Gov Sovereigns/Treasurys

Executive Summary Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates The neutral interest rate in Australia is lower than in past cycles, for several reasons: low potential growth, weak productivity, high household debt and inflated housing valuations. Interest rate markets are discounting a very aggressive monetary tightening cycle in Australia, with the RBA Cash Rate expected to reach 2.6% by end-2022 and 3.1% by end-2023. Australian inflation will peak in H2/2022, and the RBA will not need to raise rates beyond the midpoint of the RBA's estimated neutral range of 2-3%. The Australian dollar has not responded to rising interest rate expectations or high commodity prices, largely due to weak Chinese growth. The Aussie is cheap and has upside if China delivers more economic stimulus. The newly-elected Labor-led government will not be able to pursue its ambitious social and environmental agenda without finding more revenue to offset the inflationary impact of larger budget deficits. Expect modest fiscal stimulus, with increased spending, but also minor tax hikes for multinational corporations and high-income earners. Bottom Line: For global bond investors, an overweight allocation to Australian government bonds is warranted with the RBA likely to disappoint aggressive market rate hike expectations. For currency investors, the undervalued Australian dollar is an attractive play on an eventual rebound of Chinese growth. Feature The month of May has been eventful for investors in Australia. The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) delivered its first interest rate hike since 2010 on May 3, a move that markets had expected but which was much earlier than the RBA’s prior forward guidance. The May 21 federal election returned the Labor party to power for the first time since 2013. These events introduce new risks for the Australian economy and financial markets, altering a policy backdrop that had been highly stimulative - and, more importantly, highly predictable - during the pandemic but must now change in response to the new reality of high inflation. In this Special Report, jointly published by BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy, Foreign Exchange Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy, we discuss the investment implications of the start of the monetary tightening cycle and the new government in Australia. Our main conclusions: markets are somehow pricing in both too many RBA rate hikes and not enough currency upside for the Australian dollar, while expectations for major fiscal policy changes should be tempered. Will The RBA Kill The Economic Recovery? Australian government bonds have been one of the worst performers in the developed world so far in 2022 (Chart 1), delivering a total return of -9.1% in AUD terms, and -9% in USD-hedged terms, according to Bloomberg. The benchmark 10-year yield now sits at 3.20%, up +142bps since the start of the year but off the 8-year intraday high of 3.6% reached in early May. Australia has historically been a “high-beta” bond market that sees yields rise more when global bond yields are rising. That is a legacy of the days when the RBA had to push policy rates to levels that exceeded other major central banks like the Fed during global tightening cycles. But by the RBA’s own admission, the neutral policy interest rate is now lower than in previous years, perhaps no more than 0% in real terms according to RBA Governor Philip Lowe. Our RBA Monitor, which consists of economic and financial variables that typically correlate to pressure on the RBA to tighten or ease policy, has been signaling since mid-2021 that higher interest rates were increasingly likely (Chart 2). However, markets have moved to price in a very rapid and aggressive tightening, with a whopping 268bps of rate hikes discounted over the next year in the Australian overnight index swap (OIS) curve. Chart 1Australian Bond Yields Have Surged Vs Global Peers Australian Bond Yields Have Surged Vs Global Peers Australian Bond Yields Have Surged Vs Global Peers ​​​​​ Chart 2Markets Expect Very Aggressive RBA Tightening Markets Expect Very Aggressive RBA Tightening Markets Expect Very Aggressive RBA Tightening ​​​​​​ The growth component of the RBA Monitor will likely soon ease up with the OECD leading economic indicator for Australia in a clear downtrend (bottom panel). However, the inflation component of the RBA Monitor will stay elevated for longer given current high inflation - headline CPI inflation in Australia hit a 20-year high of 5.1% in Q1/2022 - and the tight Australian labor market. Even with those robust inflation pressures, markets are pricing in a peak level of interest rates that appears far more restrictive than the RBA is willing, and likely able, to deliver. We see three primary reasons for this. Weak Potential Growth Implies A Lower Neutral Rate The OIS curve is priced for the RBA Cash Rate staying between 3-4% over the next decade (Chart 3). The real policy rate (adjusted by CPI swap forwards as the proxy for inflation expectations), is expected to average around 1% over that same period. Those are the highest “terminal rate” estimates among the G10 economies. At the press conference following the May 3 rate hike, RBA Governor Lowe noted that “it’s not unreasonable to expect that the normalization of interest rates over the period ahead could see interest rates rise to 2.5%”. Lowe said that was the midpoint of the RBA’s 2-3% inflation target, thus the expected normalization of policy rates would take the inflation-adjusted real rate to 0%. That is a far cry from the more aggressive increase in real rates discounted in the Australian OIS and CPI swap curves. Lowe also noted that a real rate above 0% “over time […] would require stronger productivity growth in Australia.” On that front, the data is not suggesting that the RBA will need to reconsider its views on the neutral real interest rate anytime soon. The 5-year annualized growth rate of labor productivity is an anemic -0.8%, down from the mid-2010s peak of around 1.5% and far below the late-1990s peak of around 2.5% (Chart 4). Chart 3Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates ​​​​​ Chart 4A Powerful Structural Reason For A Lower Australian Neutral Rate A Powerful Structural Reason For A Lower Australian Neutral Rate A Powerful Structural Reason For A Lower Australian Neutral Rate ​​​​​ Chart 5The Australian Housing Cycle Is Peaking The Australian Housing Cycle Is Peaking The Australian Housing Cycle Is Peaking Assuming a pre-pandemic growth rate of the working age population of between 1-1.5%, and productivity around 0.5%, Australia’s potential GDP growth rate is, at best, around 2% (middle panel) and is likely even lower than that. The working-age population growth rate fell to 0% during the pandemic due to migration restrictions that have yet to be lifted. However, population growth had already been slowing pre-COVID due to falling birth rates and reduced worker visa caps in 2018-19. High Household Debt Raises Interest Rate Sensitivity Of Consumer Demand Sluggish trend growth is not the only reason why Australia’s neutral interest rate is lower than markets are discounting. Given elevated housing valuations and aggressive lending practices, highly indebted Australian households are now more sensitive to rate increases than in years past. Australian mortgage lenders began aggressively issuing shorter-term (typically 3-year) fixed rate mortgages in 2020 after the collapse in bond yields due to the initial COVID shock, to entice borrowers to lock in low interest rates. This raised the share of new fixed rate mortgages from a historic average around 15% of all new mortgages to nearly 50%. Since the RBA ended its yield curve control policy last November, which targeted 3-year bond yields, 3-year fixed mortgage rates have surged from 2.93% to 4.34%. That already has had an impact on housing demand - home price growth has peaked in the major cities according to CoreLogic, while building approvals are contracting on a year-over-year basis (Chart 5). As the surge of fixed rate mortgage loans begin to mature in 2023, Australian homeowners will see a major spike in refinancing costs, both for fixed rate and variable rate lending. This trend should weaken home demand, and house price inflation, even further. Inflation Will Soon Peak The RBA expects softer house price inflation to help slow overall Australian inflation rates. The central bank is projecting headline CPI inflation to fall from the latest 5.1% to 4.3% by June 2023 and 2.9% by June 2024 (Chart 6). That would still be a level near the top of the RBA target band, but the downtrend could be even faster than that. As in many other countries, the latest surge in Australian inflation has been led by a rapid increase in goods prices related to severe demand/supply mismatches at a time of global supply chain bottlenecks. Australian goods inflation hit an 31-year high of 6.6% in Q1/2022, essentially matching the housing component of the CPI index (Chart 7). Yet with US goods inflation having already peaked, as have global shipping costs, it is likely that Australia goods inflation will soon follow suit. This will lower headline Australian inflation to levels more consistent with services inflation, which reached 3% in Q1/2022. Chart 6The RBA Sees Persistent Above-Target Inflation The RBA Sees Persistent Above-Target Inflation The RBA Sees Persistent Above-Target Inflation That floor in more domestically-driven services inflation will also be influenced by the pace of wage growth in Australia. The latest reading on the best wage indicator Down Under, the Wage Price Index, showed that year-over-year wage growth only reached 2.4% in Q1/2022. Chart 7Australia Goods Inflation Should Soon Peak Australia Goods Inflation Should Soon Peak Australia Goods Inflation Should Soon Peak ​​​​​ This is a surprisingly low outcome given the tightness of the Australian labor market with the unemployment rate at an all-time low of 3.9% (Chart 8). Depressed labor supply is not a factor keeping the unemployment rate low, as the labor force participation rate and hours worked are both above pre-pandemic levels. Prior to the rate hike at the May 3 policy meeting, the RBA had been highlighting soft wage growth as a reason to delay the start of the monetary tightening cycle. After the May meeting, RBA Governor Lowe noted that according to the RBA’s “liaison” surveys of Australian businesses, nearly 40% of respondents said they were giving wage increases above 3%. The RBA believes that wage growth in the 3-4% range is consistent with Australian inflation remaining within the RBA’s 2-3% target band, a condition that was deemed necessary before rate hikes could begin. The message from the RBA liaison surveys was enough to trigger the start of the tightening cycle. While the Australia OIS curve is priced for an aggressive series of rate hikes, and shorter-term interest rate expectations are elevated, there is less inflationary concern priced into medium-term inflation expectations. The 5-year/5-year forward Australia CPI swap is at 2.2%, down -15bps since the start of 2022 and barely within the RBA target band. Some of that is a global factor – the 5-year/5-year forward US TIPS breakeven has declined by -44bps over just the past month. However, the Australia 5-year/5-year forward CPI swap peaked at the start of the year, just as Australian interest rate expectations began to ratchet higher (the 2-year Australia government bond yield was 0.35% at the start of 2022 and now sits at 2.61%). An increasing amount of discounted rate hikes, occurring alongside falling inflation expectations, is a sign that markets are incrementally pricing in a restrictive monetary policy. We agree with RBA Governor Lowe’s assessment that the neutral nominal Cash Rate is, at best, 2.5%. Thus, the current discounted peak in the Cash Rate of 3.2% would be restrictive. Very strong consumer spending growth at a time when inflation was already high could be a sign that a restrictive monetary stance is now necessary. However, the outlook for Australian consumption is not without risks. Consumer confidence has plunged alongside declining purchasing power, as wage growth has lagged the inflation upturn (Chart 9). While the expectation is that inflation will peak and wage growth will pick up over the latter half of 2022, it is still uncertain if the relative moves will be large enough to give a meaningful lift to real wage growth and consumer spending power. Chart 8Medium-Term Inflation Expectations Falling, Despite Low Unemployment Medium-Term Inflation Expectations Falling, Despite Low Unemployment Medium-Term Inflation Expectations Falling, Despite Low Unemployment ​​​​​​ Chart 9Headwinds For The Australian Consumer Headwinds For The Australian Consumer Headwinds For The Australian Consumer ​​​​​​ The RBA believes that consumer spending will be supported by the high level of savings, with the household saving rate currently at 13.6%. Yet the high level of household debt means that debt service burdens will rise as interest rates move higher, which may limit the degree to which Australian consumers run down savings to fuel greater consumer spending. Another reason why a more restrictive monetary policy could be needed is if there was a substantial loosening of fiscal policy that was fueling faster growth, especially at a time when inflation was already overshooting. This makes an analysis of the latest election results highly relevant to the path of Australian interest rates. Bottom Line: Markets are pricing in a shift to a restrictive level of interest rates in Australia, an outcome that is not necessary with inflation set to peak at a time of high household leverage. Labor Party Takes Power With Limited Political Capital Australia’s federal election on May 21 brought a Labor Party government into power, headed by new Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. National policy is unlikely to change substantially. Australia has low political risk but high geopolitical risk – meaning that domestic politics are manageable for investors but China’s conflict with the West and other geopolitical events are revolutionizing Australia’s place in the world. The previous Liberal-National Coalition government had been in power since 2013, had never found a stable leader, and had been buffeted by a series of external shocks: a commodity bust, China trade conflict, the COVID-19 pandemic, and inflation. Hence it is no surprise that Labor came back to power – it almost did so in 2019. However, Labor’s popularity is questionable. The new government does not have a robust political mandate: Labor will fall short of a single-party majority (or will have a very thin majority at best): As we go to press, Labor won 74 seats out of 151 in the House of Representatives. A party needs 76 seats for a majority. Labor will likely rely on three Green Party seats and some of the 10 independents to pass legislation. These minor parties will have considerable influence. Labor’s popular vote share is underwhelming: Labor won 32.8% of the popular vote, down from 33.3% in 2019, and beneath the 36% of the vote won by the outgoing Liberal-National Coalition (Table 1). The Green Party rose to 12% of the vote. While this only translates to three seats in parliament, the Greens will hold the balance of power. Table 1Australian Federal Election Results, 2022 The New Normal In Australia The New Normal In Australia Labor does not control the Senate: A bill requires a majority vote in both the House and Senate for passage. A majority requires 38 seats, but Labor and the Greens are currently slated to fall short at 36 seats. Hence, as in the House, the Labor Party will rely on “cross-bench” votes from minor parties to get a majority for bills. Labor won through pragmatism and moderation: Having suffered a surprise defeat in 2019, the Labor Party adopted a more moderate and pragmatic tone in the current election. Prime Minister Albanese campaigned on a motto of “safe change,” declared that he was “not woke,” and adopted a relatively hawkish tilt on trade and foreign policy (China relations) and immigration (“boat people”). Labor has limited room for maneuver in international relations: China’s economy is slowing down and stimulus does not work as well as it used to. China’s political system is reverting to autocracy and the Xi Jinping administration is attempting to carve a sphere of influence in the region, increasing long-term security threats to Australia in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. China has declared a “no limits” strategic partnership with a belligerent Russia, leaving the US no option but to pursue containment strategy against both powers. Prime Minister Albanese has already met with President Biden and the Quadrilateral Dialogue to emphasize Australia’s need to counter China’s newly assertive foreign policy. While Albanese may attempt to reduce trade tensions with China, any such moves will be heavily constrained. Inflation, not climate change, brought Labor to power: The media is hailing the election as a historic shift on the question of climate change and climate policy. But popular opinion has not changed much on this topic in recent years and the election results only partially support the thesis. A better explanation is that the pandemic and its inflationary aftermath galvanized opposition to the ruling Liberal-National Coalition. Hence both fiscal policy and climate policy – the most important areas of change – will be constrained by inflation. Chart 10Australia Cannot Cut Defense Amid China Challenge The New Normal In Australia The New Normal In Australia There are two key policy takeaways from the above assessment: First, on fiscal policy, the new Labor-led government will face limitations due to inflation and the macroeconomic cycle. It will likely respond to inflation – the crisis that got it elected – even though China’s slowdown will produce negative surprises for global and Australian growth. The government will not be able to cut defense spending given the geopolitical setting (Chart 10). That means it will also not be able to pursue its ambitious social and environmental agenda without finding more revenue to offset the inflationary impact of larger budget deficits. Tax hikes are coming for multinational corporations and high-income earners. In terms of the size of the fiscal impact, the Labor Party promised spending increases worth AUD$18.9 billion (1.0% of GDP), to be offset by tax hikes amounting to AUD$11.5 billion in new revenue (0.6% of GDP). The result would be an AUD$7.5 billion increase in the budget deficit (0.4% of GDP) – a net fiscal stimulus (Chart 11). Currently the IMF projects a 1.84% fiscal drag in the cyclically adjusted budget deficit for 2023, so Labor’s plans would reduce that drag by 0.4%. However, the fiscal plans will change once the new Treasurer James Chalmers produces a new budget proposal in October. Comparison with a like-minded economy is therefore useful to put the policy change into perspective. Canada’s politics shifted from center-right to center-left in 2015 and the left-leaning government at that time put forward an agenda similar to Australia’s Labor Party today. Ultimately the budget balance declined from 0.17% to -0.45% of GDP from peak to trough (Chart 12). This 0.62% of GDP stimulus provides a point of comparison. Yet inflation was not a constraint on government spending at that time. The new Australian government may not exceed that size of stimulus in an inflationary context. But it could easily surpass it if the global economy falls back into recession. Chart 11Australian Labor’s Proposed Fiscal Stimulus The New Normal In Australia The New Normal In Australia ​​​​​​ Chart 12Canada Offers Clue To Size Of Australian Stimulus The New Normal In Australia The New Normal In Australia ​​​​​​ Second, on climate policy, the new ruling coalition probably will pass major climate legislation, given the importance of Greens and left-leaning independents. But Labor will have to constrain the smaller parties’ climate ambitions to preserve popular support in areas where fossil fuel industries remain strong. Australia consumes substantially more carbon per capita than other developed economies and will continue to rely on fossil fuel exports for growth. In other words, climate policy will bring incremental rather than radical change. Bottom Line: If a global recession is avoided, then the new government’s counter-cyclical fiscal policies may work. If not, they will produce a double whammy for the Australian economy: new corporate and resource taxes on top of a slowdown in exports. The AUD As A Shock Absorber Despite a higher repricing of the interest rate curve in Australia, and elevated commodity prices, the Australian dollar (AUD) has been very soft. Part of the story is broad-based US dollar strength that has sapped any potential rebound in the AUD. More specifically, a survey of the key drivers of the AUD unveils the main source of currency weakness, by process of elimination: The divergence in monetary policy between the RBA and the Fed? No. Clearly, that has not been a driver this time around as the RBA is expected to lift rates to 3.2% over the next 12 months, in line with market pricing for rate hikes from the Federal Reserve. The commodity cycle? No. Commodity prices are softening, after being in a supply-driven bull market. As a premier resource producer, the Australian economy is intricately intertwined with the outlook for coal, iron ore, copper and even liquefied natural gas prices. As Chart 13 highlights, the AUD has massively deviated from the level implied by rising terms of trade for Australia. This is a departure from a historical correlation that has been in place since the end of the Bretton Woods system. Resource booms tend to be either demand or supply driven, or a combination of both. This time around supply restrictions have played a major role. The message from the AUD is that it responds much better to improving demand conditions. Global and relative growth dynamics? YES: The overarching driver of a weak AUD as hinted above has been slowing Chinese demand. The Zero COVID-19 policy in China has led to a drastic reduction in import volumes. This is hurting Australia’s external balance at the margin, as Chinese import volumes contract (Chart 14). Chart 13The AUD Has Lagged Terms Of Trade The AUD Has Lagged Terms Of Trade The AUD Has Lagged Terms Of Trade ​​​​​ Chart 14The AUD Is Very Sensitive To China The AUD Is Very Sensitive To China The AUD Is Very Sensitive To China There are two key takeaways from the above analysis. First, the hawkish path for interest rates priced for the RBA is not yet reflected in a weak AUD. This implies that currency and bond markets are on a collision course. Either the RBA ratifies market pricing and triggers a coiled spring rebound in the AUD, or hawkish expectations will be tempered as inflationary pressures moderate. Second, the AUD will be very sensitive to any improvement in Chinese demand, the overarching driver of currency weakness. We expect the Chinese authorities to ramp up credit stimulus, to offset weakening demand from the Zero COVID-19 policy. The AUD has historically been very sensitive to changes in Chinese money and credit variables (Chart 15). From a fundamental perspective, a lot of pessimism is embedded in the Aussie dollar. Australian GDP has already recovered above pre-pandemic levels and could be on a path to achieve escape velocity if China recovers. Chinese fiscal and monetary policy should be eased going forward. Chinese bond yields have already dropped, reflecting an easing in domestic financial conditions. Meanwhile, Australia’s commodity exposure is well suited for a green energy shift. Besides being relatively competitive in supplying the types of raw materials that China needs and wants, (higher-grade ore, which is more expensive, but pollutes less, and is in high demand in China), Australia is a big exporter of liquefied natural gas, whose prices have been soaring in recent months and is critical in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and green energy shift (Chart 16). This will provide a multi-year tailwind for Australian export volumes and terms of trade. Chart 15The Chinese Economy Could Be Bottoming The Chinese Economy Could Be Bottoming The Chinese Economy Could Be Bottoming ​​​​​ Chart 16Australia Is Resource Superstar Australia Is Resource Superstar Australia Is Resource Superstar ​​​​​ Bottom Line: BCA Research Foreign Exchange Strategy went long AUD at 72 cents. In the near term, this position could prove quite volatile as markets try to discern a clear path for global growth. But given cheap valuations and beaten down sentiment, it should prove profitable in the longer term. Investment Conclusions For Fixed Income Investors Chart 17Australian Government Bond Investment Recommendations Australian Government Bond Investment Recommendations Australian Government Bond Investment Recommendations Our careful analysis of Australian growth, inflation, the RBA’s likely next moves leads us to the following investment conclusions for Australian bonds (Chart 17): Maintain neutral duration exposure within dedicated Australian bond portfolios (for now): On a forward basis, the entire Australian yield curve is converging to that discounted 3.5% peak in the Cash Rate (top panel). Eventually, Australian bond yields will fall once inflation clearly peaks in H2/2022 and markets realize that the RBA will not be hiking as fast as expected, justifying an above-benchmark duration tilt. Until then, Australian bond yields will be rangebound, especially with the RBA no longer buying bonds via quantitative easing, leaving more bond issuance to be absorbed by private investors. Underweight Australian inflation-linked bonds versus nominal-paying government bonds: Inflation will soon peak, and the discounted RBA stance is too hawkish – a recipe for lower inflation breakevens. Overweight Australian government bonds within global bond portfolios: Australia has returned to its “high-yield-beta” status, which means that an overweight stance is warranted when global bond yields are stable or falling. BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy’s Global Duration Indicator, a growth-focused leading indicator of the momentum of global bond yields, is signalling a more stable backdrop for global yields over the rest of 2022. The Duration Indicator is also a fine leading indicator of the relative return performance of Australian government bonds (middle panel) and is supportive of an overweight stance on Australian debt. Go Long December 2022 Australia Bank Bill futures: This is a tactical trade (i.e. investment horizon of no more than six months), based on the extreme pricing of rate hikes by year-end. The market price of the December 2022 futures contract is currently 97.11, or an implied interest rate of 2.89% compared to the current RBA Cash Rate of 0.35%. That contract is priced for far too many rate hikes than will be delivered over the remaining seven RBA meetings of 2022.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Chester Ntonifor Chief Foreign Exchange Strategist ChesterN@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com

Executive Summary Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates The neutral interest rate in Australia is lower than in past cycles, for several reasons: low potential growth, weak productivity, high household debt and inflated housing valuations. Interest rate markets are discounting a very aggressive monetary tightening cycle in Australia, with the RBA Cash Rate expected to reach 2.6% by end-2022 and 3.1% by end-2023. Australian inflation will peak in H2/2022, and the RBA will not need to raise rates beyond the midpoint of the RBA's estimated neutral range of 2-3%. The Australian dollar has not responded to rising interest rate expectations or high commodity prices, largely due to weak Chinese growth. The Aussie is cheap and has upside if China delivers more economic stimulus. The newly-elected Labor-led government will not be able to pursue its ambitious social and environmental agenda without finding more revenue to offset the inflationary impact of larger budget deficits. Expect modest fiscal stimulus, with increased spending, but also minor tax hikes for multinational corporations and high-income earners. Bottom Line: For global bond investors, an overweight allocation to Australian government bonds is warranted with the RBA likely to disappoint aggressive market rate hike expectations. For currency investors, the undervalued Australian dollar is an attractive play on an eventual rebound of Chinese growth. Feature The month of May has been eventful for investors in Australia. The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) delivered its first interest rate hike since 2010 on May 3, a move that markets had expected but which was much earlier than the RBA’s prior forward guidance. The May 21 federal election returned the Labor party to power for the first time since 2013. These events introduce new risks for the Australian economy and financial markets, altering a policy backdrop that had been highly stimulative - and, more importantly, highly predictable - during the pandemic but must now change in response to the new reality of high inflation. In this Special Report, jointly published by BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy, Foreign Exchange Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy, we discuss the investment implications of the start of the monetary tightening cycle and the new government in Australia. Our main conclusions: markets are somehow pricing in both too many RBA rate hikes and not enough currency upside for the Australian dollar, while expectations for major fiscal policy changes should be tempered. Will The RBA Kill The Economic Recovery? Australian government bonds have been one of the worst performers in the developed world so far in 2022 (Chart 1), delivering a total return of -9.1% in AUD terms, and -9% in USD-hedged terms, according to Bloomberg. The benchmark 10-year yield now sits at 3.20%, up +142bps since the start of the year but off the 8-year intraday high of 3.6% reached in early May. Australia has historically been a “high-beta” bond market that sees yields rise more when global bond yields are rising. That is a legacy of the days when the RBA had to push policy rates to levels that exceeded other major central banks like the Fed during global tightening cycles. But by the RBA’s own admission, the neutral policy interest rate is now lower than in previous years, perhaps no more than 0% in real terms according to RBA Governor Philip Lowe. Our RBA Monitor, which consists of economic and financial variables that typically correlate to pressure on the RBA to tighten or ease policy, has been signaling since mid-2021 that higher interest rates were increasingly likely (Chart 2). However, markets have moved to price in a very rapid and aggressive tightening, with a whopping 268bps of rate hikes discounted over the next year in the Australian overnight index swap (OIS) curve. Chart 1Australian Bond Yields Have Surged Vs Global Peers Australian Bond Yields Have Surged Vs Global Peers Australian Bond Yields Have Surged Vs Global Peers ​​​​​ Chart 2Markets Expect Very Aggressive RBA Tightening Markets Expect Very Aggressive RBA Tightening Markets Expect Very Aggressive RBA Tightening ​​​​​​ The growth component of the RBA Monitor will likely soon ease up with the OECD leading economic indicator for Australia in a clear downtrend (bottom panel). However, the inflation component of the RBA Monitor will stay elevated for longer given current high inflation - headline CPI inflation in Australia hit a 20-year high of 5.1% in Q1/2022 - and the tight Australian labor market. Even with those robust inflation pressures, markets are pricing in a peak level of interest rates that appears far more restrictive than the RBA is willing, and likely able, to deliver. We see three primary reasons for this. Weak Potential Growth Implies A Lower Neutral Rate The OIS curve is priced for the RBA Cash Rate staying between 3-4% over the next decade (Chart 3). The real policy rate (adjusted by CPI swap forwards as the proxy for inflation expectations), is expected to average around 1% over that same period. Those are the highest “terminal rate” estimates among the G10 economies. At the press conference following the May 3 rate hike, RBA Governor Lowe noted that “it’s not unreasonable to expect that the normalization of interest rates over the period ahead could see interest rates rise to 2.5%”. Lowe said that was the midpoint of the RBA’s 2-3% inflation target, thus the expected normalization of policy rates would take the inflation-adjusted real rate to 0%. That is a far cry from the more aggressive increase in real rates discounted in the Australian OIS and CPI swap curves. Lowe also noted that a real rate above 0% “over time […] would require stronger productivity growth in Australia.” On that front, the data is not suggesting that the RBA will need to reconsider its views on the neutral real interest rate anytime soon. The 5-year annualized growth rate of labor productivity is an anemic -0.8%, down from the mid-2010s peak of around 1.5% and far below the late-1990s peak of around 2.5% (Chart 4). Chart 3Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates ​​​​​ Chart 4A Powerful Structural Reason For A Lower Australian Neutral Rate A Powerful Structural Reason For A Lower Australian Neutral Rate A Powerful Structural Reason For A Lower Australian Neutral Rate ​​​​​ Chart 5The Australian Housing Cycle Is Peaking The Australian Housing Cycle Is Peaking The Australian Housing Cycle Is Peaking Assuming a pre-pandemic growth rate of the working age population of between 1-1.5%, and productivity around 0.5%, Australia’s potential GDP growth rate is, at best, around 2% (middle panel) and is likely even lower than that. The working-age population growth rate fell to 0% during the pandemic due to migration restrictions that have yet to be lifted. However, population growth had already been slowing pre-COVID due to falling birth rates and reduced worker visa caps in 2018-19. High Household Debt Raises Interest Rate Sensitivity Of Consumer Demand Sluggish trend growth is not the only reason why Australia’s neutral interest rate is lower than markets are discounting. Given elevated housing valuations and aggressive lending practices, highly indebted Australian households are now more sensitive to rate increases than in years past. Australian mortgage lenders began aggressively issuing shorter-term (typically 3-year) fixed rate mortgages in 2020 after the collapse in bond yields due to the initial COVID shock, to entice borrowers to lock in low interest rates. This raised the share of new fixed rate mortgages from a historic average around 15% of all new mortgages to nearly 50%. Since the RBA ended its yield curve control policy last November, which targeted 3-year bond yields, 3-year fixed mortgage rates have surged from 2.93% to 4.34%. That already has had an impact on housing demand - home price growth has peaked in the major cities according to CoreLogic, while building approvals are contracting on a year-over-year basis (Chart 5). As the surge of fixed rate mortgage loans begin to mature in 2023, Australian homeowners will see a major spike in refinancing costs, both for fixed rate and variable rate lending. This trend should weaken home demand, and house price inflation, even further. Inflation Will Soon Peak The RBA expects softer house price inflation to help slow overall Australian inflation rates. The central bank is projecting headline CPI inflation to fall from the latest 5.1% to 4.3% by June 2023 and 2.9% by June 2024 (Chart 6). That would still be a level near the top of the RBA target band, but the downtrend could be even faster than that. As in many other countries, the latest surge in Australian inflation has been led by a rapid increase in goods prices related to severe demand/supply mismatches at a time of global supply chain bottlenecks. Australian goods inflation hit an 31-year high of 6.6% in Q1/2022, essentially matching the housing component of the CPI index (Chart 7). Yet with US goods inflation having already peaked, as have global shipping costs, it is likely that Australia goods inflation will soon follow suit. This will lower headline Australian inflation to levels more consistent with services inflation, which reached 3% in Q1/2022. Chart 6The RBA Sees Persistent Above-Target Inflation The RBA Sees Persistent Above-Target Inflation The RBA Sees Persistent Above-Target Inflation That floor in more domestically-driven services inflation will also be influenced by the pace of wage growth in Australia. The latest reading on the best wage indicator Down Under, the Wage Price Index, showed that year-over-year wage growth only reached 2.4% in Q1/2022. Chart 7Australia Goods Inflation Should Soon Peak Australia Goods Inflation Should Soon Peak Australia Goods Inflation Should Soon Peak ​​​​​ This is a surprisingly low outcome given the tightness of the Australian labor market with the unemployment rate at an all-time low of 3.9% (Chart 8). Depressed labor supply is not a factor keeping the unemployment rate low, as the labor force participation rate and hours worked are both above pre-pandemic levels. Prior to the rate hike at the May 3 policy meeting, the RBA had been highlighting soft wage growth as a reason to delay the start of the monetary tightening cycle. After the May meeting, RBA Governor Lowe noted that according to the RBA’s “liaison” surveys of Australian businesses, nearly 40% of respondents said they were giving wage increases above 3%. The RBA believes that wage growth in the 3-4% range is consistent with Australian inflation remaining within the RBA’s 2-3% target band, a condition that was deemed necessary before rate hikes could begin. The message from the RBA liaison surveys was enough to trigger the start of the tightening cycle. While the Australia OIS curve is priced for an aggressive series of rate hikes, and shorter-term interest rate expectations are elevated, there is less inflationary concern priced into medium-term inflation expectations. The 5-year/5-year forward Australia CPI swap is at 2.2%, down -15bps since the start of 2022 and barely within the RBA target band. Some of that is a global factor – the 5-year/5-year forward US TIPS breakeven has declined by -44bps over just the past month. However, the Australia 5-year/5-year forward CPI swap peaked at the start of the year, just as Australian interest rate expectations began to ratchet higher (the 2-year Australia government bond yield was 0.35% at the start of 2022 and now sits at 2.61%). An increasing amount of discounted rate hikes, occurring alongside falling inflation expectations, is a sign that markets are incrementally pricing in a restrictive monetary policy. We agree with RBA Governor Lowe’s assessment that the neutral nominal Cash Rate is, at best, 2.5%. Thus, the current discounted peak in the Cash Rate of 3.2% would be restrictive. Very strong consumer spending growth at a time when inflation was already high could be a sign that a restrictive monetary stance is now necessary. However, the outlook for Australian consumption is not without risks. Consumer confidence has plunged alongside declining purchasing power, as wage growth has lagged the inflation upturn (Chart 9). While the expectation is that inflation will peak and wage growth will pick up over the latter half of 2022, it is still uncertain if the relative moves will be large enough to give a meaningful lift to real wage growth and consumer spending power. Chart 8Medium-Term Inflation Expectations Falling, Despite Low Unemployment Medium-Term Inflation Expectations Falling, Despite Low Unemployment Medium-Term Inflation Expectations Falling, Despite Low Unemployment ​​​​​​ Chart 9Headwinds For The Australian Consumer Headwinds For The Australian Consumer Headwinds For The Australian Consumer ​​​​​​ The RBA believes that consumer spending will be supported by the high level of savings, with the household saving rate currently at 13.6%. Yet the high level of household debt means that debt service burdens will rise as interest rates move higher, which may limit the degree to which Australian consumers run down savings to fuel greater consumer spending. Another reason why a more restrictive monetary policy could be needed is if there was a substantial loosening of fiscal policy that was fueling faster growth, especially at a time when inflation was already overshooting. This makes an analysis of the latest election results highly relevant to the path of Australian interest rates. Bottom Line: Markets are pricing in a shift to a restrictive level of interest rates in Australia, an outcome that is not necessary with inflation set to peak at a time of high household leverage. Labor Party Takes Power With Limited Political Capital Australia’s federal election on May 21 brought a Labor Party government into power, headed by new Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. National policy is unlikely to change substantially. Australia has low political risk but high geopolitical risk – meaning that domestic politics are manageable for investors but China’s conflict with the West and other geopolitical events are revolutionizing Australia’s place in the world. The previous Liberal-National Coalition government had been in power since 2013, had never found a stable leader, and had been buffeted by a series of external shocks: a commodity bust, China trade conflict, the COVID-19 pandemic, and inflation. Hence it is no surprise that Labor came back to power – it almost did so in 2019. However, Labor’s popularity is questionable. The new government does not have a robust political mandate: Labor will fall short of a single-party majority (or will have a very thin majority at best): As we go to press, Labor won 74 seats out of 151 in the House of Representatives. A party needs 76 seats for a majority. Labor will likely rely on three Green Party seats and some of the 10 independents to pass legislation. These minor parties will have considerable influence. Labor’s popular vote share is underwhelming: Labor won 32.8% of the popular vote, down from 33.3% in 2019, and beneath the 36% of the vote won by the outgoing Liberal-National Coalition (Table 1). The Green Party rose to 12% of the vote. While this only translates to three seats in parliament, the Greens will hold the balance of power. Table 1Australian Federal Election Results, 2022 The New Normal In Australia The New Normal In Australia Labor does not control the Senate: A bill requires a majority vote in both the House and Senate for passage. A majority requires 38 seats, but Labor and the Greens are currently slated to fall short at 36 seats. Hence, as in the House, the Labor Party will rely on “cross-bench” votes from minor parties to get a majority for bills. Labor won through pragmatism and moderation: Having suffered a surprise defeat in 2019, the Labor Party adopted a more moderate and pragmatic tone in the current election. Prime Minister Albanese campaigned on a motto of “safe change,” declared that he was “not woke,” and adopted a relatively hawkish tilt on trade and foreign policy (China relations) and immigration (“boat people”). Labor has limited room for maneuver in international relations: China’s economy is slowing down and stimulus does not work as well as it used to. China’s political system is reverting to autocracy and the Xi Jinping administration is attempting to carve a sphere of influence in the region, increasing long-term security threats to Australia in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. China has declared a “no limits” strategic partnership with a belligerent Russia, leaving the US no option but to pursue containment strategy against both powers. Prime Minister Albanese has already met with President Biden and the Quadrilateral Dialogue to emphasize Australia’s need to counter China’s newly assertive foreign policy. While Albanese may attempt to reduce trade tensions with China, any such moves will be heavily constrained. Inflation, not climate change, brought Labor to power: The media is hailing the election as a historic shift on the question of climate change and climate policy. But popular opinion has not changed much on this topic in recent years and the election results only partially support the thesis. A better explanation is that the pandemic and its inflationary aftermath galvanized opposition to the ruling Liberal-National Coalition. Hence both fiscal policy and climate policy – the most important areas of change – will be constrained by inflation. Chart 10Australia Cannot Cut Defense Amid China Challenge The New Normal In Australia The New Normal In Australia There are two key policy takeaways from the above assessment: First, on fiscal policy, the new Labor-led government will face limitations due to inflation and the macroeconomic cycle. It will likely respond to inflation – the crisis that got it elected – even though China’s slowdown will produce negative surprises for global and Australian growth. The government will not be able to cut defense spending given the geopolitical setting (Chart 10). That means it will also not be able to pursue its ambitious social and environmental agenda without finding more revenue to offset the inflationary impact of larger budget deficits. Tax hikes are coming for multinational corporations and high-income earners. In terms of the size of the fiscal impact, the Labor Party promised spending increases worth AUD$18.9 billion (1.0% of GDP), to be offset by tax hikes amounting to AUD$11.5 billion in new revenue (0.6% of GDP). The result would be an AUD$7.5 billion increase in the budget deficit (0.4% of GDP) – a net fiscal stimulus (Chart 11). Currently the IMF projects a 1.84% fiscal drag in the cyclically adjusted budget deficit for 2023, so Labor’s plans would reduce that drag by 0.4%. However, the fiscal plans will change once the new Treasurer James Chalmers produces a new budget proposal in October. Comparison with a like-minded economy is therefore useful to put the policy change into perspective. Canada’s politics shifted from center-right to center-left in 2015 and the left-leaning government at that time put forward an agenda similar to Australia’s Labor Party today. Ultimately the budget balance declined from 0.17% to -0.45% of GDP from peak to trough (Chart 12). This 0.62% of GDP stimulus provides a point of comparison. Yet inflation was not a constraint on government spending at that time. The new Australian government may not exceed that size of stimulus in an inflationary context. But it could easily surpass it if the global economy falls back into recession. Chart 11Australian Labor’s Proposed Fiscal Stimulus The New Normal In Australia The New Normal In Australia ​​​​​​ Chart 12Canada Offers Clue To Size Of Australian Stimulus The New Normal In Australia The New Normal In Australia ​​​​​​ Second, on climate policy, the new ruling coalition probably will pass major climate legislation, given the importance of Greens and left-leaning independents. But Labor will have to constrain the smaller parties’ climate ambitions to preserve popular support in areas where fossil fuel industries remain strong. Australia consumes substantially more carbon per capita than other developed economies and will continue to rely on fossil fuel exports for growth. In other words, climate policy will bring incremental rather than radical change. Bottom Line: If a global recession is avoided, then the new government’s counter-cyclical fiscal policies may work. If not, they will produce a double whammy for the Australian economy: new corporate and resource taxes on top of a slowdown in exports. The AUD As A Shock Absorber Despite a higher repricing of the interest rate curve in Australia, and elevated commodity prices, the Australian dollar (AUD) has been very soft. Part of the story is broad-based US dollar strength that has sapped any potential rebound in the AUD. More specifically, a survey of the key drivers of the AUD unveils the main source of currency weakness, by process of elimination: The divergence in monetary policy between the RBA and the Fed? No. Clearly, that has not been a driver this time around as the RBA is expected to lift rates to 3.2% over the next 12 months, in line with market pricing for rate hikes from the Federal Reserve. The commodity cycle? No. Commodity prices are softening, after being in a supply-driven bull market. As a premier resource producer, the Australian economy is intricately intertwined with the outlook for coal, iron ore, copper and even liquefied natural gas prices. As Chart 13 highlights, the AUD has massively deviated from the level implied by rising terms of trade for Australia. This is a departure from a historical correlation that has been in place since the end of the Bretton Woods system. Resource booms tend to be either demand or supply driven, or a combination of both. This time around supply restrictions have played a major role. The message from the AUD is that it responds much better to improving demand conditions. Global and relative growth dynamics? YES: The overarching driver of a weak AUD as hinted above has been slowing Chinese demand. The Zero COVID-19 policy in China has led to a drastic reduction in import volumes. This is hurting Australia’s external balance at the margin, as Chinese import volumes contract (Chart 14). Chart 13The AUD Has Lagged Terms Of Trade The AUD Has Lagged Terms Of Trade The AUD Has Lagged Terms Of Trade ​​​​​ Chart 14The AUD Is Very Sensitive To China The AUD Is Very Sensitive To China The AUD Is Very Sensitive To China There are two key takeaways from the above analysis. First, the hawkish path for interest rates priced for the RBA is not yet reflected in a weak AUD. This implies that currency and bond markets are on a collision course. Either the RBA ratifies market pricing and triggers a coiled spring rebound in the AUD, or hawkish expectations will be tempered as inflationary pressures moderate. Second, the AUD will be very sensitive to any improvement in Chinese demand, the overarching driver of currency weakness. We expect the Chinese authorities to ramp up credit stimulus, to offset weakening demand from the Zero COVID-19 policy. The AUD has historically been very sensitive to changes in Chinese money and credit variables (Chart 15). From a fundamental perspective, a lot of pessimism is embedded in the Aussie dollar. Australian GDP has already recovered above pre-pandemic levels and could be on a path to achieve escape velocity if China recovers. Chinese fiscal and monetary policy should be eased going forward. Chinese bond yields have already dropped, reflecting an easing in domestic financial conditions. Meanwhile, Australia’s commodity exposure is well suited for a green energy shift. Besides being relatively competitive in supplying the types of raw materials that China needs and wants, (higher-grade ore, which is more expensive, but pollutes less, and is in high demand in China), Australia is a big exporter of liquefied natural gas, whose prices have been soaring in recent months and is critical in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and green energy shift (Chart 16). This will provide a multi-year tailwind for Australian export volumes and terms of trade. Chart 15The Chinese Economy Could Be Bottoming The Chinese Economy Could Be Bottoming The Chinese Economy Could Be Bottoming ​​​​​ Chart 16Australia Is Resource Superstar Australia Is Resource Superstar Australia Is Resource Superstar ​​​​​ Bottom Line: BCA Research Foreign Exchange Strategy went long AUD at 72 cents. In the near term, this position could prove quite volatile as markets try to discern a clear path for global growth. But given cheap valuations and beaten down sentiment, it should prove profitable in the longer term. Investment Conclusions For Fixed Income Investors Chart 17Australian Government Bond Investment Recommendations Australian Government Bond Investment Recommendations Australian Government Bond Investment Recommendations Our careful analysis of Australian growth, inflation, the RBA’s likely next moves leads us to the following investment conclusions for Australian bonds (Chart 17): Maintain neutral duration exposure within dedicated Australian bond portfolios (for now): On a forward basis, the entire Australian yield curve is converging to that discounted 3.5% peak in the Cash Rate (top panel). Eventually, Australian bond yields will fall once inflation clearly peaks in H2/2022 and markets realize that the RBA will not be hiking as fast as expected, justifying an above-benchmark duration tilt. Until then, Australian bond yields will be rangebound, especially with the RBA no longer buying bonds via quantitative easing, leaving more bond issuance to be absorbed by private investors. Underweight Australian inflation-linked bonds versus nominal-paying government bonds: Inflation will soon peak, and the discounted RBA stance is too hawkish – a recipe for lower inflation breakevens. Overweight Australian government bonds within global bond portfolios: Australia has returned to its “high-yield-beta” status, which means that an overweight stance is warranted when global bond yields are stable or falling. BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy’s Global Duration Indicator, a growth-focused leading indicator of the momentum of global bond yields, is signalling a more stable backdrop for global yields over the rest of 2022. The Duration Indicator is also a fine leading indicator of the relative return performance of Australian government bonds (middle panel) and is supportive of an overweight stance on Australian debt. Go Long December 2022 Australia Bank Bill futures: This is a tactical trade (i.e. investment horizon of no more than six months), based on the extreme pricing of rate hikes by year-end. The market price of the December 2022 futures contract is currently 97.11, or an implied interest rate of 2.89% compared to the current RBA Cash Rate of 0.35%. That contract is priced for far too many rate hikes than will be delivered over the remaining seven RBA meetings of 2022.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Chester Ntonifor Chief Foreign Exchange Strategist ChesterN@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com

Listen to a short summary of this report.         Executive Summary The US Inflation Surprise Index Has Rolled Over Goldilocks: A Skeptical Q&A Goldilocks: A Skeptical Q&A Global equities are nearing a bottom and will rally over the coming months as inflation declines and growth reaccelerates. While equity valuations are not at bombed-out levels, they have cheapened significantly. Global stocks trade at 15.3-times forward earnings. We are upgrading tech stocks from underweight to neutral. The NASDAQ Composite now trades at a forward P/E of 22.6, down from 32.9 at its peak last year. The 10-year Treasury yield should decline to 2.5% by the end of the year, which will help tech stocks at the margin. The US dollar has peaked. A weakening dollar will provide a tailwind to stocks, especially overseas bourses. US high-yield spreads are pricing in a default rate of 6.2% over the next 12 months, well above the trailing default rate of 1.2%. Favor high-yield credit over government bonds within a fixed-income portfolio.   Bottom Line: The recent sell-off in stocks provides a good opportunity to increase equity allocations. We expect global stocks to rise 15%-to-20% over the next 12 months. Back to Bullish We wrote a report on April 22nd arguing that global equities were heading towards a “last hurrah” in the second half of the year as a Goldilocks environment of falling inflation and supply-side led growth emerges. Last week, we operationalized this view by tactically upgrading stocks to overweight after having downgraded them in late February. This highly out-of-consensus view change, coming at a time when surveys by the American Association of Individual Investors and other outfits show extreme levels of bearishness, has garnered a lot of attention. In this week’s report, we answer some of the most common questions from the perspective of a skeptical reader.   Q: Inflation is at multi-decade highs, global growth is faltering, and central banks are about to hike rates faster than we have seen in years. Isn’t it too early to turn bullish? A: We need to focus on how the world will look like in six months, not how it looks like now. Inflation has likely peaked and many of the forces that have slowed growth, such as China’s Covid lockdown and the war in Ukraine, could abate.   Q: What is the evidence that inflation has peaked? And may I remind you, even if inflation does decline later this year, this is something that most investors and central banks are already banking on. Inflation would need to fall by more than expected for your bullish scenario to play out. A: That’s true, but there is good reason to think that this is precisely what will happen.  Overall spending in the US is close to its pre-pandemic trend. However, spending on goods remains above trend while spending on services is below trend (Chart 1). Services prices tend to be stickier than goods prices. Thus, the shift in spending patterns caused goods inflation to rise markedly with little offsetting decline in services inflation. To cite one of many examples, fitness equipment prices rose dramatically, but gym membership fees barely fell (Chart 2). Chart 1Total US Consumer Spending Is Almost Exactly At Its Pre-Pandemic Trend, But The Composition Of Spending Remains Skewed Total US Consumer Spending Is Almost Exactly At Its Pre-Pandemic Trend, But The Composition Of Spending Remains Skewed Total US Consumer Spending Is Almost Exactly At Its Pre-Pandemic Trend, But The Composition Of Spending Remains Skewed Chart 2Asymmetries Matter: Firms Manufacturing Sports Equipment Jacked Up Prices, But Gyms Barely Cut Prices Asymmetries Matter: Firms Manufacturing Sports Equipment Jacked Up Prices, But Gyms Barely Cut Prices Asymmetries Matter: Firms Manufacturing Sports Equipment Jacked Up Prices, But Gyms Barely Cut Prices As goods demand normalizes, goods inflation will come down. Meanwhile, the supply of goods should increase as the pandemic winds down, and hopefully, a detente is reached in Ukraine. There are already indications that some supply-chain bottlenecks have eased (Chart 3). Q: Even if supply shocks abate, which seems like a BIG IF to me, wouldn’t the shift in spending towards services supercharge what has been only a modest acceleration in services inflation so far? A: Wages are the most important driver of services inflation. Although the evidence is still tentative, it does appear as though wage inflation is peaking. The 3-month annualized growth rate in average hourly earnings for production and nonsupervisory workers slowed from 7.2% in the second half of 2021 to 3.8% in April (Chart 4). Assuming productivity growth of 1.5%, this is consistent with unit labor cost inflation of only slightly more than 2%, which is broadly consistent with the Fed’s CPI inflation target.1 Image Chart 4Wage Pressures May Be Starting To Ease Wage Pressures May Be Starting To Ease Wage Pressures May Be Starting To Ease Image Moreover, a smaller proportion of firms expect to raise wages over the next six months than was the case late last year according to a variety of regional Fed surveys (Chart 5). The same message is echoed by the NFIB small business survey (Chart 6). Consistent with all this, the US Citi Inflation Surprise Index has rolled over (Chart 7).   Chart 6... Small Business Owners Included ... Small Business Owners Included ... Small Business Owners Included Chart 7The US Inflation Surprise Index Has Rolled Over The US Inflation Surprise Index Has Rolled Over The US Inflation Surprise Index Has Rolled Over   Q: What about the “too cold” risk to your Goldilocks scenario? The risks of recession seem to be rising. A: The market is certainly worried about this outcome, and that has been the main reason stocks have fallen of late. However, we do not think this fear is justified, certainly not in the US (Chart 8). US households are sitting on $2.3 trillion excess savings, equal to about 14% of annual consumption. The ratio of household debt-to-disposable income is down 36 percentage points from its highs in early 2008, giving households the wherewithal to spend more. Core capital goods orders, a good leading indicator for capex, have surged. The homeowner vacancy rate is at a record low, suggesting that homebuilding will be fairly resilient in the face of higher mortgage rates.   Q: It seems like the Fed has a nearly impossible task on its hands: Increase labor market slack by enough to cool the economy but not so much as to trigger a recession. You yourself have pointed out that the Fed has never achieved this in its history. A: It is correct that the unemployment rate has never risen by more than one-third of a percentage point in the US without a recession occurring (Chart 9). That said, there are three reasons to think that a soft landing can be achieved this time. Image Chart 9When Unemployment Starts Rising, It Usually Keeps Rising When Unemployment Starts Rising, It Usually Keeps Rising When Unemployment Starts Rising, It Usually Keeps Rising First, increasing labor market slack is easier if one can raise labor supply rather than reducing labor demand. Right now, the participation rate is nearly a percentage point below where it was in 2019, even if one adjusts for increased early retirement during the pandemic (Chart 10). Wages have risen relatively more at the bottom end of the income distribution. This should draw more low-wage workers into the labor force. Furthermore, according to the Federal Reserve, accumulated bank savings for the lowest-paid 20% of workers have been shrinking since last summer, which should incentivize job seeking (Chart 11). Chart 10Labor Participation Has Further Scope To Recover Labor Participation Has Further Scope To Recover Labor Participation Has Further Scope To Recover Chart 11Depleted Savings Will Force More Lower-Wage Workers Into The Labor Market Depleted Savings Will Force More Lower-Wage Workers Into The Labor Market Depleted Savings Will Force More Lower-Wage Workers Into The Labor Market Second, long-term inflation expectations remain well contained, which makes a soft landing more likely. Median expected inflation 5-to-10 years out in the University of Michigan survey stood at 3% in May, roughly where it was between 2005 and 2013 (Chart 12). Median expected earnings growth in the New York Fed Survey of Consumer Expectations was only slightly higher in April than it was prior to the pandemic (Chart 13). Chart 12Consumer Long-Term Inflation Expectations Have Risen But Remain Relatively Low Consumer Long-Term Inflation Expectations Have Risen But Remain Relatively Low Consumer Long-Term Inflation Expectations Have Risen But Remain Relatively Low Chart 13US Consumers Do Not Expect Wages To Grow At A Much Higher Rate Than In The Pre-Pandemic Period US Consumers Do Not Expect Wages To Grow At A Much Higher Rate Than In The Pre-Pandemic Period US Consumers Do Not Expect Wages To Grow At A Much Higher Rate Than In The Pre-Pandemic Period A third reason for thinking that a soft landing may be easier to achieve this time around is that the US private-sector financial balance – the difference between what the private sector earns and spends – is still in surplus (Chart 14). This stands in contrast to the lead-up to both the 2001 and 2008-09 recessions, when the private sector was living beyond its means.   Q: You have spoken a lot about the US, but the situation seems dire elsewhere. Europe may already be in recession as we speak! A: The near-term outlook for Europe is indeed challenging. The euro area economy grew by only 0.8% annualized in the first quarter. Mathieu Savary, BCA’s Chief European Strategist, expects an outright decline in output in Q2. To no one’s surprise, the war in Ukraine is weighing on European growth. The Bundesbank estimates that a full embargo of Russian oil and gas would reduce German real GDP by an additional 5% on top of the damage already inflicted by the war (Chart 15). Chart 14The US Private-Sector Financial Balance Remains In Surplus The US Private-Sector Financial Balance Remains In Surplus The US Private-Sector Financial Balance Remains In Surplus Chart 15Germany’s Economy Will Sink Without Russian Energy Goldilocks: A Skeptical Q&A Goldilocks: A Skeptical Q&A While such a full embargo is possible, it is not our base case. In a remarkable about-face, Putin now says he has “no problems” with Finland and Sweden joining NATO, provided that they do not place military infrastructure in their countries. He had previous threatened a military response at the mere suggestion of NATO membership. In any case, there are few signs that Putin’s increasingly insular and dictatorial regime would respond to an oil embargo or other economic incentives. The wealthy oligarchs who were supposed to rein him in are cowering in fear. It is also not clear if Europe would gain any political leverage over Russia by adopting policies that push its own economy into a recession. It is worth noting that the price of the December 2022 European natural gas futures contract is down 39% from its peak at the start of the war (Chart 16). It is also noteworthy that European EPS estimates have been trending higher this year even as GDP growth estimates have been cut (Chart 17). This suggests that the analyst earnings projections were too conservative going into the year. Chart 16European Natural Gas Futures Are High But Below Their Peak European Natural Gas Futures Are High But Below Their Peak European Natural Gas Futures Are High But Below Their Peak Chart 17European And US EPS Estimates Have Been Trending Higher This Year European And US EPS Estimates Have Been Trending Higher This Year European And US EPS Estimates Have Been Trending Higher This Year Chart 18Chinese Property Sector: Signs Of Contraction Chinese Property Sector: Signs Of Contraction Chinese Property Sector: Signs Of Contraction Q: What about China? The lockdowns are crippling growth and the property market is in shambles. A: There is truth to both those claims. The government has all but said that it will not abandon its zero-Covid policy anytime soon, even going as far as to withdraw from hosting the 2023 AFC Asian Cup. While the number of new cases has declined sharply in Shanghai, future outbreaks are probable. On the bright side, China is likely to ramp up domestic production of Pfizer’s Paxlovid drug. Increased availability of the drug will reduce the burden of the disease once social distancing restrictions are relaxed. As far as the property market is concerned, sales, starts, completions, as well as home prices are all contracting (Chart 18). BCA’s China Investment Strategy expects accelerated policy easing to put the housing sector on a recovery path in the second half of this year. Nevertheless, they expect the “three red lines” policy to remain in place, suggesting that the rebound in housing activity will be more muted than in past recoveries.2  Ironically, the slowdown in the Chinese housing market may not be such a bad thing for the rest of the world. Remember, the main problem these days is inflation. To the extent that a sluggish Chinese housing market curbs the demand for commodities, this could provide some relief on the inflation front.   Q: So bad news is good news. Interesting take. Let’s turn to markets. You mentioned earlier that equity sentiment was very bearish. Fair enough, but I would note the very same American Association of Individual Investors survey that you cited also shows that investors’ allocation to stocks is near record highs (Chart 19). Shouldn’t we look at what investors are doing rather than what they’re saying? A: The discrepancy may not be as large as it seems. As Chart 20 illustrates, investors may not like stocks, but they like bonds even less. Chart 19Individual Investors Still Hold A Lot Of Stock Individual Investors Still Hold A Lot Of Stock Individual Investors Still Hold A Lot Of Stock   Image Chart 20B... But They Like Bonds Even Less ... But They Like Bonds Even Less ... But They Like Bonds Even Less Chart 21Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off Global equities currently trade at 15.3-times forward earnings; a mere 12.5-times outside the US. The global forward earnings yield is 6.7 percentage points higher than the global real bond yield. In 2000, the spread between the earnings yield and the real bond yield was close to zero (Chart 21). It should also be mentioned that institutional data already show a sharp shift out of equities. The latest Bank of America survey revealed that fund managers cut equity allocations to a net 13% underweight in May from a 6% overweight in April and a net 55% overweight in January. Strikingly, fund managers were even more underweight bonds than stocks. Cash registered the biggest overweight in two decades.   Q: Your bullish equity bias notwithstanding, you were negative on tech stocks last year, arguing that the NASDAQ would turn into the NASDOG. Given that the NASDAQ Composite is down 29% from its highs, is it time to increase exposure to some beaten down tech names? A: Both the cyclical and structural headwinds facing tech stocks that we discussed in These Three High-Flying Equity Sectors Could Come Crashing Back Down To Earth and The Disruptor Delusion remain in place. Nevertheless, with the NASDAQ Composite now trading at 22.6-times forward earnings, down from 32.9 at its peak last year, an underweight in tech is no longer appropriate (Chart 22). A neutral stance is now preferable.   Chart 22Tech Stock Valuations Have Returned To Earth Tech Stock Valuations Have Returned To Earth Tech Stock Valuations Have Returned To Earth Q: I guess if bond yields come down a bit more, that would help tech stocks? A: Yes. Tech stocks tend to be growth-oriented. Falling bond yields raise the present value of expected cash flows more for growth companies than for other firms. While we do expect global bond yields to eventually rise above current levels, yields are likely to decline modestly over the next 12 months as inflation temporarily falls. We expect the US 10-year yield to end the year at around 2.5%.   Q: A decline in US bond yields would undermine the high-flying dollar, would it not? A: It depends on how bond yields abroad evolve. US Treasuries tend to be relatively high beta, implying that US yields usually fall more when global yields are declining (Chart 23). Thus, it would not surprise us if interest rate differentials moved against the dollar later this year. Chart 23US Treasuries Have A Higher Beta Than Most Other Government Bond Markets US Treasuries Have A Higher Beta Than Most Other Government Bond Markets US Treasuries Have A Higher Beta Than Most Other Government Bond Markets It is also important to remember that the US dollar is a countercyclical currency (Chart 24). If global growth picks up as pandemic dislocations fade and the Ukraine war winds down, the dollar is likely to weaken. Chart 24The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency Image A wider trade deficit could also imperil the greenback. The US trade deficit has increased from US$45 billion in December 2019 to US$110 billion. Equity inflows have helped finance the trade deficit, but net flows have turned negative of late (Chart 25). Finally, the dollar is quite expensive – 27% overvalued based on Purchasing Power Parity exchange rates.   Q: Let’s sum up. Please review your asset allocation recommendations both for the next 12 months and beyond. A: To summarize, global inflation has peaked. Growth should pick up later this year as supply-chain bottlenecks abate. The combination of falling inflation and supply-side led growth will provide a springboard for equities. We expect global stocks to rise 15%-to-20% over the next 12 months. Historically, non-US stocks have outperformed their US peers when the dollar has been weakening (Chart 26). EM stocks, in particular, have done well in a weak dollar environment Chart 26Non-US Stocks Will Benefit From A Weaker US Dollar Non-US Stocks Will Benefit From A Weaker US Dollar Non-US Stocks Will Benefit From A Weaker US Dollar Chart 27The Market Is Too Pessimistic On Default Risk The Market Is Too Pessimistic On Default Risk The Market Is Too Pessimistic On Default Risk Within fixed-income portfolios, we recommend a modest long duration stance over the next 12 months. We favor high-yield credit over safer government bonds. US high-yield spreads imply a default rate of 6.2% over the next 12 months compared to a trailing 12-month default rate of only 1.2% (Chart 27). Chart 28Falling Inflation Will Buoy Consumer Sentiment Falling Inflation Will Buoy Consumer Sentiment Falling Inflation Will Buoy Consumer Sentiment Our guess is that this Goldilocks environment will end towards the end of next year. As inflation comes down, real wage growth will turn positive. Consumer confidence, which is now quite depressed, will improve (Chart 28). Stronger demand will cause inflation to reaccelerate in 2024, setting the stage for another round of central bank rate hikes.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Follow me on           LinkedIn Twitter       Footnotes 1    The Federal Reserve targets an average inflation rate of 2% for the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) index. Due to compositional differences between the two indices, CPI inflation has historically averaged 30-to-50 basis points higher than PCE inflation. This is why the Fed effectively targets a CPI inflation rate of 2.3%-to-2.5%. 2    The People’s Bank of China and the housing ministry issued a deleveraging framework for property developers in August 2020, consisting of a 70% ceiling on liabilities-to-assets, a net debt-to-equity ratio capped at 100%, and a limit on short-term borrowing that cannot exceed cash reserves. Developers breaching these “red lines” run the risk of being cut off from access to new loans from banks, while those who respect them can only increase their interest-bearing borrowing by 15% at most. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Goldilocks: A Skeptical Q&A Goldilocks: A Skeptical Q&A Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores Goldilocks: A Skeptical Q&A Goldilocks: A Skeptical Q&A

Dear Client, This week, the US Bond Strategy service is hosting its Quarterly Webcast (May 17 at 9:00 AM EDT, 14:00 PM BST, 15:00 PM CEST and May 18 at 9:00 HKT, 11:00 AEST). In addition, we are sending this Quarterly Chartpack that provides a recap of our key recommendations and some charts related to those recommendations and other areas of interest for US bond investors. Please tune in to the Webcast and browse the Chartpack at your leisure, and do let us know if you have any questions or other feedback. To view the Quarterly Chartpack PDF please click here. Best regards, Ryan Swift, US Bond Strategist

Executive Summary Global inflation will peak sometime in the next few months, a process that has likely already begun in the US. This will give policymakers some breathing room to turn less hawkish, a more credible stance given softening global growth momentum and increased financial market volatility. Our Global Golden Rule of Bond Investing suggests that overall government bond returns should turn positive over the next year, but with widening divergences across countries for our base case scenarios. Projected government bond return expectations over the next 12 months look most attractive in Australia, Germany and the UK – where far too many rate hikes are priced in – compared to the US, where the Fed is more likely to follow through on most, but not all, discounted rate increases. Japan has the lowest expected returns, and the defensive properties of “low-beta” JGBs will be less necessary with global yield momentum set to peak in the latter half of 2022. Our Global Golden Rule Base Case Scenarios For The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Bottom Line: The return expectations over the next year stemming from our Global Golden Rule suggest the following country allocation recommendations in global government bond portfolios: maintain overweights in Australia, Germany and the UK, stay underweight the US and neutral Canada, but downgrade Japan to underweight. Feature Chart 1A Pause In The Global Bond Bear Market A Pause In The Global Bond Bear Market A Pause In The Global Bond Bear Market Global bond markets may finally be showing signs of settling down after a painful period of rising yields and high volatility. Government bond yields across the developed economies have fallen substantially over the past week as equity and credit markets have sold off, in a typical risk-off response to increased concerns over global growth momentum. For example, benchmark 10-year government yields have fallen by -32bps both the US and UK, -25bps in Germany and -22bps in Canada since the cyclical intraday high was reached on May 9. These moves are modest in the context of the cyclical bond bear market, with the Bloomberg Global Treasury index still down -12.1% year-to-date and -14.4% on a year-over-year basis (Chart 1). That painful selloff has been driven by expectations of intense monetary tightening in response to surging global inflation. However, last week’s release of US Consumer Price Index data for April confirmed that US goods inflation has peaked, a trend that we expect to follow suit in other countries (Chart 2). That will leave inflation momentum, and eventual interest rate hikes, to be driven more by domestic services inflation that will prove to be less correlated across countries over the next 6-12 months (Chart 3). Chart 2Inflation & Rate Hike Expectations Have Become Correlated. . . Inflation & Rate Hike Expectations Have Become Correlated. . . Inflation & Rate Hike Expectations Have Become Correlated. . . ​​​​​​ Chart 3. . .Making Our Global Golden Rule All About Inflation . . .Making Our Global Golden Rule All About Inflation . . .Making Our Global Golden Rule All About Inflation ​​​​​​ With that in mind, we revisit our framework for linking government bond returns to monetary policy outcomes versus expectations, the Global Golden Rule of Bond Investing. A Brief Overview Of The Global Golden Rule In September 2018, we published a Special Report introducing a government bond return forecasting methodology called the “Global Golden Rule.” This was an extension of a framework introduced by our sister service, US Bond Strategy, that links US Treasury returns (versus cash) to changes in the fed funds rate that were not already discounted in the US Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve.1 The historical results convincingly showed that investors who "get the Fed right" by making correct bets on changes in the funds rate versus expectations were very likely to make the right call on the direction of Treasury yields and Treasury returns. Related Report  Global Fixed Income StrategyRevisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing We discovered that relationship also held in other developed market countries. This gave us a framework to help project expected global bond returns simply based on a view for future central bank interest rate moves versus market expectations.2 Specific details on the calculation of the Global Golden Rule can be found in those original 2018 papers. In the following pages, we present the latest results of the Global Golden Rule for the US, Canada, Australia, the UK, the euro area and Japan. The set-up for the chart shown for each country is the same. We show the 12-month policy rate “surprise”, defined as the actual change in the central bank policy rate over the preceding 12-months versus the expected 12-month change in the policy rate from a year earlier extracted from OIS curves (a.k.a. our 12-month discounters). We then compare the 12-month policy rate surprise to the annual excess return over cash (treasury bills) of the Bloomberg government bond index for each country. We also show the 12-month policy rate surprise versus the 12-month change in the government bond index yield. The very strong historical correlation between those latter two series is the backbone of the Global Golden Rule framework. After that, we present tables showing expected yield changes and excess returns for various maturity points, as well as the overall government bond index, derived from the Global Golden Rule regressions. The expected change in yield is derived from regressions on the policy rate surprises, with different estimations done for each maturity point. In the tables, we show the results for different scenarios for changes in policy rates. For example, the row in the return tables labeled “+25bps” would show the expected yield changes and excess returns if the central bank for that particular country lifts the policy interest rate by +25bps over the next 12 months. Showing these scenarios allows us to pick the one that most closely correlates to our own expectation for central bank actions, translating that into government bond return expectations. Global Golden Rule: US Chart 4Risk/Reward Favors Less UST-Bearish Fed'Surprises' Risk/Reward Favors Less UST-Bearish Fed'Surprises' Risk/Reward Favors Less UST-Bearish Fed'Surprises' US Treasuries have delivered a painful loss of -7.8% versus cash over 12 months. Bearish outcomes of such magnitude were last seen during 1994 and 1999 when the Fed was aggressively lifting the funds rate. The Fed delivered a smaller hawkish surprise over the past year than those 1990s episodes, with a trailing 12-month policy rate surprise of -72bps. Thus, the Golden Rule underestimated losses realized by US Treasuries, as US bond yields moved to price in far more Fed tightening than what was expected one year ago. The US OIS curve now discounts +229bps of rate hikes over the next 12 months, taking the fed funds rate to 3.3% (Chart 4). That is a more aggressive profile than was laid out in the March 2022 Fed “dots”, where the median FOMC member projection called for the funds rate to climb to 2.8% in 2023. That means there is less scope for Fed rate hikes to surprise versus market expectations that are already very hawkish, at a time when US growth and inflation momentum is rolling over. Our base case calls for the Fed to deliver +200bps of rate increases over the next year, +50bps at the next two policy meetings followed by +25bps at the subsequent four meetings. That outcome produces a Golden Rule forecast of the overall US Treasury index yield falling -13bps, generating a total return of +3.73% (Tables 1 & 2). Table 1US: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Table 2US: Expected Changes In Treasury Yields Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Global Golden Rule: Canada Chart 5Canadian Bonds Selloff After A Hawkish BoC Canadian Bonds Selloff After A Hawkish BoC Canadian Bonds Selloff After A Hawkish BoC Canadian government bonds have sold off hard over the past 12 months, delivering an excess return over cash of -7.5% (Chart 5). That loss reflects the Bank of Canada’s (BoC) hawkish turn, but is a less severe outcome compared to other developed economy government bond markets that saw a major repricing of rate hike expectations like the US and Australia. Losses in the Canadian government bond market were consistent with the +34bps of hawkish surprises delivered by the BoC, which tightened by +75bps on a 12-month basis versus the +41bps expected by markets in May 2021. Rate expectations are highly aggressive on a forward basis. The Canadian OIS curve now discounts 210bps of interest rate increases over the next 12 months. However, high household debt in Canada, fueled by a relentlessly expanding housing bubble, will limit the ability of the BoC to match the Fed’s rate hikes over the next 6-12 months. Higher debt levels also imply a lower nominal neutral rate of interest, as the BoC has less room to hike before debt servicing costs become overly burdensome for overleveraged Canadian consumers. Our base case is that the BoC will deliver +150bps of tightening over the next 12 months. This produces a Golden Rule forecast of a decline in the overall Canadian government bond index yield of -17bps, delivering a projected total return of 4.52% (Tables 3 & 4). Table 3Canada: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Table 4Canada: Expected Changes In Government Bond Yields Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Global Golden Rule: Australia Chart 6Aggressive Rate Hike Expectations On A Forward Basis For Australia Aggressive Rate Hike Expectations On A Forward Basis For Australia Aggressive Rate Hike Expectations On A Forward Basis For Australia Australian government bonds have delivered a negative excess return over cash of -9.6% over the past year (Chart 6). This is the biggest sell-off among all the countries covered in our Global Golden Rule framework. The magnitude of those realized losses far exceeded what would have been predicted by the Golden Rule a year ago, with the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) delivering only a modest hawkish surprise. An unexpectedly high Australian headline inflation print of 5.1% in Q1 of this year led the RBA to deliver a surprise +25bps rate hike in April. This created a mild hawkish policy rate surprise of -17bps over the past 12 months, as only +8bps of tightening had been discounted in the Australian OIS curve in May 2021. The Australian OIS curve is now discounting 292bps of rate hikes over the next year, taking the cash rate to just over 3% - a level last seen in 2013 when the neutral rate in Australia was much higher by the RBA’s own reckoning. The RBA appears confident in the Australian economy, forecasting the unemployment rate to reach a 50-year low around 3.5% in 2023. However, we believe the RBA will be more measured in its pace of rate increases over the next year than markets expect, as global traded goods inflation cools and Australian wages are still not overheating. According to the Golden Rule projections, our base case of +150bps of tightening will produce a decline in Australian government bond index yield of -92bps, delivering a projected total return of 9.29% (Tables 5 & 6). Table 5Australia: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Table 6Australia: Expected Changes In Government Bond Yields Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Global Golden Rule: UK Chart 7The BoE Will Hike Less Than Markets Expect The BoE Will Hike Less Than Markets Expect The BoE Will Hike Less Than Markets Expect UK government bonds have gotten hit hard over the past year, delivering a negative excess return over cash of -7.9% - one of the worst performances seen over the past quarter century (Chart 7). The size of that loss was in line with the Global Golden Rule forecasts, given the magnitude of the rate shock seen in the UK. The Bank of England (BoE) hiked rates by 90bps over the past 12 months, which was a hawkish surprise of -79bps compared to what was discounted one year earlier. The UK OIS curve is now priced for another +139bps of rate hikes over the next year. This would take the BoE’s Bank Rate to 2.4%, a level that would push the UK unemployment rate up by two percentage points and lower UK inflation to below 2% within the next 2-3 years, according to the BoE’s own forecasting models. As we discussed in our report last week, where we upgraded our stance on UK Gilts to overweight, the neutral level of UK policy rates is between 1.5-2%, at best, with UK potential growth barely above 1%. Thus, markets are already pricing in a very restrictive monetary policy stance from the BoE that is unlikely to be fully delivered before UK growth and inflation decline sharply. Our base case calls for the BoE to deliver only another +75bps of hikes over the next year, which will produce a fall in the UK government bond index yield of -21bps and a total return of 4.12% (Tables 7 & 8). Table 7UK: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Table 8UK: Expected Changes In Gilt Yields Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Global Golden Rule: Germany Chart 8German Bunds Stand To Gain From An ECB Dovish Surprise German Bunds Stand To Gain From An ECB Dovish Surprise German Bunds Stand To Gain From An ECB Dovish Surprise German government bonds suffered major losses over the past year, underperforming cash by -8.5% over the past year. We saw no policy surprise from the European Central Bank (ECB) over that time relative to market expectations (Chart 8). The dramatic sell-off instead reflected surging expectations of future tightening as the euro area faces an energy-driven inflation spike. The trailing 12-month policy rate surprise for Germany (and the overall euro area) remains stuck near zero. However, markets now expect a very aggressive move by the ECB, discounting a full +156bps of tightening over the next 12 months. This would push the ECB’s main refinancing rate to levels last seen in the disastrous tightening cycle during the 2011 European debt crisis. As argued by our colleagues at BCA Research European Investment Strategy, the euro area is heading into a growth slowdown and energy inflation looks set to peak. Even if the hawks are able to sway the ECB Governing Council to begin hiking rates this summer, the slowing trajectory of growth and inflation make it highly unlikely that the ECB will deliver the full amount of tightening currently discounted. Our base case is that the ECB will deliver only +50bps of tightening over the next 12 months, enough to push the deposit rate out of negative territory to 0%. As shown in Tables 9 & 10, this is consistent with the Germany government bond index yield falling -55bps, delivering an index return of 5.07% over a 12-month horizon. Table 9Germany: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Table 10Germany: Expected Changes In Bund Yields Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Global Golden Rule: Japan Chart 9The Upside On A BoJ Dovish Surprise Is Limited The Upside On A BoJ Dovish Surprise Is Limited The Upside On A BoJ Dovish Surprise Is Limited Japanese government bonds (JGBs) have delivered an excess return versus cash of -1.8% over the past twelve months (Chart 9). The policy rate surprise was flat as the Bank of Japan (BoJ) kept the policy rate unchanged at -0.1%. Admittedly, the Golden Rule framework is poorly suited to project Japanese bond returns. The BoJ has been unable to lift policy rates for many years, while instituting yield curve control on 10-year JGBs since 2016 to anchor yields near zero. With no variability on policy rates or bond yields, a methodology that links bond returns to unexpected policy interest rate changes will have poor predictive power. However, rates traders are making some attempt to challenge the BoJ’s ultra-dovish posture. The Japan OIS curve now discounts +9bps of tightening, approximately enough to push the policy rate to zero, over the next 12 months. With the yen weakening rapidly and the cost of imported energy elevated, consumer price inflation in Tokyo (excluding fresh food) hit the BoJ’s 2% target in April. However, as evidenced in the minutes of the March BoJ meeting, policymakers see a sustainable inflation overshoot as unlikely. Our base case is the “Flat” scenarios shown in Tables 11 & 12, with the BoJ keeping policy rates unchanged for the next twelve months and delivering a slight dovish surprise. That generates a Golden Rule forecast of a -6bps fall in the Japanese government bond index yield, with a total return projection of 0.87%. Table 11Japan: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Table 12Japan: Expected Changes In JGB Yields Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Investment Implications Of The Global Golden Rule Projections For all the countries discussed above, our base case calls for the respective central banks to deliver less tightening than markets are discounting over the next year. This suggests that government bonds should be expected to deliver positive returns versus cash, even as we expect multiple rate increases from all central banks except the BoJ. While this could argue for an above-benchmark duration stance at the overall global level, we prefer to translate the Global Golden Rule results via country allocations – as we have greater conviction on relative central bank moves in the current high inflation environment – while keeping overall global duration exposure at neutral. The return outcomes for our base case scenarios for the six countries in our Global Golden Rule framework are presented in Table 13. We show the expected returns both in local currency and hedged into US dollars, the latter allowing a comparison in common currency terms. In our base case scenarios, we expect Australian and German government bonds to deliver the strongest performance over the next year, followed by the UK, Canada, the US and Japan. Table 13Our Global Golden Rule Base Case Scenarios For The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Chart 10Downgrade 'Defensive' Low-Yield-Beta JGBs To Underweight Downgrade 'Defensive' Low-Yield-Beta JGBs To Underweight Downgrade 'Defensive' Low-Yield-Beta JGBs To Underweight Our UK upgrade to overweight last week was a change to our strategic call on Gilts. Based on the results from our Global Golden Rule update, increased exposure to UK Gilts should be “funded” in a global bond portfolio by reducing exposure to Japan, with JGBs expected to deliver the weakest returns. Cutting JGB exposure also fits with the signal from our Global Duration Indicator, which is heralding a peak in global bond yield momentum in the latter half of 2022 (Chart 10). JGBs are typically a good “defensive” overweight country allocation in an environment of rising global bond yields. Persistently low Japanese inflation prevents the BoJ from credibly signaling rate hikes when other central banks like the Fed are lifting rates in response to stronger growth or overshooting inflation as is currently the case. The relative performance of Japan versus the Bloomberg Global Treasury benchmark index (in USD-hedged terms) is highly correlated to the year-over-year momentum of the overall level of global bond yields. With our Duration Indicator signaling a peak in yield momentum, we expect JGBs, which continue to exhibit a very low “beta” to changes in global bond yields, to underperform. Thus, this week we are downgrading our strategic allocation to Japan from overweight (4 out of 5) to underweight (2 out of 5). We view this as an offsetting recommendation to our UK upgrade from last week, while leaving our other country allocations unchanged. The result is that our country recommendations now line up with the expected returns from our Global Golden Rule, as can be seen in Table 13. That includes leaving the recommended US Treasury exposure at underweight, as we expect the Fed to deliver the smallest dovish surprise out of the central banks discussed in this report. We are adding both of the view changes made over the past two weeks, upgrading the UK and downgrading Japan, to our model bond portfolio as seen on pages 20-21. Bottom Line: Our Global Golden Rule suggests that developed market government bonds are expected to deliver positive returns over the next year as softening inflation momentum leads central banks to not fully deliver discounted rate hikes. Return expectations look most attractive in Australia, Germany and the UK, especially compared to the US and Japan.     Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Shakti Sharma Senior Analyst ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Deborah Acri Research Associate deborah.acri@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see BCA Research US Bond Strategy Special Report, "The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing", dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcarearch.com. 2     Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing", dated September 25, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Global Fixed Income - Strategic Recommendations* Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Tactical Overlay Trades

Executive Summary UK Stocks Are Close To A Bottom UK Stocks Are Close To A Bottom UK Stocks Are Close To A Bottom The UK economic outlook has greatly deteriorated. Weak global growth and punishing energy inflation will cause activity to contract over the next 12 months. Cost-push pressures will drag inflation above 10% in 2022. Moreover, demand-pull inflation highlights problems with the supply-side of the economy. UK yields have downside relative to those in the Euro Area. GBP/USD will bottom once global stock prices find a floor. EUR/GBP possesses more upside. UK stocks will enjoy a structural tailwind relative to their Eurozone counterparts as a result of a secular bull market in commodity prices. Nonetheless, UK equities are likely to underperform in the second half of 2022. UK small-cap stocks are massively oversold compared to large-cap shares; however, a peak in energy inflation must take place for small-cap equities to stage a rebound. TACTICAL INCEPTION DATE RETURN SINCE INCEPTION (%) COMMENT Overweight UK Gilts Within European Fixed-Income Portfolios 05/16/2022   Cyclical Buy European Healthcare Equities / Sell UK Healthcare Equities 05/16/2022   Tactical Buy European Financials Equities / Sell UK Financials Equities 05/16/2022   Tactical Bottom Line: British Gilts will outperform because of the weakness in UK economic activity, but the trade-weighted pound will remain under pressure. The performance of UK large-cap names is mostly independent from the state of the British economy. The commodity secular bull market will create a potent tailwind for this market. However, a better entry point lies ahead.       The Bank of England’s (BoE) latest policy meeting was a cold shower for market participants and their aggressive interest rate pricing in the SONIA curve. Money markets expected a peak in the Bank Rate of 2.7% in 2023, but the BoE’s new Market Participants Survey is calling for it to peak at 1.75% before easing off to 1.5% in 2024. The UK economy is in trouble. Inflation is high and broad-based, which explains why investors are pricing in such an aggressive path for the Bank Rate. Yet, economic activity is weakening and could even contract in early 2023. The BoE clearly puts more weight on growth than investors do. What are the implications of the inflation, growth, and policy outlook for British assets? BCA has upgraded its view on UK bonds to overweight within global fixed income portfolios. We expect more softness in the pound versus the euro. UK large-cap stocks will continue to trade in line with energy dynamics, which means it is still too early to buy British small-cap equities. In the meantime, UK financial and healthcare names will underperform their Euro Area counterparts. Growth To Weaken Further The -0.1% month-over-month GDP contraction in March underscores that UK economic activity has already decelerated sharply. However, the deterioration is only starting. Most sectors of the economy show ominous signs for the quarters ahead. Consumer Sector The biggest hurdle facing UK consumers, like most of their European neighbors, is the surge in inflation, particularly energy and food prices. Safety nets are looser than on the continent, and UK households’ real disposable income are contracting sharply. The impact of this weakening of activity is already visible. UK consumer confidence is falling in line with the knock to real disposable income (Chart 1, top panel). Moreover, real retail sales have already slowed sharply, and the BRC Like-For-Like Retail Sales measure is contracting on an annual basis (Chart 1, bottom panel). As a result, the outlook for consumption is worsening. Ofgem, the UK gas and electricity market regulator, lifted its energy price cap by 54% on April 1st and plans to increase it again by an expected 40% in October. Consequently, the BoE anticipates the share of households’ disposable income spent on energy to hit 7.7% by the end of the year — its highest level since the early 1980s (Chart 2). Chart 1Falling Real Incomes Hurt Falling Real Incomes Hurt Falling Real Incomes Hurt Chart 2Intensifying Energy Drag Intensifying Energy Drag Intensifying Energy Drag The savings cushion developed during the pandemic will not be enough to prevent weaker retail sales. More than 40% of households plan to dip into their existing savings and curtail their savings rate; however, UK excess savings skew heavily toward the richer households. Poorer households with low savings are the ones who spend the largest share of their income on energy (Chart 3), and they are also the ones with a higher marginal propensity to consume. Thus, the knock to these households portends further weakness in consumption volumes. Chart 3The Poor Are Hit Harder Is UK Stagflation Priced In? Is UK Stagflation Priced In? Chart 4No Salvation From Housing No Salvation From Housing No Salvation From Housing Housing is unlikely to save the day. While house prices and housing transactions are robust (Chart 4, top panel), mortgage approvals are declining rapidly and average sales per chartered surveyors are also softening (Chart 4, bottom panels), which suggests housing activity will slow. Rising mortgage rates are a problem. Since January, the quoted rates on mortgages with 90% LTV and 75% LTV are up 65bps and 70bps, respectively, which is hurting housing marginal demand. Moreover, 20% of the UK’s mortgage stock carries variable rates, which further hurts aggregate demand. Business Sector The business sector is also feeling the crunch from rapidly rising energy and input costs. It also dreads the deterioration in consumer sentiment and its implication for future final demand. Chart 5Dwindling Capex Outlook Dwindling Capex Outlook Dwindling Capex Outlook Business confidence is falling abruptly. The CBI Inquiry Business Optimism measure has fallen to its lowest level since the beginning of the pandemic in 2020, when the UK GDP was contracting at a 21% annualized rate (Chart 5). Unsurprisingly, the collapse in business confidence prompted a rapid slowdown in CAPEX. The BoE’s Agents Survey reports that 40% of UK firms have unsustainably low profit margins because of rising input prices and partial pass-through. As a result of financial stress, further capex weakness is likely in the coming quarters. The impact on overall activity of these expanding worries is evident. UK industrial production has slowed very sharply and is now a meager 0.7% on an annual basis. The situation will degrade. Export growth remains strong, which is helping the business sector; however, the rapid slowdown in global industrial production indicates that UK exports will follow suit (Chart 5, second panel). This will have a knock-on effect on corporate profits (Chart 5, bottom panel), which will depress capex further. Other Considerations Chart 6No Offset From The Government No Offset From The Government No Offset From The Government The problems of the private sector may be encapsulated in one indicator. After a surge that boosted GDP, the UK’s nonfinancial private sector’s credit impulse is rapidly contracting (Chart 6), which confirms that risks to activity are building. The public sector will not provide an offset. According to the IMF Fiscal Monitor’s projections, the UK’s fiscal thrust will equal -3.3% of GDP in 2022 and -1.4% in 2023, even after the small giveaways from Chancellor Rishi Sunak’s Spring Statement (Chart 6, bottom panel). Together, these developments confirm our view that UK GDP may also flirt with a recession in the coming 12 months. Bottom Line: The UK economy is facing potent headwinds and activity is set to contract over the coming quarters. Surging energy costs are hurting household consumption and businesses are cutting investment. This time around, government spending is unlikely to come to the rescue, at least not until further pain is inflicted on the UK’s private sector. The BoE expects output to contract in early 2023, with which we agree. Inflation: The Worst Of Both Worlds UK headline inflation is likely to move into double digits territory before year-end. Worrisomely, it will also be more stubborn than that of the Eurozone, because it goes beyond higher food and energy input costs. Essentially, the UK suffers from both the cost-push inflation plaguing the rest of Europe and the demand-pull inflation witnessed in the US. Chart 7Continued Pass-Through Is UK Stagflation Priced In? Is UK Stagflation Priced In? The UK’s cost-push inflation will worsen in the second half of the year and could lift headline CPI above 10% by Q4 2022. Its main driver will be the Ofgem’s second energy cap increase scheduled for October, which is expected to increase household energy costs by 40%. Companies will also try to pass through a greater proportion of their rising costs to their consumers to protect their depleted margins. So far, the BoE’s Agents Survey reveals that on average, UK firms have passed through 80% of their non-labor input cost increases (Chart 7, top panel). In all the sectors surveyed, expected price increases are set to accelerate compared to the past 12 month and may even reach 14% in the manufacturing sector and 8% in the consumer goods sector (Chart 7, bottom panel). Demand-pull inflation is also present in the UK, unlike the rest of Europe, with core CPI at 5.7%, high service inflation, and rapidly rising wage growth. The key problem is an overheating labor market exacerbated by labor supply problems. By the end of 2021, the UK recorded 600 thousand inactive people more than before the pandemic, or individuals who are of working age but outside of the labor force and not seeking a job. This has compressed the labor participation rate to 63%, or the lowest level since the 2011-2012 period (Chart 8). So far, not even rapid wage gains have incentivized these persons to seek employment. The impact of Brexit further curtails the supply of labor. Since the pandemic began, the size of the working age population has decreased by 100 thousand as EU citizens have moved back home (Chart 8, second panel). Labor demand, however, is not weak. Job vacancies have surged to an all-time high of 1.3 million, or a ratio of one job vacancy per unemployed worker. Moreover, according to the BoE’s Agents Survey, the proportion of firms reporting recruitment difficulties is extremely elevated (Chart 8, third panel). As a result of weak labor supply but strong labor demand, wages are rising rapidly (Chart 8, bottom panel), with the KPMG/REC Indicator of pay higher than 6%. Chart 8Labor Market Tightness Labor Market Tightness Labor Market Tightness Chart 9Poor Productivity Weighs On Trend GDP Poor Productivity Weighs On Trend GDP Poor Productivity Weighs On Trend GDP Rapidly increasing wages and underlying inflation are indicative of a greater malaise. UK GDP is still 3.6% below its pre-COVID trend, while US GDP has already moved past its previous peak. Yet, wages and underlying inflation are just as strong in both economies. This suggests that the UK trend GDP has slowed more than in the US and that aggregate demand is colliding more rapidly with the constraint created by a weaker potential GDP. Labor supply is not the only culprit behind the slowdown in UK’s trend GDP. Since Brexit, UK capex has been particularly weak, which has depressed productivity growth and suppressed trend GDP further (Chart 9). Bottom Line: The BoE expects UK headline CPI inflation to move above 10% before the end of the year. We agree with this assessment. Cost-push inflation will remain strong in response to additional increases in regulated energy prices this fall and greater pass-through from businesses. Meanwhile, the labor market is overheated because of weak labor supply and surging job vacancies. The UK core inflation is likely to be sticky as Brexit weighs on the country’s trend GDP, which causes aggregate demand to surpass aggregate supply easily. Investment Implications The investment implications of the UK’s weak growth and strong inflation outlook are far reaching. Fixed Income Implications BCA’s Global Fixed Income Strategy service upgraded UK government bonds to overweight from underweight in their global fixed income portfolios. We heed this message and move to overweight UK Gilts relative to German Bunds within European fixed income portfolios. Chart 10The BoE's Dovish Justification The BoE's Dovish Justification The BoE's Dovish Justification The BoE’s forecast calls for a deeply negative output gap as well as a rising rate of unemployment in 2023 and 2024. According to the BoE’s model, these dynamics will weigh on headline CPI next year (Chart 10). We take the BoE at its word when it communicated a gentler pace of rate hikes than was anticipated by the SONIA curve. The BoE believes that the weakness in the UK’s trend GDP growth weighs on the country’s neutral rate of interest. Thus, there is a limited scope before higher interest rates hurt economic activity. Since the BoE already foresees a poor growth outcome and weaker inflation next year, this view of the neutral rate logically results in a shallow path of interest rate increases. In other words, the BoE is not the Fed. This view prompts our fixed income colleagues to expect the SONIA curve to move toward the gentler rhythm of interest rate hikes proposed by the BoE. As a corollary, it implies that Gilt yields have more downside. More specifically, BCA sees room for UK-German yields spreads to narrow. Investors have expected the BoE to be significantly more hawkish than the European Central Bank (ECB), and a partial convergence in expected interest rate paths is likely. Moreover, UK yields have a higher beta than German ones. As a result, the current wave of risk aversion driven by global growth fears should cause an outperformance of UK government bonds compared to German ones. Currency Market Implications The outlook for GBP/USD depends on the evolution of overall market conditions. If risk assets remain under pressure, so will Cable. Chart 11Cable And EM Stocks Cable And EM Stocks Cable And EM Stocks A durable bottom in GBP/USD will coincide with a rebound in EM equities (Chart 11). The correlation between these two assets most likely reflects the UK’s current account deficit of 2.8% of GDP in 2021. Large external financing needs render the currency very sensitive to global liquidity conditions and thus, to the dollar’s trend and global risk aversion, as is the case with EM assets. Peter Berezin, BCA Chief Global Strategist, expects global stocks to rebound in the near future, which will lift EM equities in the process. Interestingly, GBP/USD does not correlate with the relative performance of EM shares. Thus, a rebound in Cable does not contradict BCA’s Emerging Market Strategy service’s view that EM stocks are likely to underperform further in the coming months. Chart 12A Big Handicap For the GBP vs the EUR A Big Handicap For the GBP vs the EUR A Big Handicap For the GBP vs the EUR BCA’s Foreign Exchange strategy team sees further upside in EUR/GBP, toward the 0.9 level. 2-year yield differentials between the UK and Germany are likely to narrow in response to the downgrade of the SONIA curve. Importantly, the wide UK current account deficit necessitates higher real interest rates to prop the pound against the euro because the Eurozone current account surplus stands at 2.3% of GDP. However, neither the 2-year nor 10-year real rates are higher in the UK than they are in the Euro Area (Chart 12). Additionally, even the nominal yield premium of UK bonds vanishes once they are hedged into euros. UK hedged 2-year bonds yield 50bps less than their German counterparts, and 10-year Gilts offer 80bps less than Bunds, which limits continental inflows into the UK. Equity Market Implications UK stocks are pro-cyclical, and their absolute performance will bottom in tandem with global equities. The near-term outlook for global equities remains clouded by the confluence of global growth fears, a weaker CNY, and tighter monetary policy around the world. Meanwhile, UK stocks are very cheap, trading at a forward P/E ratio of 11. They are tactically oversold and are lagging forward earnings (Chart 13). Relative to global equities, the performance of UK stocks will continue to track that of global energy firms compared to the broad market. The heavy exposure of UK large-cap indices to oil and gas stocks has been a major asset since energy shares have become market darlings (Chart 14). Chart 13UK Stocks Are Close To A Bottom UK Stocks Are Close To A Bottom UK Stocks Are Close To A Bottom Chart 14UK Large-Caps Are About Oil UK Large-Caps Are About Oil UK Large-Caps Are About Oil At the time of writing, Sweden and Finland have yet to officialize their membership application to NATO, but BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy team assigns a high probability to this outcome. Russia will not stand idly by, especially as the EU threatens to cut their oil imports. Consequently, a deeper energy embargo is increasingly likely, which should prompt a temporary but violent rally in oil and natural gas prices. This process should sustain a few more weeks of outperformance from UK large-cap shares relative to the rest of the world. Chart 15The UK vs The Eurozone: Cheap But Overbought The UK vs The Eurozone: Cheap But Overbought The UK vs The Eurozone: Cheap But Overbought Structurally, UK equities are likely to remain well supported. A pullback in relative performance later this year is possible once oil prices ease off as BCA’s Commodity and Energy team expects. However, the oil market will stay tight for years to come because of the investment dearth observed since 2014-2015, when OPEC 2.0 started its market-share war. According to Bob Ryan, BCA’s Chief Commodity Strategist, it will take years of high returns in the sector to attract the capital needed to lift energy capex enough to line up supply with demand. Thus, energy remains a structurally favored sector, which will boost the cheap UK market’s appeal. UK stocks enjoy a structural tailwind relative to Euro Area shares. They remain cheap, because they still trade at a significant historical discount (Chart 15). Moreover, relative earnings are moving decisively in favor of UK stocks, something that is unlikely to change, even if the UK economy contracts. Ultimately, UK large-cap names derive the bulk of their profits from overseas and the structural tailwind of a secular commodity bull market will continue to assert itself on relative profits. Nevertheless, UK shares have also become extremely overbought, which raises the risk of a pullback in the second half of the 2022 (Chart 15, third and fourth panel). The recent outperformance of UK stocks relative to those of the Eurozone has been larger than what sectoral biases explain. An equal-sector weights version of the UK MSCI has outperformed a similarly constructed Euro Area index by 9.6% year-to-date. Chart 16Waiting For Catalysts To A Eurozone Rebound Waiting For Catalysts To A Eurozone Rebound Waiting For Catalysts To A Eurozone Rebound A tactical rectification of the overbought conditions in the performance of UK equities relative to those of the Euro Area will require an ebbing of stagflation fears in the Euro Area (Chart 16, top panel). This implies that investors looking to buy Eurozone equities are waiting for a stabilization in the energy market (that is, waiting for clarity about Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO decision as well as Russia’s response). It also means that the Chinese economy must stabilize, since Eurozone equities are more sensitive to the evolution of the Chinese credit impulse than UK ones (Chart 16, second panel). Nonetheless, BCA’s Global Fixed Income Strategy team’s view on UK-German spreads is consistent with an eventual tactical pull back in the relative performance of UK stocks vis-à-vis Euro Area ones (Chart 16, bottom panel). Two pair trades make attractive vehicles to bet on an underperformance of UK stocks relative to those of the Euro Area in the second half of 2022. The first one is to sell UK financials at the expense of Euro Area financials. Historically, a decline in UK Gilt yields relative to their German equivalent strongly correlates with an underperformance of UK financials (Chart 17). The second one is to sell UK healthcare names relative to those in the Eurozone. The relative performance of healthcare shares has greatly outpaced relative earnings and is now hitting a critical resistance level (Chart 18). Moreover, UK healthcare firms are exceptionally overbought relative to their Euro Area competitors. Importantly, those two trades display little correlation to the broad market trend. Chart 17Challenges To UK Financials Challenges To UK Financials Challenges To UK Financials Chart 18UK Healthcare: Running Ahead Of Itself UK Healthcare: Running Ahead Of Itself UK Healthcare: Running Ahead Of Itself Finally, UK small-cap stocks are becoming attractive relative to their large-cap counterparts, although the timing remains risky. Unlike the internationally focused large-cap indices, small-cap shares are a direct bet on the health of the UK domestic economy. Hence, small- and mid-cap names have massively underperformed the FTSE-100 as market participants sniffed out the poor outlook for UK economic activity (Chart 19). They are now extremely oversold relative to large-cap names and their overvaluation has been corrected. The main problem with small-cap shares is the lack of a catalyst to rectify their oversold conditions. The most likely candidate for such a reversal would be a peak in energy inflation, considering it stands at the crux of the headwinds that UK consumption and growth face. However, energy CPI will not peak until later this fall and thus, the pain on UK households will build until then. As a result, wait for a clear sign that energy inflation recedes before entering a long UK small-cap / short UK large-cap contrarian trade (Chart 20). Chart 19Bombed Out Small-Caps... Bombed Out Small-Caps... Bombed Out Small-Caps... Chart 20…Need A Peak In Energy Inflation ...Need A Peak In Energy Inflation ...Need A Peak In Energy Inflation Bottom Line: In line with our expectations that UK growth will worsen significantly in the quarters ahead, we follow the BCA Global Fixed Income team and move to overweight UK government bonds within European fixed income portfolios. While we expect GBP/USD will bottom once global risk assets find a floor, BCA’s Foreign Exchange Strategy team also anticipates Sterling to depreciate further relative to the euro. Because of their large energy and materials exposure, UK large-cap equities will enjoy a structural outperformance relative to Euro Area large-cap indices on the back of a secular bull market in commodities. However, a temporary pullback in the UK’s relative performance is likely in the second half of 2022. Selling UK financials and UK healthcare stocks relative to their Eurozone counterparts offers a compelling approach to implement this view. Finally, UK small-caps are oversold relative to large-caps, but we recommend investors wait until energy CPI peaks when a relative rebound may emerge.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com Tactical Recommendations Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations

Executive Summary The Fed, Bank of England (BoE) and Reserve Bank of Australia all hiked rates last week. The BoE, however, signaled a note of caution on future UK growth, given soaring energy prices and plunging consumer and business confidence.  Interest rate markets are pricing in a peak in UK policy rates over the next year near 2.5%, above realistic estimates of neutral that are more in the 1.5-2% range. UK productivity and potential growth remain too weak to support a higher neutral rate than that. With the BoE forecasting near recessionary conditions over the next couple of years if those market-implied rate hikes come to fruition, the time is right to increase exposure to UK government bonds in global fixed income portfolios. UK Rate Expectations Are Too High UK Rate Expectations Are Too High UK Rate Expectations Are Too High Bottom Line: Markets are overestimating how much additional tightening the Bank of England can deliver. We are upgrading our recommended strategic stance on UK Gilts from underweight (2 out of 5) to overweight (4 out of 5). Not All Central Bankers Can Credibly Restore Credibility Chart 1Developed Market Bond Yields Back To 2018 Highs Developed Market Bond Yields Back To 2018 Highs Developed Market Bond Yields Back To 2018 Highs Three more central bank meetings, three more rate hikes. Last week brought a 50bp hike from the Fed, a 25bp hike – the first of this tightening cycle – by the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and a 25bp rate increase from the Bank of England (BoE). The Fed and RBA moves did little to stabilize the government bond bear markets in the US and Australia, but the BoE was able to provide a temporary reprieve for the Gilt selloff by playing up potential UK recession (stagflation?) risks. Bond yields worldwide remains laser focused on high global inflation and the associated monetary policy response that will be needed to stabilize inflation expectations (Chart 1). That includes both interest rate hikes and reducing the size of bloated central bank balance sheets. The threat of such “double tightening” is weighing on global growth expectations and risk asset valuations. The MSCI World equity index is down -6.4% (in USD terms) so far in the Q2/2022 and down -14.5% since the mid-November/2021 peak. Although in a more mitigated way, credit markets are also being impacted, with the Bloomberg Global High-Yield index down -2.6% so far in Q2 on an excess return basis versus government bonds. Rate hike expectations have started to catch up to elevated inflation expectations, at least according to inflation linked bonds. The yield on 10-year US TIPS now sits at +0.29%, a huge swing from the -1% level seen just one month ago (Chart 2). The 10-year real yield is even higher in Canada (+0.81%) where the Bank of Canada just delivered its own 50bp rate hike in April. On the other hand, 10-year real yields remain deeply below 0% in Europe and the UK, where central bankers have been providing less explicit guidance on future rate hikes and asset purchase reductions compared to the Fed or Bank of Canada. Interest rate markets remain reluctant to price in significantly positive real policy interest rates at the peak of the current tightening cycle. Our proxy for the real terminal rate expectation, the 5-year/5-year overnight index swap rate (OIS) minus the 5-year/5-year CPI swap rate, is only +0.18% in the US. It is still deeply negative in Europe (-1.53%) and the UK (-0.97%). Our estimates of the term premium component of 10-year government bond yields in those three markets is rising alongside interest rate expectations yet remains deeply negative in Europe and the UK (Chart 3). Chart 2Real Rate Divergences In The Face Of A Global Inflation Shock Real Rate Divergences In The Face Of A Global Inflation Shock Real Rate Divergences In The Face Of A Global Inflation Shock ​​​​​​ Chart 3Markets Still Pricing In Structurally Low Rates Markets Still Pricing In Structurally Low Rates Markets Still Pricing In Structurally Low Rates ​​​​​​ Of those three major bond markets, we see the UK term premium as being the least likely to see additional upward repricing, with the BoE less likely than the Fed or ECB to push for an aggressively smaller balance sheet given domestic economic risks. UK Rate Expectations Are Too Hawkish Chart 4Our BoE Monitor Justifies Recent Tightening Moves Our BoE Monitor Justifies Recent Tightening Moves Our BoE Monitor Justifies Recent Tightening Moves The Bank of England raised rates by 25bps last week, pushing Bank Rate to a 13-year high of 1.0%. The decision was a 6-3 majority, with three Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) members calling for a 50bp hike – matching recent moves by other G-10 central banks like the Fed and Bank of Canada – given tight UK capacity constraints (i.e. low unemployment) and high realized inflation. The MPC noted that additional rate increases would likely be necessary to tame very high UK inflation, a message confirmed by the elevated level of our UK Central Bank Monitor (Chart 4). However, the new economic forecasts presented by the BoE painted a gloomy picture on UK growth, raising the risks of a recession even as UK inflation is expected to continue climbing to a 10% peak in late 2022 on the back of high energy prices.1 Strictly looking at current inflation, the case for the BoE to continue hiking rates is obvious. Yet the BoE may now be placing more weight on the downside risks to growth from the energy shock, at a time when fiscal tightening is no longer providing stimulus. In the press conference following last week’s MPC meeting, BoE Governor Andrew Bailey noted the difficult situation policymakers are facing given the huge surge in energy prices that is fueling inflation while also weighing on household and business real incomes. So what is “neutral” anyway? Related Report  Global Fixed Income StrategyThe UK Leads The Way The BoE is one of the least transparent major central banks when it comes to providing guidance on what it thinks the neutral policy rate is. Market participants are left to arrive at their own conclusions and those can vary substantially, as is currently the case. The UK OIS curve is discounting a peak in rates of 2.72% in 2023 and discounting rate cuts after that starting in 2024. Yet the respondents to the BoE’s new Market Participants Survey are calling for a much lower trajectory with rates peaking at 1.75% before falling to 1.5% in 2024 (Chart 5). Those rate levels are in the lower half of the range of longer-run neutral rate estimates from the same Market Participants Survey, between 1.5% and 2.0% (the shaded box in the chart). Chart 5UK Rate Expectations Are Too High UK Rate Expectations Are Too High UK Rate Expectations Are Too High Chart 6Recessionary BoE Forecasts, Except For GDP Recessionary BoE Forecasts, Except For GDP Recessionary BoE Forecasts, Except For GDP Combining the messages from the OIS curve and the Survey, markets are pricing in a path for the BoE Bank Rate that will become restrictive by mid-2023, with another 172bps of rate hikes. The BoE uses market pricing for future interest rates in its economic forecasts. The Bank’s models suggest that a move to raise rates to 2.5% in response to high UK inflation, as markets are discounting, would result in a severe UK downturn that would both push up unemployment from the current 3.7% to 5.4% by Q2/2025 (Chart 6). Headline inflation would plunge to 1.3% over the same period as the UK output gap widens to -2.25% of GDP from the current “excess demand” level of +0.5%. Oddly enough, the BoE is only forecasting a flat profile for real GDP growth over that entire three-year forecasting period, although there will clearly be some negative GDP prints during that period to generate such a massively disinflationary outcome. A mixed picture on UK growth Currently, the UK economy is flashing some warning signs on growth momentum. The UK manufacturing PMI was 55.8 in April, still well above the 50 level indicating growth but 9.8 pts below the cyclical peak in 2021 (Chart 7). The services PMI is in better shape at 58.9, but it did dip lower in the latest reading. The GfK consumer confidence index has fallen sharply in response to contacting real household income growth, reaching the second-lowest reading in the history of the series dating back to 1974 in April. This is a warning sign for consumer spending – retail sales fell in April for the first time in fifteen months (middle panel). Business confidence is also impacted by the high costs of both energy and labor that is squeezing profit margins. UK real investment spending is nearly contracting on a year-over-year basis, despite the robust readings on investment intentions from the BoEs’ Agents Survey of UK businesses (bottom panel).UK firms are facing higher wage costs at a time of very tight labor market and robust labor demand. The BoE estimates that UK private sector wage growth, after adjusting for compositional effects related to the pandemic, will accelerate to 5.1% by the end of Q2/2022 (Chart 8). Chart 7UK Growth Facing Inflationary Headwinds UK Growth Facing Inflationary Headwinds UK Growth Facing Inflationary Headwinds ​​​​​​ Chart 8UK Labor Market Remains Healthy UK Labor Market Remains Healthy UK Labor Market Remains Healthy ​​​​​​ Chart 9Will House Prices Signal The Peak In UK Inflation? Will House Prices Signal The Peak In UK Inflation? Will House Prices Signal The Peak In UK Inflation? A robust labor market and quickening wage growth is forcing the BoE to maintain a relatively hawkish bias at a time of high energy inflation, even with the growth outlook darkening in the central bank’s own forecasts. Booming house prices are also making the central bank’s job more challenging. The annual growth rate of the Nationwide UK house price index reached 12.4%, a 17-year high, in March. However, rising mortgage rates and declining household real incomes will likely begin to eat into housing demand and, eventually, help slow the rapid pace of house price growth (Chart 9, bottom panel). Summing it all up, the overall UK inflation picture, including wages and housing costs in addition to energy prices and durable goods prices, will force the BoE to deliver a few more rate hikes before year-end before reaching a peak level that is lower than current market pricing. The neutral UK interest rate is likely very low Chart 10Structurally Weak UK Growth = A Low Neutral Rate Structurally Weak UK Growth = A Low Neutral Rate Structurally Weak UK Growth = A Low Neutral Rate The UK economy has suffered from structurally low potential economic growth dating back to the Brexit referendum in 2016. UK businesses stopped investing in the face of the uncertainty over the UK’s relationship with Europe. There has basically been no growth in UK fixed investment over the past five years. In response, UK productivity has only grown an annualized 0.9% over that same period (Chart 10) and the OECD’s estimate of UK potential GDP growth has been cut from 2% to 1.1%. With such low potential growth, the neutral BoE policy interest rate is likely even lower than the 1.5-2% range of estimates from the BoE’s Market Participant Survey. Tighter fiscal policy also lowers the neutral UK interest rate, with the UK Office of Budget Responsibility forecasting a narrowing of the UK budget deficit of -13.6 percentage points between the 2021 peak and 2027 (bottom panel). A flat UK Gilt curve is also a sign that the neutral interest rate is quite low. The 2-year/10-year Gilt curve now sits at a mere -49bps with Bank Rate only at 1% (Chart 11). While this is modestly steeper from the near-inversion of the curve seen at the start of 2022, a very flat curve at a nominal policy rate of only 1% suggests that the neutral rate is not far from the current level. Sluggish UK equity market performance and widening UK corporate credit spreads also argue that Bank Rate may already be turning restrictive, although a lower trade-weighted pound is helping to mitigate the overall tightening of UK financial conditions. Chart 11UK Financial Conditions Are Not Restrictive (Yet) UK Financial Conditions Are Not Restrictive (Yet) UK Financial Conditions Are Not Restrictive (Yet) ​​​​​​ Chart 12Pressure On The BoE Will Not Peak Until Inflation Does Pressure On The BoE Will Not Peak Until Inflation Does Pressure On The BoE Will Not Peak Until Inflation Does ​​​​​​ In the end, the pressure on the BoE to tighten will not ease until UK inflation peaks. The BoE is suffering a severe credibility crisis, with its own public opinion survey showing the deepest level of public dissatisfaction with the bank since the Global Financial Crisis (Chart 12). Inflation expectations are at similar levels that prevailed during that period, although the unique nature of the current inflation upturn, fueled by global supply-chain squeezes and war-related boosts to commodity prices, will likely prevent a repeat of the relatively fast reversal of inflation expectations seen after the Global Financial Crisis. Investment Implications – Get Ready For Gilt Outperformance Chart 13Upgrade UK Gilts To Overweight Upgrade UK Gilts To Overweight Upgrade UK Gilts To Overweight With the BoE already pushing Bank Rate towards a plausible neutral range, we do not expect many more rate hikes in the UK. Our base case is that the BoE hikes 2-3 more times by year-end, pushing Bank Rate to 1.5-1.75%, before pausing. This would represent a lower peak in policy rates than currently priced in the UK OIS curve. That is a relatively dovish outcome that typically leads to positive performance for a government bond market according to our “Global Golden Rule” framework, which we will revisit in next week’s Strategy Report. For now, however, we see a strong case to turn more positive on UK Gilts, with the BoE likely to deliver fewer rate hikes than discounted (Chart 13). The BoE is also far less likely to begin reducing its balance sheet by selling its Gilt holdings back to the market. BoE Governor Bailey strongly hinted last week that such aggressive quantitative tightening (QT) was not a given, even after the Bank research staff presents its proposals to the MPC in August. A delay in QT would also be a factor boosting UK Gilt performance versus other developed economy bond markets where more aggressive reductions in central bank balance sheets are more likely, like the US and potentially even the euro area. This week, we are upgrading our recommended strategic UK weighting from underweight to overweight. In next week’s report, we will consider the proper allocation for the UK within our model bond portfolio, after reviewing potential bond return forecasts stemming from our Global Golden Rule. Bottom Line: Markets are overestimating how much additional tightening the Bank of England can deliver. We are upgrading our recommended strategic stance on UK Gilts from underweight (2 out of 5) to overweight (4 out of 5). Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      The mechanical way that the UK government’s energy price regulator, Ofgem, sets price caps on retail gas and electricity costs - based on changes in wholesale energy costs implied by futures curves – means that UK household energy prices will rise by 40% in October, according to BoE estimates. GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark It’s Time To Flip The Script - Upgrade UK Gilts It’s Time To Flip The Script - Upgrade UK Gilts The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index It’s Time To Flip The Script - Upgrade UK Gilts It’s Time To Flip The Script - Upgrade UK Gilts Tactical Overlay Trades

Executive Summary The Fed offered more explicit near-term forward rate guidance at its meeting last week. This guidance will reduce yield volatility at the front-end of the curve during the next few months. We expect the Fed to deliver two more 50 basis point rate hikes (in June and July) before settling into a pattern of hiking by 25 bps at each meeting. Our anticipated Fed hike path is shallower than what is priced in the market, but it also lasts longer. Investors should position for this outcome by buying the December 2022 SOFR futures contract versus the December 2024 contract. Economic and financial market indicators suggest that the 10-year Treasury yield will fall back during the next six months, alongside falling inflation. Rate Expectations Rate Expectations Rate Expectations Bottom Line: Investors should keep portfolio duration close to benchmark for now, though we expect to get an opportunity to reduce portfolio duration later this year once inflation and bond yields are lower. Feature Last week was a chaotic one for the US bond market. Treasury yields rose and the Fed delivered its first 50 basis point rate increase since 2000. Yet, there is a broad consensus that the Fed’s message was dovish relative to expectations. In this week’s report we try to make sense of these confusing market signals. We do this by focusing on two important occurrences: (1) The Fed’s “dovish” 50 basis point rate hike and (2) The 10-year Treasury yield breaking above 3% for the first time since 2018. The Fed Takes Back Control Chart 1An Uncertain Rates Market An Uncertain Rates Market An Uncertain Rates Market Fed Chair Jay Powell had a clear agenda for last week’s FOMC press conference. Simply, he wanted to provide more concrete forward rate guidance to a market that had become increasingly volatile (Chart 1). The problem is that while the Fed had been explicit about its intention to lift rates, it hadn’t provided any firm guidance about its anticipated pace of tightening. This led to wild speculation in rates markets. Will the Fed lift rates at every meeting or every other meeting? Will it move in traditional 25 basis point increments or perhaps 50 basis point increments? Maybe even 75 basis point increments? This sort of speculation is unacceptable to Chair Powell who said in his opening remarks that the Fed “will strive to avoid adding uncertainty to what is already an extraordinarily challenging and uncertain time.”1 New Explicit Forward Guidance From Chair Powell’s post-meeting press conference, we can discern the following about the Fed’s near-term rate hike intentions. The Fed will not lift rates by 75 basis points at any single meeting. Two more 50 basis point rate hikes are likely at the June and July FOMC meetings. After July, the Fed will likely continue to lift rates at each FOMC meeting. Inflation’s trend will dictate whether these rate increases are delivered in 50 bps or 25 bps increments. The Fed will continue to lift rates at every meeting until it is confident that it has “done enough to get us on a path to restore price stability.” It’s also worth noting that, in addition to delivering a 50 basis point rate hike and providing firmer forward rate guidance, the Fed announced that it will begin shrinking its balance sheet on June 1. The Fed will follow the plan that was presented in the minutes from the March FOMC meeting and that we discussed in a recent report.2 Turning to markets, we see that the overnight index swap curve (OIS) is priced for an additional 201 bps of rate increases between now and the end of 2022 (Chart 2). This is consistent with three more 50 basis point rate hikes and two more 25 basis point rate hikes at this year’s five remaining FOMC meetings. If delivered, those hikes would bring the fed funds rate up to a range of 2.75% to 3.00%. Chart 2Rate Expectations Rate Expectations Rate Expectations Looking out until the end of 2023, we see the OIS curve priced for 262 bps of rate increases. That is, the market is priced for roughly 200 bps of tightening between now and the end of 2022, but only another 62 bps of rate increases in 2023. In fact, Chart 2 shows that the OIS curve has the funds rate peaking at 3.49% near the middle of 2023 and then edging slowly back down. Related Report  US Investment StrategyWage-Price Spiral? Not So Fast Based on our view that inflation will decline between now and the end of the year, we see the Fed delivering only 175 bps of additional tightening this year (50 bps rate hikes in June and July, followed by three more 25 bps hikes). This is slightly lower than what is priced in the curve. However, given the strong state of private sector balance sheets, we can also easily envision 25 basis point rate increases continuing at every meeting in 2023. That scenario would push the fed funds rate above 4% by the end of 2023, significantly higher than what is priced in the market. We recommend that investors position for this “slower, but longer” tightening cycle by buying the December 2022 SOFR futures contract versus the December 2024 contract (see “Yield Curve Trades” table on page 12). Charts 3A-3D focus more specifically on what’s priced in for the next few FOMC meetings. The charts show where the fed funds rate is expected to land after each meeting, as implied by the fed funds futures curve. Additionally, we use an ‘x’ to denote where we expect the fed funds rate to be at the end of each meeting. You can see that we expect the fed funds rate to be about 25 bps lower than the market by the end of September. Our expectation of a slower near-term hike pace stems from our view that inflation has already peaked.3 With that in mind, it’s notable that monthly core PCE inflation printed below levels consistent with the Fed’s 2022 forecasts in both February and March (Chart 4). In addition, last week’s employment report showed a significant deceleration in average hourly earnings (Chart 5). Average hourly earnings are an imperfect wage measure because they don’t adjust for the changing industry composition of the workforce. However, an adjusted measure that gives each industry group equal weighting is also starting to slow (Chart 5, bottom panel). Chart 3AMay 2022 FOMC Meeting May 2022 FOMC Meeting May 2022 FOMC Meeting Chart 3BJune 2022 FOMC Meeting June 2022 FOMC Meeting June 2022 FOMC Meeting Chart 3CJuly 2022 FOMC Meeting July 2022 FOMC Meeting July 2022 FOMC Meeting Chart 3DSeptember 2022 FOMC Meeting September 2022 FOMC Meeting September 2022 FOMC Meeting Chart 4Tracking Below The Fed's Forecast Tracking Below The Fed's Forecast Tracking Below The Fed's Forecast Chart 5Peak Wage Growth Peak Wage Growth Peak Wage Growth Bottom Line: The Fed’s more explicit rate guidance will reduce yield volatility at the front-end of the curve. Two more 50 basis point rate hikes are likely in June and July, but we expect falling inflation will prompt the Fed to switch to 25 basis point hikes after that. We also expect the tightening cycle to last longer than what is currently priced in the curve. Investors should keep portfolio duration close to benchmark and should position for our expected “slower, but longer” tightening cycle by owning the December 2022 SOFR futures contract versus the December 2024 contract. A Quick Note On The Neutral Rate And Financial Conditions Chart 6Financial Conditions Financial Conditions Financial Conditions Chart 2 shows that the market expects the Fed to lift the funds rate until it is slightly above the range of the Fed’s long-run neutral rate estimates (2% - 3%). At that point, restrictive monetary policy will presumably weigh on economic growth enough for the Fed to back away from tightening. While forecasters need some estimate of the neutral rate to predict where bond yields will land at the end of the cycle, it’s important to understand that Fed policymakers are not guided by these same concerns. In fact, Chair Powell said the following last week when asked whether the Fed intended to lift rates above estimates of neutral: … there’s not a bright line drawn on the road that tells us when we get [to neutral]. So we’re going to be looking at financial conditions, right. Our policy affects financial conditions and financial conditions affect the economy. So we’re going to be looking at the effect of our policy moves on financial conditions. Are they tightening appropriately? And then we’re going to be looking at the effects on the economy. And we’re going to be making a judgment about whether we’ve done enough to get us on a path to restore price stability. In other words, actual Fed policy will not be guided by neutral rate estimates. Instead, the Fed will continue lifting rates at a regular pace until it sees enough evidence of tightening financial conditions and slowing inflation. For this reason, it will be critical to monitor broad indexes of financial conditions as the Fed tightens policy. At present, the Goldman Sachs Financial Conditions Index remains deep in “accommodative” territory, but it is rising quickly (Chart 6). Based on history, we might expect the pace of tightening to slow once the index breaks into “restrictive” territory. Conversely, if financial conditions don’t tighten very much, then it will encourage the Fed to hike more aggressively.  The Return Of 3% Treasury Yields Chart 7Back Above 3% Back Above 3% Back Above 3% The 10-year Treasury yield broke above 3% after the FOMC meeting on Wednesday and it has so far held firm above that key psychological level. The last time the 10-year yield reached these heights was near the end of the last tightening cycle in 2018 (Chart 7). One big difference between today and 2018 being that today’s 3% 10-year yield consists of a much higher inflation component and a much lower real yield (Chart 7, bottom panel). At 2.88%, the cost of inflation compensation embedded in the 10-year yield is too high, and it will fall as inflation rolls over and the Fed tightens. There is a question, however, about whether this drop in 10-year inflation expectations will translate into a lower nominal bond yield or simply be offset by a rising 10-year real yield. The answer will depend on how quickly inflation comes down off its highs. Chart 85y5y Is Above Neutral 5y5y Is Above Neutral 5y5y Is Above Neutral If inflation falls quickly during the next few months, then the market will start to price-in a less aggressive Fed. This will hold down the 10-year real yield. However, if inflation remains sticky near its current level, then the market will judge that the Fed still has a lot of work to do. This will pressure 10-year real yields higher even if long-dated inflation expectations recede. It’s often simpler to ignore the breakdown between real yields and inflation expectations and focus purely on the nominal bond yield itself. This exercise strongly suggests that long-maturity nominal bond yields will fall back somewhat during the next six months. First, we observe that the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield has risen to 3.19%, above the upper-end of survey estimates of the long-run neutral fed funds rate (Chart 8). Long-maturity forward yields have rarely moved much above the range of neutral rate estimates during the past decade. Second, high-frequency indicators that historically correlate with bond yields have not justified the recent move higher in the 10-year yield. The ratio between the CRB Raw Industrials commodity price index and gold and the relative performance of cyclical versus defensive equity sectors have both stalled out, even as yields have shot up (Chart 9). Finally, the change in bond yields correlates strongly with the level of economic data surprises. Positive data surprises tend to coincide with a rising Treasury yield, and vice-versa. Economic data surprises have been positive during the past few months, justifying the move higher in yields (Chart 10). However, that trend is poised to reverse in the coming months. Economic momentum is bound to slow now that the Fed is tightening and the labor market is close to full employment. Further, the Economic Surprise Index exhibits a strong mean-reverting pattern. Extremely high values tend to be followed by lower values, and vice-versa. A simple auto-regressive model of the Surprise Index suggests that it is on track to turn negative within the next month. Chart 9Bonds Go Their Own Way Bonds Go Their Own Way Bonds Go Their Own Way Chart 10Economic Data Surprises Economic Data Surprises Economic Data Surprises Bottom Line: Our indicators suggest that the 10-year Treasury yield will fall back somewhat during the next six months. That said, on a longer-run horizon we continue to expect that interest rates will rise further than the market anticipates. Investors should maintain neutral portfolio duration for now, but stand ready to re-initiate below-benchmark positions later this year once inflation and bond yields are lower. A Quick Note On The Yield Curve And Credit Spreads Yield Curve Positioning Not only have bond yields increased since the Fed meeting last Wednesday, but the Treasury curve has also steepened significantly. The turnaround in the yield curve has been startling. The 2-year/10-year Treasury slope was inverted one month ago, but it is now back up to 40 bps (Chart 11). But despite the big moves in the 2/10 slope, the yield curve remains quite flat beyond the 5-year maturity point. In fact, the 2/5/10 butterfly spread – the 5-year yield minus the yield on a duration-matched 2/10 barbell – remains far too high compared to the 2/10 slope (Chart 11, bottom 2 panels). Therefore, our recommended yield curve positioning remains unchanged. Investors should buy the 5-year Treasury note versus a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes. Credit Spreads A steeper yield curve has positive implications for corporate bond spreads. All else equal, a steeper yield curve suggests that we are further away from the end of the economic recovery, meaning that corporate bonds have a longer window for outperformance. That said, at 40 bps, the 2-year/10-year Treasury slope is still relatively flat, and while corporate bond spreads have widened during the past few months, the high-yield index option-adjusted spread is still close to its 2019 level and the 12-month breakeven spread for the investment grade index is still below its median since 1995 (Chart 12). Chart 11Favor The 5-Year Favor The 5-Year Favor The 5-Year Chart 12Corporate Bond Valuation Corporate Bond Valuation Corporate Bond Valuation We remain cautious on corporate credit for the time being. Specifically, we recommend an underweight allocation (2 out of 5) to investment grade corporates and a neutral allocation (3 out of 5) to high-yield. However, if the 2-year/10-year Treasury slope were to steepen to above 50 bps and/or if corporate bond spreads were to widen further, then we may see an opportunity this year to tactically increase exposure. Stay tuned. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1    https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20220504.p… 2    Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Peak Inflation,” dated April 19, 2022. 3    Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Peak Inflation,” dated April 19, 2022.   Recommended Portfolio Specification On A Dovish Hike And A 3% Bond Yield On A Dovish Hike And A 3% Bond Yield Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns

Executive Summary The US Still Dominates Economic Output The US Still Dominates Economic Output The US Still Dominates Economic Output While the Ukraine war has been positive for the greenback, there is a slow tectonic shift away from the dollar as China rethinks holding concentrated foreign currency reserves. In the near term, the dollar faces positive macro variables and still-rising geopolitical tensions. Longer term, as global trade slows and countries gravitate into regional trading blocs, the dollar will need to fall to narrow the US trade deficit. By the same token, the Chinese RMB could weaken in the near term but will stabilize longer term. China will promote its currency across Asia. Currency volatility will take a step-function higher in this new paradigm. Winners will be the currencies of small open economies, especially in resource-rich nations. Trade Recommendation Inception Date Return LONG GOLD 2019-12-06 27.7% Bottom Line: Cyclical forces continue to underpin the dollar, such as rising US interest rates, a slowdown in global growth, and a safe haven premium from still-high geopolitical tensions. That said, the dollar is overbought, expensive, and vulnerable to reserve diversification over the longer term. While tactical long positions make sense, strategic investors should not chase the dollar higher. Feature Currency market action this week focused on two key central bank meetings: the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. The Fed raised rates by 50 basis points while the BoE raised by 25 points, yet the market expectation differs. In the US, markets imply that the Fed can keep real interest positive while engineering a soft landing in the economy. In the UK (and Euro Area), markets see more acute stagflationary risks and assign a higher probability to a policy error. This situation, together with rising geopolitical risk, has put a bid under the dollar. Related Report  Commodity & Energy StrategyDie Cast By EU: Inflation, Recession Risks Rise Brewing in the background is the prospect that the Ukraine war and US sanctions on Russia could have longer-term consequences on the dollar. Specifically, Russia and China are now locked into a geopolitical partnership to undermine US geopolitical dominance, including the dollar’s supremacy. While this discussion will inevitably come with some speculation about what will happen in the future, what does the evidence say so far? More importantly, what are some profitable investment opportunities that could arise from any shift? The Russo-Chinese Rebellion Chart 1The US Needs To Externally Finance Defense Spending The US Needs To Externally Finance Defense Spending The US Needs To Externally Finance Defense Spending From Russia’s and China’s point of view, the United States threatens to establish global hegemony. The US possesses the world’s largest economy and most sophisticated military. It has largely maintained its preponderance in these spheres despite the rise of China, the resurgence of Russia, and the formation of the European Union as a geopolitical entity (Chart 1). If the US succeeds in its current endeavor of crippling Russia’s economy and surrounding it with NATO military allies, the world will be even more imbalanced in terms of power, while China will be isolated and insecure. To illustrate this point, NATO’s military spending is much higher than that of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which is not nearly as developed a military alliance (Chart 2). Hence Russia and China believe they must take action to counter the US and establish a global balance of power. When Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping met on February 4 to declare that their strategic partnership will suffer “no limits,” which means no military limits, they declared a new multipolar era and warned against US domination under the guise of liberalism. If China allows Putin to fail in his conflict with the West, the Russian regime will eventually undergo a major leadership and policy change and China will become isolated. Whereas if China accepts Russia’s current strategic overture, China will be fortified. Russia can be immensely supportive of China’s Eurasian strategy to bypass US maritime dominance and improve supply security (Chart 3). Chart 2NATO Vs SCO: US Threat Of Dominance FX Consequences Of The US-Russia Conflict FX Consequences Of The US-Russia Conflict The consequence of this Russo-Chinese alliance will be to transact in a currency that falls outside sanctions by the US. This will be no easy feat. The US dollar still monopolizes the world’s monetary system, even though the US is likely to lose economic clout over time.  Chart 3China Cannot Reject Russia FX Consequences Of The US-Russia Conflict FX Consequences Of The US-Russia Conflict ​​​​​ De-Dollarization And A Brewing USD Crisis? Fact Versus Fiction A reserve currency must serve the three basic functions of money on a global scale – providing a store of value, unit of account, and accepted medium of exchange. This status gives the dominant reserve currency an “exorbitant privilege,” a range of advantages including the ability to run persistent current account deficits and impose devastating sanctions on geopolitical rivals. Since the turn of the century, the US has struggled to maintain domestic political stability and has failed to deter challenges to its global leadership posed by Russia, China, and lesser powers. Lacking public support for foreign military adventures after Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington turned to economic sanctions to try to influence the behavior of other states. The results have been mixed in terms of geopolitics but cumulatively they have been neutral or positive for the trade-weighted dollar. The US adopted harsh sanctions against North Korea in 2005, Iran in 2010, Russia in 2012, Venezuela in 2015, and China in 2018. The primary trend in the dollar was never altered (Chart 4). Chart 4A Chronicle Of Sanctions And The Dollar A Chronicle Of Sanctions And The Dollar A Chronicle Of Sanctions And The Dollar Yet sweeping sanctions against Russia and China are qualitatively different from other sanctions– as they are among the world’s great powers. The extraordinary sanctions on Russia in 2022 – including cutting off its access to US dollar reserves – have proven deeply unsettling for China and other nations that fear they might someday end up on the wrong side of the US’s foreign policy. Russia’s own experience proves that diversification away from the dollar is likely to occur. From a peak of 47% in 2007, Russia reduced its dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves to 16%. It cut its Treasury holdings from a peak of over 35% of international reserves to less than 1% today. Meanwhile Russia increased its gold holdings from 2% in 2008 to 20% (Chart 5). The Russians accelerated their diversification away from the dollar after invading Ukraine in 2014 to reduce the impact of sanctions. However, the world is familiar with Russian economic isolation. The West embargoed the USSR throughout the Cold War from 1949-1991. The dollar rose to prominence during this period, so it is not intuitive that Russia’s latest withdrawal from the global economy will enable other countries to abandon the dollar when they have failed in the past due to lack of alternatives. What is clear is that there is no clean or easy exit today from a dollar-denominated financial system. But there are a few lessons from Russia: The ruble has recouped all the losses since the implementation of sanctions. It runs a large current account surplus and has stemmed capital outflows. Another factor has been a sharp reduction in its dependence on the dollar. This will cushion the inflationary impact of US sanctions. Going forward, Russia will be much more insulated from the US dollar but at a terrible cost to potential economic growth (Chart 6). A dearth of US dollar capex into Russia will cripple productivity growth. The lesson for other US rivals will be to take economic stability into account when engaging in geopolitical rivalry.  Chart 5Russia Was Able To Dump Treasurys... Russia Was Able To Dump Treasurys... Russia Was Able To Dump Treasurys... The dollar has been unfazed by the Russian debacle. The victims have been other reserve currencies such as the euro, British pound, and Japanese yen, which are engulfed in an energy crisis from Russia’s actions.  Chart 6...But The Economic Impact Will Remain Severe ...But The Economic Impact Will Remain Severe ...But The Economic Impact Will Remain Severe ​​​​​​ The key question that matters for investors will be what China will do. As one of the largest holders of US Treasurys, a destabilizing exit would have dramatic currency market impacts and could backfire on China. The trick will be to continue exiting this system without precipitating domestic instability. What Will China Do? China has learned two critical lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, with regard to raising the appeal of the RMB. First, the economic impact of US sanctions can still be devastating even when you have diversified out of dollars. Second, access to commodities is ever more important. As such, any strategy China chooses will need to mitigate these risks. China started diversifying away from the dollar in 2011 and today holds $1.05 trillion in US Treasurys. A little less than half of its foreign exchange reserves are denominated in dollars (Chart 7). This has been a gradual diversification that has not upended the current monetary regime. More importantly, China’s diversification accounts for the bulk of the shift by non-allies away from treasuries. Their share of foreign-held treasuries has fallen from 41% in 2009 to 23% today (Chart 8). Chart 7China Has Lowered USD Reserve Holdings China Has Lowered USD Reserve Holdings China Has Lowered USD Reserve Holdings ​​​​​​ Chart 8US Allies Still Willing To Hold USDs... US Allies Still Willing To Hold USDs... US Allies Still Willing To Hold USDs... ​​​​​​ China’s diversification has helped drive down the overall foreign share of US government debt holdings (excluding domestic central banks) from close to 50% in the middle of the last decade to 36% today (Chart 9). It has also weighed on the dollar. China can and will speed up its diversification from the dollar in the wake of the Ukraine war. While Americans will say that China only need fear such sanctions if it attacks Taiwan or other countries, China will not rest assured. Beijing must respond to US capability, not the Biden Administration’s stated intentions. A new Republican administration could arise as soon as January 2025 and take the offensive against China. The US and China are already engaged in great power rivalry and Beijing cannot afford to substitute hope for strategy. China ran a $224 billion current account surplus in 2021, so part of its strategy could be to reduce the pool of savings that need to be recycled every year into global assets. Since 2007 China has sent large amounts of outward direct investment into the world to acquire real assets and natural resources. The Xi administration tried to bring coherence to this outward investment by prioritizing different countries and investments adhere to China’s economic and strategic aims. The Belt and Road Initiative is the symbol of this process (Chart 10). Going forward, China will continue this process. It will also recycle more of its savings at home by increasing investment in critical industries such as energy security, semiconductors, and defense. Chart 9...But A Slow Diversification From US Debt Persists FX Consequences Of The US-Russia Conflict FX Consequences Of The US-Russia Conflict The key priorities will remain a Eurasian strategy of circumventing the US navy. Building natural gas pipelines and other infrastructure to link up with Russia is an obvious area of emphasis, although it will involve tough negotiations with Moscow. China will also prioritize Central Asia, the Middle East, South Asia, and mainland Southeast Asia as areas where its influence can grow with limited intervention by the US and its allies (Chart 11). Chart 10The Belt And Road Initiative In Progress The Belt And Road Initiative In Progress The Belt And Road Initiative In Progress ​​​​​​   Chart 11China Outward Investment Will Need To Be Strategic FX Consequences Of The US-Russia Conflict FX Consequences Of The US-Russia Conflict Chart 12The RMB Could Dominate Intra-Regional Asean Trade FX Consequences Of The US-Russia Conflict FX Consequences Of The US-Russia Conflict As China invests more at home and in other countries, financing and invoicing deals in the renminbi will grow. While the dollar is the transactional currency globally, it is far less relevant when considering local trading blocs. The euro dominates intra-European trade, suggesting China can try to expand RMB invoicing for intra-Asian trade (Chart 12). Even then, however, the yuan faces serious obstacles from China’s inability or unwillingness to extend security guarantees to its partners, failure shift the economic model to consumerism, persistent currency controls, closed capital account, and geopolitical competition with the United States. Investors should pay close attention to shifts occurring at the margin. The number of bilateral swap lines offered to foreign central banks by the People’s Bank of China has grown (Chart 13), with a total amount of around 4 trillion yuan. This allows the PBoC to use its massive foreign exchange reserves, worth about US$3.2 trillion, to back yuan liabilities. As China continues to grow and increases the share of RMB trade within its sphere of influence, the yuan will rise as an invoicing currency (Chart 14). This could take years, even decades, but a shift is already underway. Chart 13The People's Bank Of Asia? FX Consequences Of The US-Russia Conflict FX Consequences Of The US-Russia Conflict ​​​​​​ Chart 14China Is Growing In Economic Importance China Is Growing In Economic Importance China Is Growing In Economic Importance ​​​​​​ In the near term, any US sanctions on China will hurt the RMB. Combined with hypo-globalization, China’s zero-Covid policy, narrowing interest rate differentials, and flight from Chinese assets, it is too soon to be positive on the RMB in the context of US-China confrontation (Chart 15). Longer term, China’s ability to ascend the reserve currency ladder will require a more radical change in Chinese policy to move the dollar. Chart 15CNY And US Sanctions CNY And US Sanctions CNY And US Sanctions Where Does The Euro Fit In? The biggest competitor to the US dollar is the euro, which took the largest chunk out of the US’s share of the global currency reserve basket in recent decades (Chart 16). Yet the EU could suffer a long-term loss of security, productivity, and stability from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing energy cutoff with Russia. Chart 16The Dollar Remains A Reserve Currency The Dollar Remains A Reserve Currency The Dollar Remains A Reserve Currency The EU will have to spend more on energy security and national defense. This will lead to an increase in debt securities that other countries could buy, which offers a way for countries to diversify from the dollar. However, Europe does not provide China or Russia with protection from US sanctions. The EU is allied with the US, it imposed sanctions on Russia along with the US, and like the US is pursuing extra-territorial law enforcement with its sanctions. When the US withdrew from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, the EU disagreed technically, but in practice it enforced the sanctions anyway. The euro is hardly a safer reserve currency than sterling or the yen for countries looking to quarrel with the United States. The fact is that all of these allied states are likely to cooperate together in the event that any other state attempts to revise the global order as Russia has done. Not necessarily because they are democracies and share similar values but because they derive their national security from the US and its alliance system. The takeaway is that the euro will become a buying opportunity if and when the security environment stabilizes. Then diversification into the euro will occur. But it will not become a landslide that unseats the dollar, since the euro will still have a higher geopolitical risk premium. Investment Takeaways The historical evidence suggests that US sanctions have not weighed on the dollar. In the case of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, it has been positive for the greenback. That said, there is a slow tectonic shift from the dollar, as each economic powerhouse evaluates the merits of holding concentrated foreign currency reserves. In the near term, the dollar will continue to be driven by traditional economic variables – global growth, real interest rate differentials, and the resilience of the US economy. That remains a positive. Geopolitical tensions reinforce the dollar’s current rally. Longer term, as globalization deteriorates and countries gravitate into regional trading blocs, the dollar will need to adjust lower to narrow the US trade deficit. By the same token, the RMB could weaken in the near term but will need to stabilize longer term, if Beijing wants it to be considered an anchor and store of value for other Asian currencies. Chart 17Silver Demand Could Explode Higher As Currency Volatility Rises Silver Demand Could Explode Higher As Currency Volatility Rises Silver Demand Could Explode Higher As Currency Volatility Rises The key takeaway is that currency volatility will take a step-function higher in this new paradigm. The winners could be the currencies of small open economies, especially in resource-rich nations. A world in which economic powers increasingly pursue national interests is likely to be inflationary. These powers will deplete the external pool of global savings, as current account balances wind down in favor of national and strategic interests. They will also likely encourage the demand for anti-fiat assets as currency volatility takes a step-function higher. Gold is likely to do well is this environment, but silver could be on the cusp of an explosion higher. The metal has found some measure of support around $22-23 per ounce even as manufacturing bottlenecks have hammered industrial demand. Long-only investors should hold both gold and silver, but a short gold/silver position makes sense both economically and from a valuation standpoint (Chart 17). Geopolitical Housekeeping: We are closing our Long FTSE 100 / Short DM-ex-US Equities trade for a gain of 19.5%. We still favor this trade cyclically and will look to reinstate it at a future date. We are also booking gains on our short TWD-USD trade for a return of 5.8% — though we remain short Taiwanese equities and continue to expect a fourth Taiwan Strait geopolitical crisis.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix

Executive Summary A True Bond Bear Market, USD-Hedged Or Unhedged A True Bond Bear Market, USD-Hedged Or Unhedged A True Bond Bear Market, USD-Hedged Or Unhedged The US dollar has appreciated in 2022, most notably against the euro and Japanese yen. The rally has been more muted against the currencies of major US trading partners like the Canadian dollar and Chinese yuan. The dollar strength to date has had minimal impact on US inflation and will not force any adjustment in the Fed’s hawkish path on interest rates. The weakness of the euro and yen versus the USD will not turn the ECB or Bank of Japan more hawkish, given the lack of visible pass-through from currency depreciation to domestic inflation in Europe and Japan. The two largest owners of US Treasuries, China and Japan, have not increased Treasury purchases in response to higher US yields and a firmer US dollar. Geopolitical tensions and a desire to diversify out of US assets will continue to limit China buying of US Treasuries. Even higher US yields will be needed to compensate Japanese investors for higher bond and currency volatility at a time when the cost to hedge USD exposure is high and rising. Bottom Line: An appreciating US dollar is not yet a reason to expect a peak in US inflation or Treasury yields, or a change in ECB/BoJ policy. Maintain a neutral global duration stance and continue to underweight US Treasuries versus German Bunds and JGBs. Feature The strengthening US dollar (USD) has gotten the attention of investors, with the DXY index up +8.1% since the start of 2022 and threatening a major breakout from the range that has prevailed since 2016 (Chart 1). There have been notable moves in the major currencies that are in the DXY index, especially the euro (EUR) and Japanese yen (JPY). EUR/USD now sits at 1.05 and is threatening a move towards the parity level last seen in 2002. USD/JPY has seen a stunningly rapid increase to the current 130 level, rising 15 big figures in just two months. On a broader basis, the USD rally has been less impressive. The Federal Reserve’s nominal broad trade-weighted dollar index is up a more modest +3.7%  year-to-date (Chart 2). Currencies of the major US trading partners have seen less impressive moves versus the dollar compared to the euro and yen. The Canadian dollar is down -1.9%, while the Mexican peso is flat, versus the dollar so far in 2022. Even the tightly managed Chinese currency (CNY) has belatedly joined the depreciation party, with USD/CNY up +4% since mid-April. Chart 1USD Breaking Out Against The Majors USD Breaking Out Against The Majors USD Breaking Out Against The Majors ​​​​​ Chart 2Smaller FX Moves From The Larger US Trade Partners Smaller FX Moves From The Larger US Trade Partners Smaller FX Moves From The Larger US Trade Partners ​​​​​​ For bond markets, the move towards a stronger US dollar is relevant if a) it is sustainable; b) it helps cool off the overheating US economy; and c) it induces capital flows into US Treasuries. On all three counts, the current bout of dollar strength has not been enough to reverse the upward trajectory of US Treasury yields, in absolute terms and relative to government bonds in Europe and Japan. Multiple Drivers Of The USD Rally First and foremost, the latest appreciation of the USD has been about rising US interest rate expectations. The Fed’s increasingly hawkish rhetoric in response to surging inflation has forced a sharp upward adjustment of both the near-term and medium-term path for US bond yields. This has been most evident in the real yield component of yields, with the yield on the 10-year inflation-protected TIPS now in positive territory at +0.15% - a big increase from the -0.5 to -1% range that has prevailed during the past two years of the COVID pandemic. Related Report  Global Fixed Income StrategyWe’re All Yield Chasers Now The momentum of the USD rally, with a +13.6% year-over-year gain in the DXY index, has been robust compared to the outright level of US bond yield spreads versus the major developed markets, especially after adjusting for realized inflation differentials (Chart 3). This reflects other USD-bullish factors beyond US interest rate expectations. The US dollar typically behaves as a defensive currency, appreciating during periods of slowing global growth and/or rising investor risk aversion. Both are happening at the same time right now, boosting the safe haven appeal of the US dollar. Global growth expectations are depressed, with the ZEW survey of investment professionals back down to the pandemic lows of 2020 (Chart 4, top panel).1 Worries about slowing growth and high inflation, and the rapid tightening of global monetary policies needed to combat that inflation, are also weighing on investor confidence. US equity market volatility has picked up and investors are paying up to protect their portfolios via options - the VIX index is back above 30 and the CBOE put/call ratio is at a two-year high (middle panel). Chart 3A Big USD Rally Fueled By Wider Real Yield Differentials A Big USD Rally Fueled By Wider Real Yield Differentials A Big USD Rally Fueled By Wider Real Yield Differentials ​​​​​​ Chart 4Slowing Global Growth & Rising Risk Aversion Weighing On USD Slowing Global Growth & Rising Risk Aversion Weighing On USD Slowing Global Growth & Rising Risk Aversion Weighing On USD ​​​​​​ This “perfect storm” of USD-bullish factors – rising US interest rate expectations, slowing global growth expectations and increased investor nervousness – has pushed to USD to a level that now appears stretched. BCA Research’s US Dollar Composite Technical Indicator, which combines measures of breadth, momentum, sentiment and trader positioning, is now at an overbought extreme that has heralded past US dollar reversals (bottom panel). Bottom Line: The rising US dollar now discounts a lot of Fed tightening, growth pessimism and investor fear. Conditions for a reversal are in place if any of those USD-bullish factors lose influence, most notably Fed expectations. USD Strength Does Not Impact The Outlook For The Fed, ECB Or BoJ Chart 5A True Bond Bear Market, USD-Hedged Or Unhedged A True Bond Bear Market, USD-Hedged Or Unhedged A True Bond Bear Market, USD-Hedged Or Unhedged USD strength has made life even more difficult of bond investors, at a time when returns across the fixed income universe have suffered because of the duration-related losses from rising bond yields. The Bloomberg Global Treasury index is down -12.2% so far in 2022, and down -18% from the 2020 peak, on a currency-unhedged basis (Chart 5). The returns are not much better this year on a USD-hedged basis, down -6.8% since the start of the year. The latter is suffering from both duration losses and the rising cost to hedge the US dollar. An investor hedging USD exposure into JPY must pay an annualized 165bps (using 3-month currency forwards), while hedging USD exposure into EUR costs 200bps. Those hedging costs primarily reflect higher US interest rate expectations versus Europe and Japan. They will only come down when markets believe that the Fed will stop raising interest rates and begin to easy policy. It is not clear that the current bout of USD strength, on its own, is enough to change the Fed’s plans. Typically, a substantially stronger US dollar would lead the Fed along a less hawkish path, as it would act to slow imported inflation pressures. However, this is not a typical Fed cycle with US headline CPI inflation at a 41-year high of 8.5%. A huge part of that US inflation overshoot is due to global supply squeezes that have impacted the prices of traded goods and commodities. On a rate-of-change basis, the appreciating US dollar is coinciding with some slowing of commodity price momentum, but less so for goods prices. The index of world export prices compiled by the CPB Research Bureau in the Netherlands is up +12.2% on a year-over-year basis, a rapid pace that typically exists during periods of US dollar depreciation (Chart 6, top panel). The annual growth of the CRB commodity index is +17.2%, down from the peak of +54.4% in June 2021, and has roughly tracked the acceleration of the US dollar (middle panel). Yet even with the moderation of commodity inflation, the US dollar strength seen to date has not been enough to slow overshooting global goods price inflation – a necessary condition for central banks like the Fed to turn less hawkish (bottom panel). We do expect global goods price inflation to moderate over the rest of 2022, especially in the US, as post-pandemic consumer spending patterns shift away from goods back towards services. This will be a demand-related story, however, not a USD-strength-related story. Until there is more decisive evidence that goods inflation is slowing meaningfully, the Fed will be forced to deliver on its latest hawkish rhetoric. This includes shifting to a path of hiking rates by 50bps per meeting and moving towards a faster reduction of the Fed’s balance sheet. Right now, there is not much evidence suggesting that the stronger dollar should derail that trajectory (Chart 7): Chart 6USD Strength Not Helping To Slow Global Inflation USD Strength Not Helping To Slow Global Inflation USD Strength Not Helping To Slow Global Inflation ​​​​​ Chart 7The Fed Will Remain Hawkish, Despite A Firmer USD The Fed Will Remain Hawkish, Despite A Firmer USD The Fed Will Remain Hawkish, Despite A Firmer USD ​​​​​​ Non-oil import prices are expanding at a +7.5% pace and accelerating in the face of a firmer US dollar that would normally coincide with slowing import price growth (top panel) The overall level of US financial conditions – which includes not only the currency but other variables like equity prices and corporate bond yields - remains stimulative, both in absolute terms and relative to the level of the trade-weighted US dollar (middle panel). One area of concern is the widening US trade deficit, now nearly -5% of GDP in nominal terms (bottom panel). That wider deficit is primarily related to the combination of strong import demand (and soaring import prices) and soft export demand given slowing global growth. A stronger US dollar does not help reverse either of those trends. However, it is difficult for the Fed to isolate the impact of the currency on the trade deficit given the other non-currency-related factors weighing on US export and import demand (i.e. weaker exports because of the Ukraine war and China COVID lockdowns). In sum, the US dollar strength seen so far does not change our expectations on the path of US inflation, and the pace of Fed tightening, over the next 6-12 months. We still see the Fed delivering multiple rate hikes, but less than the 298bps discounted in the US overnight index swap (OIS) curve over the next year. Conversely, the weakness of the euro and yen versus the US dollar does not change our outlook for the ECB and Bank of Japan. We see both central banks not delivering anything close to the rate hikes discounted in OIS curves. Chart 8Not Much Inflation From A Weaker Euro & Yen Not Much Inflation From A Weaker Euro & Yen Not Much Inflation From A Weaker Euro & Yen On a trade-weighted basis, the euro is only down -5% over the past year - a modest move in comparison to soaring euro area inflation, which hit +7.5% on a headline basis and +3.5% on a core basis in April (Chart 8, middle panel). The ECB is under pressure to end its asset purchases very quickly and begin raising rates, but the euro does not appear to be a reason to accelerate the ECB’s timetable. In Japan, the very rapid weakening of the yen has generated shockingly little inflation, especially in the current environment of strong global goods/commodities inflation. The trade-weighted yen is down -12.7% on a year-over-year basis, yet Japan’s “core-core” CPI index that excludes food and energy prices remains in deflation hitting -0.7% in March – a move exaggerated by plunging mobile phone prices, but still very weak compared to the path of the yen and global goods prices. OIS curves are currently discounting 183bps of ECB rate hikes and 9bps of Bank of Japan rate hikes over the next year. We recommend fading that pricing by staying overweight core Europe and Japan in global bond portfolios, especially versus the US where the Fed is far more likely to follow through on discounted rate hikes. Bottom Line: The dollar strength to date has had minimal impact on US inflation and will not force any adjustment in the Fed’s hawkish path on interest rates. At the same time, the weakness of the euro and yen versus the USD will not turn the ECB or Bank of Japan more hawkish, given the lack of visible pass-through from currency depreciation to domestic inflation in Europe and Japan. Can Foreign Investors Replace Fed Treasury Buying? Chart 9UST Demand Shifting To More Price-Sensitive Buyers UST Demand Shifting To More Price-Sensitive Buyers UST Demand Shifting To More Price-Sensitive Buyers For bond investors, the role of non-US demand for US Treasuries has always been a source of mystery that is often used to explain yield movements. Rumors of flows from major emerging market currency reserve managers or large Asian pension funds has often been used to justify a bullish or bearish view on Treasuries – even when hard data that could prove the existence of such flows is published with long lags that make it useless for timely analysis. The impact of potential foreign bond buying on US Treasury yields has been less influential over the past couple of years. Fed buying via quantitative easing (QE) has swamped all other sources of demand for Treasuries. With the Fed now in a rate hiking cycle that will also lead to a rapid start of quantitative tightening (QT) this summer, the question of who will replace the Fed’s demand for US Treasuries becomes once again relevant for the future path of US bond yields beyond the expected path of the fed funds rate. Already, there has been an adjustment in the term premium for longer-term US Treasury yields – the component of bond yield valuation that would be most impacted by large flows - as the Fed has slowed its pace of bond buying (Chart 9). The New York Fed’s estimates of the term premium on the 10-year Treasury yield reached deeply depressed levels – around -100bps - at the peak of the Fed’s pandemic QE program in 2020. As the US economy has recovered from the 2020 COVID recession, US interest rate expectations have increased but so have estimates of the term premium, which are now back to zero or even slightly positive. The Fed’s QE bond buying has been purely volume driven, with the size and timing of the purchases announced well in advance. The Fed is often called a “price insensitive” buyer since its buying is done without any consideration of yield levels. Other Treasury investors, including foreign buyers, are more price sensitive, with demand influenced by the level of yields. According to the TIC database on US capital flows produced by the US Treasury Department, net foreign buying of Treasuries has picked up, totaling +$346 billion over the 12 months to the most recently available data from February 2022 (Chart 10). That increase has entirely come from private investors, as so-called “official” flows have been flat. Chart 10China Remains On A UST Buyer's Strike China Remains On A UST Buyer's Strike China Remains On A UST Buyer's Strike ​​​​​​ Chart 11European Buying Of USTs Set To Peak? European Buying Of USTs Set To Peak? European Buying Of USTs Set To Peak? ​​​​​​ The latter is a continuation of the trend seen over the past few years where China, the nation with the second largest holdings of US Treasuries, has stopped buying them. This is a decision rooted in both geopolitics and economics. Smaller trade surpluses mean China has fewer new currency reserves to invest, while worsening Sino-US tensions have led Chinese authorities to diversify existing reserve holdings away from US Treasuries into gold and other assets. Looking ahead, China is unlikely to significantly ramp up its Treasury purchases despite more attractive US yields and Chinese policymakers tolerating some mild currency weakness versus the US dollar. Beyond China, demand for Treasuries from Europe and Japan has picked up but remains moderate by historical standards. For European investors, there has been a major swing in the TIC data, moving from a net outflow (on a 12-month running total basis) of -$194 billion in December 2020 to a net inflow of +$24 billion in February 2022 (Chart 11, top panel). Typically, net inflows into Treasuries are linked to the FX-hedged spread between US and German government debt. Specifically, when the hedged 10-year Treasury-Bund spread widens to a level between 100-150bps, the flows from Europe into Treasuries begin to improve (middle panel) When that hedged spread narrows to zero or lower, the flows turn the other way and European demand for Treasuries begins to wane. That is typically followed by a widening of the unhedged Treasury-Bund spread (bottom panel). With the current FX-hedged Treasury-Bund spread now at zero, a result of the high cost of hedging US dollars into euros given elevated US rate expectations, we expect European demand for Treasuries to diminish over the rest of 2022. This will help support a wider Treasury-Bund spread as the Fed delivers far more rate hikes than the ECB. For Japan, the largest holder of Treasuries, there has only been a stabilization of outflows over the 12 months to February 2022 (Chart 12, top panel). Past periods of large net inflows from Japan into US Treasuries have occurred when the hedged 10-year US Treasury-JGB spread has approached 200bps (middle panel). With the current spread at only 112bps, Japanese investor demand for Treasuries is unlikely to return without a significant increase in US yields. Chart 12UST Yields Not Attractive Enough To Induce More Japanese Demand UST Yields Not Attractive Enough To Induce More Japanese Demand UST Yields Not Attractive Enough To Induce More Japanese Demand ​​​​​​ Chart 13Foreign Bond Investing Is Too Volatile For Japanese Investors Right Now Foreign Bond Investing Is Too Volatile For Japanese Investors Right Now Foreign Bond Investing Is Too Volatile For Japanese Investors Right Now More timely weekly capital flow data from Japan shows that Japanese investors have been reluctant to move money into foreign bonds (Chart 13). Elevated levels of bond/rate volatility, and currency volatility given the huge rally in USD/JPY, have made large Japanese bond investors more cautious on increasing foreign bond allocations, even on a currency-hedged basis. If bond/FX volatility subsides, Japanese investors will become “better buyers” of foreign bonds once again. However, Japanese investors may opt to increase allocations to European bonds rather than US Treasuries, with European yields at comparable levels to US Treasuries in JPY-hedged terms (Tables 1-4). For example, a 30-year German Bund hedged into yen now yields 1.46%, compared to a JPY-hedged 30-year US Treasury yield of 1.33%. Table 12-Year Developed Market Government Bond Yields, Hedged Into USD, EUR & JPY Recent USD Strength Is Not Bond Bullish Recent USD Strength Is Not Bond Bullish Table 25-Year Developed Market Government Bond Yields, Hedged Into USD, EUR & JPY Recent USD Strength Is Not Bond Bullish Recent USD Strength Is Not Bond Bullish Table 310-Year Developed Market Government Bond Yields, Hedged Into USD, EUR & JPY Recent USD Strength Is Not Bond Bullish Recent USD Strength Is Not Bond Bullish Table 430-Year Developed Market Government Bond Yields, Hedged Into USD, EUR & JPY Recent USD Strength Is Not Bond Bullish Recent USD Strength Is Not Bond Bullish Bottom Line: Foreign demand for US Treasuries is unlikely to accelerate enough to replace diminished Fed QE purchases over the next 6-12 months, given high USD-hedging costs and elevated Treasury yield volatility. Non-US investors will not help bring an end to the US bond bear market. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      The Global ZEW expectations series shown in Chart 4 is an equal-weighted average of the individual expectations series for the US and euro area. GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark Recent USD Strength Is Not Bond Bullish Recent USD Strength Is Not Bond Bullish The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Global Fixed Income - Strategic Recommendations* Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Recent USD Strength Is Not Bond Bullish Recent USD Strength Is Not Bond Bullish Tactical Overlay Trades