Germany

Highlights The main headwinds to euro area growth in 2018 are easing in 2019, at least in part and for the time being. The two main tail-risks are a messy Brexit and financial market volatility, but these are not our central case. Stay overweight the Eurostoxx50 versus the S&P500. Go underweight German bunds. Go overweight the German DAX versus German long-dated bunds. Add the German DAX as a new long position to the existing long basket holdings in France, Ireland and Switzerland. Maintain the short basket holdings in Norway and Denmark. Feature Chart of the WeekThe Underperformance Of German Equities Vs. German Bonds Is At A Euro Debt Crisis Extreme! Economies do not grow in straight lines. Rather, the process of economic expansion is a never-ending ebb and flow, creating clockwork-like oscillations in economic activity. As a perfect illustration, the growth in the euro area wage bill has trended higher through the past five years and is now running at very healthy 4 percent clip. Yet this strong uptrend has been interspersed with wobbles that have occurred with a remarkable regularity (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Economies Have Regular Wobbles... The recent setback in euro area activity has spooked some economy watchers. Even the ECB has just moved its risk assessment surrounding the growth outlook to the downside. But the downgrade was largely a result of its ‘data-dependency’ which, by definition, is always backward looking. This meant that the downgrade had a negligible effect on the financial markets which are always forward looking. For the markets, there is a much more important issue: is the recent setback the start of something serious, or can we expect a bounce back? The Setback The explanation for the regular wobbles in euro area growth comes from the oscillations in global economic activity (Chart I-3). But here we need to be wary of a potentially circular argument. As Europe is a dominant component of the global economy, euro area domestic demand setbacks could themselves be the root cause of the over-arching global growth oscillations. Chart I-3...Because Of Clockwork-Like Oscillations In Global Economic Activity Recently, Italy and Germany have suffered idiosyncratic ‘country and sector specific’ setbacks. The spat between Rome and Brussels over Italy’s 2019 budget caused Italian bond yields to soar and Italian bank lending to contract viciously (Chart I-4). Meanwhile, the auto sector – a major engine of the German economy – spluttered as it absorbed the new WLTP emissions testing standard. Through the middle of 2018 German vehicle exports suffered a €20 billion hit which shaved 0.6 percent from the €3.4 trillion German economy (Chart I-5).  Chart I-4Italian Bank Lending Contracted Viciously, But Will Now Recover Chart I-5German Auto Exports Plunged, But Will Now Recover Despite all of this, the epicentre of the 2018 growth setback was not inside Europe, but outside Europe. The ECB correctly blames the recent down-oscillation not on domestic causes, but on softer external demand, specifically “vulnerabilities in emerging markets”. The central bank argues that once there is clarity on the exports and the trade sector, much of the euro area’s weakness will wash out.  Another very important driver of European growth oscillations is the oil price. In recent years, the growth in GDP in excess of wages has perfectly and inversely tracked oscillations in the oil price (Chart I-6). The simple reason is that Europeans are net importers of energy, and the amount of energy they consume tends to be price inelastic. Hence, when energy prices soar as they did for most of 2018, it squeezes European real spending. Conversely, when energy prices plunge as they have more recently, it boosts real spending. Chart I-6Oil: Another Driver Of European Growth Somewhat contrary to received wisdom, one thing that does not generally drive euro area growth oscillations is the euro exchange rate. When the euro weakens, it does of course make the euro area’s exporters more competitive. But working against this, a weaker euro also raises the prices of imported energy and food, thereby squeezing euro area consumers’ real incomes. And vice-versa when the euro strengthens. Hence, while the euro’s moves do create growth winners and losers within the euro area, these tend to cancel out at the aggregate economy level. The Bounce Back The main headwinds to euro area growth in 2018 are easing in 2019, at least in part and for the time being. Regarding the vulnerabilities in emerging markets, many ECB governors argue that “everything we know says that the Chinese government is taking strong measures to address its slowdown”. Recent improvements in China’s monetary statistics provide strong evidence for this view (Chart I-7). Chart I-76-Month Credit Impulses Are Bouncing Back Everywhere Meanwhile, credit growth in the euro area itself is also accelerating, albeit modestly. This is hardly surprising given that financing conditions are very favourable. Even though the ECB has done nothing to policy interest rates, more dovish forward guidance has effectively made euro area monetary policy more accommodative: since October, core euro area 10-year bond yields are down 40 bps. And with banks’ balance sheets stronger, the ECB claims “the conditions for a continuation of credit to the economy are in place.”  Over the same three month period, the crude oil price has plunged by 35 percent (Chart I-8). Draghi confirmed our observation above: lower energy prices support real disposable income for euro area households. Chart I-8Double Boost: Lower Bond Yields And Lower Oil Draghi also pointed out another positive impulse: fiscal policy in the euro area has now flipped from contractionary to slightly expansionary. As regards the idiosyncratic sector specific setbacks, the Italian 10-year BTP yield has unwound its budget spat spike, and is down 100 bps since October. It follows that Italian bank credit growth is likely to recover. And Draghi explained that “the specific episode of the car industry in Germany will soon wash out because there is going to be a rebound in the sector.” Still, two significant tail-risks could smother the bounce back: Uncertainties related to geopolitical factors and the threat of protectionism, specifically, a messy Brexit. Financial market volatility. The Investment Implications Our central case is that the tail-risks do not materialise. And that the recent combination of more favourable financing conditions in the euro area and globally, lower energy prices, fiscal thrust, and the removal of specific setbacks in Italy and Germany should engineer some sort of growth bounce back in the euro area.  One important implication is that the strong recent rally in German bunds is close to exhaustion, and even vulnerable to a short-term retracement. This is supported by our trusted technical indicator warning of an imminent liquidity shortage and a corrective price reversal (Chart I-9). Go underweight German bunds on a short term horizon. Chart I-9The Rally In The German Bund Is Exhausted A mirror-image implication is that the underperformance of the German DAX relative to German long-dated bunds is now at euro debt crisis extremes (Chart I-1 and Chart I-10). This relative performance also appears technically exhausted and ripe for a reversal. As an asset allocation position, go overweight the DAX versus German long-dated bunds on a tactical. Chart I-10The Extreme Underperformance Of The DAX Will Reverse In line with the growth rebound thesis, stock market selection – through the underlying sector exposures – should now have a modest tilt towards cyclicality. Stay overweight the Eurostoxx50 versus the S&P500. Within Europe, our current long positions in France, Ireland, and Switzerland combined with short positions in Norway and Denmark do provide the required tilt towards cyclicality. Nevertheless, today we are adding the oversold German DAX to our long stock markets basket. Fractal Trading System* In line with the fundamentals-based arguments in the main body of this report, this week’s recommended trade is to go long the DAX versus the 30-year bund. Set a profit target of 2.5 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com   Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Special Report

Feature In the late 1980s, half of the global stock market capitalization resided in Japan Furthermore, almost a third of the Japanese stock market capitalization resided in banks. It followed that to have a view on the global stock market you had to have a view on Japanese banks. Indeed, in 1988, five of the ten largest companies in the world were Japanese banks. Less than ten years later, the weighting of Japanese banks in the global stock market had collapsed to less than one percent, rendering Japanese banks a largely irrelevant part of a global equity portfolio. In the new millennium, it was the turn of European banks to step into the limelight. By 2007, the proportion of the euro area's stock market capitalization in banks had ballooned to a quarter. And then, Europe followed in Japan's footsteps. Today, the weighting of banks in the Euro Stoxx has plunged to around a tenth. Could European banks now become a global investment irrelevance too (Feature Chart)? Feature ChartAre Europe's Banks Following In Japan's Footsteps? European banks have performed very poorly. From their peak in 2007, a one dollar investment in euro area banks relative to the world index would now be worth just 15 cents. But Japanese banks have performed abysmally: from their peak in the late 1980s, a one dollar investment in Japanese banks relative to the world index would now be worth a pitiful 3 cents (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3).1 Chart 2Japan Dominated The Global Stock Market In The Late 1980s Chart 3Banks Have Performed Abysmally What turned Japanese bank shares from heroes to zeroes? Some people point to sky-high valuations: in the late 80s, Japanese bank dividend yields dropped below 0.5 percent (Chart I-4), and these high valuations clearly contributed to their subsequent poor investment performance. But this was not the main reason. Chart 4Japanese Banks Offered Miserly Dividend Yields Banks' Lifeblood Is Credit Creation The main reason for the severe underperformance of Japanese banks was that they lost their lifeblood: credit creation. Put simply, if bank assets stop growing structurally, then it is impossible for bank revenues to grow structurally. But in Japan, it was worse: from the 1990s through the mid noughties, private sector indebtedness actually shrank from 220 percent to 160 percent of GDP, and this explains the bulk of the abysmal performance of bank equities (Chart I-5). Chart 5Banks' Lifeblood Is Credit Creation The important lesson is that the structural outlook for bank equities depends first and foremost on the structural outlook for bank credit creation. This is especially true in Europe because the majority of credit intermediation occurs via the banking system rather than via the bond market. So how can we assess the structural outlook for bank credit creation? Basically by noting that there appears to be an upper limit at which all the good lending has been done. Additional bank credit then generates misallocation of capital and mal-investments. At which point, the economy and bank asset quality start to suffer, limiting any further increase in profitable lending. The precise point at which this happens is not set in stone, because high levels of public indebtedness, through 'crowding out', can pull down the limit of productive private indebtedness. And vice-versa. Nevertheless when private indebtedness, as a percentage of GDP, reaches the mid-200s, the evidence suggests that the scope for further growth becomes limited. On this basis, the outlook for bank asset growth in Europe is a mixed bag. In Switzerland, Sweden and Norway, private indebtedness already stands at 250 percent of GDP, implying that the stock of profitable bank assets is close to its upper limit (Chart I-6). Chart 6In Switzerland, Sweden And Norway, Private Indebtedness Is Very High Meanwhile in the euro area, private indebtedness ratios in the Netherlands and Belgium are already well above 200 percent, and in France at 200 percent. On the other hand, the ratios in Germany and Italy - the largest and third largest euro area economies - are barely above 100 percent (Chart I-7). This bestows on them the honour of the lowest privately indebted major economies in the world (Chart I-8), with considerable theoretical capacity for bank asset growth. Admittedly, Italy has a high level of public indebtedness. Nevertheless, it is hard to deny that if the banking system in Italy could be unfrozen, there is great scope for economically productive lending. Chart 7In Germany And Italy, Private Indebtedness Is Very Low Chart 8In Japan, Private Indebtedness Has Plunged Having said all that, we now turn to something that bank investors everywhere in the world should fear: blockchain. Blockchain Is A Mortal Threat To Banks The internet's major innovation was to decentralize and democratize information. Before the internet, the creation, ownership and dissemination of information was a function centralized to privileged organizations: governments, media and entertainment companies. But after the internet, anybody and everybody could create, receive and share content - and this has proved to be a game changer for the governments, media and entertainment companies that previously owned and/or controlled the information. In the same way, blockchain's major innovation is to decentralize and democratize trust. The Economist even described blockchain as "the trust machine".2 It follows that blockchain will be a game changer for the privileged organizations whose raison d'être is to supply trust and integrity in transactions - essentially, those that act as a middleman. Clearly, one such privileged organization is the banking system, because the banking system is really nothing more than a middleman that provides trust and integrity in the transaction between the people with savings and the people who want to borrow those savings. Granted, banks also assess and price the credit risk of borrowers as well as provide a degree of insurance for savers. But with the prevalence of universal credit scoring systems and compensation schemes, there is a growing tendency to decentralize those functions too. Put simply, blockchain removes the need for a middleman. Until now, counterparties without an established trust relationship could only transact through a middleman who could add the trust and integrity overlay. But once each participant in the transaction trusts the blockchain itself, they no longer need to use a costly intermediary, like a bank. Therefore, just as the internet has revolutionized politics, media and entertainment, it is our very high conviction view that blockchain will revolutionize the way that money, assets and securities are held, transferred and accounted for. And the major casualty will be the banking system as we now know it. Investment Considerations The structural case for European banks is that Germany and Italy - the largest and third largest euro area economies - have considerable scope for bank credit expansion. The structural case against is that the other European economies have very limited scope for bank credit expansion. Furthermore, we confidently predict that within a decade blockchain will have decentralized and democratized financial intermediation, transforming it to something that is unrecognizable from today. Overall, this will not be a good thing for bank investors. With this in mind, German and Italian real estate and real estate equities are a much cleaner structural play on the potential for increased private indebtedness in those economies, whether intermediated by the banking system or not (Chart I-9 and Chart I-10). Chart 9The Evolution Of Private Indebtedness... Chart 10...Drives The Real Estate Market We end with another important lesson from Japan. Even in a three decade long bear market, the banks had the capacity for countertrend bursts of outperformance from oversold levels, sometimes by as much as 50 percent in a year. This is because even within a structural bear trend, there are cycles of excessive depression. European banks could be ripe for such a countertrend burst of outperformance. This year, European banks sank by 35 percent versus European healthcare. However, the sharp deceleration in global credit growth which dragged them down has now clearly reversed (Chart I-11). On this basis, the next six months could be a countertrend phase: a brief opportunity to own some European banks, at least relative to other equity sectors. Chart 11European Banks Are Ripe For A Burst Of Outperformance Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Performances are calculated in common currency terms. 2 Please see 'the trust machine', The Economist, October 31, 2015.

Special Report

Highlights So What? Chancellor Angela Merkel's decision to step down as party chairperson is positive for European political evolution and thus not a risk to the market. Why? The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is unlikely to turn Euroskeptic, the median German voter is not. Europhile Green Party is surging, throwing shade at the narrative that Germans are souring on Europe. New elections are unlikely in the next 12 months, neither main centrist party would benefit. Chancellor Merkel's stabilizing role in the Euro Area crisis is overstated. Infusion of new blood is precisely what Germany, and Europe, needs. Also... 2019 will be a big year for Europe with multiple decisions to be taken on governance reforms. New leadership in Berlin is exactly what the doctor ordered. Feature German Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) suffered a deep loss in the Hesse election on October 28. Germany's main centrist parties - the center-right CDU and center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) - suffered deep losses in Hesse, mirroring the results in Bavaria from October 14 (Chart 1). The results have prompted Angela Merkel to confirm that she will not stand for re-election as chair of the CDU at the Hamburg party convention and that she will not seek any political posts after her current term as chancellor ends in 2021. Chart 1Winners And Losers In Bavaria And Hesse In this Client Note, we examine what Chancellor Merkel's decision means for Germany and Europe. Are Euroskeptics Taking Over Germany? The most important question for global investors is whether Merkel's fall from grace is related to a growing trend of populism in Europe. In part, yes. However, Merkel's problem is deeper. Merkel-fatigue in Germany has deeper roots than her decision on immigration in 2015. Polling suggests that Merkel recovered from that crisis and reached a 70% approval rating in mid-2017, only to see a precipitous decline since (Chart 2). Chart 2Merkel's Political Capital Is Spent That said, German Euroskeptic sentiment is not on the rise (Chart 3). In fact, Germans support the currency union at one of the highest clips in Europe. Furthermore, Germans continue to "feel" European (Chart 4). Chart 3Germans Are Europhile... Chart 4...And Feel Quite European In the last two Lander elections in Bavaria and Hesse, the right-wing, Euroskeptic party Alternative for Germany (AfD) underperformed its national polling. Its support in opinion polls, at 16%, appears to be limited by the number of Germans who identify as Euroskeptic, similarly around 14%. In fact, it was the Green Party that surprised in both Bavaria and Hesse, gaining 8.9% and 8.7% respectively. Bottom Line: The short answer is no, Germany is not being taken over by Euroskeptics. True, the 2015 migration crisis has given the AfD a tailwind, allowing it to become entrenched in the political system. Yet just as impressive is the rise of the Europhile Green party (Chart 5). Chart 5Grand Coalition Parties Would Be Crazy To Call A New Election OK, But Will The CDU Move To The Right? The previous question was purposely hyperbolic. The more nuanced question is whether the CDU will swing to the right in the face of AfD's rise? The answer depends on the issue. The two key issues are immigration and EU integration. On immigration, it is simply good politics for Germany's center-right party to steal from the AfD platform. The only downside of adopting a right-leaning immigrant policy is that it will make forming coalitions with the surging Green Party more difficult. It was immigration policy that ultimately prevented the so-called Jamaica Coalition - the CDU, the Green Party, and the pro-business and mildly Euroskeptic Free Democratic Party (FDP) - from becoming a fully-fledged ruling coalition in November 2017. This forced Merkel to re-establish the uninspiring Grand Coalition with the SPD.1 On European integration, it is possible that the CDU will adopt more Euroskeptic rhetoric, but such a move could backfire. First, data suggests that Germans continue to support the euro at a high clip. Second, AfD has already captured the "hard Euroskeptic" voters, whereas FDP has captured "soft Euroskeptics." It is unclear if the CDU has any chance of getting any of those voters back by crowding the "Euroskeptic corner." In fact, data from Bavaria and Hesse indicate that the CDU has been losing voters equally to the Green Party and the AfD. From the perspective of the Median Voter Theory, the CDU has a clear path forward. By remaining Europhile and pro-EU, it can ensure that it does not abandon the 83% of Germans who continue to support the currency union. The German median voter clearly does not want to abandon European institutions. But by ditching Merkel's liberal, pro-immigrant policy, the CDU can ensure that it withstands the AfD's attack on its right flank. Bottom Line: Germany's main center-right party has the luxury of picking its battles with the right-wing AfD. We suspect that the CDU will adopt some of the AfD's anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy, but retain its centrism on other issues. Who Will Replace Merkel As The Head Of The CDU? After months of speculation, Chancellor Merkel has confirmed that she will not pursue the CDU chairmanship at the upcoming December 7-8 party conference in Hamburg. Instead, Germany's ruling party will select a new chairperson, one who will be groomed as Merkel's successor for the 2021 election. The process for selecting the CDU chairperson is largely closed and dominated by party elites. The Federal Executive Board of the CDU - which is made up of the chairperson and 39 other members - sits down with the CDU parliamentary faction to approve the candidates, ensuring that a rogue candidate cannot stage a surprise in the delegate vote. It is highly likely that Merkel will be able to hand-pick a successor. Table 1 is our attempt to collate the likeliest candidates to replace Merkel as the head of the CDU. The list includes only one Euroskeptic candidate - former party whip Friedrich Merz who has not sat in the Bundestag since 2009 - and quite a few outright Europhiles. Merkel's preferred candidate is Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer - often referred to by German media by her acronym AKK - a centrist who is to the left of Merkel on economic policy, EU matters, and social issues. Table 1Potential Merkel Successors Given the short period of time between now and the Hamburg conference, it is highly unlikely that a surprise candidate - such as the Euroskeptic Merz - will emerge victorious. Merkel, for instance, spent months grooming the party rank-and-file prior to her nomination. Bottom Line: Merkel's successor is likely to be hand-picked. Will Merkel Survive Until 2021? Merkel's chances of staying in power until the end of the current government's term will increase if her favored successor - Kramp-Karrenbauer - emerges victorious in December. A win for an outsider, or someone highly critical of Merkel (such as Jens Spahn, who has disagreed with Merkel on immigration), might hasten Merkel's demise. How would such an outcome play out? If Merkel resigns, the Bundestag would have to elect a new chancellor with a simple majority. Given that the CDU currently governs in a coalition with the SPD, the latter party would have to support the election of a new chancellor. Kramp-Karrenbauer would be acceptable to the SPD, but one of the more contentious candidates may not. A new election would require the chancellor - Merkel or her successor - to lose a confidence vote that he or she has called. However, this is a controversial matter constitutionally as the government must claim that it has reached a legislative impasse on a particular issue. (Chancellor Gerhard Schroder argued in 2005 that his economic agenda was stalled.) The other question is why would either of the ruling parties want new elections at this point? Both centrist parties are tanking in the polls, as both Bavarian and Hesse elections signal and as overall polling indicates (see Chart 5). As such, we suspect that a new election will not take place over the next 12 months, at the very least. Bottom Line: Early elections are not easy to arrange and neither of the two ruling parties want one at the moment. Merkel has at least one more year in power. Investment Implications: Does Any Of This Matter? Chancellor Merkel has lost all of her political capital: that much is clear. As such, her decision to begin the process of finding a successor is a positive development, one that political leaders rarely take willingly. Given the election of a Europhile Emanuel Macron in France in 2017, Berlin needs to find a comparable partner that can carry on reforms. Otherwise, Germany risks wasting the window of opportunity afforded by the Macron presidency to make critical changes to Euro Area governance. On the agenda over the next year or two are several important issues. First, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is supposed to be granted new powers, evolving it into a kind of European replacement for the IMF. Some argue - including the ESM's leadership - that this expanded role will necessitate a greater injection of capital, for which obviously Berlin must be on board. Second, the stalled Banking Union project requires Berlin's intimate involvement. A deposit insurance union would go a long way toward stabilizing the Euro Area amid future financial crises. Under Merkel, Berlin has been reticent to greenlight such developments. Third, Berlin must agree with EU peers on several important positions after the European Parliament elections in May 2019. These will include staffing the European Commission. According to press reports this summer, Merkel was focused on ensuring that the next president of the European Commission would be a German. To get her way, Chancellor Merkel supposedly indicated that she would not fight to get a German to replace Mario Draghi, whose term at the ECB is set to expire in October 2019. A change at the top in Berlin, particularly if a Euroskeptic takes over the CDU, may signal a reversal of this strategy. That said, what Berlin wants is not necessarily what Berlin will get, no matter who is in charge. Finally, there is the philosophical question of whether Merkel has been a factor of stability for Europe over the past decade. We believe the answer is no. Not for any normative reason but rather because she has been an intently domestic chancellor. Investors have been overstating Merkel's role as the "anchor" of Euro Area stability. She has, in fact, dithered multiple times throughout the crisis. In 2011, for example, Merkel delayed the decision on whether to set up a permanent Euro Area fiscal backstop mechanism due to the upcoming Lander elections in Rhineland-Palatinate and Baden Württemberg. Such delays and hesitations have cost Europe considerable momentum throughout the crisis and since. As such, we believe that Chancellor Merkel's decision presents considerable upside for European politics and limited downside. Infusion of new blood in Berlin is the only way for Europe to restart the stalled governance reforms. However, much will depend on whether the CDU takes a significant turn towards a "softer Euroskeptic" position or maintains its traditional pro-European outlook. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 1 The name references the colors of the three parties (black for CDU, green for the Green Party, and yellow for the FDP).

Special Report

Highlights The Global Golden Rule (GGR): The gap between market expectations of global central bank policy rates and realized interest rate outcomes is a reliable predictor of government bond returns. Thus, "getting the policymaker call right" is the key to outperformance for bond investors. Implied Government Bond Yields: Given the strong correlation between policy rate surprises and government bond yield changes, we can use the GGR to forecast yields one year from now based on our own assumptions of how many rate hikes (cuts) will be delivered versus what is discounted in money market yield curves. Total Return Forecasts: We can use implied government bond yield changes from the GGR to generate expected 12-month total returns for government bond indexes of different maturities, taking into account different rate hike assumptions for various central banks. Feature Chart 1Global Monetary Divergences? This month marked the ten-year anniversary of the 2008 Lehman Brothers default, which set off a worldwide financial crisis and a massive easing of global monetary policy. Extraordinary measures - zero (or negative) interest rates, large-scale asset purchases and dovish forward guidance from policymakers - were all successful in suppressing both global bond yields and volatility over time, helping the global economy slowly heal from the crisis. Now, a decade later, such hyper-easy monetary policies are no longer required given low unemployment rates and rising inflation in the major developed economies. That can be seen today with the Federal Reserve shifting to "quantitative tightening" (letting bonds run off its swollen balance sheet) alongside steady rate hikes, the European Central Bank (ECB) set to stop net new buying of euro area bonds at year-end, and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) dramatically slowing its pace of asset purchases. BCA's Central Bank Monitors, which assess the cyclical pressure on policymakers to tighten or ease monetary policy, have collectively been calling for interest rate increases since the start of 2017. Yet our Central Bank Monetary Barometer, which measures the percentage of central banks that have tightened policy over the previous three months, shows that only 1 in 5 banks have actually delivered rate hikes of late (Chart 1). Thus, the risks are tilted towards more countries moving away from highly accommodative monetary conditions given tightening labor markets and rising inflation pressures. This now-global shift towards policy normalization has major implications for global bond investing. The focus is now returning back to more traditional drivers of government bond returns, like changes in central bank policy rates. We recently shared a Special Report published by our colleagues at our sister BCA service, U.S. Bond Strategy, describing a methodology they dubbed "The Golden Rule of Bond Investing".1 That report introduced a numerical framework that translates actual changes in the U.S. fed funds rate relative to market expectations into return forecasts for U.S. Treasuries. The historical results convincingly showed that investors who "get the Fed right" by making correct bets on changes in the funds rate versus expectations were very likely to make the right call on the direction of Treasury yields. In this Special Report, we extend that Golden Rule analysis to government bonds in the other major developed markets (DM). Our conclusion is that utilizing a "Global Golden Rule" (GGR) framework that links bond returns to unexpected changes in policy rates can help bond investors correctly forecast changes in non-U.S. bond yields. The report is set up in two sections. First, we illustrate how the GGR works and how it empirically tends to generally succeed over time for different DM bond markets. In the second section, we make use of the GGR to generate expected return forecasts for non-U.S. government bonds for a variety of interest rate "surprise" scenarios. ECB Policy Rate Surprises Dovish surprises from the ECB do reliably coincide with positive German government bond excess returns versus cash (Chart 2A). Chart 2AECB Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I Chart 2BECB Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II The 12-month ECB policy rate surprise and the 12-month change in the Bloomberg Barclays German Treasury index yield displays a strong positive correlation (Chart 2B). The excess returns during periods of dovish surprises is 14.4% on average and are positive 85% of the time. Hawkish surprises on the other hand, coincide with negative average excess returns of -1.5% (Chart 2C). In terms of total return, the picture is roughly the same except that under hawkish surprises, the average total return you would expect is now positive, given that it factors in coupon income (Chart 2D). Chart 2CGermany: Government Bond Index Excess Return & ECB Policy Rate Surprises (2004 - Present) Chart 2DGermany: Government Bond Index Total Return & ECB Policy Rate Surprises (2004 - Present) Table 1Germany: 12-Month Government Bond Index Returns And Rate Surprises (2004 - Present) Looking ahead, the ECB should not deviate from its current dovish forward guidance of no interest rate hikes until at least the third quarter of 2019. That is somewhat consistent with the reading of the ECB monitor being almost equal to zero. Bank Of England (BoE) Policy Rate Surprises The GGR works well for the U.K. as can be seen in Chart 3A. Chart 3ABoE Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I Chart 3BBoE Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II The 12-month BoE policy rate surprise and the 12-month change in the Bloomberg Barclays U.K. Treasury index yield displays a strong positive correlation except for a major divergence in 1997-1998 (Chart 3B). Dovish surprises coincide with positive excess returns over cash 78% of the time and are on average equal to 6.2% over the full sample (Chart 3C and Chart 3D). As you would expect if the GGR applies, hawkish surprises coincide with negative excess returns. Chart 3CU.K.: Government Bond Index Excess Return & BoE Policy Rate Surprises (1993 - Present) Chart 3DU.K.: Government Bond Index Total Return & BoE Policy Rate Surprises (1993 - Present) Table 2U.K.: 12-Month Government Bond Index Returns And Rate Surprises (1993 - Present) Looking ahead, outcomes will be biased toward dovish surprises over the next six months given the uncertain outcome of the U.K.-E.U. Brexit negotiations. Against that backdrop, the BoE will remain accommodative despite inflationary pressures building up. Bank Of Japan (BoJ) Policy Rate Surprises The GGR does not seem to work when it comes to the Japanese bond market. This reflects the fact that both the markets and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) have understood that chronic low inflation has required no changes in BoJ policy rates (Chart 4A, second panel). Chart 4ABoJ Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I Chart 4BBoJ Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II While the 12-month BoJ policy rate surprise and the 12-month change in the Bloomberg Barclays Japan Treasury index yield displayed a strong positive correlation pre-1998, the correlation has broken down since then (Chart 4B). Negative excess returns over cash both coincide with dovish and hawkish surprises, on average over time. Further, dovish surprises coincide with positive excess returns only 45% of the time (Chart 4C and Chart 4D). Chart 4CJapan: Government Bond Index Excess Return & BoJ Policy Rate Surprises (1994 - Present) Chart 4DJapan: Government Bond Index Total Return & BoJ Policy Rate Surprises (1994 - Present) Table 3Japan: 12-Month Government Bond Index Returns And Rate Surprises (1994 - Present) Looking ahead, given that the BoJ will in all likelihood maintain its ultra-accommodative monetary policy stance in the near future, we do not expect the GGR to become more effective when applied to the Japanese bond market. Bank Of Canada (BoC) Policy Rate Surprises The GGR works relatively well for the Canadian bond market (Chart 5A). Chart 5ABoC Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I Chart 5BBoC Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II We observe a tight correlation between 12-month BoC policy rate surprises and the 12-month change in the Bloomberg Barclays Canada Treasury index yield, especially post-2010 (Chart 5B). Dovish surprises coincide with positive excess returns 81% of the time and 94% of the time if we look at total returns (Chart 5C and Chart 5D). Chart 5CCanada: Government Bond Index Excess Return & BoC Policy Rate Surprises (1993 - Present) Chart 5DCanada: Government Bond Index Total Return & BoC Policy Rate Surprises (1993 - Present) Table 4Canada: 12-Month Government Bond Index Returns And Rate Surprises (1993 - Present) Looking ahead, the BoC will most likely continue to follow the tightening path of the Federal Reserve, admittedly with a lag. However, accelerating inflation at a time when there is no spare capacity in the Canadian economy suggests that the BoC could deliver more rate hikes than are already priced for the next 12 months. As shown in Table 4, hawkish surprises from the BoC do coincide with negative monthly excess returns of -2.8%. Reserve Bank Of Australia (RBA) Policy Rate Surprises The GGR applies extremely well to the Australian bond market (Chart 6A). Chart 6ARBA Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I Chart 6BRBA Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II The 12-month RBA policy rate surprise and the 12-month change in the Bloomberg Barclays Australia Treasury index yield displays the tightest correlation out of all the countries covered (Chart 6B). Dovish surprises coincide with positive excess returns 83% of the time and 96% of the time if we look at total returns (Chart 6C and Chart 6D). Turning to hawkish surprises, they reliably coincide with negative excess returns. Chart 6CAustralia: Government Bond Index Excess Return & RBA Policy Rate Surprises (1994 - Present) Chart 6DAustralia: Government Bond Index Total Return & RBA Policy Rate Surprises (1994 - Present) Table 5Australia: 12-Month Government Bond Index Returns And Rate Surprises (1994 - Present) As can be seen on the bottom panel of Chart 6A, the RBA Monitor has been rapidly falling since 2016 and now stands in the "easier monetary policy" required. However, the RBA will likely have to see a rise in unemployment or a decline in realized inflation before it considers cutting rates, which raises a risk of "hawkish" surprises if the market begins to price in rate cuts. Reserve Bank Of New Zealand (RBNZ) Policy Rate Surprises The GGR works fairly well for Nez Zealand (NZ) government bonds (Chart 7A). Chart 7ARBNZ Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I Chart 7BRBNZ Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II 12-month RBNZ policy rate surprises and the 12-month change in the Bloomberg Barclays NZ Treasury yield exhibit a decent correlation (Chart 7B). Unusually, NZ is the only bond market covered in this report where both dovish and hawkish surprises coincide with positive excess returns on average, although positive episodes are much less frequent for hawkish surprises than for dovish surprises; respectively 55% and 86% (Chart 7C and Chart 7D). Chart 7CNZ: Government Bond Index Excess Return & RBNZ Policy Rate Surprises (2000 - Present) Chart 7DNZ: Government Bond Index Total Return & RBNZ Policy Rate Surprises (2000 - Present) Table 6New Zealand: 12-Month Government Bond Index Returns And Rate Surprises (2000 - Present) Looking ahead, the RBNZ has already provided forward guidance indicating that the Overnight Cash Rate (OCR) will most likely stay flat until 2020 - an assessment that we agree with, so the odds are against any policy surprises over at least the next 6-12 months. Using The Global Golden Rule To Forecast Government Bond Returns The practical application of the GGR is that it can be used as a framework for generating expected changes in yields and calculating total return forecasts for global government bond indices. The strong correlation demonstrated in the previous section between the 12-month policy rate surprises and the 12-month change in the average yield from the government bond indexes allows us to translate our "assumed" policy rate surprise over the next 12 months into expected changes in yields along the curve. With these expected yield changes, we can simply generate expected total returns using the following formula: Expected Total Return = Yield - (Duration*Expected Change In Yield) + 0.5*Convexity*E(DY2) E(DY2) = 1-year trailing estimate of yield volatility It is important to note that we would not give too much importance to what this analysis yields for longer-dated bonds. As shown in the Appendices, once we move into longer government bond maturities, the correlation between the policy rate surprise and the change in yields declines or even becomes non-existent for some countries. This result should not be surprising, as longer-term yields are driven by other factors besides simply changes in interest rate expectations. Inflation expectations, government debt levels and demand from longer-term investors like pension funds all can have a more outsized influence on the path of longer-term bond yields relative to the shorter-end. That results in much more uncertainty when it comes to the total return forecasts for long-dated maturities calculated with this framework. Practically speaking, we are not encouraging our readers to blindly follow that yield and return expectations generated by the GGR, even for bond markets where it clearly seems to be working over time. Rather, the GGR can be integrated in a larger asset-allocation framework for a global fixed-income portfolio by providing one possible set of bond market outcomes. On a total return basis, the results presented below, interpreted alongside the readings on the BCA Central Bank monitors, suggest that investors should be underweight core Euro Area (Germany, France and Italy), Australia and New Zealand while remaining overweight the U.K. and Canada over the next twelve months. As for Japan, given the likelihood that BoJ will leave its policy rate flat, the results hint at a neutral allocation. Jeremie Peloso, Research Analyst jeremie@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, CFA, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing", dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "BCA Central Bank Monitor Chartbook: Divergences Opening Up," dated September 19, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Global Golden Rule: Germany In light of the forward guidance ECB President Mario Draghi has been providing to the markets, it appears that the most likely scenario over the next 12 months is for the ECB to keep interest rates on hold. Based on the strong relationships between 12-month ECB policy rate surprises and 12-month changes in yields along the curve (Appendix A), a flat interest rate scenario would be bond bearish for German government bonds especially at the short end of the curve with the 1-year German yield expected to rise by 16bps (Table 7A). Table 7AGermany: Expected Changes In Bund Yields Over The Next 12 Months (BPs) Using the expected change in yields thus inferred by the policy rate surprise, the German government bond aggregate index is forecasted to return 0.45% over the next 12 months (Table 7B). Table 7BGermany: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Global Golden Rule: U.K. Markets are currently discounting only 21bps of rate hikes in the U.K. over the next year. Thus, even a scenario where the BoE delivers only a single 25bp rate hike would be bearish for U.K. Gilts, especially at the short-end of the curve. Applying the GGR, 1- and 3-year Gilt yields would be expected to rise by 20bps and 10bps respectively (Table 8A). Table 8AU.K.: Expected Changes In Gilt Yields Over The Next 12 Months (BPs) Interpolating these expected yield changes, the 1-3 year government bond index total return forecast would be 0.46%. On the other hand, if the BoE prefers to keep rates on hold given the uncertainty of the Brexit outcome, that same 1-3 year government bond index is forecasted to deliver 0.97% of total return over the next 12 months (Table 9B). This is our current base case scenario for Gilts. Table 8BU.K.: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Global Golden Rule: Japan Despite many rumors to the contrary earlier this year, the base case view remains that the BoJ will not change its stance on monetary policy anytime soon. As such, the expected changes in JGB yields under a flat interest rate scenario over the next 12 months are close to zero at the short end of the curve and rather bond bullish at the longer end of the curve; for instance, the 30-year JGB yield would be expected to rally by 9bps (Table 9A). Table 9AJapan: Expected Changes In JGB Yields Over The Next 12 Months (BPs) In that most likely scenario, the Japanese government bond index is forecasted to deliver 0.83% of total return over the next 12 months. In the event that the BoJ surprises the markets by delivering one rate hike of 25bps, it would be bond bearish for JGBs and the total return forecasts for the government bond indices would be negative, regardless of the maturity (Table 9B). Table 9BJapan: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Global Golden Rule: Canada Will the Bank of Canada follow the footsteps of the Fed? The markets certainly seem to think so, with more than three 25bps rate hikes priced in for next 12 months in the OIS curve. Table 10ACanada: Expected Changes In Government Bond Yields Over The Next 12 Months (BPs) That scenario would be outright bearish for Canadian government bonds, with 1- and 2-year yields rising by 16bps and 21bps, respectively (Table 10A). In terms of total returns, the GGR framework forecasts that with 75bps of rate hikes, the Canadian government bond aggregate index would deliver a positive return of 2.35% (Table 10B). This is because 75bps of hikes are currently discounted in the Canadian OIS curve, thus it would neither be a hawkish nor dovish surprise. Table 10BCanada: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Global Golden Rule: Australia The RBA Monitor just dipped below the zero line, implying that easier monetary policy is required based on financial and economic data. Table 11A shows that a rate cut delivered by the RBA in the next 12 months would be bond bullish for Aussie yields, especially at the long end of the curve, where the 30-year Aussie bond yield would fall by 34bps. Table 11AAustralia: Expected Changes In Aussie Yields Over The Next 12 Months (BPs) Of all the interest rate scenarios presented in Table 11B, the two rate cut scenarios would return the highest total returns. For instance, the Australian government bond aggregate index would return 2.80% and 3.90% in the event of one and two 25bps rate hikes, respectively. Table 11BAustralia: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Global Golden Rule: New Zealand Our view is that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand will stay on hold for a while longer, which is broadly the same message conveyed by the RBNZ Monitor being positive, but very close to 0. With that in mind, a flat interest rate scenario appears to be bond bearish for the NZ bond yields, except for the longer end of the curve (Table 12A). Table 12ANew Zealand: Expected Changes In NZ Yields Over The Next 12 Months (BPs) Table 12BNew Zealand: Government Bond Index Total For New Zealand, the government bond aggregate bond index is the only index provided by Bloomberg Barclays, as opposed to the other countries in our analysis where different maturities are given. In the flat interest rate scenario, the total return forecast for the overall index would be of 2.53% over the next 12 months. Appendix A: Germany Chart 1Change In 1-Year German Bund Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise Chart 2Change In 2-Year German Bund Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise Chart 3Change In 3-Year German Bund Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise Chart 4Change In 5-Year German Bund Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise Chart 5Change In 7-Year German Bund Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise Chart 6Change In 10-Year German Bund Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise Chart 7Change In 30-Year German Bund Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise Appendix B: France Chart 8Change In 1-Year French OAT Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise Chart 9Change In 2-Year French OAT Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise Chart 10Change In 3-Year French OAT Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise Chart 11Change In 5-Year French OAT Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise Chart 12Change In 7-Year French OAT Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise Chart 13Change In 10-Year French OAT Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise Chart 14Change In 30-Year French OAT Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise Appendix C: Italy Chart 15Change In 1-Year Italian Gov't Bond Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise Chart 16Change In 2-Year Italian Gov't Bond Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise Chart 17Change In 3-Year Italian Gov't Bond Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise Chart 18Change In 5-Year Italian Gov't Bond Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise Chart 19Change In 7-Year Italian Gov't Bond Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise Chart 20Change In 10-Year Italian Gov't Bond Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise Chart 21Change In 30-Year Italian Gov't Bond Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise Appendix D: U.K. Chart 22Change In 1-Year Gilts Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoE Policy Rate Surprise Chart 23Change In 2-Year Gilts Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoE Policy Rate Surprise Chart 24Change In 3-Year Gilts Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoE Policy Rate Surprise Chart 25Change In 5-Year Gilts Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoE Policy Rate Surprise Chart 26Change In 7-Year Gilts Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoE Policy Rate Surprise Chart 27Change In 10-Year Gilts Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoE Policy Rate Surprise Chart 28Change In 30-Year Gilts Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoE Policy Rate Surprise Appendix E: Japan Chart 29Change In 1-Year Japanese JGB Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoJ Policy Rate Surprise Chart 30Change In 2-Year Japanese JGB Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoJ Policy Rate Surprise Chart 31Change In 3-Year Japanese JGB Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoJ Policy Rate Surprise Chart 32Change In 5-Year Japanese JGB Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoJ Policy Rate Surprise Chart 33Change In 7-Year Japanese JGB Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoJ Policy Rate Surprise Chart 34Change In 10-Year Japanese JGB Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoJ Policy Rate Surprise Chart 35Change In 30-Year Japanese JGB Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoJ Policy Rate Surprise Appendix F: Canada Chart 36Change In 1-Year Canadian Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoC Policy Rate Surprise Chart 37Change In 2-Year Canadian Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoC Policy Rate Surprise Chart 38Change In 3-Year Canadian Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoC Policy Rate Surprise Chart 39Change In 5-Year Canadian Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoC Policy Rate Surprise Chart 40Change In 7-Year Canadian Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoC Policy Rate Surprise Chart 41Change In 10-Year Canadian Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoC Policy Rate Surprise Chart 42Change In 30-Year Canadian Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoC Policy Rate Surprise Appendix G: Australia Chart 43Change In 1-Year Aussie Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBA Policy Rate Surprise Chart 44Change In 2-Year Aussie Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBA Policy Rate Surprise Chart 45Change In 3-Year Aussie Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBA Policy Rate Surprise Chart 46Change In 5-Year Aussie Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBA Policy Rate Surprise Chart 47Change In 7-Year Aussie Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBA Policy Rate Surprise Chart 48Change In 10-Year Aussie Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBA Policy Rate Surprise Appendix H: New Zealand Chart 49Change In 1-Year NZ Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBNZ Policy Rate Surprise Chart 50Change In 2-Year NZ Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBNZ Policy Rate Surprise Chart 51Change In 3-Year NZ Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBNZ Policy Rate Surprise Chart 52Change In 5-Year NZ Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBNZ Policy Rate Surprise Chart 53Change In 7-Year NZ Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBNZ Policy Rate Surprise Chart 54Change In 10-Year NZ Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBNZ Policy Rate Surprise

Highlights German real estate and real estate equities remain a worthwhile multi-year position, especially in relative terms. The dominant stocks are Vonovia, Deutsche Wohnen, LEG, and GSW. Swedish real estate and real estate equities are likely to face harder times. The dominant stocks are Lundbergforetagen, Castellum, Fastighets, and Fabege. The structural pair-trade is long German real estate equities, short Swedish real estate equities. Italian real estate offers distressed opportunities. The long-term equity play is Covivio. We remain reluctant to own U.K. residential real estate or real estate equities. Chart of the WeekExtremes In European Real Estate Feature Nowadays, the best way to play the relative performance of an individual economy is through real estate. Indeed, European real estate offers compelling structural opportunities for investors who want to go long, and for investors who want to go short. By contrast, the opportunities to play intra-European economic divergences through other asset-classes have become limited. Nineteen European countries share one currency and one policy interest rate; and the mega-cap companies that drive the major equity indexes are multinationals exposed to the global economy. Meaning that a stock market's relative performance is no longer defined by its home economy; it is now defined instead by its dominant sectors and stocks.1 This leaves real estate as the purest play on the domestic economy. The evidence comes from the huge divergences in real estate market performances across Europe through the past two decades (Chart I-2-Chart I-4). While house prices in Sweden and Norway have more than trebled in real terms, house prices in Germany and Italy are at the same real level today as in 1995 (Chart of the Week). Chart I-2Winners And Losers In##br## European Real Estate Chart I-3Winners And Losers In##br## European Real Estate Chart I-4Winners And Losers In##br## European Real Estate How can German real estate be such a massive structural underperformer when the German economy has been one of Europe's star performers? The answer is that house prices take their cue from wages. German wages were suppressed for more than a decade, from which they are now playing a long catch up. A Tale Of Two Real Estate Markets: Germany And Sweden The two long-term drivers of house prices, assuming no supply bottlenecks, are: Real wages. The availability and price of bank credit. Real rents should trend higher to reflect the increasing quality of accommodation. For example, kitchens and bathrooms, heating and cooling systems and home security should all get better. In essence, the quality of accommodation benefits from productivity improvements. Of course, such improvements require investment expenditure. But a real estate investor requires a return on this investment. Therefore, rents - even after expenses - should increase in real terms. Given that house prices must maintain some long-term connection with rents, house prices should also trend higher in real terms, reflecting the improvements in home quality. But if real wages are not rising, it is impossible for tenants to absorb higher real rents, and so real rents and house prices stagnate. This describes the situation in Germany through 1995-2010 when labour market reforms resulted in real wages going nowhere, despite major gains in workers' real productivity (Chart I-5). Furthermore, as nominal adjustments to rents occur infrequently, German real rents and house prices actually fell through this extended period (Chart I-6). Chart I-5Through 1995-2010 German##br## Real Wages Stagnated... Chart I-6...So German Real Rents And ##br##House Prices Declined Since 2010, the dynamic has reversed. Needing to catch up with the economic fundamentals, German real wages, real rents and house prices have all rebounded very strongly. Nevertheless, based on the long-term connection with real productivity gains, German real rents and house prices have considerable further catch up potential. Just fifty miles across the Baltic Sea, the opposite is true. In Sweden - and Norway - house prices appear to have run well ahead of the economic fundamentals. For this, blame the central banks. In recent years, Sweden's Riksbank and the Norges Bank have had to shadow the ECB's ultra-loose policy to prevent a sharp appreciation of their currencies. The trouble is that the flood of bank credit has been absurdly inappropriate for the booming Scandinavian economies. So the ECB's policy may indeed have generated bank credit fuelled bubbles... albeit in Sweden and Norway. Real estate equities are just a leveraged play on rents - and thereby real estate capital values - because the companies take on debt to finance their property portfolios. This means that in the short term, they are (inversely) sensitive to bond yields, but in the long term the main driver is rental growth. Hence, in the German real estate market's post-2011 rebound, German real estate equities - now dominated by Vonovia, Deutsche Wohnen, LEG, and GSW - have trebled (Chart I-7), and the market relative trade is up a very pleasing 75 percent since we initiated it. Any rise in bond yields would be a short term drag, but given that real rents and house prices have further catch-up potential, the sector remains a worthwhile multi-year position, especially in relative terms. Chart I-7German Real Estate Equities ##br##Have Trebled Since 2012 Interestingly, Swedish real estate equities have also trebled in the post-2011 period (Chart I-8). But in Sweden's case, house prices are extended relative to the economic fundamentals. Swedish real estate equities - now dominated by Lundbergforetagen, Castellum, Fastighets, and Fabege - are likely to face harder times. Chart I-8Swedish Real Estate Equities ##br##Have Also Trebled Since 2012 Hence, the structural pair-trade is long German real estate equities, short Swedish real estate equities. Italian Real Estate Offers Distressed Opportunities Turning to Italian real estate, it has exhibited the mirror-image pattern of Germany. From the late nineties to 2008, Italian house prices almost doubled in real terms - only then to enter a ten year bear market. In recent years, Italian real wages have been growing again, raising the question: what is holding back Italian house prices? The answer is a banking system that will not lend, making it difficult for anybody to finance a house purchase (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Italian Banks Haven't Been Lending... This lack of bank financing means that the natural flow of real estate that has to find a new owner is not receiving any bids. The upshot is that a long-term investor who can access financing can pick up property at highly distressed valuations, often at a fraction of the market price a few years ago. Some investors cannot remove a nagging fear about an 'Italexit' from the monetary union and the deep crisis that would follow. It is precisely because of the deep crisis that would ensue from a euro breakup that its likelihood remains low - though admittedly not zero. But even in that extreme eventuality, as long as Italy did not become an outlaw state in which property rights were dismantled, a long-term investor might still fare well. Because he would own a real asset bought at a very distressed price. Within the stock market, the real estate equity sector in Italy - just as in Germany and Sweden - has been a leveraged play on the house price cycle (Chart I-10). But there are two caveats: the sector is tiny with one dominant company, Beni Stabili; and Beni Stabili has just been taken over by the French property company Covivio. Still, now that Covivio owns a large portfolio of Italian real estate assets, it would be the appropriate equity to play this multi-year theme. And the bonus is that it offers a dividend yield of 5 percent. Chart I-10...Creating Distressed Opportunities In Italian Real Estate U.K. Real Estate Faces Headwinds Finally, the recent pressure on U.K. house prices is likely to persist (Chart I-11) - with the housing market facing at least one of three potential headwinds: Chart I-11U.K. Real Estate Faces Headwinds A disorderly Brexit, though not our central case, would pose a huge risk for the U.K. economy. On the other hand, an orderly and smooth transition to Brexit would liberate the Bank of England to hike interest rates further in 2019. Bear in mind that in the U.K., wage pressures and CPI inflation are not dissimilar to those in the U.S., where the Federal Reserve has already hiked the policy rate seven times. So it is largely the uncertainties surrounding Brexit that are staying the BoE's hands. The precarious path to leaving the EU on March 29 2019 is littered with landmines for Theresa May. Any of these landmines could trigger a snap General Election, a Jeremy Corbyn led Labour government, and the spectre of a high-end 'land value' tax. Hence, we remain reluctant to own U.K. residential real estate or real estate equities. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 For the compelling evidence, please see Charts 1-6 in the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report 'The Eight Components Of Equity Market Allocation' July 26 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model* The 30% outperformance of India versus China during the recent EM shock is technically stretched, hitting a fractal dimension that signals a potential reversal, assuming no further deterioration in news flow. On this technical basis, the countertrend trade would be long China/short India with a profit target of 9% and symmetrical stop-loss. In other trades, long platinum/short nickel reached the end of its 65 day holding period very comfortably in profit. However, short consumer services versus consumer goods hit its stop-loss. This leaves five open trades. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-12 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Without a true banking union it is impossible to have a true monetary union. The result is a fragmented monetary policy. A fragmented monetary policy with an inflexibly rigid fiscal policy is a recipe for economic and political polarization. Until the banking union is complete, policymakers must permit a more fragmented fiscal policy as a crucial economic counterbalance. Expect a multi-year narrowing in core euro area long bond yield spreads versus their counterparts in the U.K. and U.S. Extremely loose monetary policy is inappropriate for Germany and France and ineffective for Italy. If Italy's banking system does recover to full functionality, the best long-term investment play will be Italy's real estate market. The equity play is Covivio. Feature The European Monetary Union is a contradiction because European monetary policy is not united; it is fragmented. Granted, the euro area has one policy interest rate, and one currency. But monetary policy works principally through accelerations and decelerations in the broad money supply, whose main component is bank credit. It follows that when the banking system is fragmented, a genuine monetary union is elusive. Italy Is 'Yin', The Rest Of Europe Is 'Yang' Economist Richard Koo distinguishes two distinct phases of an economy, a 'yin' phase and a 'yang' phase, with the key difference being the financial health of the private sector including the all-important banking system. In a yang economy, the private sector and the banks are solvent and functional. In such an economy, the smaller and less intrusive the government, the better. Fiscal policy is ineffective because it crowds out private investment. But monetary policy is highly effective because a forward-looking private sector generates a demand for bank credit which will accelerate or decelerate according to the policy interest rate. In a yin economy, the opposite is true. The private sector and/or the banks are insolvent and dysfunctional. In such an economy, monetary policy is ineffective. No amount of depressing interest rates, central bank liquidity injections, or bond buying is able to stimulate bank lending. This is because impaired balance sheets prevent the private sector from borrowing and/or the banks from lending. But in a yin economy, fiscal policy is highly effective. Because the private sector is single-mindedly paying down debt, the government can borrow and spend these private sector debt repayments and excess savings with no danger of crowding out. Indeed in a yin economy, if the government consistently applies an appropriately sized fiscal stimulus, the economy can continue to grow at a healthy pace. Chart I-1-Chart I-6 should make it crystal clear that while Germany and France have a yang economy, Italy has a yin economy. Chart I-1Italy Has A 'Yin' Economy: ##br##Monetary Policy Is Not Effective... Chart I-2...But Fiscal Policy##br## Is Effective Chart I-3France Has A 'Yang' Economy: ##br##Monetary Policy Is Effective... Chart I-4...But Fiscal Policy##br## Is Not Effective Chart I-5Germany Has A 'Yang' Economy:##br## Monetary Policy Is Effective... Chart I-6...But Fiscal Policy ##br##Is Not Effective A Monetary Union Needs A Banking Union In Germany and France, bank credit has surged in response to the ECB's ultra-accommodative monetary policy. But in Italy, bank credit growth is almost non-existent. Through the past ten years, no amount of depressing interest rates, central bank liquidity injections, or bond buying has been able to stimulate Italy's money supply (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-7Italian Banks Are ##br##Not Lending... Chart I-8...Because The Italian Banking System Has##br## Been Left Undercapitalised For A Decade Furthermore, when the ECB bought Italian government bonds from investors, where did Italian investors deposit the hundreds of billions of euros they received? Not in the local Italian banks, but in German banks, which they deemed to be much safer. Italian banks are not lending, and their depositors are still very wary, because the Italian banking system has been left undercapitalized for a decade. The irony is that the ECB's bond-buying was supposed to help Italy the most, but has probably helped it the least (Chart I-9). Chart I-9The ECB's Bond-Buying Has Exacerbated##br## The Target2 Imbalances Europe's full-fledged banking union is still years away. Europe has established a single supervisor for its 130 largest banks. It has also set up a single resolution fund (SRF) to wind down failing banks in an orderly fashion. Unfortunately, the SRF's coffers will not be full for another six years.1 Until then, the SRF will not be credible to the financial markets without a backstop. A candidate to provide such a backstop would be the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), but this is work in progress. Europe also lacks a common deposit insurance scheme. Knowing that the buck stops with the national government makes depositors wary, as has been the case recently in Italy. The large international banks are keen to implement a pan-European deposit insurance scheme. But this requires a clean-up of bank balance sheets in certain countries, notably Italy. Otherwise, the prudent banks will balk at the prospect of paying for the past mistakes of their less prudent competitors. Again, this is work in progress which may take several years to complete. A Fragmented Monetary Policy Requires A Fragmented Fiscal Policy If the entire euro area economy enters a yin phase, the constituent governments are allowed to use fiscal policy to support growth. For example, when the whole euro area went into a yin phase during the debt crisis, the European Commission relaxed the normal 3% cap on government deficits, and this fiscal stimulus helped the most troubled countries to weather the storm. But what if one country enters a yin phase, while the others are still in a yang phase? For example, a 'no-deal' Brexit would hit Ireland much harder than other euro area economies. The EU budget can help to an extent but, at just 1% of Europe's GDP compared to almost 20% in the U.S., the budget is small. This might still be sufficient to help Ireland, but it is insufficient for a large economy like Italy. The ESM can also help, but the assistance arrives too late - when the troubled country has already lost market access, and thereby is in, or close to, a recession. The unfortunate truth is that without a true banking union it is impossible to have a true monetary union. The result is a fragmented monetary policy, as is the case right now. A fragmented monetary policy with an inflexibly rigid fiscal policy is a recipe for economic polarization and thereby, political polarization. Therefore, until the banking union is complete, policymakers must permit a more fragmented fiscal policy as a crucial economic counterbalance. Because ultimately, a less economically polarized euro area will be a more successful and united euro area. An important test to this thesis has now arrived, as the new government in Italy prepares next year's budget. The government must agree its fiscal plan by September and present a draft to the European Commission by mid-October. Italy was projected to reduce its structural deficit by about 0.8 percent. But given that Italy will have one of the world's lowest structural deficits in the coming years, this reduction seems unnecessarily drastic (Table I-1). Because an increase in the deficit might unnerve the markets, the optimal outcome would be to leave the structural deficit close to its current level. Table 1Italy Will Have One Of The World's Lowest Structural Deficits We end with two brief thoughts for investors. The evidence clearly shows that the ECB's extremely loose monetary policy is wholly inappropriate for the euro area's mostly yang economy and largely ineffective for Italy's yin economy. On this premise, expect a multi-year narrowing in core euro area long bond yield spreads versus their counterparts in the U.K. and U.S. Finally, if Italy's banking system does gradually recover to full health and functionality, the best long-term investment play will be Italy's real estate market, in which prices have been bid down to depressed levels due to a lack of a lack of bank financing. On this premise, the long-term equity play is Covivio. Please note that I am taking a brief summer break, so the next weekly report will come out on August 23. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 The SRF will be gradually built up during 2016-2023 and shall reach the target level of at least 1% of the amount of covered deposits of all credit institutions within the Banking Union by December 31 2023. Fractal Trading Model* We have seven open positions, so we are not adding any new trades this week. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Paradox 1: U.S. growth will slow, and this will force the Fed to raise rates MORE quickly. Paradox 2: China will try to stimulate its economy, and this will HURT commodities and other risk assets. Paradox 3: Global rebalancing will require the euro area and Japan to have LARGER current account surpluses. Feature Faulty Assumptions Investors assume that slower U.S. growth will cause the Fed to turn more dovish; efforts by China to stimulate its economy will boost market sentiment towards risk assets; and global rebalancing requires the euro area and Japan to reduce their bloated current account surpluses. In this week's report, we consider the possibility that all three assumptions are wrong. Let's start with the U.S. growth picture. U.S. Growth About To Slow? The U.S. economy grew by 4.1% in the second quarter, the fastest pace since 2014. The composition of growth was reasonably solid. Net exports boosted real GDP by 1.1 percentage points, but this was largely offset by a 1.0 point drag from a slower pace of inventory accumulation. As a result, domestic final demand increased at a robust rate of 3.9%, led by personal consumption (up 4.0%) and business fixed investment (up 7.3%). Unfortunately, the second quarter is probably as good as it gets for growth. We say this not because we expect aggregate demand growth to falter to any great degree. Quite the contrary. Consumer confidence is high and the labor market is strong, with initial unemployment claims near 49-year lows. The Bureau of Economic Analysis' latest revisions revealed a much higher personal savings rate than had been previously estimated (Chart 1). The savings rate is now well above levels that one would expect based on the ratio of household net worth-to-disposable income (Chart 2). This raises the odds that consumer spending will accelerate. Chart 1Households Are Saving More ##br##Than Previously Thought Chart 2Consumption Could Accelerate ##br##As The Savings Rate Drops Rising consumer demand will prompt businesses to expand capacity (Chart 3). Core capital goods orders surprised on the upside in June, with positive revisions made to past months. Capex intention surveys remain at elevated levels. So far, fears of a trade war have not had a major impact on business investment. Fiscal spending is also set to rise. Federal government expenditures increased by only 3.5% in Q2, far short of the 10%-plus growth rate that some forecasters were projecting. The effect of the tax cuts have also yet to make their way fully through the economy. Supply Matters Considering all these positive drivers of demand, why do we worry that growth could slow meaningfully later this year or in early 2019? The answer is that for the first time in over a decade, demand is no longer the binding constraint to growth - supply is. Today, there are fewer unemployed workers than job vacancies (Chart 4). The number of people outside the labor force who want a job is near all-time lows. Businesses are reporting increasing difficulty in finding qualified labor. Chart 3U.S. Companies Plan To Boost Capex Chart 4Companies Are Struggling To Fill Job Openings New business investment will add to the economy's productive capacity over time, but in the near term, the boost to aggregate demand from new investment spending will easily exceed the contribution to aggregate supply.1 The Congressional Budget Office estimates that potential real GDP growth is running at around 2%. What happens when the output gap is fully eliminated, and aggregate demand growth begins to eclipse supply growth? The answer is that inflation will rise. Instead of more output, we will see higher prices (Chart 5). Chart 5Inflationary Pressures Tend To Increase ##br##When Spare Capacity Is Absorbed Rising inflation will force the Fed to engineer an increase in real interest rates, even in the face of slower GDP growth. Such a stagflationary outcome is not good for equities, which is one reason why we downgraded our cyclical recommendation on risk assets from overweight to neutral in June. Higher-than-expected real interest rates will put upward pressure on the U.S. dollar. A stronger dollar will hurt U.S. companies with significant foreign exposure more than it hurts their domestically-oriented peers. If history is any guide, a resurgent greenback will also cause credit spreads to widen (Chart 6). Chinese Stimulus: Be Careful What You Wish For Chinese stimulus helped reignite global growth after the Global Financial Crisis and again during the 2015-2016 manufacturing downturn. With global growth slowing anew, will China once again come to the rescue? Not quite. China does not want to let its economy falter, but high debt levels, and an overvalued property market plagued by excess capacity, limit what the authorities can do (Chart 7). Chart 6A Stronger Dollar Usually Corresponds ##br##To Wider Corporate Borrowing Spreads Chart 7China: High Debt Levels Make ##br##Credit-Fueled Stimulus A Risky Proposition Granted, the government has loosened monetary policy at the margin and plans to increase fiscal spending. However, our China strategists feel these actions are more consistent with easing off the brake than pressing down on the accelerator.2 They note that the authorities continue to squeeze the shadow banking system, as evidenced by the continued deceleration in money and credit growth, as well as rising onshore spreads for the riskiest corporate bonds (Chart 8). The Specter Of Currency Wars If Chinese growth continues to decelerate, what options do the authorities have? One possibility is to double down on what they are already doing: letting the RMB slide. Chart 9 shows that the Chinese currency has weakened substantially more over the past six weeks than its prior relationship with the dollar would have suggested. Chart 8Chinese Credit Growth Has Been Slowing Chart 9The Yuan Has Weakened More Than Expected ##br##Based On the Broad Dollar Trend Letting the currency weaken is a risky strategy. Global financial markets went into a tizzy the last time China devalued the yuan in August 2015. The devaluation triggered significant capital outflows, arguably only compounding China's problems. This has led some commentators to conclude that the authorities would not make the same mistake again. But what if the real mistake was not that China devalued its currency, but that it did not devalue it by enough? Standard economic theory says that a country should always devalue its currency by enough to flush out expectations of a further decline. Perhaps China was simply too timid? Capital controls are tighter in China today than they were in 2015. This gives the authorities more room for maneuver. China is also waging a trade war with the United States. The U.S. exported only $188 billion of goods and services to China in 2017, a small fraction of the $524 billion in goods and services that China exported to the United States. China simply cannot win a tit-for-tat trade war with the United States. In contrast, China is better positioned to wage a currency war with the United States. The Chinese simply need to step up their purchases of U.S. Treasurys, which would drive up the value of the dollar. Efforts by China to devalue its currency would invite retaliation from the United States. However, since the Trump Administration seems keen on pursuing a protectionist trade agenda no matter what happens, the Chinese may see their decision to weaken the yuan as the least bad of all possible outcomes. Unlike traditional stimulus in the form of additional infrastructure spending and faster credit growth, a currency devaluation would roil financial markets, causing risk asset prices to plunge. Metal prices would take it on the chin, since a weaker RMB would make it more expensive for Chinese businesses to import commodities. China now consumes close to half of the world's supply of copper, zinc, nickel, aluminum, and iron ore (Chart 10). Investors should remain underweight emerging market equities relative to developed markets and shun the currencies of commodity-exporting economies. We are currently short AUD/CAD on the grounds that a China shock would hurt metal prices more than energy prices. The Canadian dollar is highly levered to the latter, while the Aussie dollar is more levered to the former. Global Rebalancing: It's Not About Getting To Zero We have argued before that China's high savings rate explains why the country has maintained a structural current account surplus, despite the economy's rapid GDP growth rate.3 Both the euro area and Japan also have an excessive savings problem, minus the mitigating effect of rapid trend growth. The euro area's excessive savings problem was masked during the nine years following the introduction of the euro by a massive credit boom across much of the region (Chart 11). Germany did not partake in that boom, but it was still able to export its excess savings to the rest of the euro area via a rising current account balance. Chart 10China Is A More Dominant Consumer ##br##Of Metals Than Oil Chart 11Germany Did Not Take Part ##br##In The Credit Boom Germany Needs A Spender Of Last Resort Chart 12 shows that Germany's current account surplus with other euro area members mirrored the country's increasing competitiveness vis-à-vis the rest of the region. In essence, the spending boom in southern Europe sucked in German exports, with German savings financing the periphery's swelling current account deficits. This is the main reason why German banks were hit so hard during the Global Financial Crisis: They were the ones who underwrote the periphery's spendthrift ways. That party ended in 2008. With the periphery no longer the spender of last resort in Europe, Germany had to find a way to export its savings to the rest of the world. But that required a cheaper currency, which Mario Draghi ultimately delivered in 2014 when he set in motion the ECB's own quantitative easing program. So where do we go from here? Germany's excess savings problem is not about to go away anytime soon. The working-age population is set to decline over the next few decades, which means that most domestically oriented businesses will have little incentive to expand capacity (Chart 13). The peripheral countries remain in belt-tightening mode. This will limit demand for German imports. Meanwhile, countries such as Spain have made significant progress in reducing unit labor costs in an effort to improve competitiveness and shift their current account balances back into surplus. Chart 12Competitiveness Gains In The 2000s Allowed ##br##Germany To Increase Its Current Account Surplus Chart 13Germans Need To Have More Children The ECB And The BOJ Can't Afford To Raise Rates The private sector financial balance in the euro area - effectively, the difference between what the private sector earns and spends - now stands near a record high (Chart 14). Fiscal policy also remains fairly tight. The IMF estimates that the euro area's cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance will be in a surplus of 0.9% of GDP in 2018-19, compared to a deficit of 3.8% of GDP in the United States (Chart 15). Chart 14Euro Area: Private Sector ##br##Balance Remains Elevated Chart 15The Euro Area's Fiscal Policy Is Tight If the public sector is unwilling to absorb the private sector's excess savings by running large fiscal deficits, those savings need to be exported abroad in the form of a current account surplus. Failure to do so will result in higher unemployment, and ultimately, further political upheaval. This means that the ECB has no choice other than to keep rates near rock-bottom levels in order to ensure that the euro remains cheap. Japan has been more willing than Europe to maintain large budget deficits, but the problem is that this has resulted in a huge debt-to-GDP ratio. The Japanese would like to tighten fiscal policy, starting with the consumption tax hike scheduled for October 2019. However, this may require the economy to have an even larger current account surplus, which can only be achieved if the yen weakens further. This, in turn, suggests that the Bank of Japan will not abandon its yield curve control policy anytime soon. We were not in the least bit surprised this week when Governor Kuroda poured cold water on the idea that the BoJ was contemplating raising either its short or long-term interest rate targets. The bottom line is that thinking about global imbalances solely in terms of current account positions is not enough. One should also think about the distribution of aggregate demand across the world. Countries with demand to spare such as the United States can afford to run current account deficits, while economies with insufficient demand such as the euro area and Japan should run current account surpluses. The key market implication is that interest rates will remain structurally higher in the United States, which will keep the dollar well bid. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 This is partly because it can take a while for additional capital spending to raise aggregate supply. For example, it may take a few years to build an office tower or a new factory. Corporate R&D investment may not generate tangible benefits for a long time, especially in cases where the research is focused on something complicated (i.e., the design of new computer chips or pharmaceuticals). And even if investment spending could be transformed into additional productive capacity instantaneously, aggregate demand would still rise more than aggregate supply, at least temporarily. Here is the reason: The nonresidential private-sector capital stock is about 120% of GDP in the United States. As such, a one percent increase in investment spending would raise the capital stock by four-fifths of a percentage point. Assuming a capital share of income of 40% of national income, a one percent increase in the capital stock would lift output by 0.4%. Thus, a one-dollar increase in business investment would boost aggregate demand by one dollar in the year it is undertaken, while increasing supply by only 4/5*0.4 = roughly 32 cents. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China Is Easing Up On The Brake, Not Pressing The Accelerator," dated July 26, 2018. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "U.S.-China Trade Spat: Is R-Star To Blame?" dated April 6, 2018. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights Global Yields: Flattening government yield curves in the developed world have raised concerns about a potential future growth slowdown. Yet real policy rates will need to move into positive territory before monetary policy becomes truly restrictive and curves invert. This means global bond yields have not yet peaked for this cycle. UST-Bund Spread: The U.S. Treasury-German Bund spread has overshot our fair value estimates, and relative positive data surprises are turning more in favor of Europe. We are taking profits on our tactical UST-Bund spread widening trade, after a gain of 7% (hedged into U.S. dollars). UST Technicals: Some of the oversold technical conditions in the U.S. Treasury market have turned more neutral, but sentiment remains bearish. With both U.S. growth and inflation accelerating, we recommend sticking with a strategic below-benchmark U.S. duration stance rather than playing for a tactical short-covering Treasury rally. Feature In most years, investment professionals can look forward to taking some well-deserved time off in July to hit the beach and read a good book. This year, those same investors are forced to keep an eye on their Bloombergs while responding to the public musings of Donald Trump. The president made comments late last week that threatened the independence of the Federal Reserve, while also accusing China and Europe of currency manipulation. While those headlines can briefly move markets on a sunny summer day, they represent more Trump-ian bluster than any potential change in the conduct of U.S. monetary or currency policy. Chart of the WeekCan Policy Be Truly "Tight"##BR##With Negative Real Rates? The underlying dynamic remains one of mixed global growth (strong in the U.S., slowing almost everywhere else) but with low unemployment and rising inflation in most major economies. That means that independent, inflation-fighting central bankers must focus on their inflation mandates. In the U.S., that means more Fed rate hikes and a firm U.S. dollar, regardless of the desires of President Trump - the author of the large fiscal stimulus, at full employment, which is forcing the Fed to continue hiking rates. In other countries, however, the economic backdrop is leading to varying degrees of central banker hawkishness. That ranges from actual rate hikes (Canada) to tapering of bond buying (Europe, Japan) to merely talking up the potential for rate increases (U.K., Sweden, Australia). The aggregate monetary policy stance of the major developed market central banks is now tilted more hawkishly. So it is no surprise that global government bond yield curves have been flattening and returns on risk assets have been underwhelming (Chart of the Week). Yet the reality is that all major global curves still have a positive slope, even in the U.S. and Canada where central banks have been most actively tightening, while real policy interest rates remain below zero. It would be highly unusual for yield curves to invert before real rates turned positive, especially if central bankers must move to an outright restrictive stance given tight labor markets and rising realized inflation. This implies that there is more scope for global bond yields to rise over the next 6-12 months. We continue to recommend that investors maintain a defensive overall duration stance ... and to focus more on that good book on the beach and less on Trump's Twitter feed. Where To Next For The Treasury-Bund Spread? Chart 2A Pause In The Rising Yield Trend,##BR##Not A Reversal The rise in bond yields in both the U.S. and euro area seen in the first quarter of 2018 has been partly reversed since then. One of the culprits has been a stalling of the rally in oil markets, which has prompted a pause in the rise of inflation expectations on both sides of the Atlantic (Chart 2). Yet another factor has been the larger decline in real bond yields, which have fallen around 20bps in the both the U.S. and euro area since the peak in mid-May (bottom two panels). A potential driver of those lower real yields is the growing concern over the potential hit to global growth from rising trade tensions between the U.S. and China (and Europe, Canada, Mexico, etc). This comes at a time when China's economic growth was already slowing and acting as a drag on global trade activity and commodity prices. There has been significant weakness in China's currency and equity market of late, which raises the specter of another broader global selloff as occurred during the Chinese turbulence of 2015/16. Yet the declines in industrial metals prices and emerging market corporate debt have been far more modest so far in 2018 (Chart 3). A big reason for that has been the more subdued performance of the U.S. dollar this year, unlike the massive surge in 2015/16 that crushed risk assets worldwide (Chart 4). A more likely driver of the recent drop in real yields in the U.S. and core Europe was the slump in euro area economic data earlier in 2018. That move not only drove yields lower, but also pushed out the market-implied timing of the first ECB rate hike (Chart 5) and drove the spread between U.S. Treasuries and German Bunds to new wides. In our last Weekly Report, we updated our list of indicators in the U.S. and euro area that we have been monitoring to assess if our below-benchmark duration stance was still appropriate.1 The conclusion was that the underlying trends in growth and inflation on both sides of the Atlantic still supported higher bond yields on a cyclical basis, although the pressures were greater in the U.S. Yet at the same time, the gap between U.S. and euro area government bond yields has remained historically wide, with the 10-year Treasury-German Bund spread now sitting at 255bps - the highest level since the late 1980s. Chart 3Slowing Growth##BR##In China... Chart 4...But Not Yet Enough To Threaten##BR##Global Financial Stability Monetary policy differences have historically been the biggest driver of that spread. Today, the Fed is well into an interest rate hiking cycle that began nearly three years ago, and is now in the process of unwinding its balance sheet. Meanwhile, the ECB has been keeping policy rates at or below 0% while engaging in large-scale bond buying (Chart 6). Chart 5A Turn In European Yields##BR##On The Horizon? Chart 6Wide UST-Bund Spread Reflects##BR##Monetary Policy Divergences When looking at more typical fundamental drivers of the Treasury-Bund spread, many of the cross-regional differences are already "in the price". The spread appears to have overshot relative to the three main factors that go into our Treasury-Bund spread valuation model (Chart 7): The gap between Fed and ECB policy rate The ratio of the U.S. unemployment rate to the euro area equivalent The gap between headline inflation in the U.S. and euro area The Fed's rate hikes have now widened the policy rate differential versus the ECB equivalent (the short-term repo rate) to 200bps. At the same time, the rapidly improving situation in the euro area labor market now means that the unemployment ratio has been constant over the past couple of years, while euro area inflation has also caught up a bit toward U.S. levels in recent months. Adding it all up together in our Treasury-Bund valuation model - which also includes the sizes of the Fed and ECB balance sheets to quantify the impact on yields of bond-buying programs - and the conclusion is that the current spread level of 255bps is 50bps above "fair value" (Chart 8). Chart 7UST-Bund Spread Overshooting Fundamentals Chart 8UST-Bund Spread Looks Wide On Our Model Importantly, fair value is still rising, primarily because of the widening policy rate differential. We have consistently argued that the true cyclical peak in the Treasury-Bund spread will occur when the Fed is done with its rate hike cycle. Yet there are opportunities to play that spread more tactically, based on shorter-term indicators. For example, the gap between the data surprise indices for the U.S. and euro area has been a correlated to the momentum of the Treasury-Bund spread, measured as the 13-week change of the level of the spread (Chart 9). Data surprises are now bottoming out in the euro area while they continue to drift lower in the U.S. As a result, the Treasury-Bund spread momentum has begun to fade, right in line with the narrowing of the data surprise differential. Also from a more technical perspective, the deviation of the Treasury-Bund spread from its 200-day moving average is at one of the more stretched levels of the past decade. Combined with the extended spread momentum, this suggests that the Treasury-Bund spread should expect to see a period of consolidation in the next few months (Chart 10). Chart 9Relative Data Surprises No Longer##BR##Support A Wider UST-Bund Spread Chart 10UST-Bund Spread Momentum##BR##Got To Stretched Extremes We have been recommending both a structural short U.S./long core Europe position in our model bond portfolio for over a year now. We also entered into a trade that directly played for a wider 10-year Treasury-Bund spread in our Tactical Trade portfolio. We initiated that recommendation on August 8th, 2017 when the spread was at 162bps. With the spread now at 255bps, we are now closing out that recommendation this week, taking a profit of 7% (inclusive of the gains from hedging the Bund exposure into U.S. dollars).2 At the same time, we feel that it is too early to position for a narrowing of the Treasury-Bund spread. The large U.S. fiscal stimulus will continue to put upward pressure on U.S. bond yields over the next year, both through higher U.S. inflation and the associated need for tighter Fed policy. Already, the Treasury-Bund spread reflects both the relatively larger dearth of spare capacity in the U.S. economy (Chart 11) and the expected widening of the U.S. federal budget deficit compared to reduced deficits in the euro area (Chart 12). Much like the rise in the fair value of the Treasury-Bund spread, this suggests that there is limited downside for the spread on a more medium-term basis. Chart 11UST-Bund Spread Narrowing Will Be##BR##Limited By Faster U.S. Growth... Chart 12...The Result Of Looser##BR##U.S. Fiscal Policy We are taking profits on our tactical spread based on our read of all of our relevant indicators. There is a good chance, however, that we could consider re-entering a spread widening trade on any meaningful narrowing of the spread or adjustment in our indicators. Bottom Line: The fundamental drivers of the 10-year U.S. Treasury-German Bund spread continue to point to the spread staying wide over the next 6-12 months. Yet the spread has overshot our fair value estimates, and relative positive data surprises are turning more in favor of Europe. We are taking profits on our tactical UST-Bund spread widening trade, after a gain of 7% (hedged into U.S. dollars). A Quick Update On U.S. Treasury Market Technicals One of the overriding aspects of the U.S. Treasury market over the past few months has been the stretched technical backdrop. The combination of oversold price momentum, bearish sentiment and aggressive short positioning have helped keep yields in check, even as U.S. growth and inflation accelerate and the Fed continues to signal more future rate hikes. Back in March, we presented a study of previous episodes of an oversold U.S. Treasury market since the year 2000.3 Our goal was to determine how long it typically took for a resolution of oversold Treasury market conditions. Unsurprisingly, we concluded that the longest episodes of oversold Treasuries occurred when U.S. economic growth and core inflation were both accelerating, and vice versa. At the time of that report, all of the technical indicators that we looked at were signaling that Treasury bearishness was deeply entrenched (Chart 13). Now, four months later, there has been some change in those indicators: Chart 13UST Technical Indicators##BR##Are More Mixed Now The 10-year Treasury yield relative to its 200-day moving average: then, +43bps; now, +18bps The trailing 26-week total return of the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. Treasury index: then, -4.3%; now, -0.6% The J.P. Morgan client survey of bond managers and traders: then, very large underweight duration positioning; now, positioning is neutral The Market Vane index of bullish sentiment for Treasuries: then, near the bottom of the range since 2000; now, still near that same level The CFTC data on speculator positioning in 10-year U.S. Treasury futures: then, a large net short of -8% (scaled by open interest); now, still a large net short of -11%. Therefore, the message from the technical indicators is more mixed now than in March. Price momentum and duration positioning is now neutral, while sentiment and speculative positions remain stretched. The former suggests that there is scope for Treasury yields to begin climbing again, while the latter implies that there may still be room for some counter-trend short-covering Treasury rallies in the near term. In our March study, we defined the duration of each episode of an oversold Treasury market by the following conditions: The start date was when the 10-year Treasury yield was trading at least 30bps above its 200-day moving average and the Market Vane Treasury bullish sentiment index dipped below 50; The end-date was when the yield declined below its 200-day moving average. The details of each of those episodes can be found in Table 1. This is the same table that we presented back in March, but we have now added the current episode. At 150 days in length, this is already the fourth longest period of an oversold Treasury market since 2000. Yet perhaps most surprising is the fact that Treasury yields are essentially unchanged since the start date of the current episode (March 20th, 2018). There is no other period in our study that where yields did not decline while the oversold market resolved itself. Table 1A Look At Prior Episodes Of An Oversold U.S. Treasury Market Perhaps this can be interpreted as a sign that there is still scope for a final short-covering Treasury rally before this current oversold episode can truly end. Yet as we concluded in our March study, it took an average of 156 days for an oversold market to be fully corrected if U.S. growth was accelerating (i.e. the ISM manufacturing index was rising) and core PCE inflation were both rising at the same time - as is currently the case (Chart 14). Chart 14U.S. Growth/Inflation Backdrop Points To Yields Consolidating, Not Reversing The longest such episode in 2003/04 lasted for 203 days before the 10-year yield fell below its 200-day moving average. Yet the second longest episode (196 days) occurred in 2013/14, and Treasury yields ended up climbing to a new cyclical high before eventually peaking. Given the underlying positive momentum in both U.S. economic growth and inflation, but with a mixed message from the technical indicators, we suspect that this current oversold episode may have further to run. Yet as we concluded back in March, and still believe today, it will prove difficult to earn meaningful returns betting on a counter-trend decline in yields this time, as any such move will likely be modest in size and lengthy in duration. Bottom Line: Some of the oversold technical conditions in the U.S. Treasury market have turned more neutral, but sentiment remains very bearish and there are large speculative short positions. With both U.S. growth and inflation accelerating, we recommend sticking with a strategic below-benchmark U.S. duration stance rather than playing for a tactical short-covering Treasury rally. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "The Trendless, Friendless Bond Market", dated July 17th 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 The return on this trade is calculated using the Bloomberg Barclays 7-10-year government bond indices for the U.S. and Germany, adjusted for duration differences between the indices. The German return is hedged into U.S. dollars, as this trade was done on a currency-hedged basis. 3 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Bond Markets Are Suffering From Withdrawal Symptoms", dated March 20th 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights The real culprit for the mushrooming U.S./euro area trade imbalance is the ECB, and specifically its post-2014 experiment with ultra-loose monetary policy. There could be a major sea-change in ECB policy after November 2019 when Draghi's Presidency ends - just as there was after the last two changes in the ECB Presidency in November 2003 and November 2011. The yield spread between 30-year U.S. T-bonds and German bunds has much more scope to tighten than to widen. The euro's undervaluation - as calculated by the ECB itself - will ultimately correct. European exporters and equity markets heavily exposed to exporters - such as Sweden's OMX - will find the going tough, one way or another. If a stronger currency doesn't hit them, then President Trump surely will. Feature Chart of the WeekThe U.S./Euro Area Trade Imbalance Is A Near-Perfect Function Of Relative Monetary Policy Here in London last week President Trump trumpeted one of his biggest gripes: "The European Union treats the United States horribly. And that's going to change. And if it doesn't change, they're going to have to pay a very big price... Last year, we lost $151 billion with the European Union. We can't have that. We're not going to have that any longer, okay?" 1 President Trump is absolutely right about the size of the U.S. trade imbalance with Europe. But he is wrong to place the blame entirely on "trade barriers that are beyond belief". At least half of the imbalance - including with Germany - has appeared since 2014 (Chart I-2). Therefore, by definition, this part of the bilateral deficit is neither a structural issue, nor about trade barriers. Chart I-2Half of Germany's Export Surplus Appeared After 2014 The Real Culprit For The Mushrooming U.S/Euro Area Trade Imbalance As we have identified on these pages many times, the real culprit for the mushrooming U.S./euro area trade imbalance is the ECB, and specifically its post-2014 experiment with ultra-loose monetary policy. This experiment has resulted in a significantly undervalued euro, which has made the euro area grossly over-competitive vis-à-vis the United States, as calculated by the ECB itself. The Chart of the Week provides the damning and incontrovertible evidence: the U.S./euro area bilateral deficit is a near-perfect function of relative monetary policy. Of course, the ECB is targeting neither the euro nor the trade imbalance; the ECB is targeting its definition of price stability. The trouble is that the ECB definition of price stability omits owner-occupied housing costs, and thereby understates true euro area inflation by 0.5 per cent. To the extent that the ECB thinks in terms of real interest rates based on its own (faulty) definition of inflation, this means that the ECB is setting real interest rates that are far too low for the euro area's true economic fundamentals, resulting in the significantly undervalued euro and the associated trade imbalance (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). Chart I-3Relative Monetary Policy Has Driven The Euro's Undervaluation... Chart I-4...And The Euro's Undervaluation Has Driven The U.S./Euro Area Trade Imbalance The bilateral deficit, by definition, is based on a true cross-border comparison, so it is tracking the 'apples for apples' real interest rate differential almost tick for tick, as our charts compellingly show. This true real interest rate differential is stretched relative to the fundamentals. In effect, while incorrectly measured inflation is deceiving the ECB, the mushrooming trade imbalance tells us that something is seriously awry. That something is not trade barriers that are too high; that something is ECB monetary policy that is too loose. The Target2 Imbalance Reaches €1.5 Trillion The ECB's ultra-loose policy has spawned another huge distortion: the euro area Target2 banking imbalance, which now amounts to an unprecedented €1.5 trillion (Chart I-5). What is the Target2 imbalance (Box 1), and why should we care about it anyway? Chart I-5ECB Policy Has Lifted The Target2 Banking Imbalance To Euro 1.5 Trillion BOX 1 What Is Target2? Target2 stands for Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system. It is the settlement system for euro payment flows between banks in the euro area. These payment flows result from trade or financial transactions such as deposit transfers, sales of financial assets or debt repayments. If the banking system in one member country has more payment inflows than outflows, its national central bank (NCB) accrues a Target2 asset vis-à-vis the ECB. Conversely, if the banking system has more outflows than inflows, the respective NCB accrues a Target2 liability vis-à-vis the ECB. Target2 balances therefore show the cumulative net payment flows within the euro area. The ECB has delegated its QE sovereign bond purchases to the respective national central banks within the Eurosystem. In the case of Italian bonds, Italian investors have offloaded their BTPs to the Bank of Italy and deposited the received cash cross-border in countries with healthier banking systems - like Germany. Strictly speaking, this flow of Italian investor cash to German banks is not the same as the deposit flight during the depths of the euro debt crisis in 2012. Rather, we might call it precautionary cash management. Nevertheless, in Eurosystem accounting terms it still means that the Bundesbank has a new liability to German banks denominated in 'German' euros, while the Bank of Italy has a new asset - the BTP - denominated in 'Italian' euros (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). The Target2 imbalance is the aggregate of such mismatches between Eurosystem liabilities denominated in 'German and other core' euros and assets denominated in 'Italian and other periphery' euros. Chart I-6The Target2 Imbalance Reflects The##br## Cross-Border Flow Of Italian Investor Cash... Chart I-7...To German Banks Does any of this Target2 accounting gymnastics really matter? No, so long as a 'German' euro equals an 'Italian' euro, the imbalance is just an accounting identity within the Eurosystem. But if Germany and Italy started using different currencies, then suddenly all hell would break loose. The Bundesbank liability to German banks would be redenominated into deutschemarks, while the Bank of Italy asset would be redenominated into lira. Thereby the ECB would end up with much greater liabilities than assets, and a solvency shortfall potentially equivalent to hundreds of billions of euros would end up on the shoulders of the ECB's shareholders - largely, German taxpayers. Some people might argue that by increasing the cost of a divorce, an actual split becomes less likely. But this reasoning is weak. As we have seen in recent election and referendum outcomes, the biggest risk comes from a populist backlash against the status quo. And populist backlashes do not stop to do a detailed cost benefit analysis. A Sea-Change For The ECB In 2019? Although the ECB is unlikely to broadcast the undesired side-effects of its ultra-loose policy, it must by now be acutely aware that it is spawning huge imbalances. The costs are rising while the benefits are becoming questionable. The irony is that the one euro area economy that arguably does need stimulus - Italy - has a dysfunctional banking system which makes ultra-loose monetary policy largely ineffective anyway. Despite record low interest rates through the past four years, Italian bank credit growth has been virtually non-existent (Chart I-8). As we pointed out last week in Monetarists Vs Keynesians: The 21st Century Battle, the M5S/Lega coalition government is right to say: Italy would be better off with fiscal stimulus, not monetary stimulus.2 Chart I-8Italian Banks Have Not Been Lending The ECB will end its QE purchases at the end of this year, though the central bank has promised to maintain its current constellation of negative and zero interest rates "at least through the summer of 2019". However, it might be problematic to extend this forward guidance much beyond that. This is because Mario Draghi's eight year term as ECB President ends on October 31 2019, and it would be difficult both politically and operationally to tie the steering hands of his successor, especially if he/she comes from outside the current Governing Council. Interestingly, the last two changes in the ECB Presidency marked major sea-changes in policy direction: in 2003, Jean-Claude Trichet immediately stopped the rate cutting of his predecessor, Wim Duisenberg; and in 2011, Mario Draghi immediately reversed the rate hikes of his predecessor, Trichet. We would not bet against another major sea-change at the end of 2019 (Chart I-9). Chart I-9A Sea-Change For The ECB In 2019? If the end of 2019 does mark a turning point in relative monetary policy, investors should plan for three medium-term repercussions: The yield spread between 30-year U.S. T-bonds and German bunds has much more scope to tighten than to widen. The euro's undervaluation - as calculated by the ECB itself - will ultimately correct. European exporters and European equity markets heavily exposed to exporters - such as Sweden's OMX - will find the going tough, one way or another. If a stronger currency doesn't hit them, then President Trump's vow that "they're going to have to pay a very big price" surely will (Chart I-10). Chart I-10If A Stronger Currency Doesn't Hit European Exporters, Then President Trump Surely Will! 1 At the joint press conference with Theresa May. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report 'Monetarists Vs Keynesians: The 21st Century Battle' July 12 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model* This week's recommended trade is to go long gold, whose 65-day fractal dimension is close to the lower bound that has reliably signaled previous tradeable trend reversals. Set a profit target of 3% with a symmetric stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations