Fixed Income

Highlights Reflation Trade: The backdrop for global growth and monetary liquidity remains positive, and suggests that risk assets will outperform government debt for the balance of 2017. However, there are some early signs of fading momentum which raises risks for financial markets in 2018. New Zealand: The more dovish tone taken by the RBNZ reflects the more uncertain outlook for New Zealand growth and inflation. Go long 5-year New Zealand government bonds versus 5-year U.S. Treasuries (currency-hedged) and also versus 5-year German government debt (currency-unhedged). South Korea: Large expected increases in fiscal spending from the new government in Seoul will drive up the longer end of the South Korean government bond curve, while the Bank of Korea's easing stance and weak domestic economy will anchor the short-end of the curve. Position for this by entering a 2-year/10-year steepening trade in the South Korean government bond market. Feature "I know it makes no difference to what you're going through; but I see the tip of the iceberg, and I worry about you." - Rush Is The Liquidity Party Starting To Wind Down? Global financial markets continue to enjoy the "sweet spot" of a solidly expanding global economy, but without enough inflation pressure to force central banks to slam on the monetary brakes. That backdrop is starting to change, though. Odds are rising that the European Central Bank (ECB) will begin tapering its bond buying next year, with some hints of that possibly being announced as soon as next week's monetary policy meeting. At the same time, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) - faced with the operational constraints of buying an ever-increasing share of Japanese financial assets - is focused on targeting long-term interest rates rather than increasing liquidity. Even the Federal Reserve is now talking about reducing its massive balance sheet later this year. The liquidity tailwind to global growth and risk assets is now at risk of becoming a headwind. Already, the growth rate of the major central bank balance sheets has rolled over and is on course to decelerate further over the next year (Chart of the Week). Importantly, this downshift in global liquidity momentum is happening as signs of slowing growth have appeared in some major economies like China and the U.S. (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekLiquidity Tailwind To Risk##BR##Assets Is Fading Chart 2Growth Momentum##BR##Already Starting To Cool Off We remain concerned that the Chinese economy will see a policy-induced deceleration in the 2nd half of the year. However, we still expect the U.S. to rebound after the soft patch of growth in the first quarter, and we see nothing in the Euro Area data to suggest that the current solid expansion is at risk of fading quickly. This should allow inflation expectations to drift upward toward the central bank targets given the apparent lack of spare capacity on both sides of the Atlantic (Chart 3). Chart 3Fed & ECB Facing##BR##Economic Capacity Constraints We still expect the Fed to deliver another two rate hikes before year-end and the ECB to begin its exit strategy from the current extraordinary monetary policies by slowing the pace of asset purchases starting early next year. For now, the backdrop will remain supportive for the outperformance of growth-sensitive assets like corporate credit and equities over government bonds in the U.S. and Europe over the balance of 2017. However, the early signals sent by "leading leading" indicators such as our Global Leading Economic Indicator diffusion index (Chart 2, top panel) suggests that liquidity and growth trends will become far more challenging for the markets in 2018. Bottom Line: The backdrop for global growth and monetary liquidity remains positive, and suggests that risk assets will outperform government debt for the balance of 2017. However, there are some early signs of fading momentum which raises risks for financial markets in 2018. Maintain a below-benchmark duration exposure and an overweight allocation to corporate debt in global fixed income portfolios. New Zealand: Safety From A Global Bond Apocalypse? A growing number of the world's most wealthiest (and, arguably, most paranoid) people are reportedly buying real estate in New Zealand as a safe haven place to live if modern civilization collapses.1 While the immediate need for taking such precautions can be debated, there is sound logic in treating New Zealand as a location far removed from the current geopolitical and socio-economic problems of the world. We now see a case for treating New Zealand bonds as a potential "safe haven" market for global fixed income investors. The Economic Backdrop Has Become More Muddled We have been running a SHORT position in New Zealand (paying 12-month OIS rates) in our Tactical Overlay portfolio since last November. Our view then was that the New Zealand economy would surprise to the upside in 2017 and inflation was likely to start drifting upward. This would pressure the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) to raise the Official Cash Rate (OCR) from the highly accommodative level of 1.75%. So far, that expectation has not panned out as the RBNZ has held rates steady amid a more uncertain outlook for the New Zealand economy. Growth indicators have been a bit mixed over the past few months, but the current uptick in the manufacturing purchasing managers' index (PMI) is pointing to real GDP expanding around 3% on a year-over-year basis (Chart 4). If maintained for the full year, this would be slightly above the RBNZ's estimate of potential growth at 2.8%. There are some downside risks, however, given that consumer and business confidence are both below previous cyclical peaks and fiscal policy is expected to be mildly restrictive in 2017 (bottom three panels). The housing market remains a key cyclical wild card. Residential construction has been a significant source of growth over the past few years, driven by a surge in net immigration into New Zealand and declining interest rates (Chart 5). However, the RBNZ is projecting immigration inflows to slow from the current high level, largely due to improving labor market conditions in the developed economies (most notably, Australia, which is the largest source of New Zealand immigrants). Chart 4Stable NZ Growth...For Now Chart 5NZ Housing Activity Starting To Peak Out Slower immigration would reduce the demand for New Zealand housing at a time when mortgage rates have already been rising off the record lows seen in 2016 (bottom panel). This has occurred without any rate hikes from the RBNZ, as rising global bond yields have put upward pressure on New Zealand bank funding costs, which have been passed through to higher mortgage rates. The RBNZ is currently projecting growth in house prices to slow sharply from last year's robust 15% pace to just 5% in 2017. The main drivers are higher borrowing costs and the ongoing impact of macro-prudential regulations against high loan-to-value ratio mortgage lending. Importantly, slower housing activity will not only have a direct impact on GDP growth through softer construction, but will also indirectly dampen consumer spending growth via wealth effects. Yet even with this expected drag on growth from housing, the New Zealand economy is still expected to face capacity constraints over the rest of the year. Higher Uncertainty Over Price Pressures Both the RBNZ and the International Monetary Fund estimate that the output gap has fully closed and is projected to move into positive territory this year (Chart 6). At the same time, the current unemployment rate of 4.9% is below the OECD's estimate of the full employment level and the RBNZ projects a further decline in joblessness in 2017 (third panel). Despite this evidence of the economy reaching capacity constraints, both wage growth and price inflation remain subdued and inflation expectations remain well-anchored around 2% - the midpoint of the RBNZ's 1-3% target range. Wage costs are particularly depressed, growing only 1% on a year-over-year basis in Q1. This may be related to the rise in the labor force participation rate - up to an all-time high of 70.6% in Q1 from a cyclical low of 68.2% at the end of 2015 - that has increased the available supply of labor. The most recent headline inflation print for Q1 was quite strong, taking the year-over-year growth rate up to 2.2%. Yet in the RBNZ's April Monetary Policy Statement (MPS), the central bank took a surprisingly dovish tone, citing uncertainty over the true degree of slack in the economy and downside risks to growth that would prevent a further acceleration of inflation.2 The RBNZ now forecasts inflation to not rise above 2.2% this year and to fall back to 1.1% in both 2018, led by a sharp decline in growth for tradeables, mostly energy and food inflation (Chart 7). Importantly, this forecast includes the recent decline in the trade-weighted New Zealand Dollar (NZD). Non-tradeables inflation is also expected to stabilize on the back of slower housing-related items in the consumer price index. Chart 6RBNZ Not Expecting A Big Rise In Inflation... Chart 7...As Growth In Tradeables Prices Cools A Weaker Case For Tighter Monetary Policy The official RBNZ projection is that the OCR will stay unchanged at 1.75% until September 2019. The market expectation priced into the NZD OIS curve calls for 27bps of hikes over the next twelve months (Chart 8). Our New Zealand Central Bank Monitor has been suggesting the need for tighter monetary policy since mid-2016, but appears to be rolling over (2nd panel). The diminished rate hike expectations have coincided with a decline in the NZD and a sharp underperformance of New Zealand equities. The markets are giving a consistent signal on softening growth prospects in New Zealand, confirming the central bank's more recent dovish turn. Chart 8Market Expectations Of##BR##RBNZ Hikes Are Fading Given the newfound uncertainties over the New Zealand growth and inflation outlook, the case for owning New Zealand interest rate exposure has grown a little bit stronger. Admittedly, we do not envision a major pullback in growth, and inflation may not fall by as much as the RBNZ is expecting given how little spare capacity there appears to be in the economy. Yet there is now just enough uncertainty to keep the central bank on hold for longer than expected, as was noted in the "scenario analysis" section of the April MPS.3 The RBNZ noted that if the level of spare capacity is smaller than currently assumed, then the latest growth forecast will result in inflation eventually moving to 2.0% in 2018 and 2.3% in 2019, resulting in the OCR needing to rise to 2.25% in two years. Alternatively, if housing demand slows even faster than current projections, inflation would be below the 2% target during the next two years and the OCR would need to fall to 1.25% by the end of 2018. Our takeaway from this is that, even in the more positive scenario, interest rates are not expected to rise by much more than the markets are currently discounting. Position For Tighter New Zealand Spreads Versus Treasuries & Bunds The economic risks in New Zealand now appear evenly balanced. This argues for stable monetary policy and diminished bond volatility. Current market forwards for both government bonds and NZD swaps shows that very little movement in interest rates is expected over the next year (Chart 9). We generally agree with this pricing, although the uncertainty over the degree of spare capacity, and underlying inflation pressures, make a directional view on interest rates or the shape of the yield curve an unattractive risk proposition. A more interesting opportunity presents itself in looking at spread trades between New Zealand government bonds versus other developed market sovereign debt. The yield betas for New Zealand versus the U.S. and Germany have fallen steadily over the past year (Chart 10), indicating that New Zealand bonds can be more insulated from the rise in yields that we expect for U.S. Treasuries and German Bunds over the latter half of 2017. Given the competitively high yields on offer in New Zealand, even on a currency-hedged basis (bottom panel), we see a case for going long New Zealand interest rate exposure versus U.S. and Germany. Chart 9Higher NZ Bond Yields##BR##Priced Into Forwards Chart 10NZ Bonds: Now Lower Beta##BR##With Higher Hedged Yields At current yield levels, going long New Zealand versus Germany looks more compelling relative to spread compression trades versus U.S. Treasuries. We see strong potential for New Zealand-Germany spreads to tighten faster than the forwards over the next six months (Chart 11), largely through rising German yields as the ECB signals that a tapering of bond purchases is set to begin next year. The downside potential for New Zealand-U.S. spread compression looks less likely from current tight levels, although if Treasury yields rise by as much as we expect in the coming months, some spread tightening should occur here, as well. Chart 11Go Long 5Yr NZ Bonds Vs##BR##USTs and German OBLs Based on our analysis, we are closing our current NZD rates trade in our Tactical Overlay portfolio with a tiny profit of +3bps , and entering two new trades: long 5-year NZD government bonds versus 5-year U.S. Treasuries, on a currency-hedged basis; and long 5yr NZD government bonds versus 5-year German government debt, on a currency-unhedged basis.4 We are choosing to hedge the currency exposure back into USD for the former given the view of BCA's currency strategists that the EUR/USD exchange rate is now stretched too far to the upside and is at risk of declining as the Fed delivers on additional rate hikes in the coming months.5 In other words, we see a greater potential for a decline in NZD/USD than NZD/EUR in the next 3-6 months. Bottom Line: The more dovish tone taken by the RBNZ reflects the more uncertain outlook for New Zealand growth and inflation, in contrast to the strong likelihood of additional Fed rate hikes and an ECB taper announcement in the next few months. Go long 5-year New Zealand government bonds versus 5-year U.S. Treasuries (currency-hedged) and also versus 5-year German government debt (currency-unhedged). South Korea: A Bad Moon Rising For Bond Yields Chart 12Markets Not Worried##BR##About The New President The new South Korean president, Moon Jae-In was elected on May 9th, ending a year of political turmoil after the previous president's scandal and impeachment. Our colleagues at BCA Geopolitical Strategy view Moon and his Democratic Party as a major shift to the political left.6 The new president's policy agenda is aimed at economic stimulus for the working class alongside reforms of the country's chaebol industrial giants. Korean financial markets have greeted the election result positively, with the benchmark KOSPI equity index up 2.7%, and the Korean won up 1% versus the U.S. dollar, from the pre-election levels on May 8th. (Chart 12). This is consistent with past market behavior, as the won tends to be less reactive toward domestic events (i.e. after the previous president's impeachment, the won actually strengthened) and more sensitive to international uncertainties (i.e. North Korea-U.S. military tensions, as occurred in mid-March). Korean interest rates, however, have shown little response to the change in leadership in Seoul, with bond yields unchanged since the election. We see this as presenting an opportunity for fixed income investors. Clearly, the new regime in Seoul represents a real change for the Korean people, but it also represents a potential shift in the economic backdrop - namely, through an expected large fiscal stimulus from the new government - that will impart a steepening bias to the Korean interest rate curve. A Sluggish Economy Greets The New President While the steady, if unspectacular, pace of global growth in the past few years has been enough to absorb spare capacity in many countries, South Korea's sub-par economic performance has left the country with a widening output gap (Chart 13). Policymakers are well aware that consumer spending, which contributes about 60% of GDP, has been steadily weakening alongside slowing credit growth. Chart 13Sluggish Growth In South Korea The new government will attempt to boost domestic consumption, and thus overall growth, by increasing social welfare spending. Moon's economic agenda calls for raising the minimum wage by 55% by 2020, increasing subsidies for education costs and parental leave, and doubling the basic pension payment for the elderly regardless of their income level. It might prove to be very effective in the short term at boosting consumer spending, but this may not prove to be a sustainable driver of growth in South Korea, where the marginal swings in the economy have historically been driven more by exports. Youth joblessness is another problem that Moon will attempt to tackle with his ambitious economic program. While the labor market may appear healthy, with an overall unemployment rate of only 3.7%, the situation is far more challenging for young adults in South Korea - the jobless rate for those aged 20-29 is 11.3%. One of the reasons for such a high unemployment rate among young South Koreans is that university graduates, of which there are many in this highly-educated nation, expect (and look for) high-paying jobs, but cannot find enough of them.7 The labor market has become more competitive in recent years as weak economic growth has limited the ability of private sector, especially large corporations, to hire as much. To solve this problem, the new government has promised to create 810,000 jobs in the public sector. Creating public sector jobs may temporarily solve the high unemployment rate, but in the long run, this will also cause larger fiscal burdens for taxpayers. Position For A Steeper South Korean Yield Curve Headline CPI inflation in South Korea is currently hovering around the 2% target of the Bank of Korea (BoK), while core CPI growth is lower at 1.3%. The BoK has maintain the policy rate at 1.25% since June 2016, with a bias towards additional easing given the lack of sustained inflationary pressure amid weak domestic demand. The BoK did sound a slightly more upbeat tone on the economy at last week's monetary policy meeting, led by the spillover effects from improving global growth rather than a more bullish expectation on the Korean consumer. Importantly, the central bank still expects inflation pressures to remain subdued - no surprise given the large output gap. The BoK did note that it is monitoring several factors in judging future policy decisions: the pace of rate hikes by the Fed, trends in global trade, geopolitical tensions, the pace of household debt accumulation and "the directions of the new government's fiscal policies." The latter may end up being the most important factor, as President Moon is proposing an increase in government spending equal to 0.7% of GDP - an amount equal to ½ of the estimated output gap coming after a 2016 budget surplus of 1% of GDP. This increase in fiscal spending could directly drive up the longer-end of Korean yield curve, as this would result in a narrower budget surpluses and greater KGB issuance. At the same time, the lack of domestic inflation pressures, even with the fiscal stimulus, will keep the BoK on an easing bias that will keep short dated yields well anchored. Therefore, we see the potential for the Korean yield curve to eventually steepen and break the downward-sloping trendline in place since 2014 (Chart 14). We recommend positioning for this move by entering a 2-year/10-year steepening trade in the Korean yield curve. Admittedly, this trade is more structural than tactical in nature, as the Moon stimulus policies will take time to unfold. Importantly, a flattening of the 2-year/10-year KGB curve is currently priced into the forwards, meaning that positioning now for a steepener does not incur negative carry (Chart 15). Chart 14More Fiscal Stimulus =##BR##Steeper Korea Curve Chart 15Enter A 2Yr/10Yr##BR##Korean Bond Curve Steepener Also, Korean 10-year bond yields are currently exhibiting a strong correlation to similar maturity U.S. Treasuries with a yield beta around 1.0 (bottom panel). Given our view that longer-dated U.S. yields have upside risk from both additional Fed rate increases and higher U.S. inflation expectations, that high yield beta suggests that the Korean yield curve could suffer some of the same cyclical bear-steepening pressures that we expect for U.S. Treasuries in the next 3-6 months. Bottom Line: Large expected increases in fiscal spending from the new government in Seoul will drive up the longer end curve of the South Korean government bond curve, while the Bank of Korea's easing stance and weak domestic economy will anchor the short-end of the curve. Position for this by entering a 2-year/10-year steepening trade in the South Korean bond curve. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/29/silicon-valley-new-zealand-apocalypse-escape 2 The central bank noted that its "suite" of output gap estimates, using varying methodologies, have an unusually wide range at the moment between -1.5% and +2%. 3 http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monetary-policy/monetary-policy-statement 4 These trades can be done using interest rate swaps as well (receiving NZD rates vs paying USD & EUR rates), as swap spreads are expected to remain broadly stable in all three regions. 5 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Bloody Potomac", dated May 19 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets" dated May 24 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 According to the OECD, Korea's college enrollment rate was a whopping 87% as recently as 2014. The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Monetary Policy: The Fed will deliver two rate hikes between now and the end of the year and will also begin the process of winding down its balance sheet. The market is only priced for 36 bps of rate hikes this year. Maintain below-benchmark duration. Economy: Weakness in Q1 GDP was concentrated in consumer spending and inventories. Both of these components are likely to strengthen in the months ahead. Inflation: The Fed is content to rely on Phillips Curve inflation forecasts, and does not need to see actual inflation rise in order to lift rates. However, if inflation does not rebound as expected, the Fed will become increasingly concerned about falling inflation expectations and could adopt a more dovish reaction function later this summer. We think inflation will be strong enough to avoid this outcome. Financial Conditions: The Fed strongly believes that financial conditions lead economic growth. Absent any major changes in the economic data, the pace of rate hikes will be determined by the Fed's targeting of financial conditions. Feature The market-implied probability of a June rate hike jumped sharply during the past two weeks (Chart 1), and stood at 81% as of last Friday's close. In all likelihood the fourth rate hike of the cycle, and the third in the past six months, will occur at the next FOMC meeting on June 14. In our view, the Fed will deliver two 25 basis point rate hikes between now and the end of the year and will also begin the process of winding down its balance sheet (see Box). With the market only priced for 36 bps of rate hikes during that timeframe, we continue to advocate a below-benchmark duration stance. Chart 1Still On For June The minutes from the May FOMC meeting, released last week, suggest that most Fed policymakers still maintain a forecast for two more hikes this year. The minutes also provide some useful insight about how FOMC participants think about the economy and what developments could cause their forecasts to change. This week we take a look at what the Fed believes, and consider whether those beliefs are well founded. Box Balance Sheet Strategy Revealed We wrote about the potential impact of the Fed’s balance sheet policy in last week’s report (please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Two Challenges For U.S. Policymakers”, dated May 23, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com), but provide a brief update this week because of new information gained from the May FOMC minutes. Previously, it was unknown whether the Fed would cease the reinvestment of its securities holdings all at once, or whether it would “taper” the reinvestment by gradually increasing the amount of securities it allowed to run off. We now know that “nearly all policymakers expressed a favorable view” of a tapering strategy where the Fed will set a series of gradually increasing caps on the total amount of securities it allows to run off its balance sheet. The plan calls for the caps to be raised every three months, according to a schedule that will be set in advance. The only reason for this plan to not function smoothly would be if market participants start to view the reinvestment caps as an additional policy tool that the Fed will vary according to economic conditions. This would risk taking the focus off the fed funds rate as the main policy tool, and would make it difficult for the market to interpret the overall stance of monetary policy. The minutes show that the Fed plans to avoid this messy outcome by setting a fixed schedule for changing the reinvestment caps. If the market believes that the Fed will stick to this schedule, then the plan should work fine. The May minutes also showed that “nearly all policymakers” thought that it would be appropriate to begin the reinvestment process this year, as long as economic conditions do not deteriorate. While we still lack some important details, such as the Fed’s target for the ultimate level of reserves in the banking system, we now think it is very likely that these details will emerge at either the June or September FOMC meeting and that balance sheet run off will begin following either the September or December meeting. What The Fed Believes: Weak Q1 Growth Is Transitory Although the incoming data showed that aggregate spending in the first quarter had been weaker than participants had expected, they viewed the slowing as likely to be transitory.1 Even after last week's slight upward revision, at 1.2%, first quarter GDP growth came in well below its post-crisis average (Chart 2). However, a quick look at the major components of GDP reveals that the weakness was concentrated in consumer spending and the change in private inventories (Chart 2, bottom two panels). Growth contributions from residential and non-residential investment were actually considerably above their post-crisis averages, and the contributions from net exports and government spending were in-line with theirs (Chart 3). Chart 2The Consumer Was A Drag In Q1 Chart 3Investment Is A Bright Spot We know from history that large changes in inventories tend to mean-revert fairly quickly. In fact, we can model the inventory component of GDP growth based on the lagged change in inventories and the Backlog of Orders component of the ISM Manufacturing survey (Chart 4). Both of these factors suggest that inventories will bounce back strongly next quarter. In fact, the ISM survey shows the largest backlog of manufacturing orders since 2014. Likewise, weakness in consumer spending is unlikely to persist. The fundamental drivers of consumer spending all continue to paint a positive picture (Chart 5). Chart 4Big Backlog Of Orders Chart 5Consumer Spending Drivers: Part I Consumer confidence has hardly given back any of its post-election gains (Chart 5, panel 1). Personal income growth is already on the upswing, and income expectations point to further acceleration (Chart 5, panel 2). Employment is still growing at a reasonably robust pace, and the mild slowdown since early 2015 has been offset by stronger wage growth (Chart 5, bottom panel). Longer-run drivers of consumer spending are also solid. Households continue to accumulate wealth, and household leverage has returned to late 1990s levels. In other words, household balance sheets are the healthiest they have been since prior to the housing bubble (Chart 6). More broadly, indicators of overall GDP growth are also pointing toward an acceleration (Chart 7). The ISM Non-Manufacturing index increased to 57.5 in April from 55.2 in March, and the BCA Beige Book Monitor - an indicator based on the occurrence of certain keywords in the Fed's Beige Book2 - has gone vertical. It would be unusual for GDP growth to diverge from these two indicators for a prolonged period of time. Chart 6Consumer Spending Drivers: Part II Chart 7Overall Growth Indicators Bottom Line: Weakness in Q1 GDP was concentrated in consumer spending and inventories. Both of these components are likely to strengthen in the months ahead. The Fed is probably correct that weak Q1 growth will prove transitory. Recent Weak Inflation Readings Are Also Transitory Overall, most participants viewed the recent softer inflation data as primarily reflecting transitory factors, but a few expressed concern that progress toward the Committee's objective may have slowed.3 We dealt with the inflation outlook in last week's report,4 through the lens of our Phillips Curve inflation model. To recap, using our model we found it very difficult to craft a realistic set of economic assumptions that resulted in year-over-year core PCE inflation below 1.88% by the end of the year. In our base case economic scenario the model projects that core inflation will reach 2.11%. Because our model is based on one that Janet Yellen referred to in a 2015 speech,5 we assumed that the Fed would reach a similar conclusion with regards to the inflation outlook. Although it must be said that the May FOMC meeting occurred prior to the disappointing April CPI release, it is notable that the minutes from the May meeting say that only "one member view[ed] further progress of inflation toward the 2 percent objective as necessary before taking another step to remove policy accommodation." In other words, almost all Fed members are content to rely on Phillips Curve style inflation models, which suggest that inflation will rise in the near future, and are putting less weight on the current low level of actual inflation. Of course, that dynamic could change relatively quickly. Chart 8 shows the track record of our Phillips Curve model, and we can see that it is not unusual for large residuals - on the order of 0.5% - to persist for significant periods of time. This means that even if all of our forecasts of the independent variables in the model turn out to be correct, there is still a chance that actual inflation will not keep pace with the model. In light of current circumstances, one period in particular stands out. The period from late-1993 to mid-1994, denoted by the shaded region in Chart 8. Chart 8The Fed Still Believes In The Phillips Curve In that episode the fair value from our model suggested that inflation should trend higher. Instead, inflation fell quite sharply. Eventually the model's fair value also moved lower, driven by a declining contribution from the model's lagged inflation term,6 and also by falling inflation expectations. In our view, this latter point is particularly important. In 1993-94, the failure of inflation to keep pace with Phillips Curve forecasts eventually caused market participants to lose faith and revise their inflation expectations lower. In a worst case scenario, a large decline in inflation expectations can feed on itself, leading to a deflationary spiral from which the Fed would have difficulty escaping. Chart 9Inflation Expectations Are ##br##Tough To Measure The Fed is very worried about falling (or more specifically "un-anchored") inflation expectations. In her aforementioned 2015 speech,7 Chair Yellen cautioned that temporary fluctuations in import prices or resource utilization could lead to permanent changes in inflation if they also caused inflation expectations to shift. Also, the longer the Fed misses its inflation target, the more likely it is that inflation expectations will become un-tethered. This is a very real risk. For now, the FOMC continues to view inflation expectations as well anchored, although the May minutes showed that "some participants" expressed concern that "the public's longer-term inflation expectations may have fallen somewhat." One problem is that there is no perfect way to measure inflation expectations (Chart 9). Market-based measures of inflation compensation are well below levels that have been consistent with the Fed's 2% inflation target in the past (Chart 9, panel 1), but these measures are volatile and are often driven by market-specific factors unrelated to inflation expectations. Meantime, the inflation expectations of professional forecasters have been quite stable (Chart 9, panel 2), while the message from consumer inflation expectations is mixed (Chart 9, bottom panel). The University of Michigan consumer survey shows inflation expectations near an all-time low, but the New York Fed's survey shows them in an uptrend. In any event, the strong correlation between consumer inflation expectations and gasoline prices makes them questionable at best. Bottom Line: The Fed is content to rely on Phillips Curve inflation forecasts, and does not need to see actual inflation rise in order to lift rates. However, if inflation does not rebound as expected, the Fed will become increasingly concerned about falling inflation expectations and could adopt a more dovish reaction function later this summer. We think inflation will be strong enough to avoid this outcome and that the Fed is still on track for two more rate hikes this year. Financial Conditions Are Crucial [Some participants] noted variously that the decline in longer-term interest rates and the modest depreciation of the dollar over the intermeeting period would provide some stimulus to aggregate demand, that the Committee's recent policy actions had not resulted in a tightening of financial conditions, or that some of the decline in longer-term yields reflected investors' perceptions of diminished odds of significant fiscal stimulus and an increase in some geopolitical and foreign political risks.8 The above passage shows that the Fed believes that financial conditions lead growth, a result we have also shown in prior reports (Chart 10).9 In this context, the Fed would expect financial conditions to tighten as it lifts rates, eventually causing economic growth to moderate. If financial conditions fail to tighten it would suggest that monetary policy needs to become more restrictive, and vice-versa. Financial conditions tightened dramatically following the December 2015 rate hike (Chart 11) and the ensuing growth slowdown caused the Fed to postpone the next rate hike for 12 months. Then, financial conditions were relatively unchanged following the December 2016 rate hike, and this allowed the Fed to deliver another hike in March. The large easing in financial conditions since the March hike is telling the Fed that it needs to step up its pace. Chart 10The Fed Believes That Financial Conditions Lead Growth Chart 11A Big Easing Since March Ultimately, the Fed still needs inflation to increase. This means that it does not want financial conditions to tighten too much, and would likely prefer to keep the Chicago Fed's Adjusted Financial Conditions index below the zero line (Chart 11, top panel). A negative reading from the adjusted index signals that financial conditions are easy relative to the strength of the economy. That is, they should be sufficiently accommodative to allow the economic recovery to continue and cause inflation to rise. At the same time, levels that are deep in accommodative territory signal that the Fed can move more rapidly. Bottom Line: The Fed strongly believes that financial conditions lead economic growth. Absent any major changes in the economic data, the pace of rate hikes will be determined by the Fed's targeting of financial conditions. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee May 2-3, 2017. https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20170503.pdf 2 For further details on the BCA Beige Book Monitor please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Great Debate Continues", dated April 17, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 3 Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee May 2-3, 2017. https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20170503.pdf 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Two Challenges For U.S. Policymakers", dated May 23, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm 6 One of the independent variables in our model is a 12-month lag of the year-over-year change in core PCE inflation. The lagged inflation variable pressures the model's fair value toward the level of actual inflation. If no other variables change, then over time the lagged inflation variable will ensure that the model fair value converges toward actual inflation. 7 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm 8 Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee May 2-3, 2017. https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20170503.pdf 9 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Buy The Back-Up In Junk Spreads", dated March 14, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights The equity risk premium (ERP) is distorted: too low. The Eurostoxx600 uptrend is reaching a technical limit according to its 130-day (6-month) fractal dimension. The U.S.-Euro area bond yield spread is distorted: too high. The Spain-France bond yield spread is distorted: too high. The Italy-Germany bond yield spread is not distorted. Feature Central banks' massive interventions in markets have left many investors wondering: has the market's price discovery mechanism become dysfunctional - and if so, where most severely? It is a good question because clearly, the prices that are most distorted are also the ones most likely to dislocate, and generate lucrative opportunities. This week's report assesses the distortion in three important relative pricings: the Italy-Germany sovereign yield spread; the U.S.-euro area sovereign yield spread; and the prospective excess return from equities over bonds, otherwise known as the equity risk premium. The Italy-Germany Bond Yield Spread Is Not Distorted We often hear the claim that the ECB's bond purchase program has compressed periphery bond yields relative to core yields. But we find no evidence for such a distortion. For example, relative to the ECB's capital key1 and other guidelines for bond purchase volumes, there is a larger ongoing supply of Italian BTPs than German bunds.2 So from a technical perspective, the ECB's interventions should have depressed German bund yields more than Italian BTP yields, thereby expanding the spread. Chart Of The WeekLow Volatility: We've Been Here Before... And It Didn't Last In fact, the technical distortion seems quite small because the Italy-Germany yield spread can be fully justified by its two underlying fundamentals: relative competitiveness (Chart I-2) and euro breakup probability (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Euro Area Yield Spreads Depend On Relative Competitiveness ... Chart I-3... And The Probability Of Euro Break-Up The premium on Italian BTP yields exists as a compensation for the expected redenomination loss in the tail-event of euro breakup. Assuming this currency depreciation would neutralize Italy's current 25% under-competitiveness versus Germany, we can infer that the 125 bps yield premium on 5-year BTPs is pricing a 5% annual probability of euro breakup (because 125 bps = 25% loss times 5% probability). The probability should account for an Italian election that is due within the next year, and Italian public support for the euro hovering at an unconvincing majority of around 55%. In this context, the probability should be somewhat elevated, though not alarming. So a 5% annual probability of euro breakup through the next five years seems reasonable within its post-crisis 2%-20% range. On this basis, the Italian-Germany yield spread is not distorted (Chart I-4). Instead, the real anomaly is the Spain-France (5-year) yield spread which stands at 50 bps (Chart I-5). There is now no difference in competitiveness between Spain and France, so there should be no redenomination premium on Spanish Bonos over French OATs, irrespective of the probability of euro break up. Stay structurally overweight Spanish Bonos versus French OATs. Chart I-4The Italy-Germany Yield Spread At 150 Bps Is Fair Chart I-5The Spain-France Yield Spread At 50 Bps Is Too High The U.S.-Euro Area Bond Yield Spread Is Distorted: Too High If bond price discovery were based solely on economic fundamentals, the U.S.-euro area yield spread would not be at a multi-decade extreme today. Such an extreme spread exists because the difference between Fed and ECB policy is much more polarized than is justified by the economic fundamentals. In this sense, the relative pricing is distorted. Consider the hard data. The percentages of the working age population in employment are at the same respective pre-crisis highs in both economies; the difference in wage inflation is closing; and the gap between core inflation in the U.S. and euro area has narrowed very sharply to just 0.6%. Indeed, excluding the cost of shelter - which is not represented in the euro area CPI - core inflation in the U.S. is now lower than in the euro area. Agreed, Fed policy should be tighter than ECB policy. But the expected difference should not be at a multi-decade extreme. Given the self-proclaimed 'data-dependency' of both the Fed and the ECB, the polarization of monetary policy expectations (Chart I-6) has to converge to the rapidly narrowing gap in the hard economic data, one way or another (Chart I-7). Chart I-6The U.S.-Euro Area Yield ##br##Spread Is Too High ... Chart I-7... And Will Gravitate To The Narrowing ##br##Gap In The Economic Data I conclude that: the U.S.-euro area (and U.S.-Germany) yield spread can close much further; euro/dollar can rise structurally; and the market neutral equity pair-trade long euro area Financials/short U.S. Financials can continue to outperform. The caveat is that these positions are just one big correlated trade (Chart I-8 and Chart I-9). Chart I-8Expected Monetary Policy Difference ##br##Is Driving The U.S.-Germany Yield Spread ... Chart I-9... And Therefore The Relative ##br##Performance Of Financials The Equity Risk Premium Is Distorted: Too Low Equity market behaviour is starkly asymmetric; market ascents tend to be gentle and drawn out, while descents tend to be violent and abrupt. By contrast, bond market behaviour is more symmetric; both upward and downward moves can be gentle or violent. The upshot is that when the equity market is ascending, its observed volatility declines. And the longer and more established the ascent becomes, the lower the observed volatility goes, both in absolute terms and relative to bonds. Crucially, this is just an observation of the inherent behaviour of equities: a low observed volatility simply tells us that equity ascents are gentle and drawn out (Chart I-10); it does not tell us that equity risk has diminished. Chart I-10Low Volatility Just Tells Us That Equity Ascents Are Gentle And Drawn Out. ##br##It Does Not Tell Us That Equity Risk Has Diminished! Unfortunately, the decline in the observed volatility may create the illusion that equity risk has diminished. In response, investors might demand a smaller (or no) equity risk premium (ERP) - the excess prospective long-term return over bonds - because they have falsely concluded that the risk of a large intermediate loss is vanishing. In turn, the shrinking ERP and lower required return justifies an even higher price today, allowing the market to continue its gentle ascent. So observed volatility falls even further, and the process feeds on itself in a self-reinforcing spiral. Readers might recognise this as the setup of the Minsky hypothesis in which the illusion of systemic stability breeds systemic instability and an eventual tipping point - a so-called 'Minsky Moment'. The Minsky hypothesis is an explanation for the boom bust cycle in the economy. It proposes that a credit boom initially generates strong and steady growth with low observed volatility. But the associated hubris - "no more boom and bust" - eventually encourages reckless lending and thereby sows the seeds of its destruction. When the misallocated loans cannot be repaid, the inevitable nemesis arrives. Likewise, in the case of the equity market, today's low observed volatility is absolutely not a reason for hubris. Yet as demonstrated in Markets Suspended In Disbelief,3 the low observed volatility has seduced investors into accepting a wafer-thin ERP. Today's low observed volatility is at the lower end of a range that has existed for at least 50 years (Chart of the Week). We have been here many times before. In each case, the low observed volatility did not last. And when it rose, so too did the ERP. As supporting evidence, observe that the 130-day (6-month) fractal dimension of the Eurostoxx600 is suggesting that the current uptrend is reaching its technical limit (Chart I-11). As a reminder, when an investment's fractal dimension approaches its natural lower bound, it signals that excessive trend following and groupthink have reached a natural point of instability. At which point the established trend is likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. Chart I-11The Current Uptrend In The Eurostoxx600 ##br##Is Reaching Its Technical Limit Before making a large absolute commitment to the equity asset class on a 6-12 month or longer horizon, I would first like to see both of these trustworthy signals stop flashing red. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 The capital key refers to the proportion of the ECB's capital owned by each of the euro area member states, and it is broadly pro-rata to the member state's GDP. 2 German GDP is 2 times the size of Italian GDP, but the stock of German sovereign debt is only 1.1 times the size of Italian sovereign debt. 3 Published on April 13 2017 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* The 65-day fractal dimension of nickel versus tin is approaching a level which has previously signaled an imminent trend-reversal. Go long nickel/short tin as this week's trade. Chart I-12 For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Feature Chart 1 Senior officials at the Federal Reserve have begun preparing the market for the eventual run down of the central bank's balance sheet. After several rounds of quantitative easing (QE), total assets held by the Fed currently stand at US$4.5 trillion - a dramatic increase from US$900 billion before the global financial crisis. Indeed, efforts to shrink the Fed's balance sheet are essentially reverse QE. As the 2013 'Taper Tantrum" suggests, such a profound change in U.S. monetary policy can have a significant impact on interest rates and broader financial assets, and Fed officials are working hard to properly anchor market expectations. In comparison, how the People's Bank of China manages its balance sheet is much less transparent and less understood by market participants, even though the PBoC has the biggest balance sheet among the world's major central banks (Chart 1). Currently, the PBoC's total assets amount to US$4.9 trillion, compared with about US$4.5 trillion for both the Fed and the European Central Bank (ECB). Moreover, its balance sheet has stopped growing since 2015 in local currency terms and has been shrinking in dollar terms, but the impact on the economy and financial markets has so far not been material. Generally speaking, a central bank uses its balance sheet to aid monetary policy. It controls the size and composition of its assets to affect interest rates, and in turn the economy. Through "operation twist" and QE, the Fed significantly increased its holdings of longer-dated Treasury securities and mortgage backed securities (MBS), which currently account for 95% of its assets (Table 1). Therefore, shrinkage of the Fed balance sheet means that the Fed's holdings of long-term securities will gradually be reduced - likely by allowing them to run off at maturity rather than selling them in the open market. This should nonetheless put some upward pressure on long-term risk-free rates going forward. Table 1The Fed's Balance Sheet In a Special Report we published six years ago, we pointed out the explosion in the PBoC's balance sheet and its unique features compared with other central banks.1 In a nutshell, the PBoC's biggest holdings on its asset side were U.S. Treasurys rather than domestic risk-free assets. The Chinese central bank was essentially engaging in a massive "currency swap" in which it accumulated U.S. Treasurys while dramatically increasing the country's monetary base. Meanwhile, it was also working hard to "sterilize" by forcing commercial banks to maintain an increasingly massive sum of required reserves with the central bank. These policy tools, however, were inherently crude and clumsy, with huge volatility in monetary market rates and overall financial volatility being a key after-effect. This week we are revisiting the PBoC's balance sheet to highlight some major shifts in recent years. Some developments are worth highlighting. Dynamics have completely reversed since 2015, when Chinese official reserves began to fall, leading to a shrinking in the PBoC's balance sheet by about US$500 billion since the all-time peak. The "sterilization" process has also been reversed, as the PBoC has been releasing liquidity back into the domestic financial system. The overall liquidity situation has been largely stable. Normally a decline in the PBoC's foreign asset holdings would lead to a decline in the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) to offset the liquidity outflows, leading to a simultaneous decline in both sides of the central bank's balance sheet. The PBoC, however, has been resisting shrinking its balance sheet. As its foreign asset holdings (U.S. Treasurys) have been declining, the PBoC has significantly ramped up domestic asset holdings by increasing direct claims on commercial banks through repos and other lending facilities. The central bank appears to be concerned that a lowered RRR will stoke more domestic capital outflows, which risks creating a vicious circle. How the PBoC manages domestic liquidity has seen major shifts in recent history, and will likely continue to evolve going forward. The RRR, as a monetary policy tool, will likely be gradually phased out.2 Over the long run, this will lead to important changes in the PBoC's balance sheet and the way it conducts monetary policy. In the short term, commercial banks' excess reserves are at close to record low levels. The odds are rising that the RRR will be lowered in the coming months, especially if the RMB stabilizes against the dollar, as we expect.3 Finally, it is worth noting that the most aggressive phase of the Fed's QE efforts coincided with the most rapid phase of the PBoC's balance sheet expansion. This means that both central banks were aggressive buyers of U.S. Treasurys and risk-free assets in previous years. Looking forward, if a shrinking Fed balance sheet leads to a sharp increase in U.S. interest rates and a dollar rally, it could force the PBoC to also liquidate its holdings of U.S. Treasurys to stabilize the RMB exchange rate. This means both the Fed and the PBoC could become marginal sellers of Treasurys, which would have a much more profound impact on U.S. interest rates and the growth outlook. Monitoring the PBoC's balance sheet will become increasingly important for Fed watchers. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Delving Into the PBoC'S Balance Sheet," dated July 27, 2011, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "More On The Chinese Debt Debate," dated April 20, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Can The RMB Appreciate Against The Dollar, Again?" dated May 11, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Table 2 offers a simplified balance sheet of the People's Bank of China. Foreign assets still account for 65.6% of its total assets, down from a peak of 83% in 2014. In comparison, most other major central banks' assets are predominantly domestic government bonds. The explosive growth of the PBoC's holding of foreign assets had been the only source of its balance sheet expansion before 2015. In the past two years the PBoC's domestic assets have increased sharply. Overall the PBoC's balance sheet has stayed flat in the RMB terms. PBoC's holding of foreign and domestic assets has been matched by expansion of reserve money (monetary base) on the liability side of the PBoC's balance sheet, including currency issuances (M0 and cash in the vaults of depository institutions) and deposits of commercial banks in the central bank. Commercial banks' reserve deposits at the PBoC have continued to grow even though the PBoC balance sheet expansion has stalled. (Chart 2) Table 2The PBoC's Balance Sheet Chart 2 PBoC holdings of foreign assets include foreign exchange reserves and gold. Foreign reserves currently account for 63% of PBoC total assets, compared with a peak of 84% in 2014. Official record shows that gold is still a negligible share of its total assets. Other major items on the asset side of the PBoC's balance sheet include claims on the government, commercial banks and other financial corporations. The PBoC's claims on the government (entirely on the central government) account for 4.5% of its total assets. In 2007 the government set up a sovereign wealth management fund to manage part of the country's reserves. The government issued bonds to the PBoC in exchange for foreign exchange reserves, which was used as capital of the investment firm. Legally the PBoC is forbidden to directly hold government bonds. The PBoC's claims on other depository corporations (commercial banks) include loans and rediscounts to commercial banks and the net amount of repurchase agreements, which has increased sharply since 2016. The PBoC claims on other commercial banks were a major policy tool to control liquidity in the early 2000s. The central bank's claims on other financial corporations mainly include loans to the asset management firms that the government set up in the late 1990s to deal with bad loans spun off from commercial banks. There has been no change in this item in recent years. (Chart 3 and Chart 4) Chart 3 Chart 4 On the liability side of the PBoC's balance sheet, the dominant item is reserve money, which includes currency issuances and deposits of depository corporations. Taken together these items account for almost 90% of banks' total liabilities. However, currency issuances (M0 and cash in vault) have been hovering around 20% of the PBoC balance sheet in recent years. Deposits of depository corporations account for about 66%. Deposits of commercial banks in the central bank include required and free reserves. Currency issuance and free reserves make up China's "high power money" that can result in a much larger increase in money supply through the money multiplier. Therefore, adjusting the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) on banks has been a key policy tool for the PBoC to control "loanable" funds and liquidity. The central bank, however, been reluctant to adjust RRR since 2016 despite continued liquidity outflow. Commercial banks used to hold large amounts of free reserves with the central bank, which however have declined sharply in recent years. The massive reserves of commercial banks in the PBoC offer a critical liquidity buffer for banks at times of crisis. As banks' free reserves have been running thin, there is a building case for an RRR reduction in coming months. (Chart 5 and Chart 6) Chart 5 Chart 6 Other major items on the liability side of the PBoC's balance sheet include bond issues, government deposits and foreign liabilities. The central bank started to issue bonds (notes) in 2002 as a way to sterilize foreign capital inflows, a tool that has essentially been phased out. Currently, total outstanding bonds amount to RMB 50 billion, a mere 0.1% of the PBoC total liability, compared with almost 30% in 2007. The PBoC's foreign liabilities are deposits of international financial institutions, which account for a negligible share of its total assets. Government deposits account for 8.4% of the central bank's total liabilities, or RMB 2.88 trillion at the end of April 2017. The PBoC regularly auctions off fiscal deposits to commercial banks as a way to adjust interbank liquidity. (Chart 7 and Chart 8) Chart 7 Chart 8 There are four main items on the PBoC's balance sheet that the central bank uses at its discretion to manage domestic liquidity: claims on depository corporations (banks), deposits of depository corporations, liabilities to the government (fiscal deposits) and bond issues. Claims on depository corporations are on the asset side, and include loans and rediscounts to commercial banks and the net amount of repurchase agreements. The PBoC has significantly expanded some new liquidity tools, such as various lending facilities and open market operations. These assets are mostly short term, allowing the central bank flexibility to adjust the quantity quickly. Reserve deposits of commercial banks, central bank bond issues and fiscal deposits are on the liability side of the PBoC's balance sheet, but reserve deposits play by far the largest role in the central bank's sterilization efforts. Commercial banks reserve deposits are still hovering around record high levels. (Chart 9 and Chart 10) Chart 9 Chart10 Taken together, the ebbs and flows of the PBoC's sterilization operations coincide with the pace of country's foreign reserve accumulation. The PBoC was able to "sterilize" about 80% of foreign capital inflow before 2015, and it has been quickly adjusting its balance sheet to offset domestic capital outflows in the past two years. All these items on the PBoC's balance sheet should be cross-checked to assess its liquidity operations, rather than focusing on one item. Looking forward, the PBoC's liquidity operations will remain contingent on the situation of cross-border capital flows in the near term, and its monetary independence will remain compromised. Over the long run, a free-floating RMB exchange rate will diminish the purpose of PBoC's precautionary holdings of foreign reserves, which will in turn impact how the central bank manages its balance sheet for domestic considerations. (Chart 11 and Chart 12) Chart 11 Chart 12 Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Duration: The bond market is not providing adequate compensation for the inflationary economic back-drop. Remain below-benchmark duration on a 6-12 month investment horizon. The Fed & Inflation: Even in the most deflationary of the four scenarios we consider, inflation is still projected to be very close to the Fed's median forecast by year end. The Fed is still on track for two more rate hikes this year. The Fed's Balance Sheet: The run-down of the Fed's balance sheet will lead to a substantial increase in gross Treasury issuance next year. Most, if not all, of this extra issuance will be met by greater demand from the banking sector. Feature Chart 1Inflationary Pressures Are Building No, the title of this report does not refer to the challenge of getting a tax reform bill through Congress when betting markets say there is a 44% chance that the President won't keep his job through 2018.1 Although bond markets are clearly sending the message that progress on tax reform is less likely with the White House embroiled in controversy. The 10-year Treasury yield fell to 2.22% last week after having briefly broken above 2.4% earlier in the month (Chart 1). For the record, our Geopolitical Strategy service thinks that even a growing scandal within the Trump administration won't be enough to prevent tax cuts,2 and from our point of view, we worry that bond markets might be distracted by the political soap opera and are missing the underlying economic picture. As the nominal 10-year yield fell last week, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate also declined to 1.78%, its lowest level since prior to the election. Meanwhile, the base case scenario from our Phillips Curve model of core PCE inflation, which closely tracks the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate (Chart 1, bottom panel), is sending the message that inflationary pressures are building in the economy, tax reform or no tax reform. Chart 2The Fed's 2017 Forecasts The next section of this report provides more detail on the assumptions underlying our Phillips Curve model, but suffice it to say that the bond market is not providing adequate compensation for the inflationary economic back-drop. Remain below-benchmark duration on a 6-12 month investment horizon. The remainder of this report focuses on two key challenges that U.S. policymakers will face this year. The first is the Fed's challenge of whether to focus on Phillips Curve derived forecasts of inflation or the actual core inflation data. The second challenge relates to how the Treasury department will deal with the run-off of the Fed's balance sheet. The Fed's Phillips Curve Challenge As of the March FOMC meeting, the Fed's median projection called for two more 25 basis point rate hikes before the end of the year, and also for core PCE inflation to reach 1.9% (Chart 2). It would be logical to assume that if inflation were no longer expected to reach 1.9%, that the anticipated pace of rate hikes would also decline. On that note, a cursory glance at recent inflation data makes 1.9% look a tad aspirational. Core PCE inflation is running at only 1.56% year-over-year through March, and will probably stay low in April given that year-over-year core CPI fell from 2% in March to 1.89% in April (see Box). BOX A Note On The Divergence Between CPI And PCE While weak core CPI probably does indicate that core PCE will stay low, we would not expect the entirety of April's CPI drop to translate into the PCE data. A key driver of last month's disappointing core CPI was a 0.2% month-over-month decline in medical care prices, and the treatment of medical care costs is an important difference between CPI and PCE. The weight of medical care in core PCE is more than double the 10% weighting of medical care in core CPI, because the PCE deflator also factors in the medical care spending of government agencies on behalf of consumers while CPI only tracks the amount spent by consumers directly. For this reason, we see that the medical care components of CPI and PCE are not closely correlated (Chart 3). In fact, CPI medical care inflation has been decelerating for some time while PCE medical care inflation has been grinding higher alongside the health care component of the Producer Price Index (PPI). The health care component of PPI was flat in April, but the underlying uptrend remains unbroken. We would expect the spread between core CPI and core PCE to tighten in the months ahead as relative medical care costs continue to converge (Chart 3, bottom panel). Chart 3Expect CPI and PCE To Converge Meanwhile, a forecast based on trends in the labor market would suggest that inflation is set to accelerate. This, in a nutshell, is the Fed's conundrum. It can rely on Phillips Curve-type inflation forecasts and risk tightening too quickly if inflation does not respond as expected. Or, it can rely on the actual inflation data and risk staying easy for too long. For now, we believe the Fed will cling firmly to the Phillips Curve option. In a speech from September 2015,3 Chair Yellen outlined her model for inflation forecasting. In Yellen's model, core inflation tends to fluctuate around a long-run trend that is determined by inflation expectations. Changes in resource utilization (aka the employment gap) and relative import prices can cause inflation to deviate from this trend but, as long as these shocks prove transitory, inflation should gradually move back toward the level determined by expectations. Inspired by this approach, we created a Phillips Curve model of core PCE - the output of which was shown in Chart 1 on page 1. Specifically, we model core PCE as a function of: 12-month lag of core PCE Long-run inflation expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters Resource utilization (proxied by the difference between the unemployment rate and the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) estimate of the long-run natural unemployment rate) Non-oil import prices relative to overall core PCE The value of this approach is that we can assess how core inflation is likely to react to varying assumptions about inflation expectations, the unemployment rate, the natural unemployment rate (NAIRU), and the trade-weighted U.S. dollar. We use the trend in the dollar to forecast relative import prices. A stronger dollar leads to lower import prices, and vice-versa. Charts 4-7 show the results of running this model under four different scenarios. We conclude that it is very difficult to create a set of reasonable assumptions where core PCE inflation does not approach the Fed's 1.9% forecast by year end. Given that Fed policymakers are very likely using a similar framework, we would expect them to arrive at the same conclusion. Scenario 1: The Base Case. In the first scenario we assume that the unemployment rate stays at its current level (4.4%) and also that the trade-weighted dollar remains flat. We also use the CBO's NAIRU estimate and assume no change in inflation expectations. In this environment, our model projects that year-over-year core PCE inflation will reach 2.11% by the end of December (Chart 4). Scenario 2: Strong Dollar. In this scenario we make the same assumptions as in Scenario 1, except that we allow the dollar to appreciate at a pace of 10% per year. The result is that import price deflation is more pronounced, but year-over-year core PCE inflation is still projected to reach 1.95% by year end (Chart 5). Chart 4Phillips Curve Model: Base Case Scenario Chart 5Phillips Curve Model: Strong Dollar Scenario Scenario 3: Bad NAIRU. In this scenario we consider that the CBO's NAIRU assumption might be too high. Specifically, we allow NAIRU to decline linearly from 5.07% at the end of 2012 to 4% by the end of 2013, we then hold it constant at 4%. Currently, the CBO's NAIRU estimate is 4.74%. In this scenario we also hold the unemployment rate, inflation expectations and the dollar flat. The result is that year-over-year core PCE inflation is projected to reach 2.03% by the end of the year (Chart 6). Scenario 4: The Deflation Case. In this scenario we make the same NAIRU assumption as in Scenario 3, but also incorporate 10% per year dollar appreciation. In this most deflationary scenario, the model still projects 1.88% core PCE inflation at year end (Chart 7). Chart 6Phillips Curve Model: Bad NAIRU Scenario Chart 7Phillips Curve Model: The Deflation Case Bottom Line: Even in the most deflationary of our four scenarios we still project inflation that is very close to the Fed's median forecast. We expect the Fed will arrive at a similar conclusion and will stay on track for two more rate hikes this year. However, if the actual core inflation data do not respond by moving higher during the next 3-4 months, then the Fed's hawkish stance will increasingly come into question. The Fed's Balance Sheet Is The Treasury's Problem Janet Yellen is sure to face some questions about how the Fed plans to unwind its balance sheet at next month's FOMC press conference, but the truth is that we already have a lot of information about how the Fed intends to proceed. The more challenging questions should be asked to the Treasury department, since it is the Treasury that will decide in what form the Fed's balance sheet run-off ultimately finds its way back into private hands. We have written about this topic twice in recent months. First, we published a detailed Special Report on how we expect monetary policy to evolve from an operational perspective in February.4 Then, we updated our expectations based on information contained in the March FOMC minutes.5 This week, we provide some additional observations based on what we learned from the recent meeting of the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee (TBAC). Chart 8Fed's Balance Sheet Will Still Be Large First, a brief recap. The Fed has told us that it plans to: Start shrinking its balance sheet later this year (assuming its growth forecasts remain intact) Shrink its balance sheet by ceasing the reinvestment of both MBS and Treasury securities at the same time The Fed has still not decided whether it will simply cease reinvestment all at once, or whether reinvestment will be phased out gradually (i.e. "tapered"). It has also not provided any guidance on what level of reserve balances it intends to maintain going forward. In Chart 8 we show that even if the Fed decides to drain reserves all the way down to zero, this process is likely to be complete by mid-2021. In fact, it might not even take that long since we have assumed a relatively slow pace of $15 billion MBS run-off per month. What is notable is that the Fed's balance sheet will still be sizeable even after reserves have fallen to zero. The reason is that the Fed's balance sheet needs to increase over time to keep pace with the growth of currency in circulation. Our calculations show that by the time reserve balances reach zero in mid-2021, the Fed will still be holding $1.3 trillion of Treasury securities and $1.1 trillion of MBS. After 2021, the Fed would likely continue to allow MBS to run off, but would once again start reinvesting the proceeds into Treasuries. Where Does The Treasury Department Come In? At present, the Fed reinvests the proceeds from its maturing securities by purchasing Treasury notes and bonds at regularly scheduled auctions. This means that when the Fed ceases the reinvestment of the securities running off its balance sheet, the Treasury department will have to increase the amount of issuance that is made available to the public. The Treasury is therefore tasked with determining whether the extra issuance will take the form of T-bills, short-dated notes or long-dated bonds. At the most recent TBAC meeting, committee members seemed to favor a strategy where the extra issuance is spread evenly across all maturities in proportion to current auction sizes, and where the proportion of T-bills in the overall funding mix is held constant. In Chart 9 and Chart 10 we show what this will mean for gross Treasury issuance of 2-year, 5-year, 10-year and 30-year securities, both in dollar terms and as a percentage of GDP. Chart 9Gross Coupon Issuance: In Dollar Terms Chart 10Gross Coupon Issuance: % Of GDP Interestingly, the Treasury department decided against placing a larger portion of the extra issuance in T-bills, as we had thought they might, and we remain concerned about the lack of short-term low-risk debt instruments in the market. The demand for short-term, low-risk instruments - largely from non-financial corporations, asset managers and foreign exchange reserve funds - is in a secular uptrend. Prior to the financial crisis this demand was met by broker/dealers in the repo market. Then, when regulations killed the repo market, the Fed increased the supply of bank reserves to make up for the shortfall (Chart 11). If the Fed drains reserves from the system and T-bill issuance does not increase substantially to compensate, a supply shortage of short-maturity instruments could develop. We would not be surprised to see the Treasury increase the proportion of T-bills in its funding mix, from historically low levels (Chart 12), if stresses in short-term rates markets start to appear at some point down the road. Chart 11A Shortage Of Cash-Like Instruments Chart 12Bill Issuance Has Room To Rise Can The Treasury Market Absorb All The Extra Issuance? Obviously, the most important question is whether the Treasury market will be able to absorb the substantial extra issuance shown in Charts 9 & 10. There are two reasons why we don't think the extra issuance will have a material impact on yields. First, the path of inflation and the expected pace of rate hikes will continue to drive the movement in long-dated yields. While the inflation component of nominal yields is tied to realized inflation, the real component of yields is closely linked to the expected number of rate hikes during the next 12 months (Chart 13). From this perspective, it is difficult to see how shrinkage of the Fed's balance sheet can have a material impact on yields unless it influences inflation or the expected pace of hikes. Second, the draining of reserves from the banking system will increase banks' demand for Treasury securities, providing a powerful offset to the increased supply of Treasuries. The newly implemented Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) mandates that banks must hold High-Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) that are at least sufficient to cover net cash outflows over a stressed 30-day period. HQLAs are divided into tiers, with Treasury securities and reserves at the Fed qualifying as Tier 1 assets. Agency MBS are considered Tier 2A assets, this means that a 15% haircut must be applied to MBS balances for the purposes of the HQLA calculation. An even larger haircut is applied to riskier assets such as corporate bonds. Chart 14 shows the aggregate balances of reserves, Treasury securities and Agency MBS for all private depository institutions, as well as a proxy for banking sector HQLAs that we calculated to include only: reserves, Treasury securities, and agency MBS with a 15% haircut. Chart 13Focus On Rate Expectations Chart 14Banks Need Safe Assets As the Fed's balance sheet shrinks and reserves are drained from the banking system, banks will be forced to buy Treasuries in numbers that are at least sufficient to maintain mandated HQLA balances. At the moment, it is difficult to calculate how much Treasury buying will be necessary. The regulation only forces banks to start reporting their LCRs on a quarterly basis starting on April 1 of this year. Citigroup did report an LCR of 121% in its 2016 annual report, and we suspect that the ratios for other banks are in the same neighborhood. The mandated LCR is 100%. If Citigroup's reported LCR is a reasonable guide, this means that banks are just barely above mandated LCR levels. In other words, banks will need to replace almost all of the decline in bank reserves with purchases of Treasury securities. This surge in demand will offset a good chunk, if not all, of the extra Treasury issuance that is on its way. Bottom Line: The run-down of the Fed's balance sheet will lead to a substantial increase in gross Treasury issuance next year. Most, if not all, of this extra issuance will be met by increased demand from the banking sector. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.predictit.org/Contract/5367/Will-Donald-Trump-be-president-at-year-end-2018#data 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment", dated May 17, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 3 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "The Way Forward For The Fed's Balance Sheet", dated February 28, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Payback Period In Corporate Bonds", dated April 11, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights U.S. Politics: We recommend that investors look through the political noise in D.C., which is unlikely to arrest the current cyclical economic upturn. Maintain a pro-growth asset allocation within fixed income portfolios: below-benchmark duration, favoring corporate credit over government bonds, especially in the U.S. Duration Checklists: An update of our Duration Checklists shows that the backdrop remains conducive to rising Euro Area bond yields, while the upward pressures on U.S. yields have diminished somewhat. The majority of the indicators, however, continue to point to higher U.S. Treasury and German Bund yields. Europe: Reduce European duration exposure, but wait for wider spread levels before moving out of European government bonds into U.S. Treasuries. Feature The Economy Trumps Politics Chart of the WeekHas Anything Really Changed? A whiff of panic swept across global financial markets last week, as the political risk bugaboo came back with a vengeance. In the U.S., the deepening morass surrounding President Trump's decision to fire former FBI Director Comey, and the potential links to the ongoing investigation of the White House's ties to Russia, raised concerns that Trump's ambitious pro-growth policy agenda would never make it out of Congress. Even this year's darling in the Emerging Markets, Brazil, suffered a huge financial rout after news broke of corruption allegations against the current president. Amid growing talk of a potential impeachment of Trump, the market action was a classic risk-off move, with equity markets falling, the VIX finally waking from its slumber and safe-haven assets like gold, U.S. Treasuries and the Japanese yen rallying. The euro climbed to new 2017 highs versus the U.S. dollar, without any changes in expectations about potential policy moves from the European Central Bank (ECB), as the market knocked down the probability of a June Fed rate hike (Chart of the Week). Some creative commentators called these market moves "the Trump fade" - the beginnings of a reversal of the so-called "Trump trade" that has sent U.S. equity prices and bond yields higher since the U.S. election on expectations of a large U.S. fiscal stimulus. We remain skeptical, however, that expectations of tax cuts and increased government spending have been the main drivers of the post-election boost in U.S. stock prices and Treasury yields, as the current cyclical upturn in global growth was already underway before Trump's election victory. Our colleagues at the BCA Geopolitical Strategy service note that, despite Trump's terrible overall approval ratings (Chart 2), his support among his Republican voters remains strong (Chart 3). Thus, an impeachment is only likely if the Republicans were to lose control of the House of Representatives in next year's U.S. midterm elections. Fear of that outcome should motivate the GOP to try and push through tax and healthcare reform well ahead of the 2018 midterms, in order to present a positive economic message to voters.1 Unless the evidence against Trump becomes so damning that even the Republicans in Congress have to focus on impeachment instead of policy, investors should ride out any market volatility associated with worries that the Trump economic agenda is at risk. Chart 2Trump's Support Abysmal Chart 3GOP Not Yet Willing To Impeach Trump Even without a boost to growth from D.C., however, we continue to expect the U.S. economy to grow above 2.5% in 2017. This above-trend pace will keep the Fed in play for at least two additional rate hikes before year-end, as it would give policymakers confidence that U.S. inflation expectations would return back the Fed's 2% target. In addition, as we discuss in the next section, the cyclical upturn in the Euro Area economy is showing no signs of cooling off, which will put more pressure on the ECB to begin preparing the markets for an eventual tapering of its asset purchases. The recent decline in bond yields is unlikely to persist much longer. Bottom Line: We recommend that investors look through the political noise in D.C., which is unlikely to arrest the current cyclical economic upturn. Maintain a pro-growth asset allocation within fixed income portfolios: below-benchmark duration, favoring corporate credit over government bonds, especially in the U.S. Checking In On Our Duration Checklists In a Special Report published back in February, we introduced a list of indicators to follow to assess the likely direction of U.S. Treasury and German Bund yields.2 We called these our "Duration Checklists", incorporating data on economic growth, inflation, investor risk aversion and market technicals to judge whether our bias to maintain a below-benchmark duration stance should be maintained. This week, we provide an update on those Checklists. The current message from the Checklists is that there is reduced upward pressure on bond yields from the overall strength of the global economy than existed four months ago. Domestic forces, however, are still pointing to higher yields in the U.S. and, especially, the Euro Area (Table 1). Specifically: Table 1A More Bond-Bearish Backdrop For Bunds Than USTs Global economic activity indicators have lost some momentum. While the global leading economic indicator (LEI) is still rising, our global LEI diffusion index has fallen sharply and is now below the 50 line, indicating that a more countries now have a falling LEI. In addition, the global ZEW index has drifted a touch lower, global data surprises are no longer positive, and the global credit impulse has ticked downward (Chart 4). Only the rising LEI warrants a "check" in our Checklists (i.e. justifies our current below-benchmark duration stance). U.S. & European domestic economic activity remains in good shape. Consumer and business confidence remains at strong levels on either side of the Atlantic, with corporate profit growth still accelerating (Charts 5 & 6). Only the modest decline in the U.S. manufacturing purchasing managers' index (PMI) is worthy of an "x" in our U.S. Checklist, although the index remains well above 50 and is not pointing to a more serious deterioration in the U.S. economy. Chart 4Global Growth Backdrop Has##BR##Turned Less Bond-Bearish Chart 5U.S. Economic Strength##BR##Still Supports Higher UST Yields Chart 6Euro Area Growth Is##BR##Gaining Upward Momentum Inflation pressures have eased a bit, especially in the U.S. The slowing momentum in global energy prices has taken some of the steam out of headline inflation in both the U.S. and Europe. Wage inflation has eased up a bit in the U.S., even with the labor market running at full employment (Chart 7). Wage growth and core inflation have recently ticked higher in the Euro Area, however, while the unemployment rate there has fallen to within less than a percentage point away from the OECD estimate of the NAIRU (Chart 8).3 The only indicators worthy of a "check" are the unemployment gap in both the U.S. and Euro Area, although we will give a potential "check" (with a question mark) to European wage inflation. If the recent uptick gains additional momentum, the case for the ECB to begin moving to a less accommodative policy stance will be much stronger. Chart 7Inflation Pressures On UST Yields Have Eased Chart 8Core Inflation & Wages Bottoming Out In Europe? There is still a pro-risk bias among global investors. U.S. and Euro Area equity markets are still in bullish trends, trading well above their 200-day moving averages. At the same time, corporate credit spreads remain tight and option-implied equity volatility is very low (even after last week's pop in the U.S. on the Trump drama). All indicators are worthy of a "check", suggesting that easier financial conditions can lead to higher bond yields (Charts 9 & 10). We are, however, giving an "x" to the European Checklist for the deviation of the Stoxx 600 from its moving average, as it is now at the +10% extreme that we defined as being potentially bond-bullish as it could foreshadow a near-term correction of an overheated stock market. Chart 9Still Generally A Risk-Seeking Backdrop In The U.S. Chart 10Strong Risk-Seeking Behavior In Europe Bond markets no longer look technically stretched. The sharp move higher in yields at the end of 2016 left all our indicators of yield momentum at bearish extremes (for bond prices). With bond yields pulling back from 2017 highs, however, the momentum measures all look neutral at the moment and are not an impediment to higher yields (Charts 11 & 12). The same goes for duration positioning in the U.S., with the net longs on 10-year Treasury futures now at the highest level since 2007. All of the technical indicators in our Checklists warrant an "check". Chart 11UST Technicals No##BR##Longer Stretched Chart 12Technicals Are No Impediment##BR##To Higher Yields In Europe Summing it all up, our Duration Checklists show that the majority of indicators are still pointing to higher bond yields in the U.S. and Europe, although not as decisively as when we first published the Checklists in February. There are more "check" on the European side of the ledger, however, suggesting that there is more room for European government bond yields to rise relative to U.S. Treasuries. This would indicate a potential trade opportunity to cut allocations to Europe and raise allocations to the U.S. Chart 13UST-Bund Spread Is Now Too Low The recent decline in U.S. yields, however, has narrowed the U.S. Treasury/German Bund spread to levels that make putting on a tightening trade unattractive on a tactical basis. (Chart 13). The gap between the data surprise indices in the U.S. and Euro Area already reflects the recent soft patch for the U.S. economy (middle panel). That spread in the surprise indices now at historically wide levels, suggesting more potential for Treasury yields to rise if the U.S. data begins to rebound soon, as we expect. Also, the gap between U.S. and Euro Area inflation expectations has narrowed alongside the recent downtick in U.S. core inflation (bottom panel), although we expect the decline in U.S. core inflation to be short-lived given the persistent tightness of the U.S. labor market. Net-net, we would prefer to see a wider Treasury-Bund spread before making switching our country exposure out of Europe and into the U.S. We can, however, listen to the message from our Checklists and reduce our duration exposure in Europe. Specifically, we are cutting our allocations to the longer maturity buckets (5 years out to 30 years) by 50% in our model portfolio for Germany, France and Italy, putting the proceeds into the 1-3 year buckets (see the table on Page 12). This will reduce our overall recommended portfolio duration by just over 1/10th of a year, as well as put an additional bear-steepening curve tilt within our European government allocations. We are comfortable with that bias, given the growing risk that the ECB will soon begin signaling a tapering of asset purchases once the current program expires at the end of the year. Bottom Line: An update of our Duration Checklists shows that the backdrop remains conducive to rising Euro Area bond yields, while the upward pressures on U.S. yields have diminished somewhat. The majority of the indicators, however, continue to point to higher U.S. Treasury and German Bund yields. Reduce European duration exposure, but wait for wider spread levels before moving out of European government bonds into U.S. Treasuries. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment", dated May 17 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "A Duration Checklist For U.S. Treasuries & German Bunds", dated February 15 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 3 Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate Of Unemployment. The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Politics will inject further volatility into risk assets, but stocks will outperform bonds and cash on a 6-12 month horizon. The health of the economy and earnings matter more than Trump's political woes for investors and the Fed. The consumer - a key driver of the U.S. economy and corporate earnings - will provide a solid backdrop for the economy through 2017 and beyond. The combination of balance sheet shrinkage and Fed rate hikes will lead to higher bond yields than are currently discounted in the market. It is a different story for the mortgage market, where spreads will be biased to widen during Fed runoff. Feature The Economy Matters More Than Politics The health of the economy and earnings matter more than Trump's political woes for investors and the Fed. When the economy and earnings backdrop was favorable during presidential scandals in the 1920s and the 1990s, the equity markets performed well. In the early 70s, amid soaring inflation and the worst recession since the Great Depression, there was a bear market in equities (Chart 1). Today, the backdrop for the economy and earnings - while not as robust as in the 1920s or late 1990s - provides support for higher stock prices, two more Fed rate hikes and higher Treasury bond yields. Trump's political woes may slow, but not completely halt the GOP's legislative agenda1. Support for Trump among his GOP base remains high at 85%, making impeachment a long shot until after the November 2018 mid-term elections (Chart 2). If the Democrats take the House, they are likely to impeach Trump in 2019. For the Trump and the Republicans in Congress, this means the impetus is even greater to make progress now on tax cuts, tax reform and infrastructure. However, the embattled White House will slow the process as the president's staff often acts as a coordinator among the various factions in Congress. With Trump's team preoccupied with political woes, they will not be effective in this role. Chart 1Economy Will Trump Politics ##br## For Financial Markets Chart 2GOP Base Not Yet Willing To ##br## Impeach Trump The Fed will look through the politics and focus on the health of the economy and will continue to raise rates gradually this year, with the next hike coming in June. Financial conditions have eased since the Fed's 25 basis point rate hike in December, and that alone should be enough to keep the Fed on track to tighten next month. As we have noted in recent reports, even without fiscal stimulus, the U.S. economy will still grow near its long-term potential, tighten the labor market and push up wages and inflation. The Fed has been reticent to include any impact from fiscal stimulus into their policy deliberations thus far. The minutes of the March FOMC meeting noted that "members continued to judge that there was significant uncertainty about the effects of possible changes in fiscal and other government policies". Bottom Line: The lack of progress on legislation may result in a pullback in U.S. equity prices, but absent a material weakening of the U.S. economy or profit picture, the pullback will not turn into a bear market. Checking In On The Consumer The consumer - a key driver of the U.S. economy and corporate earnings - will provide a solid backdrop for the economy through 2017 and beyond. This backdrop will allow the Fed to pursue two rate hikes this year. The weakness in several indicators has worried some investors that the economy may be on the verge of a slowdown or even a collapse. However, a firming economy should sustain corporate earnings growth and, ultimately, higher stock prices. Consumer spending's share of GDP is 68% and increasing (Chart 3). GDP growth excluding consumer spending is more volatile than overall GDP growth. The household sector has contributed 75% to growth since the end of the recession, which is the best performance of any sector. The key drivers of spending point to further gains in the sector, and the imbalances that were present ahead of prior downturns are not evident today. Chart 3Household Share Of GDP Is At An All Time High And Rising Chart 4Consumer Spending Remains In An Uptrend Household spending growth has softened but remains in an uptrend. Broad measures of consumer spending tend to peak two to four years prior to the start of a recession. The lead time is even longer in a long-cycle expansion.2 Investors should not dismiss the weakness altogether, but position portfolios for the late-cycle environment. Personal consumption expenditure growth peaked at 4% year-over-year in Q1 2015. Auto sales, a timelier measure of spending although not as comprehensive, peaked in December 2016 (Chart 4). Applying the 2 to 4 year lead time noted above - and making the assumption that spending has indeed peaked - this points to a recession commencing in the middle of 2019 at the earliest. Household net worth is at an all-time high, and the overall wealth effect on consumer spending has been positive for some time. Our forecast for financial markets and the housing market, though modest, imply that the positive wealth effect will continue. Debt-financed spending remains a viable option for consumers, which was not the case in late 2007 before the onset of the recession. Banks have not changed their lending standards for most consumer loans and demand for these loans will stay solid despite the Fed rate increases that we expect. The Bank Credit Analyst's March 2017 report showed that even a 100-basis point rate rise from the current levels would not lift the interest payments to burdensome levels by historical standards. Incomes will continue to climb and importantly, consumer income expectations have also hit new highs. With the economy at the Fed's assessment of full employment, wage growth is accelerating, albeit more modestly than in previous recoveries. Our recent report3 found that wages tend to rise about two years after the output gap has formed a bottom. A narrowing output gap leads to a tighter labor market and higher incomes. As measured by the quit rate, job security is at a fresh cycle high (not shown). Many consumer indicators are in better shape today than they were in 2007 or at similar points in the other long cycles4 (Charts 5 and 6). We define the long cycle economic expansions as those lasting 8-10 years. The two expansions that meet the definition are 1981-1990 and 1992-2001.5 Consumer spending is running in line with incomes, unlike in the mid-2000s. Chart 5Key Consumer Metrics ##br## Remain Favorable Chart 6There Is Still Plenty Of Support ##br## For Solid Consumer Spending Mortgage equity withdrawal, a crucial source of debt-fueled consumer spending prior to 2007, has been non-existent in this cycle. Spending on essentials are close to all-time lows. In 2007 they were at record highs and had moved up dramatically in the prior half-decade amid escalating debt levels, rising energy prices and consumer interest rates. We are concerned by the historically high percentage of household incomes (17%) dedicated to medical care. An aging population, ever rising healthcare costs and uncertainty surrounding the future of Obamacare may drive medical spending even higher. Household debt levels as a percentage of disposable income peaked in 2008 at over 120%, but are back under 100%, i.e. at the level that existed prior to the 2007-2009 recession. The level of household debt compares favorably to similar points in the long cycles of the 1980s and 1990s. Financial obligations are at multi-decade lows (Chart 6, bottom panel). Bottom Line: The fundamentals supporting consumer spending remain solid. A healthy consumer means the economy can meet the Fed's modest GDP forecast for 2017, keeping the central bank on track to tighten twice more in 2017. This outlook supports our view for stocks over bonds in the next 6-12 months. The Fed's Balance Sheet: It's Diet Time Chart 7Fed Set To Begin Tapering In Early 2018 The minutes from the March FOMC meeting indicated that a change in the Fed's reinvestment policy will likely be appropriate "later this year". The minutes suggested that the FOMC is split on whether to simply terminate all reinvestment for both Treasurys and MBS, or to "taper" reinvestment over time. Our base case is that the Fed will follow up a June rate hike with another one in September, at which point policymakers will provide some details on their plans for balance sheet runoff to begin in January of 2018. Investors are rightly concerned about the potential impact of the runoff, especially given that memories of the 2013 "taper tantrum" are still fresh. There is disagreement among academics about whether quantitative easing (QE) directly depressed bond yields by restricting the supply of high-quality fixed income assets, or whether the impact on yields was solely via the "signaling effect" (i.e. that QE implied that short-rates will be held at a low level for a very long time). Either way, balance sheet runoff will likely have some impact on bond yields. A good starting point is to employ an empirical estimate of the impact of QE. The IMF has modeled long-term Treasury yields based on a number of economic and financial variables, including inflation expectations, demographics, growth, current accounts and budget balances. The model also includes the stock of assets held by the Fed as a share of GDP. If the Fed were to begin running off its holdings of both Treasurys and MBS at the beginning of 2018 by terminating all reinvestment, then the amount of bank reserves held at the Fed would likely evaporate by 2021. This represents a fall of roughly 10 percentage points of GDP (Chart 7). Given the IMF interest rate model's coefficient of -0.9, it implies that long-term Treasury yields and mortgage rates would rise by 90 basis points from the "portfolio balance" effect alone. However, it is more complicated than that. The impact on yields is likely to be tempered by three factors: The Fed may opt to avoid going "cold turkey" on reinvestment, choosing instead to scale back gradually. Fed President William Dudley recently commented that the Fed wants balance sheet reduction to "run in the background", such that it is not a major event for markets. Some academic experts are recommending that the Fed maintain a fairly large balance sheet by historical standards because of the need in financial markets for short-term, risk-free assets that would diminish if there are fewer excess bank reserves available. Banks, for example, are required by regulators to hold more high-quality assets than they did in the pre-Lehman years. The implication is that the balance sheet may never fully revert to historic norms relative to GDP. As the FOMC dials back monetary stimulus it will be concerned with overall monetary conditions, including short-term rates, long-term rates and the dollar. If long-term rates and/or the dollar rise too quickly, policymakers will moderate the pace of rate hikes and use forward guidance to talk down the long end of the curve so as to avoid allowing financial conditions get too tight, too quickly (i.e. the term premium would rise, but would be partly offset by a lower expected path for the fed funds rate). Thus, the path of short-term rates is dependent on the dollar and the reaction of the long end of the curve. It is difficult to estimate how it will shake out, but a recent report from the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City estimated that a $675 billion reduction in the size of the Fed's balance sheet is equivalent to a 25 basis point increase in the fed funds rate (although the authors admit that the confidence band around this estimate is extremely wide).6 We expect that the impact of runoff alone will be much less than the 90 basis point estimate discussed above. Still, the combination of balance sheet shrinkage and Fed rate hikes will lead to higher bond yields than is currently discounted in the market. We could also see some upward pressure on global term premia when the ECB announces the next tapering of its QE purchase program, possibly this autumn. However, it will be years before the ECB will be in a position to reduce the size of its balance sheet. As for the Bank of Japan, we doubt that the central bank will ever shed its JGB holdings. What about the shape of the Treasury curve? Our fixed-income strategists believe that the shape of the curve will be determined by the normal cyclical dynamics we have seen in the past. We are still in a window in which the Treasury curve will steepen as yields rise. A little later in the Fed cycle, the curve will bear-flatten as the long-end begins to rise at a slower pace than the front end. We do not see balance sheet adjustment as changing these dynamics much. Similarly, with respect to credit spreads, the state of nonfinancial corporate sector balance sheets and the overall stance of monetary policy will continue to be the main drivers of the credit cycle. If unwinding the balance sheet leads to a premature tightening of financial conditions, then the Fed will proceed more slowly on rate hikes. The crucial indicator to watch is core PCE inflation. Credit spreads will remain fairly well contained until core PCE inflation reaches the Fed's 2% target. At that point, the pace of monetary normalization will ramp up, putting spreads at risk of widening. It is a different story for the mortgage market, where spreads will be biased to widen during Fed runoff. While spreads have already widened a bit, in our view they still do not adequately compensate for the additional MBS supply that will hit the market when the Fed takes a step back. Historically, there is a reasonably tight correlation between MBS spreads and the spread between mortgage rates and Treasury yields (Chart 8). Thus, it is reasonable to expect mortgage rates to rise by more than Treasury yields. Chart 8MBS Spreads Set To Widen As Fed Tapers While the Fed's balance sheet reduction by itself may not have a big impact on the dollar, we still believe the currency has more upside because of the divergence in the overall monetary policy stance between the U.S. on one side and the ECB and Bank of Japan (BoJ) on the other. The BoJ will hold the 10-year JGB near to zero for quite some time. The ECB will also not be in a position to tighten for a long time, outside of removing negative short rates and tapering QE purchases a bit further in 2018. Meanwhile, we think the Fed will tighten by more than is currently discounted. Admittedly, the economic data have disappointed so far in 2017 and CPI inflation has softened which, at the margin, would cause some FOMC members to back away from rate hikes. Nonetheless, policymakers are focused more on the labor market than GDP to gauge the health of the expansion and the amount of economic slack. Despite the dismal Q1 GDP figures, following unimpressive growth in 2016, the unemployment rate has already fallen below what the FOMC expected the rate will be at the end of this year! A tightening labor market means that the economy is still growing above a trend pace. Unless there is a clear deceleration in wage growth as measured by the ECI or the Productivity and Cost report, the FOMC will likely hike rates by more than the 38 basis points currently discounted over the next 12 months. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 See Geopolitical Strategy Report, "Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment," May 17, 2017. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 See The Bank Credit Analyst, March 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3 See U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Still Awaiting the Next Pullback", May 15, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com 4 See The Bank Credit Analyst, March 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com 5 We did not include the 1960s in this analysis because the Fed waited too long to tighten and allowed inflation to get out of hand. 6 Forecasting the Stance of Monetary Policy Under Balance Sheet Adjustments. The Macro Bulletin, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Troy Davig and A. Lee Smith. May 10, 2017.

Highlights Increased regulatory scrutiny on the domestic financial sector may continue to create some headline risks and financial volatility, but the real economic impact should be marginal. The recent regulatory crackdown has mainly caused liquidity issues in the domestic market rather than any sort of real growth issue. Chinese shares listed overseas will continue to grind higher. Domestic A shares will remain largely trendless. Domestic corporate bonds are starting to look attractive after the most recent panic selloff. Feature Chinese domestic stocks and bonds have taken a beating of late as the authorities ramped up scrutiny to rein in excesses in the country's financial sector. While it is warranted to control accumulated financial risk - especially associated with shadow banking activity - the "campaign" style administrative crackdown has caused widespread confusion and mini-panics among domestic investors. The actions and corresponding reactions illustrate the authorities' primitive control tools, which are increasingly at odds with the rapidly developing financial sector, and how blanket actions can spur undue financial volatility and provoke unintended consequences. For now, we expect the economic fallout to be limited, unless the financial crackdown causes further spikes in interest rates and a sudden halt in credit flows. Chinese shares listed overseas will continue to grind higher in the absence of a major policy mishap that short-circuits the broad growth improvement and the profit cycle upturn. Domestic A shares will remain largely trendless, while the more richly valued bubbly segments of the market will continue to deflate. Domestic corporate bonds are starting to look attractive after the most recent panic selloff. What Do They Want To Achieve? Policymakers' primary focus has been on cracking down on excessive speculation in financial markets and restricting lending activities that are not in compliance with legal and regulatory requirements. Financial sector deregulation in recent years has increasingly blurred the lines between banks, insurance companies, brokers and trust companies, and regulators are constantly challenged to monitor all the increasingly sophisticated moving parts. From the banking sector's point of view, regulators are concerned that lenders have been aggressively boosting their exposure to other banks and non-bank financial institutions instead of providing credit to the "real economy." Overall commercial banks' claims on other banks and non-bank financial institutions have increased from 12% of their total assets in 2006 to over 25% as of January 2017, while their liabilities to other banks and non-bank financial firms have increased from 7% to 12% (Chart 1). Smaller banks are even more dependent on interbank financing for loanable funds. Interbank transactions and repo activities account for about 14% of smaller lenders' total source of funding, compared with 2% for large banks (Chart 2). Some small banks regularly borrow at lower costs through the interbank market or use negotiable certificate of deposits to purchase "wealth management products" offering higher returns issued by other banks or financial institutions. The duration mismatch leads to constant pressure to roll over these short-term financial instruments. The increasing interdependence among the country's financial institutions also creates the risk of a chain reaction in the financial system should some type of credit event erupt. Chart 1Increasing Interdependence Among Financial Institutions The Chinese authorities have long regarded preventing systemic financial risk as a top priority, and the recent growth improvement has provided a window of opportunity for some housecleaning without a major adverse impact on the economy. Therefore, it is unlikely that regulators will back off from tightening regulatory supervision going forward. Overall, the authorities will continue to discourage overtrading within the financial system, and enforce full disclosure of off-balance-sheet items and shadow lending activities. The saving grace is that tightened macro prudential measures have already begun to curtail banks' aggressive expansion to non-bank financial institutions. Commercial banks' claims to these firms have slowed sharply since last year's peak (Chart 3). Meanwhile, the recent rise in interbank rates should also further discourage the perceived "risk-free" funding arbitrage to play the interest rate gap between long- and short-dated financial assets. All of this reduces the pressure of an escalation in the regulatory crackdown. Chart 2Smaller Banks Depend More On##br## Wholesale Funding Chart 3Banks' Exposure To Non-Bank Financial Firms ##br##Has Been Scaled Back Should Investors Be Concerned? In essence, banks' rising claims to other financial institutions means a lengthening of the credit intermediation channel, in which financing goes from credit providers through multiple layers of intermediaries to reach final borrowers in the real economy. In other words, banks, instead of lending directly to borrowers, channel loans to trust companies or securities brokers, who in turn transfer the funds to the real economy through "shadow banking" activities such as trust loans or various forms of "wealth management products", typically at higher rates. From this perspective, cracking down on lending excesses within the financial system in of itself should not have a material impact on credit flows to final corporate borrowers. In fact, streamlining the financial intermediation channel holds the promise of increasing accessibility to bank credit for the corporate sector and reducing its funding cost, which should benefit the overall economy in the long run. In the near term, liquidity tightening and the regulatory crackdown could push up interest rates and disrupt credit flows, which should be closely monitored to assess near-term negative impact on the economy. So far, the impact does not appear material. Chart 4Regulatory Crackdown ##br## Has Not Interrupted Credit Flows Interbank rates have increased by about 100 basis points across the board since the beginning of this year, and 10-year government bond yields have risen by 50 basis points - both of which pale in comparison to the significant improvement in overall business activity. Nominal GDP growth expanded by 11.8% in the first quarter, compared with 9.6% in Q4, 2016. Furthermore, the central bank early this week re-started its medium-term lending facility (MLF), which was designed to avoid liquidity overkill in the domestic financial sector. Overall, the risk of overtightening of liquidity is not high. The regulatory crackdown since early this year has not had a meaningful impact on credit expansion. Banks' claims to other financial institutions have slowed sharply, but overall loan growth has been rather stable. Importantly, medium- and long-term loans to the corporate sector, pivotal for overall capital spending, have in fact accelerated (Chart 4). In short, increased regulatory scrutiny on the domestic financial sector may continue to create some headline risks and financial volatility, but the real economic impact should be marginal. We expect the authorities to remain highly vigilant and avoid policy overkill. Reading Market Tea Leaves There have been some notable divergences among different classes of Chinese stocks (Chart 5). Chinext, the domestic small-cap venture board, has suffered heavy losses of late, while large-cap A shares have been much more resilient. Meanwhile, offshore Chinese shares have barely felt any pressure at all. H shares have moved higher of late, while Chinese firms listed in the U.S. have decisively broken out. The divergence between onshore and offshore Chinese stocks' performance confirms the recent regulatory crackdown has mainly caused liquidity issues in the domestic market rather than any sort of real growth issue. Barring major policy mistakes, we expect the Chinese economy to stay buoyant, as discussed in detail in our recent report.1 As such, a few investment conclusions can be drawn. Tighter liquidity will likely continue to place downward pressure on domestic stock prices, but the downside is limited by overall buoyant activity and improving profits. We expect the broad-A share market will remain narrowly range-bound. Overseas-listed Chinese shares are not subject to domestic liquidity constraints, and will likely continue to grind higher supported by growth improvement, profit recovery and low valuation multiples. The small-cap Chinext market has long been viewed as the more speculative segment of the domestic financial market, with higher multiples and greater volatility than large-cap A shares. As such, this market will remain vulnerable to domestic liquidity tightening. Even after the most recent selloff, the bourse's trailing price-to-earnings ratio and price-to-book ratio are still at 38.4 and 4.6, respectively, much higher than for broader onshore and offshore Chinese stocks. The recent selloff in the onshore corporate bond market has also been driven by liquidity pressure, which in our view is overdone. While it's true that economic acceleration justifies higher yields, corporate spreads have also widened sharply, which is at odds with the broad growth acceleration and profit recovery. In addition, after the most recent selloff, Chinese corporate spreads are significantly higher than in most other major markets (Chart 6). In the near term, tighter liquidity may continue to induce more selling pressure in the domestic bond market. Cyclically we expect Chinese corporate bond spreads to narrow. Chart 5Diverging Market Trends Chart 6The Sharp Spike In Chinese Corporate ##br##Spreads Is Overdone Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Has China's Cyclical Recovery Peaked?" dated May 5, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Four separate indicators provide compelling evidence for a 'mini-cycle' in activity. 1. The bond yield. 2. The credit impulse. 3. The steel equity sector price. 4. The consumer price index (CPI). Right now, the mini-cycle is about 4 months into downswing whose average duration tends to be about 8 months. Hence, the surprise in the coming months could be that inflation comes in below expectations. Feature Central to our European investment philosophy is the existence of what we call a 'mini-cycle' in global activity. Right now, this cycle is about 4 months into a mini-downswing whose average duration tends to be about 8 months. Within this global mini-cycle the irony is that Europe itself has been a paragon of stability. Quarter on quarter growth has remained within a remarkably narrow 1.2-2.2%1 band for eight consecutive quarters. And the dispersion of growth across euro area countries now stands at a historical minimum. We expect the euro area's relative stability to persist given the recent bottoming of the euro area 6-month bank credit impulse. Nevertheless, for the European investment and inflation outlook, the global growth cycle is as important, or more important, than the domestic cycle. In highly integrated and correlated international markets, the absolute direction of European asset prices takes its cue from a global rather than a local conductor. The pace of consumer price inflation also tends to be a global rather than a local phenomenon. For example, through the past 10 years, the inflation cycles in the euro area, U.K. and U.S. have been near identical (Chart I-2). Chart Of the WeekThe Steel Sector Has A Clear Mini-Cycle Chart I-2The Inflation Cycle Is Global, Not Local In this light, the ECB now correctly assesses that "the risks surrounding the euro area outlook relate predominantly to global factors." As we go on to show below, the surprise in the coming months could be that inflation comes in below expectations. This would slow the ECB's exit from its current ultra-accommodative monetary policy. But because these downside inflation surprises were coming from outside the euro area, it would force other central banks to become even more dovish relative to current expectations. On this basis, we are very comfortable to maintain our relative return positions in European investments: expect euro currency outperformance; T-bond/German bund yield spread convergence; and euro area Financials outperformance versus global Financials. For absolute return positions, expect the relatively benign backdrop for bonds to continue into the summer months. Mini-Cycles: The Evidence Mounts In previous reports, we presented two pieces of evidence for economic mini-cycles. First, the global bond yield shows a remarkably regular wave like pattern with each half-cycle averaging about 8 months (Chart I-3). Second, the acceleration and deceleration of bank credit flows - as measured in the credit impulse - also exhibits a remarkably regular wave like pattern, with each half-cycle also lasting about 8 months (Chart I-4). Chart I-3The Bond Yield Has A Clear Mini-Cycle Chart I-4The Credit Impulse Has A Clear Mini-Cycle We proposed that the bond yield and credit impulse cycles are inextricably embraced in a perpetual feedback loop: a higher bond yield weighs on credit flows; this slows economic growth which then shows up in activity data; in response, the bond market lowers the bond yield; the lower bond yield boosts credit flows, which lift economic growth; and so on... But as each stage in the sequence comes with a delay, the bond yield and credit impulse mini-cycles should be 'out of phase'. And this is precisely what the empirical evidence shows (Chart I-5). Chart I-5The Bond Yield And Credit Impulse Mini-Cycles Are Out Of Phase Now, to build an even stronger case for mini-cycles we will add a third and fourth piece of compelling evidence. The third piece of evidence is the steel equity sector price, which is an excellent real-time indicator of the growth cycle, and shows exactly the same mini-cycle profile as the bond yield (Chart of the Week). The fourth piece of evidence is the consumer price index (CPI) which also presents an identical mini-cycle profile (Chart I-6). Chart I-6The Consumer Price Index Has A Clear Mini-Cycle As with the bond yield and the steel equity sector price, we have de-trended the CPI to better show the underlying cyclicality. But in the case of the CPI, our chosen de-trending rate of 2% has special significance: 2% is the inflation target for most central banks. Hence, if the de-trended CPI is rising, inflation is running above the 2% target; if the de-trended CPI is falling, inflation is running below the 2% target. In this regard, the mini-cycle in the CPI carries a disturbing asymmetry. Observe that in recent mini-upswings, inflation has just about reached the 2% target. But in each and every mini-downswing, inflation has substantially undershot the 2% target. Based on the regularity of the mini-cycle through the past 10 years, we can estimate that we are about half way into a mini-downswing. If so, the surprise in the coming months could be that inflation comes in below expectations, frustrating the ECB. Still, as the disinflationary surprises will emanate from outside the euro area, other major central banks might be even more frustrated. And this supports our aforementioned relative positions in European investments. What Is Your Most Provocative Non-Consensus View? The observation that inflation has struggled to reach 2% in mini-upswings, but substantially undershot 2% in each and every mini-downswing is very telling. The strong suggestion is that the recent modest uplift in inflation towards 2% could just be a mini-cyclical rather than structural phenomenon. The death of debt super-cycles combined with an incipient wave of Artificial Intelligence (AI) led automation still constitutes a very powerful structural deflationary force, which should not be underestimated. The technical pattern of bond yields also supports this thesis. Chartists will point out that the global bond yield is still in a well-defined pattern of lower highs and lower lows - which is to say a well-established downward channel (Chart I-7). And that it would take the yield to rise by a quarter (about 40 bps) to breach this channel. The German 30-year bund yield gives a very similar message (Chart I-8). Chart I-7Still In A Structural Downtrend: The Global Bond Yield... Chart I-8...And The German 30-Year Bund Yield At meetings, clients often ask for the most non-consensus investment view - something to which the street attributes a 10% chance, but to which I attribute a 50% or higher chance. Given the asymmetrical mini-cycle behaviour of both inflation and bond yields and the powerful structural forces of deflation shown in the preceding charts, here is my provocative answer: Perhaps the structural low in bond yields is not behind us; perhaps it is to come in the next major global downturn. But this is a personal view. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 At an annualized rate. Fractal Trading Model* There are no new trades this week, leaving us with four open trades. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Fractal Trading Model * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Special Report

Highlights Venezuela's economic implosion accelerated with the oil price crash. The petrodollar collapse is suffocating consumption as well as oilfield investment, creating a "death spiral" of falling production. The military has already begun assuming more powers as Maduro becomes increasingly vulnerable, and will likely take over before long. OPEC's cuts may help Maduro delay, but not avoid, deposition. Civil unrest/revolution could cause a disruption in oil production, profoundly impacting oil markets. Feature The wheels on the bus go round and round, Round and round, Round and round ... The story of Venezuela's decline under the revolutionary socialist government of deceased dictator Hugo Chavez is well known. The country went from being one of the richest South American states to one of the poorest and from being reliant on oil exports to being entirely dependent on them (Chart 1). The straw that broke the back of Chavismo was the end of the global commodity bull market in 2014 (Chart 2). Widespread shortages of essential goods, mass protests, opposition political victories, and a slide into overt military dictatorship have ensued.1 Chart 1Venezuela Suffers Under Chavismo Chart 2Commodity Bull Market Ended The acute social unrest at the end of 2016 and beginning of 2017 raises the question of whether Venezuela will cause global oil-supply disruptions that boost prices this year.2 One of the reasons we have been bullish oil prices is the fact that the world has little spare production capacity (Chart 3). This means that political turmoil in Venezuela, Libya, Nigeria, or other oil-producing countries could take enough supply out of the market to accelerate the global rebalancing process and drawdown of inventories, pushing up prices. The longer oil prices stay below the budget break-even levels of the politically unstable petro-states (mostly $80/bbl and above), the more likely some of them will be to fail. Venezuela, with a break-even of $350/bbl, has long been one of our prime candidates (Chart 4).3 Venezuela is on the verge of total regime collapse and a massive oil production shutdown. This is not a low-probability outcome. However, the fact that the military is already taking control of the situation, combined with our belief that OPEC and Russia will continue cutting oil production to shore up prices, suggest that the regime may be able to limp along. Therefore a continuation of the gradual decline in oil output is more likely than a sharp cutoff this year. Investors should stay short Venezuelan 10-year sovereign bonds and be aware of the upside risks to global oil prices. A Brief History Of PDVSA State-owned oil company PDVSA is the lifeblood of Venezuela. It once was a well-run company that allowed foreign investment with a reasonable government take, but now it is shut off from direct foreign investment. In 1996-1997, prior to Chavez being elected in late 1998, Venezuela was a rampant cheater on its OPEC quota, producing 3.1-3.3 MMB/d versus a quota of ~2.4 MMB/d in 1996 and ~2.8 in 1997. The oil-price crash that started in late 1997 and bottomed in early 1999 (remember the Economist's "Drowning In Oil" cover story on March 4, 1999 predicting $5 per barrel crude prices?) was a critical event propelling the rise of Chavez (Chart 5). One of the planks in Chavez's platform was that Venezuela had to stop cheating on OPEC quotas because that strategy had helped cause the oil-price decline and subsequent economic misery. Without the oil-price crash, Chavez would not have had such strong public support in the run-up to the 1998 elections, which he won. Chavez did in fact rein in Venezuela's production to 2.8 MMB/d in 1999, which had a positive impact on oil prices and reinforced OPEC. In 2002 and 2003, there were two labor strikes at PDVSA and a two-day coup that displaced Chavez. When Chavez returned to power, he fired 18,000 experienced workers at PDVSA and replaced them with political loyalists. Since then, the total number of employees at PDVSA has swelled from about 46,000 people in 2002, when PDVSA was producing 3.2 MMB/d, to about 140,000 people today, when it is producing slightly below 2 MMB/d. Average oil revenue per employee was over $500,000/person in 2002 at $20 oil, versus about $100,000/person today at $50 oil. Suffice it to say, PDVSA is stuffed to the gills with political patronage, and a strike or a revolution inside PDVSA against President Nicolas Maduro is unlikely. However, if opposition forces manage to seize control of government, the Chavistas in control of PDVSA may attempt to shut down operations to deprive them of oil revenues and blackmail them into a better deal going forward. Chart 5Oil Bust Catapulted Chavez Venezuela is estimated to have the world's largest proved oil reserves at about 300 billion barrels (Chart 6). In addition, there are 1.2-1.4 trillion barrels estimated to rest in heavy-oil deposits in the Orinoco Petroleum Belt (at the mouth of the Orinoco river) that is difficult to extract and has barely been touched. Chart 7Venezuela Cuts Forced By Economic Disaster These reserves are somewhat similar to Canada's oil sands. It is estimated that 300-500 billion barrels are technically recoverable. In the early 2000s, there were four international consortiums involved in developing these reserves: Petrozuata (COP-50%), Cerro Negro (XOM), Sincor (TOT, STO) and Hamaca (COP-40%). However, Chavez nationalized the Orinoco projects in 2007, paying the international oil companies (IOCs) a pittance. XOM and COP contested the taking and "sued" Venezuela at the World Bank. XOM sought $14.7 billion and won an arbitrated decision for a $1.6 billion settlement in 2014. Venezuela continues to litigate the case and the amount awarded to investors has apparently been reduced by a recent ruling. Over the past decade, as Venezuelan industry declined due to dramatic anti-free market laws, including aggressive fixed exchange rates absurdly out of keeping with black market rates, the government nationalized more and more private assets in order to get the wealth they needed to maintain profligate spending policies. The underlying point of these policies is to garner support from low-income Venezuelans, the Chavista political base. In addition to the Orinoco nationalization, the government appropriated equipment and drilling rigs from several oilfield service companies that had stopped working on account of not being properly paid. In 2009, Petrosucre (a subsidiary of PDVSA) appropriated the ENSCO 69 jackup rig, although the rig was returned in 2010. In 2010, the Venezuelan government seized 11 high-quality land rigs from Helmerich & Payne, resulting in nearly $200MM of losses for the company. These rigs were "easy" for Venezuela to appropriate because they did not require much private-sector expertise to operate. As payment failures continued, relationships with the country's remaining contractors continued to be strained. In 2013, Schlumberger (SLB), the largest energy service company in the world, threatened to stop working for PDVSA due to lack of payment in hard currency. PDVSA paid them in depreciating Venezuelan bolivares, but tightened controls over conversion into U.S. dollars. Some accounts receivables were partially converted into interest-bearing government notes. Promises for payment were made and broken. SLB has taken over $600MM of write-downs for the collapse of the bolivar (Haliburton, HAL, has taken ~$150MM in losses). With accounts receivable balances now stratospherically high at approximately $1.2 billion for SLB, $636 million for HAL (plus $200 million face amount in other notes), and $225 million for Weatherford International, the service companies have already taken write-offs on what they are owed and have refused to extend Venezuela additional credit. Unlike the "dumb iron" of drilling rigs, the service companies provide highly technical proprietary goods and services, from drill bits and fluids to measuring services. The lack of these proprietary technical services diminishes PDVSA's ability to drill new wells and properly maintain its legacy production infrastructure. Venezuela's production started falling in late 2015 - well before OPEC and Russia coordinated their January 2017 production cuts (Chart 7). Drought contributed to the problem in 2016 by causing electricity shortages and forced rationing of electricity (60-70% of Venezuela's electricity generation is hydro); water levels at key dams are still very low, but the condition has eased a bit in 2017. After watching crude oil production fall from 2.4 MMB/d in 2015 to 2.05 MMB/d in 2016, OPEC gave Venezuela a production quota of 1.97 MMB/d for the first half of 2017, which is about what they were expected to be capable of producing. In essence, Venezuela was exempt from production cuts, like other compromised OPEC producers Libya, Nigeria and Iran. So far, Venezuela has produced 1.99 MMB/d in the first quarter, according to EIA. Venezuela's falling production is not cartel behavior but indicative of broader economic and political instability. Venezuela is losing control of oil output, the pillar of regime stability. Bottom Line: The double-edged sword for energy companies is that if the regime utterly fails, the country's 2MM b/d of production may be disrupted. However, if government policy shifts - whether through the political opposition finally gaining de facto power or through the military imposing reforms - Venezuela could ramp up its production, perhaps by 1MMB/d within five years, and more after that if Orinoco is developed. How Long Can Maduro Last? Chavez's model worked like that of Louis XIV, who famously said, "après nous, le déluge." Chavez benefited from high oil prices throughout his reign and died in 2013 just before the country's descent into depression began (Chart 8). He won his last election in 2012 by a margin of 10.8%, while Maduro, his hand-picked successor, won a special election only half a year later by a 1.5% margin, which was contested for all kinds of fraud (Chart 9). Chart 8A Hyperflationary Depression Thus Maduro has suffered from "inept successor" syndrome from the beginning, compounding the fears of the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) that the succession would be rocky. Maduro lacked both the political capital and the originality to launch orthodox economic reforms to address the country's mounting inflation and weak productivity, but instead doubled down on Chavez's rapid expansion of money and credit to lift domestic consumption (Chart 10).4 Chart 10Excessive Monetary And Credit Expansion Chart 11Exports Recovered, Reserves Did Not The economic collapse was well under way even before commodities pulled the rug out from under the government.5 Remarkably, the recovery in export revenue since 2010 did not occasion a recovery in foreign exchange reserves - these two decoupled, as Venezuela chewed through its reserves to finance its growing domestic costs (Chart 11). This means Venezuela's ability to recover even in the most optimistic oil scenarios is limited. Another sign that the economic break is irreversible is the fact that, since 2013, private consumption has fallen faster than oil output - a reversal of the populist model that boosted consumption (Chart 12). Chart 12Consumption Falls Faster Than Oil Output Chart 13Oil-Price Crash Hobbles Maduro Critically, the external environment turned against Maduro and PSUV as oil prices declined after June 2014. In November 2014 Saudi Arabia launched its market-share war against Iran and U.S. shale producers, expanding production into a looming global supply overbalance. Brent crude prices collapsed to $29/bbl by early 2016 (Chart 13). This pushed Venezuela over the brink.6 First, hyperinflation: Currency in circulation - already expanding excessively - has exploded upward since 2014. The 100 bolivar note has exploded in usage while notes of lower denominations have dropped out of usage. Total deposits in the banking system are growing at a pace of over 200%, narrow money (M1) at 140%, and consumer price index at 150% (see Chart 10 above). Real interest rates have plunged into an abyss, with devastating results for the financial system. The real effective exchange rate illustrates the annihilation of the currency's value. Monetary authorities have repeatedly devalued the official exchange rate of the bolivar against the dollar (Chart 14). However, the currency remains overvalued, which creates a huge gap between the official rate and the black market rate, which currently stands at about 5,400 bolivares to the dollar. Regime allies have access to hard USD, for which they charge high rents, and the rest suffer. Chart 14Official Forex Devaluations Chart 15Domestic Demand Collapses Second, the real economy has gone from depression to worse: Exports peaked in October 2008, nearly recovered in March 2012, and plummeted thereafter. Imports have fallen faster as domestic demand contracted (Chart 15). Venezuela must import almost everything and the currency collapse means staples are either unavailable or exorbitantly expensive. Venezuelan exports to China reached 20% of total exports in 2012 but have declined to about 14% (Chart 16). This means that Venezuela has lost a precious $10 billion per year. The state has also been trading oil output for loans from China, resulting in an ever higher share of shrinking oil output devoted to paying back the loans, leaving less and less exported production to bring in hard currency needed to pay for production, imports, and debt servicing. Both private and government consumption are shrinking, according to official statistics (Chart 17). Again, the consumption slump removes a key regime support. Chart 16Chinese Demand Is Limited Chart 17Public And Private Consumption Shrink Third, Venezuela is rapidly becoming insolvent: Venezuela's total public debt is high. It stood at 102% of GDP as of August 2014, and GDP has declined by 25%-plus since then. Total external debt, which becomes costlier to service as the currency depreciates, was about $139 billion, or 71% of GDP, in Q3 2015 (Chart 18). It has risen sharply ever since the fall in export revenues post-2011. The destruction of the currency by definition makes the foreign debt burden grow. Chart 18External Debt Soars... Chart 19...While Forex Reserves Dwindle The regime's hard currency reserves are rapidly drying up - they have fallen from nearly $30 billion in 2013 to just $10 billion today (Chart 19). Without hard cash, Venezuela will be unable to meet import costs and external debt payments. In Table 1, we assess the country's ability to make these payments at different oil-price and output levels. Assuming the YTD average Venezuelan crude price of $44/bbl, export revenue should hit about $32 billion this year, while imports should hover around $21 billion, leaving $11 billion for debt servicing costs of roughly $10 billion (combining the state's $8 billion with PDVSA's $2 billion). Thus if global oil prices hold up - as we think they will - the regime may be able to squeak by another year. In short, the regime could have about $11 billion in revenues left at the end of the year if the Venezuela oil basket hovers around $44/bbl and production remains at about 2 MMB/d. That is a "minimum cash" scenario for the regime this year, though it by no means guarantees regime survival amid the widespread economic distress of the population. Chart 20Foreign Asset Sales Will Continue If production drops to 1.25 MMb/d or lower as a result of the economic crisis - or if Venezuelan oil prices settle at $28/bbl or below - the regime will be unable to meet its import costs and debt payments. It will have to sell off more of its international assets as rapidly as it can (Chart 20), restrict imports further, and eventually default. Moreover, the calculation becomes much more negative for Venezuela if we assume, conservatively, $10 billion in capital outflows, which is far from unreasonable. Outflows could easily wipe out any small remainder of foreign reserves. So far, the government has chosen to deprive the populace of imports rather than default on external debt, wagering that the military and other state security forces can suppress domestic opposition for longer than the regime can survive under an international financial embargo. This strategy is fueling mass protests, riots, and clashes with the National Guard and Bolivarian colectivos (militias). An extension of the OPEC-Russia production cuts in late May, which we expect, will bring much-needed relief for Venezuela's budget. Thus, there is a clear path for regime survival through 2017 on a purely fiscal basis, though it is a highly precarious one - the reality is that the state is bound to default sooner or later. Moreover, the socio-political crisis has already spiraled far enough that a modest boost to oil prices this year will probably be too little, too late to save Maduro and the PSUV in its current form. As we discuss below, the question is only whether the military takes greater control to perpetuate the current regime, or the opposition is gradually allowed to take power and renovate the constitutional order. Bottom Line: Even if oil production holds up, and oil prices average above $44/bbl as we expect, the country's leaders will have to take extreme measures to avoid default. Domestic shortages and military-enforced rationing will compound. As economic contraction persists, social unrest will intensify. Will The Military Throw A Coup? Explosive popular discontent this year shows no sign of abating. It is a continuation of the mass protests and sporadic violence since the economic crisis fully erupted in 2014. However, as recession deepens - and food, fuel, and medicine shortages become even more widespread - unrest will spread to a broader geographic and demographic base. Protests since September 2016 have drawn numbers in the upper hundreds of thousands, possibly over a million on two occasions. Security forces have increasingly cracked down on civilians, raising the death toll and provoking a nasty feedback loop with protesters. Reports suggest that the poorest people - the Chavista base - are increasingly joining the protests, which is a new trend and bodes ill for the ruling party's survival. Already the public has turned against the United Socialist Party, as evinced by the December 2015 legislative election results and a range of public opinion polls, which show Maduro's support in the low-20% range. In the 2015 vote, the opposition defeated the Chavistas for the first time since 1998. The Democratic Unity Roundtable won a majority of the popular vote and a supermajority of the seats in the National Assembly. Since then, however, Maduro has used party-controlled civilian institutions like the Supreme Court and National Electoral Council - backed by the military and state security - to prevent the opposition's exercise of its newfound legislative power. Key signposts to watch will be whether Maduro is pressured into restoring the electoral calendar. The opposition has so far been denied local elections (supposedly rescheduled for later this year) and a popular referendum on recalling Maduro. So it has little reason to expect that the government will hold the October 2018 elections on time. The government is likely to keep delaying these votes because it knows it will lose them. In the meantime, the opposition has few choices other than protests and street tactics to try to pressure the government into allowing elections after all. Further, oil prices are low, so the regime is vulnerable, which means that the opposition has every incentive to step up the pressure now. If it waits, higher prices could give Maduro a new infusion of revenues and the ability to prolong his time in power. The question at this point is: will the military defect from the government? The military is the historical arbiter of power in the country. Maduro - who unlike Chavez does not hail from a military background - has only managed to make it this far by granting his top brass more power. Crucially, in July 2016, Maduro handed army chief Vladimir Padrino Lopez control over the country's critical transportation and distribution networks, including for food supplies. He has also carved out large tracts of land for a vast new mining venture, supposed to focus on gold, which the military will oversee and profit from.7 What this means is that the government and military are becoming more, not less, integrated at the moment. The army has a vested interest in the current regime. It is also internally coherent, as recent political science research shows, in the sense that the upper-most and lower-most ranks are devoted to Chavismo.8 Economic sanctions and human rights allegations from the U.S. and international community reinforce this point, making it so that officials have no future outside of the regime and therefore fight harder for the regime to survive.9 Still, there are fractures within the military that could get worse over time. Divisions within the ranks: An analysis of the Arab Spring shows that militaries that defected from the government (Egypt, Tunisia), or split up and made war on each other (Syria, Libya, Yemen), exhibited certain key divisions within their ranks.10 Looking at these variables, Venezuela's military lacks critical ethno-sectarian divisions, but does suffer from important differences between the military branches, between the army and the other state security forces, and between the ideological and socio-economic factions that are entirely devoted to Chavismo versus the rest. Thus, for example, it is possible that Bolivarian militias committing atrocities against unarmed civilians could eventually force the military to change its position to preserve its reputation.11 Popular opinion: Massive protests have approached 1 million people by some counts (of a population of 31 million) and have combined a range of elements within the society - not only young men or violent rebels/anarchists. Also, public opinion surveys suggest that supporters of Maduro have a more favorable view of the army, and opponents have a less favorable view.12 This implies that Maduro's extreme lack of popular support is a liability that will weigh on the military over time. Military funds shrinking: Because of the economic crisis, Maduro has been forced to slash military spending by a roughly estimated 56% over the past year (Chart 21). The military may eventually decide it needs to fix the economy in order to fix its budget. Autonomous military leader: That General Lopez has considerable autonomy is another variable that increases the risk of military defection or fracture. As the country slides out of control Lopez will likely intervene more often. He already did so recently when the Chavista-aligned Supreme Court tried to usurp the National Assembly's legislative function. The attorney general, Luisa Ortega Diaz, broke with party norms by criticizing the court's ruling. Maduro was forced to order the court to reverse it, at least nominally restoring the National Assembly's authority. Lopez supposedly had encouraged Maduro to backtrack in this way, contrary to the advice of two notable Chavistas, Diosdado Cabello and Vice President Tareck El Aissami. Ultimately, military rule for extended periods is common in Venezuelan history. Chavez always deeply integrated the party and military leadership, so the regime could persist through greater military assertion within it, or the military could take over and initiate topical political changes. Finally, if Lopez is ready to stage a coup, he may still wait for oil prices to recover. It makes more sense to let the already discredited ruling party suffer the public consequences of the recession than to seize power when the country is in shambles. Previous coup attempts have occurred not only when oil prices were bottoming but also when they bounded back after bottoming (Chart 22). It would appear that the Venezuelan military is as good at forecasting oil prices as any Wall Street analyst! For oil markets, the military's strong grip over the country suggests that even if Maduro and the PSUV collapse, the party loyalists at PDVSA may not have the option of going on strike. The military will still need the petro dollars to stay in power, and it will have the guns to insist that production keeps up, as long as economic destitution does not force operations to a halt. Bottom Line: There is a high probability that the military will expand its overt control over the country. As long as the leaders avoid fundamental economic reforms, the result of any full-out military coup against Maduro may just mean more of the same, which would be politically and economically unsustainable. Chart 22Coups Can Come After Oil Price Recovers Chart 23Stay Short Venezuelan Sovereign Bonds Investment Implications Any rebound in oil prices as a result of an extension of OPEC's and Russia's production cuts at the OPEC meeting on May 25 will be "too little, too late" in terms of saving Maduro and the PSUV. They may be able to play for time, but their legitimacy has been destroyed - they will only survive as long as the military sustains them. To a great extent, the ruling party has already handed the keys over to the military, and military rule can persist for some time. Hence oil production is more likely to continue its slow decline than experience a sudden shutdown, at least this year. This is because it is likely that military control will tighten, not diminish, when Maduro falls. Incidentally, the military is also more capable than the current weak civilian government of forcing through wrenching policy adjustments that are necessary to begin the process of normalizing economic policy - such as floating the currency and cutting public spending. But any such process would bring even more economic pain and unrest in the short term, and it has not begun yet. Even if the ruling party avoids defaulting on government debts this year - which is possible given our budget calculations - it is on the path to default before long. We remain short Venezuelan 10-year sovereign bonds versus emerging market peers. This trade is down 330 basis points since initiation in June 2015, but Venezuelan bonds have rolled over and the outlook is dim (Chart 23). Within the oil markets, our base case is that global oil producers have benefitted and will benefit from the marginally higher prices derived from Venezuela's slow production deterioration. Should a more sudden and severe production collapse occur, the upward price response would be much more acute. A sustained outage of Venezuelan production would send oil prices quickly towards $80-$100/bbl as a necessary price signal to curb demand growth, creating a meaningful recessionary force around the globe. Oil producers, specifically U.S. shale producers that can react quickly to these price signals, would stand to benefit temporarily from the higher prices, but would again suffer from falling oil prices in the inevitable post-crisis denouement. Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Matt Conlan, Senior Vice President Energy Sector Strategy mattconlan@bcaresearchny.com 1 For the military takeover, please see "Venezuelan Debt: The Rally Is Late," in BCA Emerging Markets Strategy, "EM: From Liquidity To Growth?" dated August 24, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Energy Spring," dated December 10, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com; BCA Commodity and Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Tactical Focus Again Required In 2017," dated January 5, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com; and Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "The Other Guys In The Oil Market," dated April 5, 2017, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Venezuelan Chavismo: Life After Death," dated April 2, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Strategic Outlook 2013," dated January 16, 2013, and Monthly Report, "The Reflation Era," dated December 10, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Assessing Political And Financial Landscapes In Argentina, Venezuela And Brazil," dated January 6, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 7 For Lopez's taking control, please see "Venezuelan Debt: The Rally Is Late" in BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "EM: From Liquidity To Growth?" dated August 24, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. For the gold mine, please see Edgardo Lander, "The Implosion of Venezuela's Rentier State," Transnational Institute, New Politics Papers 1, September 2016, available at www.tni.org. 8 The junior officers have advanced through special military schools set up by Chavez, while the senior officials have been carefully selected over the years for their loyalty and ideological purity. Please see Brian Fonseca, John Polga-Hecimovich, and Harold A. Trinkunas, "Venezuelan Military Culture," FIU-USSOUTHCOM Military Culture Series, May 2016, available at www.johnpolga.com. 9 Please see David Smilde, "Venezuela: Options for U.S. Policy," Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 2, 2017, available at www.foreign.senate.gov. 10 Please see Timothy Hazen, "Defect Or Defend? Explaining Military Responses During The Arab Uprisings," doctoral dissertation, Loyola University Chicago, December 2016, available at ecommons.luc.edu. 11 Civilian deaths caused by the National Guard and Chavez's loyalist militias triggered the aborted 2002 military coup. Please see Steven Barracca, "Military coups in the post-cold war era: Pakistan, Ecuador and Venezuela," Third World Quarterly 28: 1 (2007), pp. 137-54. 12 See footnote 8 above.