Iran

Feature One of BCA Research’s key geopolitical views since May 2019, outlined recently in our 2020 Outlook, is rapidly materializing: a dramatic escalation in the US-Iran conflict. On January 3 the United States successfully conducted a drone strike against a convoy carrying two high-level targets near the Baghdad International Airport. These were Iranian General Qassim Soleimani and his key Iraqi associate, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandes. The former, Soleimani, was Iran’s most influential military and intelligence leader, and one of its most powerful leaders overall. He was the head of the formidable Quds Force, the overseas arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the staunchest military wing of the regime at home and abroad. The latter target, al-Muhandes, was the head of Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah militia and the broader coalition of pro-Iran Shiite militias in Iraq known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). This coalition was partly responsible for defeating the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Since then it has sought to consolidate Iranian influence in Iraq, pushing back against Iraqi Sunnis and Shia nationalists, and their allies in the US and Persian Gulf. Chart 1Bull Market In US-Iran Tensions Bull Market In US-Iran Tensions Bull Market In US-Iran Tensions The US assassinations follow a significant increase in Iranian and Iran-backed militant attacks against US allies in the Middle East this year. These stem from a breakdown in the US-Iran diplomatic detente that was enshrined in the 2015 nuclear agreement. President Donald Trump revoked this agreement in 2018 and in May 2019 imposed crippling sanctions on Iran’s oil exports and economy — initiating a “bull market” in US-Iran strategic tensions (Chart 1). Recent events show a clear path of strategic escalation — even in the wake of a summer of “fire and fury” and the extraordinary Iran-backed attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil refinery in September. Widespread popular unrest has dissolved the Iraqi government, creating intense competition between Iraqi nationalists, led by Moqtada al-Sadr, and Iran’s proxies, led by al-Muhandes and the PMF. This unrest marked a significant challenge to Iran’s sphere of influence and necessitated an Iranian backlash. For instance, al-Sadr’s enemies attacked his headquarters with a drone in early December. Meanwhile Kataib Hezbollah launched a spate of rocket strikes against US and Iraqi bases that culminated in the death of an American contractor near Kirkuk on December 28 — crossing an American red line. The US retaliated with damaging air strikes against Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq and Syria on December 29, prompting a PMF blockade of the US Embassy in Baghdad on December 31. While this was a limited blockade, the US has now retaliated by assassinating Soleimani and al-Muhandes, taking the conflict to a new level. There is every reason to expect tensions to escalate further in the new year. First, the Iranian regime is under severe economic stress due to the US sanctions and broader global slowdown (Charts 2A&B). Domestic protests have erupted in recent years, while the regime struggles with economic isolation, a restless youth population, and a looming succession when Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei eventually steps down. This is an existential struggle for the regime, while President Trump may only be in office for 12 months. Public opinion polls show that the Iranian populace blames the government for economic mismanagement, and yet that the renewed conflict with the US under the Trump administration is shifting the blame to US sanctions (Chart 3). Hence the regime will continue to distract the populace by resisting Trump’s pressure tactics. Chart 2ARegime Survival ... Regime Survival... Regime Survival... Chart 2B... An Existential Challenge ... An Existential Challenge ... An Existential Challenge     Chart 3US Conflict Distracts From Domestic Woes Trump And Iran: Will Maximum Pressure Work? Trump And Iran: Will Maximum Pressure Work? This tendency will be reinforced by the death of Soleimani, which heightens the regime’s vulnerability while rallying domestic support due to Soleimani’s popularity as a leader (Chart 4). The regime is looking to its survival over the long run. It would be a remarkable shift in policy for Tehran to enter negotiations with Trump, since it would then risk vindicating his “maximum pressure” doctrine, possibly helping him secure a second term in office. Chart 4Hard-Line Soleimani Was Popular (Reformist President Rouhani Is Not) Trump And Iran: Will Maximum Pressure Work? Trump And Iran: Will Maximum Pressure Work? Meanwhile President Trump’s circumstances are apparently urging him to double down on his aggressive foreign policy against Iran. First, while he will not be removed from office by a Republican Senate, his impeachment trial threatens to mar his re-election chances. This is a prime motivation to pursue foreign policy objectives to distract the public and seek policy wins. Chart 5Falling Oil Import Dependency Emboldens US Falling Oil Import Dependency Emboldens US Falling Oil Import Dependency Emboldens US Second, the Trump administration may feel emboldened by the rise of US shale oil production and decline in US oil import dependency (Chart 5). Simulations we published in our December 6 Strategic Outlook show that Iran would have to sustain an oil supply cutoff as large as the Abqaiq attack for four months in order to drive gasoline prices high enough to harm the US economy as a whole. This buffer may have convinced Trump he has plenty of room for maneuver in confronting Iran. Third, Trump undoubtedly feels the need to maintain the credibility of his threats against Iran, North Korea, and other nations given his impeachment, widely known electoral and economic vulnerability, and his recent capitulation to China in the trade war. The clear threat by Iran to create a humiliating US embassy crisis in Baghdad likely struck a nerve in the White House, reviving memories of Saigon under Gerald Ford, Tehran under Jimmy Carter, and Benghazi under Barack Obama. By taking the offensive, President Trump has reinforced the red line against the death of American citizens or attacks on US assets. Nevertheless he now runs the risk of driving Iran into further escalation rather than negotiation. Iran is not yet likely to court a full-scale American attack by shutting down the Strait of Hormuz. It is more likely to retaliate via regional proxy attacks, including cutting off oil production, pipelines, and shipping — at a time of its choosing. If Trump’s pressure tactics succeed, it will advance its nuclear program rather than staging large-scale attacks. Investment Conclusions Iraqi instability will worsen as a result of the past month’s events, bringing 3.5 million barrels of daily oil production under a higher probability of disruption than when we first flagged this risk. Supply disruptions there or elsewhere in the region would hasten the drawdown in global inventories and backwardation of prices occurring due to the revival in global demand on China stimulus and OPEC 2.0 production cuts. Continued oil volatility, as in 2018-19, should be expected, but the risk for now lies to the upside as Middle East tensions could cause an overshoot. We remain long Brent crude and overweight energy sector equities. Second, the US election — and hence US domestic and foreign policy over the next five years — could hang in the balance if the Iran conflict escalates to broader and more open hostilities as we expect. President Trump is favored for re-election. Yet we have contended since 2018 that the revocation of the Iran nuclear deal was a grave geopolitical decision that could jeopardize Trump’s economy and hence re-election — and that remains the case. Chart 6Trump 'Maximum Pressure' A Gamble In 2020 Trump 'Maximum Pressure' A Gamble In 2020 Trump 'Maximum Pressure' A Gamble In 2020 Trump was elected in part because he is viewed as strong on terrorism, and the confrontation with Iran and its proxies will reinforce that reputation in the short run. Iranian attacks will also boost Trump’s approval rating, other things being equal. However, much can change by November. Jimmy Carter’s election troubles with Iran point to a serious risk to Trump, as the initial surge in patriotic support could turn sour over time if unemployment rises as a result of any oil shocks (Chart 6). Even George Bush Jr saw a dramatic fall in approval, from a much higher base than Trump, despite foreign policy conditions that were more transparently favorable to him in 2004 than any conflict with Iran will be to Trump in 2020. Trump has campaigned against Middle Eastern wars to a war-weary public, so the rally around the flag effect will not necessarily play to his favor in the final count. It is too soon to speculate about these matters — our view remains unchanged — but the Iran conflict is now much more likely to be a major factor in the US election and Iran is certainly capable of frustrating US presidents. This reinforces our base case that Trump is only slightly favored to win. Moreover his foreign policy conflicts — in Asia as well as the Middle East — ensure that global policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk will remain elevated despite dropping off from the highs reached last year amid the trade war. We remain long pure play global defense stocks on a cyclical and secular basis. We see gold as the appropriate hedge given our expectation that the trade ceasefire and China stimulus will reinforce a global growth recovery despite Middle Eastern turmoil. Higher oil prices push up inflation expectations and limit any benefit to government bonds.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com

Feature One of BCA Research’s key geopolitical views since May 2019, outlined recently in our 2020 Outlook, is rapidly materializing: a dramatic escalation in the US-Iran conflict. On January 3 the United States successfully conducted a drone strike against a convoy carrying two high-level targets near the Baghdad International Airport. These were Iranian General Qassim Soleimani and his key Iraqi associate, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandes. The former, Soleimani, was Iran’s most influential military and intelligence leader, and one of its most powerful leaders overall. He was the head of the formidable Quds Force, the overseas arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the staunchest military wing of the regime at home and abroad. The latter target, al-Muhandes, was the head of Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah militia and the broader coalition of pro-Iran Shiite militias in Iraq known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). This coalition was partly responsible for defeating the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Since then it has sought to consolidate Iranian influence in Iraq, pushing back against Iraqi Sunnis and Shia nationalists, and their allies in the US and Persian Gulf. Chart 1Bull Market In US-Iran Tensions Bull Market In US-Iran Tensions Bull Market In US-Iran Tensions The US assassinations follow a significant increase in Iranian and Iran-backed militant attacks against US allies in the Middle East this year. These stem from a breakdown in the US-Iran diplomatic detente that was enshrined in the 2015 nuclear agreement. President Donald Trump revoked this agreement in 2018 and in May 2019 imposed crippling sanctions on Iran’s oil exports and economy — initiating a “bull market” in US-Iran strategic tensions (Chart 1). Recent events show a clear path of strategic escalation — even in the wake of a summer of “fire and fury” and the extraordinary Iran-backed attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil refinery in September. Widespread popular unrest has dissolved the Iraqi government, creating intense competition between Iraqi nationalists, led by Moqtada al-Sadr, and Iran’s proxies, led by al-Muhandes and the PMF. This unrest marked a significant challenge to Iran’s sphere of influence and necessitated an Iranian backlash. For instance, al-Sadr’s enemies attacked his headquarters with a drone in early December. Meanwhile Kataib Hezbollah launched a spate of rocket strikes against US and Iraqi bases that culminated in the death of an American contractor near Kirkuk on December 28 — crossing an American red line. The US retaliated with damaging air strikes against Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq and Syria on December 29, prompting a PMF blockade of the US Embassy in Baghdad on December 31. While this was a limited blockade, the US has now retaliated by assassinating Soleimani and al-Muhandes, taking the conflict to a new level. There is every reason to expect tensions to escalate further in the new year. First, the Iranian regime is under severe economic stress due to the US sanctions and broader global slowdown (Charts 2A&B). Domestic protests have erupted in recent years, while the regime struggles with economic isolation, a restless youth population, and a looming succession when Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei eventually steps down. This is an existential struggle for the regime, while President Trump may only be in office for 12 months. Public opinion polls show that the Iranian populace blames the government for economic mismanagement, and yet that the renewed conflict with the US under the Trump administration is shifting the blame to US sanctions (Chart 3). Hence the regime will continue to distract the populace by resisting Trump’s pressure tactics. Chart 2ARegime Survival ... Regime Survival... Regime Survival... Chart 2B... An Existential Challenge ... An Existential Challenge ... An Existential Challenge     Chart 3US Conflict Distracts From Domestic Woes Trump And Iran: Will Maximum Pressure Work? Trump And Iran: Will Maximum Pressure Work? This tendency will be reinforced by the death of Soleimani, which heightens the regime’s vulnerability while rallying domestic support due to Soleimani’s popularity as a leader (Chart 4). The regime is looking to its survival over the long run. It would be a remarkable shift in policy for Tehran to enter negotiations with Trump, since it would then risk vindicating his “maximum pressure” doctrine, possibly helping him secure a second term in office. Chart 4Hard-Line Soleimani Was Popular (Reformist President Rouhani Is Not) Trump And Iran: Will Maximum Pressure Work? Trump And Iran: Will Maximum Pressure Work? Meanwhile President Trump’s circumstances are apparently urging him to double down on his aggressive foreign policy against Iran. First, while he will not be removed from office by a Republican Senate, his impeachment trial threatens to mar his re-election chances. This is a prime motivation to pursue foreign policy objectives to distract the public and seek policy wins. Chart 5Falling Oil Import Dependency Emboldens US Falling Oil Import Dependency Emboldens US Falling Oil Import Dependency Emboldens US Second, the Trump administration may feel emboldened by the rise of US shale oil production and decline in US oil import dependency (Chart 5). Simulations we published in our December 6 Strategic Outlook show that Iran would have to sustain an oil supply cutoff as large as the Abqaiq attack for four months in order to drive gasoline prices high enough to harm the US economy as a whole. This buffer may have convinced Trump he has plenty of room for maneuver in confronting Iran. Third, Trump undoubtedly feels the need to maintain the credibility of his threats against Iran, North Korea, and other nations given his impeachment, widely known electoral and economic vulnerability, and his recent capitulation to China in the trade war. The clear threat by Iran to create a humiliating US embassy crisis in Baghdad likely struck a nerve in the White House, reviving memories of Saigon under Gerald Ford, Tehran under Jimmy Carter, and Benghazi under Barack Obama. By taking the offensive, President Trump has reinforced the red line against the death of American citizens or attacks on US assets. Nevertheless he now runs the risk of driving Iran into further escalation rather than negotiation. Iran is not yet likely to court a full-scale American attack by shutting down the Strait of Hormuz. It is more likely to retaliate via regional proxy attacks, including cutting off oil production, pipelines, and shipping — at a time of its choosing. If Trump’s pressure tactics succeed, it will advance its nuclear program rather than staging large-scale attacks. Investment Conclusions Iraqi instability will worsen as a result of the past month’s events, bringing 3.5 million barrels of daily oil production under a higher probability of disruption than when we first flagged this risk. Supply disruptions there or elsewhere in the region would hasten the drawdown in global inventories and backwardation of prices occurring due to the revival in global demand on China stimulus and OPEC 2.0 production cuts. Continued oil volatility, as in 2018-19, should be expected, but the risk for now lies to the upside as Middle East tensions could cause an overshoot. We remain long Brent crude and overweight energy sector equities. Second, the US election — and hence US domestic and foreign policy over the next five years — could hang in the balance if the Iran conflict escalates to broader and more open hostilities as we expect. President Trump is favored for re-election. Yet we have contended since 2018 that the revocation of the Iran nuclear deal was a grave geopolitical decision that could jeopardize Trump’s economy and hence re-election — and that remains the case. Chart 6Trump 'Maximum Pressure' A Gamble In 2020 Trump 'Maximum Pressure' A Gamble In 2020 Trump 'Maximum Pressure' A Gamble In 2020 Trump was elected in part because he is viewed as strong on terrorism, and the confrontation with Iran and its proxies will reinforce that reputation in the short run. Iranian attacks will also boost Trump’s approval rating, other things being equal. However, much can change by November. Jimmy Carter’s election troubles with Iran point to a serious risk to Trump, as the initial surge in patriotic support could turn sour over time if unemployment rises as a result of any oil shocks (Chart 6). Even George Bush Jr saw a dramatic fall in approval, from a much higher base than Trump, despite foreign policy conditions that were more transparently favorable to him in 2004 than any conflict with Iran will be to Trump in 2020. Trump has campaigned against Middle Eastern wars to a war-weary public, so the rally around the flag effect will not necessarily play to his favor in the final count. It is too soon to speculate about these matters — our view remains unchanged — but the Iran conflict is now much more likely to be a major factor in the US election and Iran is certainly capable of frustrating US presidents. This reinforces our base case that Trump is only slightly favored to win. Moreover his foreign policy conflicts — in Asia as well as the Middle East — ensure that global policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk will remain elevated despite dropping off from the highs reached last year amid the trade war. We remain long pure play global defense stocks on a cyclical and secular basis. We see gold as the appropriate hedge given our expectation that the trade ceasefire and China stimulus will reinforce a global growth recovery despite Middle Eastern turmoil. Higher oil prices push up inflation expectations and limit any benefit to government bonds.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com

Highlights 2019 was a good year for our constraint-based method of political analysis. Trump was impeached, the trade war escalated, and China (modestly) stimulated – all as predicted. Nevertheless Trump caught us by surprise in Q2, with sanctions on Iran and tariffs on China. Our best trades were long defense stocks, gold, and Swiss bonds. Our worst trade was long rare earth miners. Feature Jean Buridan’s donkey starved to death because, faced with equal bundles of grain on both sides, it could not decide which to eat. So the legend goes. Investors face indecision all the time. This is especially the case when a geopolitical sea change is disrupting the global economy. Two or more political outcomes may seem equally plausible, heightening uncertainty. What is needed is a method for eliminating the options that require the farthest stretch. That’s what we offer in these pages, but we obviously make mistakes. The purpose of our annual report card is to identify our biggest hits and misses so we can hone our ability to combine fundamental macro and market analysis with the “art of the possible,” delivering better research and greater returns for clients. This is our last report for 2019. Next week we will publish a joint report with Anastasios Avgeriou of BCA Research’s US Equity Strategy. We will resume publication in early January. We wish all our clients a merry Christmas, happy holidays, and a happy new year! American Politics: Unsurprising Surprises Chart 1Our 2019 Forecast Held Up Our 2019 Forecast Held Up Our 2019 Forecast Held Up On the whole our 2019 forecast held up very well. We argued that the global growth divergence that began in 2018 would extend into 2019 with the Fed hiking rates, a lack of massive stimulus from China, and an escalation in the US-China trade war. The biggest miss was that the Fed actually cut rates three times – addressed at length in our BCA Research annual outlook. But the bulk of the geopolitical story panned out: the US dollar, US equities, and developed market equities all outperformed as we expected (Chart 1). Geopolitical risk in the Trump era is centered on Trump himself. Beginning in 2017, we argued that the Democrats would take the House of Representatives in the midterm elections and impeach the president. Congress would not be totally gridlocked: while we argued for a government shutdown in late 2018, we expected a large bipartisan budget agreement in late 2019 and always favored the passage of the USMCA trade deal. Still, Congress would encourage Trump to go abroad in pursuit of policy victories, increasing geopolitical risks. We also argued that, barring “smoking gun” evidence of high crimes, the Republican-held Senate would acquit Trump – assuming his popularity held up among Republican voters themselves (Chart 2). These views either transpired or remain on track. The implication is that Trump-related risk continues and yet that Trump’s policies are ultimately constrained by the guardrails of the election. The latter factor helped propel the equity rally in the second half of the year. We largely sat out that rally, however. We overestimated the chances that Senator Bernie Sanders would falter and Senator Elizabeth Warren would swallow his votes, challenging former Vice President Joe Biden for the leading position in the early Democratic Party primary. We expected a significant bout of equity volatility via fears of a sharp progressive-populist turn in US policy (Chart 3). Instead, Sanders staged a recovery, Warren fell back, Biden maintained his lead, and markets rallied on other news. Chart 2Trump Will Be Acquitted How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card Chart 3Fears Of A Progressive Turn Did Not Derail The H2 Rally How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card Warren could still recover and win the nomination next year. But the Democratic Primary was not a reason to remain neutral toward equities, as we did in September and October. China’s Tepid Stimulus In recent years China first over-tightened and then under-stimulated the economy – as we predicted. But we misread the credit surge in the first quarter as a sign that policymakers had given up on containing leverage. In total this year’s credit surge amounts to 3.4% of GDP, about 1.2% short of what we expected (based on half of the 9.2% surge in 2015-16) (Chart 4). China’s credit surge was about 1.2% short of what we expected, but the direction was correct. While the government maintained easy monetary policy as expected, its actions combined with negative sentiment to snuff out the resurgence in shadow banking by mid-year (Chart 5). Chart 4China's Credit Surge Was Underwhelming China's Credit Surge Was Underwhelming China's Credit Surge Was Underwhelming Still, China’s policy direction is clear – and fiscal policy is indeed carrying a greater load. The authorities are extremely unlikely to reverse course next year, so global activity should turn upward (Chart 6). Our “China Play Index” – iron ore prices, Swedish industrials, Brazilian stocks, and EM junk bonds, all in USD terms – has appreciated steadily (Chart 7). Chart 5China's Shadow Banking Remained Under Pressure China's Shadow Banking Remained Under Pressure China's Shadow Banking Remained Under Pressure   Chart 6Global Activity Should Turn Upward In 2020 Global Activity Should Turn Upward In 2020 Global Activity Should Turn Upward In 2020 Chart 7Our 'China Play Index' Performed Well Our 'China Play Index' Performed Well Our 'China Play Index' Performed Well US-China: Underestimating Trump’s Risk Appetite We have held a pessimistic assessment of US-China relations since 2012. We rejected the trade truces agreed at the G20 summits in December 2018 and June 2019 as unsustainable. Our subjective probabilities of Trump achieving a bilateral trade agreement with China have never risen above 50%. Since September we have expected a ceasefire but not a full-fledged deal. Nevertheless we struggled with the timing of the trade war ups and downs (Chart 8). In particular we accepted China's new investment law as a sufficient concession and were surprised on May 5 when talks collapsed and Trump increased the tariffs. The lack of constraints on tariffs prevailed in 2019 but in 2020 the electoral constraint will prevail as long as Trump still has a chance of winning. Our worst trade recommendation of the year emerged from our correct view that the June G20 summit would lead to trade war escalation. We went long rare earth miners based outside of China. We expected China to follow through on threats to impose a rare earth embargo on the US in retaliation for sanctions against Chinese telecom giant Huawei. Not only did the US grant Huawei a reprieve, but China’s rare earth companies outperformed their overseas rivals. The trade went deeply into the red as global sentiment and growth fell (Chart 9). Only with global growth turning a corner have these high-beta stocks begun to turn around. Chart 8Expect A Ceasefire, Not A Full-Fledged Trade Agreement Expect A Ceasefire, Not A Full-Fledged Trade Agreement Expect A Ceasefire, Not A Full-Fledged Trade Agreement Chart 9Our Worst Call: Long Rare Earth Miners Our Worst Call: Long Rare Earth Miners Our Worst Call: Long Rare Earth Miners Chart 10North Korean Diplomacy Has Not Collapsed (Yet) North Korean Diplomacy Has Not Collapsed (Yet) North Korean Diplomacy Has Not Collapsed (Yet) Our sanguine view on North Korea was largely offside this year. Setbacks in US negotiations with North Korea have often preceded setbacks in US-China talks. This was the case with the failed Hanoi summit in February and the inconsequential summit at the demilitarized zone in June. This could also be the case in 2020, as Washington and Pyongyang are now on the verge of breaking off talks with the latter threatening a “Christmas surprise” such as a nuclear or missile test. It is not too late to return to talks. Beijing is the critical player and is still enforcing crippling sanctions on North Korea (Chart 10). Beijing would benefit if North Korea submitted to nuclear and missile controls while the US reduced its military presence on the peninsula. We view this year as a hiccup in North Korean diplomacy but if talks utterly collapse and military tensions break out then it would undermine our view on US-China talks, Trump’s reelection odds, and US Treasuries in 2020. Hong Kong, rather than Taiwan, became the site of the geopolitical “Black Swan” that we expected surrounding Xi Jinping’s aggressive approach to domestic dissent. We have never downplayed Hong Kong. The loss of faith in the governing arrangement with the mainland began with the Great Recession and shows no sign of abating (Chart 11). We shorted the Hang Seng after the protests began, but closed at the appropriate time (Chart 12). The problem is not resolved. Also, Taiwan can test its autonomy much farther than Hong Kong and we still expect Taiwan to become ground zero of Greater China political risk and the US-China conflict. Chart 11Hong Kong Discontent Is Structural How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card Chart 12Our Hang Seng Short Is Done Our Hang Seng Short Is Done Our Hang Seng Short Is Done Chart 13Trump Needs A Trade Ceasefire Trump Needs A Trade Ceasefire Trump Needs A Trade Ceasefire Trump is unlikely to seek another trade war escalation given the negative impact it would have on sentiment and the economy (Chart 13). He could engage in another round of “fire and fury” saber-rattling against North Korea, as the economic impact is small, but he will prefer a diplomatic track. Taiwan, however, cannot be contained so easily if tempers flare. As we go to press it is not clear if Trump will hike the tariff on China on December 15. Some investors would point to his tendency to take aggressive action when the market gives him ammunition (Chart 14). We doubt he will, as this would be a policy mistake – possibly quickly reversed or possibly fatal for Trump. Trump’s electoral constraint is more powerful in 2020 than it was in 2019. Chart 14Trump Ceasefire Will Last As Long As Economy Is At Risk Trump Ceasefire Will Last As Long As Economy Is At Risk Trump Ceasefire Will Last As Long As Economy Is At Risk Chart 15Our 'Doomsday Basket' Captured Trump's First Three Years Our 'Doomsday Basket' Captured Trump's First Three Years Our 'Doomsday Basket' Captured Trump's First Three Years Our best tactical trade of the year stemmed from the geopolitical risk in Asia (and the Fed’s pause): we recommended a long gold position this summer that gained 16%. We also closed out our “Doomsday Basket” of gold and Swiss bonds, initiated in Trump’s first year, for a gain of 14% (Chart 15). Now that the market has digested Trump’s tactical retreat, we have reinitiated the gold trade as a long-term strategic hedge against both short-term geopolitical crises and the long-term theme of populism. Iran: Fool Me Once, Shame On You … This is the second year in a row that we are forced to explain our analysis of Iran – we were only half-right. Our long-held view is that grand strategy will push the US to pivot to Asia to counter China while scaling back its military activity in the Middle East. Two American administrations have confirmed this trend. That said, there is still a risk that President Trump will get entangled in Iran and that risk is growing. Global oil volatility – which spiked during the market share wars of 2014 – declined through the beginning of 2018, until the Trump administration took clearer steps toward a policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran. The constraints on Trump are obvious: the US economy is still affected by oil prices, which are set globally, and Iran can damage supply and push up prices. Therefore Trump should back down prior to the 2020 election. Yet Trump imposed sanctions, waivered on them, and then re-imposed them in May 2019 – catching us by surprise each time (Chart 16). Chart 16Trump Flip-Flopped On Iran Policy Trump Flip-Flopped On Iran Policy Trump Flip-Flopped On Iran Policy Chart 17Iran Tensions Backwardated Oil Markets Iran Tensions Backwardated Oil Markets Iran Tensions Backwardated Oil Markets This saga is not resolved – we are witnessing what could become a secular bull market in Iran tensions. True, a Democratic victory in 2020 could lead to an eventual restoration of the 2015 nuclear deal. True, the Trump administration could strike a deal with the Iranians (especially after reelection). But no, it cannot be assumed that the US will restore the historic 2015 détente with Iran. Within Iran the regime hardliners are likely to regain control in advance of the extremely uncertain succession from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and this will militate against reform and opening up. We went long Brent crude Q1 2020 futures relative to Q1 2021 to show that tensions were not resolved (Chart 17) – the attack on Saudi Arabia in September confirmed this view. And yet the oil price shock was fleeting as global supply was adequate and demand was weak. Our current long Brent spot trade is not only about Iran. Global growth is holding up and likely to rebound thanks to monetary stimulus and trade ceasefire, OPEC 2.0 has strong incentives to maintain production discipline (driven by both Saudi Arabian and Russian interests), and the Iranian conflict has led to instability in Iraq, as we expected. The UK: Not Dead In A Ditch British Prime Minister Boris Johnson proclaimed this year that he would "rather be dead in a ditch” than extend the deadline for the UK to leave the EU. The relevant constraint was that a disorderly “no deal” exit would have meant a recession, which we used as our visual illustration of why Johnson would not actually die in a ditch (Chart 18). The test was whether parliament could overcome its coordination problems when it reconvened in September, which it immediately did, prompting us to go long GBP-USD on September 6 (Chart 19). This trade was successful and we remain long GBP-JPY. Chart 18The Reason We Rejected How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card Chart 19UK Parliament Voted Down No-Deal Brexit UK Parliament Voted Down No-Deal Brexit UK Parliament Voted Down No-Deal Brexit Populism faltered in Europe, as expected. As we go to press, the UK Christmas election is reported to have produced a whopping Conservative majority. This year Johnson mounted the most credible threat of a no-deal Brexit that we are ever likely to see and yet ultimately delayed Brexit. The Conservative victory will produce an orderly Brexit. The trade deal that needs to be negotiated next year will bring volatility but it does not have a firm deadline and is not harder to negotiate than Brexit itself. The UK has passed through the murkiest parts of Brexit uncertainty. Moreover, our high-conviction view that more dovish fiscal policy would be the end-result of the Brexit saga is now becoming consensus. Europe: Not The Crisis You Were Looking For The European Union was a geopolitical “red herring” in 2019 as we expected. Anti-establishment feeling remained contained. Italy remains the weakest link in the Euro Area, but the political “turmoil” of 2018-19 is the populist exception that mostly proves the rule: Europeans are not as a whole rebelling against the EU or the euro. On France, Italy, and Spain our views were fundamentally correct. Even in the European parliament, where anti-establishment players have a better chance of taking seats than in their home governments, the true Euroskeptics who want to exit the union only make up about 16% of the seats (Chart 20). This is up from 11% prior to the elections in May this year. Chart 20Euroskepticism Was Overstated How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card Yet the European political establishment is losing precious time to prepare for the next wave of serious agitation, likely when a full-fledged recession comes. Chart 21Trump Did Not Pile Tariffs Onto Auto Sector Trump Did Not Pile Tariffs Onto Auto Sector Trump Did Not Pile Tariffs Onto Auto Sector Germany is experiencing a slow transition from the long reign of Angela Merkel, whose successor has plummeted in opinion polls. The shock of the global slowdown – particularly heavy in the auto sector (Chart 21) – hastened Germany’s succession crisis. Chart 22Overstated EU Political Risk, Understated Chinese Risk Overstated EU Political Risk, Understated Chinese Risk Overstated EU Political Risk, Understated Chinese Risk There is a silver lining: this shock is forcing the Germans to reckon with de-globalization. Attitudes across the country are shifting on the critical question of fiscal policy. Even the conservative Christian Democrats are loosening their belts in the face of the success of the Green Party and a simultaneous change in leadership among the Social Democrats to embrace bigger spending. The Trump administration refrained from piling car tariffs onto Europe amidst this slowdown in the automobile sector and overall economy. We expected this delay, as there is little support in the US for a trade war with Europe, contra China, and it is bad strategy to fight a two-front war. But if the US economy recovers robustly and Trump is emboldened by a China deal then this risk could reignite in future. With European political risk overstated, and Chinese mainland risk understated, we initiated a long European equities relative to Chinese equities trade (Chart 22), as recommended by our colleagues at BCA Research European Investment Strategy. And now we are initiating the strategic long EUR/USD recommendation that we flagged in September with a stop at 1.18. Japan: Shinzo Abe Has Peaked Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is still in power and still very popular, whether judged by the average prime minister in modern memory or his popular predecessor Junichiro Koizumi. But he is at his peak and 2019 did indeed mark the turning point – it is all downhill from here. First, he lost his historic double super-majority in the Diet by falling to a mere majority in the upper house (Chart 23). He is still capable of revising the constitution, but now it is now harder – and the high water mark of his legislative power has been registered. Chart 23Abe Lost His Double Super Majority How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card Chart 24Consumption Tax Hike Shows Limits Of Abenomics Consumption Tax Hike Shows Limits Of Abenomics Consumption Tax Hike Shows Limits Of Abenomics Second, he proceeded with a consumption tax from 8% to 10% that predictably sent the economy into a tailspin given the global slowdown (Chart 24). We thought the tax hike would be delayed, but Abe opted to hike the tax and then pass a stimulus package to compensate. This decision further supports the view that Abe’s power will decline going forward. It is now incontrovertible that the Liberal Democrats are eschewing a radical plan of debt monetization in which they coordinate ultra-dovish fiscal policy with ultra-dovish monetary policy. “Abenomics” has not necessarily failed but it is a fully known quantity. Abe will next preside over the 2020 summer Olympics and prepare to step down as Liberal Democratic party leader in September 2021. It is conceivable he will stay longer, but the likeliest successors have been put into cabinet positions, including Shinjiro Koizumi, son of the aforementioned, whom we would not rule out as a future prime minister. Constitutional revision or a Russian peace deal could mark the high point of his premiership, but the peak macro consequences have been felt. Japan suffered a literal and figurative earthquake in 2011. Over the long run Tokyo will resort to more unorthodox economic policies and redouble its efforts at reflation. But not until the external environment demands it. This suggests that the JPY-USD is a good hedge against risks to the cyclically bullish House View in 2020 and supports an overweight stance on Japanese government bonds. Emerging Markets: Notable Mentions India: We were correct that Narendra Modi would be reelected as prime minister, but we did not expect that he would win a single-party majority for a second time (Chart 25). The risk is that this result leads to hubris – particularly in foreign policy and domestic social policy – rather than accelerating structural reform. But for now we remain optimistic about reform. Chart 25 How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card East Asia: We are optimistic on Southeast Asia in the context of US-China competition. But we proved overly optimistic on Malaysia and Indonesia this year, while we missed a chance to close our long Thai equity trade when it would have been very profitable to do so. Turkey: Domestic political challenges to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have led to a doubling down on unorthodox monetary policy and profligate fiscal policy, as expected. Early in the year we advised clients that Erdoğan would delay deployment of the Russian S-400 air defense system in deference to the US but it quickly became clear that this was not the case. Thus we correctly anticipated the sharp drop in the lira over the autumn (Chart 26). The US-Turkey relationship continues to fray and additional American sanctions are likely. Russia: President Vladimir Putin focused on maintaining domestic stability amid tight fiscal and monetary policy in 2019. This solidified our positive relative view of Russian currency and equities (Chart 27). But it also highlighted longer-term political risks. We expect this trend to continue, but by the same token Russia is a potential “Black Swan” risk in 2020. Chart 26The Lira's Autumn Relapse The Lira's Autumn Relapse The Lira's Autumn Relapse Chart 27Russia's Eerie Quiet In 2019 Russia's Eerie Quiet In 2019 Russia's Eerie Quiet In 2019 Venezuela: Venezuela’s President Nicolas Maduro eked out another year of regime survival in 2019 despite our high-conviction view since 2017 that he would be finished. However, the economy is still collapsing and Russian and Chinese assistance is still limited (Chart 28). Before long the military will need to renovate the regime, even if our global growth and oil outlook for next year is positive for the regime on the margin. Chart 28Maduro Clung To Power Maduro Clung To Power Maduro Clung To Power Chart 29Our 2019 Winner: Global Defense Stocks Our 2019 Winner: Global Defense Stocks Our 2019 Winner: Global Defense Stocks Brazil: We were late to the Brazilian equity rally. While we have given the Jair Bolsonaro administration the benefit of the doubt, a halt to structural reforms in 2020 would prove us wrong. Our worst trade of the year was long rare earth miners, mentioned above. Our best trade was long global defense stocks (Chart 29), a structural theme stemming from the struggle of multiple powerful nations in the twenty-first century. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com Jingnan Liu Research Associate jingnan@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic Consulting Editor marko@bcaresearch.com

Highlights OPEC 2.0 agreed to cut output by another 500k b/d at its Vienna meeting last week, bringing the total official cuts by the producer coalition to 1.7mm b/d. Saudi Arabia added 400k b/d of additional voluntary cuts, bringing its total cuts to almost 900k b/d vs. its October 2018 production level. We think the market will tighten, as a result, and are getting long 2H20 Brent vs. short 2H21 Brent; this is the backwardation trade that worked well this year, producing an average return of 180%. There was no extension of OPEC 2.0 output cuts beyond end-March, although an extraordinary meeting of the coalition was scheduled for March 5, 2020. Anti-government civil unrest in Iraq and Iran has resulted in the killing of hundreds of protesters in both countries by state security forces. The unrest raises the threat of disruptions to oil supplies from Iraq and to ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Clashes between pro-Iranian protesters and Iraqi nationalists in Baghdad prompted a visit to the city by Iran’s top military commander, Qassem Soleimani, over the weekend. Soleimani reportedly is participating in talks to find a new prime minister for Iraq. Soleimani’s visit drew criticism from Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the most prominent Shia religious leader in Iraq. Feature OPEC 2.0’s deepening of production cuts to 1.7mm b/d will be largely ceremonial, unless free riders in the producer coalition – led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – fully comply with the new levels agreed last week in Vienna (Chart of the Week).1 Contrary to our expectation, the production cuts were not extended beyond end-March, although an extraordinary meeting of the coalition was scheduled for March 5, 2020, in Vienna to review market conditions prior to the deal’s expiry.2 The market was not expecting anything other than symbolism in the just-concluded discussions among OPEC 2.0 members regarding production cuts. The bulk of the cuts in the coalition’s production are the result of US sanctions against Venezuela and Iran, which have removed ~ 1.8mm b/d from the market and KSA's cuts, which will total ~ 900k b/d following OPEC 2.0's Vienna meeting.  We believe this will lead to a tighter market, and will steepen the backwardation in the Brent forward curve.  We are, therefore, recommending a longer 2H20 Brent position vs. a short 2H21 Brent position. The sanctions-induced cuts are squeezing the economies of both Venezuela and Iran, which, in the case of the latter, is producing a blowback on Iraq. Chart of the WeekOPEC 2.0 Raises Output Cuts To 1.7mm b/d In Vienna Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iran Fights To Maintain Influence In Iraq Following an unexpected increase in gasoline prices last month, violent anti-government protests erupted around Iran, which provoked a deadly crackdown by the state. The ongoing unrest has resulted in the death of hundreds of protesters, which, by the US’s estimate, stand at more than 1,000. This claim was refuted by Iranian officials.3 It is impossible to overstate the importance of maintaining freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. The unrest that followed the gasoline price hike was the deadliest since that country’s Islamic Revolution in 1979, according to the New York Times. The Times reported that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps opened fire on protestors calling for the removal of leadership, killing scores.4 Protests also erupted in states closely aligned with Iran in the past couple of months – i.e., Lebanon, Iraq.5 For the oil market, Iraq matters most: It is difficult to overstate the importance of keeping Iraq’s 4.7mm b/d of crude oil production flowing to global markets. Likewise, it is impossible to overstate the importance of maintaining freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea and the rest of the world’s oil-consuming markets (Map 1). Map 1The Persian Gulf And Strait of Hormuz Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level More than 20% of the world’s crude oil and condensates supplies transit the Strait on any given day (Chart 2). The anti-government protests in Iraq and Iran raise the threat level to production in Iraq, and attacks on shipping transiting the Strait of Hormuz by the latter, or a direct confrontation with the US and its Gulf allies. Our colleagues in BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy (GPS) are following the evolution of events in Iran and Iraq closely. Following is their assessment of what led to the most recent unrest in Iraq.6 Chart 2Violence Again Threatens Gulf Oil Supply Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Chart 3AFertile Ground For Unrest In Iraq Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Deadlock In Iraq While both the grievances and demands of the protesters in Lebanon and Iraq are similar, the unrest in Iraq is of much greater consequence from a global investor’s perspective. The trigger was the removal of the highly revered Lieutenant General Abdul-Wahab al-Saadi from his position in the Iraqi army by Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi.7 The popular general was unceremoniously transferred to an administrative role in the Ministry of Defense. Iraqi protesters are united in their economic grievances, frustrated at a political and economic system that is unwilling to translate economic gains to improved livelihoods for its people. The sacking of al-Saadi – considered a neutral figure – was interpreted as evidence of Iranian influence and the greater sway of the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organization of various paramilitary groups. Iraqis all over the country responded by attacking the Iranian consulate in Karbala and offices linked to Iranian-backed militias. Iraqi protesters are united in their economic grievances, frustrated at a political and economic system that is unwilling to translate economic gains to improved livelihoods for its people. The May 2018 parliamentary elections, which ushered in Prime Minster Abdul-Mahdi, failed to generate much improvement. The country continues to be plagued by high unemployment, corruption, and an utter lack of basic services (Charts 3A & 3B). This has ultimately resulted in a lack of confidence in Iraqi leadership who are being increasingly perceived as benefiting from the status quo at the expense of the populace. Chart 3BFertile Ground For Unrest In Iraq Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Most importantly, the ruling elite has failed to respond to key trends that emerged in last year’s parliamentary elections. The extremely low voter turnout reveals that Iraqis are disenchanted with the government's ability to meet their needs. Meanwhile the success of Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s Sairoon coalition – running on a platform stressing non-sectarianism and national unity – in securing the largest number of seats highlights the desire for a reduction of foreign interference (both Iranian as well as US/Saudi) in domestic politics. Neither the US nor Saudi Arabia have an appetite to step in and provide the support necessary to counteract Iran. Moreover, Iran and its proxies in Iraq will not back down easily. Thus, the ongoing protests are to a great extent the result of the new government’s failure to heed the warnings brought about by the 2018 election and protests. They have served to deepen the rift between the rival Shia blocs, particularly those Iraqi nationalists who deeply resent the intrusion of Iran into its political structures. Iraq is in a state of deadlock. That said, Iran is unlikely to stand by idly as its influence wanes. As a result, we are likely to witness greater unrest as the rift between the two Shia blocs intensifies. Neither the US nor Saudi Arabia have an appetite to step in and provide the support necessary to counteract Iran. Moreover, Iran and its proxies in Iraq will not back down easily. At the same time, the geographical spread of the protest movement demonstrates that Iraqis are fed up with the current system.8 This points to greater instability in Iraq as no side is backing down and the only foreign power willing and able to interfere is Iran. US Sanctions Continue To Pressure Iran The Trump administration’s crippling “maximum pressure” sanctions have sent Iran’s Economy reeling. The Trump administration continues to enforce its “maximum pressure” sanctions, which have reduced Iranian oil exports from 1.8 million barrels per day at their recent peak to 100,000 barrels per day in November (Chart 4). These are crippling sanctions that have sent Iran’s economy reeling. Chart 4Iran Remains Under “Maximum Pressure” Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has ruled out negotiations with Trump. They would be unpopular at home without a major reversal on sanctions from Trump (Chart 5). Chart 5 Major US Reversal Prerequisite For Iran Talks Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Trump presumably aims to avoid an oil shock ahead of the election. The US and its allies have visibly shied away from conflict in the wake of Iran’s provocations, including the spectacular attack on eastern Saudi Arabia's oil infrastructure that knocked 5.7 million barrels of oil per day offline in September. However, this does not mean the odds of war are zero. Opinion polls show that the Iranian public primarily blames the government for the collapsing economy. The Americans or the Iranians could miscalculate. Both sides might think they can improve their standing at home by flexing military muscle abroad. Iran is a rational actor and would not normally court American airstrikes or antagonize a potentially lame duck president. Yet it is under extreme pressure due to the sanctions, as the riots and protests following the gasoline price hikes indicate. Iran also faces significant unrest in its sphere of influence, as discussed above. Opinion polls show that the Iranian public primarily blames the government for the collapsing economy, and yet that American sanctions are siphoning off some of this anger (Chart 6). This could tempt Iran’s leaders to continue staging provocations in the Strait of Hormuz or elsewhere in the region, perhaps with attacks on US assets or those of its GCC allies. Chart 6Iranians Blame Tehran, Tehran Blames America Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Hardline Iranian military leaders and politicians currently receive the most favor in polling, while the reformist President Rouhani – undercut by the American withdrawal from the 2015 deal – is among the least popular. Elections for the Majlis, or Parliament, in February will likely reverse the reformist turn in Iranian politics that began in 2012. The regime stalwarts are gearing up for the supreme leader’s succession in the coming years. While a Democratic White House could restore the 2015 deal Trump unilaterally abrogated, that ship may have sailed. Trump, under impeachment, could seek to distract the public. This was Bill Clinton’s tactic with Operations Infinite Reach, Desert Fox, and Allied Force in 1998-99. These operations were minor and not comparable to a conflict with Iran. However, Trump may be emboldened. On paper the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve – along with OPEC and other petroleum reserves and spare capacity – could cover most major oil-shock scenarios. A supply outage the size of the Abqaiq attack in September would have to persist for four months to cause enough price pressure to harm the US economy and decrease Trump’s chances of winning re-election. The simulations in Chart 7 overstate the gasoline price impact by assuming that global strategic oil reserves remain untapped, along with spare capacity. Chart 7Desperation Could Force Iran To Take Excessive Risks Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Thus while the Iranians may take excessive risks, the Trump administration may not refrain this time from airstrikes. Bottom Line: While the Middle East is always full of risks to oil supply, Iran’s vulnerability and Trump’s status at home make the situation unusually precarious. We continue to believe an historic oil-supply disruption is a fatter tail risk than investors realize, or are pricing in currently. Market Round-Up Energy: Overweight Following the long-awaited OPEC 2.0 meeting held last week, the group “surprised” the market by announcing it will deepen its production cut by ~ 500k b/d, pushing the total cut to 1.7mm b/d. The bulk of the additional adjustments comes from Saudi Arabia (Chart of the Week). Importantly, the group emphasizes the importance of full compliance by every member – this would imply a ~225k b/d reduction from Iraq alone. We remain overweight oil in 2020. Base Metals: Neutral Copper prices rose sharply over the past week, reaching $2.71/lb at Tuesday's close, a level last seen in July 2019. US-China trade optimism last Friday sparked the rally. Copper’s physical market remains tight, inventories are low globally, and demand is set to rebound on the back of major central banks’ accommodative monetary policy. Even so, sentiment and positioning remain weak (Chart 8). We expect this to reverse, further supporting prices over the short term. Precious Metals: Neutral Risk-on sentiment following President Trump’s upbeat comments on US-China trade negotiations pushed gold prices down by $18/oz last Friday – one of the largest single-day declines YTD. Precious metals markets continue to follow the ups and downs of trade-war headlines and global growth-related news. Nonetheless, our fair-value model suggests gold is fairly priced at ~ $1,465/oz (Chart 9). Any significant drop below that level would provide an entry opportunity for investors to add gold as a portfolio hedge in 2020. Ags/Softs: Underweight The USDA released its final crop progress update on Monday. Corn was 8% behind full harvest, with North Dakota remaining the laggard with only 43% of the corn picked. Markets ignored this as March Corn futures slid close to 1.5% on a weekly basis. Chinese purchases of at least five bulk cargo shipments of U.S. soybeans lifted prices above $9/bu on Tuesday in anticipation of the USDA monthly crop production report. Wheat prices were flat on a weekly basis, as traders awaited results of an Egyptian purchase tender on Tuesday. Chart 8Copper Sentiment And Positioning Remain Weak Copper Sentiment And Positioning Remain Weak Copper Sentiment And Positioning Remain Weak Chart 9Gold Fair Value Is ~ 5/oz Gold Fair Value Is ~ $465/oz Gold Fair Value Is ~ $465/oz   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     Please see On OPEC 2.0’s Agenda In Vienna: More Production Cuts, Longer Deal, published December 5, 2019.  We noted  most of the production cuts that matter to the market already are in place – i.e., Saudi Arabia’s over-compliance of ~ 400k b/d, along with Venezuela’s and Iran’s involuntary production cuts of ~ 1.8mm b/d resulting from US sanctions, as of October 2019.  Under the amended production cuts, KSA agreed to remove close to 170k b/d more, lifting its total official voluntary quota and over-compliance, which brings its total cuts to close to 900k b/d.  The total OPEC 2.0 additional cuts come to just over 500k b/d.  Based on media reports going into the Vienna meeting last week, it would appear Russia prevailed on the producer coalition in its effort to keep the expiry of the production deal at end-March.  However, the March 5 extraordinary meeting of the coalition states indicates KSA was successful in keeping the discussion re extending the deal alive. 2     In our current modeling, we assume the original 1.2mm b/d of cuts will remain in place to year-end 2020.  We will be updating our balances and price forecasts in next week’s Commodity & Energy Strategy. 3    Please see U.S. says Iran may have killed more than 1,000 in recent protests, published by uk.reuters.com December 5, 2019.   Iranian leaders blamed “thugs” aligned with the US and rebels for the violence, and, in a separate report citing an Amnesty International claim that 143 protesters were killed, said “several people, including members of the security forces, were killed and more than 1,000 people arrested.”  Please see Iran says hundreds of banks were torched in 'vast' unrest plot published November 27, 2019, by uk.reuters.com.  The size of the price increase is difficult to ascertain: The government says gasoline costs were increased by 50% with a goal of raising $2.55 billion/year, while other reports claim the hike amounted to as much as 300% in different parts of the country last month. 4    Please see With Brutal Crackdown, Iran Is Convulsed by Worst Unrest in 40 Years, published by the New York Times December 1, 2019. 5    The extent to which these states are entwined with Iran recently came to light via a cache of leaked Iranian diplomatic cables obtained by The Intercept, a not-for-profit news organization established by Pierre Omidyar, a founder of eBay.  The cables were published jointly by The Intercept and the New York Times November 19, 2019.  Please see The Iran Cables: Secret Documents Show How Tehran Wields Power in Iraq, published by the Times.  The article claims “The unprecedented leak exposes Tehran’s vast influence in Iraq, detailing years of painstaking work by Iranian spies to co-opt the country’s leaders, pay Iraqi agents working for the Americans to switch sides and infiltrate every aspect of Iraq’s political, economic and religious life.” 6    This analysis in the remainder of this report is an abridged version of original work published by BCA Research’s GPS service in reports entitled Iraq's Challenge To Iran Is Underrated and 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society published November 8 and December 6, 2019.  We believe events over the past week and weekend warrant this in-depth examination of the ongoing unrest and instability in Iraq and Iran.  Both reports are available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7     Lt. Gen. Abdul-Wahab al-Saadi was recognized and respected among Iraqis for fighting terrorism and his role in ridding the country of the Islamic State. The Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces were uneasy with Saadi’s close relationship with the US military. His abrupt removal was likely a result of the Iraqi government’s growing concern over al-Saadi’s popularity and rumors of a potential military coup. 8    Protests are occurring in all regions in Iraq. They are supported by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. This is a significant development from the 2018 protests which were mainly concentrated in Iraq’s southern region.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q3 Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level

Highlights The Fed is the usual culprit for killing business cycles — but the Fed is on hold. This makes geopolitics the likeliest candidate to kill the cycle. The key geopolitical risks are US political turmoil, China’s economic policy, and the US-Iran confrontation. Nevertheless, policymakers are adjusting to the threat of recession, which points to a continuation of this long-in-the-tooth expansion. The US-China talks will be driven by Trump’s need for an economic boost ahead of the US election. If the economy or Trump’s approval rating fails anyway, then all bets are off. Go long gold as a strategic hedge. Feature Great power struggle, or “multipolarity,” continues to be our mega-theme in 2020. The world does not operate like a normal society, with a single government that possesses a monopoly on the use of force and ensures stability. Nations are individualistic, armed, and dangerous, creating what scholar Hedley Bull once called “The Anarchical Society.” This is not pure chaos, but rather a community of nations that lacks a clear and undisputed leader. Hence, quarrels break out often. Updating our geopolitical power index shows that the rise of China remains the most disruptive trend in global politics (Chart 1). The gap between the US and China has closed until recently, with China’s downshift in growth rates, but American fear is just being awakened (Chart 2). Given that Beijing threatens the US’s military and technological dominance over the long run, Washington will continue to develop a containment policy. Chart 1China's Geopolitical Rise Is Disruptive 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society Chart 2China-US Power Gap Is Narrowing 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society China is too big to quarantine, especially for a relatively unpopular first-term American president who eschews international coalition-building. The European Union’s decline in relative power is more marked than that of the United States, but China does not pose as much of a security threat to Europe. This trend exacerbates the already serious divergence in the trans-Atlantic alliance – which will worsen if Trump wins on November 3, 2020. Hence, globalization faces persistent challenges, as indicated by the falling import share of global output (Chart 3). This multi-decade process has peaked, creating a headwind for trade-exposed firms over the long run. What about the next 12 months? Will geopolitics kill the bull market? Not necessarily. Just as central bankers have cut interest rates to guard against deflationary risks (Chart 4), so the key governments are adjusting policies to avoid recessionary risks, especially with the memory of 2008 still fresh. Simply put: The Fed is on pause, Trump wants to be reelected, and China cannot afford a hard landing. Chart 3Globalization Faces Challenges 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society Chart 4Policymakers Are Reacting To Deflationary Risks 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society Clearly the risks to this view are elevated. The chief ones: (1) President Trump becomes a lame duck, cannot run on an economic platform, and thus makes a desperate attempt to win as a “war president” (2) Xi Jinping overestimates his advantage, in domestic or foreign policy, and makes a policy mistake (3) the US-Iran conflict spirals out of control due to Iran’s economic vulnerability. Other risks, such as Brexit, pale by comparison. Fear And Loathing On The Campaign Trail It is too soon to declare that Trump’s presidency is finished. On the contrary he is slightly favored to win reelection: • The Senate is unlikely to remove him from office. Republican support for the president is well above average despite evidence that Trump tried to get Ukrainian officials to investigate his political rival (Chart 5). The implication is that a year from now Democrats will have suffered a policy failure while Trump will have been cleared of charges. Chart 5Trump Still Popular Among Republicans 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society • The odds of recession in the coming year are low. The US voter is buffered by rising real incomes and wages and high net wealth (Chart 6). To unseat a sitting president requires a recessionary backdrop that fundamentally discredits him and his party – not just slowing growth. Chart 6Pocketbook Voter Theory To The Test 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society • Trump’s low approval rating does not prohibit him from reelection. While historically low, it is also historically stable. Our quantitative election model – which predicts Trump will win the Electoral College with 279 votes by clinging onto Pennsylvania – shows that Trump’s victory margin would increase if we looked not at the average level of his approval but at its change, momentum, or low range (i.e. stability). Table 1 shows the results of all four variations of his approval rating, with ascending chances of winning key swing states. Table 1All Measures Of Trump’s Approval Rating Get Him 270 Electoral College Votes 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society Trump’s odds of winning will affect the US equity market throughout the year. As long as he remains competitive, i.e. neither scandal nor the economy cause his approval rating to break down, he will have reason to temper his policies to cater to US financial markets. Foreign and trade policies are Trump’s only ways to improve the economy and voter support. Trump’s only remaining way to boost the economy and improve voter support lies in foreign policy and trade policy. Specifically, he will stop increasing tariffs on China – and maybe even roll back tariffs to August 2019 or even April 2019 levels (Chart 7) – at least as long as the manufacturing recession persists. Chart 7Some Tariff Rollback Is Possible 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society China is unlikely to implement painful structural changes when Trump could be gone in 12 months’ time. Strategic tensions outside of trade will undermine any ceasefire. Hence economic policy uncertainty will remain elevated even though it will drop off from recent peaks. Assuming the electoral constraint prevents Trump from levying sweeping tariffs on China or Europe, he will be limited to other foreign and trade policies to try to boost his approval rating or fire up his base: • We expect a third summit with Kim Jong Un of North Korea. Trump is rumored to be considering some troop reduction in exchange for progress on denuclearization (neither of which would be irreversible). • Otherwise Trump could turn to saber-rattling, since Pyongyang is threatening to resume long-range tests and the economic consequences of another round of “fire and fury” would be limited. • Trump could also rattle the saber against Iran, Venezuela, or other rogue states. If Trump becomes uncompetitive in the election, then the market will sell off. The market will have to price not only policy discontinuity (e.g. higher taxes), but also the chance of a progressive-populist taking the White House. Moreover, if a Democrat is able to unseat an incumbent president, the Democrats will take the Senate as well. Trump is a known unknown; this scenario would be an unknown unknown. The Democratic Party’s primary election will consume the first half of the year. It culminates in the Democratic National Convention, strategically chosen to take place in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on July 13-16. Wisconsin is one of three critical swing states. Will former Vice President Joe Biden win the nomination? A high conviction is not warranted. Biden is clearly the frontrunner, but we think a progressive can pull it off. A simulation of the Democratic Convention “pledged delegates,” based on November polling in the first four primary elections, shows Biden far short of a majority (Chart 8). He needs to outperform his polls, but this will be difficult given that he is well-known, has not performed well in debates, and will have Mayors Pete Buttigieg and Michael Bloomberg nipping at his heels in the Midwest and Northeast, respectively. Chart 8Do Not Discount A Progressive Win 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society Over time, candidates will drop out, so it is more informative to look at the “centrist” candidates as a whole compared to the “progressives.” Here the early primary polling suggests that the progressives will come closest to victory (Chart 9). Chart 9Progressives Come Closest To Victory 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society The trend within the party is to move to the left. Senators Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders are tied as voters’ second choice – even Buttigieg supporters are split between Biden and Warren (Chart 10). What is unknown is whether Warren (or Sanders) can consolidate the progressive vote faster than Biden (or Buttigieg) consolidates the centrist vote. Chart 10If Biden Falters, Progressives Are Next In Line 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society Chart 11Structural Imbalances Give Rise To Populism 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society Trends pointing toward a progressive victory may not at first trouble the market, but any signs that a progressive is pulling ahead decisively will force investors to sharply upgrade the probability that he or she will win the White House. This will cause equity volatility, which could become self-reinforcing. A progressive nominee would force investors to recognize that populism and political risk are here to stay – which is our expectation given that they are motivated by polarization, inequality, and other structural imbalances in the United States (Chart 11). Left-wing or progressive populism is far more negative for corporate earnings than Trump’s right-wing or “pluto-populism.” Sanders or Warren present the worst case for investors because they favor trade protectionism in addition to higher taxes and minimum wages. Most presidents achieve their chief legislative priority in their first term and there is no reason to assume a progressive presidency would be any different. The implication is higher corporate taxes as well as individual taxes to pay for a sweeping expansion of the social safety net – positive for the economy perhaps but negative for corporate earnings. Chart 12A Progressive Win Threatens Key Sectors 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society An extensive re-regulation of the US economy would occur regardless, since it falls under executive authority. It would affect the key equity sectors in the US bourse, technology and health (Chart 12), as well as energy and financials. The choice of a centrist Democrat like Biden (or Buttigieg) would be the least negative outcome for US equities of all the Democrats. The market would probably cheer a Trump versus Biden matchup for this reason. Biden favors higher taxes and regulation but is an establishment politician and known quantity. However, even Biden will be pulled to the left by the current within his party once in office; and Buttigieg will govern to the left of Biden. Trump’s reelection would spur a relief rally in US equities, but it would be short-lived. He would solidify low taxes and deregulation and would have a real chance of passing an infrastructure package. But he would also curtail labor force growth with his border wall and double down on trade protectionism – likely against Europe as well as China this time. His unpredictable and aggressive tendencies would be turbo-charged by a new popular mandate. We expect to cut back on risk exposure upon Trump’s reelection, assuming the bull market has survived to return him to office. A Democratic victory would mark another reversal in US policy orientation. Given our view that the White House call is also the Senate call, this would be the third time since 2008 that the country has witnessed a total reversal. Domestic American political risk will not end with the election: a legitimacy crisis could follow a narrow election, and institutional erosion continues regardless. It is too soon to call peak polarization, as the election will result in either a left-wing government bent on redistributing wealth or a right-wing Trump administration that exacerbates inequality. A centrist "return to normalcy" is possible with a Biden or Buttigieg victory. This reinforces our constructive cyclical view. Bottom Line: The chief risk from US politics in 2020 is Trump becoming a lame duck and resorting to belligerent foreign policy to try to win back voters through a rally around the flag. The chief risk of the Democratic nomination, and the general election, is a left-wing populist winning the White House. Any Democratic victory would likely bring the Senate, removing a key constraint. Over time the median voter is moving to the left. The Man Who Changed China Chart 13Xi Is Purging Misallocated Capital 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society Xi Jinping undoubtedly represents a “new era” in China – a reassertion of Communist Party rule. The party faced a crisis of legitimacy amid the Great Recession and Arab Spring and was determined to regain political, economic, and social control. Xi had previously been anointed but was all too happy to take on the role of neo-Maoist strongman. Yet Xi’s playbook is close to that of President Jiang Zemin’s: centralize the party, repress dissent, modernize the military, restructure banks and the economy, upgrade the country’s science and technology, and expand China’s global influence. The difference is that while Jiang rode the high tide of globalization, Xi is riding the receding tide. Jiang culled two-thirds of the country’s state-owned enterprises, laying off over 40 million people, confident that a surge of new growth would ensue. Xi is also cracking down – allowing bankruptcies to purge misallocated capital (Chart 13) – but with a large debt load and shrinking labor force, he needs the state sector to put a floor under growth rates. The takeaway is that Xi will act pragmatically to boost growth when China’s stability is threatened, as he did in 2015-16. The trade war has already forced him to backtrack on the 2017-18 deleveraging campaign and stimulate the economy. The combined fiscal and credit impulse amounts to 6.6% of GDP from trough to now, and it hasn’t peaked. The implication is that Chinese growth – and global growth – will pick up from here (Chart 14). Chinese authorities are still trying to contain the growth in leverage, which has kept this year’s stimulus in check. But the chief banking regulator has also stated that as long as the macro-leverage ratio is not growing faster than 10%, this goal is met (Chart 15). Chart 14Chinese Growth Will Pick Up 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society Chart 15China Says Leverage Already Contained 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society The economy has not yet durably bottomed, so the state will continue adding support. The coming year is the third and final year of the “Three Battles” – against poverty, pollution, and systemic risk – as well as the final year of the thirteenth five-year plan. Beijing is falling short on its targets for real urban per capita income (Chart 16) and poverty elimination (Chart 17). A last-minute rush to meet these targets is likely and will require more fiscal stimulus. Chart 16Beijing Falls Short Of Urban Income Target... 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society Chart 17...And Poverty Target 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society This is not an argument for a blowout credit splurge. China is saving dry powder for a further escalation in the US containment strategy and a worse economic downturn. Do not expect a blowout Chinese credit splurge. The core constraint on policy is unemployment. Stimulus efforts have created a bottom in the employment component of the manufacturing PMI as well as a notable uptick in the demand for urban labor (Chart 18). To withdraw stimulus now – or tighten policy – would be to trigger a relapse in an economy that is ultimately at risk of a debt-deflation trap. Chart 18Chinese Stimulus Shows Up In Employment 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society Chart 19A Banking Crisis Is A Risk To The Chinese Economy 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society Tougher controls on credit and shadow banking have seen an uptick in corporate defaults and bank failures. With the government deliberately imposing pain on bloated sectors of the economy, financial turmoil could spread. Newspaper mentions of defaults, layoffs, and bankruptcies have only slightly subsided since stimulus efforts began (Chart 19). If bank failures spiral out of control, the economy will tank. The state will have to fight fires. Tariffs have accelerated the trend of firms relocating out of China, which began because of rising wages and a darkening business environment (Chart 20). A questionable trade ceasefire will not reverse the process as American and Asian companies are seeking a lasting solution, which requires them to set up shop elsewhere. China will want to mitigate the process, first by stabilizing domestic growth, and second by accepting Trump’s tactical trade retreat. Xi is also trying to avoid diplomatic isolation by courting trade partners other than the US, since the ceasefire is unreliable and the US containment strategy is presumed to continue. This involves outreach to the rest of Asia, Russia, and Europe, and even to distrustful neighbors like Japan and India. Europe is the swing player. China’s Asian neighbors, and Australia and New Zealand, have reason to fear Beijing’s growing clout and seek the US’s security umbrella. Russia and China are informal allies. But the European public is not interested in the new cold war – China does not threaten Europe from next door, like Russia does, and the Trump administration is threatening Europe with both trade war and Middle Eastern instability. European leaders are happy to take the market share that the US is leaving, as is clear from direct investment (Chart 21). Only a concentrated US diplomatic effort can address this divergence, which is not forthcoming in 2020. Chart 20Firms Are Relocating Out Of China 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society Chart 21Europe Exploits US-China Rift 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society A new Democratic administration, or a change in Trump strategy in the second term, could eventually produce a multilateral western coalition demanding that China open up and liberalize parts of its economy. But Europe will need to be convinced of the underlying reality that China is doubling down on the state-led industrial policies that provoked the Americans to begin with. Beijing is after economic self-sufficiency, indigenous innovation, and leadership in high-tech production and new frontiers. Its official research and development budget is not its only means for achieving this end (Chart 22) – it also has state-backed acquisitions and cyber campaigns. Germany and Europe have begun scrutinizing Chinese investment, separately from the United States. Chart 22Beijing Is After Economic Self-Sufficiency 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society The danger to China – and the world – is that Xi Jinping might overplay his hand. He could overtighten money, credit, or property regulations and spoil the economy when global growth is vulnerable. His anti-corruption campaign is a telling reminder of his heavy hand in domestic affairs (Chart 23). Chart 23Xi Jinping Risks Overplaying His Hand 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society Chart 24China Needs To Calm Things Down 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society He could also suppress protesters in Hong Kong and rattle sabers over Taiwan or the South China Sea in a way that undermines the trade ceasefire. Or he could fail to bring the North Koreans to heel. These strategic tensions are significant only insofar as they undermine the trade ceasefire or provoke US-China saber-rattling. Failing to act as an honest broker in the Iran crisis would also irk Europeans and give them an excuse to side with the US. Bottom Line: China will continue modestly stimulating the economy next year to achieve a durable stabilization in growth. The risk of debt-deflation and rising unemployment ultimately necessitates this policy. Beijing can accept Trump’s tariff rollback for the sake of stability – China’s policy uncertainty relative to the rest of the world is off the charts and Beijing has an interest in calming things down (Chart 24). Yet Beijing will double down on indigenous innovation, while courting the rest of the world so as to preempt criticism and isolate the Americans. The risk is that Xi proves too heavy-handed when it comes to domestic leverage, the tech grab, strategic disputes, or trade talks with Washington. The Strait Of Hormuz Risk Chart 25US-Iran Conflict Still Unresolved 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society In a special report earlier this year entitled “The Polybius Solution” we argued that while the US-China conflict is the major long-term geopolitical conflict, the US-Iran showdown could supersede it in the short term. This remains a risk for 2020, as the Trump administration’s confrontation with Iran is fundamentally unresolved (Chart 25). The Trump administration is still enforcing “maximum pressure” sanctions, which have reduced Iranian oil exports from 1.8 million barrels per day at their recent peak to 100,000 barrels per day in November (Chart 26). These are crippling sanctions that have sent Iran’s economy reeling. Chart 26Iran Remains Under 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has ruled out negotiations with Trump. They would be unpopular at home without a major reversal on sanctions from Trump (Chart 27). Chart 27Major US Reversal Prerequisite For Iran Talks 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society Trump presumably aims to avoid an oil shock ahead of the election. The US and its allies have visibly shied away from conflict in the wake of Iran’s provocations, including the spectacular attack on eastern Saudi Arabia that knocked 5.7 million barrels of oil per day offline in September. However, this does not mean the odds of war are zero. The Americans or the Iranians could miscalculate. Both sides might think they can improve their standing at home by flexing their muscles abroad. Iran is a rational actor and would not normally court American airstrikes or antagonize a potentially lame duck president. Yet it is under extreme pressure due to the sanctions. It faces significant unrest both at home and in its sphere of influence (Iraq and Lebanon). Opinion polls show that the public primarily blames the government for the collapsing economy, and yet that American sanctions are siphoning off some of this anger (Chart 28). This could tempt the leaders to continue staging provocations in the Strait of Hormuz or elsewhere in the region. Chart 28Iranians Blame Tehran, Tehran Blames America 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society Hardline military leaders and politicians currently receive the most favor in polling, while the reformist President Rouhani – undercut by the American withdrawal from the 2015 deal – is among the least popular (Chart 29). The Majlis (parliament) elections in February will likely reverse the reformist turn in Iranian politics that began in 2012. The regime stalwarts are gearing up for the supreme leader’s succession in the coming years. While a Democratic White House could restore the 2015 deal, that ship may have sailed. Chart 29Rouhani And Reformists In Trouble 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society A historic oil supply disruption is a fatter tail risk than investors realize. Chart 30The Iranians May Take Excessive Risk 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society Trump, under impeachment, could seek to distract the public. This was Bill Clinton’s tactic with Operations Infinite Reach, Desert Fox, and Allied Force in 1998-99. These operations were minor and not comparable to a conflict with Iran. However, Trump may be emboldened. On paper the US strategic petroleum reserve (along with OPEC and other petroleum reserves) could cover most major oil shock scenarios. According to Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst at BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy, a supply outage the size of the Abqaiq attack in September would have to persist for four months to cause enough price pressure to harm the US economy and decrease Trump’s chances of winning reelection. The simulations in Chart 30 overstate the gasoline price impact by assuming that global oil reserves remain untapped. Thus while the Iranians may take excessive risks, the Trump administration may not refrain this time from airstrikes. Bottom Line: While the Middle East is always full of risks to oil supply, Iran’s vulnerability and Trump’s status at home make the situation unusually precarious. A historic oil supply disruption is a fatter tail risk than investors realize. Europe Is A Price Taker, Not A Price Maker Just as the US and China have a shared incentive to avoid tariff-induced recession, so the UK and EU have a shared incentive to prevent a shock reversion to basic WTO tariffs. The December 31, 2020 deadline for the UK-EU trade deal, like the various deadlines for Brexit itself, can be delayed. Even Prime Minister Boris Johnson has proved unwilling to exit without a deal and even a hung parliament has proved capable of preventing him from doing so. The negotiation of a trade deal – which is never easy and always drags on – will be a lower-order risk in the wake of the past two years’ Brexit-induced volatility. Johnson will not be held hostage by hardline Brexiters given that Brexit itself will be complete. If our view on Chinese growth is correct, then Europe’s economy can recover and European political risk will be a “red herring” in 2020, as it was in 2019. Instead the EU presents an opportunity. Chart 31Euro Area Breakup Risk Has Subsided 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society Euro Area break-up risk has subsided after a series of challenges in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis (Chart 31). There is not a basis for a reversal of this trend, at least not until a full-blown recession afflicts the continent. The rise in anti-establishment parties coincided with a one-off surge in migration that is finished – and successful populists from Greece to Italy have moderated on euro membership once in power. Germany is entering a profound transition driven by de-globalization and tensions with the United States. It is more likely to have an early election than the consensus holds. But it is fundamentally stable and supportive of European integration. In fact the great debate about fiscal policy poses an upside risk over the long run both for European equities and the European project. We remain optimistic on French structural reforms even though President Emmanuel Macron must overcome significant public opposition. An eerie quiet hangs over Russia, making it one of our “Black Swan” risks for 2020. Oil prices are not very high, which discourages foreign adventures, and President Vladimir Putin has spent his fourth term trying to consolidate international gains and improve domestic stability. But approval of the government is weak, the job market is deteriorating, and social unrest is cropping up. There is plenty of room to ease monetary and fiscal policy, but a sharp downturn could provide the basis for an aggressive foreign policy action to shore up regime support. The US election also presents the risk of renewed US-Russian tensions, whether over election interference or a Democratic victory. Investment Conclusions Geopolitics is the likeliest candidate to derail the global bull market in 2020. Nevertheless, policymakers are adjusting to their constraints. Trump and Xi are negotiating a ceasefire and a disorderly Brexit is off the table. Even Trump’s impeachment shows that the US system of checks and balances remains intact. After all, there is nothing to prevent removal from office if Trump further antagonizes public opinion and the Republican Senate. This means that policy uncertainty will decline on the margin in 2020, even as it remains elevated due to the danger of the underlying events. The nature of US economic imbalances suggests that the policy discontinuity of a Democratic victory on November 3, 2020 would be better for the economy (via household consumption) than it would be for corporate earnings. Policy continuity with the Trump administration suggests the opposite. On a sectoral basis we recommend going long US energy large cap stocks and short info-tech and communications. Energy has limited downside even if a progressive wins whereas tech has limited upside even if Trump wins. The BCA Research House View expects the US dollar to weaken as global growth rebounds, stocks to outperform bonds and cash, and developed market equities to outperform those of the United States. But a Republican victory in November would push against these trends as it is more bullish for the greenback and for US equities relative to global. As a play on the global growth rebound we expect, we recommend going long industrial metals. Like our colleagues at BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy, we are initiating this as a tactical trade but it may become strategic. We are reinitiating a tactical long Korea / short Taiwan equity trade. Taiwanese political risk is understated ahead of January’s election and the island is the epicenter of the US-China cold war. We are restoring our long gold trade as a strategic hedge. Populism and de-globalization are potentially inflationary, but they are also linked with great power competition which will increase the frequency of geopolitical crises. In either case, gold is the right safe haven to own.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com

Highlights Lingering weakness evident in fundamental supply-demand data will fade next year, and with it the downward pressure on oil prices. Price risk is skewed to the upside: Continued monetary accommodation from systematically important central banks and fiscal stimulus will revive oil demand; OPEC 2.0 production restraint and market-imposed discipline in the US will slow the growth of oil supply. Shale-oil supply growth also is threatened by flaring of associated natural gas in the Bakken and Permian basins. Failure to limit the burn-off into the atmosphere at oil-production sites could provide the environmental lobby an opening to challenge growth. Elevated geopolitical tensions cannot be ignored, particularly as economic and political discontent boils over in Iraq and Iran, where leaders could feel compelled to lash out. To the downside, global economic policy uncertainty remains elevated. It continues to keep the USD well bid. This raises consumers’ local-currency costs in the EM economies driving demand growth, and lowers production costs ex-US, incentivizing supply growth at the margin. Weaker 2019 data showing up in demand and upward revisions to inventories pushed our 4Q19 Brent forecast down to $63/bbl from $66/bbl, and our 2020 forecast to $67/bbl from $70/bbl. We continue to expect WTI will trade $4/bbl below Brent. Feature In the multi-level game that drives the political economy of oil, domestic and international factors shaping supply-demand fundamentals are always shifting. As multiple constituencies vie for advantage, market participants will be forced to grapple with the consequences of policies now under consideration. The bullet points above provide a restricted aperture through which to view some of the issues currently in play.1 Markets are responding favorably to the unwinding of tighter global financial conditions this year brought about by tighter US monetary policy last year, and China’s 2017-18 deleveraging campaign. Demand-side impacts of policy shifts and policy signaling remain the most prominent feature of fundamental adjustments markets will continue to grapple with, as fall-out from the Sino-US trade war; political discontent in DM and EM electorates; and ad hoc economic policy raise global economic policy uncertainty. Markets are responding favorably to the unwinding of tighter global financial conditions this year brought about by tighter US monetary policy last year, and China’s 2017-18 deleveraging campaign. This is most visible in our global Leading Economic Indicators (LEIs), particularly in EM economies, although DM demand also looks like it could pick up (Chart of the Week). For the real economy, it is useful to remember Milton Friedman’s “long and variable lags” regarding the effects of monetary policy and how they affect oil markets.2 Chart of the WeekGlobal LEIs Point To Demand Recovery Global LEIs Point To Demand Recovery Global LEIs Point To Demand Recovery Chart 2BCA's EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast Points Toward Upturn in Oil Demand BCA's EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast Points Toward Upturn in Oil Demand BCA's EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast Points Toward Upturn in Oil Demand EM growth is hugely important to global oil-demand growth in our analysis. Our proprietary EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast continues to indicate EM economies are responding to easier global financial conditions (Chart 2).3 Global growth expectations for oil demand are diverging sharply in the lead-up to OPEC 2.0’s December 5 meeting in Vienna. At the low end, the US EIA expects 2019 growth of 760k b/d this year, a sharply lower estimate than the agency’s co-eval institutions; OPEC is closing in on the 1mm b/d growth threshold at 0.98mm b/d, followed by the IEA at 1mm b/d. We lowered our estimate of oil-demand growth this year to 1.1mm b/d, in line with weaker consumption data being reported by these big agencies. Shale-oil production growth faces an additional risk from the flaring of associated natural gas in the Permian and Bakken basins. We are maintaining our expectation for growth of 1.4mm b/d next year, which is close to the EIA’s estimate (Chart 3). The IEA’s estimate for 2020 stays at 1.2mm b/d, while OPEC’s is just under 1.1mm b/d. On the supply side, we expect lower US shale-oil output growth next year. Lower prices, backwardated WTI futures curves – which results in lower forward prices for producers hedging their output – and recalcitrant investors who are unwilling to commit capital to all but the most profitable shale-oil producers will take their toll (Chart 4). As a result, we expect US shale output to reach ~ 9.35mm b/d on average next year in the Big Five basins (Permian, Eagle Ford, Bakken, Niobrara and Anadarko). This leads to an 800k b/d increase in our US lower 48 output over this year’s levels, which is down from our earlier estimate of a 900k b/d increase. Chart 3Stronger Oil Demand, Tighter Supply Will Lift Oil Prices in 2020 Stronger Oil Demand, Tighter Supply Will Lift Oil Prices in 2020 Stronger Oil Demand, Tighter Supply Will Lift Oil Prices in 2020 Chart 4Lower Prices, Backwardated WTI Curve Lead to Lower Rig Count, Shale-Oil Output Lower Prices, Backwardated WTI Curve Lead to Lower Rig Count, Shale-Oil Output Lower Prices, Backwardated WTI Curve Lead to Lower Rig Count, Shale-Oil Output Shale-oil production growth faces an additional risk from the flaring of associated natural gas in the Permian and Bakken basins. Failure to limit the burn-off into the atmosphere at oil-production sites could provide the environmental lobby an opening to challenge growth, as the electorate grows increasingly restive with the practice. Industry officials in Texas and North Dakota – home to the Permian and Bakken plays – already have been sounding the alarm on this issue.4 According to Rystad Energy, flaring reached another record high in the Permian at 752 million cubic feet per day in 3Q19 amid growing oil production. Lastly, we continue to follow events in Iraq and Iran closely where economic and political discontent with the status quo has led to civil unrest. We also are penciling in an extension of OPEC 2.0’s 1.2mm-barrel-per-day output cut to year-end 2020. Over-compliance likely persists, particularly from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). Stronger non-OPEC output from Norway and Brazil offsets this somewhat (Table 1). Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Lingering Oil-Demand Weakness Will Fade Lingering Oil-Demand Weakness Will Fade Lastly, we continue to follow events in Iraq and Iran closely where economic and political discontent with the status quo has led to civil unrest.  As our colleague Roukaya Ibrahim notes, “The country continues to be plagued by high unemployment, corruption, and an utter lack of basic services … . This has ultimately resulted in a lack of confidence in Iraqi leadership who are being increasingly perceived as benefiting from the status quo at the expense of the populace.”5 There is an underlying tension within the society between Iraqi forces loyal to Iran’s Shia theocracy and Iraqis seeking full autonomy for their country. “The widening rift between the rival Iraqi Shia blocs implies that any détente will be temporary,” according to BCA’s geopolitical strategists. We have consistently maintained markets are too complacent regarding these geopolitical risks, which also encompass US-Iran hostilities in the Persian Gulf. We are reducing our 4Q19 Brent forecast to $63/bbl from $66/bbl, and our 2020 forecast to $67/bbl from $70/bbl. That said, our balances still reflect the lingering demand weakness discussed above, and continue to work through higher inventories. In line with revisions by the EIA to historical inventory levels and lower demand growth, we are reducing our 4Q19 Brent forecast to $63/bbl from $66/bbl, and our 2020 forecast to $67/bbl from $70/bbl (Chart 5). We continue to expect WTI will trade $4/bbl below Brent (Chart 6). Chart 5Storage Revisions Help Weaken Price Forecasts Storage Revisions Help Weaken Price Forecasts Storage Revisions Help Weaken Price Forecasts Chart 6BCA 2020 Oil Price Forecasts Fall Slightly To $67/bbl For Brent, $63/bbl For WTI BCA 2020 Oil Price Forecasts Fall Slightly To $67/bbl For Brent, $63/bbl For WTI BCA 2020 Oil Price Forecasts Fall Slightly To $67/bbl For Brent, $63/bbl For WTI Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Persists While accommodative monetary policy and stimulative fiscal policy will foster a revival in commodity demand, global economic uncertainty remains elevated.6 This risks keeping the broad trade-weighted USD index for goods (TWIBG) well bid (Chart 7). This raises consumers’ local-currency costs in the EM economies driving growth, and lowers production costs ex-US, incentivizing supply growth at the margin. Chart 7Elevated Global Economic Uncertainty Keeps USD Well Bid, Retards Demand Lingering Oil-Demand Weakness Will Fade Lingering Oil-Demand Weakness Will Fade We remain confident the combination of global monetary accommodation and fiscal stimulus will revive commodity demand.  However, given the economic uncertainty confronting policymakers globally, this revival likely will be modest. As the multi-level game dominating the evolution of the political economy of the oil market becomes more complex and uncertain – particularly in re the Sino-US trade war and domestic politics in systemically important economies – monetary and fiscal policy have an additional headwind to battle in the attempt to revive aggregate commodity demand. Bottom Line: We remain confident the combination of global monetary accommodation and fiscal stimulus will revive commodity demand. However, given the economic uncertainty confronting policymakers globally, this revival likely will be modest, with oil prices rising ~ 10% next year. That said, if the phase-one Sino-US trade deal leads to a phase-two and –three – i.e., a durable resolution to the trade imbroglio and political discontent roiling markets, the recovery could be more significant.7     Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Market Round-Up Energy: Overweight. Trade-related news continues to drive short-term price movements. On Tuesday, Brent prices fell 2.5% on rising pessimism about the US-China “phase one” deal. On the supply side, OPEC 2.0 countries will meet in early December to assess whether the group should extend – and possibly deepen – output cuts. Russia signaled it is unlikely to support deeper cuts, but appears to be open to extending the current quotas until year-end 2020. Our updated global oil market balances assume OPEC 2.0 will agree to extend the current production curbs. Separately, anti-government protests in Basra, Iraq, are impacting the oil sector. On Monday, protesters reportedly blocked roads leading to the major oil fields and to commodity export terminals. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper prices seem detached from their current fundamentals, moving up and down with expectations related to the US-China trade war and ongoing protests in Chile – the world’s largest copper producer. Negative sentiment has weighed on copper most of this year. Speculative short positioning reached a high of 137k contracts in August, pushing our Copper Composite Indicator into “oversold” territory. Going forward, the metal’s fundamentals will support higher prices; quarter-to-date copper prices increased 3.5%. Global visible copper inventories resumed their downward trend in 2H19 – reaching a 10-year low. We expect global growth to pick up in the coming months – led by emerging economies. Risks are skewed to the upside. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold prices recovered to $1475/oz after trading close to our $1450/oz stop-loss last week. Slightly weaker real rates in the US and ratcheted-up trade tensions supported the yellow metal’s price this week. Over the short term, prices could be pushed lower as markets await positive developments re a Sino - US trade agreement. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Corn futures traded lower earlier in the week, but rebounded slightly Tuesday after the USDA Crop Progress reported the harvest rate for it was 76%, which was below analysts’ expectations of 77% and well below the five-year average of 92%. Wheat performed better, marking a 0.9% weekly increase in March futures on the back of a lower percentage of the crop being rated good or excellent by the USDA.  Finally, soybeans were flat throughout the week but fell almost 0.8% on Wednesday, amid reports that a phase-one trade deal between US and China may not be completed by the end of 2019.     Footnotes 1       Understanding and balancing these interests is difficult, as is forecasting outcomes. Please see Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988). 2      Friedman’s classic paper, “The Lag in Effect of Monetary Policy,” appeared in the Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 69, No. 5 (Oct., 1961). Our own research suggests these lags range from six to 18 months in commodity markets. 3      Our EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast uses our Global Industrial Activity (GIA) Index, and our Global Commodity Factor (GCF) and EM Import Volume (EMIV) models to characterize the current state of commodity demand. The GIA index uses trade data, FX rates, manufacturing data, and Chinese industrial activity statistics to gauge current global industrial activity, which is highly correlated with trade-related activity. The GCF uses principal component analysis to distill the primary driver of 28 different commodity prices traded globally. Lastly, the EMIV model is driven by EM import volumes, which are highly correlated with income; as income rises, oil demand – and commodity demand in general – rises. Please our report entitled Global Financial Conditions Support Higher Commodity Demand, which was published October 31, 2019, for additional discussion. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com.  Concerns over associated natural-gas flaring into the atmosphere are rising in the shale-oil community, as political discontent with the practice grows.  Please see Gas Flaring “Running Rampant” In The Permian, published by oilprice.com, and New Initiative will Map and Measure Methane Emissions Across the Permian Basin, a press release issued by the Environmental Defense Fund outlining their initiative to install methane emissions-monitoring gear around the Permian to begin logging the massive amount of flaring in that basin.   According to the Oil & Gas Journal, “… collective volumes of flared and vented gas from (the Permian and Bakken) basins up to about 1.15 bcfd. For comparative purposes, that represents 12 billion cu m/year of wasted gas, which exceeds the yearly gas demand of nations such as Israel, Colombia, and Romania.”  Please see Permian gas flaring, venting reaches record high published by the OGJ June 4, 2019.  Please see Permian gas flaring reaches yet another high, published by Rystad Energy on its website November 5, 2019. 4      S&P Global Platts posted an interesting podcast on its website featuring an interview with Lynn Helms, director of the North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources. He said flaring in the Bakken – where production is hitting record highs – will force state regulators to throttle back on the rate of shale-production growth beginning in 2Q20, when growth could slow substantially if gas-capture technologies are not deployed.  Growth could remain subdued for 2020-21, he said.  Please see North Dakota’s record oil growth to be upended by flaring rules, posted November 18, 2019. 5      Please see Iraq's Challenge To Iran Is Underrated, published by BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy November 8, 2019.  It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6      We measure uncertainty using the Baker-Bloom-Davis Global Economic Policy Uncertainty (GEPU) index. This is a GDP-weighted index of newspaper headlines containing a list of words related to economic policy uncertainty, which are found in newspapers and articles online from 20 countries representing almost 80% of global GDP are scoured for reports reflecting economic uncertainty. Please see our October 17 and October 31, 2019, reports Policy Uncertainty Lifts USD, Stifles Global Oil Demand Growth and Global Financial Conditions Support Higher Commodity Demand for the original research on this topic. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7      This is not our base case. Our geopolitical strategists expect a temporary ceasefire in the trade war, but doubt that a “grand compromise” leading to a new period of US-China economic engagement will emerge from the negotiations. Strategic tensions will keep rising on a secular basis between the two countries. Please see BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy weekly report entitled How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019. It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q3 Lingering Oil-Demand Weakness Will Fade Lingering Oil-Demand Weakness Will Fade Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades Lingering Oil-Demand Weakness Will Fade Lingering Oil-Demand Weakness Will Fade

Highlights Lebanon and Iraq – the two countries most entrenched in Iran’s sphere of influence – are experiencing mass unrest. Protesters in both states are calling for the dismantling of sectarian based political systems, economic reforms, and reduced foreign interference. The unrest in Iraq is of greater consequence due to its role as a major global oil supplier. The widening rift between the rival Iraqi Shia blocs implies that any détente will be temporary.  We remain tactically long spot crude oil on the back of the geopolitical risks to supply amid an expected revival in global demand. Feature A wave of popular uprisings has swept over Lebanon and Iraq. While the riots are to a large extent a product of long-standing economic and governance failures, the timing is consequential. The Middle East is experiencing a paradigm shift. With the US reducing its strategic commitment to the region, most recently evidenced by the withdrawal of its troops from northeast Syria, a power vacuum has emerged. This opens up the necessity for foreign actors – Russia – as well as regional powers – Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey – to fill the void. The evolution of power could be unsettling given that it will likely generate greater instability in a region that is fertile ground for unrest. Iran has so far emerged a winner in this dynamic. It has expanded its influence in Iraq since the US pullout, it has played a critical role in saving the Assad regime, and it has seen Saudi initiatives fail in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Qatar. It is making progress toward building its ‘land bridge’ to the Mediterranean (Map 1).1 Map 1Iran’s Aspirational ‘Land Bridge’ To The Mediterranean Iraq's Challenge To Iran Is Underrated Iraq's Challenge To Iran Is Underrated The tensions brought about by the US withdrawal from the JCPOA further illustrate Iran’s growing regional sway. It has hardened its stance. Meanwhile the US and its allies have been vacillating. The Saudi coalition – mired in a war in Yemen and confronting domestic risks – is reluctant to engage in a full-scale confrontation.  Even though Iran has a higher pain threshold, it stands on shaky ground. Just last year it was rocked by domestic protests demanding less foreign adventurism. Lebanon and Iraq are the two countries most entrenched in Iran’s sphere of influence. Protesters in both countries are calling for greater national unity – demanding an overhaul of the political system, and arguing that the sectarian set-up has failed to meet their most basic needs. What occurs in Beirut and Baghdad will be of great consequence for Tehran. Deadlock In Iraq “Out, out, Iran! Baghdad will stay free!” - Chants by Iraqi protesters While both the grievances and demands of the protesters in Lebanon and Iraq are similar, the unrest in Iraq is of much greater consequence from a global investor’s perspective. The trigger was the removal of the highly revered Lieutenant General Abdul-Wahab al-Saadi from his position in the Iraqi army by Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi.2 The popular general was unceremoniously transferred to an administrative role in the Ministry of Defense. The sacking of al-Saadi – considered a neutral figure – was interpreted as evidence of Iranian influence and the greater sway of the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organization of various paramilitary groups. Iraqis all over the country responded by attacking the Iranian consulate in Karbala and offices linked to Iranian-backed militias. Chart 1AFertile Ground For Unrest In Iraq Fertile Ground For Unrest In Iraq Fertile Ground For Unrest In Iraq The protesters are also united in their economic grievances, frustrated at a political and economic system that is unwilling to translate economic gains to improved livelihoods for its people. The May 2018 parliamentary elections, which ushered in Prime Minster Abdul-Mahdi, failed to generate much improvement. The country continues to be plagued by high unemployment, corruption, and an utter lack of basic services (Charts 1A & 1B). This has ultimately resulted in a lack of confidence in Iraqi leadership who are being increasingly perceived as benefiting from the status quo at the expense of the populace. Chart 1BFertile Ground For Unrest In Iraq Iraq's Challenge To Iran Is Underrated Iraq's Challenge To Iran Is Underrated Most importantly, the ruling elite has failed to respond to key trends that emerged in last year’s parliamentary elections. The extremely low voter turnout reveals that Iraqis are disenchanted with the government's ability to meet their needs. Meanwhile the success of Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s Sairoon coalition – running on a platform stressing non-sectarianism and national unity – in securing the largest number of seats highlights the desire for a reduction of foreign interference (both Iranian as well as US/Saudi) in domestic politics. Where the election results failed to translate into real change for Iraq is in the appointment of the Prime Minister. Abdul-Mahdi – a technocrat – was a compromise candidate that surfaced as a result of a five-month long political standstill between the two rival Shia blocs, each claiming to have gained a majority of seats in parliament. On one end is the Iran-backed bloc led by Hadi al-Amiri head of both the Fatah Alliance and the PMF, and Nouri al-Maliki leader of the State of Law Coalition. On the other end is al-Sadr’s Sairoon coalition, which joined forces with Ammar al-Hakim of the Wisdom Movement, and champions greater unity and less foreign interference. The result has been a weak prime minister who is perceived to be incapable of pushing back against Iraq’s ruling elites and ushering in structural reforms. Instead the Prime Minister is seen as benefiting from a corrupt system. The rift between Iraq’s rival Shia blocks is deepening. Thus, the ongoing protests are to a great extent the result of the new government’s failure to heed the warnings brought about by the 2018 election and protests. They have served to deepen the rift between the rival Shia blocs. Last week Abdul–Mahdi responded to calls by al-Sadr and former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to resign by arguing that it is up to the main political leaders to agree to put forward a vote of no confidence in the Iraqi parliament. He agreed to resign, on condition that political parties jointly approve of a replacement. For now, that appears improbable. In a move that has been interpreted as a display of Iranian interference, al-Amiri changed heart after a reported meeting with Iranian Quds Force leader Qassem Suleimani last week in Baghdad. He backed down on his agreement to support al-Sadr to bring down Abdul-Mahdi, and has instead stated Abdul-Mahdi’s resignation will only bring about more chaos. This interference on the part of Iran was likely induced by fears that a crisis-stricken Iraq would weaken its hegemony over the region. Iraq is in a state of deadlock. A vote of no confidence would require a majority of 165 in parliament and would require the support of various Sunni and Kurdish parties (Chart 2). Al-Sadr is likely calculating that a new election is in his best interest. He would be able to capitalize on the movement given that he has aligned himself with the protesters, and will gain seats in parliament. Chart 2A Shia Schism In Iraq’s Parliament Iraq's Challenge To Iran Is Underrated Iraq's Challenge To Iran Is Underrated This would allow the nationalist bloc to gain a majority and appoint a government that is acceptable to the protesters. However, this scenario would also entail greater meddling from Iran, as it is unlikely to stand by idly as its influence wanes. As a result, we are likely to witness greater unrest as the rift between the two Shia blocs intensifies. Neither the US nor Saudi Arabia have an appetite to step in and provide the support necessary to counteract Iran. Moreover, Iran and its proxies in Iraq will not back down easily. At the same time, the geographical spread of the protest movement demonstrates that Iraqis are fed up with the current system.3 Despite the death of over 260 Iraqis, the protesters have yet to be deterred by the violence. This points to greater instability in Iraq as no side is backing down and the only foreign power willing and able to interfere is Iran. The impasse could be resolved if the main actors – the rival Shia blocs – agree to compromise. However, that is precisely what transpired last year and resulted in Abdul-Mahdi’s appointment. It ultimately led to only a temporary resolution of the unrest: a one-year deferral. If a similar compromise is reached in the current environment, it too will result in only a temporary détente. The grievances afflicting Iraqis cannot be resolved easily or swiftly. Iraq is in for an extended period of instability. Bottom Line: Iraqi protesters and authorities are in stalemate. The rift in the Shia bloc is deepening. There does not appear to be a clear path to bridge the demands and desires of the protesters and the leadership. Any détente will be temporary. Even if under a new election the protests translate to greater seats for the nationalist bloc, it will not translate to a de-escalation of domestic tensions. It may resolve the protests, but Iran-backed groups will retaliate. Iraq is in for an extended period of instability. Deadlock In Lebanon “All of them means all of them” “No to Iran – No to Saudi” - Chants by Lebanese protesters Just as Iraqi protesters are expressing national unity in calling for an end to sectarian politics and foreign interference, Lebanon’s protests stand out for crossing religious and regional divides. They have swept across the country, and include the Shia-dominated southern region where anger is even being directed at Hezbollah. Among the protesters’ demands is the removal of all three heads of the pillars of government – the Maronite Christian President Michel Aoun, the Sunni Prime Minister Saad Hariri, and the Shia Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri. Rather than being a source of division, the unrest is a demonstration of unity among Lebanese of all ideologies against the entire political system. Since Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s resignation on October 29, the movement rages on. Protesters are claiming that they are unwilling to back down until all their demands are met, including a complete overhaul of the sectarian power-sharing system, which has defined the country’s politics since the end of the 1975-1990 civil war.4 Chart 3Economic Deterioration In Lebanon Economic Deterioration In Lebanon Economic Deterioration In Lebanon The movement and the protesters’ complaints are not surprising. The government has failed to prevent the economy from moving toward collapse. It has long been in decline, with Lebanese feeling the pinch of corruption, economic stagnation, high unemployment, and the effects of the massive influx of Syrian refugees (Chart 3).The trigger of the uprising, a tax on WhatsApp calls amid clear signs of a domestic liquidity shortage, is a delayed response to what citizens have already known and felt for some time: a deteriorating economic situation. While the protests were caused by these economic grievances, they persist due to a crisis of confidence between the political class and the masses. Neither concessions on the part of the government in the form of a list of reforms nor the prime minister’s resignation convinced protesters to halt the movement. The uprising appears set to remain steadfast so long as the current politicians remain in power. The challenge for Lebanon’s protesters – and political elite all the same – is that while the protesters are united in their demands, they have so far been headless. The protesters have refused to present a list of acceptable replacement leaders, insisting that it is the government’s role to propose potential alternatives to the people. This has led to deadlock and will be a hurdle for the government in negotiating with demonstrators. On the other side of the conflict, the current political class, including Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, has expressed warnings about the chaos that would ensue with a government resignation. According to the Lebanese constitution, following Hariri’s resignation President Aoun is now tasked with consulting Lebanon’s fractured parliament to determine the next prime minister – a role reserved for a Sunni Muslim. However, if history is any guide, this process could take months and protesters are not that patient. Given that Hariri has sidelined himself and – unlike Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri or Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil – he is not the core target of protesters’ ire, there is a possibility that he may once again be appointed to the post of prime minister. While the outgoing government will take on a caretaker role until a new one is formed, demonstrators are standing their ground. ​​This has generated a political standoff causing Lebanese assets to bear the brunt (Chart 4). The emergence of competing rallies – in the form of support for President Michel Aoun – only complicates and possibly prolongs the situation. For now, the army is staying on the sidelines, allowing the protests to be – for the most part – a peaceful one. However, with Hezbollah also subject to the protesters’ wrath, odds of greater regional tensions have increased. Hezbollah may attempt to regain lost support by provoking Israel. The instability could also prompt Hezbollah to reassert its willingness to use force against domestic enemies, namely any new government that attempts to disarm it. In the meantime, Lebanon’s economy and financial markets will remain under pressure. The economy depends on capital inflows from citizens living abroad to finance the large twin deficit and maintain the dollar peg. Thus, the decline in sentiment will weigh on the economy (Chart 5). While the government has not implemented official capital controls, banks have independently tightened restrictions and raised transaction fees to reduce capital outflow. Chart 4Further Unrest Ahead Further Unrest Ahead Further Unrest Ahead Chart 5Weak Sentiment Weighs On Lebanon's Economy Weak Sentiment Weighs On Lebanon's Economy Weak Sentiment Weighs On Lebanon's Economy Bottom Line: Lebanese protesters and the political class are in deadlock. The prime minister’s resignation has done little to ease the tension, and demonstrators are refusing to back down until a new non-sectarian, technocratic government is formed. The domestic economy will remain frail. Earlier this week the central bank asked local lenders to boost their liquidity by raising their capital by 20% or $4 billion in 2020 in anticipation of potential downgrades. A stabilization of the political situation is a necessary precondition to boost confidence and once again shore up capital inflows. Nevertheless, with the protest movement being largely headless, the path toward compromise with the government will be challenging, raising the odds of prolonged tensions. What Of Iran’s Sphere Of Influence? “Not Gaza, Not Lebanon, I Give My Life For Iran” - Chants by Iranian protesters, January 2018 Iran has a strong incentive to preserve the established systems in both Lebanon and Iraq. The protesters’ demands risk weakening its grip on power in the region. In both movements, pro-Iranian forces have taken a stance against the protests with Hezbollah in Lebanon advising against the resignation of Prime Minister Hariri while the Iran-backed bloc in Iraq voiced concern over the chaos that will ensue with the prime minister’s resignation. Meanwhile, Tehran’s position is hardening. Iran is taking further steps away from the nuclear deal, injecting uranium gas into centrifuges at its underground Fordow nuclear complex, making the facility an active nuclear site rather than a permitted research plant. Chart 6Popular Support For Iran’s Hardening Stance Iraq's Challenge To Iran Is Underrated Iraq's Challenge To Iran Is Underrated Chart 7US-Iran Détente Unlikely Iraq's Challenge To Iran Is Underrated Iraq's Challenge To Iran Is Underrated This reflects the loss of public support for the JCPOA and the loss of confidence that other countries will honor their obligations toward the nuclear agreement (Chart 6). In a speech on November 3 marking the fortieth anniversary of the 1979 US Embassy takeover, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei renewed his ban on negotiations with the US. His stance mirrors public opinion, which is moving toward an increasingly unfavorable view of the US (Chart 7). However, this does not mean that President Hassan Rouhani’s administration is immune to popular discontent. Rather, with Iranians living through a continued economic deterioration and assigning the most blame to domestic mismanagement and corruption, there could be cracks forming in Iran as well (Chart 8). Chart 8A Case For Unrest In Iran? Iraq's Challenge To Iran Is Underrated Iraq's Challenge To Iran Is Underrated Bottom Line: The ongoing US withdrawal from the Middle East opens opportunities for Iran to increase its regional influence. It has been capitalizing on such opportunities by lending support to its proxies in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Gaza. However, the escalation of unrest in Lebanon and Iraq pose a risk to Iran’s grip on power in the region. On the one hand, if the movements there result in new governments, Iran will witness its wings clipped. This could incentivize retaliation and violence in Iraq, and provocations by Hezbollah along Lebanon’s southern border in an attempt to regain lost support. On the other hand, a prolonged standstill between protesters and the governments could result in greater Iranian influence over the long term. Other foreign powers are unwilling to wholeheartedly intervene to fill an emergent power vacuum. Investment Implications The risk of a decline in Iran’s control over its sphere of influence and the still unstable state of Iraqi domestic politics suggest that the geopolitical risk premium in oil prices should remain elevated. For now, President Trump is still enforcing sanctions and Iran’s oil exports have largely collapsed (Chart 9). The White House is continuing to add pressure by warning Chinese shipping companies – the largest remaining buyer of Iranian oil – against turning off their ships’ transponders. Chart 9The US Maintains Pressure On Iran Iraq's Challenge To Iran Is Underrated Iraq's Challenge To Iran Is Underrated News reports indicate that oil workers in Iraq’s southern region have started to join the government demonstrations. Moreover, reports on Wednesday indicate that the 30k b/d of production from the Qayarah oil field has been shut down due to road blockades in Basra that are preventing trucks from transporting crude to the Khor al-Zubair port. The geopolitical risk premium in oil prices should remain elevated. While the impact on the country’s oil production and exports have so far been minimal, a prolonged standoff between protesters and the government could result in supply outages. Today’s environment is notably different than that of the ISIS invasion of Iraq in 2014. Tensions then did not create a geopolitical risk premium in oil as they occurred amid an oil market share war, which kept supply abundant. Similarly, the September attack on Saudi Arabian oil facilities did not result in a lasting price spike as it occurred at a time of weak global demand. Moreover, Saudi Arabia possesses the technology and spare capacity that permitted it to swiftly restore output and maintain export commitments. The same cannot be said today about Iraq. A disruption there would be of greater consequence to oil markets, as illustrated by the 2008 Battle of Basra. Especially given Saudi Arabia's need to maintain high prices and amid the Aramco IPO and the tailwind created by a rebound in global growth. The fall in global economic policy uncertainty as the US and China move toward a trade ceasefire will weaken the dollar and support global demand for oil, which is overall bullish for oil prices. Moreover, US-Iran tensions remain unresolved which pose risks to production and shipping infrastructure in the region. We remain tactically long spot crude oil on the back of the geopolitical risks to supply as well as an expected revival in global demand. We are booking a 4.6% gain on our GBP-USD trade but remain long sterling versus the yen. Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1    The ‘land bridge’ is an aspirational route by which Iran would create a strategic corridor to the Mediterranean, stretching through friendly territory. 2   Lt. Gen. Abdul-Wahab al-Saadi was recognized and respected among Iraqis for fighting terrorism and his role in ridding the country of the Islamic State. The Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces were uneasy with Saadi’s close relationship with the US military. His abrupt removal was likely a result of the Iraqi government’s growing concern over al-Saadi’s popularity and rumors of a potential military coup. 3   Protests are occurring in all regions in Iraq. They are supported by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. This is a significant development from the 2018 protests which were mainly concentrated in Iraq’s southern region. 4   Under the current system, Lebanon’s president has to be a Maronite Christian, the parliament speaker a Shiite Muslim and the prime minister a Sunni. Cabinet and parliament seats are equally split between the two Muslims groups and Christians.

Highlights There is a tentative decline in geopolitical risk: An orderly Brexit or no Brexit is the likely final outcome and the U.S.-China talks are coming together. The outstanding geopolitical risks still warrant caution on global equities in the near term. Internal and external instability in Saudi Arabia, any American persistence with maximum pressure sanctions on Iran, and domestic instability in Iraq pose a risk to global oil supply. Go long spot crude oil and GBP/JPY. Feature Chart 1A Tentative Decline In Geopolitical Risk A Tentative Decline In Geopolitical Risk A Tentative Decline In Geopolitical Risk Our views on Brexit and the U.S.-China trade talks are coming together, resulting in a tentative decline in geopolitical risk (Chart 1). The British parliament still needs to ratify Boris Johnson’s exit agreement, painstakingly negotiated with the EU in a surprise summit this week. He may not have the votes. If he fails then he will have a basis to seek an extension to the Brexit deadline on October 31. But it is clear that the EU is willing to allow compromises to prevent a no-deal exit shock from exacerbating the slowdown in the European economy. An orderly Brexit is the final outcome (or no Brexit at all if an election and new referendum should say so). We are removing the $1.30 target on our long GBP/USD call in light of these developments and going long GBP/JPY. Similarly, while uncertainty lingers over U.S.-China relations, it is clear that President Trump is sensitive to the impact of the manufacturing recession and the risk of an overall recession on his reelection prospects. He is therefore pursuing a ceasefire and delaying tariffs. China is minimally reciprocating to forestall a collapse in relations. The December 15 tariff hike will be delayed and, if a ceasefire fails to improve the economic outlook, we expect Trump to engage in some tariff rollback on the pretext that talks are “making progress.” However, we do not expect a bilateral trade agreement or total tariff rollback. And other factors (like political risks in Greater China) could still derail the process. The outstanding geopolitical risks still warrant caution on global equities in the near term. These risks include a collapse in the U.S.-China talks (e.g. due to Hong Kong, Taiwan, or the tech race), and the ascent of Elizabeth Warren as the front runner in the Democratic Party’s early primary election. There is also the risk of another oil price shock emanating from the Middle East, which we discuss in this report. The Aftermath Of Abqaiq It has been a geopolitically eventful summer in the Middle East (Diagram 1). While there were plenty of warning shots, the September 14 drone and missile strikes on Saudi Aramco infrastructure was the big bang – wiping out 5.7 mm b/d of crude oil supplies overnight (Chart 2). The attacks were significant not only in terms of their impact on global oil markets, but also because they exposed the U.S.’s and Saudi Arabia’s reluctance to engage in a full-scale military confrontation with Iran. It is too early to call peak tensions in the Persian Gulf. Diagram 1Timeline: Summer Fireworks In The Persian Gulf Around The Middle East Around The Middle East Chart 2Closing Hormuz Would Be The Biggest Oil Shock Ever Around The Middle East Around The Middle East It is too early to call peak tensions in the Persian Gulf. The October 11 strike on an Iranian-owned oil tanker in the Red Sea and the reported U.S. cyber-attacks against Iranian news outlets may well mark the “limited retaliation” that we expected. Nevertheless, last month’s events uncovered vulnerabilities that suggest that even if the U.S. and its Gulf allies back off, geopolitical risk will remain elevated. Chart 3Saudis Are Profligate Defense Spenders Around The Middle East Around The Middle East The most obvious outcome of the September 14 attack is the realization of just how vulnerable Saudi Arabia is to attacks by its regional enemies. Despite being the third most profligate defense spender in the world – and the first relative to GDP (Chart 3) – Saudi Arabia was unable to protect its critical infrastructure. For that, Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman (MBS) will surely face domestic pressure. After five years, Saudi Arabia has little to show from its war in Yemen, other than a humanitarian crisis that has hurt its international standing. Instead, the operation has been a burden on the kingdom’s finances and a nuisance to security in the southwestern provinces of Najran, Jizan and Asir, where the Iran-allied Houthis have conducted regular attacks on oil infrastructure and airports. Some domestic disquiet will be defused if the Yemen war is downgraded or resolved. Saudi Arabia recently accepted the olive branch extended by the Houthis and is reportedly in talks to deescalate. But this will not fully eliminate domestic uncertainty. After all, MBS’s other initiatives – in Syria, in Iraq, in lobbying the U.S. – are also in jeopardy. The conspiracy theory surrounding the September 29 murder of General Abdulaziz al-Faghem, King Salman’s longstanding personal bodyguard, is case in point. Rumor has it that the king was enraged upon hearing of the Houthi movement’s September 28 capture of three Saudi military brigades, and decided to revoke the Crown Prince’s title, instead appointing the youngest Sudairi brother, Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz, in his place.1 The ploy was allegedly uncovered, resulting in General al-Faghem’s murder.2 This is entirely speculation and we find the idea of MBS’s removal to be highly doubtful. The King’s and Crown Prince’s joint appearance during President Vladimir Putin’s visit to the kingdom earlier this week should dispel speculation about a brewing palace coup. Nevertheless, the murder itself is extremely concerning and reinforces independent reasons for concerns about internal stability. Chart 4Impatient Diversification Threatens Domestic Stability Impatient Diversification Threatens Domestic Stability Impatient Diversification Threatens Domestic Stability The pursuit of the Saudi reform agenda, “Vision 2030,” is premised first and foremost on the consolidation of power in the hands of MBS and his faction. The appointment of King Salman’s son, Prince Abdulaziz, as energy minister was motivated by a desire to expedite the initial public offering of state oil giant Saudi Aramco, which could begin as early as November. This was preceded by the appointment of Yasir Al-Rumayyan, head of the sovereign wealth fund and a close ally of MBS, as chairman of Aramco. Moreover, wealthy Saudis – some of whom were detained at the Ritz Carlton in November 2017 – are reportedly being strong-armed into buying stakes in the pending IPO. While weaning Saudi Arabia’s economy off of crude oil is the best course of action for long-term stability (Chart 4), the transition will threaten domestic stability. Meanwhile the conflict with Iran is far from settled. Bottom Line: The September 14 drone strikes on key Saudi oil infrastructure revealed both Saudi Arabia’s and the U.S.’s unwillingness to engage in military action against and a full confrontation with Iran. This will raise concerns regarding the kingdom’s ability to defend itself. Moreover, Saudi Arabia remains vulnerable to domestic pressure as MBS strives to maintain his consolidation of power in recent years and pursues Vision 2030. Internal or external instability in Saudi Arabia poses a risk to global oil supply. Iran’s Resistance Economy Can Handle Trump’s Maximum Pressure Chart 5Iran's Economy Is Feeling The Bite Iran's Economy Is Feeling The Bite Iran's Economy Is Feeling The Bite On the other side of the Persian Gulf, the Iranians are displaying a higher pain threshold than their enemies. The economy is suffering under the U.S.’s crippling sanctions, with exports at the lowest level since 2003 (Chart 5). The IMF expects Iran’s economy to contract by 9.5% this year, with annual inflation forecast at 35.7%. Oil exports, the lifeblood of its economy, are down 89% YoY. Nevertheless, Iran is well-versed in the game of chicken, it is methodically displaying its ability to create havoc across the region, and it has not waivered in its stance that President Trump must ease sanctions and rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal if it is to engage in bilateral talks. All the while, Iran continues to reduce its nuclear commitments. On September 5, Rouhani indicated plans to completely abandon research and development commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and to begin working on more advanced uranium enrichment centrifuges which was capped at 3.7% under the JCPOA (Table 1). We also expect Iran to follow-through on its threat of withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) if Trump maintains sanctions. Table 1Iran Is Walking Away From 2015 Nuclear Deal Around The Middle East Around The Middle East The same resolve cannot be shown on the part of the United States or Saudi Arabia. Chart 6Americans Do Not Support War With Iran Around The Middle East Around The Middle East President Trump is constrained by the risk of an Iran-induced oil price shock ahead of the 2020 election. He is therefore eager to deescalate tensions with Iran. He is abandoning the field in Syria (on which more below), opting to add a symbolic 1,800 troops into Saudi Arabia for deterrent effect instead. This defensive posture is being undertaken within the context of American public opinion, which opposes war with Iran or additional military adventures in the Middle East (Chart 6). This signifies the U.S.’s strategic deleveraging from the Middle East in order to shift its focus to Asia Pacific, where America has a greater priority in managing the rise of China. At the same time, negotiations between the Saudis and Yemeni Houthis suggest a lack of Saudi appetite for all-out conflict with Iran, clearing the way for a diplomatic solution. As Rouhani stated “ending the war in Yemen will pave the ground for de-escalation in the region,” specifically between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Saudis have amply signaled in the wake of the Abqaiq attack that they wish to avoid a direct confrontation, particularly given the Trump administration’s apparent unwillingness (under electoral constraint) to continue providing a “blank check” for MBS to conduct an aggressive foreign policy. Already the United Arab Emirates – a key player in the Saudi-led coalition against Yemen – has distanced itself from Riyadh and sought to ease tensions with Iran. It recently reduced its commitment to the Yemen war and engaged in high-level meetings with Iran. The UAE’s national security adviser, Tahnoun bin Zayed, visited Tehran on a secret mission, the latest in a series of backchannel efforts to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Other reported efforts at diplomacy include visits by Iraqi and Pakistani officials. The remaining uncertainty is whether Trump will quietly ease sanctions on Iran, and whether Iran will quit while it is ahead. If Trump maintains maximum pressure, Iran may need to stage further attacks and oil disruptions to threaten Trump’s economy and encourage sanction relief. Otherwise, Iran, smelling American and Saudi fear, could overstep its bounds and commit a provocation that requires a larger American response, thus re-escalating tensions. While Trump’s economic and electoral constraint suggests that he will ease sanctions underhandedly, Iran’s risk appetite is apparently very high: Abqaiq could have gone terribly wrong. It also has an opportunity to flex its muscles and demonstrate American inconstancy to the region. This could lead to miscalculation and a more significant oil price shock than already seen. Bottom Line: Iran has remained steadfast in its position while the United States, Saudi Arabia, and their allies appear to be capitulating. They have more to lose than gain from all-out conflict. But Iran’s decision-making is opaque and any American persistence with maximum pressure sanctions will motivate additional provocations, escalation, and oil supply disruption. Making Russia Great Again? Recent events in Turkey and Syria do not come as a surprise. We have long highlighted a deeper Turkish intervention into Syria as a regional “black swan” event. In August we warned clients that the Trump-Erdogan personal relationship would not save Turkey from impending U.S. sanctions. In September we warned that Turkish geopolitical risk premia had collapsed, as measured by our market-based GeoRisk indicator, and that this collapse was certain to reverse in a major way, sending the lira falling. As we go to press the Turks have declared a ceasefire to avoid sanctions but nothing is certain. Putin has pounced on the opportunity to capitalize on the U.S. retreat. If Turkey is the loser, who is the winner? First, Trump, who benefits from fulfilling a campaign pledge to reduce U.S. involvement in foreign wars – a stance that will ultimately be rewarded (or at least not punished) by a war-weary public. Second, Iran and Russia, Syria’s major allies, who have invested greatly in maintaining the regime of Bashar al-Assad throughout the civil war and now face American withdrawal and heightened U.S. tensions with its allies and partners in the region as a result. Iran benefits through the ability to increase its strategic arc, the so-called “Shia Crescent,” to the Mediterranean Sea. Russia benefits through solidifying its reclaimed status as a major player in the Middle East – an indication of global multipolarity. President Vladimir Putin has pounced on the opportunity to capitalize on the U.S. retreat with official visits to both Saudi Arabia and the UAE this week. He made promises of both stronger economic ties and the ability to broker regional power. On the economic front, the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) selected Saudi Arabia as the venue for its first foreign office, signaling its interest in the region. It has already approved 25 joint projects with investment valued at more than $2.5 billion. There are also talks of RDIF-Aramco projects in the oil services sector worth over $1 billion and oil and gas conversion projects worth more than $2 billion. Moreover, RDIF signed multiple deals worth $1.4 billion with UAE partners. Chart 7Russia Has Been Complying With OPEC 2.0 Cuts Russia Has Been Complying With OPEC 2.0 Cuts Russia Has Been Complying With OPEC 2.0 Cuts Most importantly, the Saudis and Russians share the same objective of supporting global oil prices and have been jointly managing OPEC 2.0 supply since 2017 (Chart 7). Russia’s approach to the region focuses on enhancing its all-around strategic influence. Chart 8Erdogan Is Playing Into Turkish Concerns About Syrian Refugees Around The Middle East Around The Middle East Although Russia’s allies include Iran and Syria – Saudi Arabia’s rivals – it has presented itself as a pragmatic partner to other powers, including Turkey and even the Saudis and Gulf states. As such, the Kremlin has leverage on both sides of the regional divide, giving it the potential to serve as a power broker. However, any Saudi purchase of the Russian S-400 defense system, long under negotiation, would unsettle the United States. Turkey is threatened with American sanctions for its purchase of the same system.3 The U.S. may be willing to tolerate some increased Russian influence in the Middle East, but a defense agreement may be its red line. The Trump administration still wields the stick of economic sanctions. Growing Russian influence extends beyond the Gulf states. The U.S.’s withdrawal from northeast Syria last week and the Turkish invasion is a gift to the Russians. They are now the only major power from outside the Middle East engaged in Syria. They have embraced this position, positioning themselves as peace brokers between the Syrian regime, with whom they are allied, and Turkey, as well as the Turkish arch-enemy, the Kurds, who now lack American support and must turn to Syria and Russia for some kind of arrangement to protect themselves. Russia has therefore cemented its return as a strategic player in the region, after its initial intervention in Syria in 2015. Turkey’s incursion into Syria is an attempt by President Erdogan to confront the battle-hardened Syrian Kurds and prevent a Kurdish-controlled continuous border with Syria, and to distract from his weakened domestic position. He is striving to garner support by playing to broad Turkish concerns about Syrian refugees in Turkey (Chart 8). The intervention will seek to create a space for refugees to be placed on the Syrian side of the border. However given that there is little domestic popular support for a military intervention, he runs the risk of further alienating voters, who are already losing patience with his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). So far, the incursion has the official support of all Turkey’s political parties except the Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). However this will change as the intervention entails western economic sanctions, a drawn-out military conflict, and limited concrete benefits other than the removal of refugees. Chart 9Turkey's Already Vulnerable Economy Will Take A Hit Turkey's Already Vulnerable Economy Will Take A Hit Turkey's Already Vulnerable Economy Will Take A Hit The already vulnerable economy is likely to take a hit (Chart 9). Markets have reacted to the penalties imposed by the U.S. so far with a sigh of relief as they are not as damaging as they could have been – i.e. Turkish banks were spared.4 However, this is just the opening salvo and more sanctions are on the way – Congress is moving to impose sanctions of its own, which Trump is unlikely to veto. Moreover, the European Union is following suit and imposing sanctions of its own, including on military equipment. Volkswagen already announced it is postponing a final decision on whether to build a $1.1 billion plant in Turkey. This comes at a time of already existing sensitivities with the EU over Turkish oil and gas drilling activities in waters off Cyprus. EU foreign ministers are responding by drawing up a list of economic sanctions. These economic risks will likely hold back the central bank’s rate cutting cycle as the lira and financial assets will take a hit. Bottom Line: The U.S. pivot away from the Middle East is a boon for Moscow, which is pursuing increased cooperation in the Gulf and gaining influence in Syria. Russia is marketing itself as a strategic player and effective power broker. Erdogan’s incursion in Syria, while motivated by domestic weakness, will backfire on the Turkish economy. Maintain a cautious stance on Turkish currency and risk assets. Iraq Is The Fulcrum Iraq’s geographic position, wedged between Saudi Arabia and Iran, renders it the epicenter of the regional power struggle. In the wake of the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign on Iran we have frequently highlighted that a dramatic means of Iranian pushback, short of closing shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, is fomenting unrest in an already unstable Iraq. This would be a threat to U.S. strategy as well as to global oil supplies. Iraq is the epicenter of the regional power struggle. In this context, Iraq’s revered Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s visit to Iran on September 10, just four days ahead of the September Saudi Aramco attack, raises eyebrows. Sadr is the key player in Iraq today and over the past two years he had staked out a position of national independence for Iraq, eschewing overreliance on Iran. A rapprochement between Sadr and Iran is a negative domestic development for Iraq, which has recently been making strides to reduce Iran’s political and military grip. It would undermine Iraqi stability by increasing divisions over ideology, sect, economic patronage, and national security. There is speculation that Sadr’s trip was intended to discuss Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi, who is perceived as weak and incapable of managing the various powers on Iraq’s political scene. The violent protests rocking Iraq since early September support this assessment. Protestors are motivated by discontent over unemployment, poor services, and government corruption, which are perceived to have mostly deteriorated since the start of Abdul Mahdi’s term (Chart 10). While Abdul Mahdi has announced some reforms in response to the popular discontent, including a cabinet reshuffle and promises of handouts for the poor, they have done little to quell the protests. The popular demands are only one of the existential threats facing the government. The second and potentially more serious risk is the security threat. Iraq has been failing at its attempts to formally integrate the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) – Iran-backed paramilitary groups that were instrumental in ISIS’s defeat – into the national security forces. This is essential in order to prevent Iran from maintaining direct control of security forces within Iraq. A majority of the public agrees that the PMU should not play a role in politics (Chart 11), reflecting the underlying trend demanding Iraqi autonomy from Iran. Chart 10Rising Discontent In Iraq Around The Middle East Around The Middle East Chart 11Little Support For A Political Role For The PMU Around The Middle East Around The Middle East Given that the PMU is in effect an umbrella term for ~50 predominantly Shia paramilitary groups, internal divisions exist within the forces which compete for power, legitimacy, and resources. Recently, it has been purging group leaders perceived as a threat to the overall forces and the senior leadership which maintain strong links to Iran. Chart 12Iraq Is Divided Across Political Affiliation Around The Middle East Around The Middle East This internal struggle also reflects the intra-Shia struggle for power among Iraq’s main political parties. On the one side there is the conservative, pro-Khamenei bloc led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and PMU commander Hadi al-Ameri, and on the other is the reformist, nationalist leader Muqtada al-Sadr’s joined by Ammar al-Hakim. Given that most Iraqis view their country as a divided nation across political affiliation, this is a risk to domestic stability (Chart 12). Thus even if the wider risk of regional tensions abates and reduces the threat of sabotage to oil infrastructure and transportation, the current domestic situation in Iraq remains uneasy. But given that we do not see the regional tensions abating yet – due to either American maximum pressure or Iranian hubris – this dynamic translates into an active threat to oil supplies, with 3.4 mm b/d of exports concentrated in the southern city of Basra. Bottom Line: Heightened domestic instability in Iraq poses a non-negligible threat to oil supplies. This risk is compounded by Iraq’s location as a geographic buffer between regional rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia, and Iran’s interest in fomenting unrest to pressure the U.S. into relaxing sanctions. Investment Conclusions The common thread across the Middle East is a persistent threat to global oil supply in the wake of the extraordinary Abqaiq attack. First, it cannot be stated with confidence that Iran will refrain from causing additional oil disruptions, as it is convinced that President Trump’s appetite for conflict is small (and Trump is indeed constrained by fear of an oil shock). President Rouhani has an interest in removing Trump from power, which an oil shock might achieve, and the Supreme Leader may even be willing to risk a conflict with the United States as a means of increasing support for the regime and infusing a new generation with revolutionary spirit. Iran loses in a total war, but Tehran is convinced that the U.S. does not have the will to engage in total war. Second, Russia’s interest in the region is not in generating a durable peace but in filling the vacuum left by the United States and making itself a power broker. Any instability simply increases oil prices which is positive for Russia. Third, Iraq’s instability is both domestically and internationally driven. It is nearly impossible to differentiate between the two. Iranian hubris could manifest in sabotage in Iraq. Or Iraq could destabilize under the regional pressures with minimal Iranian encouragement. Either way the world’s current below-average spare oil production capacity could be hit sooner than expected if shortages result. Go long spot crude oil. On equities, with a U.S.-China ceasefire in the works, and little chance of a no-deal Brexit, we see our cyclically positive outlook reinforced, though we maintain near-term caution due to U.S. domestic politics. In terms of equity focus, we are overweight European equities in developed markets and Southeast Asian equities in emerging markets.   Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The Sudairi branch of the al-Saud family is made up of the seven sons of the late King Abdulaziz and Hussa al-Sudairi of the powerful Najd tribe. 2 Please see TRT World “Killing of Saudi King’s Personal Bodyguard Triggers Speculation,” October 2, 2019, available at https://www.trtworld.com. 3 In the wake of the attack on Saudi Aramco oil facilities, President Putin trolled the U.S. by recommending that Saudi Arabia follow the footsteps of Iran and Turkey in purchasing Russia’s S-300 or S-400 air defense systems. 4 The U.S. penalties include sanctions against current and former officials of the Turkish government, a hike in tariffs on imports of Turkish steel back up to 50 percent, and the halt in negotiations on a $100 billion trade deal.