Geopolitics

Highlights Our immediate reaction to Theresa May's vision of Brexit boils down to three points: You can wish all you want... but what you wish isn't what you get. Do you understand the legal framework? Where does this leave Scotland? Feature You Can Wish All You Want... But What You Wish Isn't What You Get Theresa May essentially set out her wish-list for what Brexit should look like. But it was a vision seen through rose-tinted spectacles. The speech listed all the benefits to the U.K. but conveniently ignored most of the costs. It was a speech to rouse the Conservative Party, rather than to present a thoughtful and sober analysis. Hence, the speech was riddled with intellectual inconsistencies and impossibilities. For example, she wants "Britain to negotiate its own trade agreements" which would entail departing the Customs Union. But contradicting this, she also wants "cross-border trade to be as frictionless as possible" which would entail retaining some sort of Customs Union. More importantly, there are two sides to every negotiation and so far, we are only hearing one side - May's vision of a future in sunlit uplands. Spokesmen for the EU27 are probably chomping at the bit to reply. But smartly, they have entered a vow of silence until after Article 50. Just like a poker player who has to wait just a little longer to reveal that he carries all the aces... Do You Understand The Legal Framework? Events since the referendum on June 23 show that the U.K. Government was completely unprepared for the No vote. Hence, the government's strategy - in as much as one exists - has been made on the hoof, and quite often with the minimum of research or analysis. Most notably, the government did not understand the legal framework to leave the EU - specifically that the invoking of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty might require an Act of Parliament, a precondition on which the Supreme Court will soon opine. Now, Prime Minister May claims that "we will no longer be members of the Single Market", but this may not be simple to deliver. Leaving the EU might not automatically mean leaving the Single Market. This is because the Single Market is not defined by the EU but by the European Economic Area (EEA), consisting of the 28 countries of the EU plus Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. Crucially, membership of the EEA is governed by its own Treaty. Therefore, leaving the Single Market will require a careful legal interpretation of Article 126, Article 127 and Article 128 of the EEA Treaty. We will cover this in more detail in a future report. Prime Minister May also promised Parliament a vote on the final deal struck with the EU27. But it was unclear whether losing that vote would mean staying in the EU (as the pound seemed to interpret) or leaving with no deal (more likely). Where Does This Leave Scotland? A clean Brexit would be a pyrrhic victory if it meant the breakup of the United Kingdom - indeed it would effectively become an 'Engexit', rather than a Brexit. But that is the risk, because Nicola Sturgeon has said that leaving the Single Market is a red line that Scotland is unwilling to cross. Thereby, Theresa May's speech has increased the probability of a new referendum on Scottish Independence. In summary, the speech did not reduce the uncertainties around Brexit. It increased them. The U.K. is not out of the woods, it is just about to enter the woods. Hence, the knee-jerk spike in the pound was unwarranted. We anticipate further volatility in the pound and maintain our strategy of 'owning the tails': for example, short pound/euro but with call options at €1.30. As for the FTSE100 relative performance, investment reductionism shows that it is just an inverse play on the pound. As the pound weakens, the FTSE100 outperforms, and vice-versa (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekFTSE100 Relative Performance Is Just An Inverse Play On The Pound FTSE100 Relative Performance Is Just An Inverse Play On The Pound FTSE100 Relative Performance Is Just An Inverse Play On The Pound Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* Pleasingly, our long gold position has hit its profit target in a classic liquidity-triggered trend reversal. There are no new trades this week. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-2 Long Gold Long Gold * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Feature Which of the following activities requires more brainpower: beating a grandmaster at chess, or cleaning the table underneath the chessboard? The answer is cleaning the table. This explains why Artificial Intelligence (AI) can now trounce the best human chess player, but no AI can (yet) reliably pick up the chessboard and dust underneath it. The cognitive scientist Steven Pinker points out that the human mind can understand quantum physics, send a rocket to the moon and decode the genome, but reverse-engineering simple human movements involves a mind-boggling complexity. "The hard problems are easy and the easy problems are hard." AI researchers call this Moravec's Paradox:1 the counterintuitive result that much less computing power is required for advanced problem solving than for simple sensorimotor skills.2 Feature ChartCooks, Waitresses And Bartenders Is The Fastest Growing Employment Sector Cooks, Waitresses And Bartenders Is The Fastest Growing Employment Sector Cooks, Waitresses And Bartenders Is The Fastest Growing Employment Sector Pay Deflation For The Many... The hard problems that are easy for AI are those that require the application of complex algorithms and pattern recognition to large quantities of data - such as beating a grandmaster at chess. Or a job such as calculating a credit score or insurance premium, translating a report from English to Mandarin Chinese, or managing a stock portfolio. The easy problems that are hard for AI are those that require the replication of human movement in everyday tasks. Jobs such as cleaning, gardening, or cooking. Therefore: "As the new generation of intelligent devices appears, it will be the stock analysts who are in danger of being replaced by machines... (Cleaners), gardeners, and cooks are secure in their jobs for decades to come." For societies and economies, Moravec's Paradox generates a chilling deflationary headwind. Many of the jobs that AI will destroy - like credit scoring, language translation, or managing a stock portfolio - are regarded as skilled, and require years of advanced education and training. They have limited human competition, and are well-paid. Conversely, many of the jobs that AI cannot (yet) destroy - like cleaning, gardening or cooking - are relatively unskilled. They have unlimited human competition, and are low-paid. ...Pay Inflation For The Tiny Few As well as sensorimotor skills, humans still beat AI in three other fields: creativity, innovation, and complex communication. As Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee3 observe in The Second Machine Age: "Computers are still machines for generating answers, not posing interesting new questions... We've never seen a truly creative machine, or an entrepreneurial one, or an innovative one." Hence, these are the skills you should encourage your children to acquire as their defence against AI. Moreover, the leaders in these fields - the very best entrepreneurs, innovators and communicators as well as top sportsmen and musicians - now find themselves in a particularly strong position. This is because a second powerful dynamic is at play. As we showed in the first Special Report in this series The Superstar Economy,4 the internet allows the very best entrepreneurs, innovators and communicators to sell their services to an effectively unlimited audience. And social media, as a large-scale validation system, reinforces the winner-takes-all dynamic. Therefore, as the proliferation and power of the internet and social media have increased dramatically, so too have both the earnings growth rate and the longevity of the superstars - exaggerating the skew in the Pareto distribution of incomes. Simply put, the superstars in sensorimotor skills, creativity, innovation, and complex communication will continue to see very strong pay inflation (Chart I-2). Chart I-2The Cost Of Living Extremely Well Continues To Rise Unabated The Cost Of Living Extremely Well Continues To Rise Unabated The Cost Of Living Extremely Well Continues To Rise Unabated The Hollowing Out Of The Middle Class Sadly, only a tiny fraction of the population can become superstars. As AI takes over mid-skill knowledge work, the vast majority of displaced workers start going after jobs lower on the skills and wage ladder. As these jobs also have lower security, this keeps a lid on credit growth, because without income security, households are less willing to borrow and banks are less willing to lend. The result is that the on-going Second Machine Age - the ushering in of Artificial Intelligence - is hollowing out the middle class. Contrast this with the First Machine Age - the ushering in of 'Artificial Strength'. The steam engine replaced muscle power, both human and animal. Thereby, it destroyed mostly low-skill work and effectively created the middle class. But does the evidence support the narrative for the Second Machine Age? The answer is yes. The changing sectoral profile of the jobs market through 1997-2017 is almost identical to the changing profile of output, as captured by GVA.5 Which means that job destruction and creation has kept relative productivity between sectors broadly unchanged through the past 20 years (Tables I-1-I-5). In other words, human jobs have disappeared where AI can do them better. And they have gone to where AI cannot do them better, because the jobs involve some degree of sensorimotor or communication skill. Table I-1U.K. Jobs Have Gone To Where Machines Cannot (Yet) Beat Humans The Superstar Economy: Part 2 The Superstar Economy: Part 2 Table I-2The U.K. Value Added Profile Is Similar To The Jobs Profile The Superstar Economy: Part 2 The Superstar Economy: Part 2 Table I-3U.S. Jobs Have Gone... The Superstar Economy: Part 2 The Superstar Economy: Part 2 Table I-4...To Where Machines Cannot (Yet) Beat Humans The Superstar Economy: Part 2 The Superstar Economy: Part 2 Table I-5The U.S. Value Added Profile Is Similar To The Jobs Profile The Superstar Economy: Part 2 The Superstar Economy: Part 2 U.S. data provides fascinating sub-sector detail. The employment sub-sectors that have grown the most are relatively low-income but which require sensorimotor skills: Food Services and Drinking Places - cooks, waitresses and bartenders - and Social Services, followed by communication-dependent Education Services (Feature Chart). And now comes the bombshell. A separate study by Ball State University carried out an attribution analysis of the 6 million U.S. manufacturing destroyed through 2000-20106 (Table I-6). The study's salutary conclusion was that only 13% of the job losses resulted from trade, and almost 90% resulted from productivity improvements - in other words, because AI can do the jobs better than humans. Table I-6Only 13% Of Manufacturing Job Losses Are Due To Trade The Superstar Economy: Part 2 The Superstar Economy: Part 2 It follows that short of reversing the advance of technology, no amount of "Take Back Control", "Build A Wall" or "Make America Great Again" can change the powerful wind of change in the employment market. The Implications Of The Superstar Economy In terms of implications for policymakers and investors, all of the conclusions in the original Special Report The Superstar Economy remain valid, so we will reiterate them. Bear in mind that we originally wrote these on March 24, 2016. Several of the predictions have already proved eerily prescient. Headline and aggregate-economy statistics such as GDP and income are no longer representative statistics for the living standards of the vast majority of the population. Therefore, politicians will need to pay close attention to the underlying distribution of these statistics. But as many politicians seem blissfully unaware of the extreme skews in the Pareto distribution, we can expect a higher frequency of shocks at the ballot box. If economic growth is mostly happening at the top-end of the Pareto distribution, the vast majority of incomes will be stagnating or declining.7 So we can expect structurally weak private sector credit growth. Lacking rampant house price inflation or confidence in income growth, households and firms will be unwilling to borrow, and banks will be unwilling to lend. Hence, the opportunities to own bank equities will be limited to short-term tactical timeframes. If economic growth is mostly happening at the top-end of the Pareto distribution, and credit growth is weak, we can expect a continued absence of generalised price inflation. Monetary policymakers need to immediately discard discredited concepts such as the Phillips curve relationship between headline growth, unemployment and the inflation rate. But as many of these conventionally-trained economists will find it difficult to change their thinking, we can expect a higher frequency of policy errors. Interest rates and bond yields will remain structurally depressed. Bond yields will move cyclically, but there will be no persistent uptrend. A long sequence of rate hikes anywhere will be unsustainable. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Named after the roboticist Hans Moravec 2 Evolutionary biology provides a good explanation for Moravec's Paradox. The part of the brain - the cerebellum - that is responsible for sensorimotor skills has experienced much more evolution and development compared with the part of the brain - the neocortex - that is responsible for problem-solving. It follows that AI requires exponentially greater computational resources to replicate even low-level sensorimotor skills than it does to replicate problem-solving. 3 Andrew McAfee spoke at our 2015 New York Conference. 4 Published on March 24, 2016 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com 5 Gross Value Added 6 The Myth and the Reality of Manufacturing in America by Michael J. Hicks and Srikant Devaraj, June 2015 Ball State University Center for Business and Economic Research. 7 Please also see Chart 10 in the Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Low Rates Forever", dated March 4, 2016 available at gis.bcaresearch.com

Highlights Trump's protectionism supercharges our theme of Sino-American tensions. China is at a stark disadvantage to the U.S. in a trade war. China cannot give concessions easily; it may batten down the hatches. Remain short RMB; but go long "One China," i.e. mainland stocks versus Taiwan/Hong Kong. Feature "Life's short span forbids us to enter on far reaching hopes." - Horace, Odes "Of course, you know, this means war." - Bugs Bunny, Looney Tunes President-elect Trump has said he will not designate China a "currency manipulator" on the first day of his presidency, contrary to what he promised during the campaign. Is this a sign that Trump is "normalizing" after the wild threats of his campaign? What are the real risks of a U.S.-China "trade war"? How should investors prepare? Trade War Is More Likely Than You Think BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has long cautioned investors that geopolitical tensions in East Asia were severely underestimated by the market.1 In 2013, we argued that a Sino-American military conflict was more likely than most of our clients dared to think.2 And over the past several years, in one-on-one conversations and in presentations at numerous conferences, we have stressed that tensions in East Asia could imperil the largest trade relationship. Why so alarmist? We have always based our analysis on three key pillars: Multipolarity: With the U.S. in a relative decline, containing China's rise has become a national security issue. The U.S. "Grand Strategy" operates under the imperative that no regional power is allowed to become a regional hegemon, as that would be a stepping stone to global competition. "Pivot" To Asia: The U.S. geopolitical deleveraging from the Middle East was from the start designed to free up more U.S. resources for Asia. While the Obama Administration pursued the pivot cautiously, it was putting the infrastructure in place for a confrontation with China. Regional dynamics: China is surrounded by neighbors that are cautious about Beijing's intentions for geographic, historical, and strategic reasons. They have therefore sought to balance their increasing economic addiction to China with deeper military and political links to the U.S. Chart 1China, Not NAFTA, In Trump's Crosshairs China, Not NAFTA, In Trump's Crosshairs China, Not NAFTA, In Trump's Crosshairs Trump's victory has made markets considerably less oblivious to the risks we have stressed to clients for the past five years. The idea that a trade war might erupt is now widely discussed. And Trump's repeated statements about Taiwan, North Korea, and the South China Sea have awoken some investors to the reality that a trade conflict could spill over into strategic areas, and vice versa. Nevertheless, judging by the ebullient market reaction relative to previous U.S. presidential transitions, most investors think that cool heads will inevitably prevail. They may be right, but from where we sit it is premature - and imprudent - to bet on it. Make no mistake, China, not NAFTA, will suffer the brunt of Trump's efforts to fulfill his protectionist campaign promises (Chart 1). We see 70% odds that a "crisis event" will affect U.S.-China trade patterns in a significant way over the next four years. How Did We Get Here? The Global Financial Crisis caused a sharp break in Sino-American relations: It interrupted the economic symbiosis between China and American households refused to keep re-leveraging, forcing China to become more internally driven economy (Chart 2). With final demand in the U.S. declining, China decided to re-leverage with credit, injecting its existing overproduction and overcapacity with steroids. But this only accelerated China's capture of global export market share, while supercharging the deflationary global effects (Chart 3). On top of its credit policies, China has struggled to internationalize the RMB. So now, it is not only still washing the world with its industrial overcapacity but also inadvertently - or not so innocently - reducing the prices of its goods with the weakening of its currency (Chart 4). Chart 2U.S.-China Symbiosis Has Died U.S.-China Symbiosis Has Died U.S.-China Symbiosis Has Died Chart 3China's Historic Export Grab China's Historic Export Grab China's Historic Export Grab Chart 4China Still Exporting Deflation China Still Exporting Deflation China Still Exporting Deflation U.S.-China trade disputes have a long history. China's WTO entrance was agreed only with the stipulation that China be treated as a "non-market economy" for 15 years. Punitive trade bills almost passed through Congress in 2005 and 2010-11, for instance, but were held back at the last minute.3 Since 2009, in particular, protectionist policies have emerged. President Obama began his term with an unprecedented use of the authority under Section 421 of the 1974 Trade Act to punish China for "market distorting" exports of car tires, and with protectionist "Buy America" provisions in his economic stimulus package. After that, a sequence of tit-for-tat punitive measures took place affecting a range of goods on both sides, attempted Chinese investments in the U.S., and American companies operating in China. China's meteoric rise, surging trade surpluses with the U.S., and the rapid loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs was the main cause of tension (Chart 5). Americans benefited from China's rise, namely from cheaper goods and lower interest rates, but it caused significant economic dislocations.4 Meanwhile Chinese protectionism discouraged American elites that had endorsed China's rise on the hopes of gradually unfolding market access. Amid the heightened political risks of the global recession and its aftermath, China intensified intellectual property theft, non-tariff barriers, indigenous innovation policies, and cyber-attacks.5 The saving grace, for markets, was that the aforementioned tensions always remained within bounds. The WTO was a mutually recognized adjudicator. Also, the rival American and Chinese commercial authorities played a slow, step-by-step, predictable game, with the punitive measures being mostly proportional. When pressures flared in the U.S., the executive branch stayed Congress's hand; meanwhile China's government could steamroll any internal opposition to its trade policies. No more. Hillary Clinton might have helped contain trade tensions, but the outlook has darkened irrespective of Trump. Notably, American multinational corporations have increasingly decried Chinese protectionism and lobbied for the U.S. government to help persuade China to give them greater market access and a better legal-regulatory climate (Chart 6). As the Obama administration exited the stage in December 2016, the U.S., Japan and others refused to accept China's "market economy" status despite the fifteen-year deadline coming due. This means the U.S. and its allies explicitly wanted to reserve the power to impose anti-dumping duties more easily on China, which is what "Non-Market Economy" status entails (Chart 7).6 China considers this delay an outright violation of U.S. commitments under WTO. Chart 5A Tale Of Two Manufacturers A Tale Of Two Manufacturers A Tale Of Two Manufacturers Chart 6American Business Under Pressure In China Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Chart 7China's Non-Market Status A Liability Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Further, Clinton had promised to create a special prosecutor for trade disputes and to triple the number of enforcement officers. More broadly, she wanted to continue Obama's "Pivot to Asia" policy that had roiled U.S.-China strategic relations. Bottom Line: U.S.-China trade relations had already turned sour as a result of the divergence of interests following the Global Financial Crisis. China has emerged as a trade juggernaut and the U.S. corporate and political establishments have become far more anxious about it recently. Now Trump has supercharged the situation. Will Trump "Normalize" In Office? With Trump, the U.S. is likely to undergo a "regime change" in terms of how trade policy is conducted - the only question is how long-lasting it will be. U.S. presidents have very few constraints on trade and foreign policy (Table 1). Ignore Trump's statements and look at his team: Incoming Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, National Trade Council chief Peter Navarro, and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer.7 This group, especially Navarro, is stridently hawkish on China and appears ready to bring the full weight of the United States' economic and strategic advantages to the table in order to negotiate a new framework of relations. Table 1Trump Is Not Constrained On Trade Policy Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin The model is the renegotiation of trade relations with an ascendant Japan in the 1980s. And China looks ripe for a crackdown by this yardstick. The penetration of Chinese exports meet or exceed Japan's position at its peak in the 1980s (Chart 8). Meanwhile the RMB has not appreciated nearly as much as the yen had done by this time (Chart 9). Ultimately the two resolved their differences because Japan acceded to major U.S. demands, strengthening its currency after the 1985 Plaza Accord and accelerating financial liberalization. It helped that the two were staunch allies without genuine security tensions (unlike the U.S. and China today). Chart 8China Has Gotten Away ##br##With More Than Japan Did China Has Gotten Away With More Than Japan Did China Has Gotten Away With More Than Japan Did Chart 9Reagan Forced Faster ##br##Appreciation On Japanese Yen Reagan Forced Faster Appreciation On Japanese Yen Reagan Forced Faster Appreciation On Japanese Yen From the Trump administration's point of view, the standard trade remedies have failed given that U.S. trade deficits have deteriorated all along. True, China has made considerable structural adjustments in recent years (Chart 10). But relative to the U.S., China has not really changed its ways. In fact, the current account surplus, which has collapsed from 10% to around 2% since 2008, is now roughly equal to the trade surplus with the United States (Chart 11). Chart 10China's Economic Rebalancing Under Way China's Economic Rebalancing Under Way China's Economic Rebalancing Under Way Chart 11China's Trade Surplus With U.S. Indispensable China's Trade Surplus With U.S. Indispensable China's Trade Surplus With U.S. Indispensable Therefore we do not put much stock in Trump's claim that he will not call China a currency manipulator on day one - this does not signal a "normalization" or softening of Trump's protectionist line. There was always a technical issue with this pledge that made the timing awkward.8 The manipulator charge will remain a Sword of Damocles hanging over China this year and next, but it is also only one tool in Trump's toolkit - and not the most intimidating one either (Diagram 1). Diagram 1Calling China A Currency Manipulator: The Process Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin At a minimum, Trump could easily do what Obama did in February 2009 on tires - simply approve recommendations from his own Treasury Department for tariffs on specific goods. At a more aggressive level, he has the example of Richard Nixon before him. Nixon imposed a 10% surcharge on all dutiable goods in 1971. We would not put it beyond Trump to take arbitrary actions within the four-year term if international economic conflicts heat up dramatically. (We will be especially leery in the lead-up to the 2018 or 2020 elections if Trump's touted deal-making is not going his way.) Congress is not likely to prove a major constraint, at least not at first. Trump's election is a strong signal that the U.S. populace wants more protectionist policies. Congressional Republicans are limited, given the laws empowering the president on trade, and they will face the reality that his electoral strategy succeeded in great part because of voter demand for protectionism in key Midwestern states. Democrats, in these and other competitive states, have to perform verbal gymnastics to oppose Trump's positions on trade that substantially echo their own. And as mentioned, U.S. multinationals are not likely to "domesticate" Trump - rather, they will lobby for relative moderation or tactfulness within his general framework. Bottom Line: Trump is relatively unconstrained on trade policy. We expect his administration to begin with a "shot across the bow" in the first 100 days - a mostly but not entirely symbolic punitive measure against China - and then to seek high-level negotiations toward a framework for the administration's relations with China over the next four years. We expect the initial shot to rattle markets, then for a calming period to ensue, which will give a false sense of security. But given the lack of constraints on Trump, we are not optimistic. What Are China's Options? In a trade war with the U.S., China is outgunned on every front. Its economy is far more vulnerable to a disruption of exports to the U.S. than vice versa (Chart 12). It does not have ready alternatives to the U.S., given that U.S. imports of Chinese goods are roughly equal to Japanese, South Korean, German, Vietnamese and British imports combined. And China is most competitive in goods that the U.S. can easily source elsewhere (Chart 13). Chart 12The Numbers Favor The U.S. In A Trade War The Numbers Favor The U.S. In A Trade War The Numbers Favor The U.S. In A Trade War Chart 13The U.S. Can Find Substitutes For China Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Yes, China can disrupt the supply chain for the iPhone, but no, the Trump administration is not going to confuse Apple's interests with what it views as the "National Interest." Certainly China will favor non-American companies - Airbus over Boeing, etc - but the U.S. growth model is not reliant on exports, so it is not clear that the Trump administration will heed Boeing's cries about long-term competitiveness. The states most exposed to Chinese retaliation - Alaska, Oregon, Washington, Louisiana, and South Carolina - will not harm his electoral base. His Midwestern Rust Belt states could suffer, according to some research, but voters there may approve of his protectionist measures and Trump's other economic policies may blunt the short-term impact of Chinese retaliation.9 Looking at major Chinese export categories to the U.S., like textiles, electrical machinery, and equipment, suggests that 30 million Chinese jobs could be affected - perhaps ten times as many as the comparable U.S. jobs at risk from Chinese retaliation (far more than proportional given population). There is one factor that stands in China's favor. The history of trade wars says something different than the raw balance of trade. Like all wars, trade wars seek political ends, and a government's internal unity and resilience can be critical to its ability to bear out the worst.10 Politically, it is not clear that the U.S. has a better stomach for a full trade war than China: The U.S. remains divided - Polarization will worsen under Trump given his low approval ratings, low favorability, narrow popular victory margin, and controversial policy inclinations. Though China-bashing and economic patriotism can win some support, and we do not expect Congress or the corporate lobby to prevent Trump from launching a trade crusade if he wishes, nevertheless we see a fair chance that Trump would lose credibility and be forced to moderate his stance once negative trade consequences began to be felt at home. China is relatively unified - Xi has set himself up to be the "core" of power in the Communist Party in anticipation of worsening domestic conditions.11 It is worth remembering that the original use of the "core leader" moniker emerged in the wake of the Tiananmen Square crackdown when the Western world imposed sanctions on a newly liberalized China and it was forced to retreat into its shell from 1989-1992 (Chart 14). China's leadership wants to make the country less dependent on the U.S., and more autarkic, but is having difficulty imposing austere changes on itself. Trump may hasten the reforms while giving Chinese leaders a convenient "foreign devil" to distract the populace from the pain of restructuring. Chart 14China Rode Out Western Pressure In 1989 China Rode Out Western Pressure In 1989 China Rode Out Western Pressure In 1989 The above should not suggest that China wants a trade war, however. Trump is threatening to kick the export leg out from under its growth model at a time when the other leg - investment - stands at risk from domestic credit excesses.12 But the recent case study of Russia and economic sanctions is instructive. President Vladimir Putin used sanctions to blame all of the economic ills that befell Russia on the West, even though the Kremlin was often at fault. That policy largely worked. Bottom Line: China stands to suffer the most economically in a trade war with the United States. Chinese policymakers may therefore choose to ride out the economic costs of a trade war while blaming the U.S. for the pain. But closing its economy today would derail global growth and cause a dramatic spike in geopolitical risk, unlike in 1989. Strategic Spillover Trump's approach is likely to increase geopolitical risk because he wants to use the strategic disagreements plaguing Sino-American relations as leverage to get concessions on trade. The three hot spots are: Taiwan - Tensions with Taiwan spiked when Trump revealed that his administration considers the "One China" policy to be up for negotiation. China has engaged in serious saber-rattling in response, both around Taiwan and in the South China Sea. By linking trade disputes with Taiwan, Trump likely made it harder for Xi to compromise on the former without looking weak on the latter. Trump's negotiating style may work in business, but will not work with China on Taiwan, which is a matter of sovereignty and a clear red line. North Korea - Trump has said North Korea will not manage to test an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), which it is preparing to do. He is threatening to hold China to account for not curbing the North's violations of UN resolutions on nuclear proliferation and missile development. This would likely mean an expansion of the practice adopted under Obama of sanctioning Chinese entities for dealing with North Korean partners. This situation would likely shake up markets that have normally been able to ignore North Korea. South China Sea - Trump has repeatedly signaled that China has militarized the South China Sea, and his incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson suggested that China be deprived of access, a policy that would trigger a shooting war if operationalized. Persistent tensions here are unlikely to go away anytime soon and could spark a diplomatic crisis or naval conflict (if not with the U.S. then with regional players like Vietnam). Thus Trump's administration is likely to make serious demands on China regarding its strategic situation and national security even while demanding an overhaul of trade policies that will force difficult economic reforms on China. Bottom Line: China's political strengths at home make it unlikely to compromise on Trump's major strategic demands. Contrary to adding leverage in trade negotiations - where the U.S. already has the upper hand - using these issues as negotiating tools is likely to cause China to fear for its security and thus become more defiant. Risks To The View The risk to this view would be that the U.S. and China manage to negotiate a new framework and actually improve relations, with the U.S. giving more respect to China's legitimate rights and regional initiatives in exchange for Chinese concessions. But is China capable of conceding significantly on Trump's major demands? RMB appreciation? No. Many commentators have pointed out that Trump's view of the RMB is outdated - the PBoC is now propping it up, not suppressing it. The driver of RMB weakness is China's excessive monetary and credit expansion, weakening productivity growth, domestic investors' desires to move capital out, corporate deleveraging, the need for stimulus, tightening Fed policy, and rising geopolitical risks. While it is possible that the PBoC will defend the RMB to the hilt, the near-term path of least resistance is down, and that sets China on a collision course with the Trump administration. Market access and dumping? Yes. Trump complains that China taxes U.S. imports unfairly and dumps goods into the American market, killing jobs. To appease the U.S., China could take concrete steps to remove non-tariff barriers and open wider investment avenues for U.S. businesses - it has recently suggested it might do so.13 Less likely, it could accelerate overcapacity cuts and reduce subsidies to state-owned enterprises. These moves would fit with its avowed reform goals and strengthen Chinese self-sufficiency in the long run, and Xi's administration likely has the power to do them. China could also improve intellectual property protections and declare a ceasefire on cyber-attacks on companies. All of this is possible, but clearly extremely difficult to achieve. Strategic concerns? Maybe. It is conceivable but unlikely that China could de-escalate matters in the South China Sea and agree to a "freedom of navigation" guarantee for the United States, which is not a party to the territorial disputes. A significant compromise on North Korea would be even less likely, since China is unwilling to move beyond the usual, ineffective management and impose real hardship on the regime for its violations of UN resolutions and improving nuclear and missile capabilities. One impetus for China to concede on these points is that it is fearful of creating instability in a politically sensitive year in which it will oversee a major five-year leadership rotation at its National Party Congress. Trump may deliberately threaten to disrupt the transition in order to extract concessions. Bottom Line: We operate on a constraint-based methodology: Trump has very few constraints on trade policy, China has major constraints on making these concessions, so there is no basis for assuming that the two countries will skip conflict and go directly to a new level of cooperation. Investment Recommendations We remain short the RMB. The currency has fallen by 5.62% since we initiated this trade. The trade itself has suffered a bit since the end of last year as a result of the PBoC's efforts to fight speculation. But monetary expansion sans productivity improvements continues apace in China, and we expect USD strength to persist, so we think there is room for the RMB to fall further. In the near term, however, the USD could experience further pullback as investors start pricing the negatives of the Trump administration. Therefore we are closing our long USD/EUR trade for a 4.55% gain. We remain somewhat positive on China relative to EM - because of the relative unity and centralization of its government and financial resources at its disposal - but we would not recommend investing in Chinese assets in the absolute due to the heightened internal and external risks outlined above. Hence we propose going long the "One China" policy, i.e. long Chinese mainland stocks versus Taiwan and Hong Kong (Chart 15). This enables us to play the fact that mainland valuations are depressed while the global trend of de-globalization and the conflicts within Greater China and with the U.S. are likely to increase uncertainties about Hong Kong and Taiwan. These two are particularly vulnerable to tighter regulations or sanctions from Beijing. Yan Wang, Senior Vice-President at BCA's China Investment Strategy, argues that while there is no case for a clear directional move in Chinese stocks - especially given the ongoing tightening of policies on the property sector - nevertheless they should be favored relative to global equities, given that growth is improving, fiscal policy will remain accommodative, and valuations are depressed (Chart 16).14 Meanwhile our negative outlook on China in absolute terms supports a globally negative outlook on cyclical equities relative to defensives. Cyclicals move with EM in general and China in particular. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President in charge of U.S. Equity Strategy, notes that EM performance does not warrant the sharp rise in U.S. cyclicals versus defensives, nor that in globally oriented versus domestically oriented stocks (Chart 17).15 This creates the opportunity for a tactical short. Chart 15Chinese Stocks Are Cheap Chinese Stocks Are Cheap Chinese Stocks Are Cheap Chart 16China Trades With Cyclicals China Trades With Cyclicals China Trades With Cyclicals Chart 17Go Long The 'One China Policy' Go Long The 'One China Policy' Go Long The 'One China Policy' Finally, we caution investors about investing in companies with major exposure to China (Table 2). We would recommend that clients short a "China, Inc" Index of the top 20 S&P 500 stocks exposed to trade with China relative to the rest of S&P 500. The "China, Inc" stocks have been outperforming the market for a while (Chart 18). We fear that China may retaliate against some of these firms as the trade war with the U.S. heats up. Table 2'China, Inc.' May Suffer From Trade War Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Chart 18Short 'China, Inc.' Relative To Market Short 'China, Inc.' Relative To Market Short 'China, Inc.' Relative To Market Matt Gertken, Associate Editor mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President, marko@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kurri, Research Analyst 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?" dated September 25, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think," dated October 4, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Imad Moosa, The U.S.-China Trade Dispute: Facts, Figures And Myths (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2012). 4 For prominent research on this topic, please see David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, "The China Shock: Learning From Labor-Market Adjustment To Large Changes In Trade," Annual Review of Economics 8 (2016), pp. 205-40, available at www.annualreviews.org; Autor et al., "Foreign Competition And Domestic Innovation: Evidence From U.S. Patents," NBER Working Paper No. 22879, December 2016, available at www.nber.org. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Reports, "Reflections On China's Reforms," dated December 11, 2013, and "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Scholars have shown that countries granting China market economy status have subsequently initiated fewer antidumping cases against it. Please see Francisco Urdinez and Gilmar Masiero, "China And The WTO: Will The Market Economy Status Make Any Difference After 2016?" The Chinese Economy 48:2 (2015), pp. 155-172. Technically speaking, the difference in duty rates can be substantial between market and non-market economies; please see the U.S. Government Accountability Office, "U.S.-China Trade: Eliminating Nonmarket Economy Methodology Would Lower Antidumping Duties For Some Chinese Companies," GAO-06-231, January 2006, available at www.gao.gov. 7 Ross has criticized China more heavily since joining Trump; Navarro is the author of Death By China: Confronting The Dragon, A Global Call To Action (Pearson, 2011); together they criticized China in a paper for Trump's campaign, "Scoring The Trump Economic Plan: Trade, Regulatory, & Energy Policy Impacts," dated September 29, 2016, available at assets.donaldjtrump.com. Lighthizer worked on Ronald Reagan's Treasury Department's team that engaged in the tough trade negotiations with Japan in the mid-1980s. 8 The existing statutory procedure, now enshrined in Title VII of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, involves the Treasury Department making semi-annual assessments and potentially initiating bilateral or multilateral negotiations. According to the more or less standard time frame since 1988, any charges of currency manipulation would occur in the April report at earliest, and more likely in the October report or thereafter. For Trump to have designated China a manipulator on day one, he would either have had to issue a simple statement of intent or an executive directive that bypassed the formal foreign exchange review process. 9 Please see Andy Kiersz, "Here's Every State's Biggest International Trading Partner," Business Insider, October 20, 2016, available at www.businessinsider.com. See also Marcus Noland et al, "Assessing Trade Agendas In The US Presidential Campaign," Peterson Institute for International Economics, PIIE Briefing 16-6, dated September 2016, available at piie.com. 10 Serbia "defeated" the much larger Austria-Habsburg in their "Pig War" in the early 1900s, while Ireland won most of its key demands from England despite losing the "Economic War" of the 1930s. Russia's attempts over the past decade to bully Ukraine into submission have not succeeded in achieving Russia's political aims. In each of these cases, a far greater economic disparity existed than currently exists between the U.S. and China, and yet even then the weaker country's popular support, and the willingness of neighbors to exploit the new trade opportunities that opened up, enabled the weaker country to win the political clash of wills. 11 Please see "China: Xi Is A "Core" Leader... So What?" in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "De-Globalization," dated November 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses," dated October 26, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see "China unveils new plan to further open economy to foreign investment," Reuters, January 17, 2017, available at www.reuters.com. 14 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: The 2017 Outlook, And The Trump Wildcard," dated January 12, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "2017 High-Conviction Calls," dated January 9, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights The pound will suffer more in the near term as Brexit negotiations take center stage. However, this will create a buying opportunity as the pound is only getting cheaper. Moreover, the economic outlook is constructive and the BoE will be repriced. Set a limit-sell on EUR/GBP at 0.933. The U.S. border-tax proposal will not boost the dollar by an additional 25%. Feature This week, the British Supreme Court started sitting again, with Brexit its hottest case. As the ultimate ruling nears, the pound will once again move to the forefront of investors' minds. Political risks remain elevated in the near term, but the economic negatives from Brexit are well discounted. The long-term outlook for the pound is brightening. Politics Still In The Driver Seat Investors have been pinning their hopes on the likely Supreme Court decision to uphold the High Court judgment, and rule that an act of parliament is necessary to trigger Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. Such a move, in the eyes of pundits and market participants, greatly increases the likelihood that the U.K. will move toward a "soft Brexit" rather than a "hard Brexit". The pound already discounts some of this as a positive: since October 12, cable is flat near its closing low of 1.21, despite a nearly 5% rally in the dollar index. However, the coming months are likely to prove tumultuous. The pound will fall victim to the upcoming opening of negotiations between the EU and the U.K. The U.K. policy-uncertainty index collapsed after surging in the wake of the Brexit victory, preventing the pound from plunging against a surging dollar (Chart I-1). Nonetheless, uncertainty is set to rise anew, as Parliament will vote in favor of triggering Article 50: The political environment at home remains ardently pro-Brexit (Chart I-2). Moreover, while the May government has suggested it is willing to contribute to the EU's budget to retain access to the common market, it remains adamant on setting limitations to the free movement of people. Chart I-1Economic Uncertainty Is Too Low Economic Uncertainty Is Too Low Economic Uncertainty Is Too Low Chart I-2No Bregret No Bregret No Bregret Additionally, the EU has a built-in incentive to show to the European Union electorate that leaving the union comes at a heavy cost. Thus, EU negotiators will be intransigent and harsh when setting up their opening gambit. Chart I-3Immigration: A Key Concern In The EU GBP: Dismal Expectations GBP: Dismal Expectations With the EU holding the stronger hand in the negotiations, the headline risks for the pound will be great. Even the survival of the so-called passporting of financial services - i.e., the unfettered ability to conduct business within the European Economic Area - is looking increasingly tenuous, with TheCityUK - the country's most important financial lobby - giving up on the issue altogether. This will require an even greater discount on the pound. However, we expect calmer heads to prevail and for the U.K. to retain at least some access to the common market, with some transitional agreements likely to be struck. The U.K. has a strong incentive to keep passporting alive. Meanwhile, controlling movements of people is becoming increasingly popular in the EU. Immigration is a growing concern, now only second to unemployment for the EU as a whole, and the No. 1 worry in Germany (Chart I-3). This suggests a deal on limiting the movement of people is probable. Thus, the pound is likely to sell off as the triggering of Article 50 nears. Once this hurdle is over, political risk premia will be fully adjusted and markets will be able to focus once again on the economic fundamentals. Bottom Line: The politics of Brexit will continue to weigh on the pound until the opening rounds of the Brexit negotiations between the U.K. and the EU begin. Until then, economic factors will take the backbench, and the pound will fall against both the USD and EUR. British Economy To Best Expectations Beyond the politically dominated short-term time horizon, the pound should be driven by the economy and valuations. Let's begin with the economy. On this front, there is room for optimism, at least relative to dismal expectations. A recent survey by the Financial Times shows that 40% of economists are more pessimistic than before on the U.K. economy, and that only 13% expect some improvement relative to their prior forecasts. The first positive is that Great Britain's fiscal drag is being lessened relative to pre-Brexit expectations (Chart I-4). While the Hammond Autumn statement did not point to an outright implementation of stimulus, it did show a 1.1% and 1.3% of GDP reduction in the austerity measures that were to be implemented by the Treasury in 2017 and 2018, respectively. Moreover, the U.K. currently lags both the EU and other advanced economies in terms of public investments as a share of GDP (Chart I-5). This also suggests that, if need be, there is plenty of room to ease budgets going forward. In fact, the recent populist stance taken by May points to more spending in that realm, due to the higher multiplier associated with infrastructure spending. Chart I-4Fiscal Easing GBP: Dismal Expectations GBP: Dismal Expectations Chart I-5Scope For Stimulus GBP: Dismal Expectations GBP: Dismal Expectations Beyond the fiscal picture, the key to the U.K.'s economic future is the outlook for consumption, a sector representing 65% of GDP. Worries are very prevalent that the consumer will aggressively curtail spending, facing a surge in inflation due to the collapse of the pound. However, we are less gloomy. To begin with, the outlook for inflation is better than originally feared. Domestic price pressures, which affect nearly 70% of the consumption basket, remain well contained (Chart I-6). Moreover, while the fall in the pound could exert some upward motion on this inflation measure, their muted correlation implies that domestic prices are unlikely to rise much beyond 2-3%. Meanwhile, the British labor market remains quite tight, suggesting that the outlook for U.K. wages will remain healthy. The ILO unemployment rate stands at 4.8%, near all-time lows; and skilled-labor shortages have not been such a problem since 1990 (Chart I-7). Chart I-6Still Muted Domestic Inflation Still Muted Domestic Inflation Still Muted Domestic Inflation Chart I-7Tight U.K. Labor Market Tight U.K. Labor Market Tight U.K. Labor Market Put together, our wage and core CPI models point toward a slowdown in real wage growth, but not a contraction (Chart I-8). Since nominal wage growth is little affected by the Brexit vote and inflation is expected to be temporary, the permanent-income hypothesis suggests that households are likely to dip into their savings to absorb the slowdown in real income growth (Chart I-9). Thus, U.K. consumption growth should remain stable in 2017. Chart I-8No Contraction In Real Wages No Contraction In Real Wages No Contraction In Real Wages Chart I-9No Calamity In Consumption No Calamity In Consumption No Calamity In Consumption Another key consideration for the U.K. economy is the great easing in financial and monetary conditions registered in the past 12 months (Chart I-10). This easing first and foremost reflects collapsing borrowing costs. This is crucial as U.K. banks are very robust and are in a position to increase their lending, especially to households (Chart I-11). Chart I-10Massive Easing In British##br## Monetary Conditions Massive Easing In British Monetary Conditions Massive Easing In British Monetary Conditions Chart I-11U.K. Banks ##br##Are Strong GBP: Dismal Expectations GBP: Dismal Expectations As a result, the British credit impulse has improved considerably (Chart I-12). It is true that this improvement reflected some Brexit-related distortions, but the factors above suggest that it is likely to continue to point north, highlighting a positive outcome for the U.K. economy. Confirming this intuition, after sharply deteriorating, the RICS survey is improving anew, pointing toward higher house prices (Chart I-13). While we expect any house-price improvements to be stronger outside London than in the capital, the 16% decline in the pound since the beginning of 2016 is improving the attractiveness of this market to foreigners. The U.K. economy has historically been strongly affected by housing price dynamics, and a resilient housing market would be a key support for consumption, despite slowing real wage growth (Chart I-13, bottom panel). Chart I-12Credit Impulse Points Health Credit Impulse Points Health Credit Impulse Points Health Chart I-13Housing Is A Support Housing Is A Support Housing Is A Support Trade, too, should prove less of an issue than originally feared. In recent years, the contribution of net exports to growth has been negative, both at the global level and vis-à-vis the rest of the EU (Chart I-14). With Brexit, trade with Europe will continue to subtract from growth, but not at an accelerating pace. Meanwhile, the large decline in the pound should cushion trade with the rest of the world. Where the risk to the U.K. economy is most pronounced is in business capex. On that front, the large degree of uncertainty that the U.K. will still have to face points to a brake on capex. However, business capex only represents 9% of the U.K.'s economy and has already been contracting. Further muting the effect of uncertainty, U.K. PMIs are as strong as the U.S. equivalent measures (Chart I-15), and U.K. profits are also rebounding. Thus, we expect that the drag from U.K. capex will not deepen. If anything, U.K. capex could surprise to the upside. Chart I-14Trade Always Was A Drag On Growth Trade Always Was A Drag On Growth Trade Always Was A Drag On Growth Chart I-15U.K. Businesses Are Fine U.K. Businesses Are Fine U.K. Businesses Are Fine Bottom Line: We expect the U.K. economy to remain a positive surprise for investors. The fiscal drag is lessening; household consumption should prove robust; housing will strengthen, as the credit impulse continues to perk up; the trade drag is unlikely to deepen; and capex will not worsen, and may in fact improve going forward. Investment Conclusions In the aftermath of the Brexit vote, despite a sharp upward revision to its inflation forecast, the MPC implemented extraordinary policy easing to compensate for risks to growth looming on the horizon. The BoE cut rates to 0.25%, increased its asset purchases by GBP70 billion to GBP435 billion, and put in place the Term Funding Scheme to incentivize bank lending. This week, Governor Mark Carney highlighted that he thought the BoE had been too pessimistic regarding the outlook for U.K. growth and that, in his eyes, the MPC was likely to move away from its extraordinary easing sooner rather than later. We think this outcome is indeed warranted, and not priced into the market. While not out of control, inflation is rising, but the downside risk to the economy appears to be contained. Thus, the BoE is unlikely to extend its asset purchases and will lose its easy bias going forward. Markets are not ready for this reality. With the pound trading 25% below PPP against the USD, and 20% too cheap against the EUR, it is clearly a value play (Chart 16A and Chart 16B). While over a two-year basis, such discounts to PPP should result in an appreciation of the pound, this tells us nothing of the outlook for the next year or so. In fact, in 1984, GBP/USD traded at an even larger discount to PPP than it does today. Chart I-16AGBP Is Cheap GBP Is Cheap GBP Is Cheap Chart I-16BGBP Is Cheap GBP Is Cheap GBP Is Cheap Current-account considerations are still a worry. However, the elasticity of the current account to the pound is limited. In fact, while the elasticity of exports to the pound is of the expected sign in our modeling, for imports, it is not. This reflects the elevated import content of British exports. A lower pound is therefore unlikely to be the most crucial means to improve that current-account position. Moreover, despite its current-account deficit of nearly 6% of GDP, the U.K. still runs a basic balance-of-payments surplus of 12%, even after the recent fall in FDI inflows (Chart I-17). Instead, on an intermediate-term basis, the outlook is driven by interest rate differentials and policy considerations. Here again, the outlook for the pound is brightening, especially against the euro. Due to the balance-sheet operations conducted by the BoE and ECB, interest rates in the U.K. and the euro area do not fully reflect domestic policy stances. Instead, we like to use the shadow rates. Currently, shadow rates tentatively argue that GBP/USD should begin to roll over, and unequivocally point toward a lower EUR/GBP (Chart I-18). In fact, balance-sheet dynamics point toward shorting EUR/GBP. As such, with our core view that the USD remains in a cyclical bull market - albeit one experiencing a temporary pause - the outlook for GBP/USD may still be mired by the strength of the USD. Instead, we find it cleaner to play a better-than-expected British economy by going short EUR/GBP. Long-term technicals on this cross are also extremely stretched (Chart I-19). Chart I-17U.K. Basic Balance Is Healthy... U.K. Basic Balance Is Healthy... U.K. Basic Balance Is Healthy... Chart I-18Shadow Rates: Bullish Pound... Shadow Rates: Bullish Pound... Shadow Rates: Bullish Pound... Chart I-19EUR/GBP Has Rarely Been This Overbought EUR/GBP Has Rarely Been This Overbought EUR/GBP Has Rarely Been This Overbought Due to the political risk looming over the next few month, the timing is complex. We are reluctant to short EUR/GBP unhedged at this point in time. We expect GBP to remain weak over the next month or two. Instead, we recommend two strategies. One - very similar to the play recommended by Dhaval Joshi of our European Investment Strategy service - is to be long EUR/GBP spot while purchasing long-dated out-of-the money puts on this cross. The other, is to set a limit-sell order at EUR/GBP at 0.933. Nimble traders may want to buy EUR/GBP in the wake of the Supreme Court decision and sell it as Article 50 gets triggered. Bottom Line: This week, Carney took an upbeat stance on the U.K. economy. We agree, and think that the BoE will move away from its hyper-dovish policy stance sooner than markets expect. As such, we foresee rate differentials to move in favor of the very cheap pound. The optimal way to play this strength is against the euro. However, since we expect more volatility in the pound as the U.K. triggers Article 50, we elect to implement this view through a limit-sell order at EUR/GBP 0.933. A Few Words On Trump's Tax Policy This week, much ink has been spilled on Trump's and the GOP's tax plan, especially the border adjustment. While a 20% tax on imports, and a 0% tax on exports would in a textbook world result in a near-automatic 25% appreciation in the dollar, this is far from where the reality stands. This analysis forgets that such a move would instantaneously impair the net international investment position of the U.S. by another 10 to 15% of GDP, pushing it below -50% of GDP. Additionally, such a move would cause a complete collapse of commodity prices and a massive tightening of EM financial conditions, especially for borrowers with USD liabilities. The ensuing deflationary crisis would prevent the Fed from hiking as much as is currently priced in and may even cause a global recession. Additionally, such a policy is likely to provoke tit-for-tat responses from other nations, muting its economic repercussions and its impact on the dollar. Globalization is frittering away. Instead, as we argued in the Dirigisme theme of our 2017 outlook, such tax is bullish at the margin on the dollar as future investment by U.S. corporations will now be biased toward the U.S., especially if another component of the tax plan gets implemented: the greater expensing of capex.1 This means that the non-U.S. output gap will grow more negative relative to the U.S. than would have been the case without this piece of legislation. This would put upward pressure on U.S. rates vis-à-vis the rest of the world, but nothing on the order of 25%. Instead, we expect the U.S. dollar to appreciate by a bit more than 5% on a 12-18 months basis, with some upside risk. Peter Berezin of our Global Investment Strategy service will cover tax reforms in great detail in the coming weeks, a report whose conclusions we look forward to share with our clients. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits", dated December 16, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1U.S. Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2U.S. Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 Since Donald Trump's widely anticipated news conference, the DXY has fallen roughly 1.7% as markets recognized the risks represented by Trump's outlook on trade and relations with China. As a reiteration, we highlight the significance of market overpricing in the DXY's previous rally. This is a clear indication of participants remaining overly reliant and hopeful on Trump's fiscal proposals in determining the greenback's value. A disappointing proposal is likely to lead to a correction in the dollar, however downside will be limited by the crucial 99 to 100 level. Although our long-term case remains bullish - especially if the border tax goes through - it is possible that markets could react to Trump's comments at his inauguration on January 20, generating substantial volatility for the dollar. Report Links: Update On A Tumultuous Year - January 6, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits -December 16, 2016 Party Likes It's 1999 - November 25, 2016 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 As the surging power of the dollar abates, so does the downward pressure on the euro. The common currency has made significant progress this year after bottoming below 1.04 three weeks ago. Following last week's strong data, this week's figures followed through with additional resilience: Eurozone industrial output increased 3.2% annually; French and German industrial output increased 2.2% monthly; German real GDP grew at 1.9%. More interestingly, the Czech economy recorded quite a strengthening in its economy, with retail sales increasing 7.9% on a yearly basis, and yearly inflation at 2% in December from 1.5%. Such an increase in inflation could prompt the CNB to abandon the floor on EUR/CZK to allow for the conduct of independent monetary policy and tighten rates accordingly. This should prove profitable for our short EUR/CZK trade. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits -December 16, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 Relative Pressures And Monetary Divergences - October 21, 2016 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 The yen continues to rally this year after its dramatic sell-off at the end of 2016. Although USD/JPY has now found support at its 10-week moving average, we expect that a repricing of growth expectations for the U.S. should push the yen up further to USD/JPY 110. On the data side, recent numbers in Japan paint a positive picture: Consumer confidence came at 43.1, against expectations of 41.3. This is the highest level of consumer confidence since July 2013. Bank lending also increased to 2.6% YoY growth versus 2.4% on November. Encouraging signs from the Japanese economy will only make the BoJ more resolute in its radical policies, given that so far they have shown to be effective. Consequently, the outlook for the yen on a cyclical basis remains very bearish. Report Links: Update On A Tumultuous Year - January 6, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Party Likes It's 1999 - November 25, 2016 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 In a remarkable volte-face, BoE Governor Mark Carney signaled a possible raise in economic forecast after admitting that fears of a recession triggered by Brexit were overblown. In his own words: "Having gone through the night and the day after, the scale of the immediate risks around Brexit have gone down for the U.K." We agree that Brexit will probably cause a slowdown in the economy. However what matters for the pound is not whether the U.K. slows down but rather how the slowdown compares to expectations. As we have mentioned many times we believe these expectations are overblown, as the pound is very cheap. Thus, while it is true that the pound could still suffer more downside up until when negotiations begin, once political risks dissipate, this currency will become a very attractive bargain, particularly against the euro. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits -December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Data was quite weak for Australia this week: Retail sales increased at a below-consensus monthly pace of 0.2%; Building permits contracted by 4.8% since last year in November; Job advertisements contracted by 1.9% in December; AiG Performance of Construction Index increased to 47 from 46.6 - although construction employment had the lowest reading on employment in nine months. Along with the USD's weakness, recent strength in iron ore has buoyed the AUD - even against the CAD and the NOK - lifting AUD/USD 4.8% since the beginning of this year. However, there does not seem to be a clear improvement in the Australian economy yet, which fundamentally reasons against this rally. Additionally, the 14-day RSI is approaching the crucial overbought level of 70, which may signal a potential end to this surge. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 The New Zealand Dollar has been one of the best performers against the U.S. dollar since last week, appreciating by over 2%. All in all, the New Zealand economy continues to hum along as the top performer in the G10: Employment growth is around 6%, the highest pace in 23 years. The output gap is at 2% of GDP, which indicates that the economy is growing above potential and that inflationary pressures may eventually emerge in New Zealand. The last point is important because although headline inflation continues to be very low, core inflation is slowly creeping up. While it is true that the slowdown in dairy prices is concerning, it should be a matter of time before inflation starts to pick up again, a development that should lift the NZD against the AUD. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 The Canadian economy has shown resilience this year, with the Business Outlook Survey suggesting that the drag from the preceding oil collapse has subsided. Investment intentions are around 25% and employment intentions are close to 40%; Both input and output price expectations have seen a huge surge, and inflation expectations have ticked up; Also, housing starts have come out much better than expected. In addition, the recent strength in the Canadian dollar has also been supported by strong oil prices, as USD/CAD has decreased by almost 3% since the end of last year. As long as the greenback's momentum remains weak, oil prices are likely to see upside, boosting the CAD. Nevertheless, this rally is likely close to burning out: both the RSI and the Coppock Curve are indicating oversold and trend reversal levels for USD/CAD. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits -December 16, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 Relative Pressures And Monetary Divergences - October 21, 2016 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 As we suggested last week, EUR/CHF has rallied once more after hovering under the critical level right under 1.07 at which the SNB tends to intervene to depreciate the franc. As long as Switzerland suffers from deflation, the SNB will continue to intervene whenever the franc gets near this levels. Indeed, recent data should give assurance to the SNB that their strategy is working: Real retail sales growth came at 0.9%, not only beating expectations but also returning to positive territory after being negative for the past year and a half. The unemployment rate continues to be very low at 3.3%. On a cyclical basis we are bullish on the franc given Switzerland's large current account surplus of 11%, and that monetary policy is currently as accommodative as can be and will only tighten in the future. This means that risks for the franc point to the upside. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 After rising for most of the week USD/NOK fell sharply on Wednesday, and is now near a support line established in October. The Norges Bank has repeatedly stated that inflation is bound to slow down any time soon. However recent data shows that inflation continues to stay strong in Norway: Headline inflation was unchanged in December, coming at 3.5%. Core Inflation slowed slightly, coming in at 2.5% versus 2.6% the previous month. If inflation continues to be high, the Norges Bank will eventually have to change its stand to a less dovish one, helping the NOK in the process, particularly against its crosses. Moreover, given that the U.S. is the marginal consumer of oil, and China the marginal consumer of metals, outperformance by the U.S. against China should continue to help oil producers against other commodity currencies. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 The Swedish economy is showing resilience: Industrial production increased by 0.1% yearly and by 1.2% monthly in November; Inflation increased 0.5% mom, and 1.7% yoy. Inflation is approaching to the Riksbank’s 2% target. The SEK rallied on the release of the news, as EUR/SEK dropped 0.5% and USD/SEK by around 0.6%. A strengthening Swedish economy will likely cause diverging rate differentials between Sweden and the Euro area, as the latter still battles deflationary pressures. This will limit EUR/SEK’s upside. USD/SEK will be dictated mostly by movements in the dollar itself. Therefore, SEK should outperform both USD and EUR for now. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Dear Client, I am visiting clients in Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and India this week, and as such there will be no regular Weekly Report. Instead, we are sending you a Special Report written by my colleague Marko Papic, Senior Vice President, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service. Marko argues that the Middle East has reached a stable equilibrium, as much as is possible, and will not drive the news or markets in 2017. I hope you will find this report both interesting and informative. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy Highlights The Middle East is not a major geopolitical risk in 2017. Saudi-Iranian and Russo-Turkish tensions will de-escalate, for now. The OPEC production cut will go through; oil prices will average $55/bbl in 2017. Geopolitical risk continues to rotate to the Asia Pacific region. Trump, Iranian elections, and Iraqi instability pose risks to the view. Feature The Middle East has dominated the news flow for the past five years, for good reason. The carnage in Syria and Iraq is tragic and reprehensible. However, the investment relevance of the various regional conflicts is dubious. For all the attention paid to the rise of the Islamic State, we would remind clients that the group's conquest of Iraq's second-largest city Mosul in June 2014 did not cause a spike in oil prices but rather marked the end of the bull market (Chart 1)! From an investment perspective, the only dynamic worth watching in the Middle East is the "Great Game" between regional actors, which have been looking to fill the vacuum left by America's dramatic geopolitical deleveraging (Chart 2). The U.S. strategy is permanent and driven by global interests, namely the rise of China and the need to shift resources towards East Asia. Given the incoming Trump administration's laser focus on China, we expect that the U.S. will remain aloof from the Middle East. Chart 1Ironically, Worry About The Fall Of ISIS Ironically, Worry About The Fall Of ISIS Ironically, Worry About The Fall Of ISIS Chart 2While The U.S. Military Deleverages... While The U.S. Military Deleverages... While The U.S. Military Deleverages... Does the recent détente between Russia and Turkey in Syria, and between Iran and Saudi Arabia over OPEC production cuts, signal that the Middle East has finally found geopolitical equilibrium? We tentatively think the answer is yes. This will reduce the importance of the region as the primary source of geopolitical risk premia, which BCA's geopolitical strategists have expected to shift to Asia for some time.1 Saudi-Iranian Tensions Are On Ice Chart 3...The Saudi Arabian Military Leverages Up ...The Saudi Arabian Military Leverages Up ...The Saudi Arabian Military Leverages Up Since the U.S. decision to deleverage from the region in 2011, Saudi Arabia has leveraged up, becoming one of the world's largest arms purchasers and involving itself overtly and covertly in several regional conflicts in the process (Chart 3). Saudi insecurity deepened following President Barack Obama's decision to leave no troops in Iraq. The last U.S. soldier of the main occupation force left Iraq on December 18, 2011. The very next day, on December 19, Iraq's Shia Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, a close ally of Iran, issued an order for the arrest of the Sunni Vice-President Tariq al-Hashimi. The move by al-Maliki set off what essentially became a civil war in the country, with the Sunni minority eventually turning to ever-more radicalized militant groups for protection. From the Saudi perspective, Iraq is a vital piece of real estate as it is a natural buffer between itself and its Shia rival Iran. While the Fifth Fleet of the U.S. Navy, based in Bahrain, continues to guard against any Iranian incursion via the Persian Gulf, there is very little space between the Saudi oil fields and Iran if Iraq falls into Iran's orbit. The subsequent five years saw Iran and Saudi Arabia fight several proxy wars in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. These included direct military action by Iran in Iraq and Syria against Saudi-backed militants and by Saudi Arabia in Yemen against Iranian-backed militants. It also included oil politics, with Saudi Arabia announcing in November 2014 that it was ending years of its price-setting strategy. These strategies ultimately proved to be unsustainable and BCA's Geopolitical Strategy called the peak in Saudi-Iranian tensions in February 2016.2 Why? First, because oil prices collapsed! Geopolitical adventurism is a luxury afforded to those with the means to pursue adventures. The combination of low oil prices, domestic social outlays, and an expensive war in Yemen forced Saudi Arabia to burn through $220 billion of its foreign reserves between July 2014 and December 2016, equivalent to 30% of its central-bank holdings!3 There is a relationship between high oil prices and aggressive foreign policy in oil-producing states (Chart 4). Political science research shows that the relationship is not spurious. As Chart 5 illustrates, petrol states led by revolutionary leaders are much more likely to engage in militarized international disputes.4 This relationship is particularly pronounced when oil sells at above $70 per barrel. At that price, oil producing states become more prone to disputes than non-oil states, regardless of leadership qualities. Chart 4 Chart 5 Second, Saudi Arabia's military campaign in Yemen proved to be a disaster. The kingdom intervened in March 2015 to reinstate the democratically elected President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, who had been removed from power by Iranian-linked Houthi rebels. The real reason for the intervention was for the Saudis to gauge their war-making capabilities, test their recently purchased military equipment, and put a check on Iranian influence in the region. A quick, successful war in Yemen would have been a template for future interventions in Iraq and Syria on behalf of Sunni allies, and would have cemented Saudi Arabia's position as a regional power in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal. As BCA's Geopolitical Strategy warned, however, defeating the experienced Houthis would not be easy and Saudi Arabia would ultimately hesitate to commit to a land war.5 The intervention has resulted in disaster for Saudi Arabia on several levels: Houthis remain in control of the capital Sana'a and largely the same territory that encompassed the former Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen); The Saudis, desperate for a ground-force presence, have turned a blind eye to Al Qaeda's and ISIS's control of almost a third of the country in the south and coastal regions; Saudi forces have taken considerable losses, including some high-tech and high-priced items; The conflict has exposed severe military deficiencies, from the low level of strategic and tactical planning of senior staff, to the poor communication of units at the middle level, to the pervasive low morale and training of the rank-and-file. The biggest loss for Saudi Arabia has been that of leadership. What began as a pan-Sunni intervention led by Riyadh, with considerable involvement by the UAE and Egypt, has seen the Saudis lose almost all their allies. The UAE removed its troops in mid-2016 (in somewhat of a diplomatic spat with Riyadh) and Egypt has subsequently held military exercises with Russia, a Saudi rival in the region, and decided in December to provide military advisors to the Syrian Arab Army. All the talk about a "Sunni NATO" is over. Saudi Arabia's experience in Yemen, combined with the decline in its currency reserves, forced it to come to terms with reality, and eventually agree to an oil production cut with Russia and Iran. Thus it took Saudi Arabia exactly five years, from the U.S. withdrawal in Iraq in 2011, to realize the limits of its regional power. Bob Ryan, Senior Vice President of BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy, correctly forecast the OPEC cut and expects the deal to be successfully implemented in 2017.6 One reason Bob is confident is that both Saudi Arabia and Russia are looking to privatize their energy sector significantly by 2018. Russia has sold 19.5% of Rosneft and the Saudis want to conduct an IPO of 5% of their state-owned oil company Aramco. It makes no sense to do this IPO in an environment of low oil prices. Furthermore, sovereign debt issuance to cover budget deficits will become cheaper when oil prices are higher. Geopolitics are aligning with Bob's view as well. Saudi Arabia's attempt to counter Iranian influence in the region has failed both militarily and via oil politics. Riyadh is focusing inwards, on its "Vision 2030" reforms, which will entail considerable domestic upheaval as a result of its comprehensive effort to remove the ultra-conservative religious establishment from power.7 This is now coming to light, with Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman recently announcing harsh punitive measures for any cleric who incites or resorts to violence against the reform agenda. Bottom Line: Saudi Arabia's bid for regional hegemony is over, at least for now. The country is focusing inwards, on long-term political and social reforms and economic diversification. Its efforts to bring Iran to heel with low oil prices and with direct military confrontation in Yemen have failed. The oil production-cut deal between Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia should hold as a result of the de-escalation of Saudi-Iranian tensions and the socio-economic priorities of all three states. BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy service is overweight energy relative to other commodities as a result.8 Is The Russia-Turkey Détente Sustainable? Turkey and Russia have concluded a political and military détente in Syria with surprising speed. This has made one of our major geopolitical risks for 2017 - a Turkish-Russian confrontation over Syria - already obsolete. Much as with Saudi Arabia, Turkey has had a bite of regional hegemony, did not like the bitter taste, and has decided to make a deal with its rivals instead. For Turkey, the real concern over the past five years has been American inaction in Syria. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has spent a lot of political capital opposing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. He had hoped that a successful revolution would create a new client state for Turkey, yielding Turkey overland access to Persian Gulf energy sources. Erdogan was therefore beyond dismayed when President Barack Obama failed to intervene in Syria in 2013 following Assad's use of chemical weapons. The chronology of what happened next is important: Russia intervened two years later, in September 2015, to stem the progress of anti-Assad rebels and save the regime from collapse. Two months later, a Russian Sukhoi Su-24 was shot down by Turkish F-16s in the Turkey-Syria border area. Turkey and Russia broke relations for a while, but tensions did not escalate. Ankara faced a coup attempt in mid-July 2016, which the ruling party linked to the U.S.-based Islamist preacher Fethullah Gülen. The Obama administration refused to extradite Gülen without concrete evidence of his involvement. By late July, Turkish officials were calling Russia a "friendly neighbor" and a "strategic partner." In early August, Erdogan met Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg, after issuing a letter with an apology to the family of the shot-down pilot. Then, on August 24, Turkey invaded Syria. The military intervention, dubbed "Operation Euphrates Shield," was officially launched to fight the Islamic State, a common pretext these past three years. Erdogan officially stated that he also aimed to fight Assad's regime, but this appeared to put Ankara and Moscow back on collision course, and statements from the Turkish side have since been "corrected." The real reason for the intervention was not to fight ISIS or Assad, but rather to curb the gains made by the various Kurdish militias on the ground in Iraq and Syria. In particular, Ankara intervened to prevent the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) - the armed wing of the Syrian Democratic Union Party, which is affiliated with the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers' Party - from linking up with its now vast territory held in the north of Syria (Map 1). Chart The territory, which our map shows has expanded considerably as the YPG has claimed mostly Islamic State-held areas, is split between Rojava, the main territory east of the Euphrates river, and the Afrin enclave near the Mediterranean Sea. For Turkey, the proximity of such a vast Kurdish-held territory so close to its own Kurdish southeastern region presents a national-security nightmare. The operation's strategic goal was to capture Al-Bab, the stronghold of the Islamic State in northern Syria and a strategic point between the two YPG-held swaths of territory. However, it has taught the Turks that they have no experience fighting a prolonged battle, especially against local insurgents and militants who know the region. Since the first attack on Al-Bab's western part, the Turkish army has suffered three defeats and retreated to initial positions. With Turkey stuck in Al-Bab, the Russian air force has now begun to bomb Islamic State positions to help their tentative new ally. This level of operational coordination is notable and important. It suggests that Turkey, a NATO member state, is now reliant on Russian air strikes for ground support rather than on American sorties flying out of NATO's air base in Incirlik, Turkey. Turkey even claims that U.S. presence in Incirlik is obsolete if it receives no help from the U.S. Air Force around Al-Bab. How sustainable is the Turkey-Russia détente? We suspect it will be quite sustainable, at least in the short term. Ankara has moved away from demands for Assad to step down, with the Deputy Prime Minister, Numan Kurtulmus, recently stating that Turkey would not "impose any decision" on the Syrian people regarding future leadership. The assassination of the Russian ambassador in Turkey also failed to derail Russo-Turkish cooperation. Beyond the short term, however, the question remains what Turkey intends to do about Kurdish gains, which are considerable in both Syria and Iraq. The town of Manbij, for instance, is strategically located west of the Euphrates and was supposed to be ceded to Turkey by the Kurds. The situation could grow even more complicated for Turkey as the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq may proclaim independence after the Islamic State stronghold of Mosul is liberated in early 2017.9 The YPG in Syria could then ask to join their fellow Kurds in Iraq in forming a unitary state. Although unlikely, this scenario is probably on Turkey's mind, as it would mean that the Kurds inside Turkey may intensify their anti-government insurgency. Note, however, that this scenario does not bother Russia. As far as Moscow is concerned, it has succeeded in keeping Assad in power, its Syrian naval base in Tartus is secure, and it has proven its ability to project power outside of its immediate sphere of influence (Ukraine, Crimea, Georgia, and the Caucasus), thus advertising its "Great Power" status. Bottom Line: For the time being, the Russian-Turkish détente will hold. The real risk is not a Turkish-Russian confrontation, but rather a wider Turkish engagement in both Syria and Iraq against the Kurds sometime in the future. We suspect that the Turkish military experience in Syria may make the Turks think twice about engaging in a large-scale war against the Kurds across three states. But given the erratic policymaking out of Ankara in recent years, it is difficult to say this with any confidence. The geopolitical risk of Turkish imperial overreach will continue to weigh on Turkish assets in 2017. Risks To The Sanguine View There are many reasons why investors should stay up at night in 2017, but the Middle East is not one of them. The process of U.S. deleveraging from the region has been painful and costly (from a human perspective especially), but it has ultimately forced regional powers to figure out how to carve out the leftover space between them. There are a few questions left to answer, starting with the Kurdish question. But, for the most part, we do not expect to see the major players - Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, Egypt, or Israel - come to blows with each other. There are three major risks to this sanguine view. The U.S. Is Back! The current semi-stable equilibrium will definitely be thrown off track if the Trump administration decides to sink its teeth fully into the Middle East. We expect President-elect Donald Trump to authorize greater military action against the Islamic State, including more intense air strikes. However, this is not a qualitative reversal of Obama's deleveraging policy. A real reversal would be if Trump decided to follow the advice of Iran hawks in his government - of whom there are several - and increase tensions with Tehran. This is unlikely, given Trump's focus on China and his willingness to improve ties with Russia, a nominal ally of Iran. In fact, there has been almost no talk of Iran from either President-elect Trump or any of his advisors since the election. Furthermore, while U.S. oil imports from OPEC are no longer declining, they are still massively down since their peak in the mid-2000s (Chart 6). It is unlikely that Trump will commit resources to a region of diminishing importance to U.S. interests. Change Of Guard In Tehran. While the risk of Washington saber-rattling with Iran is overstated, what happens if the moderate President Hassan Rouhani is defeated in the upcoming May election? Hardliners are arguing that the nuclear deal with the West has done nothing for the economy, the main pillar of Rouhani's 2013 platform. This is not true. Headline inflation ticked up in late 2016, but remains well off the 40% levels in 2013, while GDP growth has been in the black throughout Rouhani's term, and net exports have bottomed (Chart 7). However, the flow of FDI into the country has been tepid, probably due to ongoing uncertainty with the government transition in the U.S. Both European and Asian businesses are waiting to see if the incoming Trump administration wants to revive sanctions. Meanwhile, skirmishes between U.S. and Iranian vessels - purportedly controlled by the hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - have increased in the Persian Gulf. Perhaps the hardliners in Tehran are hoping that they can bait the hardliners in D.C. into a pre-election confrontation that sinks Rouhani. Iraqi Instability. Although the Iraqi government is set to take over Mosul from the Islamic State some time in Q1 2017, the fact remains that the country is bitterly divided between Sunnis and Shia amidst sluggish oil revenues. While the production cut deal will raise revenues marginally, revenues will still be well below their highs (Chart 8). Defeating the Islamic State militarily is one thing, but the real challenge is for Baghdad to reintegrate the Sunni population, which largely lives in territory devoid of oil production. A renewal of civil strife and terrorism targeting Iraqi civilians, which could happen as the Islamic State militants blend back into the wider population, may be a risk in 2017. Chart 6U.S. Imports From OPEC Remain Low U.S. Imports From OPEC Remain Low U.S. Imports From OPEC Remain Low Chart 7Iranian Economy Improves Under Reformist Rule Iranian Economy Improves Under Reformist Rule Iranian Economy Improves Under Reformist Rule Chart 8Iraqi Oil Revenues Still Down From Highs Iraqi Oil Revenues Still Down From Highs Iraqi Oil Revenues Still Down From Highs A word on Israel may also be in order. Israel has not played a major geopolitical role in the region for the past five years and we suspect it will not in the next five. It is secure from its neighbours, who cannot match it in terms of military capability, and remains preoccupied with domestic politics and internal security. Meanwhile, the days when the region unified against Israel are over. Sectarian and ethnic conflicts have gutted Israel's traditional enemies. And former foes, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are now close allies. The one geopolitical threat that remains is Iran. However, that threat remains dormant as long as Israel maintains nuclear supremacy over Iran and as long as the U.S. remains a security guarantor for Israel. We do not see either changing any time soon. Investment Implications The main investment implication of our thesis that the Middle East has found a new equilibrium is that the region will not dominate the news flow in 2017. Short of a major Turkish blunder in Syria and Iraq, we see the current status quo largely frozen in place. Saudi Arabia appears to have conceded, for now at least, its inferior place in the geopolitical pecking order. Investors have plenty of things to worry about in 2017, such as general de-globalization, a potential Sino-American trade war, geopolitical tensions in East Asia, and elections in four of the five largest euro-area economies. Our geopolitical team's long-standing thesis that geopolitical risk is rotating out of the Middle East and into East Asia is therefore fully playing out.10 Chart 9KSA-Russia Production ##br##Pact Aims at Lowering Inventories KSA-Russia Production Pact Aims at Lowering Inventories KSA-Russia Production Pact Aims at Lowering Inventories In the near term, the geopolitical equilibrium should allow Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia to maintain their six-month agreement to cut production by up to 1.8 million b/d. The stated volumes to be cut are comprised of 1.2 million b/d from OPEC, 300,000 b/d from Russia, and another 300,000 b/d from other non-OPEC producers. The goal of this agreement is to reduce global oil inventories to more normal levels, which our commodity strategists believe will happen by the end of 2017 (Chart 9). Bob Ryan, of the Commodity & Energy Strategy, forecasts U.S. benchmark WTI crude prices to average $55/bbl in 2017. The incoming Trump administration will focus its Middle East policy on cooperating with regional actors against the Islamic State. Investors should expect to see more American "muscle" dedicated to the fight, perhaps at the risk of causing civilian casualties (which the Obama White House was careful to avoid). The downside of this strategy is that as the Islamic State loses its territory and ceases to be a caliphate, it will revert to being a more conventional terrorist organization. Its foreign fighters may return home to Europe, Russia, and elsewhere, while home-grown militants will seek to sow further Sunni-Shia discord, especially in Iraq. Unfortunately, this trend will keep our thesis of "A Bull Market For Terror" intact, which lends support to U.S. defense stocks.11 Marko Papic, Senior Vice President marko@bcaresearch.com Oleg Babanov, Editor/Strategist obabanov@bcaresearch.co.uk 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see "Middle East: Saudi-Iran Tensions Have Peaked," in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Mercantilism Is Back," dated February 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 According to the estimates of BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy, "Tactical Focus Again Required In 2017," dated January 5, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Cullen S. Hendrix, "Oil Prices and Interstate Conflict Behavior," Peterson Institute for International Economics, dated July 2014, available at iie.com. According to Hendrix, revolutionary leaders are "leaders who come to power by force and attempt to transform preexisting political and economic relationships, both domestically and abroad." The definition is broad and includes leaders who used force in order to gain prominence. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Client Note, "Does Yemen Matter?" dated March 26, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "2017 Commodity Outlook: Energy," December 8, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Saudi Arabia's Choice: Modernity Or Bust," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. See also Emerging Market Equity Sector Strategy, "MENA: Rise Early, Work Hard, Strike Oil," dated October 4, 2016, available at emes.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy, "Tactical Focus Again Required In 2017," dated January 5, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see P. Ronzheimer, C. Weinmann, and K. Mössbauer, "Kurden Brauchen Mehr Deutsche Abwehrraketen," Bild, dated October 28, 2016, available at http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/mossul/kurden-brauchen-dringend-milan-systeme-48495330.bild.html. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "The Great Risk Rotation," dated December 11, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "A Bull Market For Terror," dated August 5, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights Will inflation return in Europe & Japan? Can Trumponomics successfully boost U.S. economic growth? Will global market volatility remain this low? Can China avert a crisis and still be the engine of global growth? Feature With a New Year now upon us, fixed income investors are trying to determine what the next move is for global bond yields after the rapid rise at the end of 2016. While much has been made of the impact of the 2016 U.S. election result on the global bond rout, many other important factors will drive fixed income markets this year (Chart of the Week). In our first Weekly Report of the New Year, we present our list of the most important questions for global bond markets in 2017. Chart 1The Big Questions For 2017 The Big Questions For 2017 The Big Questions For 2017 Chart 2Taper Tantrum 2.0? Taper Tantrum 2.0? Taper Tantrum 2.0? Will Inflation Return In Europe & Japan? Extremely low inflation in the Euro Area and Japan over the past few years has forced both the European Central Bank (ECB) and Bank of Japan (BoJ) to pursue exceptionally accommodative monetary policies like negative interest rates and large scale quantitative easing (QE) programs - the latter acting to depress bond term premia among the major developed markets. Much of this decline in headline inflation in both regions was due to the 2014/15 collapse in oil prices and the previous strength in both the euro and yen (Chart 2), but core inflation and wage growth have also been subdued. If headline inflation were to move higher in either Europe or Japan, it could call into question the central banks' commitment to continue hyper-easy monetary stimulus programs. This could raise the threat of another "taper tantrum" in developed bond markets later in 2017. The recovery in global energy prices in 2016, combined with significant currency depreciations related to ECB/BoJ QE, have boosted the annual growth in the local currency price of oil to 72% in the Euro Area and 63% in Japan. Already, headline inflation measures have begun to move higher in response and, judging by past relationships, a move up to 2% headline inflation in both regions by year-end is possible. In Chart 3 & Chart 4, we present simulations for headline inflation in both the Euro Area and Japan assuming the only changes come from movements in oil prices, the euro and the yen. We show two scenarios where the Brent oil price rises to $65/bbl (the high end of the range expected by our commodity strategists in 2017) and $75/bbl (an extreme scenario). In both simulations, the euro and yen continue to weaken versus the U.S. dollar until mid-2017 before recovering to near current levels by year-end. Chart 3Euro Area Inflation Simulation Euro Area Inflation Simulation Euro Area Inflation Simulation Chart 4Japan Inflation Simulation Japan Inflation Simulation Japan Inflation Simulation Our simulations show that headline inflation in both the Euro Area and Japan could rise to at least the 2% level, and perhaps even higher, if oil prices continue to climb and both the yen and Euro weaken towards 125 and parity versus the U.S. dollar, respectively. Given our views on the likely path of interest rates in the U.S. - higher, as the Fed continues hiking rates - the U.S. dollar is likely to strengthen more in 2017. The oil price moves incorporated in our simulations are somewhat more bullish than our base case expectation, but not extraordinarily so. If there are any upside surprises to global growth this year, oil prices could show surprising strength given the production cutbacks occurring in many of the major oil exporting nations. Higher inflation would be welcome by both the ECB and BoJ, especially if it were accompanied by a rise in inflation expectations. Both central banks have acknowledged the role played by low realized inflation in recent years in depressing expected inflation, but the latter could move up surprisingly fast if the markets believe that either central bank will be slow to respond to the rise in realized inflation. That seems like more of a risk in Japan, where the BoJ is aiming for an overshoot of its 2% inflation target and is promising to keep the Japanese government bond (JGB) curve at current levels until that point is reached. The ECB would be much more likely to make the decision to begin tapering their bond purchases if Euro Area inflation approaches 2%. We see this as the biggest potential threat to global bond markets in 2017 - even more than the expected Fed rate hikes, which are already largely priced into the U.S. yield curve. The ECB was able to successfully kick the tapering can down the road last month by choosing to extend its QE program to the end of 2017, but a decision to defer tapering again will be much harder to make if Euro Area inflation is closer to 2%. If the ECB were to announce a taper later in 2017, this would be very damaging for the long ends of yield curves in the developed markets as bond term premia would begin to normalize - perhaps very rapidly. There is more room for adjustment for term premia in core Euro Area government bonds relative to U.S. Treasuries. An ECB taper announcement, or even just expectations of it, would mark the peak in the spread between U.S. Treasuries and German Bunds which is now at the highest levels in a quarter century. Given the busy upcoming election calendar in the Euro Area, the ECB will not want to even mention the word "taper" until later in the year. Until then, owning inflation protection in Europe, and Japan as well, is the best way to position for upside surprises in inflation in those regions. Bottom Line: Rising inflation in the Euro Area and Japan in 2017 will prompt a rethink of the hyper-easy monetary policies of both the ECB and BoJ, but only the former is likely to consider a taper of its bond purchase program this year. That decision would push global bond yields higher via wider term premia and cause Euro Area government bond markets to underperform U.S. Treasuries, but not until later in the year. Can Trumponomics Successfully Boost U.S. Economic Growth? After a long and divisive U.S. election campaign, the curtain is about to officially be raised on the Trump era on January 20. In anticipation of a more pro-growth agenda from the new president, investors have already bid up the valuations of assets sensitive to U.S. economic growth, like equities and corporate bonds, while also driving up both U.S. Treasury yields and the U.S. dollar. Chart 5Time To Spruce Up U.S. Infrastructure Time To Spruce Up U.S. Infrastructure Time To Spruce Up U.S. Infrastructure Markets are now discounting a fairly rosy scenario for a solid "Trump bump" to U.S. economic growth in 2017. This is to be expected, given that the president-elect won the White House on a platform full of promises to, among other things, boost government infrastructure spending, cut corporate taxes, tear down excess regulations on U.S. companies and adopt a more protectionist U.S. trade policy. In terms of a direct impact to U.S. GDP growth, there are three obvious places where the economic plan of Candidate Trump could turn into stronger growth this year for President Trump: government fixed investment, net exports and private capital expenditure. Trump's infrastructure plans have received much of the attention from those bullish on U.S. growth in 2017; unsurprising given the proposed size of the proposals ($550 billion). This stimulus would appear to be a source of low-hanging fruit to boost U.S. economic growth, as years of underinvestment has left America with an aging government infrastructure in need of an upgrade (Chart 5). Yet the boost to growth from government investment spending has historically not been large, adding between 0.25% and 0.5%, at most, over the past 40 years (bottom panel). Trump's proposed figure of $550 billion would fit right in with that experience, as it would represent 0.3% of the current $18.6 trillion U.S. economy. That assumes that all the proposed infrastructure spending occurs in a single year. Given the usual long lead times for big government infrastructure projects, and the discussions between the White House and the U.S. Congress over the scope and funding of any major government spending initiative, it is highly unlikely that the direct effect of more infrastructure spending will provide much of a boost to U.S. growth in 2017. That impact is more likely to be seen in 2018. A boost to growth from trade is also possible given Trump's fiery protectionist election rhetoric and his decision to nominate China hawks for major cabinet positions. It is unclear if Trump is willing to risk entering a trade war with China (or even Mexico) by raising import tariffs soon after taking office. It is even more uncertain if this will provide much of an immediate lift to U.S. net exports, if tariffs merely raise the cost of imports without any material substitution to domestically produced goods and services. Even if it did, trade has rarely contributed positively to real U.S. GDP growth outside of recessions since 1960. That leaves private fixed investment as the biggest potential source of new growth in the U.S. in 2017. Trump is proposing a cut in the U.S. corporate tax rate from 35% to 15%, while the Republican plan already set out by House Speaker Paul Ryan is calling for a cut to 25%. Both sides also are in favor of a lower "repatriation tax" on corporate profits held abroad, at a rate of 10-15%. So with all parts of the U.S. government in agreement, a move to cut corporate taxes appears to be a near certainty. In the past, efforts to initiate comprehensive tax reform have been not been done quickly in Washington. Our colleagues at BCA Geopolitical Strategy, however, believe that a deal between the White House and Congress could happen in the first half of 2017. The details of the other major policy initiatives that Trump wants done early in his first term - repealing and replacing Obamacare, and the infrastructure spending program - will be much harder to iron out than a tax cut on which both Trump and the Republican Congress agree. Doing the tax reform first will be the easier choice for a new president.1 Cutting corporate taxes seems like a move that should help boost U.S. private investment spending, as it would raise the after-tax return on capital. However, investment spending has already been underperforming relative to after-tax cash flows since the 2008 Financial Crisis, and the effective tax rate paid by the U.S. corporate sector is already much lower than the 35% marginal tax rate (Chart 6). Something else besides tax levels has been weighing on U.S. corporate sentiment with regards to capital spending intentions. It may be that the burden of excess government regulations, which has soared during the years of the Obama administration (bottom panel), has dampened animal spirits in the U.S. corporate sector. On that front, Trump's proposals to slash regulations - none bigger than repealing Obamacare - could help boost business confidence and fuel an upturn in capital spending. Chart 6A Regulatory Burden, Not A Tax Burden A Regulatory Burden, Not A Tax Burden A Regulatory Burden, Not A Tax Burden Chart 7Making Corporate America Happy Again Making Corporate America Happy Again Making Corporate America Happy Again Some rebound in capex was likely to occur, Trump or no Trump, given the recent improvement in U.S. corporate profits (Chart 7, top panel). This is especially true in the Energy sector which generated the biggest drag on U.S. corporate investment spending after the collapse in oil prices in 2014/15. Since the election, however, there has been a noticeable improvement in confidence within the "C-suite" for American companies. The Duke University/CFO Magazine measure of optimism on the U.S. economy hit the highest level in over a decade (middle panel), while the Conference Board index of CEO optimism soared to the highest level in three years, at the end of 2016. Executive confidence at those levels would be consistent with a pace of capital spending that could add up to 1 full percentage point to U.S. real GDP growth, based on past relationships - (bottom panel). For both of these surveys, executives cited a more positive outlook on future growth after the U.S. election as a major reason for the increase in optimism. In sum, the biggest potential lift to U.S. economic growth in 2017 from Trumponomics will come from business investment and not government spending or exports, and likely by enough to boost overall U.S. GDP growth to an above-trend pace that will prompt the Fed to deliver at least 2-3 rate hikes by year-end. Bottom Line: A major boost to U.S. economic growth from government investment spending and net exports is unlikely in 2017. A pickup in corporate investment, however, seems far more likely given the boost to longer-term business confidence seen after the U.S. elections, coming at a time of improving global economic growth. Will Market Volatility Stay This Low? Given all the uncertainties over the latter half of 2016, from Brexit to Trump to Italy, it is surprising how low market volatility has been. Measures of implied volatility like the VIX index for U.S. equities have remained incredibly subdued, while even the uptick in MOVE index has been relatively modest considering the year-end carnage in the Treasury market (Chart 8). The fact that global risk assets can remain so relatively well-behaved, even after a surprising U.S election result and a Fed rate hike that has boosted the U.S. dollar, is a sign that the "Fed Policy Loop" - where a more hawkish U.S. monetary stance causes an unwanted surge in the U.S. dollar and a selloff in equity and credit markets - has been broken. As we discussed in our 2017 Outlook report, the Fed Policy Loop framework would not apply in an environment where non-U.S. economic growth was improving, as is the currently the case.2 This may be the most obvious explanation for why market volatilities are low, with developed market equities hitting cyclical highs and corporate credit spreads staying at cyclical lows. In other words, volatility is low because growth is accelerating and global central banks (most notably, the Fed) are not slamming on the brakes. Chart 8The Death Of The Fed Policy Loop? The Death Of The Fed Policy Loop? The Death Of The Fed Policy Loop? Chart 9U.S. Dollar Strength Will Persist In 2017 U.S. Dollar Strength Will Persist In 2017 U.S. Dollar Strength Will Persist In 2017 The strength of the U.S. dollar has been a function of the widening real interest rate differential between the U.S. and the rest of the world (Chart 9), which is likely to continue this year as the Fed delivers a few more rate hikes while U.S. inflation grinds slowly higher. We do not expect the Fed to be forced to shift to a more aggressive pace of tightening than currently implied by the FOMC forecasts. On the margin, this will help keep market volatility at subdued levels. A predictable Fed slowly tightening into an improving economy is not overly problematic for financial markets. That logic would be turned upside down if non-U.S. growth were to begin to slow sharply (not our base case) or if there were some non-U.S. source of uncertainty that could make markets jittery. Last year, political surprises ended up being the biggest shock for financial markets. Given the busy upcoming election schedule in Europe (Table 1), there is concern that a similar story could play out in 2017. Table 1Europe In 2017 Will Be A Headline Risk 4 Big Questions For Bond Markets In 2017 4 Big Questions For Bond Markets In 2017 The shock of Brexit and Trump have investors asking "where will the next populist uprising be?" France seems like the most obvious possibility, with the well-known right-wing (and anti-EU) populist Marine Le Pen running in this year's presidential election. French government debt has already priced in some modestly higher risk premium in recent months (Chart 10). Even in the bastion of stability, Germany, the rise of anti-immigration parties has some forecasting a difficult re-election campaign for Chancellor Angela Merkel later in the year. Our geopolitical strategists have long argued that there is not enough support for populist, anti-EU, anti-immigration parties in either Germany, France or the Netherlands (who also have an election this year) to win an election.3 The recent polling data strongly supports that view, with Le Pen's popularity on the decline for the past three years and with Merkel's popularity holding steady over the past year (Chart 11) - even as horrific terror incidents committed by "foreigners" have occurred on both French and German soil. Chart 10Not Worried About European Populism... Not Worried About European Populism... Not Worried About European Populism... Chart 11...For Good Reasons ...For Good Reasons ...For Good Reasons BCA's Chief Geopolitical Strategist, Marko Papic, believes that Italy remains the greatest political risk in Europe in 2017, with elections possible as early as the spring. With the Senate reforms defeated in the December referendum, the country needs to re-write its already complicated electoral laws. This will likely take time, pushing the potential election date to late spring or early summer. If an early election is not called, a new vote must be held by the expiry of the government's mandate in May 2018. Chart 12Italy Is The Biggest Political Risk In Europ Italy Is The Biggest Political Risk In Europ Italy Is The Biggest Political Risk In Europ Chart 13A Managed Renminbi Depreciation A Managed Renminbi Depreciation A Managed Renminbi Depreciation Given the lower support for the euro in Italy than the rest of the Euro Area (Chart 12), and given the strong showing in the polls for the anti-establishment, anti-EU Five Star Movement led by Beppe Grillo, an early Italian election could be the biggest potential political shock for markets in 2017. This likely will not be enough to cause a major flare-up of global market volatility, but it does suggest that investors should remain underweight Italian government debt. Bottom Line: Improving global growth will continue to support low market volatility during 2017, even with the Fed remaining in a tightening cycle. European political risk should not be a Brexit/Trump-type source of concern for investors outside of Italy. Can China Avert A Crisis And Still Be The Engine Of Global Growth? This is a question that we may be asking every year for the next decade, given China's high debt levels and decelerating potential economic growth. Periodic episodes of uncertainty over Chinese currency policy are always a threat to trigger capital outflows, as has occurred over the past year and half (Chart 13). The Chinese authorities have chosen to allow currency depreciation versus the U.S. dollar to help manage the pace of that outflow, particularly during the past year when interest rate differentials have moved in a more dollar-positive direction. With over US$3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves at the government's disposal, the odds remain low that a true economic crisis can unfold in China. Additional renminbi weakness versus the U.S. dollar is likely in 2017, but the recent actions to sharply raise offshore renminbi interest rates is an indication that Chinese authorities will not tolerate a rapidly weakening currency. The incoming Trump administration is obviously an unforecastable wild card here, and China could respond to a new trade war with the U.S. by allowing a more rapid pace of currency weakness versus the dollar. Having said that - if China-U.S. relations don't boil over, then the underlying story for China will be one of improving economic growth in 2017. The underlying growth indicators in our "China Checklist" unveiled late last year (Table 2) continue to improve (Chart 14), and we continue to see China as being a positive contributor to the global economic cycle in 2017 (Donald Trump and his band of China hawks notwithstanding). This is important, as the global upturn seen in 2016 began in China early in the year. This fed through into many other countries either directly via exports to China or indirectly through an improvement in the pricing power for commodity exporters that benefitted from faster Chinese demand. Table 2The GFIS China Checklist 4 Big Questions For Bond Markets In 2017 4 Big Questions For Bond Markets In 2017 Chart 14Chinese Growth Still Improving Chinese Growth Still Improving Chinese Growth Still Improving Bottom Line: China will likely remain a positive driver of the global economic upturn in 2017, with the biggest risk coming from increased tensions with the incoming Trump administration, not accelerating domestic capital outflows. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Constraints & Preferences Of The Trump Presidency", dated November 20th 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "How To Think About Global Bond Investing In 2017", dated December 20th 2016, available at gfis.bcarsearch.com 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook 2017, "5 Themes For 2017", dated December 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Overall Strategy: The global economy is entering a reflationary sweet spot that will last for the next two years. Investors should overweight equities, maintain slightly below benchmark exposure to government bonds, and underweight cash over a 12-month horizon. Fixed Income: Global bond yields will rise only modestly over the next two years, reflecting an abundance of spare capacity in many parts of the world. A major bond bear market will begin towards the end of the decade, as stagflationary forces gather steam. Equities: Investors should underweight the U.S. for the time being, while overweighting Europe and Japan in currency-hedged terms. Emerging markets will benefit from the reflationary tailwind, but deep structural problems will drag down returns. Currencies: The broad trade-weighted dollar will appreciate another 6% from current levels. The yen still has considerable downside against the dollar. The euro will grind lower, as will the Chinese yuan. The pound is approaching a bottom. Commodities: Favor energy over metals. Gold will move higher once the dollar peaks later this year. Feature I. Key Theme: A Reflationary Window The global economy is entering a reflationary sweet spot where deflationary forces are in retreat but fears of excess inflation have yet to surface. Activity data are surprising to the upside and leading economic indicators have turned higher (Chart 1). Falling unemployment in most major economies is boosting confidence, fueling a virtuous cycle of rising spending and even further declines in joblessness. Manufacturing activity is bouncing back after a protracted inventory destocking cycle (Chart 2). In addition, the stabilization in commodity prices has given some relief to emerging markets, while fueling a modest rebound in resource sector capital spending. Meanwhile, easier fiscal policy is providing a welcome tailwind to growth. The aggregate fiscal thrust for advanced economies turned positive in 2016 - the first time this has happened in six years. We expect this trend to persist for the foreseeable future. Reflecting these developments, market-based measures of inflation expectations have risen, offsetting the increase in nominal interest rates. In fact, real rates in the euro area and Japan have actually declined across most of the yield curve since the U.S. presidential election (Chart 3). This should translate into higher household and business spending in the months ahead. Chart 1Global Growth Is Accelerating Global Growth Is Accelerating Global Growth Is Accelerating Chart 2Inventory Destocking Was A Drag On Growth Inventory Destocking Was A Drag On Growth Inventory Destocking Was A Drag On Growth Chart 3Falling Real Rates In The Euro Area And Japan Falling Real Rates In The Euro Area And Japan Falling Real Rates In The Euro Area And Japan Supply Matters Yet, there has been a dark side to this reflationary trend, and one that could sow the seeds for stagflation as the decade wears on. Simply put, much of the reduction in spare capacity over the past eight years has occurred not because of much faster demand growth, but because of continued slow supply growth. Chart 4 shows that output gaps in the main developed economies would still be enormous today if potential GDP had grown at the rate the IMF forecasted back in 2008. Chart 4AWeak Supply Growth Has Narrowed Output Gaps Weak Supply Growth Has Narrowed Output Gaps Weak Supply Growth Has Narrowed Output Gaps Chart 4BWeak Supply Growth Has Narrowed Output Gaps Weak Supply Growth Has Narrowed Output Gaps Weak Supply Growth Has Narrowed Output Gaps Unfortunately, we do not expect this state of affairs to change much over the coming years. The decline in birth rates that began in the 1960s has caused working-age populations to grow more slowly in almost all developed and emerging economies (Chart 5). In some countries such as the U.S., the downward pressure on labor force growth has been exacerbated by a structural decline in participation rates, especially among the less educated (Chart 6). Chart 5Slowing Workforce Growth Slowing Workforce Growth Slowing Workforce Growth Chart 6U.S.: The Less Educated Are Shunning The Labor Force First Quarter 2017: From Reflation To Stagflation First Quarter 2017: From Reflation To Stagflation Productivity growth has also fallen (Chart 7). Part of this phenomenon is cyclical in nature, reflecting the impact of several years of weak corporate investment in new plant and equipment. However, much of it is structural. As Fed economist John Fernald has shown, the slowdown in productivity growth since 2004 has been concentrated in sectors that benefited the most from the adoption of new information technologies in the late 1990s (Chart 8).1 Recent technological innovations have focused more on consumers than on businesses. This has resulted in slower productivity growth. Chart 7Slowing Productivity Growth Around The World Slowing Productivity Growth Around The World Slowing Productivity Growth Around The World Chart 8The Productivity Slowdown Has Been ##br##Greatest In Sectors That Benefited The Most From The I.T. Revolution First Quarter 2017: From Reflation To Stagflation First Quarter 2017: From Reflation To Stagflation To make matters worse, human capital accumulation has decelerated both in the U.S. and elsewhere, dragging productivity growth down with it. Globally, the fraction of adults with a secondary degree or higher is increasing at half the rate it did in the 1990s (Chart 9). Educational achievement, as measured by standardized test scores, has also peaked, and is now falling in many countries (Chart 10). Chart 9The Contribution To Growth ##br##From Rising Human Capital Is Falling First Quarter 2017: From Reflation To Stagflation First Quarter 2017: From Reflation To Stagflation Chart 10Math Skills Around The World First Quarter 2017: From Reflation To Stagflation First Quarter 2017: From Reflation To Stagflation From Deflation To Inflation To reiterate what we have discussed at length in the past, the slowdown in potential GDP growth tends to be deflationary at the outset, but becomes inflationary later on.2 Initially, lower productivity growth reduces investment, pushing down aggregate demand. Lower productivity growth also curtails consumption, as households react to the prospect of smaller real wage gains. Eventually, however, economies that suffer from chronically weak productivity growth tend to find themselves rubbing up against supply-side constraints. This leads to higher inflation (Chart 11). One only needs to look at the history of low-productivity economies in Africa and Latin America to see this point - or, for that matter, the U.S. in the 1970s, a period during which productivity growth slowed and inflation accelerated. Likewise, a slowdown in labor force growth tends to morph from being deflationary to inflationary over time. When labor force growth slows, two things happen. First, investment demand drops. Why build new factories, office towers, and shopping malls if the number of workers and potential consumers is set to grow more slowly? Second, savings rise, as spending on children declines and a rising share of the workforce moves into its peak saving years (ages 35-to-50). The result is a large excess of savings over investment, which generates downward pressure on inflation and interest rates. As time goes by, the deflationary impact of slower labor force growth tends to recede (Chart 12). Workers who once brought home paychecks start to retire en masse and begin drawing down their accumulated wealth. Since there are few young workers available to take their place, labor shortages emerge. At the same time, health care spending and pension expenditures rise as a larger fraction of the population enters its golden years. The result is less aggregate savings and higher interest rates. Chart 11A Decline In Productivity Growth Is Deflationary In The Short Run, But Inflationary In The Long Run First Quarter 2017: From Reflation To Stagflation First Quarter 2017: From Reflation To Stagflation Chart 12An Aging Population Eventually Pushes Up Interest Rates First Quarter 2017: From Reflation To Stagflation First Quarter 2017: From Reflation To Stagflation Is Debt Deflationary Or Inflationary? The answer is both. Excessively high debt levels are deflationary at the outset because they limit the ability of overstretched borrowers to spend. However, high debt levels also reduce investment in new capacity - homes, office buildings, machinery, etc. This undermines the supply-side of the economy. Moreover, once the output gap is closed, high debt levels can become inflationary by increasing the incentive for central banks to keep rates low in order to suppress interest-servicing costs and reduce real debt burdens. Acting on that incentive also becomes easier as the output gap evaporates. Consider the case of forward guidance. If an economy has a large output gap, a central bank's promise to maintain interest rates at ultra-low levels, even after full employment has been reached, may hold little sway. After all, many things can happen between now and then: A change of central bank leadership, an adverse economic shock, etc. In contrast, if the output gap is already close to zero, a promise to let the economy run hot is more likely to be taken seriously. The U.S. Economy: Still In A Reflationary Sweet Spot The stagflationary demons described above will eventually come back to haunt the U.S., but for now and probably for the next two years, the economy will remain in a reflationary sweet spot. After a weak start to 2016, growth has bounced back. Real GDP grew by 3.5% in Q3. The Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model points to still-healthy growth of 2.9% in Q4. We expect growth to stay robust in 2017, as improving confidence and a stabilization in energy-sector investment lift overall business capex, homebuilding picks up after contracting in both Q2 and Q3 of 2016, and rising wages push up real incomes and personal consumption. Above-trend growth will continue to erode spare capacity. The headline unemployment rate has fallen to 4.6%, close to most estimates of NAIRU. Broader measures of unemployment, which incorporate marginally-attached and involuntary part-time workers, are also approaching pre-recession levels (Chart 13). Consistent with this observation, the job openings rate in the JOLT survey, the share of households reporting that jobs are "plentiful" versus "hard to get" in the Conference Board's Consumer Confidence survey, and the share of small businesses reporting difficulty in finding suitably qualified workers in the NFIB survey are all at or above 2007 levels (Chart 14). In contrast to most measures of labor market slack, industrial utilization still remains quite low by historic standards (Chart 15). In fact, the Congressional Budget Office's "capacity utilization-based" estimate of the output gap stands at around 3% of GDP, whereas its "unemployment-based" estimate is close to zero. Chart 13U.S. Labor Market: Not Much Slack Left First Quarter 2017: From Reflation To Stagflation First Quarter 2017: From Reflation To Stagflation Chart 14Most U.S. Labor Market Measures ##br## Are Back To Pre-Recession Levels Most U.S. Labor Market Measures Are Back To Pre-Recession Levels Most U.S. Labor Market Measures Are Back To Pre-Recession Levels Chart 15U.S.: Industrial Capacity Utilization Remains Low U.S.: Industrial Capacity Utilization Remains Low U.S.: Industrial Capacity Utilization Remains Low A strong dollar, as well as the ongoing decline of the U.S. manufacturing base, partly explain the low level of industrial utilization. However, another important reason bears noting: Years of depressed real wage growth has made labor scarce compared with capital. The free market solution to this problem is higher wages for workers. Good news for Main Street; but perhaps not so good news for Wall Street. Stagflation Is Coming, Just Not Yet While inflation will creep higher in 2017, a major spike is unlikely over the next two years. There are two main reasons for this. First, if the economy does run into severe capacity constraints, the Fed will have to step up the pace of rate hikes. Higher interest rates will push up the value of the dollar, curbing growth and inflation. Second, the historic evidence suggests that it takes a while for an overheated economy to generate meaningfully higher inflation. Consider how inflation evolved during the 1960s. U.S. inflation did not reach 4% until mid-1968. By that time, the output gap had been positive for five years, hitting a whopping 6% of GDP in 1966 due to rising military expenditures on the Vietnam War and social spending on Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society" programs (Chart 16). The relationship between economic slack and inflation is depicted by the so-called Phillips curve. As one would intuitively expect, inflation tends to rise when slack diminishes. However, this correlation has weakened over the past few decades (Chart 17). For example, U.S. core inflation declined only modestly during the Great Recession, and has been slow to bounce back, even as the output gap has shrunk. Chart 16It Can Take A While For Inflation To Rise In Response To An Overheated Economy It Can Take A While For Inflation To Rise In Response To An Overheated Economy It Can Take A While For Inflation To Rise In Response To An Overheated Economy Chart 17The Phillips Curve Has Flattened First Quarter 2017: From Reflation To Stagflation First Quarter 2017: From Reflation To Stagflation The adoption of inflation targeting, coupled with more transparent Fed communication, has helped anchor inflation expectations. This has flattened the Phillips curve. A flatter Phillips curve implies a lower "sacrifice ratio." This means that the Fed could let the economy overheat without putting undue upward pressure on inflation. Going forward, the temptation to exploit the flatness of the Phillips curve may be too great to resist. While the Fed would have reservations about pursuing such a strategy, Janet Yellen's musings about running a "high-pressure economy" suggest that she is at least willing to entertain the idea. Interest rates are still fairly low and a few more hikes are unlikely to cause much distress among corporate and household borrowers. As rates continue to climb, however, this may change, making it difficult for the Fed to further tighten monetary policy. This is especially the case if potential real GDP growth remains lackluster, as this would make it harder for borrowers to generate enough income to service their debts. Trump's budget-busting fiscal deficits may also put some pressure on the Fed to eschew raising rates too much in an effort to hold down interest costs. Even if such political pressures do not materialize, the challenges posed by the zero bound constraint on nominal interest rates could still justify efforts to raise the Fed's 2% inflation target. After all, if inflation were higher, this would give the Federal Reserve the ability to push down real rates further into negative territory in the event of an economic downturn. Admittedly, such a step is unlikely to be taken anytime soon. Nevertheless, given that a number of well-regarded economists - including prominent policymakers such as Olivier Blanchard, the former chief economist at the IMF; San Francisco Fed President John Williams; and former Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota - have floated the idea of raising the inflation target, long-term investors should be open-minded about the possibility. The bottom line is that inflation is likely to move up slowly over the next two years, but could begin to accelerate more sharply towards the end of the decade. Japan: The End Of Deflation? Like the U.S., Japan has also entered a reflationary window. Retail sales surprised on the upside in November, rising 1.7%, against market expectations of 0.8%. Industrial production and exports continue to rebound, a trend that should persist thanks to the yen's recent depreciation (Chart 18). Stronger economic growth is causing the labor market to heat up. The Bank of Japan estimates that the "labor input gap" is now positive, meaning that the economy has run out of surplus workers (Chart 19). Reflecting this, the ratio of job openings-to-applicants has reached a 25-year high (Chart 20). Chart 18Japan: Some Positive Economic News Japan: Some Positive Economic News Japan: Some Positive Economic News Chart 19Japan: Labor Market Slack Has Evaporated, But Industrial Capacity Utilization Has Fallen First Quarter 2017: From Reflation To Stagflation First Quarter 2017: From Reflation To Stagflation Chart 20Japan: Sign Of Tightening Labor Market Japan: Sign Of Tightening Labor Market Japan: Sign Of Tightening Labor Market Wage growth so far has been tepid, but that should change over the next two years. The labor force expanded by 0.9% year-over-year in November - the latest month for which data are available - largely due to the continued influx of women into the labor force. Chart 21 shows that the employment-to-population ratio for Japanese prime-age women now exceeds that of the U.S. by three percentage points. As Japanese female labor participation stabilizes, overall labor force growth will turn negative, pushing up wages in the process. Chart 21Japan: Female Labor Force ##br##Participation Now Exceeds The U.S. Japan: Female Labor Force Participation Now Exceeds The U.S. Japan: Female Labor Force Participation Now Exceeds The U.S. In contrast to the Fed, the BoJ is unlikely to tighten monetary policy in response to higher inflation. As a consequence, real yields will continue to fall as inflation expectations rise further. This will lead to higher net exports via a weaker yen, as well as increased spending on interest-rate sensitive goods such as consumer durables and business equipment. Indeed, a virtuous circle could develop where an overheated labor market pushes down real rates, causing aggregate demand and inflation to rise, leading to even lower real rates. If this occurs, growth could accelerate sharply, avoiding the need for more radical measures such as "helicopter money." In short, Japan may be on the verge of escaping its deflationary trap. This is something that could have happened shortly after Prime Minister Abe assumed office, but was short-circuited by the government's lamentable decision to tighten fiscal policy by 3% of GDP between 2013 and 2015. It won't make the same mistake again. Europe: Fine... For Now The European economy grew at an above-trend pace in 2016. Real GDP in the EU is estimated to have expanded by 1.9%, compared to 1.6% in the U.S. The euro area is estimated to have grown by 1.7% - the first time that growth in the common currency bloc exceeded the U.S. since the Great Recession. Euro area growth should remain reasonably strong in 2017, as telegraphed by a number of leading economic indicators (Chart 22). Fiscal austerity has been shelved in favor of modest stimulus. The European Commission is now even advising member countries to loosen fiscal policy more than they themselves are targeting (Chart 23). Chart 22Euro Area Growth Will Remain On Solid Footing In 2017 Euro Area Growth Will Remain On Solid Footing In 2017 Euro Area Growth Will Remain On Solid Footing In 2017 Chart 23The European Commission Recommends Greater Fiscal Expansion First Quarter 2017: From Reflation To Stagflation First Quarter 2017: From Reflation To Stagflation Ongoing efforts to strengthen the euro area's banking system will also help. As we noted in the "Italian Bank Job," the costs of cleaning up the Italian banking system are modest compared with the size of the Italian economy.3 The failure to have done it earlier represents a massive "own goal" by the Italian and EU authorities. As banking stresses recede, the gap in economic performance between northern and southern Europe should narrow. The overall stance of monetary policy will facilitate this trend. If the ECB keeps interest rates near zero for the foreseeable future, as it almost certainly will, Germany's economy will overheat. Chart 24 shows that the German unemployment rate has fallen to a 25-year low, while wage growth is now running at twice the rate as elsewhere in the euro area. Chart 24German Labor Market Going Strong German Labor Market Going Strong German Labor Market Going Strong An overheated German economy will help the periphery in two important ways: First, higher wage inflation in Germany will give a competitive advantage to Club Med producers seeking to sell their goods in the euro area's biggest economy. Second, faster wage growth and stronger domestic demand in Germany will erode the country's gargantuan current account surplus of nearly 9% of GDP. This will put downward pressure on the euro, giving the periphery a further competitive boost. Of course, all this rests on the assumption that Germany accepts an overheated economy. One could objectively argue that it is in Germany's political best interest to do so, as this may be the only means by which to hold the euro area together. One could also argue that rebalancing German growth towards domestic demand, and away from its historic reliance on exports, would be in the country's long-term best interest. One might also contend that German banks would accept a few more years of low rates if this helped lower nonperforming loans across the euro area, while also paving the way for the eventual abandonment of ZIRP and NIRP. Chart 25Italy Lags Peers On Euro Support Italy Lags Peers On Euro Support Italy Lags Peers On Euro Support Whatever the merits of these arguments, they clash with Germany's historical antipathy towards inflation. This means that political risk could escalate over the coming years. Against the backdrop of growing anti-establishment sentiment - fueled in no small measure by the EU's deer-in-the-headlights response to the migration crisis - Europe's populist parties will continue to make gains at the polls. Timing is important, however. With unemployment trending lower, our hunch is that any truly disruptive populist shock may have to wait until the next recession, which is likely still a few years away. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy team holds a strong conviction view that Marine Le Pen, the leader of the eurosceptic National Front, will be defeated in the second round of the presidential election in May. They also think that Angela Merkel will cling to power, partly because Germany still lacks an effective anti-establishment opposition party. Italy is more of a concern, given that support for the common currency among Italians has been falling and is now lower than virtually anywhere else in the euro area (Chart 25). Nevertheless, our geopolitical strategists assign very low odds to Italy following Britain's example and voting to leave the EU. Indeed, it is still not even clear that the U.K. will actually follow through and exit the EU. Brussels is likely to play hardball with the U.K. during the negotiations slated to begin in March. EU officials are keen to send a clear warning to other EU members who may be tempted to leave the club. It is still quite possible that another referendum will be held in one or two years concerning the terms of the negotiated agreement that would govern Britain's future relationship with the EU. Given how close the first referendum was, there is a reasonable chance that U.K. voters will choose EU membership over a bad deal. In that case, Brussels will back off from its threat that triggering Article 50 would irrevocably lead to the U.K.'s expulsion from the EU. China: Still In Need Of A Spender-Of-Last Resort Investor angst about China rose to a fever pitch early last year, but has since faded into the background. The main reason for this is that the deflationary forces which once threatened to precipitate a hard landing for the economy have abated. Growth has picked up and producer price inflation has risen from -5.3% in early 2016 to 3.3% in November (Chart 26). As our China strategists have argued, the end of PPI deflation is a major positive development for the Chinese corporate sector, as it improves its pricing power while reducing its real cost of funding (Chart 27). Real bank lending rates deflated by the PPI rose to near-record highs early last year, but have since tumbled by a whopping 10 percentage points - largely due to easing deflation. This has bestowed dramatic relief on some highly-levered, asset-heavy industries. These industries were the biggest casualties of the growth slowdown and posed material risks to the banking sector due to their high debt levels. In this vein, rising PPI and easing financial stress among these firms also bode well for banks. Chart 26China: Improving Growth Momentum China: Improving Growth Momentum China: Improving Growth Momentum Chart 27China: Real Interest Rates Dropping ##br## Thanks To Easing Deflation China: Real Interest Rates Dropping Thanks To Easing Deflation China: Real Interest Rates Dropping Thanks To Easing Deflation Unfortunately, the reflationary forces in China are masking deep underlying problems. Structural reform has been patchy at best; credit continues to expand much faster than GDP; and speculation in the real estate sector is rampant (Chart 28). Meanwhile, capital continues to flow out of the country, taking the PBOC's foreign exchange reserves down from a high of $4 trillion in June 2014 to $3.1 trillion at present. There are no easy solutions to these problems. Tightening monetary policy could help fend off capital flight, but this would hurt growth and potentially plunge the economy back into deflation. This week's spike in interbank rates is evidence of just how sensitive the economy has become to any withdrawal of monetary accommodation (Chart 29). Chart 28China: Credit Continues Expanding And The##br## Real Estate Sector Is Getting Frothy China: Credit Continues Expanding And The Real Estate Sector Is Getting Frothy China: Credit Continues Expanding And The Real Estate Sector Is Getting Frothy Chart 29China: Yet Another Spike In Interbank Rates China: Yet Another Spike In Interbank Rates China: Yet Another Spike In Interbank Rates As we controversially argued in "China Needs More Debt," China's underlying problem is a chronic excess of savings.4 This has kept aggregate demand below the level commensurate with the economy's productive capacity. In the past, China was able to export some of those excess savings abroad via a large current account surplus, which peaked at 10% of GDP in 2007 (Chart 30). However, China is now too large to export its way out of its problems. It was one thing for China to run a current account surplus of 10% of GDP when its economy represented 6% of global GDP. It is quite another to do so when the economy represents 15% of global GDP, as it does now. This is especially the case when other economies are also keen to have cheap currencies. Faced with this reality, the government has been trying to buttress aggregate demand by funneling a huge amount of credit towards state-owned companies, which have then used these funds to finance all sorts of investment projects. The problem is that China no longer needs as much new capacity as it once did. As trend GDP growth has slowed, the level of investment necessary to maintain a constant capital-to-output ratio has fallen by about 10% of GDP over the past decade.5 China's aging population will eventually lead to a drop in savings. Government plans to strengthen the social safety net should also help this transition along by reducing household precautionary savings. However, these are long-term developments. Over the next couple of years, China will have little choice but to let credit grow at a rapid pace. The good news is that China has ample domestic savings to continue financing credit expansion. The ratio of bank loans-to-deposits remains near all-time lows (Chart 31). The government also has plenty of fiscal resources to safeguard the banks from losses on nonperforming loans extended to local governments and state-owned enterprises. Chart 30China Used To Rely On Large ##br##Current Account Surplus To Export Excess Savings China Used To Rely On Large Current Account Surplus To Export Excess Savings China Used To Rely On Large Current Account Surplus To Export Excess Savings Chart 31China: Banks Have Ample Deposit Coverage China: Banks Have Ample Deposit Coverage China: Banks Have Ample Deposit Coverage All that may not be enough, however. Given the risks to financial stability from excessive investment by state-owned enterprises, the government may have little choice but to cajole households into spending more by suppressing bank deposit rates while purposely engineering higher inflation. The resulting decline in real rates will reduce the incentive to save while helping to inflate away the mountain of debt that has already been accumulated. II. Financial Markets Equities Chart 32Investors Are Optimistic Investors Are Optimistic Investors Are Optimistic Deflation is bad for equities, as is stagflation. But between deflation and stagflation there is reflation - and that is good for stocks. This reflationary window should remain open for the next two years. As such, we expect global equities to be higher in 12 months than they are today. However, the risks for stocks are tilted to the downside over both a shorter-term horizon of less than two months and a longer-term horizon exceeding two years. The near-term outlook is complicated by the fact that global equities are overbought, and hence vulnerable to a selloff. Chart 32 shows that bullish sentiment is stretched to the upside. Expectations of long-term U.S. earnings growth have also jumped to over 12%, something that strikes us as rather fanciful. Renewed rumblings in China could also spook the markets for a while. We expect global equities to correct 5%-to-10% from current levels, setting the stage for a more durable recovery. Once that recovery begins, higher-beta developed markets such as Japan and Europe should outperform the U.S. As my colleague, Mark McClellan, has shown, Europe and Japan are considerably cheaper than the U.S., even after adjusting for sector skews and structural valuation differences.6 The relative stance of monetary policy also favors Europe and Japan. Neither the ECB nor the BoJ is likely to hike rates anytime soon. This means that rising inflation expectations in these two economies will push down real rates, weakening their currencies in the process. Emerging markets are a tougher call. The combination of a strengthening dollar, growing protectionist sentiment in the developed world, and high debt levels are all bad news for emerging markets. EM equity valuations are also not especially cheap by historic standards (Chart 33). Nevertheless, a reflationary environment has typically been positive for EM equities. The tight correlation between EM and global cyclical stocks has broken down over the past three months (Chart 34). We suspect the relationship will reassert itself again over the course of 2017, giving EM stocks a bit of a boost. Chart 33EM Stocks Are Not Particularly Cheap EM Stocks Are Not Particularly Cheap EM Stocks Are Not Particularly Cheap Chart 34EM Stocks Are Lagging EM Stocks Are Lagging EM Stocks Are Lagging On balance, EM equities are likely in a bottoming phase where returns over the next 12 months will be positive but not spectacular. BCA's favored markets are Korea, Taiwan, China, India, Thailand, and Russia. We would avoid Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey, Brazil, and Peru. Turning to global equity sectors, a bias towards cyclical names is appropriate in an environment of rising global growth. Longer term, our equity sector specialists like health care and technology names. The outlook for financial stocks remains a key area of debate within BCA. Most of my colleagues would still avoid banks. I am more partial to the sector. As I argued in September in "Three Controversial Calls: Global Banks Finally Outperform," steeper yield curves will boost net interest margins over the next few years while rising demand for credit will support top-line growth (Chart 35). On a price-to-earnings basis, global banks are quite cheap, despite being much better capitalized than they were in the past (Chart 36). Chart 35AHigher Yields Will Benefit Banks Higher Yields Will Benefit Banks Higher Yields Will Benefit Banks Chart 35BHigher Yields Will Benefit Banks Higher Yields Will Benefit Banks Higher Yields Will Benefit Banks Lastly, in terms of size exposure, we prefer small caps over large caps. Small capitalization stocks tend to do better in reflationary environments (Chart 37). The ongoing retreat from globalization will also benefit smaller domestically-focused firms at the expense of those with large global footprints. In the U.S. specifically, small caps face a potential additional benefit. If the new Trump administration follows through with promised corporate tax cuts, then small caps will benefit disproportionately given that the effective tax rate of multinationals is already low. Chart 36Global Banks Are Cheap ##br##And Better Capitalized Since The Crisis Global Banks Are Cheap And Better Capitalized Since The Crisis Global Banks Are Cheap And Better Capitalized Since The Crisis Chart 37Reflationary Backdrop ##br##Favors Small Caps Outperformance Reflationary Backdrop Favors Small Caps Outperformance Reflationary Backdrop Favors Small Caps Outperformance Fixed Income And Credit Back in March 2015, we predicted that the 10-year Treasury yield would fall to 1.5% even if the U.S. economy avoided a recession.7 The call was notably out of consensus at the time, but proved to be correct: The 10-year yield reached a record closing low of 1.37% on July 5th. As luck would have it, on that very same day, we sent out a note entitled "The End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market," advising clients to position for higher bond yields. Global bonds have sold off sharply since then, with the selloff intensifying after the U.S. presidential election. As discussed above, inflation in the U.S. and elsewhere will be slow to rise over the next two years. Hence, global bond yields are unlikely to move significantly higher from current levels. Indeed, the near-term path for yields is to the downside if our expectation of a global equity correction proves true. However, once the stagflationary forces described in this report begin to gather steam towards the end of the decade, bond yields could spike higher, imposing significant pain on fixed-income and equity investors alike. Regionally, we favor Japanese and euro area bonds relative to their U.S. counterparts over a 12-month horizon. Inflation in both Japan and the euro area remains well below target, suggesting that neither the BoJ nor the ECB will tighten monetary policy anytime soon. In contrast, the Fed is likely to raise rates three times in 2017, one more hike than the market is currently pricing in. In addition, we would underweight U.K. gilts. While U.K. growth will decelerate next year as uncertainty over the Brexit negotiations takes its toll, a weaker pound and some fiscal loosening will keep the economy from flying off the rails. In this light, the market's expectations that U.K. rates will rise to only 0.66% at end-2019 seems too pessimistic. Elsewhere in the developed world, our global fixed-income strategists are neutral on Canada and New Zealand bonds, but are underweight Australia. A modest underweight to EM government bonds is also warranted. Turning to credit, a reflationary backdrop is positive for spread product insofar as it will keep defaults in check, while also propping up the appetite for riskier assets. That said, U.S. high-yield credit is now quite expensive based on our fundamental models (Chart 38). Private-sector leverage remains at elevated levels and our Corporate Health Monitor is still in deteriorating territory (Chart 39). Rising government yields could also prompt yield-hungry investors to move some of their money back into sovereign debt. On balance, U.S. corporate spreads are likely to narrow slightly this year, but corporate credit will still underperform equities. Regionally, we see more upside in European credit, given the ECB's continued bond-buying program and greater scope for corporate profit margins to rise across the region. Chart 38U.S. High-Yield Valuations U.S. High-Yield Valuations U.S. High-Yield Valuations Chart 39U.S. Corporate Health Keeps Deteriorating U.S. Corporate Health Keeps Deteriorating U.S. Corporate Health Keeps Deteriorating Currencies And Commodities BCA's Global Investment Strategy service has been bullish on the dollar since October 2014, a view that has generated a gain of nearly 17% for our long DXY trade recommendation. We reiterated this position last October in a note entitled "Better U.S. Economic Data Will Cause The Dollar To Strengthen,"8 where we predicted that the dollar would rally a further 10%. Since that report was published, the real trade-weighted dollar has gained 4%, implying another 6% of upside from current levels. Chart 40Real Rate Differentials Are Driving Up The Dollar Real Rate Differentials Are Driving Up The Dollar Real Rate Differentials Are Driving Up The Dollar Both economic and political forces have conspired to keep the dollar well bid. The resurgent U.S. economy has pushed up real rate expectations in the U.S. relative to its trading partners. Chart 40 shows the amazingly strong correlation between the trade-weighted dollar and real interest rate differentials. Rate differentials should widen further over the coming months as investors price in more Fed rate hikes, and rising inflation expectations abroad push down real rates in economies such as Japan and the euro area. As we predicted in "A Trump Victory Would Be Bullish For The Dollar" and "Three Controversial Calls: Trump Wins And The Dollar Rallies," Donald Trump's triumph on November 8th has given the greenback an additional boost. Progress in implementing any of Trump's three signature policy proposals - fiscal stimulus, trade protectionism, and immigration restrictions - will cause the U.S. output gap to narrow more quickly than it otherwise would, forcing the Fed to pick up the pace of rate hikes. Chart 41The Pound Is A Bargain The Pound Is A Bargain The Pound Is A Bargain The adoption of a "destination-based tax system" would further strengthen the dollar. Under the existing corporate tax structure, taxes are assessed on corporate profits regardless of where they are derived. In contrast, under a destination-based system, taxes would be assessed only on the difference between domestic sales and domestic costs. In practice, this means that imports would be subject to taxes, while exports would receive a tax rebate. In the simplest economic models, the imposition of a destination-based tax has no effect on domestic economic activity, inflation, or the distribution of corporate profits across the various sectors of the economy. This is because the dollar is assumed to appreciate by precisely enough to keep net exports unchanged. For that to happen, however, the requisite change in the currency needs to be quite large. For example, if the Trump administration succeeds in bringing down effective corporate tax rates to 20%, the required appreciation would be 1/(1-tax rate)=25%. Under current law, the required appreciation would be over 30%! In reality, the dollar probably would not adjust that quickly, implying that the transition period to a destination-based tax system would disproportionately benefit exporters at the expense of importers. Partly for this reason, the proposal will probably be heavily watered down if it is ever passed. Nevertheless, overall U.S. policy will continue to be biased towards a stronger dollar. Looking at the various dollar crosses, we still see more downside for the yen. The BoJ's policy of pegging the 10-year nominal yield will result in ever-lower real yields as Japanese inflation expectations rise. The euro should also continue to drift lower, most likely reaching parity against the dollar later this year. The pound could dip further if an impasse is reached during Brexit negotiations, as is likely at some point this year. That said, sterling is now very cheap, which limits the downside for the currency (Chart 41). Chart 42The Dollar Has Weighed On Gold The Dollar Has Weighed On Gold The Dollar Has Weighed On Gold The Chinese yuan will continue to grind lower, in line with most other EM currencies. As we discussed in March 2015 in a report entitled "A Weaker RMB Ahead," China's excess savings problem necessitates a weaker currency. The real trade-weighted RMB has fallen by 7% since that report was written, but a bottom for the currency remains elusive.9 As noted above, the Chinese government may have no choice but to boost household spending by suppressing deposit rates while working to engineer higher inflation. Negative real borrowing rates will keep capital flowing out of the country, putting downward pressure on the yuan. The overall direction of the Canadian and Aussie dollars will be dictated by the path of commodity prices. A reflationary environment tends to be bullish for commodities. Nevertheless, an uncertain macro outlook in China muddies the waters. We prefer oil over metals, given that the former is more geared towards growth in developed economies while the latter is heavily dependent on Chinese demand. This also makes the Canadian dollar a more attractive currency than the Aussie dollar. Lastly, a few words on gold: The combination of political uncertainty, rising inflation expectations, and continued easy money policies should provide support to bullion prices over the next year. The main negative is the potential for a further rise in the dollar. The strengthening of the dollar clearly was a factor undermining gold prices in the second half of 2016 (Chart 42). On balance, we would maintain a modest position in gold for the time being, but would look to increase exposure later this year as the dollar peaks. Peter Berezin Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 John G. Fernald, "Productivity and Potential Output Before, During, and After the Great Recession," Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Working Paper 2014-15, (June 2014), and John G. Fernald, "The Pre-Great Recession Slowdown in U.S. Productivity Growth," (November 16, 2015). 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook Fourth Quarter 2016: Supply Constraints Resurface," dated October 7, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Italian Bank Job," dated July 29, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China Needs More Debt," dated May 20, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Back in 2007, trend growth was around 10%. Consistent with the empirical literature, let us assume that an appropriate capital-to-GDP ratio is 250% and that the capital stock depreciates at 5% a year. With a trend growth of 10%, China needs 2.5*10%=25% of GDP in new investment before depreciation to keep its capital-to-GDP ratio constant, and an additional 2.5*5%=12.5% of GDP in investment to cover depreciation, for a grand total of 37.5% of GDP in required investment. With a trend GDP growth rate of 6%, however, the required investment-to-GDP ratio would only be 2.5*6%+2.5*5%=27.5%. 6 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Reports Section 2, "Are Eurozone Stocks Really That Cheap?" dated June 30, 2016, and "Japanese Equities: Good Value Or Value Trap?" dated November 24, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Seven Structural Reasons For A Lower Neutral Rate In The U.S.," dated March 13, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Better U.S. Economic Data Will Cause The Dollar To Strengthen," dated October 14, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Weaker RMB Ahead," dated March 06, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Future Development In Emerging Markets And What Sectors To Look Out For1 The global population is peaking. For Emerging Markets this means significant changes in economic development models. Commodity super-cycles are coming to an end and technological development will become more disruptive for the "old economy". Global growth will be driven by emerging and frontier markets and the accelerated speed of development will ensure leaps in technology and changes in the demographic structure of the workforce in countries that are catching up. The human population in different historic periods totalled roughly the same number, ten billion people. Periods of historic and economic development are becoming shorter. Until recently demographic growth was assumed to be exponential, but in reality it follows a hyperbolic curve, very slow in the beginning and rising faster as it approaches infinity. Growth cannot continue to infinity and models explaining tail events of the growth trajectory are of particular interest. Signs of a slowdown are apparent as humankind is approaching a global population of ten billion. The global growth model is shifting from a quantitative to a qualitative approach, with information and speed of information exchange becoming the determining factors for development. "The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a mathematical construct which, with the addition of certain verbal interpretations, describes observed phenomena. The justification of such a mathematical construct is solely and precisely that it is expected to work - that is correctly to describe phenomena from a reasonably wide area. Furthermore, it must satisfy certain aesthetic criteria - that is, in relation to how much it describes, it must be rather simple". John von Neumann The purpose of describing the model framework in this paper is first of all to provide investors with a glimpse into our long-term investment philosophy and the way we try to think about future developments. We like the framework described below, because of the good fit to reality that it has shown. Considering that the initial parts of the theory were developed in the 1980s, the model accurately predicted many events we are witnessing now. Furthermore, we hope to achieve a certain degree of predictability of future events, and lay out scenarios for how these events might affect investors. This might stimulate modelling and the thought-process. We are not advising changes in investment policy based on this, but rather invite the reader to a dialog about scenario analysis. In the end, as with every theory or model, everybody is entitled to their own views and, in this academic spirit, we welcome ideas of how to develop the framework further and apply it to different areas. Modelling Of Demographic Growth "The main difference of a human being to an animal is the desire for knowledge and the capacity to reason". Aristotle The most cited theory on demographic growth was formulated by English cleric and scholar Thomas Malthus in 1798.2 The theory later became known as the Malthusian growth model and argued that the world population is growing exponentially: P (t) = P0e rt Where P0 is the initial population size, r is the population growth rate and t is time. In essence the theory suggests that the rate of population growth increases with the number of people living on the planet, while the main constraint for growth is the scarcity of resources (Chart 1). With time it has become obvious that the human population is not evolving according to the rules applicable to all other animal species, and that the Malthusian growth model does not describe the growth trajectory correctly (Chart 2). For example, humankind represents the only exception to the inverse relationship rule between the body mass of an animal species and its population size (lower body mass equals larger population).3 Chart 1Malthusian Growth Model ##br## For The World Population The Ten Billion People Rule The Ten Billion People Rule Chart 2Malthusian Growth Model Vs. ##br## Actual Population Growth The Ten Billion People Rule The Ten Billion People Rule In 1960, von Forester, Mora and Amiot, and later Hoerner in 1975,4 demonstrated that population growth is much better described by a hyperbolic growth function5 - very slow in the early stages and exploding as we approach the present day (Charts 3A & 3B). In other words the growth-momentum relationship is not dependant on the number of people, but rather on the number of interactions between those people (the so-called "second order reaction" in physics or chemistry). Chart 3AHyperbolic Growth Function Vs. Malthusian Growth Model ##br## And Real Population Growth The Ten Billion People Rule The Ten Billion People Rule Chart 3BExamples Of Linear, Exponential ##br## And Hyperbolic Growth The Ten Billion People Rule The Ten Billion People Rule Further research tried to connect the population growth model to the economic growth function and understand where the trajectory of population growth is going.6 For example, Nielsen7 (2015) makes the assumption that the world population is going through a demographic transition process (the third in the world's history) from the latest hyperbolic trajectory to a yet unknown trend. One interesting theory was developed by Russian physicist and demographer Sergey Kapitsa (1928 - 2012). Sergey Kapitsa was the son of Nobel laureate physicist and Cambridge professor Petr Kapitsa. Being a physicist himself, Kapitsa applied physical principles to explain population growth in the perspective of the whole planet, and concentrated on the changing phases of growth at the tails of the hyperbolic curve. "Only Contradiciton Stimulates The Development Of Science. It Should Be Embraced, Not Hidden Under The Rug". Sergey Kapitsa In his work to explain population growth, Kapitsa applied methods developed in physics to describe systems with many particles and degrees of freedom.8 Kapitsa saw an advantage in the complexity of the world population, as it would allow a statistical approach to the solution of the problem, averaging out all temporary processes. Kapitsa found several constraints in the simple hyperbolic growth model, occurring at the tail ends of the trajectory. The hyperbolic model would assume that at the beginning of time, approximately 10 people would have inhabited the planet and would have lived for a billion years. At the same time, approaching 2025 our population is due to double each year. To solve these tail problems, Kapitsa introduced a so-called "cut-off growth rate", to tackle growth in the very early stages of humankind, and a "cut-off time" constant. This led to the population growth formula: dN/dt = N 2/K 2 Chart 4World Population Growth The Ten Billion People Rule The Ten Billion People Rule This states that "growth depends on the total number of people in the world N, and is a function - the square - of the number of people, as an expression of the network complexity of the global population".9 Furthermore, the "growth rate is limited, that is to say by the internal nature of the growth process, not by the lack of external resources" (Chart 4). The easy way to understand the population growth relationship is to think about it the following way - if each BCA client would write an investment advice letter to all the other BCA clients, the total number of letters written would be equal the square of the number of clients. Kapitsa also formulated three periods in the development of humankind: "Epoch A", which began 4.4 million years ago and lasted 2.8 million years. This period was characterized by linear growth of the population. "Epoch B", which included the Palaeolithic, Neolithic periods and up to recent history and lasted 1.6 million years, and growth was hyperbolic (1, 2, 3 on the chart). "Epoch C", which according to Kapitsa's calculations, started in approximately 1965, when the global population reached 3.5 billion people (4 and 5 on the chart) and population growth started to slow globally (Chart 5). Chart 5World Population Growth Rate Is Falling World Population Growth Rate Is Falling World Population Growth Rate Is Falling The model was found to be a good connecting medium between a pure mathematical approach to demographics and observations made by palaeontologists, anthropologists and historians. The main conclusions made by Kapitsa are the following: Historical periods are becoming shorter over time. The Palaeolithic period lasted over 2 million years, the Neolithic period lasted "just" 5,000-8,000 years, while the Middle Ages spanned only about 500 years. Time is passing faster, the more complex the global system of interaction becomes. Or, in other words, the larger the world population becomes. Over each historic period, approximately the same number of people have lived on the planet, in the range of 9 to 12 billion. In later papers Kapitsa singles out 10 billion as the exact number (this depends on input parameters in the formula). World population will reach the 10 billion mark before 2060. Growth is determined by social and technological changes and is driven by the number of social and economic interactions within the global system. On a historical timescale, each cycle is 2.5 - 3 times shorter than the previous one, driving the overall growth in population. Information is the controlling factor of growth. Kapitsa equates his population growth model to the economic production function and explains the non-linearity of the function by "information interaction, which is multiplicative and irreversible, and is the dominant feature of the system, determining or rather moderating its growth". Food or other resources are not a constraint factor, as through the whole of history, humankind never actually encountered any constraints in resources which would derail population growth from its hyperbolic trajectory. Humankind is now in a period of demographic transition, where the beginning is the point of most rapid increase of the growth rate (around 1965) and the end is the point of most rapid decrease. On a historic scale this transition is happening in an extremely short period - 1/50,000 of total historical time - while one in ten people who ever lived will experience this period. The rate of transition in this last period is approximately 90 years, which is just a touch longer than the life expectancy in developed countries. Furthermore, changes in the developing world are happening twice as fast as in the developed. And the reason for that is the increase in speed with which we, as human beings, exchange information. Demographic Transition And Implications For The Economy If the demographic transition period is estimated correctly and the population growth trajectory will level off, as the population stabilizes at around 10 billion, the world will face two scenarios. Either we are approaching a zero-growth reality, or development will shift from the usual "quantitative" growth model of the economy (agriculturally and later industrially driven), to a qualitative approach, where the generation and exchange of information will be paramount. This fits very well with the current reality, where we can see both scenarios happening simultaneously. While growth is approaching zero in the developed world, the move to an information-driven society is pronounced in emerging and developed markets alike. The transition period is characterized by a decrease in death rates among the population, followed by a fall in birth rates. At the same time, a surge in wealth levels and standard of living occurs, followed by longer life expectancy as a result (Charts 6A & 6B). These processes are accompanied by urbanization and a shift of the workforce from production sectors to services. Chart 6AGlobal Population ##br## Is Getting Older Global Population Is Getting Older Global Population Is Getting Older Chart 6BAge Dependency Ratio ##br## (Old Population % Of Working Population) Age Dependency Ratio (Old Population % Of Working Population) Age Dependency Ratio (Old Population % Of Working Population) While this transition has taken decades, and sometimes centuries, in the old world, emerging markets are catching up much faster and the gap in development, estimated by the model, might be not more than 50 years (Chart 7). In fact, we already can observe that the later the transition started, the faster the catch-up period. Kapitsa argues that this narrowing is "due to the nonlinear interaction between countries", or in other words, the increased speed of information transfer. What implications will this have for the global economy and emerging market economies in particular? Chart 7Population Transition, As Described By The Model, ##br## In Different Countries bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c7 bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c7 Chart 8Global Economic Growth ##br## Driven By EM And FM Global Economic Growth Driven By EM And FM Global Economic Growth Driven By EM And FM Global growth will be driven by emerging and frontier markets for the next decades. Developed countries are already at the final stage of development, where growth will oscillate around zero (Chart 8). The implications of demographics for developed world growth have been studied in a recent paper by the Federal Reserve,10 and so we will not go into too much detail. Investors should be aware that, according to the trajectory suggested by the model, the catch-up period and, hence, the period of high growth, will be shorter for emerging and frontier markets than experienced in the developed world. It is fair to assume that by the time frontier countries move into the "emerging" classification, their period of high growth might be limited to several years to a decade. The model suggests that the period of high GDP growth rates is coming to an end and that investors should be prepared for lower growth for longer. World economy will move to a qualitative focus. Kapitsa argues that humankind will not face any resource constraints, as it never has in the past. Resource constraints are overcome by migration and new technology, while the real issue is in the equal distribution of resources (including wealth and knowledge). As a result, in the coming decades the industrial sector might repeat the destiny of the agricultural sector, as seen in the U.S. and other developed economies (Chart 9). Currently only 2.5 - 3% of the world population are working in the agricultural sector, and this is sufficient to produce food for the world. It can be argued that with the further development of technology, such as 3D printing, the problem of industrial overcapacity will become even more prominent and countries with an industrial focus will face a difficult transition period. China is currently one of the EM countries undergoing such a transition, and we can see how the overcapacity created by the "old economy" is weighing on the performance of the overall economy (Chart 10). Chart 9U.S.: Move Of Working Population ##br## From Agriculture And Manufacturing To Services bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c9 bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c9 Chart 10Decline Of The bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c10 bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c10 No more commodity super-cycles? This might not be exactly true, but investors need to change the way they look at commodities and resource companies (and materials sector overall) (Chart 11). Long-term projections of supply and demand should resemble or incorporate the population growth function, which will have implications for capital expenditure. We have already seen a shift to acquire more technology rather than focus on the resource base (fields, mines etc.) (Chart 12). Chart 11Commodity Super-Cycles Coming To An End? bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c11 bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c11 Chart 12Capex Expenditures In The Oil Sector Are Falling bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c12 bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c12 The trend is towards cost-saving technology, rather than betting on higher prices and production volume. From the model's perspective, no resources will ever become scarce enough to drive prices sky high for a long period. It is rather a question of getting the timing right and finding a relative long-term dislocation between supply and demand, rather than playing fundamental "peak" stories. Chart 13South African Mining Vs. ##br## U.S. Shale Oil, ##br## A Striking Difference bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c13 bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c13 A good example of a winner in the commodity sector is U.S. shale oil: even after two years of low oil prices many companies are ready to restart production and compete on the market within a short period of time. On the other hand, the once mighty mining sector in South Africa is only a shadow of its former self, since most companies have been chasing quantity (mine expansion) and forgot about quality (extraction methods) (Chart 13). The shift of the workforce from the "old economy" to services. This process is nearly complete in the developed world, while still in full swing in the emerging markets. With an ever-aging population even in emerging markets, social spending will have to increase and new sectors - such as education, healthcare, information technology and leisure - will come into investors' focus. Information Technology. The driver of all progress. Kapitsa suggests that information cannot be treated as a commodity, due to its irreversible nature once shared with other participants. Nevertheless, in the way in which the model determines future progress, there will be surely an ever-growing industry built around information protection. It is also interesting to note that the confusion arising between generations of parents and their children is probably the effect of the ever-growing speed of information generation and exchange, where significant technological shifts are happening within the lifetime of one generation and the old generation finds it hard to keep up. The main outcomes of the appearance of an information-centric society will be the following: Disruption to old industries. We see this all over the place: the oil industry being threatened by renewables, brick-and-mortar retailers by online stores, and the banking industry might be the next victim (Chart 14). If banks fail to adopt blockchain technology into their business model, they might be excluded as an unnecessary middle man. Chart 14Change In The S&P Index Composition 1990 - 2016 The Ten Billion People Rule The Ten Billion People Rule Leaps in development stages in countries. Assuming historical periods are getting shorter and information exchange is intensifying, we might see more leaps in development stages in emerging, but especially in frontier, markets. This will become a central part of any research: to identify which countries might be "jumping" one or several stages in their development, and what those stages/industries/products might be. Chart 15Computer Companies Vs. Smartphone Producers bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c15 bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c15 In the past 10 years we witnessed several such precedents. One was China skipping the PC stage completely, with the appearance of the broadly affordable smartphone. At the end of the 1990s, tech research would have suggested investing in PC makers, extrapolating growth numbers to the Chinese population. How has this worked out (Chart 15)? Another good example is the banking industry in Africa. Apart from South Africa, which has a rich banking tradition, more and more countries in the region see growing numbers of users in the online banking space. People use their phones for every day banking needs. Many banks do not even have a brick-and-mortar presence. Maybe that is why we see so many established institutions struggling in this part of the world (Charts 16A & 16B). Chart 16AMobile Money Use By Region The Ten Billion People Rule The Ten Billion People Rule Chart 16BNumber Of Mobile Money Services In Sub-Saharan Africa bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c16b bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c16b Education. The population growth model says that information will be the main growth driver in the future and, as a consequence, education will be the most important process in human life. Education will take up more time and effort than in any other period of human history (Chart 17). Already now, education can last as long as 20 to 30 years. Compare that to the learning period of any animal. In many jobs, we are required to learn for the better part of our working life and take tests, write exams and attend seminars to keep up-to-date with progress in our industry. Healthcare. Probably the most obvious outcome because, as the older generation requires more treatment and care, the whole social system will need to be adjusted. Many countries will be unable to bear this burden financially, and the private sector will have to step in. This is what we have seen in China since 2015 (Chart 18). Chart 17Tuition Fees In The U.S. Are A Large Part Of Inflation bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c17 bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c17 Chart 18Healthcare As Proportion Of GDP bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c18 bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c18 Leisure and entertainment. Maybe not as large or obvious, but it's one of the industries that will benefit. The younger generation has already made a shift from material values, such as luxury brands, to assigning higher values to experiences and creating memories (Chart 19). The appearance of "experience day" offerings (such as driving a super-car or jumping out of an airplane), shifting shopping patterns, or the growing number of travellers even in emerging markets confirms this view. One of the questions that remains is: will government turn out to be the largest employer and provider of services, as for example in the UK (largely because of the National Health Service), or will the private sector take over a large part in this role? Chart 19China Spending On Luxury Goods ##br## Growing More Slowly Than On Travel bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c19 bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c19 Chart 20Still Calling Your ##br## Broker? The Ten Billion People Rule The Ten Billion People Rule Financial markets: future in the algorithms? It is fair to assume that financial markets will move in the direction of total automation, and will probably be "ruled" by algorithms focusing on short-term strategies (Chart 20). Robo-advisors and passive strategies will decrease commission income and force managers to rethink their investment strategies. On the other hand, people tend to save more as they get older (Chart 21). This pattern reverses, once retirement age is hit (think about medical bills etc.). Consequently, we might see lower demand for savings products once the wave of baby boomers hits retirement, which is bad news for insurance companies and for the bond market. Chart 21Consumption And Income In Perspective The Ten Billion People Rule The Ten Billion People Rule Geopolitics - no more large-scale conflicts, but lots of migration? Chart 22Worldwide Battle-related Deaths On The Decline bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c22 bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c22 Kapitsa also touched on some controversial topics in his papers - the probability of a global war and a migration crisis (keep in mind there was no migration crisis at the time the theory was developed). Kapitsa argued that, on a global scale, factors such as migration or wars do not really matter for the outcome of the model, creating only statistical "noise". But he also drew some interesting conclusions, arguing that large wars, as we saw them in the 20th century, are unlikely to happen anymore. Because of the restriction on "human resources", states will not be able to conscript and sustain large armies, as it was the case in the past, and conflicts will arise only on a local scale (Chart 22). Chart 23Population In The Baltic States Reducing Dramatically bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c23 bca.emes_sr_2016_12_13_c23 Conflicts are most likely to arise in areas of the world experiencing a spike in their population growth trajectory. This period of time is characterized by the highest instability in the "system". This means that inequality in the distribution of resources is peaking together with the population growth rate, which causes social unrest. Such inequalities in resource distribution are evened out over time together with the levelling-off of the population, or more rapidly through war or migration. On the topic of migration, Kapitsa noted that in general migration flows are driven by the search for resources, but have reduced substantially over time. Some 2,000 years ago or earlier, whole nations moved, but nowadays migration flows barely exceed 0.1% of global population. From Kapitsa's point of view, migration should be nothing to worry about. In the framework of a complex physical system, as long as migration does not come from another planet, it is unlikely to cause any harm. In Europe we might be witnessing the first countries in history with drastically shrinking populations, due to the policy of freedom of movement, and people migrating in search of resources (better work and life prospects) (Chart 23). Furthermore, the older generation will probably become more influential in terms of casting votes and deciding future development of countries or whole continents. This year's two black swan events (Brexit and the outcome of the U.S. election) were essentially driven by the older generation, and the divide in opinion may become even more pronounced in future (Chart 24). Chart 24Election Results Determined By Older Generations The Ten Billion People Rule The Ten Billion People Rule Oleg Babanov, Editor/Strategist obabanov@bcaresearch.co.uk 1 Based on the work of Sergey Kapitsa (1928 - 2012) 2 Malthus T.R. 1978. An Essay on the Principle of Population. Oxford World's Classics reprint. 3 Brody, S. Bioenergetics and Growth (Reinhold, New York, 1945) Moen, A. N. Wildlife Ecology: an Analytical Approach (Freeman, San Francisco, 1973) Van Valen, L. Evol. Theory 4, 33-44 (1978). 4 Hoerner, von S. Journal of British Interplanetary Society 28 691 (1975) 5 U.S. Census Bureau (2016). International Data Base. http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/worldpopinfo.php. von Foerster, H., Mora, P., & Amiot, L. (1960). Doomsday: Friday, 13 November, A.D. 2026. Science, 132, 255-296. 6 Maddison, A. (2001). The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. Paris: OECD. Maddison, A. (2010). Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1-2008 AD. http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/Historical Statistics/horizontal-file_02-2010.xls. 7 Nielsen, R. W. (2015). Hyperbolic Growth of the World Population in the Past 12,000 Years. http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1510/1510.00992.pdf 8 From here onwards both papers are quoted extensively: S. P. Kapitsa (1996). The Phenomenological Theory of World Population Growth. Russian Academy of Sciences 9 S.P. Kapitsa (2000). Global Population Growth and Social Economics. Russian Academy of Sciences 10 Gagnon, Etienne, Benjamin K. Johannsen, and David Lopez-Salido (2016). "Understanding the New Normal: The Role of Demographics," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-080. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2016.08

Feature Dear Client, For the last publication of 2016, we have opted to do something a little different. 2016 was a year were political shocks took pre-eminence. Whether we are talking Brexit, Trump, Italian referendum, Japanese upper-house elections, or Rousseff's impeachment; it often felt like economics took the back seat to political events. While this kind of regime shift toward more politically-driven markets can feel jarring, it is not new. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a similar event occurred. Populations in Western democracies - the U.S. and the U.K. in particular - exhausted by a decade of elevated inflation, created one of these shifts by putting Thatcher and Reagan in power. With the benefit of insight, we know how the story ended: with great economic successes in both the U.K. and the U.S. However, when Thatcher and Reagan actually took power, it was far from obvious that Western economies were about to leave stagflation and begin a low inflation boom. Today, we do not know how the Trump experiment will end. It is a similarly radical shift that politician wants to implement. Trump and his team want to beat deflation, especially wage deflation for the middle class. This is easier said than done. While we cannot claim to know how a Trump presidency will unfold, BCA has tried to provide some clarity among the noise by focusing on the implications and risks created by the various policies proposed, as well as the threat to the actual implementation of the policies. To finish the year, we would like to provide our client with some perspective. We are sending you the "Mr X" BCA Outlook published in December 1980, when Reagan was the President-elect. What is striking is that then as today, BCA was trying to make a balanced assessment of the potential for positive or disastrous changes that were about to affect the U.S. and global economy. The worries were very pronounced but ultimately proved to be unfounded. We are not saying that worries regarding Trump's proposed policies are unwarranted, but it is important to remember that investors need to remain very nimble when such shifts are emerging. Ultimately, the final direction and effect of the shifts Trump wants to implement will take years to materialize. Looking at historical reactions to similar political sea-changes is a comforting way to put things into perspective. After all, according to Zhou Enlai, it is still too early to judge the effect of the French Revolution.1 Have a great holiday period and a happy and prosperous new year. Best regards, Mathieu Savary, Vice President

Highlights 1.How Will The European Economy Cope With Higher Interest Rates? 2. How Will The European Stock Market Cope With Higher Interest Rates? 3. How Will The EU Respond To The Start Of Brexit? 4. Will The Bank of Japan's 0% Bond Yield Peg Undermine ECB Credibility? 5. What Does China's Debt Super Cycle Mean For Euro/Yuan? Feature Our strong sense is that the promised elixir of 'Trumponomics' has disoriented investors' concept of value. Suddenly thrown out of their comfort zone, long-term investors are struggling to assess: how much of Trumponomics is reality and how much is just fantasy? Chart of the WeekBrexit And Pound/Euro bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s1_c1 bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s1_c1 As rational and analytical long-term investors have become disoriented, emotional and impulsive short-term traders have been left unchecked to drive markets (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Markets Are Excessively Emotional Markets Are Excessively Emotional Markets Are Excessively Emotional Understand that the financial markets are an ecosystem in which long-term investors jostle with short-term traders. The stable equilibrium of this ecosystem relies on rationality and analysis ultimately checking emotion and impulse. And therein, perhaps, lies the essence of life itself. The descriptions "rationality and analysis" versus "emotion and impulse" are not judgements. They are simply the very different qualities needed to do very different jobs. Long-term investors must take time to rationalise and analyse the concept of fundamental value; whereas traders must use their immediate emotions and impulses to ride short-term market momentum. Therefore what happens in 2017 will depend on what the rational and analytical long-term investors conclude after their pause for reflection. This brings us to our five pressing questions for the coming year. 1. How Will The European Economy Cope With Higher Interest Rates? Now you could argue that the level of interest rates is very low by historical standards, even after last week's rate hike by the Federal Reserve. However, it is the change in interest rates that drives the change in credit growth (Chart I-3); and it is the change in credit growth that drives the change in GDP growth (Chart I-4). Chart I-3The Change In Bond Yield Drives##br## The Change In Credit Growth... bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s1_c3 bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s1_c3 Chart I-4...And The Change In Credit Growth Drives ##br##The Change In GDP Growth bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s1_c4 bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s1_c4 You could also argue that a 25bps hike in the Fed funds rate constitutes the tiniest of baby steps of monetary tightening. The problem is that bond yields have already jumped many multiples of this: the U.S. 15-year and 30-year bond yield and mortgage rate have spiked by over 75bps; the German 30-year bond yield is up 90bps; the Italian 30-year bond yield is up 100bps; and so on. It is these substantial increases in market interest rates that will weigh on credit-sensitive sectors and prospective 6-month GDP growth. Chart I-5Despite Dollar Strength, The Trade-Weighted##br## Euro Has Hardly Budged Despite Dollar Strength, The Trade-Weighted Euro Has Hardly Budged Despite Dollar Strength, The Trade-Weighted Euro Has Hardly Budged Another argument we hear is that higher bond yields are simply discounting better growth prospects ahead. The problem here is the inter-temporal distribution of growth. Higher market interest rates are a near-certain headwind to be felt within 3-6 months. Whereas Trumponomics is a very uncertain tailwind to be felt in 2018, or end 2017 at the earliest. Then there is the geographical distribution of growth. Trumponomics, at best, would boost U.S. growth. Yet market rates have also gone up aggressively in Europe, where there would be a minimal boost to growth. Bear in mind that despite dollar strength, the trade-weighted euro has depreciated just 3% from its October high (Chart I-5). Likewise, emerging market economies will see minimal growth benefits. Whereas higher dollar funding costs, stronger dollar-linked currencies, and the threat of protectionism constitute a meaningful headwind. The bigger question is: can a modern day King Canute1 single-handedly turn the tide of global deflation - the combined structural forces of over-indebtedness, demographics, technology, and globalization? There is much debate about this issue at BCA, but on balance this publication believes that the tide has not turned. 2. How Will The European Stock Market Cope With Higher Interest Rates? Trumponomics is not the structural game changer that the market seems to believe. But even if we are wrong on this, there is one over-arching relationship that will hold true irrespective: the relationship between stock market valuation and subsequent 10-year total nominal return (Chart I-6). This long-term relationship is independent of the economic backdrop: Keynesian, monetarist, neo-classical, deflationary, inflationary, or Trumponomics. Chart I-6Long-Term Returns Always Depend On Valuation Long-Term Returns Always Depend On Valuation Long-Term Returns Always Depend On Valuation The reason is that the 10-year total nominal stock market return comprises two components: the nominal income received through the next 10 years; and the terminal value of the market at the end of the 10 years. Crucially, an environment that boosts one component symmetrically depresses the second component, and vice-versa. For example, inflation boosts nominal income received, but depresses the terminal value (because the discount rate is then much higher). Deflation has the opposite effect. Therefore the relationship between valuation and subsequent 10-year total nominal return is environment-independent. Today, stock markets are priced to generate very low single-digit 10-year returns. But with the recent spike in long-term interest rates, investors can now obtain similar 10-year returns from bonds. In other words, the equity risk premium is dangerously compressed. Emotional and impulsive short-term traders do not care about this structural relationship, but rational and analytical long-term investors ultimately do. Bear in mind that the cross-asset and cross-sector moves over the past six weeks - whether in equity market, bond yield and dollar elevation, or bank outperformance, or yield-proxy and defensive underperformance - are all just various guises of the Trump reflation trade. We expect that rationality and analysis will conclude that Trumponomics is not the structural game changer that the market seems to believe right now. The trade: an unwinding of the various guises of the Trump reflation trade is likely, at least tactically. 3. How Will The EU Respond To The Start Of Brexit? Chart I-7Brexit Must Not Be A Gift To Le Pen Five Pressing Questions (And Four Trades) For 2017 Five Pressing Questions (And Four Trades) For 2017 The silence is deafening. While there is much daily noise from the U.K. about the type of Brexit it wants, the EU has been intentionally silent. Once the formal legal process of Brexit begins, it will be the EU that holds the balance of power on what Brexit ultimately looks like. The chatter from some U.K. government quarters is that it can negotiate advantageous Brexit terms. Good luck with that. Given the proximity of the French Presidential Election in April/May, the EU's opening position has to be uncompromising - so as to not hand Marine Le Pen any gifts (Chart I-7). The EU must make an example of the U.K. "pour encourager les autres". And if exiting the EU must come with a demonstrable cost, one casualty would be the pound. That said, 2017 will be an especially unpredictable year for U.K. politics and economics because Brexit creates a larger number of moving parts, complex interactions and feedback loops, both negative and positive. For example, if the Supreme Court grants the Scottish parliament a greater say in the terms of Brexit, it could compromise Theresa May's current strategy. The pound would rally on that tail-event possibility. The trade: the pound is unlikely to stay near today's €1.18. Expect a sharp move one way or the other (Chart of the Week). A good strategy might be to sell the middle of the distribution. There are many permutations of this but one example would be to short the pound and simultaneously buy call options at, say, €1.30. 4. Will The Bank of Japan's 0% Bond Yield Peg Undermine ECB Credibility? Chart I-8Pegs Get Broken bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s1_c8 bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s1_c8 2016 was the year when QE peaked. The ECB committed to lowering its monthly asset purchases. More significantly, the BoJ shifted its policy aim from targeting an amount of asset purchases to targeting a price (or yield) on the 10-year JGB. Thereby, the central bank policy experiment has moved into a more dangerous phase. As we explained in Dangers Of Linear-Thinking In A Non-Linear World 2 economies and markets are complex, non-linear systems. The inherent unpredictability of a non-linear system makes it futile and dangerous to aim for an over-precise point target in anything that we do. And that principle applies to central banks as much as to anybody else. Indeed, a 2% inflation target is a price target, albeit a price of a basket of goods and services, and the annual change of that price. The track record of any central bank achieving its self-imposed 2% inflation target in recent years is truly disastrous. Recall also that the Swiss National Bank had to break the franc's peg with the euro, one of the more recent in a long list of failed price pegs (Chart I-8). Our Fixed Income strategists believe the JGB 0% yield peg will hold. Nevertheless, the risk is underestimated that the BoJ will have to break the peg, in 2017 or beyond. The credibility of the ECB to suppress long-term bond yields would then be severely damaged. And the greatest danger would be to those euro area bond yields closest to zero. The trade: stay underweight French OATS. 5. What Does China's Debt Super Cycle Mean For Euro/Yuan? One defining feature of the last 40 years is a steady sequence of private sector credit booms which have inevitably turned to busts: notably, Japan in 1990, the Asian 'tigers' in 1998, the U.S. in 2007, and the U.K., Spain and other European countries in 2008 (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Credit Booms Sequentially Turned To Bust. Who's Next? Credit Booms Sequentially Turned To Bust. Who's Next? Credit Booms Sequentially Turned To Bust. Who's Next? In this defining feature, China's is the last of the major credit booms that hasn't turned to bust - yet. Admittedly, the ability of the Chinese authorities to 'extend and pretend' is probably greater than elsewhere in the world, and this might prevent another violent tipping point. Irrespective, the debt super cycle is over when the cost of malinvestment and misallocation of capital outweighs the benefit of good credit creation. With private sector indebtedness (including SOEs) now at, or beyond, the level where every other credit boom peaked, China appears to be approaching this point. One manifestation would be continued weakness in its currency against the major developed market crosses. The trade: go long euro/yuan. And with that, we are signing off for 2016. I do hope that this year's reports have provided some insight during particularly turbulent times, and that you might have even enjoyed the reading experience! It just remains for me to wish you a Merry Christmas and a successful and happy 2017. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 In fact, the story of King Canute has been misinterpreted. Rather than show that he could turn the tide, he wanted to show the opposite: that he was powerless against the tide. 2 Published on February 11, 2016 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model* Pleasingly, two of our open trades hit their profit targets: long platinum / short palladium and short the Greek 10-year bond. Given the extended break, we are not opening any new trades over the Christmas and New Year holiday period. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 Long Platinum / Short Palladium Long Platinum / Short Palladium * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s2_c1 bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s2_c1 Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s2_c2 bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s2_c2 Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s2_c3 bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s2_c3 Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s2_c4 bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s2_c4 Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s2_c5 bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s2_c5 Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s2_c6 bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s2_c6 Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s2_c7 bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s2_c7 Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s2_c8 bca.eis_wr_2016_12_22_s2_c8