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Highlights The FOMC managed to surprise investors at its March meeting after all, … : Everyone knew the Fed wasn’t going to hike rates last Wednesday, but the scope of the downward revision in the median dots was unexpected. … as it turns out that the median FOMC participant sees the pause as a lengthy hiatus: Not only does the median voter expect no rate hikes this year, s/he only expects one more in the entire tightening cycle. Rate-hike expectations have dwindled from three to a lonely one. The motivation for the Fed’s pivot is hardly crystal clear, … : The Fed may have turned more dovish because it fears the U.S. is losing momentum or that key major economies may be on the verge of a recession, it succumbed to pressure from the White House or financial markets, and/or it fears being unable to counter the next downturn. … but it looks to us like it has simply decided it can no longer stomach too-low inflation expectations: The zero lower bound will likely come into play when the next recession arrives, and higher inflation expectations will increase the Fed’s maneuverability by giving it the scope to reduce real rates more easily. Feature Wednesday’s FOMC meeting formalized the Fed’s turn to “patient” monetary policy. The dots revealed that the median FOMC participant’s estimates of the appropriate fed funds rate at year-end 2019 and 2020 are now 50 basis points lower than they were at the December meeting. At that meeting, the median participant expected the fed funds rate would be 2⅞% at the end of 2019, and 3⅛% at the end of 2020; the median participant now sees 2⅜% at the end of this year, the midpoint of the current 2.25 – 2.5% range, with a final hike to 2⅝% sometime in 2020. Uber-dovish St. Louis Fed President Bullard crowed in early January that the committee was starting to see things his way, and it seems that he was right. While presumably only Minneapolis President Kashkari voted with Bullard for no 2019 hikes in December, nine more participants came over to his side in the ensuing three months. The shift on the FOMC can be boiled down as follows: in December, two voters called for no hikes in 2019, and eleven called for a minimum of two hikes; in March, eleven voters called for no hikes, and two called for just two (Chart 1). The migration of nine out of seventeen voters from two or three hikes to zero hikes lopped 50 basis points off the FOMC’s median year-end projections through 2021, and has pushed our equilibrium fed funds rate model even further away from the consensus. What happened, and what does it mean for our S&P 500, Treasury and spread-product views? What Made The Fed More Patient? Our real-time view of the Fed’s turn to patience in early January was that it was a logical response to the sharp, sudden tightening of financial conditions imposed by the fourth-quarter sell-off in stocks and corporate bonds (Chart 2). We didn’t create a regression model to try to put a precise number on what the tightening in financial conditions meant, but it seemed fair to assume that it equated to at least one 25-basis-point hike in the fed funds rate. If that was as conservative an estimate as we thought, the Fed’s only rational course was to step aside, given that the financial markets had already done a quarter or two of its work for it. Chart 2Markets Tightened For The Fed In 4Q Slowing momentum in the rest of the world offered another reason for backing off. Chinese deceleration that began with domestic policymakers’ deleveraging drive has been exacerbated by the ongoing trade spat with the U.S. (Chart 3). Chinese imports are the most direct channel by which China impacts the rest of the world, and global trade has slid as China has decelerated (Chart 4). The first contraction in global export volumes since the global manufacturing slump in early 2016 has dragged on Europe, which took its 2018 cue from a soft China, rather than a robust U.S. Chart 3Deleveraging Started China's Slump ... Chart 4... Which Was Felt Around The World Within the U.S., ongoing data releases have fostered the notion that the Fed can well afford to be patient. Despite booming payroll expansion in December and January, which created 538,000 net new jobs, the unemployment rate ticked up to 4% from 3.7%.1 The data raised the possibility that there may be more labor market slack than previously estimated. Headline inflation is hardly alarming, though core measures that back out oil’s drag are hanging around the Fed’s 2% target (Chart 5). Chart 5Core Inflation Is Near Target, But Oil Has Weighed On Headline Inflation Is The Phillips Curve Dead? Is it possible that the Fed could turn away from rate hikes when the unemployment rate is a tenth of a point above its lowest level since 1969? Does the Fed really think the Phillips Curve is so flat that even 50-year lows in unemployment aren’t going to boost wages? Has it abandoned the idea that inflation and the unemployment rate are inversely related once the economy reaches full employment? We don’t think so; as we argued in our recent Special Report on the Phillips Curve,2 we are convinced that the Fed’s belief in the relationship between unemployment and inflation remains intact. Every mainstream macroeconomic inflation model incorporates an inverse relationship with the unemployment rate. We fully accept that the Phillips Curve is kinked, and that the point where it inflects is dependent on estimates of the unobservable natural rate of unemployment (NAIRU), but the economics profession has no widely accepted model that does not take as given the notion that sub-NAIRU unemployment is inflationary. Until the profession develops an alternative framework that achieves wide acceptance, the Phillips Curve will continue to be a keystone element of central bank policy. The path from higher wages to higher consumer prices may be indirect and uncertain, but the link between the unemployment gap and annual wage gains is alive and well, even in the post-Volcker, low-inflation era (Chart 6). Chart 6Wages Rise When Workers Are Hard To Find What Might The Fed See That We Don’t? We have been, and remain, constructive on the U.S. economy. The delayed December retail sales release was lousy, and the uninspiring advance January figure led the Atlanta Fed to knock nearly 40 basis points off of its estimate of consumption’s contribution to first-quarter GDP, but it seems incompatible with a roaring job market, rising wages, and an elevated household savings rate. First-quarter growth projects to be sickly, but it has been for the last few years, and the Atlanta Fed’s GDP Now model projects that real final domestic demand grew by 1.3%, in spite of the government shutdown. The FOMC seemed to err on the side of caution in trimming its growth estimates by 20 and 10 basis points (“bps”) for 2019 and 2020, respectively, and revising its unemployment rate projections 20 bps higher for both years. The global economy has surely slowed; ex-the U.S., its biggest constituents decelerated for nearly all of 2018, as Chair Powell noted. He also noted, however, that Chinese policy makers have taken several steps to support activity. That will help the rest of the world, including Europe, as an accelerating fiscal and credit impulse boosts Chinese imports (Chart 7). Brexit remains a risk the Fed would be irresponsible not to plan for, but given that a do-over referendum would probably lead to the U.K. remaining in the E.U. (Chart 8), it is a risk that may well not come to pass. Chart 7Chinese Policymakers Want To Boost Growth Chart 8Let's Call The Whole Thing Off We do not think that the Fed changed course based on White House pressure. As we have noted before, White House-Fed conflict is nothing new, and while the Arthur Burns-led Fed knuckled under during Nixon’s re-election campaign, pressure from the Johnson, Reagan and G.H.W. Bush Administrations all came to naught. We also do not think that the Fed took its cue from investors, even if its 2019 policy rate outlook now closely resembles the money market’s (Chart 9). If it is wary of inverting the yield curve, however, it may want to see long yields rise before it hikes again.3 Chart 9Seeing It The Markets' Way (At Least For 2019) Don’t Fence Me In Q: [B]elow-target inflation is a … phenomenon … across advanced economies, and I’d … like to … hear your thoughts about what kind of challenges that poses to policy makers like yourself and the global economy in general. Chair Powell: It’s a major challenge. It’s one of the major challenges of our time, really, to have … downward pressure on inflation[.] It gives central banks less room … to respond to downturns[.] [I]f inflation expectations are below two percent, they’re always going to be pulling inflation down, and we’re going to be paddling upstream and trying to … keep inflation at two percent, which gives us some room to cut, … when it’s time to cut rates when the economy weakens. … It’s … one of the things we’re looking into as part of our strategic monetary policy review this year. The proximity to the zero lower bound calls for more creative thinking about ways we can … uphold the credibility of our inflation target, and … we’re open-minded about ways we can do that. Our best guess is that the Fed has become frustrated by moribund inflation expectations ten years into a recovery. Now that it sees the potential for a recession in the not-so-distant future, it would prefer not to have to confront it with the zero lower interest-rate bound tying one hand behind its back. It would be reasonable if it would also prefer not to have to rely too heavily on asset purchases, given all the headaches that even a modest shrinking of the balance sheet has occasioned. The Fed’s ongoing monetary policy review may therefore turn out to be more than an academic exercise. It might be awfully nice to have strategies aiming to reverse past misses of the inflation objective in place before the next recession arrives. Those strategies would provide the Fed with more flexibility to reduce real interest rates via moves in the fed funds rate. Powell discussed the potential appeal of these sorts of strategies at Stanford University just a week and a half before the FOMC meeting,4 and despite all the times they’ve been bandied about, they just might come to something this time around. Investment Implications The Fed has made a significant pivot since October’s “long way from neutral,” and December’s post-FOMC press conference, when the chair seemed to be disconnected from the markets’ agita. We don’t think a 2019 rate hike is completely out of the question, but there is no doubt that the Fed’s reaction function has changed. We don’t yet see a reason to revise our terminal rate estimate down from 3.25%-3.5%, even if it’s evident that it will take a good bit longer for the Fed to get there than we initially expected. It seems to be more willing to let inflation get ahead of it – it may end up actively encouraging inflation to do so – before it completes its meandering journey to the terminal rate. Allowing the economy to run a little hotter should be equity-friendly. It’s hard to get earnings contraction without a recession, and recessions don’t occur when monetary policy is accommodative. If the Fed requires more evidence of improvement before it resumes hiking rates, the economy and corporate earnings should be able to build up more momentum than they otherwise would. The Fed’s newfound patience should also be spread-product-friendly, as borrowers become better credits as an expansion rolls along. The Treasury outlook is more nuanced. Yields fell as the Fed committed to remaining on hold for longer, but the Fed now seems to have exhausted its capacity for dovish surprises. Short of a recession or near-recession, it’s hard to see how yields can go much lower. Given markets’ seeming conviction that inflation is as dead as a doornail, however, Treasury bond yields may do no more than drift higher at the margin until the Fed’s efforts to put a floor underneath inflation expectations begin to bear some fruit. We still think risk-friendly positioning makes sense, and we reiterate our equity and spread-product overweights, our Treasuries underweight, and our below-benchmark-duration recommendation. Doug Peta, CFA Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 At the other end of the spectrum, the unemployment rate fell two ticks in February, to 3.8%, despite a meager net increase of 20,000 jobs. Short-term disconnects can be explained by the fact that the unemployment rate (household) and net payrolls additions (business establishments) are calculated from separate surveys, but no one knows exactly how many people who aren’t working are available to work when they decide the time is ripe. 2 Please see the February 26, 2019 U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report, “The Phillips Curve: Science Or Superstition?” Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 The Fed may not care a whit about the yield curve, but may simply want to hold its fire until it is convinced that the economy requires less accommodation so as not to overheat, which would get it to the same place: not hiking until long yields begin to price in the potential for overheating. 4 Please see the March 18, 2019 U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Kinder, Gentler Central Banking.” Available at usis.bcaresearch.com.

Dear Client, I had the pleasure of visiting clients in Seattle, Anchorage, and Juneau last week. In this week’s report, I address some of the questions that routinely came up during our meetings. Among other things, the topics discussed include our optimistic global growth outlook, waning dollar bullishness, implications of a more dovish Fed on the business cycle, and where we think equities are headed. Next week we will be publishing our Quarterly Strategy Outlook, which will provide a detailed discussion of our key global macro and investment views. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Feature Q: You have predicted that global growth will stabilize in the second quarter and then accelerate in the second half of the year. Are you seeing much evidence in support of this view? A: We are seeing signs of green shoots, but they are still fairly tentative. Current activity indicators appear to have stabilized (Chart 1). The global manufacturing PMI edged lower in February, but the services component increased. Consumer confidence has risen, although that may simply reflect the rebound in global equities. Chart 1Global Growth Appears To Have Stabilized The data on international trade has been quite soft. That said, the weekly Harpex shipping index, which measures global container shipping activity, has improved. The Baltic Dry Index has also shown some signs of bottoming (Chart 2). Chart 2Shipping Data Pointing To A Recent Pickup In Global Trade The diffusion index of our global leading economic indicator, which tracks the share of countries with rising LEIs, has also moved higher (Chart 3). It generally leads the global LEI. The fact that global financial conditions have eased significantly since the start of the year is also an encouraging sign. Chart 3The Uptick In The LEI Diffusion Index Suggests Global Growth Will Firm Up Q: What’s your take on the most recent Chinese economic data? A: It has been generally soft, but not abysmal. Manufacturing output continues to decelerate. Retail sales remain lackluster, with auto sales showing little evidence of improvement. Property prices are still rising, but floor space sold has begun to contract. Fixed-asset investment has held up so far this year. However, this is mainly due to a pickup in spending among state-owned companies. Both exports and imports contracted in February. In a rather unusual step, the government announced last week that exports increased by nearly 40% in the first nine days of March compared with the same period last year.1 Electricity production has also apparently rebounded. We would not place a huge weight on these statements, as the data probably has been skewed by the timing of the lunar new year, but it does seem that economic momentum may be starting to turn the corner. We are seeing signs of green shoots, but they are still fairly tentative. There is little doubt that the government is trying to jumpstart growth. Household and business taxes have been cut. The PBOC has reduced reserve requirements by 350 bps over the past year. Interbank rates have dropped. Despite the fact that the February credit data fell short of expectations, the six-month credit impulse has turned decisively higher. The Chinese credit impulse leads imports by about six-to-nine months (Chart 4). This bodes well for global trade in the second half of the year. Chart 4Global Trade Will Benefit From A Chinese Reflationary Impulse Q: Given that Chinese debt levels are already quite high, by how much more can they realistically increase? A: We do not expect credit growth to rise by as much as it did in 2009 or 2016. However, this is because the economy is in better shape, not because there is some intrinsic constraint to increasing debt from current levels. China’s elevated savings rate has kept interest rates well below trend nominal GDP growth, which is the key determinant of debt sustainability (Chart 5).2 As long as the government maintains an implicit guarantee on most local and corporate debt, as it is currently doing, default risk will remain minimal. Chart 5China's High Savings Rate Has Kept Interest Rates Well Below Trend Nominal GDP Growth In any case, given that debt now stands at 240% of GDP, a mere one percentage-point increase in credit growth would still produce a hefty 2.4% of GDP in credit stimulus. In this sense, China may be better off with a higher debt-to-GDP ratio since in steady state this will allow for a larger flow of credit-financed stimulus into the economy. Q: A revival in Chinese growth would presumably help Europe? A: Yes. Our conversations with clients revealed an ongoing negative bias towards Europe among investors (Chart 6). This is echoed in the latest BofA Merrill Lynch Global Fund Manager Survey which, for the first time in history, identified “short European equities” as the most crowded trade. Chart 6European Equities: Unloved And Unwanted We think that such deep pessimism about Europe is largely unwarranted. Faster global growth will help the European export sector later this year, while domestic demand will benefit from more accommodative fiscal policy and lower bond yields, especially in Italy. The ECB will not raise rates this year even if growth speeds up, but the market will probably price in a few more rate hikes in 2020 and beyond. This will allow for a modest re-steepening in the yield curves in core European bond markets, which should be positive for long-suffering bank profits. Political risk remains a concern. The Brexit saga has reached the farcical stage where: 1) The U.K. has voted to leave the EU; but 2) Parliament has voted to stay in the EU unless it reaches a satisfactory deal with Brussels; while 3) rejecting the only deal with Brussels that was on offer. Given that most British voters no longer want Brexit (Chart 7), we think that the government will kick the proverbial can down the road until a second referendum is announced or a “soft Brexit” deal is formulated. Either outcome would be welcomed by markets. Chart 7U.K.: In The Case Of A Do-Over, The Remain Side Would Likely Win Q: You seem less bullish on the U.S. dollar than you were last year? A: That is correct. As we discussed last week, the dollar is a countercyclical currency, meaning that it tends to move in the opposite direction of global growth (Chart 8). If global growth strengthens later this year, the trade-weighted dollar will probably weaken. Chart 8The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency Moreover, as this week’s FOMC meeting highlighted, the Fed’s reaction function has shifted in a more dovish direction. The median Fed dot now foresees no rate hikes this year and only one rate hike in 2020. In contrast, the December Summary of Economic Projections envisioned two rate hikes this year and one next year. The dollar is a countercyclical currency, meaning that it tends to move in the opposite direction of global growth. In a far cry from his October “rates are far from neutral” comment, Jay Powell stressed during this week's post-FOMC meeting press conference that the fed funds rate is currently in the “broad range of estimates of neutral.” While we would not rule out the possibility that the FOMC will raise rates at some point later this year, we now expect a more gradual pace of rate tightening than we had earlier envisioned. Q: Does a more dovish Fed imply that the economic expansion has even further to run? A: Yes. Expansions tend to end when monetary policy turns restrictive. We had previously thought that this point could be reached in late-2020, but it is now starting to look as though it will occur later than that. Broadly speaking, we see the Fed tightening cycle unfolding in two stages. In the first stage, which is the one we are in today, the Fed will raise rates in baby steps in response to better-than-expected growth and falling unemployment. In the second stage, the Fed will hike rates more aggressively as inflation starts to accelerate. Risk assets will be able to digest the first stage, but not the second. The good news is that most of our favorite indicators are not yet pointing to a major inflationary upswing (Chart 9): Despite higher tariffs, consumer import price inflation has slowed; core intermediate producer price inflation has decelerated; the prices paid components of the ISM and regional Fed surveys have plunged; inflation surprise indices have rolled over; and both survey and market-based measures of inflation expectations remain below where they were last summer. In keeping with these developments, BCA’s propriety Inflation Pipeline Indicator has fallen to a two-and-a-half-year low. Chart 9No Signs Of An Imminent Major Inflationary Upswing In The U.S. ... Wage growth has accelerated, but productivity growth has increased by even more. Unit labor cost inflation has actually been coming down since the middle of last year. Unit labor costs lead core CPI inflation by about 12 months (Chart 10). This implies that consumer price inflation is unlikely to reach uncomfortably high levels at least until the second half of next year. Chart 10... And Decelerating Unit Labor Costs Will Dampen Inflationary Pressures For The Time Being Beyond then, the risks are high that inflation will move up as the economy continues to overheat. This could force the Fed to start raising rates aggressively late next year, a course of action that will push up the dollar and cause equities and spread product to sell off. The resulting tightening in financial conditions will probably plunge the U.S. and the rest of the world into recession in 2021. Q: So stay overweight stocks for now, but consider selling at some point next year? A: Correct. The MSCI All-Country World Index (ACWI) has risen by over 14% since we upgraded it in December after having moved to the sidelines six months earlier. Given this run-up, we are not as bullish now as we were at the start of the year. Most of our favorite indicators are not yet pointing to a major inflationary upswing. Nevertheless, the path of least resistance for equities remains to the upside. While the forward P/E ratio for the MSCI ACWI has returned to where it was last September, analyst earnings expectations are currently much more conservative: Bottom-up estimates foresee EPS rising by 4.1% in the U.S. and 5.3% in the rest of the world in 2019 (Chart 11). The combination of faster growth, easier financial conditions, and ongoing corporate buybacks implies some upside to those estimates. Chart 11Analyst Expectations Are Quite Muted Moreover, real yields have fallen over the past five months – the 10-year U.S. TIPS yield is 48 basis points below its Q4 average, for example. A simple dividend discount model would suggest that global equities are about 10%-to-15% cheaper than they were prior to last year’s autumn selloff. The path of least resistance for equities remains to the upside. Q: Aren’t you worried that rising labor costs will push down profit margins even if GDP growth accelerates? A: Not really. As noted above, productivity growth has picked up. Whether this is the start of a new trend remains to be seen, but at least for now, it is dampening unit labor costs. Historically, real unit labor costs – nominal unit labor costs divided by the corporate price deflator – have tracked economy-wide profit margins very closely (Chart 12). Chart 12Real U.S. Unit Labor Costs Historically Have Tracked Economy-Wide Profit Margins Very Closely In practice, it is very rare for earnings to contract outside of recessions (Chart 13). This is why recessions and equity bear markets generally overlap (Chart 14). With the next recession still two years away, it is too early to turn defensive. Indeed, as Table 1 shows, the second-to-last year of business-cycle expansions is often the most lucrative for stock market investors. Chart 13Earnings Rarely Contract Outside Of Recessions Chart 14Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Table 1Too Soon To Get Out Q: What do you recommend in terms of regional equity allocation? A: If global growth accelerates later this year and the dollar weakens, this will create an excellent environment for international stocks – EM and Europe in particular. Investors should prepare to overweight those regions at the expense of the United States (currency unhedged). Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Elaine Chan, “China spreading ‘positive news’ of strong export rebound in early March after February plunge,” South China Morning Post, March 11, 2019. 2      Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Is There Really Too Much Government Debt In The World?” dated February 22, 2019.   Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights Venezuela’s oil production likely fell ~ 500k b/d last week in the wake of nationwide power outages, reducing total output to ~ 500k b/d. However, neither OPEC 2.0 nor U.S. President Donald Trump drew much attention to it. During an industry gathering in Houston last week, an administration official conceded events in Venezuela could affect whether U.S. waivers on its Iranian oil-export sanctions are extended beyond May 4, but that was pretty much it.1 This is consistent with the thesis we laid out last month, which reflects our view OPEC 2.0 is evolving a more flexible production strategy that allows it to adjust production quickly in response to exogenous events over which it has little control; chiefly, U.S. foreign, trade and monetary policy.2 This will result in higher prices, satisfying the sometimes-conflicting goals of OPEC 2.0’s leadership – i.e., KSA’s budgetary need for prices closer to $80/bbl, and Russian producers’ need to increase revenue through higher volumes. Given this backdrop, our updated balances and price forecasts remain largely unchanged, with minor adjustments to the overall supply side and no change on the demand side. We continue to expect Brent to average $75/bbl this year. For 2020, we continue to expect Brent to average $80/bbl – higher U.S. shale output will be offset by delays in building out deepwater export facilities in the U.S. Gulf for most of the year. We expect WTI to trade $7 and $5/bbl lower in 2019 and 2020, respectively. The balance of price risk remains to the upside, as policy risk – i.e., a miscalculation on all sides – is elevated. Highlights Energy: Overweight. We are closing our 2020 long WTI vs. short Brent position at tonight’s close, given delays in the buildout of deepwater-harbor capacity in the U.S. Gulf caused by additional environmental assessments. This likely will push the spread out to $5/bbl+, vs. our target of $3.25/bbl. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper got another endorsement from Fitch Solutions, which is predicting LME prices will average $6,900 and $7,100/MT this year and next, on the back of lower inventories and improving supply-demand fundamentals. We remain long copper, which is up 2.7% since we recommended it on March 7. Precious Metals: Neutral. Our colleagues at BCA Research’s Global Investment Strategy expect the USD to weaken in 2H19, which, all else equal, will support gold and precious metals.3 Our long gold portfolio hedge is up 6.3% since inception on May 4, 2017. Agriculture: Underweight. Grain markets likely will trade sideways ahead of the USDA’s Prospective Plantings survey of farmer intentions next Friday.   Feature The sudden loss of Venezuelan output – and exports – was barely noticed in price action over the past week.  U.S. foreign and trade policy will continue to keep oil supply and demand uncertainty elevated, particularly as sanctions against Venezuela play out against the backdrop of a collapsing infrastructure. Last week’s nationwide power outage likely caused crude oil production to drop 500k b/d from ~ 1mm b/d previously.4 The sudden loss of Venezuelan output – and exports – was barely noticed in price action over the past week. Global inventories remain swollen (Chart 1), and OPEC 2.0’s spare capacity is increasing as it cuts production (Chart 2). This allows Venezuelan production losses to be covered with little or no disruption to supply or demand, and little or no increase in the level of agita in oil markets. Chart of the WeekOECD Inventories Still High, But Continue to Drain That cushion allows the U.S. to continue to prosecute its sanctions strategy against Venezuela and Iran. But it does not give the U.S. carte blanche to pursue regime change in both countries at the same time. As we noted in our New Political Economy of Oil report last month, OPEC 2.0 possibly could cover the loss of 500k b/d of Venezuelan exports and maybe up to 1.5mm b/d of Iranian exports.5 We continue to expect waivers on the Iran sanctions to be extended, although Trump administration officials remain guarded in terms of providing markets any forward guidance. However, it would tighten the heavy-sour market even more than it is now.6 And, full-on sanctions campaigns conducted simultaneously on Venezuela and Iran following the expiration of U.S. waivers on export sanctions against the latter would leave spare capacity dangerously thin, and push the risk premium in oil prices up sharply, given the volumes Iran already is supplying (Chart 3, Table 1). Table 1Iran Exports By Country 2018 (‘000 b/d) We continue to expect waivers on the Iran sanctions to be extended, although Trump administration officials remain guarded in terms of providing markets any forward guidance. The most that’s been offered came last week in Houston at an industry convention, where Brian Hook, special representative for Iran at the U.S. State Department, indicated the U.S. administration is aware of the supply-side pressure associated with its campaigns against Venezuela and Iran. However, he offered nothing definitive one way or another, so markets will continue to assign a non-zero probability that waivers will not be extended.7 Oil Supply Expectations Remain Stable For our part, we believe waivers on the U.S. Iranian export sanctions will be extended out of necessity. While more than 2mm b/d of Venezuelan and Iranian production can be offset by increased OPEC 2.0 spare capacity – now running ~ 2.1mm b/d based on U.S. EIA estimates – it is not sufficient to cover any additional losses due to unplanned outage of the sort seen in May 2016, when 1mm b/d of Canadian oil production was lost to wildfires. These are real risks, not abstractions meant to illustrate a point.8 For 2H19, our base case now assumes OPEC 2.0’s production rises by ~ 0.5mm b/d vs. 1H19 production of 44.5mm b/d. This will smooth out the loss of Venezuelan output as it falls to 500k b/d by the end of this year, vs. the 650k b/d we expected last month. We also expect Iranian production to remain close to the 3mm b/d it will average in 1H19, likely increasing as global storage levels fall and waivers are exercised (much like a call option). News reports suggest KSA continues to advocate the extension of production cuts by OPEC 2.0 to year end. However, if the coalition’s goal is to keep Brent prices close to $75/bbl this year, and closer to $80/bbl next year – the assumptions we’re working with – OPEC 2.0 likely will have to raise production by 0.5mm b/d in 2H19 and 0.72mm b/d next year. Maintaining production cuts into 2H19 risks sending prices significantly higher, in our estimation. Globally, the big driver of growth on the supply side continues to be U.S. shales, which we now expect to increase 1.2mm b/d in 2019 and 0.9mm b/d next year, a small increase of ~ 60k b/d versus our estimates last month.9 While it is true the Permian bottleneck will be cleared by the end of this year – adding some 2mm b/d of new takeaway capacity – export capacity will remain challenged by new delays to the build-out of deepwater-harbor capacity in the U.S. Gulf well into 2020, following requests of Carlyle Group and Trafigura AG to provide additional information in environmental filings to regulators before work begins.10 This will push the Permian bottleneck from the basin to the U.S. Gulf refining market. On the back of this development, we are closing our 2020 long WTI vs. short Brent recommendation at tonight’s close, given these delays likely push the deep-water expansion in the Gulf to 4Q20 or later. Oil Demand Also Remains Stable Oil demand will continue to be supported by the easing of monetary policy in DM and EM economies to offset a slowdown in global growth. In addition, we expect China’s credit cycle to bottom in 1Q19, which will be supportive of oil demand there and in EMs generally (Chart 4). We continue to expect the Sino – U.S. trade war to be resolved in 1H19, as both presidents Trump and Xi need to get a deal done to satisfy domestic audiences – i.e., U.S. elections next year and the upcoming 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021, respectively. Chart 4EM Growth Will Lift In 2H19 During the second half of this year, we expect a more significant pick-up in China’s credit cycle, which will set the stage for a year-end rally in commodities generally – oil and base metals in particular. We also expect global demand to get a lift from a weaker USD beginning in 2H19 and extending to the end of 2020.11 We expect demand growth of 1.5mm b/d this year and 1.6mm b/d next year, slightly more than the EIA and IEA. We expect EM to account for 53.7mm b/d of growth this year and 55mm b/d next year. Total global demand will average 101.8mm b/d and 103.4mm b/d in 2019 and 2020. U.S. policy is keeping the supply- and demand-side uncertainty elevated, but OPEC 2.0’s hand has been strengthened by the fact that it is, more than ever, the fulcrum of the oil market. OPEC 2.0’s Balancing Strategy U.S. policy is keeping the supply- and demand-side uncertainty elevated, but OPEC 2.0’s hand has been strengthened by the fact that it is, more than ever, the fulcrum of the oil market: It can balance shortfalls out of spare capacity – boosted some by its production cuts – and it can reduce unintended inventory accumulation via its demonstrated ability to cut output rapidly. Our 2019 and 2020 Brent price forecasts remain at $75 and $80/bbl (Chart 5). Delays in building out U.S. Gulf deepwater-harbor capacity next year will keep exports constrained. This will back production up behind the pipe in the Permian Basin next year, and keep inventories fuller than they otherwise would be. And it means Brent markets will remain tighter than we previously expected in 2020, as WTI won’t be exported in the volumes needed to tighten the Brent - WTI spread as much as we previously expected. For 2019, we expect WTI to trade $7/bbl under Brent, and $5/bbl under in 2020 (vs. our earlier expectation of $3.25/bbl), on the back of these delays. This compels us to liquidate our long WTI vs. Brent recommendation in 2020 at tonight’s close. Chart 5OPEC 2.0 Output Hike Needed To Keep Market Balanced in 2H19 OPEC 2.0’s position as the fulcrum effectively means it can balance the market to achieve its price goals (Chart 6, Table 2). This does not drive our forecast, but it does line up with what we would expect an economically rational agent to do. Chart 6Our Ensemble Forecasts Remain Fairly Stable Table 2BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) We believe OPEC 2.0 is succeeding in evolving a strategy that allows it sufficient flexibility to respond to exogenous forces affecting oil prices, which are, for the most part, out of its control. Bottom Line: Policy uncertainty is elevated, but we believe OPEC 2.0 is succeeding in evolving a strategy that allows it sufficient flexibility to respond to exogenous forces affecting oil prices, which are, for the most part, out of its control – i.e., U.S. foreign, trade and monetary policy.12 As such, we believe it will adjust output to achieve price targets, which, despite the sometimes-public disagreements between KSA and Russia, are closer to our forecast levels of $75 and $80/bbl for Brent this year and next than not.     Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com       Footnotes 1      OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the OPEC/non-OPEC producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia.  U.S. waivers were granted by the Trump administration just before the sanctions against Iranian oil exports went into effect November 4; these waivers expire May 4, 2019. 2      Please see “The New Political Economy of Oil,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy February 21, 2019.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see “What’s Next For The Dollar,” published by BCA Research’s Global Investment Strategy published March 15, 2019.  It is available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4     In its March 2019 Oil Market Report, the IEA notes, “The electricity crisis in Venezuela has paralysed most of the country for significant periods of time. Although there are signs that the situation is improving, the degradation of the power system is such that we cannot be sure if the fixes are durable. Until recently, Venezuela’s oil production had stabilised at around 1.2 mb/d. During the past week, industry operations were seriously disrupted and ongoing losses on a significant scale could present a challenge to the market.”  We await better data to assess the full extent of the production lost in Venezuela. 5      Please see “The New Political Economy of Oil,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy February 21, 2019.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6      Please see “Oil Price Diffs: Global Convergence,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy March 7, 2019.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7      Please see “CERAWeek: US waivers for Iran oil imports may hinge on Venezuela sanctions impact: State official,” published by S&P Global Platts March 13, 2019. 8      We treat these waivers as quasi call options on Iranian crude oil in our analysis.  As inventories draw, importers holding waivers can be expected to exercise their option and lift more crude from Iran without running afoul of U.S. sanctions. 9      We approximate our shale production based on the big 5 basins (Anadarko, Bakken, Permian, Eagle Ford and Niobrara). 10     Please see “US Suspends Review On Trafigura Oil-Port Project” published by Hart Energy March 18, 2019.  See also “Exclusive: Environmental review could delay Carlyle deepwater oil export project up to 18 months,” published by reuters.com March 14, 2019. 11     See footnote 3 above. 12     A perfect example of this can be seen OPEC 2.0’s decision to move its ministerial meeting to June: A decision from the U.S. on whether to extend waivers on the Iranian sanctions will come May 4, right around the time OPEC 2.0 member states are deciding on export schedules.  If waivers are extended, member states can maintain production discipline or add volumes to the market as needed; if sanctions are re-imposed in full, they can increase production as needed. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades

Highlights Investors should use the following dynamic for tactical asset allocation: 1. Sum the 10-year yields on the T-bond, German bund, and JGB. 2. When the sum is near 4 percent, it is prudent to de-risk portfolios and sit aside, at least for a while. It is a good level to buy a mixed portfolio of high-quality 10-year government bonds. 3. Just below this level, a sum in the 3-4 percent range defines a kind of ‘no man’s land’ in which equities drift sideways. 4. When the sum is near 3 percent, the seemingly rich valuations of equities versus bonds is fully justified. And it is appropriate to redeploy tactically from bonds to equities (Chart of the Week). 5. Use the 65-day fractal dimension to pinpoint the precise transition points between asset-classes: as for example, successfully achieved for the DAX versus German bunds. Right now, with the sum near 3 percent, it is still appropriate to be overweight equities versus bonds, and our preferred expression is overweight the DAX versus the German long bund. Feature Chart of the WeekThe Rule Of 4 Becomes The Rule Of 3 The global long bond yield recently hit a two-year low (Chart I-2). This is the direct result of central banks’ pivot to dovish – a commitment to keep policy rates at current levels, rather than to hike, for the foreseeable future. Chart I-2The Global Long Bond Yield Recently Hit A Two-Year Low One consequence is that high-quality bonds have become riskier. Consider a German bund or a JGB which is yielding zero percent. The short-term potential for capital appreciation – nominal or real – has almost vanished, while the potential for vicious losses has increased dramatically. The technical term for this negative asymmetry is negative skew. Years of research in a field of behavioural economics called Prospect Theory concludes that negative skew is the metric that best encapsulates investment risk. The Correct Way Of Thinking About Investment Risk A great misunderstanding of finance is to equate risk with volatility. Risky assets, such as equities, are risky not because they are volatile in the conventional sense. After all, who minds when their asset price goes up sharply? Risky assets are risky because they have the propensity to experience much larger short-term losses than short-term gains – captured in the saying: equities climb up the stairs on the way up, but they jump out of the window on the way down. High-quality bonds have become riskier. Another great misunderstanding of finance is the idea that bonds offer a diversification benefit and, therefore, that investors should accept a lower return from them. This argument is also flawed. The bond market is bigger than the equity market, and just as bonds are a diversifier for equity investments, equities are a diversifier for bond investments. Indeed, equities have protected bond investors during vicious sell-offs in the bond market such as after Trump’s shock victory in 2016. So we could equally argue that equities offer a diversification benefit. In fact, the correct way of thinking about investment risk is as follows: An investment’s risk depends on the negative asymmetry of its short-term returns. At very low bond yields, bond returns develop the same negative asymmetry as equity returns (Chart I-3). This means that equities lose their excess riskiness versus bonds, requiring equity valuations to experience a phase transition sharply higher (Chart I-4). But when bond yields normalize, equities regain their excess riskiness versus bonds – and their valuations must suffer a phase transition sharply lower. The phase transition in equity valuations is most pronounced when the global 10-year bond yield goes up or down through 2 percent (Chart I-5). This dynamic proved to be the biggest driver of asset allocation in 2018, and is likely to be a big driver in 2019 too. Essentially, higher bond yields can suddenly and viciously undermine the valuation support of equities, triggering a plunge in the stock market and other risk-assets which threatens a disinflationary impulse. The unsurprising response from central banks is to pivot back to dovish, pulling back bond yields to previous lows. These lower bond yields then push up equity (and other risk-asset) valuations back to previous highs. An investment’s risk depends on the negative asymmetry of its short-term returns. The good news is that record high valuations of risk-assets are fully justified if bond yields remain at current levels or decline further. But the longer-term danger is that these rich valuations are hyper-sensitive to rising bond yields. The Bubble In Everything The current episode of elevated risk-asset valuations is not unprecedented, but there is a crucial difference. Previous episodes of elevated risk-asset valuations tended to be localised, either by geography or sector: 1990 was focussed in Japan; 2000 was focussed in the dot com related sectors; 2008 was focussed in the U.S. mortgage and credit markets. Extraordinary monetary policy has boosted the valuations of all risk-assets across all geographies and all asset-classes. By comparison, the post-2008 global experiment with quantitative easing, and zero and negative interest rate policy has boosted the valuations of all risk-assets across all geographies and all asset-classes – equities (Chart I-6), credit (Chart I-7), and real estate (Chart I-8). This makes it considerably more dangerous, because we estimate that the total value of global risk-assets including real estate is $400 trillion, equal to about five times the size of the global economy.1 Chart I-6Equities Remain Richly Valued Chart I-7Credit Remains Richly Valued Chart I-8The EM Real Estate Boom Happened After 2008 Let’s say you had a risk-asset that was priced to generate 5 percent a year over the next decade. Now imagine that the valuation boost from ultra-accommodative monetary policy capitalises all of those future returns to today. For those future returns to drop to zero, today’s price must surge by 63 percent.2 If you were prudent, you might amortise today’s windfall to generate the original 5 percent a year over the next decade. But if you were imprudent, you might spend a large amount of the windfall today. The total value of global risk-assets equals five times the size of the global economy. Now let’s imagine a valuation derating moves the risk-asset’s returns back to the future. For those that had prudently amortised the original windfall, nothing has really changed and future spending patterns would not be impacted. But not everybody is prudent. For those that had imprudently spent the original windfall, future spending would inevitably suffer a nasty recession. The Rule Of 4 Becomes The Rule Of 3 How can we sense the crucial 2 percent level in the global 10-year bond yield? The answer is that it broadly equates to when the sum of the 10-year yields on the T-bond, German bund and JGB is at a 4 percent level (Chart I-9). This is the genesis of our very successful ‘Rule of 4’. In 2019, just as in 2018, investors should use the following dynamic for tactical asset allocation. The rule of 4 identifies when the global 10-year bond yield is at 2 percent. Chart I-9When The Sum Of 10-Year Yields On The T-Bond, Bund, And JGB Equals 4 Percent, The Global 10-Year Yield Equals 2 Percent  Sum the 10-year yields on the T-bond, German bund, and JGB. When the sum is near 4 percent, it is prudent to de-risk portfolios and sit aside, at least for a while. It is a good level to buy a mixed portfolio of high-quality 10-year government bonds. Just below this level, a sum in the 3-4 percent range defines a kind of ‘no man’s land’ in which equities drift sideways.  When the sum is near 3 percent, the seemingly rich valuations of equities versus bonds is fully justified. And it is appropriate to redeploy tactically from bonds to equities. Use the 65-day fractal dimension to pinpoint the precise transition points between asset-classes: as for example, successfully achieved for the DAX versus German bunds (Chart I-10). Overweight equities versus bonds. With the sum of the three 10-year yields now near 3 percent, the rule of 4 has, in a sense, become the rule of 3. It is still appropriate to be tactically overweight equities versus bonds, and our preferred expression is to overweight the DAX versus the German long bund. Chart I-10Use The 65-Day Fractal Dimension To Pinpoint The Precise Transition Points Between Asset-Classes   Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Trapped: Have Equities Trapped Bonds?”, September 13, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 2 5 percent compounded over ten years.