Global
Our emerging market strategists are not convinced that global equities are in a cyclical bull market yet. Being oversold, global equity prices are already reflecting a lot of bad news. Moreover, investor sentiment on global growth has become downbeat.…
The dollar is historically a momentum currency, implying that as much as strength begets further strength, weakness begets additional weakness. As a result, the fall in the DXY from 97.5 in December to 96 raises a red flag. This red flag is even more…
The oil rout that began in October appears to have run its course, based on positioning, sentiment and technicals. All the same, several cross-market gauges we designed to assess investors’ conviction on global macro conditions continue to support a cautious view over the short term. This dichotomy in the markets’ internal dynamics supports our view volatility will remain elevated over the next month or two. After that, we expect clear evidence the global oil market is tightening, as strong OPEC 2.0 compliance with production cuts and robust demand – albeit weaker than that of the past two years – drains inventories in 1H19. This is the basis of our $80/bbl Brent forecast for this year. Highlights Energy: Overweight. Our oil recommendations made last week in the wake of the oil-price vs. fundamentals disconnect – long spot WTI and long July 2019 Brent vs. short July 2020 Brent spread – are up 5.7% and 0.7%. Base Metals: Neutral. Asia trade-volume growth likely will move lower in the short term, even if Sino – U.S. trade talks are fruitful. With or without such an outcome, precautionary inventories built on both sides will have to be drawn down, an outcome we believe is priced into base metals prices. A rapprochement would be supportive for these markets, but these inventories still have to be worked through. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold’s rally is intact, as markets gain conviction the Fed will deliver one rate hike this year. We are aligned with our House view calling for three hikes, which would present a headwind. We remain long gold as a portfolio hedge. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Insiders report China made three large purchases of soybeans from the U.S. over the past month, as trade negotiators met in Beijing this week. Optimism on the trade front is buoying optimism in ag markets.1 Feature The rout in oil prices over the course of 4Q18 appears to have run its course, based on a composite indicator we created to assess technical and sentiment information in the crude oil market, and other metrics designed to gauge internal market dynamics (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekBCA's WTI Composite Indicator Flags Oversold Condition for Crude The individual components of the composite at the end of last year all had taken a sharp down leg, indicating investors were seriously concerned about a global slowdown and perhaps even an unexpectedly early recession (Chart 2).2 This concern also was noted by the World Bank, which this week revised its EM growth outlook – the key driver of commodity demand – for 2018 lower, and shaved its global 2019 growth estimate as well.3 Chart 2Sharp Down Leg In Composite's Components Ordinarily, there is not a lot of econometric support for technical indicators. Nonetheless, we found this composite indicator does a good job of explaining y/y changes of Brent crude oil prices, and vice versa. That’s right: there is two-way Granger-causality between the BCA WTI Composite indicator and y/y crude prices (Chart 3).4 Chart 3Composite Indicator, WTI Crude Form A Feedback Loop Given this two-way relationship, it is plausible speculative positioning, investor sentiment and price momentum can help forecast short-term price movements. In turn, the movement in prices feeds back to the components of our composite indicator, and can help anticipate positioning, sentiment and momentum. Indeed, it is likely the fundamental supply-side shock arising from the higher-than-expected waivers on Iranian imports granted by the Trump administration in November – separate and apart from the selling pressure in October – set off one of these feedback loops. Given the paucity of data at the time, market participants had to guess the extent of the physical surplus arising from the waivers as OPEC 2.0 rapidly increased production and filled inventories ahead of U.S. sanctions, and at the same time fears over the strength of demand were becoming more pronounced.5 As we noted last week, we do not think the oil price rout was evidence of an as-yet undetected collapse in demand or run-away supply. OPEC 2.0 and Canadian producers will cut ~ 1.4mm b/d of production; decline-curve losses of ~ 200k b/d from states that cannot maintain or increase their supply will persist, and slower U.S. shale growth resulting from price-induced capex declines will reduce output growth there. These supply cuts, plus still-strong demand growth of 1.4mm b/d, are driving our forecast the physical oil overhang will clear in 1H19, and that Brent prices will average $80/bbl this year, with WTI trading $6/bbl below that.6 Based on the most recent “oversold” reading of the BCA WTI Composite indicator, we believe the oil rout has run its course, given the indicator is in deeply oversold territory. By now, we think the negative sentiment and spec positioning components of prices have been exhausted. Unless we see a fundamental shock – a truly unexpected collapse in demand, e.g., or a complete breakdown in OPEC 2.0 production discipline – it is difficult to foresee another sell-off. As the uncertainty clears and inventory starts to draw, speculators will re-enter the market (allowing producers to hedge), and sentiment will turn more bullish as visible evidence of lower inventories continues to be reported in weekly and monthly data. Some Indicators Still Urge Caution While the case can be made the oil rout has run its course, there still are cautionary signals flashing in our other indicators that assess internal market dynamics within and across EM and commodities. This likely will keep volatility high over the short term (Chart 4). Chart 4Conflicting Signals Will Keep Oil Vol Elevated BCA’s Emerging Market strategists’ Risk-on vs. Safe-Haven currency ratio has rolled over. This ratio picked up the degradation of demand expectations and rise in recession fears, which then spilled into global bond yields. With the benefit of hindsight, the case can be made this presaged a rise in global risk aversion in currency markets (Chart 5).7 Chart 5Warning Signs Flashing In addition, our gold ratios, which serve as growth-versus-safe-haven indicators – i.e., the copper/gold and oil/gold ratios – sagged, as industrial commodities weakened and gold rallied by 7% since November 2018.8 Together, these indicate markets were revising down their growth expectations, and reducing their risk in 4Q18. Even with the recent pick up in EM trade volume – a proxy for EM income growth – our short-term models suggest this likely will not be sustained, and that import volume growth will contract in 2H19 (Chart 6). Chart 6Expect Weaker Trade Volumes In 2H19 Our EM trade-volume models are driven by the broad trade-weighted USD (TWIB) and other FX and financial variables.9 The USD had been rallying as the U.S. domestic economy outperformed the rest of the world, and markets remained concerned over the Fed’s rates-normalization policy, which was pressuring expectations for EM trade growth lower. With the oil-price collapse of 4Q18 in the rear-view mirror, it is not inconceivable the Fed will not feel compelled to raise rates in 1H19, as inflation expectations are re-calibrated in the wake of this most important expectations driver. If this takes some of the steam out of the USD, or even causes it to retreat from its recent highs, oil – and commodities generally – will rally on the tailwind. Indeed, a depreciation in the USD of 5% from current levels could lift prices by ~18%, holding everything else constant (Chart 7). Chart 7USD's Path Will Be Important As Oil Supply and Demand Rebalance Bottom Line: Our intra- and inter-market indicators are throwing off conflicting signals regarding the current state of global oil markets. On the one hand, our WTI Composite indicator shows oil is oversold, which supports our bullish outlook. On the other hand, markets currently are signaling a larger decline in global growth than we currently have in our oil forecast models. A larger-than-expected slowdown in oil demand growth – e.g., an additional loss of 200k b/d that took growth to 1.2mm b/d – would push our Brent forecasts down by ~ $4/bbl to $76/bbl this year. Nevertheless, uncertainty about the future path of oil supply and demand is elevated, and the distribution of possible price outcomes is wide, as our most recent forecast illustrates (Chart 8). We believe the combination of OPEC 2.0 production discipline and robust demand support a rebound in oil prices in 2019. We are keeping our 2019 Brent price target at $80/bbl. Chart 8Elevated Volatility Keeps Range of Expected Prices Wide Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Pavel Bilyk, Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy PavelB@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see “China buys more U.S. soy as officials meet for trade talks,” published by reuters.com January 7, 2019.com. 2 Each of the individual components is standardized to create the WTI composite indicator. We lack CFTC open-interest data to update the open-interest series, due to the U.S. government’s shutdown. 3 This is in line with our expectation, which is contained in our most recent balances and forecast update published last week. Please see “Oil Volatility will Persist; 2019 Brent Forecast Lowered to $80/bbl.” It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. The World Bank’s latest forecast can be found in its Global Economic Prospects, which is titled “Darkening Skies.” It can be found at http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects. 4 Clive Granger used standard statistics to show information contained in past realizations of one variable can be used to predict another variable’s value. Two-way causality indicates lagged values of both variables contain statistically significant information that allows past realizations of both to be used to predict the other’s value. There is a huge literature on this topic. For an excellent intuitive explanation of Granger causality, please see the discussion beginning on p. 365 of “Time Series Analysis, Cointegration, and Applications,” Clive Granger’s Nobel lecture delivered December 8, 2003 (https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/granger-lecture.pdf). 5 Please see “All Fall Down: Vertigo In The Oil Market ... Lowering 2019 Brent Forecast To $82/bbl,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy November 15, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 We would not be at all surprised if OPEC 2.0 overdelivered on production cuts, as it did in 2017 – 1H18. 7 Relative total return (carry included) of four equally weighted EM (ZAR, RUB, BRL and CLP) and three DM (AUD, NZD and CAD) commodities currencies versus an equally weighted average of two safe-haven currencies - the Japanese yen and Swiss franc. 8 These gold ratios are discussed in detail in “Gold Ratios Wave Off ‘Red October’ … Iran Export Waivers Highlight Tight Market,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy November 8, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 9 For in-depth discussions of these models and our general approach to modeling EM trade volumes, please see “Trade, Dollars, Oil & Metals … Assessing Downside Risk,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy August 23, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Trade Recommendation Performance In 4Q18 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2018
Highlights EM equity and credit outperformance versus the U.S. in the past three months was an aberration in the cyclical and structural downtrend. Hence, the recent outperformance of EM assets provides a good entry point for investors to short EM/China assets against their U.S. counterparts. In our opinion, this strategy will work in the coming months regardless of whether global risk assets rebound or sell off – i.e., they are not dependent on market direction. Feature The fourth quarter of 2018 was marked by a precipitous plunge in global equities, led by the U.S. In the meantime, EM stocks have outperformed the global equity benchmark in the past three months. Will EM and U.S. stocks trade places again, or will EM continue to outperform U.S. and DM equities? By the end of December, global share prices had become extremely oversold, and investor sentiment was downbeat. A trifecta of confidence-boosting developments – the rapprochement between the U.S. and China in trade negotiations, the announcement of more policy stimulus in China and reassurances from Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell that monetary policy tightening is not predetermined – have since led to a rebound in global stocks. A key question for asset allocators heading into 2019 is: Will EM continue to outperform the global equity index in this rebound? We do not think so. The odds are considerable that EM will resume its underperformance versus DM in general and the U.S. in particular. The fundamental rationale for staying bearish on EM is that global trade and manufacturing remain on a downward trajectory. Chart I-1 illustrates that EM risk assets sell off when global trade is slowing, especially when the weakness stems from China. Chart I-1EM Selloff Has Been Due To Slowdown In China Chinese policymakers are easing both fiscal and monetary policies, but the impact of their efforts on the economy is yet to be seen. Declining interest rates in China do not constitute a sufficient condition to buy EM risk assets. Importantly, EM stocks often drop when Chinese interest rates are falling, as that reflects a deteriorating growth outlook (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Lower Interest Rates In China Is Not A Reason To Buy EM In short, monetary and fiscal stimulus in China are not yet sufficient to revive the mainland’s business cycle. The latter is critical to the performance of EM risk assets. We will explore China’s fiscal and credit stimulus efforts in much more detail in the coming weeks. Finally, EM equity valuations are no better than those in the U.S. In particular, our EM/U.S. relative stock valuation indicator based on a 20% trimmed mean is currently neutral (Chart I-3). This valuation measure strips out the top and bottom 10% for EM as well as U.S. sub-sectors and computes an equally weighted average of the other 80%. Hence, it eliminates the outliers that for structural or industry specific reasons trade at much lower or higher multiples. Consequently, contrary to the common narrative in the investment industry, EM equities are not cheap versus U.S. ones. Chart I-3EM Equities Are Not Cheaper Than U.S. Ones Given our high conviction on the view that U.S. will outperform EM over the coming several months, we are reiterating a few of our long-standing strategic recommendations/pair trades: Short EM stocks / long the S&P 500; Short EM banks / long U.S. banks; Short EM high-yield corporate credit / long U.S. high-yield corporate credit; Short Chinese property developers / long U.S. homebuilders. In all four cases, the recent outperformance of EM assets provides a good entry point for investors who do not yet have these positions. In our opinion, these recommendations will work in the coming months regardless of whether global risk assets rebound or sell off – i.e., they are not dependent on market direction. No Turnaround In Global Trade/Manufacturing Global cyclical equity sectors have plunged significantly and their prices may be recovering/stabilizing due to oversold conditions. Yet there are few signs of improvement in global trade and manufacturing, and no indication of a significant turnaround in financial markets that are most sensitive to global trade and Chinese growth. Our Risk-On-to-Safe-Haven (RSH) currency ratio1 has relapsed again following a failed rebound attempt (Chart I-4, top panel). Interestingly, this ratio seems to be forming a head-and-shoulders pattern, suggesting the next big move could be to the downside. As we have shown in past reports, EM share prices correlate strongly with this indicator, and a major downleg in this indicator would be consistent with a major drop in EM stocks. Chart I-4No Buy Signal For EM From The Global Currency Markets Furthermore, the annual rate of change on this currency ratio leads the EM manufacturing PMI, and it presently foreshadows more downside in the latter (Chart I-4, bottom panel). Korean and Taiwanese exports contracted slightly in December from a year ago. As frontloading from U.S. import tariffs wanes, their exports will shrink further. Chips prices are falling, signaling that the slump of the global tech hardware sector is not yet over (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Chip Prices Are Still Plunging Continued deterioration in global trade and manufacturing is bad news for emerging Asia. The technical profile of Asian stock markets is also poor, raising the odds of a meltdown as cyclical economic conditions in the region deteriorate further. The region’s relative equity performance versus global and Latin American indexes is relapsing, having failed to break above long-term moving averages (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Underweight Emerging Asian Stocks Versus Both World And Latin America Odds are that emerging Asian stocks will drop in absolute terms, underperforming both the EM and global equity benchmarks. This will drag the EM index down further. We continue to recommend the following strategy: long Latin American stocks / short emerging Asian equities. The U.S. manufacturing leading indicator – the ISM manufacturing new orders-to-inventory ratio – remains in a downtrend (Chart I-7). Chart I-7The U.S. Selloff Has Been Partially Due To Manufacturing Slowdown The average of new and backlog orders from the Chinese manufacturing PMI survey has plunged to its previous lows (Chart I-8, top panel). The domestic orders component of the People’s Bank of China’s latest 5000 industrial enterprise survey is also in a free fall (Chart I-8, bottom panel). Chart I-8China: No Sign Of Bottom In Industrial Sectors Meanwhile, the impact of Chinese domestic demand on the rest of the world occurs via mainland imports. The leading indicator for imports – the manufacturing PMI import sub-component – has plunged to 46, well below the 50 boom-bust line (see Chart I-1, bottom panel on page 1). Within the investable Chinese equity universe, cyclical sectors exposed to capital spending are making new lows in absolute terms (Chart I-9, top and middle panels). At the same time property stocks are relapsing again (Chart I-9, bottom panel). Chart I-9China: Not Much Rebound In Cyclical Equity Sectors While the authorities are once again boosting infrastructure spending by allowing local governments to issue more special bonds, the mainland’s real estate market has ground to a halt. The latter will likely offset the former. Finally, the MSCI China All Shares index – which incorporates all Chinese stocks trading inside and outside the country – has not rebounded much, despite being oversold (Chart I-10, top panel). Chart I-10China All Share Index: Poor Performance Continues Notably, this index’s relative performance versus both DM and EM equity indexes has failed to break above its 200-day moving average, despite the announced policy stimulus (Chart I-10, middle and bottom panels). These are negative technical signposts that bode ill for the outlook for Chinese share prices. Bottom Line: Odds are high that the global trade/manufacturing or related equity sectors/segments will continue struggling in the months ahead. What About The U.S. Dollar? The trade-weighted U.S. dollar has been going sideways for several months. While lower U.S. interest rate expectations have weighed on the greenback, the global manufacturing slowdown and risk-off sentiment in financial markets have put a floor under its value. The dollar is a countercyclical currency, and it does well when global growth is weakening, and vice versa (Chart I-11). Chart I-11The U.S. Dollar Is A Counter-Cyclical Currency It is impossible to know how long this standstill phase in the currency markets will last. What we do know is that when it breaks one way or another, the move will be violent and large. We believe risks to the U.S. currency are to the upside. First, U.S. consumer spending growth remains robust, and the labor market is very tight. Unless the rest of the world plunges into a major growth slump, pulling the U.S. down with it, U.S. interest rate expectations should recover, lifting the dollar. Second, a further downshift in U.S. interest rate expectations will likely occur only if the global economic slowdown is so severe that it leads the market to price in Fed rate cuts. In this scenario, the greenback will rally violently as well. The basis is that the dollar tends to appreciate during global slumps and sell off amid global growth recoveries, as illustrated in Chart I-11. Third, the only scenario where the dollar could plunge is where global trade recovers briskly, driven by growth outside the U.S. in general and in China/EM in particular. This is the least-likely scenario at the current juncture, in our opinion. The trend in the dollar is critical to the relative performance between EM and U.S. stocks. Chart I-12 demonstrates that periods of EM equity underperformance versus the U.S. typically coincide with an appreciation in the trade-weighted greenback, and vice versa. Chart I-12When EM Stocks Outperform The Global Benchmark, U.S. Underperforms And Dollar Weakens And Vice Versa Bottom Line: The next big move in the U.S. dollar will likely be up, not down. Investment Considerations Global equity prices are already reflecting a lot of bad news; they are oversold, and investor sentiment on global growth has become downbeat (Chart I-13). This could create a window for global equities to rebound on a tactical basis. Chart I-13U.S./Global Stocks Are Oversold The majority of our colleagues at BCA believe global equities are primed for a cyclical rally. We within BCA’s EM team agree with the equity rebound narrative but on a tactical basis and believe that any rebound will be led by U.S. stocks – and that EM will lag. We are not convinced that global equities are in a cyclical bull market yet. The main difference between BCA’s house view and the EM team’s outlook is the risks related to China’s economy and their impact on global cyclical equity sectors. The U.S. is relatively unexposed to Chinese growth, EM economies, commodities producers, Japan and Germany. Therefore, U.S. stocks will outperform and the dollar will do well if Chinese growth continues disappointing. Ongoing trade talks between China and the U.S. may bring about some positive results, and the Fed may continue to sound more dovish. However, we contend that the main culprit behind the global equity selloff in 2018 was neither the trade war nor the Fed, but the slowdown in global trade/manufacturing (please refer to Chart 1 and 7 on pages 1 and 6, respectively). On this front, we do not foresee an imminent reversal, as argued above. The latest underperformance of the U.S. has created a good entry point for our relative strategies/trades to be short EM / long U.S. We reiterate the following strategies/trades (Chart I-14): Chart I-14Reiterating Four EM Vs. U.S. Strategies/Trades Short EM stocks / long the S&P 500; Short EM banks / long U.S. banks; Short EM HY corporate credit / long U.S. HY corporate credit; Short Chinese property developers / long U.S. homebuilders. Within the EM equity space, we continue to recommend underweighting emerging Asia while overweighting Latin America, Russia and Central Europe. In particular, we are reiterating our long Latin America / short Emerging Asian equities trade initiated on October 11, 2018 (please refer to Chart I-6 on page 5). The complete list of our country equity allocations is presented on page 12. Finally, the path of least resistance for the dollar is up. We continue to recommend shorting a basket of the following EM currencies against the dollar: ZAR, IDR, MYR, KRW, COP and CLP. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Average of CAD, AUD, NZD, BRL, CLP & ZAR total return indices relative to average of JPY & CHF total returns (including carry). Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
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Highlights Are Markets Too Pessimistic On U.S. Growth & Inflation? What Is China’s Economic Pain Threshold To Trigger A Policy Response? Have Central Banks Become Less Concerned About Financial Markets? Feature Happy New Year! 2019 has started much like 2018 ended, with elevated global market volatility. The combination of more evidence of slowing global growth – fueled by spillovers from U.S.-China trade tensions – and central banks perceived to be overly hawkish has crushed investor sentiment. Money has flooded out of risk assets like equities and corporate debt and shifted into the traditional safe haven assets – government bonds, surplus currencies like the Japanese yen and even gold. U.S. equities and credit, which had been a refuge from the global market weakness for much of last year, have underperformed sharply as markets have moved to price in the global economic softness reaching U.S. shores. These market trends obviously run counter to our recommended positioning for overall portfolio duration (below benchmark) and credit exposure (neutral overall, favoring the U.S. over Europe and Emerging Markets). Yet we advise staying the course with our recommendations, as market pricing has become too pessimistic relative to likely global growth and inflation outcomes. The bulk of the recent decline in global bond yields has come from falling inflation expectations, which have been linked to the sharp fall in oil prices seen in the final months of 2018 (Chart of the Week). This is shown in Table 1, which presents the breakdown of the decline in the 10-year benchmark government bond yields for the major developed markets since the peak in U.S. Treasury yields back on November 8. Real yields have fallen by a more modest amount than inflation expectations in most countries, even with the pullback in cyclical indicators like the global PMI. Expected 2019 rate hikes are now fully priced out of money market curves, most notably in the U.S. Chart of the WeekSlowing Growth Is Not Why Yields Have Plunged Table 1Decomposing 10-Year Yield Changes Since The November 2018 Peak In our view, there are three vital questions regarding the recent market turbulence that must be answered before determining the appropriate global fixed income investment strategy over the next 6-12 months. The answers lead us to maintain our current recommendations on duration, country allocation and credit exposure, even with the recent market turbulence. 1) Are Markets Too Pessimistic On U.S. Growth & Inflation? The December reading for the U.S. ISM Manufacturing purchasing managers’ index (PMI) released last week showed the largest single month deceleration since 2008 (Chart 2). All the main subcomponents of the ISM index fell, including the New Orders and Export indices which are now close to falling below the 50 threshold (Chart 3). Coming on the heels of China’s PMI dipping below 50, markets became more worried that the mighty U.S. economy was being dragged down to the weaker pace of growth seen outside the U.S. Chart 2Decomposing 10-Year Yield Changes Since The November 2018 Peak Chart 3U.S. ISM Overstating U.S. Economic Weakness Yet when looking a broader array of U.S. indicators, the domestic economy still appears to be in good shape, albeit with some lost growth momentum. Consumer confidence remains solid, employment growth is accelerating, household incomes are growing at a faster pace and the personal savings rate remains elevated – all of which provide support for a faster pace of consumer spending (third panel). At the same time, the U.S. Conference Board leading economic indicator is still pointing to a healthy above-trend pace of GDP growth in 2019. U.S. Treasury yields have fallen to levels consistent with the drift lower in the ISM index (top panel), with the market now discounting one full 25bp rate cut to occur within the next twelve months. That will not happen given the tightness of the U.S. labor market and persistence of underlying domestic inflation pressures. The robust December gain reported in last Friday’s U.S. Payrolls report (+312k) may have surprised the markets, but our U.S. Employment Growth model had been signaling a faster pace of job growth for the past several months (Chart 4). The year-over-year growth in Average Hourly Earnings rose to 3.2%, the highest level in nearly a decade. With the overall unemployment still at a historically low 3.9% as labor demand is increasing, wages are likely to remain under upward pressure in the next 6-12 months. Chart 4U.S. Employment & Wages Are Accelerating Given this backdrop of economic growth that is likely to remain above-trend throughout 2019, it will be difficult to generate a sustained downturn in U.S. inflation this year, even given the lagged impact of the strong U.S. dollar and lower oil prices. While some decline in headline inflation measures is inevitable in the coming months given the rapid pace and magnitude of the 2018 oil plunge, BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy team continues to see a positive demand/supply balance helping push oil prices back towards the $80/bbl level in 2019.1 That would ensure that any decline in headline U.S. inflation would be short in duration, and of far less magnitude than the move that occurred after the 2014/15 oil plunge given the more robust domestic inflation backdrop (Chart 5). Chart 5This Is NOT A Repeat Of the 2015/16 Deflation Scare A sober assessment of the U.S. economic and inflation data leads us to conclude that U.S. interest rate markets have swung too far to the dovish side. The inflation expectations component of U.S. Treasury yields is now too low, and the Fed rate cut that is now discounted in money markets will not materialize. Rate hikes are the more likely outcome, the repricing of which will put renewed upward pressure on Treasury yields. 2) What Is China’s Economic Pain Threshold To Trigger A Policy Response? Of the potential catalysts that could turn the current investor pessimism into optimism, signs of improving Chinese growth would likely top the list. China’s economy has lost considerable momentum, with year-over-year real GDP growth slowing to 6.5% in the third quarter of last year and higher frequency data showing a further deceleration in the fourth quarter. The profit warning issued by Apple last week, prompted by an unexpectedly sharp slowing of Chinese mobile phone demand, is a sign that Chinese consumer spending may be faltering. There are several causes for the growth slump, both domestic and foreign. Chinese authorities have been clamping down on domestic leverage given elevated private debt levels, while also taking action to reduce domestic pollution levels – policies that all have helped dampen industrial activity. More recently, and more importantly, the U.S.-China tariff war has started to have a real economic impact on the economy through slowing trade activity and diminished business confidence. Given the Chinese government’s perpetual interest in maintaining domestic stability by limiting any cyclical increases in unemployment, the incentive is there for policymakers to provide renewed stimulus to put a floor under economic growth. The last such boost came in 2015/16, when the Chinese government implemented an aggressive expansion of fiscal spending alongside monetary policy measures such as interest rate cuts, reductions in reserve requirement ratios and currency depreciation. That package was enough to cause a sharp reacceleration of the Chinese economy, but only after nominal GDP growth had fallen to an 16-year low of 6.4% at the end of 2015 (Chart 6). Chart 6Nominal China Growth Less Than 7.5% Should Trigger More Stimulus … Policymakers will likely be forced into action again in 2019 if nominal GDP growth, which hit 9.6% in the third quarter of 2018, falls back below 7.5%. Forward-looking economic measures like our Li Keqiang leading indicator and the export orders component of China’s manufacturing PMI suggest that weaker growth outcome could occur by mid-2019. China’s policymakers are likely to announce some form of stimulus in the first half of the year help counteract the growth slump, which could help boost global investor confidence (especially if it is accompanied by a new trade agreement with the U.S.). While Chinese policymakers are now under more pressure to provide stimulus measures, the tools available to them are more limited than was the case in 2015/16 (Chart 7). Interest rate cuts could happen if growth continues to fall more rapidly than expected, but that would create a burst in private sector leverage that policymakers would seek to avoid. The currency could also be weakened further, but the USD/CNY exchange rate is already back to near the 7.0 level reached in the 2016 devaluation. Chart 7...Atlhough Policy Options Are More Limited Than 2016 That leaves additional cuts in the reserve requirement ratio and increases in fiscal spending as the two most likely means for China to stimulate its economy in the coming months. Yet even the fiscal channel has limits, given the much higher starting point for the budget deficit today (3.7% of GDP) than in 2015 (2%). So while the trigger for a China policy stimulus will likely be reached by mid-2019, the magnitude of the stimulus will be nowhere near as large as the 2015/16 measures. This will help stabilize global growth expectations, but likely not by enough to provide a major boost to global commodity prices or export demand from emerging market countries that are heavily dependent on China. This leads us to remain cautious on emerging market credit exposure, as we prefer to own U.S. corporate debt instead where the growth/profit outlook is better. 3) Have Central Banks Become Less Concerned About Financial Markets? A popular market narrative of late has been that the Fed “made a mistake” with its last rate hike in December. A similar argument was made for the ECB choosing the end its Asset Purchase Program last month with inflation still well short of its target and European growth decelerating. The idea that central banks had fallen “out of tune” with financial markets has spooked investors who fear that policymakers are carrying out a pre-conceived plan to normalize monetary policy without any regard to financial markets. We find this to be a highly dubious conclusion. Central bankers still care about financial markets – or, more accurately, financial conditions – but the hurdle for policymakers to respond to falling asset prices is higher now than in previous years because of a lack of spare economic capacity. Simply put, any tightening of financial conditions must be large enough to trigger a slowing of growth to a below-potential pace, resulting in rising unemployment and weaker inflation pressures. That has not been the case – yet – in the major developed economies. Financial conditions indices (FCIs) – which measure the combined impact of equity prices, credit spreads and currencies – typically lead economic growth by 2-3 quarters. The latest selloffs in equity and credit markets in the U.S. and Europe, while significant, have not been large enough to push FCIs for those regions to levels that would be consistent with below-trend growth, using the 2015/16 episode as a reference point (Chart 8). Chart 8Tightening Financial Conditions Not Signaling Below-Trend Growth...Yet Financial conditions in the U.S. are much closer to that 2015/16 reference point than in Europe, where bond yields remain very depressed and the euro is still an undervalued currency. Yet the domestic U.S. economy is in a much better state than was the case in 2015/16, as discussed earlier in this report. It is highly likely that the level of the U.S. FCI that would trigger a move to below-trend U.S. growth is much different today than in 2015/16. In other words, it would take a bigger widening of U.S. corporate credit spreads, or a sharper selloff in U.S. equity values, to generate the same type of drag on U.S. growth relative to 2015/16. Yet U.S. interest rate markets have already responded as if there was no such change in the amount of FCI tightening that would result in a more dovish Fed policy. The U.S. money markets have gone from pricing three rate hikes in 2019 to one rate cut, while bond investors have largely neutralized their bearish Treasury duration positioning (Chart 9). Chart 9USTs Now Discounting Too Much Fed Dovishness That swing in sentiment on the Fed’s next move flies in the face of the underlying health of the U.S. economic data, as well as our Fed Monitor which continues to signal the need for more Fed rate hikes (Chart 10). Our other Central Bank Monitors tell a similar story (outside of Australia), with the Monitors signaling no need for easier monetary policy but with money markets pricing out any probability of a rate hike over the next year. This leaves global government bond yields exposed to any sign that global growth momentum is stabilizing, particularly with the inflation expectations component of bond yields also vulnerable to a rebound in oil prices (Chart 11). Chart 10Bond Yields Are Now Exposed To A Repricing Of Rate Hikes Chart 11Bond Yields Are Now Exposed To A Rebound In Oil Prices Our conclusion is that financial conditions in the major economies have not yet tightened by enough to end the process of normalizing global monetary policy from the extraordinarily accommodative settings seen in recent years. In other words, bond yields have not yet peaked for this cycle. Robert Robis, CFA, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, “Oil Volatility Will Persist: 2019 Brent Forecast Lowered to $80/bbl”, dated January 3rd 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
The JPY may be cheap, but Japan’s core inflation remains well below the Bank of Japan’s objective, and shows little sign of hitting 2% within a reasonable period (see chart). The recent strength in the yen only re-enforces the inability of the BoJ to hit its…