 1Q20 (Chart of the Week). We also expect capital discipline in the U.S. to restrain shale-oil production. Lastly, news flows around U.S. – Iran tensions continue to oscillate between hopeful resolution and a hardening of positions, which fuels price volatility. At the end of the day, we expect any increase in Iranian exports resulting from an easing of U.S.-GCC-Iran tensions to be accommodated by OPEC 2.0, as it was prior to the re-imposition of U.S. export sanctions.2 These supply – demand factors combine to push our 2019 Brent forecast to $70/bbl from $73/bbl last month. We are holding our 2020 Brent forecast at $75/bbl. We continue to expect WTI to trade $7/bbl below Brent this year, and $5/bbl lower next year (Chart 2). Chart 2Demand Slowdown In 1H19 Pushes Brent Forecast Lower Highlights Energy: Overweight. Given our expectation for tighter markets, we are getting long 1Q20 Brent vs. short 1Q21 Brent at tonight’s close, expecting steeper backwardation in the benchmark forward curve as global inventories draw in 2H19. Base Metals: Neutral. At $52.50/MT, Fastmarkets MB’s spot copper TC/RC Asia – Pacific index remains depressed, suggesting smelters will have to continue to discount their services due to tight physical supplies. Expecting tighter markets, we are getting long Dec19 $3.00/lb COMEX call spreads, vs. short Dec19 $3.30/lb COMEX calls at tonight’s close. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold prices are largely being driven by U.S. real interest rates and the broad trade weighted USD, which we will explore in detail next week in a Special Report written with our colleagues in BCA’s Foreign Exchange Strategy. Given our expectation for Fed accommodation this year, we remain long gold. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA lifted expected ending stocks for corn in its latest WASDE released last week. The department expects supply growth to outstrip use, which will raise stocks 335mm bushels to 2.0 billion. Feature Last week, we had the good fortune to visit U.S. clients in “The Great State,” otherwise known as Texas. It was a fortuitous swing through the Promised Land, because we had the opportunity to gain insight on a wide range of topics impacting commodity markets, particularly oil and gold, which are responding to many of the same factors driving markets for risky assets generally. Demand for industrial commodities in particular should pick up this year and next. More than a few of our discussions centered on global aggregate demand for real and financial assets. Prior to the Osaka G20 meeting last month, it looked like the odds of a global recession were increasing. Markets were contending with tightening financial conditions in the wake of the Fed’s December 2018 rate hike, the fourth such hike last year; escalating Sino - U.S. trade tensions, which were depressing capex and demand for industrial commodities; and slowing growth generally ex U.S. (Chart 3). Positioning as if the Fed was too late in reversing the policies that led to tighter financial conditions in 2H18 and earlier this year, and in a manner consistent with a deepening of the Sino - U.S. trade war was not unreasonable. That said, a client at one of the Lone Star state's larger investment managers observed that the powerful rallies in markets for risky assets following Fed accommodative signaling beginning earlier this year strongly suggest the markets’ verdict — at least for the moment — is the Fed acted in time to arrest the risk of a global recession this year. Chart 3Global Growth Slowdown Likely Drove Policy Responses Chart 4BCA's GIA Index Signaling Industrial Commodity Rebound Added to this is the fact that the U.S. central bank is being supported by other systematically important central banks (specifically the PBOC, BOJ, and ECB), and that fiscal stimulus is being deployed globally. Against this backdrop, it is difficult to remain bearish re global aggregate demand going forward, which is to say demand for industrial commodities in particular should pick up this year and next. Indeed, this is starting to show up in our Global Industrial Activity (GIA) Index, which is heavily weighted toward EM industrial commodity demand (Chart 4).3 Oil Demand Will Roar Back In 2H19 Our updated 2019 demand estimates align with the EIA’s and IEA’s depressed 1H19 oil-consumption assessments: We now expect global consumption to grow 1.25mm b/d this year, down 100k b/d vs. our previous estimate. Next year, however, we expect demand to be up 1.50mm b/d in the wake of global stimulus, which is only 50k b/d below our June estimate.4 The IEA’s assessment of 1H19 demand weakness is particularly striking. In its latest forecast, the agency noted that in 2Q19, they show a global surplus of 500k b/d (i.e., supply exceeded demand), where previously they expected a 500k b/d deficit. This million-barrel swing – if it is confirmed when data are later revised with more accurate reporting – suggests the global economy did come close to entering recession earlier this year. We are not as bearish as the IEA, but we do incorporate the severity of the trend they highlight in our forecast. We expect 1H19 global demand grew 520k b/d y/y. In 2H19, like the IEA, we expect demand to come roaring back. We expect consumption to grow at a rate of slightly over 2mm b/d, whereas the IEA’s expecting a 1.8mm b/d rate (Table 1). We believe this momentum will be maintained into 1H20, with growth expected to come in at just over 1.8mm b/d, followed by a more subdued 1.35mm b/d growth rate in 2H20.5 Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) It is important to note here that monetary stimulus hits the economy after “long and variable lags,” in the phrasing of Nobel laureate Milton Freidman. Therefore, we will be closely monitoring our demand estimates for signs the coordinated stimulus being deployed by central banks globally actually is translating into higher industrial commodity demand.6 It also is worthwhile pointing out there is a non-trivial risk – i.e., greater than Russian-roulette odds of 1:6 – the Sino – U.S. trade war metastasizes into a global trade war as positions on both sides harden. This could usher in a new Cold War, and see global supply chains broken and reconstituted within trading blocks. The transition to such a realignment of global trade no doubt would be volatile, but, at the end of the day likely would support commodity demand as supply chains are re-built. OPEC 2.0 Remains Sensitive To EM Demand On the supply side, we continue to expect OPEC 2.0’s production strategy to be driven by its primary goal – i.e., reducing global oil inventories. This means the coalition will continue to exercise production restraint: We expect OPEC 2.0 to reduce output by 540k b/d this year per this strategy. In addition to its inventory goals, we believe OPEC 2.0 also does not want to see Brent price go through $85/bbl. This is because many EM states removed fuel subsidies following the oil-price collapse of 2014 – 2016, and the demand-destruction effects of higher prices would be realized in fairly short order above $85/bbl.7 We view this as a binding constraint – prices above the $80 - $85/bbl range will destroy EM demand, which makes them counterproductive for OPEC 2.0. As a result, next year, we expect the producer coalition to gradually raise output by 800k b/d over the January – August 2020 period, to restrain prices below $80/bbl (Chart 5). It is worthwhile mentioning, since it came up repeatedly in conversations during our Texas swing, we do not share the view OPEC 2.0’s production restraint allows U.S. shale producers to increase production and steal market share from OPEC 2.0. This restraint does play a pivotal role in our balances estimates, and is part of the equation propelling prices higher in our modeling. It is a necessary condition for U.S. shale output to grow, but it is not sufficient. U.S. shale oil is filling a market need for light-sweet crude and condensate, and is attracting investment to meet this need. It does compete with light-sweet OPEC production ex Persian Gulf, but investment in these provinces has proven to be difficult to sustain and commit to over the long haul for a variety of reasons, many of which spring from the lack of rule of law, corruption, and hostile operating environments. Shale oil production, in addition to presenting an opportunity to tap into an abundant resource, allows E&Ps to operate in a low-risk political and geological environment, where contracts are enforced by a disinterested judiciary. In terms of its importance, these factors cannot be overestimated. More importantly, the medium and heavier crudes produced and marketed by KSA and Russia are not in direct competition with U.S. shale oil, which means OPEC 2.0’s leadership is not directly fighting for market share with this output. However, there are constraints to shale-oil production, coming mostly from capital markets. We are modeling slower U.S. onshore production growth this year and next, arising from capital constraints on shale-oil producers. Our recent Special Report on the financial performance of E&P companies and the Majors highlighted the importance they attach to prioritizing investors’ interests, which is clearly visible in the financial metrics of these companies.8 Chart 5OPEC 2.0 Will Raise Supply In 2020 To Keep Brent Prices Below /bbl Chart 6Capital Discipline Will Reduce U.S. Onshore Output In 2020 Consistent with our investor-driven framework for modeling U.S. output, we reduced our expectation for U.S. onshore supply growth by 160k b/d for next year (Chart 6). As a result, we now expect U.S. onshore production to grow by 1.2mm b/d to ~ 10.0mm b/d this year and by 900k b/d to ~ 10.8mm b/d next year – mostly from shales. We expect U.S. offshore production to increase 170k b/d this year and 130k b/d next year, to 1.9mm b/d in 2019 and 2.0mm b/d in 2020. Expect Tighter Balances, Steeper Backwardation The fundamental supply – demand expectations above combine to push our 2019 Brent forecast to $70/bbl from $73/bbl last month. We are holding our 2020 Brent forecast at $75/bbl. We continue to expect WTI to trade $7/bbl below Brent this year, and $5/bbl lower next year (Chart 7). As can be seen in the Chart of the Week, our balances estimates indicate inventory draws will resume this year, which will lead to a steeper backwardation in benchmark crude streams (Chart 8). Given this expectation, we are getting long 1Q20 Brent vs. short 1Q21 Brent at tonight’s close, expecting steeper backwardation in the benchmark forward curve as global inventories draw in 2H19. Bottom Line: Oil price volatility will remain elevated, as markets transition from the profound demand slowdown reported for 1H19 to a higher-growth footing (Chart 9). We expect Brent crude to average $70 and $75/bbl this year and next, with WTI trading $7 and $5/bbl lower, respectively. On the back of our expectation balances will tighten, we are getting long 1Q20 Brent vs. short 1Q21 Brent at tonight’s close. Chart 7Balances Will Tighten In 2H19, Following 1H19 Weakness Chart 8Backwardations Will Steepen, As Inventories Draw Chart 9Volatility Will Remain Elevated We are not sounding an all-clear on aggregate demand in the wake of the fiscal and monetary stimulus being deployed globally. The odds the Sino – U.S. trade war expands to encompass global markets are not trivial (we make them greater than 1:6 in our estimation), and this could keep demand and demand expectations uncertain for an indefinite period. Evidence of this will be visible in the options markets, which will price to higher implied volatilities for a longer period of time.   Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see The Polybius Solution published by BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy July 5, 2019. It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2      OPEC 2.0 is the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia. It was founded in 2016 to manage oil production, so as to reduce global inventory levels, which were bloated by a market-share war launched by the original OPEC cartel in 2014. In the political-economy framework driving our analysis, OPEC 2.0 treats U.S. and Chinese policy as exogenous factors, and maintains sufficient flexibility to respond to whatever these states do. We develop our paradigm for this in The New Political Economy Of Oil, published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy February 21, 2019. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see “Oil, Copper Demand Worries Are Overdone,” where we introduce and discuss the GIA index, published February 14, 2019, in BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4      The EIA has lowered its growth estimates for oil consumption six consecutive times this year, with the publication of this month’s forecast. This is the third time we’ve lowered our forecast. 5      Global oil demand is extremely difficult to estimate. It is an estimate subject to large revisions, as we discussed last year: From 2010 to 2016, “On average, the EIA has increased net demand (increases in estimated demand in excess of the increase in estimated supply) by about 470,000 b/d, with the lowest retroactive increase of net demand being 260,000 b/d (2012).” Copies of this research are available upon request. 6      Please see The Lag in Effect of Monetary Policy, by Milton Friedman (1961). Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69, pages 447-466. 7      Please see With the Benefit of Hindsight: The Impact of the 2014-16 Oil Price Collapse, published January 13, 2018, by the World Bank for a discussion of subsidy removal by EM states. 8      Please see Shale-Oil E&Ps Turning A Corner?, published June 13, and U.S. Shales, GOM Production Reinforce Our Robust Production Forecasts, published July 11, 2019. These are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q2 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades

Special Report

Highlights So What? Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical risks and still-elevated domestic risks reinforce our cyclically constructive view on oil prices. Why? Saudi Arabia is still in a “danger zone” of internal political risk due to the structural transformation of its economy and society. External risks arising from the Iran showdown threaten to cutoff oil production or transportation, adding to the oil risk premium. We expect oil price volatility to persist, but on a cyclical basis we are constructive on prices. We are maintaining our long EM oil producer equities trade versus the EM equity benchmark excluding China. This basket includes Saudi equities, although in the near term these equities face downside risks. Feature The pace of change in Saudi Arabia has been brisk. Women are driving, the IPO of Aramco is in the works, and the next monarch is likely to be a millennial. Changes to the global energy economy have raised the urgency for an economic transformation that will have political and social consequences, forcing a structural transformation. While the results thus far are attractive, the adjustment phase will be rocky. Saudi Arabia’s successful transition depends on its ability to navigate three main threats: Chart 1The Epic Shale Shake-Up Continues The growth of U.S. shale producers and the dilution of Saudi Arabia’s pricing power: Since the emergence of shale technology, Saudi Arabia faces a new reality in oil markets (Chart 1). Even in the current environment of supply disruptions from major producers such as Iran, Venezuela, and Libya, Brent prices have averaged just $66/bbl so far this year, weighed down by the global slowdown, and the macro context of rising U.S. production. Saudi Arabia has had to enlist the support of Russia in the production management agreement (OPEC 2.0) in effort to support oil prices. But continued oil production cuts come at the expense of the coalition’s market share, and crude exports are no longer a dependable source of revenue for Saudi Arabia. Domestic social and political uncertainties: The successful functioning of the political system has been dependent on the government’s ability to support the lifestyles of its citizens, who have grown accustomed to the generosity of their rulers. But economic challenges bring fiscal challenges. Moreover, shifting powers within the state raise the level of uncertainty and risks during the transition phase. Saber-rattling in the region: Heightened tensions with arch-enemy Iran are posing significant risks of instability and armed conflict that could affect oil production and transportation. And as the war in Yemen enters its fifth year, it poses risks to Saudi finances and oil infrastructure – as highlighted by the multiple drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities in May. These structural risks now dominate Saudi Arabia’s policy-making. OPEC 2.0’s decision at the beginning of this month to extend output cuts into 2020 aims to smooth the economic transition by maintaining a floor under oil prices. Meanwhile Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s Vision 2030 is underway – it is a blueprint for a future Saudi Arabia less dependent on oil (Table 1). Table 1Vision 2030 Highlights Saudi leadership will struggle to minimize near term instability without jeopardizing necessary structural change. In addition to an acute phase of tensions with Iran that could lead to destabilizing surprises this year or next, Saudi Arabia’s economy has just bottomed and is not yet out of the woods. Saudi Arabia’s Economy And Global Oil Markets: Adapting To The New Normal The trajectory of Saudi Arabia’s economic performance has improved since the U-turn in its oil-price management. From 2014-16 Riyadh attempted to drive U.S. shale producers out of business by cranking up production and running prices down. Since then it has supported prices through OPEC 2.0’s production cuts (Chart 2). Export earnings have rebounded over the past two years, reversing the current account deficit (Chart 3). Although net inflows from trade in real terms contribute a much smaller share of overall economic output compared to the mid-2000s, the good news is that the trade balance is back in surplus. Chart 2Return To Cartel Tactics Boosted Economy Nevertheless, the external balance remains hostage to oil prices and may weaken anew over a longer time horizon. Chart 3Current Account Balance Has Improved Chart 4Oil Revenues Easing Budget Strain ... For Now Greater government revenues are helping to improve the budget (Chart 4), but it remains in deficit. Moreover, we do not expect Saudi Arabia to flip the budget to a surplus over the coming two years. Despite our Commodity & Energy Strategy team’s expectation of higher oil prices in 2019 and 2020,1 Saudi Arabia will struggle to balance its budget in the coming 18 months (Chart 5). Their average Brent projection of $73-$75/bbl over the next 18 months still falls short of Saudi’s fiscal breakeven oil price. Most importantly, the kingdom’s black gold is no longer a reliable source of income. Weak oil revenues create a “do-or-die” incentive for Saudi policymakers to diversify the economy. As Chart 1 above illustrates, Saudi Arabia is losing global oil influence to U.S. shale producers. While OPEC 2.0 restrains production, the U.S. will continue dominating production growth, with shale output expected to grow ~1.2mm b/d this year and ~1 mm b/d in 2020.2 Saudi Aramco has been the driving force behind the production cuts (Chart 6), yielding more and more of its market share to American producers. The bad news for Saudi Arabia is that shale producers are here to stay. The kingdom is poorly positioned for this loss of control over oil markets (Chart 7) and is being forced to adapt by diversifying its economy at long last. Chart 7A Long Way To Go In Diversifying Exports Little progress has been made on this front, despite the fanfare surrounding the Vision 2030 plan. 70% of government revenues were derived from the oil sector last year, an increase from the 64% share from two years prior, and Saudi Arabia’s dependence on oil trade has actually increased over the past year (Chart 8).3 This week’s announcement of Aramco’s plans to increase output capacity by 550k b/d does not support the diversification strategy. Nevertheless, the Saudis appear to be redoubling their efforts on Aramco’s delayed initial public offering. The IPO is an important aspect of the diversification process. It is also a driver of Saudi oil price management – other things equal, higher prices support the Saudis’ rosy assessments of the company’s total worth. While an excessively ambitious timeline and indecision over where to list the shares have been setbacks to the plan, last weekend’s meeting between King Salman and British finance minister Philip Hammond follows Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s reassertion last month that the IPO would take place in late 2020 or early 2021.4 On the non-oil front, given that Saudi Arabia’s fiscal policy is procyclical, activity in that sector is dependent on the performance of the oil sector. Strong oil sales not only improve liquidity, but also allow for greater government expenditures – both of which stimulate non-oil activity (Chart 9). This means the improvement in the non-oil sector is more a consequence of the rebound in oil revenues than an indication of successful diversification. Chart 8Saudi Reliance On Oil Not Falling Yet Yet the reform vision is not dead. Weak oil revenues may be a blessing in disguise, presenting Saudi policymakers with a “do-or-die” incentive to intensify diversification efforts. Chart 9Non-Oil Activity Still Depends On Oil Sales Bottom Line: By enlisting the support of Russia, Saudi Arabia has managed to maintain a floor beneath oil prices. However, this comes at the expense of falling market share. This leaves authorities with no choice but to diversify the economy – a feat yet to be performed. Domestic Instability Is A Potential Threat Political and social instability in Saudi Arabia is the second derivative of the new normal in global oil markets. So far instability has been limited, but the transition phase is ongoing and the government may not always manage the rapid pace of structural change as effectively as it has over the past two years. Traditionally, Saudi decision-making has comprised the interests of three main social actors: (1) the ruling al Saud family and Saudi elites (2) religious rulers, and (3) Saudi citizens. In the past, the royal family has been able to mitigate social dissent and maintain stability by ensuring that the financial interests of its citizens are satisfied while granting extensive authority to religious groups. The government has transferred profits amassed from oil to Saudi citizens in the form of subsidies for housing, fuel, water, and electricity; public services; and employment opportunities in bloated and inefficient bureaucracies. Going forward, pressure on Riyadh to reduce expenditures and adapt its budget to the changing oil landscape will persist. The authorities will have to continue to shake down elites for funds, or make cuts to these entitlements, or both. Hence policymakers are attempting to walk a thin line between near-term stability and long-term structural change. Several instances of official backtracking show that authorities fear the potential backlash. Following mass discontent in 2017, the Saudi government rolled back most of a series of cuts to public sector wages and benefits that would have led to massive fiscal savings. Instead, the government raised revenue by increasing prices of subsidized goods and services, including fuel, while doling out support to low-income families. The government also introduced a 5% value-added tax in January 2018. Unemployment – especially youth unemployment – is elevated. This is frightening for the authorities. What about the guarantee of cushy government jobs? 45% of employed Saudis work in the public sector. The consequence is an unproductive labor force lacking the skills necessary to succeed in the private sector. Declining oil revenues remove the luxury of supporting a large, unproductive labor force. Chart 10Youth And Woman Unemployment A Structural Constraint Against this backdrop, unemployment – especially youth unemployment – is elevated (Chart 10). This is frightening for the authorities as over half of Saudi citizens are below 30 years of age and the fertility rate is above replacement level implying continued rapid population growth. It will be a challenge to find employment for the rising number of young people. All the while, jobs in the private sector – which will need to take in the growing labor force – are dominated by expatriate workers. Saudi citizens hold only 20% of jobs in the private sector – but this sector makes up 60% of the country’s employment. Fixing these distortions is challenging. Overall, monthly salaries of nationals are more than double those of expatriates (Chart 11). High wage gaps also exist among comparably skilled workers, reducing the incentive to hire nationals. With non-Saudis holding over 75% of the jobs, the incentive to employ low-wage expatriate workers has also weighed on the current account balance through large remittance outflows (Chart 12). And while the share of jobs held by Saudi citizens increased, this is not on the back of an increase in the number of employed Saudis. Rather, while the number of nationals with jobs contracted by nearly 10% in 2018, jobs held by non-Saudis declined at a faster pace. The absolute number of employed Saudis is down 37% since 2015. “Saudization” efforts are aimed at reducing the wage gap – such as a monthly levy per worker on firms where the majority of workers are non-Saudi; wage subsidies for Saudi nationals working in the private sector; and quotas for hiring nationals. But these have mixed results. While Saudi employment has improved, the associated reduced productivity and higher costs have been damaging. Thus, these labor market challenges pose risks to both domestic stability, and the economy. Moreover, even though improved liquidity conditions have softened interbank rates, loans to government and quasi-government entities still outpace loans to the private sector (Chart 13). This “crowding out” effect is not conducive to a private sector revival. It is conducive to central government control, which the leadership is tightening. Chart 12Jobs For Expatriate Workers Have Declined Chart 13Monetary Conditions Ease But Private Credit Lags Facing these structural factors, authorities are attempting to appease the population through social change. There has been a marked relaxation in the ultra-conservative rules governing Saudi society. Permission for women to drive cars has been granted and the first cinemas and music venues opened their doors last year. Critically, religious rulers are seeing their wide-ranging powers curtailed. The hai’a or religious police are now only permitted to work during office hours. They no longer have the authority to detain or make arrests, and may only submit reports to civil authorities. While these changes appeal to the new generation, they also run the risk of provoking a “Wahhabi backlash.” This risk is still alive despite the past two years of policy change. The recently approved “public decency law” – which requires residents to adhere to dress codes and bans taking photos or using phrases deemed offensive – reveals the authorities’ need to mitigate this risk. Popular social reforms are occurring against a backdrop of an unprecedented centralization of power. Mohammad bin Salman will be the first Saudi ruler of his millennial generation. The evolving balance of power between the 15,000 members of the royal family will hurl the kingdom into the unknown. The concentration of power into the Sudairi faction of the ruling family, through events such as the 2017 Ritz Carlton detentions, is still capable of provoking a destabilizing backlash. Discontent among royal family members and Saudi elites may give rise to a new, fourth faction, resentful of the social and political changes. At the moment, the state’s policies have generated some momentum. A number of major hardline religious scholars and clerics have apologized for past extremism and differences over state policy and have endorsed MBS’s vision of a modern Saudi state and “moderate” Islam – the crackdown on radicalism has moved the dial within the religious establishment.5 But structural change is not quick and the social pressures being unleashed are momentous. Saudi Arabia’s oil production and transportation infrastructure are currently in danger from saber-rattling or conflict in the region. The government is guiding the process, but the consensus is correct that internal political risk remains extremely high. There has been a structural increase in that risk, as outlined in this report – and it is best to remain cautious even regarding the cyclical increase in political risk over the past two years. Bottom Line: Saudi Arabia’s new economic reality is ushering in social and political change at an unprecedented pace. Unless the interests of the three main social actors – the royal family, religious elites, and Saudi citizens – are successfully managed, a new faction comprised of disaffected elites may arise. A Dangerous Neighborhood Putting aside the longer term threat from U.S. energy independence, Saudi Arabia’s oil production and transportation infrastructure are currently in danger from saber-rattling or conflict in the region. Saudi officials originally expected the war in Yemen to last only a few weeks, but the conflict is now in its fifth year and still raging. The claim by the Iran-backed Houthi insurgents that a recent drone attack on Saudi oil installations was assisted by supporters in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern province – home to the majority of the country’s 10%-15% Shia population and oil production – is also troubling as it shows that the above domestic risks can readily combine with external, geopolitical risks. The U.S. is also joining Israel and Saudi Arabia in applying increasing pressure on Iran, which risks sparking a war. Our Iran-U.S. Tensions Decision Tree illustrates that the probability of war between the U.S. and Iran – which would involve the Saudis – is as high as 40% (Diagram 1). Diagram 1Iran-U.S. Tensions Decision Tree We are not downgrading this risk in the wake of President Trump’s decision not to conduct strikes on Iranian radars and missile launchers on June 20. President Trump claims he wants negotiations instead of war, but his administration’s pressure tactics have pushed Iran into a corner. The Iranian regime is capable of pushing the limits further (both in terms of its nuclear program as well as regional oil production and transport), which could easily lead to provocations or miscalculation. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is structurally unstable as a result of Iran’s capitalization on major strategic movements of the past two decades. The Saudis have lost a Sunni-dominated buffer in Iraq, they have lost influence in Syria and Yemen, and their aggressive military efforts to counter these trends have failed.6 The Israelis are equally alarmed by these developments and trying to persuade the Americans to take a much more aggressive posture to contain Iran. As a result, the Trump administration reneged on the 2015 U.S.-Iran nuclear agreement and broader détente – intensifying a cycle of distrust with Iran that will be difficult to reverse even if the Democratic Party takes the White House in 2020. Hence there is a real possibility of attacks on Saudi oil production facilities, domestic pipelines, and tankers in transit in the near term. Moreover, the majority of Saudi Arabia’s exports transit through two major chokepoints making these barrels vulnerable to sabotage: The Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has resumed threatening to block; The Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, located between Yemen and East Africa, which was the site of an attack on two Saudi Aramco tankers last year, forcing a temporarily halt in shipments. Saudi Arabia is acutely aware of these risks. It is the top buyer of U.S. arms and, as a result of the dramatic strategic shifts since the American invasion of Iraq, it is the world’s leading spender on military equipment as a share of GDP (Chart 14). One of our key “Black Swan” risks of the year is that the Saudis may be emboldened by the Trump administration’s writing them a blank check. Bottom Line: In addition to the structural risks associated with Saudi Arabia’s economic, social and political transition, geopolitical tensions in the region are elevated. Warning shots are still being fired by Iran and their proxies (such as the Houthis), and oil supplies are at the mercy of additional escalation. Investment Implications Saudi Arabia’s equity market is halfway through the process of joining the benchmark MSCI EM index. The process will finish on August 29, 2019 with Saudi taking up a total 2.9% weighting in the index. Research by our colleague Ellen JingYuan He at BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy shows that in the case of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Pakistan, inclusion into MSCI created a “buy the rumor, sell the news” phenomenon and suggested that a top of the market was at hand.7 Saudi equities have recently peaked in absolute terms and relative to the emerging market benchmark, supporting this thesis. Saudi equity volatility has especially spiked relative to the emerging market average, which is appropriate. We expect ongoing bouts of volatility due to the immediate, market-relevant political risks outlined above. The risk of a disruptive conflict stemming from the Saudi-Iran and U.S.-Iran confrontation is significant enough that investors should, at minimum, expect minor conflicts or incidents to disrupt oil markets in the immediate term. We expect oil price volatility to persist. Because Riyadh is maintaining OPEC 2.0 discipline in this environment, oil prices should experience underlying upward pressure. It is not that the Saudis are refusing to support the Trump administration’s maximum pressure against Iran but rather that they are calibrating their support in a way that hedges against the risk that Trump will change his mind, since that risk is quite high. This is the 55% chance of an uneasy status quo in U.S.-Iran relations in Diagram 1, which requires at least secret U.S. relaxation of oil sanction enforcement. Moreover, the Saudis want to reduce the downside risk of weak global growth and support their national interest in pushing Brent prices toward $80/bbl for fiscal and strategic purposes. Our pessimistic assessment of the Osaka G20 tariff truce between the U.S. and China is more than offset by our expectation since February that China’s economic policy has shifted toward stimulus rather than the deleveraging of 2017-18. We assign a 68% probability to additional trade war escalation in Q4 this year or at least before November 2020. But since a dramatic trade war escalation would lead to even greater stimulus, we still share our Commodity & Energy Strategy’s cyclical view that the underlying trend for oil prices is up. We are maintaining our recommendation of being long EM oil producers’ equities relative to EM-ex-China. This trade includes Saudi Arabian equities, but as a whole it has upside in the near-term as Brent prices are below our expected average and Chinese equities are still down 10% from their April highs.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Our Commodity & Energy Strategy team expects Brent prices to average $73/bbl this year and $75/bbl in 2020. For their latest monthly balances assessment, please see “Supply-Demand Balances Consistent With Higher Oil Prices,” dated June 20, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled “Supply-Demand Balances Consistent With Higher Oil Prices,” dated June 20, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 The higher export dependence on oil reflects the rebound in oil prices in 2018, rather than a decline in non-oil exports. Given the strong relationship between activity in the oil and non-oil sectors, non-oil exports also increased in 2018. 4 Saudi Aramco’s purchase of a 70 percent stake in SABIC from the Saudi Public Investment Fund (PIF) earlier this year reportedly contributed to the IPO delay. The deal will capitalize the PIF, enabling it to diversify the economy. 5 See, for example, James M. Dorsey, “Clerics and Entertainers Seek to Bolster MBS’s Grip on Power,” BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1220, July 7, 2019, available at besacenter.org. 6 The U.S., Saudi Arabia, and their allies are trying to restore Iraq as a geopolitical buffer by cultivating an Iraq that is more independent of Iranian influence – and this is part of rising regional frictions. Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi’s recently issued decree to reduce the power of Iraq’s Iran-backed milita, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and integrate them into Iraq’s armed forces by forcing them to choose between either military or political activity. Just over a year ago, Iraq’s previous Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi issued a decree granting members of the PMF many of the same rights as members of the military. 7 Please see BCA Frontier Markets Strategy, “Pakistani Stocks: A Top Is At Hand,” March 13, 2017, available at fms.bcaresearch.com.

Special Report

Highlights So What? U.S.-Iran risk is front-loaded, but U.S.-China is the greater risk overall. In the medium-to-long run the trade war with China should reaccelerate while the U.S. should back away from war with Iran. But for now the opposite is happening. A full-fledged cold war with China will put a cap on American political polarization, putting China at a disadvantage. By contrast, a U.S. war with Iran would exacerbate polarization, giving China a huge strategic opportunity. War with Iran or trade war escalation with China are both ultimately dollar bullish – even though tactically the dollar may fall. Feature Two significant geopolitical events occurred over the past week. First, U.S. President Donald Trump declared his third pause to the trade war with China. The terms of the truce are vague and indefinite, but it has given support to the equity rally temporarily. Second, Iran edged past the limits on uranium stockpiling, uranium enrichment, and the Arak nuclear reactor imposed by the 2015 nuclear pact. Trump instigated this move by walking away from the pact and re-imposing oil sanctions. If these events foreshadow things to come, global financial markets should position for lower odds of a deflationary trade shock and higher odds of an inflationary oil shock in the coming six-to-18 months. But is this conclusion warranted? Is the American “Pivot to Asia” about to shift into reverse? If the White House pursued a consistent strategy to contain China, it would bring Americans together and require forming alliances. In the short run, perhaps – but the conflict with China is ultimately the greater of the two geopolitical risks. We expect it to intensify again, likely in H2, but at latest by Q3 of 2020, ahead of the U.S. presidential election. Our highest conviction call on this matter, however, is that any trade deal before that date will be limited in scope. It will fall far short of a “Grand Compromise” that ushers in a new era of U.S.-China engagement – and hence it will be a disappointment to global equities. Our trade war probabilities, updated on June 14 to account for the expected resumption of negotiations at the G20, can be found in Diagram 1. The combined risk of further escalation is 68%. Diagram 1Trade War Decision Tree (Updated June 13, 2019 To Include G20 Tariff Pause) The risk to the view? The U.S.-Iran conflict could spiral out of control and the Trump administration could get entangled in the Middle East. This would create a very different outlook for global politics, economy, and markets over the next decade than a concentrated conflict with China.  The Missing Corollary Of The “Thucydides Trap” The idea of the “Thucydides Trap” has gone viral in recent years – for good reason. The term, coined by Harvard political scientist Graham Allison, refers to the ancient Greek historian Thucydides (460-400 BC), author of the seminal History of the Peloponnesian War. The “trap” is the armed conflict that most often develops when a dominant nation that presides over a particular world order (e.g. Sparta, the U.S.) faces a young and ambitious rival that seeks fundamental change to that order (e.g. Athens, China).1  This conflict between an “established” and “revisionist” power was highlighted by the political philosopher Thomas Hobbes in his translation of Thucydides in the seventeenth century; every student of international relations knows it. Allison’s contribution is the comparative analysis of various Thucydides-esque episodes in the modern era to show how today’s U.S.-China rivalry fits the pattern. The implication is that war (not merely trade war) is a major risk. We have long held a similar assessment of the U.S.-China conflict. It is substantiated by hard data showing that China is gaining on America in various dimensions of power (Chart 1). Assuming that the U.S. does not want to be replaced, the current trade conflict will metastasize to other areas. There is an important but overlooked corollary to the Thucydides Trap: if the U.S. and China really engage in an epic conflict, American political polarization should fall. Polarization fell dramatically during the Great Depression and World War II and remained subdued throughout the Cold War. It only began to rise again when the Soviet threat faded and income inequality spiked circa 1980. Americans were less divided when they shared a common enemy that posed an existential threat; they grew more divided when their triumph proved to benefit some disproportionately to others (Chart 2).    Chart 1China Is Gaining On The U.S. Chart 2U.S. Polarization Falls During Crisis   If the U.S. and China continue down the path of confrontation, a similar pattern is likely to emerge in the coming years – polarization is likely to decline. China possesses the raw ability to rival or even supplant the United States as the premier superpower over the very long run. Its mixed economy is more sustainable than the Soviet command economy was, and it is highly integrated into the global system, unlike the isolated Soviet bloc. As long as China’s domestic demand holds up and Beijing does not suppress its own country’s technological and military ambitions, Trump and the next president will face a persistent need to respond with measures to limit or restrict China’s capabilities. Eventually this will involve mobilizing public opinion more actively. Further, if the U.S.-China conflict escalates, it will clarify U.S. relations with the rest of the world. For instance, Trump’s handling of trade suggests that he could refrain from trade wars with American allies to concentrate attention on China, particularly sanctions on its technology companies. Meanwhile a future Democratic president would preserve some of these technological tactics while reinstituting the multilateral approach of the Barack Obama administration, which launched the “Pivot to Asia,” the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and intensive freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. These are all aspects of a containment strategy that would reinforce China’s rejection of the western order.   Bottom Line: If the White House, any White House, were to pursue a consistent strategy to contain China, the result would be a major escalation of the trade conflict that would bring Americans together in the face of a common enemy. It would also encourage the U.S. to form alliances in pursuit of this objective. So far these things have not occurred, but they are logical corollaries of the Thucydides Trap and they will occur if the Thucydides thesis is validated. How Would China Fare In The Thucydides Trap? China would be in trouble in this scenario. The United States, if the public unifies, would have a greater geopolitical impact than it currently does in its divided state. And a western alliance would command still greater coercive power than the United States acting alone (Chart 3). External pressure would also exacerbate China’s internal imbalances – excessive leverage, pollution, inefficient state involvement in the economy, poor quality of life, and poor governance (Chart 4).  China has managed to stave off these problems so far because it has operated under relative American and western toleration of its violations of global norms (e.g. a closed financial system, state backing of national champions, arbitrary law, censorship). This would change under concerted American, European, and Japanese efforts. Chart 3China Fears A Western 'Grand Alliance' Chart 4China's Domestic Risks Underrated How would the Communist Party respond? First, it could launch long-delayed and badly needed structural reforms and parlay these as concessions to the West. The ramifications would be negative for Chinese growth on a cyclical basis but positive on a structural basis since the reforms would lift productivity over the long run – a dynamic that our Emerging Markets Strategy has illustrated, in a macroeconomic context, in Diagram 2. This is already an option in the current trade war, but China has not yet clearly chosen it – likely because of the danger that the U.S. would exploit the slowdown. Diagram 2Foreign Pressure And Structural Reform = Short-Term Pain For Long-Term Gain Alternatively the Communist Party could double down on confrontation with the West, as Russia has done. This would strengthen the party’s grip but would be negative for growth on both a cyclical and structural basis. The effectiveness of China’s fiscal-and-credit stimulus would likely decline because of a drop in private sector activity and sentiment – already a nascent tendency – while the lack of “reform and opening up” would reduce long-term growth potential. This option makes structural reforms look more palatable – but again, China has not yet been forced to make this choice. None of the above is to say that the West is destined to win a cold war with China, but rather that the burden of revolutionizing the global order necessarily falls on the country attempting to revolutionize it. Bottom Line: If the Thucydides Trap fully takes effect, western pressure on China’s economy will force China into a destabilizing economic transition. China could lie low and avoid conflict in order to undertake reforms, or it could amplify its aggressive foreign policy. This is where the risk of armed conflict rises. Introducing … The Polybius Solution The problem with the above is that there is no sign of polarization abating anytime soon in the United States. Extreme partisanship makes this plain (Chart 5). Rising polarization could prevent the U.S. from responding coherently to China. The Thucydides Trap could be avoided, or delayed, simply because the U.S. is distracted elsewhere. The most likely candidate is Iran. A lesser known Greek historian – who was arguably more influential than Thucydides – helps to illustrate this alternative vision for the future. This is Polybius (208-125 BC), a Greek who wrote under Roman rule. He described the rise of the Roman Empire as a result of Rome’s superior constitutional system. Polybius explains domestic polarization whereas Thucydides explains international conflict. Polybius took the traditional view that there were three primary virtues or powers governing human society: the One (the king), the Few (the nobles), and the Many (the commons). These powers normally ran the country one at a time: a dictator would die; a group of elites would take over; this oligarchy would devolve into democracy or mob-rule; and from the chaos would spring a new dictator. His singular insight – his “solution” to political decay – was that if a mixture or balance of the three powers could be maintained, as in the Roman republic, then the natural cycle of growth and decay could be short-circuited, enabling a regime to live much longer than its peers (Diagram 3). Diagram 3Polybius: A Balanced Political System Breaks The Natural Cycle Of Tyranny And Chaos In short, just as post-WWII economic institutions have enabled countries to reduce the frequency and intensity of recessions (Chart 6), so Polybius believed that political institutions could reduce the frequency and intensity of revolutions. Eventually all governments would decay and collapse, but a domestic system of checks and balances could delay the inevitable. Needless to say, Polybius was hugely influential on English and French constitutional thinkers and the founders of the American republic. Chart 6Orthodox Economic Policy Has Made Recessions Less Frequent And Less Acute What is the cause of constitutional decay, according to Polybius? Wealth, inequality, and corruption, which always follow from stable and prosperous times. “Avarice and unscrupulous money-making” drive the masses to encroach upon the elite and demand a greater share of the wealth. The result is a vicious cycle of conflict between the commons and the nobles until either the constitutional system is restored or a democratic revolution occurs. Compared to Thucydides, Polybius had less to say about the international balance of power. Domestic balance was his “solution” to unpredictable outside events. However, states with decaying political systems were off-balance and more likely to be conquered, or to overreach in trying to conquer others. Bottom Line: The “Polybius solution” equates with domestic political balance. Balanced states do not allow the nation’s leader, the elite, or the general population to become excessively powerful. But even the most balanced states will eventually decline. As they accumulate wealth, inequality and corruption emerge and cause conflict among the three powers.  Why Polybius Matters Today It does not take a stretch of the imagination to apply the Polybius model to the United States today. Just as Rome grew fat with its winnings from the Punic Wars and decayed from a virtuous republic into a luxurious empire, as Polybius foresaw, so the United States lurched from victory over the Soviet Union to internal division and unforced errors. For instance, the budget surplus of 2% of GDP in the year 2000 became a budget deficit of 9% of GDP after a decade of gratuitous wars, profligate social spending and tax cuts, and financial excesses. It is on track to balloon again when the next recession hits – and this is true even without any historic crisis event to justify it. The rise in polarization has coincided with a rise in wealth inequality, much as Polybius would expect (Chart 7). In all likelihood the Trump tax cuts will exacerbate both of these trends (Chart 8). Even worse, any attempts by “the people” to take more wealth from the “nobles” will worsen polarization first, long before any improvements in equality translate to a drop in polarization. Chart 7Polarization Unlikely To Drop While Inequality Rises Chart 8Trump Tax Cuts Fuel Inequality Most importantly, from a global point of view, U.S. polarization is contaminating foreign policy. Just as the George W. Bush administration launched a preemptive war in Iraq, destabilizing the region, so the Obama administration precipitously withdrew from Iraq, destabilizing the region. And just as the Obama administration initiated a hurried détente with Iran in order to leave Iraq, the Trump administration precipitously withdrew from this détente, provoking a new conflict with Iran and potentially destabilizing Iraq. Major foreign policy initiatives have been conducted, and revoked, on a partisan basis under three administrations. And a Democratic victory in 2020 would result in a reversal of Trump’s initiatives. In the meantime Trump’s policy could easily entangle him in armed conflict with Iran – as nearly occurred on June 21. Iranian domestic politics make it very difficult, if not impossible, to go back to the 2015 setting. Despite Trump’s recent backpedaling, his administration runs a high risk of getting sucked into another Middle Eastern quagmire as long as it enforces the sanctions on Iranian oil stringently. Persian Gulf risks are coming to the fore. But over the next six-to-18 months, U.S.-China conflict will be the dominant market-mover. China would be the big winner if such a war occurred, just as it was one of the greatest beneficiaries of the long American distraction in Afghanistan and Iraq. It would benefit from another 5-10 years of American losses of blood and treasure. It would be able to pursue regional interests with less Interference and could trade limited cooperation with the U.S. on Iran for larger concessions elsewhere. And a nuclear-armed Iran – which is a long-term concern for the U.S. – is not in China’s national interest anyway. Chart 9Will The Pivot To Asia Reverse? Bottom Line: The U.S. is missing the “Polybius solution” of balanced government; polarization is on the rise. As a result, the grand strategy of “pivoting to Asia” could go into reverse (Chart 9). If that occurs, the conflict with China will be postponed or ineffective. Iran Is The Wild Card A war with Iran manifestly runs afoul of the Trump administration’s and America’s national interests, whereas a trade war with China does not. First, although an Iranian or Iranian-backed attack on American troops would give Trump initial support in conducting air strikes, the consequences of war would likely be an oil price shock that would sink his approval rating over time and reduce his chances of reelection (Chart 10). We have shown that such a shock could come from sabotage in Iraq as well as from attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran could be driven to attack if it believes the U.S. is about to attack. Second, not only would Democrats oppose a war with Iran, but Americans in general are war-weary, especially with regard to the Middle East (Chart 11). President Trump capitalized on this sentiment during his election campaign, especially in relation to Secretary Hillary Clinton who supported the war in Iraq. Over the past two weeks, he has downplayed the Iranian-backed tanker attacks, emphasized that he does not want war, and has ruled out “boots on the ground.” Chart 10Carter Gained Then Lost From Iran Oil Shock Third, it follows from the above that, in the event of war, the United States would lack the political will necessary to achieve its core strategic objectives, such as eliminating Iran’s nuclear program or its power projection capabilities. And these are nearly impossible to accomplish from the air alone. And U.S. strategic planners are well aware that conflict with Iran will exact an opportunity cost by helping Russia and China consolidate spheres of influence. The wild card is Iran. President Hassan Rouhani has an incentive to look tough and push the limits, given that he was betrayed on the 2015 deal. And the regime itself is probably confident that it can survive American air strikes. American military strikes are still a serious constraint, but until the U.S. demonstrates that it is willing to go that far, Iran can test the boundaries. In doing so it also sends a message to its regional rivals – Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Arab monarchies, and Israel – that the U.S. is all bark, no bite, and thus unable to protect them from Iran. This may lead to a miscalculation that forces Trump to respond despite his inclinations. The China trade war, by contrast, is less difficult for the Trump administration to pursue. There is not a clear path from tariffs to economic recession, as with an oil shock: the U.S. economy has repeatedly shrugged off counter-tariffs and the Fed has been cowed. While Americans generally oppose the trade war, Trump’s base does not, and the health of the overall economy is far more important for most voters. And a majority of voters do believe that China’s trade practices are unfair. Strategic planners also favor confronting China – unlike Trump they are not concerned with reelection, but they recognize that China’s advantages grow over time, including in critical technologies. Bottom Line: While short-term events are pushing toward truce with China and war with Iran, the Trump administration is likely to downgrade the conflict with Iran and upgrade the conflict with China over the next six-to-18 months. Neither politics nor grand strategy support a war with Iran, whereas politics might support a trade war with China and grand strategy almost certainly does. China Could Learn From Polybius Too China also lacks the Polybius solution. It suffers from severe inequality and social immobility, just like the Latin American states and the U.S., U.K., and Italy (Chart 12). But unlike the developed markets, it lacks a robust constitutional system. Political risks are understated given the emergence of the middle class, systemic economic weaknesses, and poor governance. Over the long run, Xi Jinping will need to step down, but having removed the formal system for power transition, a succession crisis is likely. China’s imbalances could cause domestic instability even if the U.S. becomes distracted by conflict in the Middle East. But China has unique tools for alleviating crises and smoothing out its economic slowdown, so the absence of outside pressure will probably determine its ability to avoid a painful economic slump. This helps to explain China’s interest in dealing with the U.S. on North Korea. President Xi Jinping’s first trip to Pyongyang late last month helped pave the way for President Trump to resume negotiations with the North’s leader Kim Jong Un at the first-ever visit of an American president north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). China does not want an unbridled nuclear North Korea or an American preventative war on the peninsula. If Beijing could do a short-term deal with the U.S. on the basis of assistance in reining in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, it could divert U.S. animus away from itself and encourage the U.S. to turn its attention toward the next rogue nuclear aspirant, Iran. It would also avoid structural economic concessions. Of course, a smooth transition today means short-term gain but long-term pain for Chinese and global growth. Productivity and potential GDP will decline if China does not reform (Diagram 4). But this kind of transition is the regime’s preferred option since Beijing seeks to minimize immediate threats and maintain overall stability. Diagram 4Stimulus And Delayed Reforms = Socialist Put = Stagflation If Chinese internal divisions do flare up, China’s leaders will take a more aggressive posture toward its neighbors and the United States in order to divert public attention and stir up patriotic support. Bottom Line: China suffers from understated internal political risk. While U.S. political divisions could lead to a lack of coherent strategy toward China, a rift in China could lead to Chinese aggression in its neighborhood, accelerating the Thucydides Trap. Investment Conclusions Chart 13An Iran War Will Bust The Budget If the U.S. reverses the pivot to Asia, attacks Iran, antagonizes European allies, and exhausts its resources in policy vacillation, its budget deficit will balloon (Chart 13), oil prices will rise, and China will be left to manage its economic transition without a western coalition against it. The implication is a weakening dollar, at least initially. But the U.S. is nearing the end of its longest-ever business expansion and an oil price spike would bring forward the next recession, both of which will push up the greenback. Much will depend on the extent of any oil shock – whether and how long the Strait of Hormuz is blocked. Beyond the next recession, the dollar could suffer severe consequences for the U.S.’s wild policies. If the U.S. continues the pivot to Asia, and the U.S. and China proceed with tariffs, tech sanctions, saber-rattling, diplomatic crises, and possibly even military skirmishes, China will be forced into an abrupt and destabilizing economic transition. The U.S. dollar will strengthen as global growth decelerates. Developed market equities will outperform emerging market equities, but equities as a whole will underperform sovereign bonds and other safe-haven assets. Over the past week, developments point toward the former scenario, meaning that Persian Gulf risks are coming to the fore. But over the next six-to-18 months, we think the latter scenario will prevail.  We are maintaining our risk-off trades: long JPY/USD, long gold, long Swiss bonds, and long USD/CNY.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      See Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are The U.S. And China Headed For War?” The Atlantic, September 24, 2015, and Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).