Financial Markets

Highlights The post-2008 boom in stocks, corporate bonds, and real estate is a ‘rational bubble’, because the relationship between risk-asset valuations and falling bond yields is exponential. But the ‘rational bubble’ is turning into an ‘irrational bubble’. Stay tactically neutral to stocks for the next few weeks to see whether valuation can revert to rationality. This means keep existing investments in the market, but hold fire on new deployments of cash. If valuation reverts to rationality, then investors can safely deploy new cash into the market. But if valuation moves into irrationality, then it will require a completely different investment mindset, in which fractal analysis will become crucial in identifying the bursting of the bubble, just as it did in 2000. Fractal trade: the Chinese stock market is vulnerable to correction. Feature Chart of the WeekA 'Rational Bubble' And An 'Irrational Bubble' Regular readers will know that we have characterised the post-2008 boom in stocks, corporate bonds, and real estate as a ‘rational bubble’. Rational, because the nosebleed valuations are justified by a fundamental driver. And not just any fundamental driver, but the most fundamental driver of all – the bond yield. However, the ‘rational bubble’ is turning into an ‘irrational bubble’, akin to the dot com mania in which valuations became totally disconnected from fundamentals (Chart of the Week). What should investors do? The Relationship Between Bond Yields And Risk-Asset Valuation Is Exponential Everyone realises that a lower bond yield justifies a lower prospective return from competing investments, such as stocks, corporate bonds, and real estate. As valuation is just the inverse of prospective return, a lower bond yield justifies a higher valuation for all risk-assets. (Chart I-2). Chart I-2House Prices have Decoupled From Rents Again (And It Didn't End Happily Last Time) But few people realise that a lower bond yield justifies an exponentially higher valuation for risk-assets. To visualise this exponential relationship, look again at the Chart of the Week. The bond yield is plotted on a logarithmic (and inverted) left scale, while the stock market forward price-to-earnings is plotted on a linear right scale. The inverted log versus linear scales demonstrate that, in the ‘rational bubble’, the lower the bond yield, the greater the impact of a given decline in the bond yield on stock market valuation. Few people realise that a lower bond yield justifies an exponentially higher valuation for risk-assets. Chart I-3 and Chart I-4 also demonstrate the exponential relationship using the earnings yield as a proxy for the prospective return on stocks. A 1.5 percent decline in the bond yield had a smaller impact on the earnings yield when the bond yield started at 4 percent in 2014 than when the bond yield started at 3 percent in 2019. At the higher bond yield, the prospective return on stocks fell by 1 percent, but at the lower bond yield, the prospective return on stocks plunged by 2.5 percent. Chart I-3A 1.5 Percent Decline In The Bond Yield Had A Smaller Impact On The Earnings Yield When The Bond Yield Started At 4 Percent... Chart I-4…Than When The Bond Yield Started ##br##At 3 Percent To repeat, the lower the bond yield, the greater the impact of a given move in the bond yield on the prospective return from stocks. The intriguing question is, why? To answer this question, we must venture into a branch of behavioural psychology developed by Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, called Prospect Theory. Prospect Theory Explains The ‘Rational Bubble’ Prospect Theory’s key finding is that we consistently overvalue the prospect of a tail-event, both positive and negative. For example, if there is a one in a million chance of winning a million pounds, then the expected value of this prospect is one pound. Yet we will consistently pay more than one pound for this positive tail-event. This willingness to overpay for a positive tail-event is the foundation of the multi-billion pound gambling and lottery industry. Now consider an ‘inverse lottery’, in which there is a one in a million chance of losing a million pounds. In theory, we should take on the risky prospect for one pound. Yet in practice, we will consistently demand more than one pound to take on this negative tail-event. In other words, we will demand a substantial ‘risk premium’. Prospect Theory explains that we overvalue tail-events because we are bad at comprehending small probabilities. Hence, the prospect of winning a million pounds, while in practice a negligible possibility, generates excessive optimism which results in overpayment for the bet. Likewise, the possibility of losing a million pounds, while in practice a negligible possibility, generates excessive pessimism, for which we demand payment of a ‘risk premium’. In the financial markets, stock markets tend to ‘gap down’ much more than they ‘gap up’. Hence, the risk of owning stocks is like the discomfort of the inverse lottery. This explains why investors normally demand a risk premium – an excess prospective return – to own stocks versus bonds. However, the risk relationship between stocks and bonds changes when bond yields approach their lower bound. Now, as bond yields have less scope to move down versus up, bond prices can gap down much more than they can gap up. The upshot is that the risk of owning bonds becomes no different to the risk of owning stocks, and the risk premium to own stocks versus bonds disappears. At ultra-low bond yields, the bond yield and the equity risk premium move up and down in tandem. Given that the prospective return on stocks equals the bond yield plus the risk premium, we can now answer our intriguing question. At ultra-low bond yields, the prospective return on stocks moves by more than the move in the bond yield, because the bond yield and the risk premium are moving up and down in tandem. The result is an exponential relationship between the bond yield and risk-asset valuations. And this explains how the post-2008 collapse in bond yields to unprecedented lows has generated a ‘rational bubble’ in stocks, corporate bonds, and real estate (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). Chart I-5A Rational Bubble In Risk-Assets... Chart I-6...Everywhere   The Rational Bubble Is Turning Irrational The post-2008 boom in risk-asset valuations is rational given the exponential relationship with a collapsed bond yield. But the rational valuation is turning irrational. Over the past few months, the stock market’s forward price-to-earnings multiple has continued to increase despite a backup in the bond yield. Note that this multiple is calculated on the next 12 months of earnings, so it already incorporates a strong post-pandemic earnings rebound (Chart I-7). Chart I-7The Rational Bubble Is Turning Irrational Furthermore, since 2009, the bond yield (plus a fixed constant) has defined a reliable lower limit for the technology sector earnings yield, meaning a well-defined upper limit for the technology sector’s valuation. Since 2009, this valuation limit has effectively defined the limit of the rational bubble and hasn’t been breached. That is, until now. The recent breach of the post-2008 valuation limit means that the rational bubble is turning irrational (Chart I-8). Chart I-8The Post-2008 Rational Valuation Limit Has Been Breached There are three ways that an irrational valuation can revert to rationality: Stock prices decline. Bond yields decline. Stock prices and bond yields drift sideways while (forward) earnings gradually rise to improve stock valuations. The Investment Decision The decision to be invested in the stock market is probably the most important decision for all investors, including those in Europe. Furthermore, the direction of the stock market is a global rather than a local phenomenon. Our current recommendation is to stay tactically neutral for the next few weeks to see whether risk-asset valuations can revert to rationality. This means keep existing investments in the market, but hold fire on new deployments of cash. Hold fire on new deployments of cash. If valuation reverts to rationality in any of the three ways listed above, then investors can safely deploy new cash into the market. But if valuation turns into irrationality, then it will require a completely different investment mindset. After all, you cannot analyse an irrational market using rational tools! In this case, technical analysis becomes much more important, and front and centre of these techniques is fractal analysis. Specifically, as investors with longer and longer time horizons join the irrational bubble, there will be well-defined moments of heightened fragility, at which correction risk increases. This is what burst the irrational bubble in 2000 (Chart I-9), and will burst any new irrational bubble. Stay tuned. Chart I-9The Dotcom Bubble Burst When All Investment Time Horizons Had Joined It Fractal Trading System* The recent strong rally and outperformance of the Chinese stock market is fragile on all three fractal structures: 65-day, 130-day, and 260-day. A good trade is to underweight China versus New Zealand (MSCI indexes), setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 9 percent. In other trades, the continued momentum of reflation plays has weighed on some recent positions as well as stopping out short MSCI World versus the 30-year T-bond. Nevertheless, the rolling 12-month win ratio stands at 54 percent. Chart I-10MSCI: China Vs. New Zealand When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated   December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Highlights The Biden administration’s budget reconciliation bill will close the output gap, so markets will have to start thinking about upcoming tax hikes, rising wages, and eventual Fed interest rate hikes. Biden’s lax immigration policies will not have a major negative impact on wage growth. A doubling of the minimum wage, which could still make it into one of two budget reconciliation bills, would include a measure to index the post-2026 minimum wage to the average rate of wage rises. Biden’s industrial policy and support of labor unions would also increase wages. Stay long Treasury inflation-protected securities versus duration-matched Treasuries and long value stocks over growth stocks.  Feature The Senate and House of Representatives passed a concurrent resolution on the budget for FY2021, the first step in the budget reconciliation process that will enable Democratic leadership to pass President Joe Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan with only a simple majority in the Senate. The budget resolution is a fantasy that the ruling party uses to bypass the Senate filibuster, as was the case under George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump. The latest such resolution claims that the budget deficit will be smaller, not larger, after the Biden rescue plan than what is currently projected by the Congressional Budget Office (Chart 1). It envisions the entire $1.9 trillion being spent in 2021 and then a huge drop in expenditures in 2022. A fiscal cliff ahead of the 2022 midterm election will not occur. Instead the second budget reconciliation maneuver, for FY2022, will increase spending levels once again with infrastructure and green projects, as per Biden’s campaign platform. Chart 1Democrats Pass Budget Resolution The FY2021 budget resolution does not contain any tax increases, “revenue offsets,” to keep the budget in line because the COVID relief is emergency spending that is one-off, not recurring. The FY2022, however, will aim partially to repeal President Trump’s tax cuts. As such financial markets will continue to “buy the rumor” of additional fiscal spending for now but they will also sell the news given that the next reconciliation bill will push up inflation expectations even further, hasten the Federal Reserve’s policy normalization, and include tax hikes. And the current buy-the-rumor phase could be interrupted anyway by Biden’s immediate foreign policy challenges. Larry Summers And The Output Gap Democrats will err on the larger side of the $1.9 trillion stimulus because they regret erring on the smaller side back in 2009. But it is still possible for the price tag to be knocked down to around $1.5 trillion given that the economy is recovering and several moderate Democrats will balk at the enormous size. After all, $900 billion passed at the end of the year is not yet spent. Biden has already compromised by raising the eligibility requirements for households to receive $1,400 stimulus checks. Larry Summers, a frequent guest at the annual BCA conference and a veteran of the Clinton and Obama White Houses, has stirred up a firestorm over the past month by warning that too much federal money spent on short-term cash handouts today would crowd out the administration’s political capital and the amount of deficit spending that is available for long-term, productivity-enhancing investments. Summers warned that the current proposed stimulus is three times larger than required to fill the output gap. Chart 2 shows the output gap from 2009-12 and projected from 2021-24 alongside the size of the relevant stimulus packages to illustrate his point. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen defended the $1.9 trillion price tag – like Summers, she is not normally one to worry about overheating the economy, but unlike Summers, she is now an administration official. She predicted that this size of package would bring the economy back to full employment by next year. The Congressional Budget Office, based on earlier congressional actions, had predicted employment would not return to its pre-COVID level until around 2024. The administration will look to Yellen now and in future to make the call on when enough stimulus is enough. With inflation expectations recovering rapidly, the Fed could be forced to hike rates as early as late 2022, though we think 2023 is more likely given our methodological bias as political analysts. This means the scope for overheating is quite large – a point reinforced by the comparison with the economic recovery back in 2009 (Chart 3). Summers’s criticism is not remiss and could come back to haunt the administration.1 When inflation picks up, the Fed will have to allow an overshoot according to its new policy of targeting average inflation. But once it is assured, it will have to start hiking rates. And once it starts hiking rates it could trigger a recession. Plus, even if we set recession risks aside, Summers’s critical point is that too much stimulus today will reduce the political and budgetary scope for Biden’s long-term agenda, which includes what will likely be his second major bill focused on infrastructure and renewables. The reconciliation process makes it highly likely that Democrats will drive through this initiative through the Senate but not if moderate Senate Democrats balk in the face of rising budget deficits and inflation. Chart 2How Much Is Too Much Stimulus? Our base case still holds that Democrats will pass both reconciliation bills over the next roughly 12 months but investors should keep Summers’s warning in mind. Chart 3Recovery Is Ahead Of The Previous Cycle There are tailwinds for Biden’s agenda. First, his political capital is moderate-to-strong and likely to strengthen over the coming year. It will get bumped up by improving economic conditions, including most recently a marked decline in bankruptcy filings from Q3 to Q4. Our updated Political Capital Index is shown in the  Appendix. Second, concern about budget deficits has eroded, as Republican fiscal largesse showed under Trump – the pandemic and atmosphere of crisis greatly reinforce this point. Third, divisions in the Republican Party have produced as many as five moderates who could assist Biden in winning close legislative votes – even beyond the relatively easy passage of the American Rescue Plan in his honeymoon period. This Republican Party split is the only significance of President Trump’s second impeachment. Trump’s legal woes will continue after he is acquitted in the Senate. The deeper Republicans are divided over Trump’s legacy the harder time they will have recovering in the 2022 midterms, where opposition parties are normally favored. But the Biden administration’s leftward agenda will bring Republicans together, especially once the country moves out of the crisis. One of the biggest battles looms over the southern border. Bottom Line: The $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan will more than close the output gap and yet it is only one of two budget reconciliation bills that the Biden administration will seek to pass over the next 12 months. There are still domestic and international factors that could impede the recovery, not least China’s policy tightening, but the risk of excessively short-term stimulus at the expense of long-term public investment is clear. Republicans Will Regroup Over Immigration To Summers’s warning about Biden’s legislative window of opportunity, recall that President Trump never achieved his signature 2016 policy promise – to build a wall on the border with Mexico – because congressional Republicans led him to prioritize repealing and replacing the Affordable Care Act (which failed) and passing the Tax Cut and Jobs Act (which succeeded). There was no political capital left for a major legislative push on the border and immigration. Immigration is one of the areas where Biden has a major incentive to push his policies aggressively. Immigrants tend to skew Democratic in their party affiliations. Americans increasingly believe immigration should be increased, a trend that accelerated after Trump’s election on an avowedly anti-immigration platform (Chart 4, top panel). Today 34% believe it should be increased in addition to 36% who are comfortable with the current level. Meanwhile the number who believe it should be decreased has fallen to 28%, down from 34%-38% around the time of Trump’s election. An anti-immigration candidate may be able to win within the Republican Party (especially under the specific circumstances of 2015-16) but he or she will have trouble winning general elections. Trump himself discarded the topic in the 2020 race. For Democrats, immigration is also probably the single most effective way to drive a wedge between the populist and establishment factions of the Republican Party. For example, establishment Republican presidents oversaw huge infusions of foreigners into US society, the 1986 Immigration and Reform Control Act, which granted amnesty to three million illegal immigrants, and the 1990 Immigration Act, which increased the quota of legal immigrants. By contrast Trump rose to power by attacking the bipartisan consensus on “open borders.” As long as a substantial cohort of Republicans defends immigration on free market principles, and upholds the corporate interest in having plentiful availability of lower wage seasonal and specialized workers, the party will be divided. The above points explain why the Biden administration will pursue immigration reform more intently than public opinion would leave one to believe. Polls show that voters want to focus on the economic recovery, the pandemic response, and social and civil rights policies more than immigration. There is no question that Biden is prioritizing the pandemic, the economy, and health care (Chart 4, bottom panel). But the Democratic Party has a strategic interest in expanding immigration so Biden will continue to plow forward with executive orders and comprehensive immigration reform in Congress. The US does need immigration reform – to ensure the flow is orderly. President Trump’s “wall” proposal did not come out of nowhere. Like the “Know Nothing Party” that emerged in the 1840s and rose to prominence in the 1850s, the Trump movement arose amid a historic increase in the foreign-born share of the population (Chart 5). But Trump’s policies hardly made a dent in the flow of legal immigrants into the US. Now Biden will reverse them and encourage more incomers. Therefore immigration will persist as a bone of contention in the 2020s. Granted, immigration has amply attested positive effects on the economy – including most clearly by lifting the US’s fertility rate so that it does not suffer from as rapid of an aging process as other developed countries. Indeed, voters are primarily concerned about illegal, not legal, immigration. Still, Republicans will struggle to walk the line between tighter immigration policies and appealing to an audience beyond “old white folks.” This suggests the Biden administration has room to run. Chart 4Public Not Too Concerned About Immigration Chart 5Historically Large Foreign-Born Population It helps Biden that the post-World War II and post-Cold War booms in legal immigration are relatively measured when compared to the overall population. The inflow of migrants was around 0.3% in 2019, very far from its post-war peak of 0.7% per year (Chart 6). Thus the Biden administration will not be overly concerned about being too progressive on this issue. Chart 6Boom In Legal Immigration Less Impressive Relative To Population Chart 7Detainees On The Mexican Border Illegal immigration is the biggest factor motivating periodic public backlashes such as in 2016. Southwestern border apprehensions – the only credible way to measure the unauthorized flow of people over the Mexican border – spiked under President Obama as well as President Trump, though US agents detained nowhere near the numbers witnessed in the 1980s and 1990s (Chart 7). The stock of illegal immigrants in the US ranges from 10-11 million and has remained flat, or fallen slightly, since the financial crisis of 2008. The weakening of the US economy, in the context of tighter border security, reduced incentives to make the difficult journey (Chart 8). The fact that President Obama and Trump increased detentions suggests that the demand to get into the country recovered over the course of the last business cycle. Based on President Biden’s voting record in the Senate and statements during the 2020 campaign, he is not an ultra-dove on the border – but his party has moved to the left on the issue. This is clear from his rivals’ positions in the Democratic primary election. Even his Vice President Kamala Harris, who was not the most radical on stage, supported decriminalizing illegal border crossings and downgrading Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Still, until Democrats repeal the filibuster in the Senate, they will not have a chance of passing comprehensive immigration reform with Republicans unless they accept stronger enforcement provisions. Biden voted for the 2006 Secure Fence Act but more recently has emphasized high-tech upgrades to better monitor crossovers. Harris also accepted high-tech security funding that did not involve building a wall. Even with these compromises, it will still be a stretch to find 10 Republicans willing to cross the aisle on this issue while Trump and his faction remain active to punish them in primary elections. Chart 8Estimate Of Total Illegal Immigrants The demand to enter the US will revive once the pandemic is over. The big surge in illegal border crossings in the 1980s-90s coincided with a period in which US economic growth and wellbeing far outpaced that of Mexico and Central America (Chart 9). The gap in GDP per capita is the crudest possible measure and does not reflect the dramatic differences in quality of life that drive people to relocate. Nevertheless, the gap remains drastic, especially with Mexico. Chart 9The Grass Is Greener On The Other Side The gap in current economic activity, such as manufacturing PMIs, between the US and Mexico is as wide as ever. Even as manufacturing contracts in Mexico, the demand for workers in US service industries is soaring (Chart 10). Moreover the US economic revival will be super-charged by the gargantuan fiscal stimulus of 2020-21 whereas Mexican government support for the economy is comparatively austere (Chart 11) Chart 10Super-Charged US Recovery Opens Big Gap With Mexico Chart 11Less Government Support In Mexico Than US Bottom Line: Biden is opening up the borders at a time of economic disparity between the US and Latin America that will lead to an influx of immigration. This is positive for US labor force growth and productivity but it will be hard to pass a long-term solution through Congress. The Republican Party is deeply divided on the issue today but it is likely to become a rallying cry as numbers of newcomers increase and as Trump-style populism remains an active force within the party. Immigration, Wages, And The Minimum Wage   The macroeconomic and market impact of easier border and immigration controls boils down to the impact on wages. There is a vast literature on this subject and we will not pretend to be comprehensive. We will merely make a few observations. The foreign-to-native-born wage differential has narrowed substantially over the past twenty years. The discount to hire immigrants has shrunk from 24% to 15% (Chart 12). This is a reflection of the high demand for immigrant labor and especially the increase in high-skilled workers alongside the booming tech, legal, financial, personal care, and health care industries in the United States – the fastest growing sectors for foreign-born workers since 2003. Earnings growth for foreign workers is more cyclical than for native workers and has been rising faster in recent decades (Chart 13). Chart 12Immigrants Command A Higher Price Than They Used To Chart 13Immigrant Wages Grow In Boom Times Immigrants work the lowest-wage jobs and hence there is some correlation between the share of foreign-born workers in any given industry and the hourly wage, just as there was at the turn of the century (Chart 14). But it does not follow that an increase in immigration suppresses wages as a whole. Chart 15 shows that, over the last business cycle at least, a change in the foreign worker share of a given industry does not correlate with a change in wage growth. Of course, it stands to reason that increasing the supply of labor decreases the price. But not if demand is growing sufficiently to raise the price for all workers. As we have seen, since migrants are willing to undertake long and dangerous journeys for work, they are likely to go where the demand is strong and the price is right – and the flow drops when the jobs dry up. Chart 14Immigrants Work The Lowest Wage Jobs Chart 15More Immigration Not Necessarily A Pay Cut Academics debate the impact on wages. There could be a negative impact, especially for low-skilled native workers, but the aggregate effect is small. One study showed that wages for native workers fell by three percent cumulatively over the 20-year period from 1980-2000 due to immigration.2  This is not dramatic. We can test the connection between immigration and wage growth informally by plotting the growth of southwest border detentions and legal permanent residence admissions alongside that of real wages. There is no clear relationship either way (Chart 16). The same is true if we test it with real median wages – the surge in border apprehensions under President Trump coincided with a boom in wages across the spectrum.  Chart 16Border Influx Does Not Suppress Wages Thus we cannot rule out the possibility that the Biden administration’s relaxation of border controls will have a dampening effect on wages over the long run but we cannot endorse it either. Chances are that the rollout of COVID-19 vaccines and government spending will continue to power a recovery that tightens the labor market and lifts wages for most workers.   What about the administration’s simultaneous policy of doubling the federal minimum wage to $15 per hour by the year 2026 – and indexing wage growth after that date to the median hourly wage? The minimum wage hike might yet make it into the budget reconciliation bill under negotiation – but Biden has already signaled it can be delayed. There is a growing fear about the negative impact on small businesses struggling during the pandemic. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that anywhere from 1 million to 2.7 million jobs could be lost in 2025 if the wage hike were implemented now and businesses would pay $333 billion.3 But the proposal will return when the second budget reconciliation bill is up for consideration unless the Senate parliamentarian rules it out, in which case its passage becomes much less likely. Only about 2% of workers are paid at or below the current minimum wage of $7.25 per hour so a minimum wage hike but the CBO estimates that 10 percent of workers would be below the proposed wage level by 2025 (Chart 17). The states with higher proportions of minimum wage workers will be the ones most affected and are mostly in the south, including South Carolina, Mississippi, Kentucky, and Texas, though there are a few in the north such as New Hampshire and Pennsylvania (Chart 18). Chart 17Most Workers Earn More Than Minimum Wage Chart 18Minimum Wage Workers By State Previous minimum wage hikes did not prevent the economy from reaching full employment – nor did they lead to a lasting pickup in overall wage growth. But indexation to overall wage growth would mark a big change in favor of an eventual wage-price spiral. It cannot be ruled out given that the reconciliation option might be available to Democrats, though it would not take effect till 2026. Bottom Line: There is no firm link between immigration growth and wage growth. Increased immigration flows often coincide with higher incomes and wages as growth and productivity improve. Meanwhile a change in the minimum wage will have a limited impact from a macro point of view alone but a bigger impact if it is indexed to wage growth after 2026, which is possible. In the coming years the much greater impact of Biden’s policies will stem from the massive infusion of fiscal spending he is likely to pass through Congress, which will close the output gap quickly and put upward pressure on wages.    Investment Takeaways Easier immigration and a higher minimum wage are not the only Biden policies that will affect wages. One of the biggest developments since Biden took office is his confirmation that he will maintain a tougher trade policy than his predecessors, excluding Trump. Biden won the election among Midwestern blue collar voters at least partly by stealing Trump’s thunder on trade and globalization. Since taking office he has issued a “Buy American” executive order and declared that he will maintain “extreme” competition with China. His cabinet appointees – notably Antony Blinken at the State Department and Janet Yellen at the Treasury – have given words of warning to China over trade as well. Geopolitical risk is one reason we are cutting back on our participation in the market’s exuberance at the moment, given that critical foreign policy stances are likely to be tested early in Biden’s term. But there is also a long-term implication of the Democrats’ marginal increase in protectionism.   It was the overall policy context of hyper-globalization that led to sluggish wage growth in the United States over the previous forty years. A major factor was the decline of manufacturing and unionization as a result of a lack of competitiveness in the US as global production came online. The erosion in manufacturing jobs only stopped in recent years (Chart 19). Popular support for unions has risen to levels last seen in the late 1970s and 1990s since the Great Recession – under Trump even Republicans talked up unions. Chart 19Blame Fall In Manufacturing, Not Foreign Workers, For Flat Wages Biden’s policies outlined above are reminiscent of the “third way” Democrats in the 1990s – particularly Bill Clinton, who oversaw an increase in the minimum wage and a surge in both legal and illegal immigration. But on trade Biden is shaping up to be more like Trump than Clinton, albeit directing his protectionism more at China than other trade partners. His spending bills will also use fiscal spending to promote industrial policy. Meanwhile labor protections will go up and unionization will at least stem its multi-decade decline.    For the stock market the risk of higher wages looms mostly due to the super-charging of the economy with stimulus. But shoring up domestic manufacturing, unions, labor perks and protections, and possibly indexing the minimum wage will contribute to faster wage growth and – to corporations – higher employment costs (Chart 20). This is a headwind to the corporate earnings outlook. But like the Biden administration’s tax hikes it is not yet affecting the market’s overall bullishness – and may not until the first reconciliation bill passes and the narrative shifts from stimulus to structural reform. Investors may soon find out that they will be dealing with higher wages, higher taxes, higher inflation, and a higher cost of capital. Chart 20Higher Wages, Lower Corporate Profits Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor jesse.Kuri@bcaresearch.com   Appendix Table A1APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Table A1BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Table A1CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets Table A2Political Risk Matrix Table A3Biden’s Cabinet Position Appointments     Footnotes 1     See BCA Global Investment Strategy, “Fiscal Stimulus: How Much Is Too Much?” January 8, 2021, bcaresearch.com. 2     George J. Borjas and Stephen J. Trejo, “The Evolution of the Mexican-Born Workforce in the United States,” in Borjas, ed, Mexican Immigration to the United States (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), pp.13-55.     3    See “The Budgetary Effects of the Raise the Wage Act of 2021,” Congressional Budget Office, February 2021, cbo.gov.  

Dear client, Next week instead of our regular Strategy Report we will be sending you a Special Report from BCA’s Equity Analyzer service on Inflation and Factor investing penned by my colleague Lucas Laskey, Senior Quantitative Analyst. Finally, on February 22 we will be hosting our quarterly webcast one at 10am EST for North American and EMEA clients and one at 8pm EST for Asia Pacific, Australian and New Zealand clients “From Alpha To Omega With Anastasios”. Mathieu Savary, who heads our Daily Insights service, will be our special guest in the morning webcast. On March 1 we will resume our regular publication schedule. Kind Regards, Anastasios Highlights Portfolio Strategy China’s engineered economic deceleration, the knee jerk US dollar bounce along with signs of soft US capital expenditures entice us to protect our deep cyclicals versus defensives portfolio gains and institute a 2.5% rolling stop to this share price ratio. Rising relative capital outlays, firming software pricing power and an M&A frenzy more than offset the negative relative profit signal from our models that sell side analysts already anticipate. Continue to overweight the S&P software index.  Recent Changes Last Tuesday we closed out our VIX futures hedge for a gain of 19% since the December 7, 2020 inception. Last Wednesday we re-initiated our long “Back-To-Work”/short “COVID-19 Winners” pair trade. Feature Equity volatility settled down last week following a ferocious ten-day SPX oscillation that sent the VIX soaring to roughly 38 near the peak at the end of January, courtesy of the GME/Wallstreetbets (WSB) saga before collapsing back down near 21 last week. Chart 1 shows that this was likely an equity-only event: both risk off currencies – the yen and the franc – actually fell versus the USD, junk bond spreads barely budged and the vol curve violently inverted, a move that more often than not signals that complacency has morphed into panic. Importantly, when the Fed embarks on active QE the SPX drawdown maxes out at 10% based on empirical evidence, including the recent September/October 10% drawdown. Using the ES futures low hit two Sundays ago, the S&P 500 experienced a 5.3% peak-to-trough pullback well within the range of previous Fed active QE iterations. As a reminder, the 2010 and 2011, 17% and 20% respective drawdowns took root after the Fed had concluded QE1 and QE2 operations. The implication is that for a more significant drawdown to materialize, likely the Fed has to end the current QE operation and reinject some volatility in the bond markets (bottom panel, Chart 1).  Isolating the true signal from all this noise, convinced us to book handsome gains to the tune of 19% in our VIX June futures hedge (conservatively assuming that no leverage was used), reinitiate the long “Back-To-Work”/short “COVID-19 Winners” pair trade and put the small cap size bias on our upgrade watch list. As volatility has slowly died down, investors can start to refocus on profit fundamentals. Similar to the steep fall in EPS that the SPX 35% drawdown predicted in March of 2020, in recent research we showed that were we to hold the SPX at current levels, its 12-month rate-of-change would surpass the 61% mark next month and forecast that profit growth would rise by a similar amount. Indeed, sell side analysts’ bottom up earnings estimates corroborate this analysis as quarterly EPS will peter out roughly at a 48% year-over-year (YOY) growth rate next quarter and vault to all-time highs in quarterly level terms in Q3 following a three-year hiatus (Chart 2). Chart 1Equity-only Event Chart 2Joined At The Hip Importantly, the tech sector no longer commands an earnings weight similar to its market cap weight likely because it’s run ahead of itself and also because the rest of the sectors are playing catch up this year as the US economy is slated to reopen on the back of the herculean inoculation efforts (profit weight and mkt cap weight columns, Table 1). Table 1Sector EPS And Market Cap Weights This is most evident on the sector contribution to this year's SPX earnings growth. Historically, the tech sector commanded the lion’s share of profit explanation for the SPX, but not in 2021. In fact, the S&P IT sector is ranked 4th in terms of contribution to overall SPX profits, behind industrials, financials and consumer discretionary (Chart 3).   Delving deeper into 12-month forward earnings growth figures is instructive. Table 2 shows our universe of coverage ranked first by GICS1 sector growth rates and then re-ranked per sub-group. As an aside the energy sector’s EPS is slated to contract in calendar 2020 and thus any YOY growth rate figures are rendered useless for the broad sector and the energy sub-industries. Chart 3Sector Contribution To 2021 SPX EPS Growth Table 2Identifying S&P 500 Sector EPS Growth Leaders And Laggards Our portfolio positioning is well aligned with the sector ranking of EPS growth for the coming year. Put differently, given the havoc that COVID-19 wreaked to the US industrial and service bases it is normal that deep cyclical sectors along with financials and the decimated services-heavy parts of the consumer discretionary sector to occupy the top ranks. In contrast, defensives sectors that were largely COVID-19 beneficiaries (especially health care and consumer staples) are near the bottom of the pit. The sole misalignment is the bombed out real estate sector that we remain overweight (Table 2). Netting it all out, our sense is that the market has successfully navigated a tumultuous two-week period and we reiterate our long-held sanguine 9-12 month cyclical view on the prospects of the S&P 500. This week, we update a defensive tech sub-group and put a tight stop in the cyclicals/defensives portfolio bent in order to protect profits. Risks To The Cyclicals Over Defensives Portfolio Bent Last December we highlighted that China’s four year cycle will peter out in the back half of 2021 and could cause some equity market consternation, with stocks likely sniffing out any trouble likely by the end of Q1/2021. It appears that investors have been sleeping at the wheel and largely distracted by the GME/WSB saga. Not only did they neglect the robust SPX profit season, but they also ignored that something is amiss in China as we first showed last week (please refer to Chart 12 here). Importantly, what worries us most is the transition from China being the primary locomotive of global growth to the US taking the reins in coming quarters. Clearly such a handoff is tumultuous, especially given the recent added risk of a reflex rebound in the greenback that we first warned about on January 12 when we set the cyclicals/defensives ratio on downgrade alert. Subsequently, we upgraded the S&P utilities sector to neutral locking in gains of 15% for the portfolio, and today we decide to institute a 2.5% rolling stop in the cyclicals/defensives portfolio bent, in order to participate on further upside but also protect 16% gains for the portfolio since the July 27, 2020 inception in case of a market relapse. Practically, when the rolling stop gets triggered we will move the cyclicals/defensives bent down to neutral via executing the downgrade alert we have in the S&P materials sector. In more detail, China’s slamming on the brakes is the key risk to cyclicals/defensives. Not only are the Chinese authorities trying to engineer a slowdown with the recent reverse repo operations, but also BCA’s China Monetary Indicator, the selloff in the Chinese sovereign bond market and the cresting in the PBOC’s balance sheet are all corroborating the economic deceleration signal (Chart 4). Chinese total social financing has peaked, the 6-month credit impulse is plunging, and the nosedive in Goldman Sachs’ Chinese current activity indicator (CAI) are all firing warning shots that the economy is slated to slowdown (Chart 5).  Chart 4Everywhere… Chart 5…One Looks… Already both the Chinese manufacturing and services PMIs have hooked down with the manufacturing new orders-to-inventories (NOI) in free fall and export orders in outright contraction. Tack on the reversal in the Citi economic surprise index (ESI) for China and the outlook dims further for US cyclicals/defensives (Chart 6). No wonder Chinese demand for loans has turned the corner, infrastructure spending has topped out and railway freight volumes have ticked down as a direct response to the tightening in Chinese monetary conditions (Chart 7). Chart 6…China… Chart 7…Is Slowing… Chinese imports flirting with the zero line best capture all this softening in Chinese data and also warns that the US cyclicals/defensives ratio is nearing a zenith (Chart 8). Beyond the dual risk of a counter trend rally in the USD and China’s undeniable deceleration, returning to US shores reveals another source of potential trouble for cyclicals/defensives. Chart 8…Down The US Citi ESI has come back down to earth, and the ISM manufacturing PMI cooled off last month with the NOI ratio flashing red (Chart 9). Importantly, Goldman Sachs’ US CAI is sinking like a stone corroborating that, at the margin, US economic data is softening (Chart 10). Moreover, US capex is in the doldrums courtesy of the collapse in EPS last year that dealt a blow to CEO confidence. Worrisomely, the rollover in the latest capex intentions from regional Fed surveys along with the downbeat NFIB survey’s capital outlays in 6-months component underscore that CEOs remain reluctant to invest (Chart 9). Chart 9Even US Trouble… Finally, relative valuations have surged to all-time highs leaving no cushion in case of a mishap, while relative technicals are in extreme overbought territory near a level that has marked the commencement of prior relative share price drawdowns (Chart 11). Chart 10…Is Brewing Netting it all out, China’s engineered economic deceleration, the knee jerk US dollar bounce along with signs of soft US capital expenditures entice us to protect our deep cyclicals versus defensives portfolio gains and institute a 2.5% rolling stop to this share price ratio. Bottom Line: Prepare to move the cyclicals/defensives portfolio bent back down to neutral from currently overweight. Today we recommend investors establish a 2.5% rolling stop to the cyclicals/defensives relative share price ratio as a risk management tool in order to protect profits. Chart 11Overstretched And Pricey Software On The Ascend While we remain on the sidelines with regard to the broad S&P technology sector we continue to recommend a barbell portfolio approach preferring defensive software and services stocks to aggressive hardware and equipment equities. In that light, we reiterate our overweight stance in the key S&P software sub-industry that still commands the highest market cap weight in the tech sector just shy of 33%. While overall capex is sluggish as we highlighted above, software capital outlays have recovered smartly and according to national accounts are growing at a 10%/annum pace. Stock market-reported capex confirms that software capital expenditures are on an absolute tear and remain a key pillar of our secular preference for this defensive tech group (Chart 12). On the sales front, COVID-19 accelerated the push to the cloud and 2020 has been a bumper year for industry sales. True there is an element of stealing revenues from the future, but as long-time readers of our publication know we do not believe that SaaS is a fad and the adoption of cloud services remains in the early innings. Impressively, while relative forward top line growth expectations have rolled over, the attempt of the software price deflator to exit deflation suggests that software stocks will easily surpass this lowered revenue bar in coming quarters (Chart 13). Chart 12Primary Capex Beneficiary Amidst the IPO frenzy that has captured investors’ imagination especially given the spectacular increases in both SNOW and PLTR (neither of which is in the SPX yet), software M&A fever remains as high as ever. This constant reduction of software stock supply, coupled with the insatiable appetite of software executives to aggressively retire equity, signals that software equity prices will remain well bid (Chart 14). Chart 13Software Tries To Exit Deflation Chart 14Positive Share Price Dynamics Nevertheless, our relative EPS growth models are waving a yellow flag. The SPX is slated to grow profits north of 25% this year, but according to our profit models software will only manage to grow in the single digits, thus trailing the broad market by a wide margin. Encouragingly, this grim relative profit growth backdrop is already reflected in depressed sell side analysts’ forecasts (Chart 15). Finally, while relative valuations are still lofty they recently have corrected back to one standard deviation above the historical mean. Similarly, relative technicals have worked off overbought conditions and have settled down near the recent historical average (Chart 16). Chart 15Risks… In sum, rising relative capital outlays, firming software pricing power and an M&A frenzy more than offset the negative relative profit signal from our models that sell side analysts already anticipate. Bottom Line: Continue to overweight the S&P software index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5SOFT – MSFT, ADBE, CRM, ORCL, INTU, NOW, ADSK, ANSS, SNPS, CDNS, FTNT, PAYC, CTXS, NLOK, TYL. Chart 16…To Monitor   Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations Size And Style Views January 12, 2021  Stay neutral small over large caps July 27, 2020 Overweight cyclicals over defensives (2.5% rolling stop) June 11, 2018 Long the BCA Millennial basket  The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, ABNB, V). January 22, 2018 Favor value over growth

Highlights There is too much euphoria and complacency in global markets. The main distinction between the current and previous episodes of speculative equity market excesses is that classic end-of-business cycle conditions – such as economic overheating and policy tightening – are now absent. Yet, it does not mean that the bull market will continue uninterrupted. This rally might be short circuited by gravitational forces as happened with the S&P 500 in 1987 and Chinese onshore stocks in 2015. Investors should consider going long EM equity or EM currency volatility to hedge their exposure. Feature There is growing evidence that the global equity rally has turned into a frenzy. Signs of investor euphoria include: The number of traded call options in the US equity market has surged to an all-time high (Chart 1). The number of put options has spiked only in the past couple of weeks and remains well below the number of call options. Chart 1A Call Buying Frenzy Is A Symptom Of Investor Exuberance Critically, there is currently too much complacency: the US put-call ratio is as low as it was in 2000 (Chart 2). The volume of stocks traded on and off all US stock exchanges has exploded since late October, reaching an all-time high (Chart 3). Chart 2A Sign Of Equity Market Complacency Chart 3US Equity Trading Volumes Are At All-Time Highs Chart 4Retail Investors Haven Been A Powerful Force In Korea And Taiwan Equity fervor is prevalent not only among American individual investors but also in many parts of the world. For instance, the breathtaking rallies in the KOSPI and Taiwanese stocks has been primarily driven by local retail investors, as shown in Chart 4. The surge in Taiwanese share prices is stunning because it completely ignores the escalating geopolitical tensions over Taiwan. BCA Research’s Chief Geopolitical Strategist, Matt Gertken, recently argued that while China is unlikely to invade Taiwan immediately, a military stand-off cannot be ruled out. China and the US have yet to arrive at a mutual understanding regarding China’s access to computer chips made in Taiwan. Overall, since the lockdowns in March last year, individual investors have rushed into equities in many countries such as the US, Korea, Taiwan, Japan, India and Brazil, to name a few. Finally, US institutional investors are fully invested, as shown in Chart 5. Besides, Chart 6 reveals that US-domiciled EM equity mutual funds’ liquidity ratio (cash as a percentage of assets) is very low. Chart 5US Institutional Investors Are Long Stocks Chart 6US-Domiciled EM Mutual Funds' Cash Is Low   There have been doubts within the global investment community about the potential for small individual investors to move the needle in the overall market. We believe that their impact has been substantial: First, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence to suggest that individual traders have been involved in options trading since the pandemic erupted. By purchasing call options, retail investors exert substantial upward pressure on share prices: dealers – who sell/write call options – typically hedge their risks by acquiring and holding the underlying stock for the duration of respective options. In short, by putting even small amounts of money at work to purchase call options, individual traders meaningfully affect share prices. Second, price formation in financial markets is influenced by the marginal investor. Everything else being equal, the entry of a new buyer into the marketplace leads to higher prices. Further, retail investors’ impact on financial markets has not been limited solely to stocks they purchase. Rather, there has been a ripple effect on the broader market. For instance, there is evidence that individual investors flocked to the market in March and April and bought en masse shares of companies most negatively affected by the pandemic, such as cruise operations, hotels, airlines and energy producers. As individual investors provided substantial bids for these stocks, institutional investors were able to offload these stocks and buy others. For instance, in Q2 last year Warren Buffett offloaded his airline stocks and allocated that capital to natural gas storage and pipelines, banks, pharma and auto stocks. If retail investors had not provided support to stocks of companies hit hard by the lockdowns and social distancing, Warren Buffett and other professional investors would not have had the opportunity to exit their positions in these stocks at acceptable prices and acquire other securities. This is the mechanism whereby the impact of new market entrants extends beyond the specific equities they purchase. Chart 7A Mini Call Option Mania Among Retail Investors Finally, Charts 1 and 3 above clearly illustrate the surge in both the number of call options and trading volumes since last March. Among call options, transactions with a small number of options have ballooned (Chart 7). This reflects individual investors activity. Consistently, the number of brokerage accounts for retail investors has mushroomed in the US and elsewhere. Bottom Line: It is obvious that the ongoing equity market euphoria is considerable. Individual investors have been playing a vital role in fostering it. The GameStop stock saga, among others, reinforces this point. When And How Will It End? This bull market shares some similarities with previous market cycles, but it also has its distinct features. Similarities: Retail investors typically rush into financial markets toward the end of a bull market. The current US equity market rally began in 2009. After the S&P 500 showed its resilience by rebounding quickly and making new highs following the selloffs in 2015, 2018 and 2019, retail investors were reassured to jump on the bull market train when the 2020 crash occurred.  In short, it took about 11 years of a US equity bull run for individual investors to feel comfortable enough to play the stock market. This is a characteristic of a late cycle/mature bull market. Speculative instruments and schemes are designed and launched. The IPO boom in SPACs1 will probably go down in history as a key feature of the speculative excesses in this cycle. Valuations overshoot during stock market euphoria but investors find reasons to justify lofty equity multiples. FAANGM stocks and other parts of the US equity market are expensive, but investors are using extremely low US bond yields – artificially suppressed by the Federal Reserve – to justify the current multiples. In such a case, the bond market will likely hold equities hostage. As bond yields rise going forward, equity valuations will be threatened. In fact, we believe rising bond yields, not the outlook for economic growth, to be the primary risk to US share prices akin to the late 1960s (Chart 8). Differences: Typically, retail investors feel comfortable investing in the stock market when the economy is strong. In this cycle, they jumped on the stock market train when the economy crashed due to the pandemic. This is a departure from previous cycles. Massive stimulus and ongoing vaccination deployment suggest the economic outlook for the US and many emerging economies is positive. In particular, EM corporate profits are set to recover (Chart 9). Chart 8The US In The 1960s: Share Prices And Treasury Yields Chart 9EM EPS Is To Recover   Hence, it is hard to be bearish on stocks based on the cyclical outlook for growth, assuming vaccination campaigns will allow many major economies to fully reopen in H2 2021. Yet, a lot of this good news seem to be already priced in. Retail investors arrive to the stock market party usually in the late stage of a business cycle – when unemployment is low, inflation is rising, and policymakers are tightening policies. That combination proves lethal for the equity market and a major top in share prices ensues. Presently, due to the pandemic-induced lockdowns, we have the opposite occurring in the US and in many EM economies. Unemployment is high, inflation remains contained, and policymakers are committed to providing unlimited stimulus. In short, the main distinction between the current and previous episodes of speculative equity market excesses is that classic end-of-business cycle conditions – such as economic overheating and policy tightening – are now absent. History doesn't repeat itself, but it does rhyme. Does it mean that the bull market will continue uninterrupted? Not necessarily. This rally might be short circuited for reasons that may differ from those that terminated previous stock market frenzies. First, speculative bubbles could burst without policy tightening. An example of this is China’s equity bubble in 2015, which crashed without policy tightening due to gravitational forces reasserting themselves. Another example is the 1987 US stock market crash that occurred without an economic or fundamental financial cause. Chart 10 illustrates the cyclical trajectories of US GDP and the Fed funds rate did not change materially before and after the equity market crash. In short, the 1987 equity crash was a case when excessive speculation/overbought conditions rather than policy tightening or a recession caused an abrupt equity sell-off. Second, in the EM equity universe, leadership has been extremely narrow. Only a handful of companies have outperformed the aggregate benchmark, propelling the index to 2007 highs. These include a few Chinese new economy stocks, and Korean and Taiwanese technology stocks (Chart 11). Outside North Asian markets (China, Korea and Taiwan), every single EM bourse has underperformed both the EM and global equity benchmarks in the past year. Chart 10The 1987 S&P 500 Crash Was Not Caused By The Fed Or The Economy Chart 11Euphoria In Asian TMT Stocks Chart 12Global ex-TMT Stocks Have Not Broken Out Yet If these global and EM TMT stocks relapse, they will inflict major damage on the EM and global indexes. The EM index has become extremely concentrated with the top five stocks accounting for 24% of the MSCI EM equity index’s market cap. Interestingly, global ex-TMT stocks have not yet broken out to new highs (Chart 12). Finally, US overall equity and global TMT valuations are vulnerable to rising US bond yields. The latter could rise without the Fed hinting at policy tightening if fixed-income investors decide that the Fed is behind the inflation curve. This could trigger a major selloff even if policymakers do not tighten policy. Investment Conclusions Chart 13Go Long EM Equity And Currency Volatility We are in a euphoria phase where fundamentals are less pertinent. The market can either rally a lot or sell off hard regardless of the profit outlook. Navigating through such markets is challenging. Going long EM equity or EM currency volatility offers a good risk-reward profile (Chart 13). Volatility will likely rise in the coming months in both scenarios: either risk assets continue rallying or they sell off. For global equity and credit portfolios, we continue recommending a neutral allocation to EM. The long-term US dollar outlook is negative, but it is oversold and odds of a near-term rebound are still high. Our currency strategy remains to short a basket of EM currencies versus an equal-weighted average of the euro, CHF and JPY. This basket of EM currencies includes the BRL, CLP, ZAR, KRW and TRY. We continue receiving 10-year swap rates in Mexico, Colombia, Russia, China, India, Indonesia and Korea. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPAC), also known as “blank check companies”, are organizations with no commercial operations that raise capital through an IPO, which is then deployed to purchase an existing company. This process is done to bypass the lengthy process of launching a traditional IPO for a young company.   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

In lieu of the next strategy report, I will be presenting the quarterly webcast titled ‘Five Contrarian Predictions For 2021-22’ on Thursday February 11 at 10.00AM EST (3.00PM GMT, 4.00PM CET, 11.00PM HKT). I hope you can join. Highlights Many of the ‘short squeezed’ investments that day traders have bid up are at, or approaching, collapsed short-term fractal structures. As such, patient long-term investors should take the other side. The biggest risk to the stock market remains the vulnerability of valuations to even a modest rise in bond yields. The happy corollary is that the structural bull market in equities will only end when the 10-year T-bond yield reaches zero. Until then, stay structurally overweight equities. Structurally overweight value-heavy European equities versus value-heavy emerging markets (EM) equities. Do not structurally overweight value-heavy European equities versus growth-heavy US equities. This is a ‘widow maker’ trade. Fractal trade: short AUD/JPY. Feature Chart of the WeekShort-Squeezed Investments Now Have Collapsed Fractal Structures (Gamestop) There is no divine law that decrees the ‘correct’ time-horizon for any investment. Depending on your objectives and skills, a correct investment horizon could be anything spanning a few milliseconds to a hundred years. Once you absorb this fundamental point, it leads to a profound conclusion:  The ‘correct’ price for any investment depends on your investment horizon. The Most Important Investment Question Is, Who Is Setting The Price? A long-term investor and a day trader will go through completely different thought processes to determine a stock’s ‘correct’ price. The long-term investor, intending to buy and hold the stock for ten years, will receive 40 quarterly dividend payments plus the stock price as it stands in 2031. Hence, the correct price is the discounted value of those expected cashflows. But for the day trader, intending to buy today to sell tomorrow, only one cashflow matters – tomorrow’s price. Hence, the correct price is simply the expected price at which he can sell tomorrow. The longer-term cashflows are irrelevant, unless they set the selling price tomorrow. Yet this is unlikely, because as Benjamin Graham put it:   In the long run the market is a weighing machine, but in the short run it is a voting machine. Therefore, a long-term investor and a day trader are completely different animals, whose price-setting behaviour must be seen through different lenses. This matters because the price is always set by the last marginal transaction. The important question then is, who is setting the price? All of which brings us to the battle raging between a cabal of day traders and a group of hedge funds. The day trader is buying today because he expects that the hedge fund, desperate to cover its short positions, must buy at an even higher price tomorrow. The day trader’s behaviour is rational, so long as it is within the law, and so long as the hedge fund short-covering is the marginal price taker. Eventually though, the desperate hedge fund will not take the price, because there are no more short positions left to cover. At this point, if the day trader wants to exit his position, the marginal buyer will be a longer-term investor who will only buy at a much lower fundamentally-determined price. The day trader will have won the battle, but lost the war. The crucial takeaway is that we should always monitor which time-horizon of investors is setting the marginal price of an investment. We can do this by continually measuring the fractal structure of the investment’s price. We should always monitor which time-horizon of investors is setting the marginal price of an investment. When the fractal structure of an investment has collapsed, it means that the time-horizon of investors setting the price has compressed to a near-term limit. Thereby it signals that the price-setting baton will return to long-term investors who will reset the price to valuation anchors, such as discounted long-term cashflows. The implication is that the preceding trend, fuelled by short-term price setters, is likely to reverse. Today, we observe that many of the investments that day traders have recently bid up are at, or approaching, collapsed short-term fractal structures. As such, patient long-term investors should take the other side (Chart of the Week, Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart I-2Short-Squeezed Investments Now Have Collapsed Fractal Structures (AMC Entertainment) Chart I-3Short-Squeezed Investments Now Have Collapsed Fractal Structures (Blackberry) The Major Misunderstanding About Real Bond Yields A common question we get is, should we compare the prospective returns on equities and bonds in nominal terms or in real terms? In an apples-for-apples comparison it shouldn’t really matter. The problem is that while we know the prospective nominal return from bonds (it is just the bond yield), it is extremely difficult to know the prospective real return from bonds. As the markets are lousy at predicting inflation, the ex-ante real bond yield is a lousy predictor of the ex-post real bond yield. A trustworthy ex-ante real bond yield requires a trustworthy prediction of inflation. But both the inflation forwards market and the breakeven inflation rate implied in inflation protected bonds are lousy at predicting inflation.1 As the markets are lousy at predicting inflation, the ex-ante real bond yield is a lousy predictor of the ex-post real bond yield (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Chart I-4The Markets Are Lousy At Predicting Inflation In Europe... Chart I-5...And In The ##br##US A second point is that the required excess return on equities versus bonds is a nominal concept. This is because the bond yield’s lower limit is set in nominal terms, at say -1 percent. Proximity to this nominal yield limit makes bonds very risky because there is no longer any upside to price, only downside. As the riskiness of equities and bonds converges, the required nominal return on equities collapses towards the ultra-low nominal bond yield. There are two important takeaways. First, we should always compare the valuation of equities and their prospective nominal return with the nominal bond yield. Second, the valuation of equities is exponentially sensitive to an ultra-low nominal bond yield (Chart I-6). Chart I-6The Relationship Between The Bond Yield And Stock Market Valuation Is Exponential We conclude that the biggest risk to the stock market remains the vulnerability of valuations to even a modest rise in bond yields. Yet the happy corollary is that the structural bull market in equities will only end when bond yields can go no lower. In practice, this means when the 10-year T-bond yield reaches zero. Until then, long-term investors should stay in the stock market. The Major Misunderstanding About Valuation Another common question we get is, is it always meaningful to compare an investment’s valuation versus its own history? The answer is no. The comparison with a historical average is meaningful only if the valuation is mathematically stationary, which is to say it has not undergone a ‘phase-shift’. If the valuation has undergone a phase-shift, then the comparison with its own history is meaningless.  As an analogy, nobody would compare their bodyweight with its lifetime average, because we understand that our bodyweight undergoes a phase-shift from childhood to adulthood. If we did compare our bodyweight with its lifetime average, it would give the false signal that we were permanently overweight! Likewise, to avoid getting a false signal from a valuation, we should always ask, has it undergone a phase-shift? If a valuation has undergone a phase-shift, then a comparison with its own history is meaningless. Unfortunately, the structural prospects for financials, oil and gas, and basic resources – sectors that dominate ‘value’ indexes and stock markets – did suffer a major downward phase-shift at the start of the 2000s (Chart I-7). It follows that we cannot compare the valuations of ‘value heavy’ indexes with their long-term history, and draw any meaningful conclusions. Chart I-7Value' Sector Profits Are In A Major Structural Downturn Proving this point, the relationship between value-heavy European valuations and subsequent 10-year return is much worse for periods ending after the global financial crisis compared with periods ending before it. Whereas the relationship between growth-heavy US valuations and subsequent return has barely changed, because the structural prospects for growth sectors have not suffered downward phase-shifts (Chart I-8 and Chart I-9). Chart I-8The Relationship Between Valuation And Future Return Has Changed In Europe... Chart I-9...But Not So Much ##br##In The US Given the ongoing trends in value versus growth profits, it is much safer to overweight value-heavy European equities versus value-heavy emerging markets (EM) equities. Do not structurally overweight value-heavy European equities versus growth-heavy US equities. This is a ‘widow maker’ trade. Fractal Trading System* The rally in AUD/JPY is at a potential a near-term top based on its collapsed 65-day fractal structure. Accordingly, this week’s recommended trade is short AUD/JPY, setting the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 2.8 percent. Chart I-10AUD/JPY In other trades, short European basic resources versus the market achieved its 4 percent profit target and is now closed. The rolling 12-month win ratio now stands at 57 percent. When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated  December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Europe and the US have deep and liquid markets in 5-year 5-year inflation swaps (or forwards), which price the expected 5-year inflation rate 5 years ahead. The current swap measures the annual inflation rate expected through 2026-31. The UK and the US also have deep and liquid markets in inflation-protected government bonds: UK index-linked gilts, and US Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS). The yield offered on such a security is real, which means in excess of inflation. The yield offered on a similar-maturity conventional bond is nominal. This means that the difference between the two yields equates to the market’s expectation for inflation over the maturity, known as the ‘breakeven inflation rate.’ Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Highlights We are hesitant to call a top to the volatility spike just yet. The US dollar is experiencing a counter-trend bounce. We also see political and geopolitical risks flashing yellow. House Democrats are drafting a reconciliation bill that will remind financial markets of looming tax hikes. President Biden faces imminent tests on China/Taiwan and Iran. The tech sector has bounced amid the setback to the reflation trade. Over the long run the Biden administration’s reflationary agenda suggests tech will no longer outperform. Biden’s regulatory risk to the tech sector is not immediate but still a downside risk. No major piece of bipartisan legislation is forthcoming but the Department of Justice, FCC, and FTC can bring negative surprises. We are hitting pause on our S&P trades until Biden passes some early hurdles. Feature Volatility has room to run, judging by past post-crisis periods (Chart 1), and this time we are especially concerned with brewing geopolitical risks, namely the US-China tensions over the Taiwan Strait. This geopolitical risk comes on top of the short squeezes and battles that retail investors are having against hedge funds all over the market. China is reminding the world of its red line against Taiwanese independence while testing the newly seated Joe Biden administration over whether it will seek a technological blockade against the mainland. Economic and trade policy uncertainty have collapsed but they would surge in the event of a crisis incident (Chart 2). While war is not likely, it is possible, so we need to see the Biden administration defuse the situation and pass this first test before we are willing to take on more risk on a tactical three-to-six-month time frame. Chart 1Volatility Can Go Higher Still Chart 2Uncertainty Down But Beijing Testing Biden Chart 3Biden's Approval Starts At 55% President Biden’s average approval rating in his first two weeks in office is 55%, right where former President Trump’s disapproval rating would have suggested (Chart 3). This is a significant but not extravagant improvement in political capital for the White House. Our Political Capital Index shows Biden’s position as moderate-to-strong (Table 1). Table 1Biden’s Political Capital Moderate-To-Strong The implication is that he still has a chance of passing his $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan as a bipartisan bill with 10 Republican senators, a feat that would likely lower the topline value to around $1.3 trillion (Republicans proposed $618 billion) and exclude an increase in the federal minimum wage to $15 per hour. There is also a strong swing of independents in favor of Democrats in the opinion polling, in the wake of the incident on Capitol Hill on January 6, despite the fact that Republican and Democratic party identification are both stuck at around 30% — meaning that the Biden administration does have something to gain by appearing bipartisan (Chart 4).1 Republicans might cooperate to staunch the bleeding of their own support. Even Republicans approve of stimulus amid the pandemic and they would later be able to oppose Biden’s more controversial proposals with better optics having demonstrated bipartisan intent at the outset. However, House Democrats are already proceeding with a budget resolution, the first step in the budget reconciliation process that enables them to bypass Republicans entirely and get almost everything they want (Diagram 1). Chart 4Will Independents Keep Breaking Toward Democrats? Diagram 1Timeline Of Impeachment, Budget Reconciliation, And Regular Legislation Biden’s political capital should strengthen over the next year as the vaccine rollout improves and the economy comes roaring back. Official economic projections suggest that growth will glide solidly above potential until 2026 and that the output gap will close by 2024 (Chart 5). These estimates will be disappointed in various ways, of course, but in the near-term the risk is to the upside as they do not include Biden’s proposed $1.9 trillion rescue plan or his remaining, post-COVID agenda afterwards, which could cost anywhere from $3.7-$6.4 trillion over a ten-year period.2 The economy will be at less risk of relapsing than of overheating. This is especially true given the Federal Reserve’s new average inflation targeting strategy, which will discourage rate hikes till next year at the very earliest (and, from a political point of view, we would think 2023). Looking at the chart, Biden’s economic backdrop is far more propitious than that of his former boss Barack Obama’s back in 2009. Biden’s political momentum is therefore sustainable when it comes to the two budget reconciliation bills he wants to pass this year and next year. Republican internal divisions will help him. These were highlighted this week by Republican National Committee Chair Ronna McDaniel’s criticism of former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s claims of voter fraud after the election and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell’s recent scathing criticism of controversial pro-Trump freshman House member Marjorie Taylor Greene of Georgia. Republicans are only beginning their internal struggle and it is not certain that it will be resolved in time for the 2022 midterm elections. This is another reason to think that Biden’s political capital will be sustained and that moderate Republicans might assist with some Democratic legislation. The risks to Biden’s momentum stem from foreign policy (China, Iran, Russia), rapidly emerging financial instability, his party’s attempts at social control, and any major (not minor) negative developments involving the still-running pandemic and vaccine rollout. Chart 5US Economic Outlook Over Biden’s Term Macro Reflation Says Stay Underweight Tech The tech sector experienced a manic phase last year when COVID-19 struck and lockdowns kept consumers at home with nothing to do but work, shop, and stare at their phones. The big five companies – Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Facebook – together witnessed an extraordinary run up relative to the other 495 companies in the S&P index that has since peaked and dropped off (Chart 6). Chart 6Fade The Big Tech Bounce Over Long Run Tech stock market capitalization accounts for 34% of American economic output – an extreme sign of over-concentration at a time when the market is generally inflated, according to the Buffett Index of stock market cap relative to GDP (Chart 7). Tech outperformance rests on strong earnings growth – supercharged due to the COVID crisis – as well as the secular fall in bond yields as a result of the global backdrop of excessive savings, low inflation, and scarce growth. Tech stocks are especially sensitive to bond yields because markets are projecting their earnings far into the future, as our colleague Mathieu Savary explained back in August. Ultra-dovish monetary policy with zero interest rates for longer and longer time frames is a perennial gift to these companies (Chart 8). Chart 7Buffett Indicator Says Big Tech Too Big Chart 8Big Tech Maxing Out As Bond Yields Rise? The catch is when and if growth and inflation expectations pick up. Even during the Dotcom bubble in the 1990s, the tech sector could not withstand rising interest rates (Chart 9). Eventually higher inflation will translate into central bank hikes and rising real interest rates – which should be very bad for tech as future cash flows lose value. Rising rates increase the cost of capital, while cyclical industries perform better in high growth environments with rising commodity prices. A recovery of inflation is becoming a more visible risk to investors over the coming few years. Even though unemployment is still elevated, and the output gap negative, the sea change in fiscal policy is likely to close this gap quickly and put upward pressure on expectations and prices. It will still take time to close the gap but each new dose of government spending on top of what is needed to plug the gap in demand due to the pandemic-stricken service sector will accelerate the time frame in which the labor market will tighten and price pressure will return. Investors are increasingly wary of this inflation risk as it is the logical consequence of the new combination of extreme monetary and fiscal accommodation. Earnings in the tech sector relative to the rest of the market have also peaked – and did not exceed their previous high point in 2010 despite the uniquely favorable backdrop (Chart 10). The big five have nearly saturated a lot of markets which raises the possibility that if the policy backdrop darkens, then they will see earnings disappointments. The Biden administration’s plan to raise the corporate tax rate to 28% and impose a 15% minimum tax on company book income would come as a double whammy for tech earnings, as they are relatively more exposed to increases in effective tax rates than other sectors. Chart 9Big Tech Wants Deflation, Big Government Wants Reflation Chart 10Big Tech Earnings Outperformance Hit Ceiling Amid Pandemic Finally, there is the long building problem of regulatory risk, as Americans have clearly become more concerned about Big Tech’s power and influence over their daily lives and politics. Here we do not think the Biden administration poses an immediate threat of frontal legislative assault, but we do think the end game is greater regulation, including tougher enforcement from antitrust agencies. Combined with geopolitical risk from Europe and other countries also seeking to tax and regulate these companies, the recent global semiconductor shortage, and the potential for a Taiwanese tech blockade, the political risk is clearly to the downside. Bottom Line: The macro backdrop has darkened for the tech sector. With governments turning more reflationary via a sea change in fiscal policy on top of ultra-easy monetary policy, inflation expectations should recover and inflation-sensitive sectors like tech should underperform. This risk is clear despite the fact that inflation requires the labor market to heal first. Any political, geopolitical, or regulatory risks would only further undermine the case for tech sector outperformance. Tech, Polarization, And Disinflation A critical question for investors is the relationship between US political polarization, the tech sector, and the disinflationary macroeconomic context that has proven so beneficial for Big Tech’s stock market performance. If polarization leads to gridlock, austerity, and disinflation, then tech can continue to enjoy the policy environment. But if polarization subsides, or if it coexists with a reflationary backdrop – as is the case today – then tech faces a new risk. It is fair to hypothesize that the rise of Silicon Valley and especially of social media has something to do with the explosion in US polarization over the past three decades. A simple chart of the S&P 500 alongside our polarization proxy – which measures the difference in presidential approval based on party – suggests that polarization could have some connection with tech sector outperformance (Chart 11). This is not a coincidence but the causality may work differently than some assume. The first period of tech sector outperformance, which rested on the “peace dividend” period of hyper-globalization, strong growth, strong dollar, low inflation, and technical innovation, occurred during the explosion of US polarization in the wake of the Cold War, when the US’s common enemy fell and the country’s political parties turned to do battle with each other for global supremacy. The structural changes of Reaganomics and NAFTA coincided with the political battles of the Republican revolution of 1994 and Bill Clinton’s sex scandal and impeachment. This heady period came to a peak in 2000 when the dotcom bubble burst and the US suffered its first contested election since 1876. Essentially globalization led to a deflationary backdrop that favored tech but also triggered the political struggle within the US for the spoils of victory in the Cold War. Chart 11Big Tech Likes Polarization And Gridlock The second period of tech sector outperformance emerged from the Great Recession, still higher wealth inequality, and the slow-burn economic recovery of the 2010s. The disinflationary environment and dollar bull market proved beneficial to the tech companies. In this case globalization’s deflationary effects continued but were compounded with US household deleveraging, which was far more malicious for the American middle class. Crucially, polarization created gridlock in Congress from 2010, preventing the US from pursuing a robust fiscal policy in the wake of the crisis that might have led to a more rapid recovery. Instead an extended disinflationary environment fed into social unrest and populism. While public animus naturally turned against Wall Street and the Big Banks in the wake of the financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank financial reform helped to pacify the public’s anger (though not entirely – and financial regulation is gradually reemerging as a relevant political risk). As the financial crisis faded from memory, but the low-growth, disinflationary environment continued to take a toll on households, an angry electorate began to freely express itself in the digital realm. Tech companies were happy to ride this wave and outperformed other sectors. As the backlash continued mounting, tech companies failed to rein in the angry userbase they had cultivated, and now they are staring at massive regulatory and legal risks from policymakers. Both Barack Obama and Donald Trump used Twitter and social media as a tool to establish direct engagement with their political base, much as Franklin Delano Roosevelt had used the radio and the fireside chat. This rising political heft ultimately made the companies conspicuous as conservatives blamed them for supporting the Obama administration (and Clinton campaign) while liberals especially blamed them for getting Trump elected. The Trump saga in particular gave rise to the so-called “tech-lash,” or backlash, as the companies’ core base of young, urbanized, cosmopolitan, and international users called on the tech companies to stop the spread of Russian propaganda, or other propaganda they disagreed with, and undertake socially progressive causes. Meanwhile the older, conservative, and rural population doubted that Russian interference caused the 2016 election result and sensed that the tech companies’ content moderators might not be all that scrupulous regarding the difference between conservative views and Russian information warfare (Chart 12, top panel). In combination with the heated election year campaigning, the pandemic and the backlash against lockdown, tension in the virtual world came to a peak last year and spilled out into the real world. This all came to a head with Twitter and Facebook first censoring and then banning President Trump from their platforms amid his claims of voter fraud and the riot on Capitol Hill. Chart 12Big Tech Not The Chief Driver Of Polarization Two major policy changes have occurred that threaten to reverse this macro backdrop. First, as a result of the 2020 crisis the Democrats won control of the White House and Congress and can now pass their mammoth spending agenda, which goes beyond pandemic relief to expanding the role of government in American economy and society – including by reflating the economy and imposing higher taxes on corporations, both of which threaten to undermine the tech sector’s outperformance. Second, China’s secular slowdown, reduction of trade dependency, and divorce from the US economy have undermined hyper-globalization. The Biden administration is pursuing on-shoring and China restrictions albeit to a lesser extent than its predecessor. If technological advance and social media cause political polarization, then these policy shifts may not last long or have a durable macro effect. But technology and communication tools have advanced throughout history regardless of whether polarization in any given country was rising or falling. Older people are the most partisan in the US yet they are the least enthusiastic users of social media (Chart 12, bottom panel). Tech and social media have proliferated across the world and yet polarization has fallen in Germany, Australia, Sweden, and other economies even as it has risen in the United States and arguably the United Kingdom (Chart 13). If social media enabled populist outcomes like Trump and Brexit, then why did populism fall short in France, Spain, Italy, and Germany? Social media participation thrived on the rise of polarization through the 2000s and 2010s but it exacerbated the problem – and once polarization erupted in the form of an anti-establishment presidency, Russian interference, the Cambridge Analytica scandal, and real world riots and social unrest, the tech platforms found themselves in the crosshairs of both of the political factions and the various politicians trying to appease their anger. Silicon Valley and the FAANGs operate in a power struggle – not merely a politicized environment – that is here to stay and will direct their attention away from their primary business and toward paying for lobbyists in Washington, Brussels, and elsewhere. This in itself is a danger to their business models even if it were not the case that the macro and policy backdrop is less supportive. Bottom Line: The reflationary fiscal and policy backdrop will continue in the coming years, a macro headwind for tech outperformance, while political risks to the tech sector have grown substantially. Chart 13Polarization Falls In Many Countries Despite Social Media Congress In Check But Regulatory Risk Persists Democrats and Republicans have a different and opposed set of grievances against Big Tech, which is likely to prevent comprehensive legislation from developing anytime soon. But legislation is still possible, and in the meantime risks will come from emboldened regulators. Based on the House judiciary hearing in July 2020, Democrats are concerned with content moderation and market concentration. They want to fortify their recent gains in preventing social media companies from aiding what they regard as the spread of seditious and libelous material or propaganda that favors the anti-establishment Trumpist right wing. Judging by the Senate Republicans’ hearings in October and November 2020, Republicans are primarily concerned with content moderation– i.e. preventing conservatives from being de-platformed, and conservative views from being censored. Republicans are less concerned about market concentration, i.e. accusations of monopolistic and anti-competitive behavior.3 Now that the social media companies have more or less thrown in with the Democrats on content moderation, Democratic priorities are likely to shift to antitrust and anti-competitive behavior. But serious changes would require either abolishing the filibuster in the Senate (which is not happening for the time being due to last month’s bipartisan power-sharing arrangement) or winning over 10 Republicans. This will be difficult, especially when it comes to the Democratic belief that a generational shift in antitrust doctrine and practice is necessary. A frontal assault on the sector would require passing a law that resolves a number of jurisprudential issues so that the courts could be instructed to interpret antitrust issues with a greater focus on rooting out anti-competitive or collusive behavior (as opposed to lowering prices and preventing consumer harm). This is possible but Republican agreement would require major compromises that the Democrats are not inclined to make. A bipartisan bill is still possible because last year’s hearings revealed that there is common ground between the two parties. Both have agreed that anti-trust agencies should be strengthened and empowered to examine Big Tech; that data should be portable and platforms should be interoperable (rather than favoring their own services or imposing penalties for users who would switch services); that mergers and acquisitions should be examined with the presumption that consumers will be harmed, so that the merging parties must show that they cannot otherwise achieve the desired consumer benefits and that their actions will serve some public good; and that regulators need not trouble themselves excessively about the problem of accurately defining the market, which is always a sticking point for such fast evolving services.4 Moreover there is overlap between the populist sides of both parties, comparable to the bipartisan populist demands to give larger household rebates amid the COVID crisis. For example, Democrats want to revise Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which protects the tech companies from being held liable for the actions and comments of third parties on their platforms. The Democratic proposal is to break down the distinction between neutral tools and content creation, arguing that tech platforms can be “negligent” and that in order to benefit from the liability protections they should have to demonstrate that they have taken reasonable steps to prevent unlawful misuse of their platforms that cause harm to others. This idea of “reasonable moderation” would leave a very vague standard for judges that would lead to a complex operating environment across different jurisdictions, but it is attractive to Trumpists and right-wing populists who support greater ability to sue the platforms for alleged bias.5 Thus revising Section 230 could create a bridge between the two parties, albeit isolating the free-market contingent in either party. It would foist huge new liabilities not only on the tech giants but also on startups and market entrants with far fewer lawyers. The mechanism will be a decisive feature of any future legislative proposal, however. Republicans are staunchly opposed to creating an Internet oversight committee, similar to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, or anything that smacks of Big Brother and would risk too cozy of a relationship between the regulatory state and the immense capabilities of the tech companies. But they could be amenable to law that strengthens the antitrust agencies and alters the parameters of judicial scrutiny if they believed it would make consumer choice and innovation more likely. If popular opinion suggested great urgency on this issue then perhaps the parties’ differences could be resolved more quickly in the form of a major bill. But polls suggest the populace is also divided on tech regulation – in part because the pandemic left consumers largely thankful for the Internet services that they relied on so heavily while under lockdown. A bare majority of conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats now favor tech regulation, the average voter is lukewarm, and moderates of both parties show little enthusiasm (Chart 14). By contrast, at the height of Democratic anxiety over Trump’s election and Russian interference, a clear majority of Democrats and Democrat-leaning independents favored tougher regulation. Chart 14Public Split On Government Regulation Of Big Tech Companies In short, the public is split, the parties are split, and the various 2020 crises have temporarily subsided, so tech regulatory risk will emanate from regulatory authorities but not from major new legislation anytime soon. Regulatory agencies thus threaten to give tech stocks negative surprises – even if the process takes time. Biden will replace one commissioner on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) immediately but may only be able to replace two Republican commissioners toward the end of his term, in September 2023 and 2024, meaning that the commission will be divided (Table 2). Any major crackdown on market concentration will have to proceed upon bipartisan grounds unless Democrats gain control of this commission sooner. Meanwhile Biden will be able to replace outgoing Republican Ajit Pai on the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) right away, giving a Democratic tilt to this body, which is capable of pursuing the administration’s goals on content regulation (Table 3). Here the Supreme Court may eventually weigh in to defend free speech and press rights, which Section 230 ultimately reinforces, but the tech companies will be in the firing line until then. Table 2Federal Trade Commission Balance Of Power Table 3Federal Communications Commission Balance Of Power Finally, Biden’s nominee for the US Assistant Attorney General for the antitrust division will be a critical post to watch for the Department of Justice’s involvement in tech regulation and antitrust, though this position requires Senate confirmation, which will rule out any populist candidate. If Biden picks a former Facebook lawyer as rumored then he clearly will not be prioritizing a tough antitrust stance.6 Bottom Line: With the Senate filibuster intact for the time being, Democrats need 10 Republican senators to join them to pass any significant legislation that would amount to a frontal assault on the tech sector. This is possible but not probable in the short run, as Congress prioritizes the fight against the pandemic, Republicans and Democrats remain divided and the public is lukewarm about regulation. Much more likely is a regulatory slow boil at the hands of the DOJ, FCC, FTC, and the states. Biden Maintains Obama Alliance With Silicon Valley Public opinion is wishy washy about Big Tech, as mentioned above. Compare attitudes toward Wall Street and the major pharmaceutical corporations. Opinion shifted against the banks drastically during the financial crisis and has since recovered to about 24% net approval, although there are also polls showing that consumers of all stripes believe the banking sector got off easy and could use more regulation (Chart 15). The health care industry also took a hit during the Great Recession, when laid off workers also lost their health insurance, and has also largely recovered due to its conduct during the pandemic. The exception is Big Pharma, which is widely blamed for excessive drug prices, got bashed under President Trump, and is about to get bashed by President Biden in the form of price caps and Medicare negotiations. By contrast with these sectors, the computer and Internet industry has seen a hit to its popular support since Trump’s election but never dipped into net negative territory and may be recovering due to its helpful role during the COVID lockdowns. When net popular approval turns negative then it will be a flashing red light for the tech sector that sweeping regulation is imminent. While some of the opinion polling is lagging, the crisis over the election is unlikely to produce this effect because the public views break down along partisan lines. Chart 15Big Tech More Popular Than Big Banks, Big Pharma Thus unlike the Trumpists, or the populists in the Democratic Party, the Biden administration is only inclined gradually to dial up the pressure on Big Tech. Biden would bite off more than any president could chew if he tackled tech aggressively along with other big corporations. His campaign platform and early executive orders show that he is already tackling Big Health Insurance and Big Oil, sectors that make up 7.5% and 1.4% of GDP respectively. There is at least some focus on re-regulating the financial industry as well (7.7% of value add), albeit with lower priority. To attempt a major overhaul of Big Tech (at least 5.3% of GDP) on top of all this would be impracticable even if Biden were inclined to listen to the anti-monopoly crusaders in his party. Information services are obviously important to the economies of solid blue states like California, New York, and Washington but they are increasingly important to critical swing states like Georgia and Pennsylvania – places where voters will be skeptical of Biden’s policies on energy and immigration. The information sector is growing fastest in blue states and in battlegrounds like Arizona. It employs more people in blue states and in battlegrounds like Georgia. And it is rapidly employing more people in the grand prize of Democratic designs, Texas, where an exodus of Californians fleeing poor governance and high costs holds out the possibility of creating a decisive Democratic ascendancy in the Electoral College. Silicon Valley and other tech clusters will maintain their unique strengths and network effects for a long time but the dispersion of the tech sector to cheaper heartland regions has electoral consequences that mainline Democrats will not want to suppress. Not only did the tech firms help Biden get elected through votes and media controls but also through campaign contributions. The financial and health care industries punished the Democrats for passing the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) and Dodd-Frank reforms in 2009-12 (Chart 16). By contrast the tech heavily favors Democrats over Republicans (with donations at $170 million versus $20 million in the 2020 election). Biden’s priorities are two budget reconciliation bills that will partially reverse the Trump tax cuts in order to pay for the entrenchment and expansion of Obamacare and other aspects of his health care and child care agenda. He is also focused on infrastructure, particularly green infrastructure and renewables, to create jobs and galvanize the climate change coalition. Broad re-regulation is coming down the pike, but health, immigration, energy, and labor are higher priorities than tech. The tech sector faces greater scrutiny than before, first from the FCC and later from the DOJ and FTC, but the administration will have more room for maneuver later in its term. Bottom Line: The Obama administration forged an alliance with Silicon Valley that Biden will largely maintain. The purpose of regulatory pressure is to build leverage over the tech giants. Chart 16Big Tech A Big Donor To Democratic Party Investment Takeaways Not all of the dominoes are lined up to topple Big Tech in a massive display of federal monopoly busting. The public is lukewarm and the political elite are divided. Nevertheless the long-term trajectory points to greater government scrutiny – and the tech sector has no margin of safety for political risk as the macro backdrop has started to shift in a more inflationary direction. Our colleague Juan Correa Ossa has shown that antitrust action to curb corporate power has tended to occur at times in US history where stock market earnings are elevated or rising rapidly relative to average wages, when inflation is running hot, and yet the economy has entered a bust phase where politicians are looking for a scapegoat to deflect public anger (Table 4). Table 4Stock Performance In Selected Judicial Events While inflation is not an immediate problem (at least not yet), it was not a problem when the FTC and DOJ went after Microsoft starting in 1998. The distressed economy and tech bubble are good enough reason for investors to expect the government to increase antitrust pressure (Chart 17). If inflation recovers in the coming years around the time the Biden administration gains room to maneuver on this issue then it is doubly bad for the tech sector. Chart 17Anti-Trust Usually Follows Economic Bust In Microsoft’s case, the stock fell when the government first brought charges but rallied throughout the twists and turns of the courtroom – especially after 2002 when the case was settled, and ever since (Chart 18). Fortunately for the company the DOJ backed away from breakup and instead ordered it to open up its application programming to others. But even firms that are broken up usually create buying opportunities. Note that Microsoft cleared its image and has not become the subject of government or popular scrutiny again today. Today’s regulators are likely to place a greater burden of proof on tech companies attempting mergers and acquisitions. The alternative for startups is to hold an initial public offering – and IPOs have exploded amid the current context of low rates, easy money, investor exuberance, a chilling effect on M&A, and a lingering pandemic. The markets are frothy, buyer beware (Chart 19). Chart 18Microsoft's Anti-Trust Warning Chart 19Regulators Will Crack Down On M&A Strategically we remain favorable toward value stocks over growth stocks given the changing macro and policy backdrop outlined above (Chart 20). However, in the very near term we would not encourage investors to take on any additional risk. The latest bout of volatility is not necessarily over, political and geopolitical risks are now underrated after a period in which they subsided from peak levels, and exuberant markets are subject to very sharp corrections.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor jesse.Kuri@bcaresearch.com Chart 20Take A Pause Amid Value Vs Growth Setback   Appendix Table A1Political Risk Matrix Table A2Biden’s Cabinet Position Appointments   Footnotes 1     Congressional Budget Office, “Overview of the Economic Outlook: 2021-2031,” February 2021, cbo.gov. 2     Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, “The Cost of the Trump and Biden Campaign Plans” October 7, 2020, and “The Cost of the Trump and Biden COVID Response Plans,” October 29, 2020, October 7, 2020, crfb.org. 3    The huge gap between the two parties can be illustrated by the recent case of Parler, the microblog that sought to rival Twitter by maintaining laissez faire content moderation standards. When Parler came under fire for attracting conservatives in the wake of the Twitter ban against Trump, Apple and Amazon teamed up to block it from their app purchasing and cloud services, thus effectively banning the app for 99% of users. There is no doubt that any private platform can regulate content according to its own standards on its own sites. In the words of Section 230, this extends not only to “obscene” or “excessively violent” material but to anything “otherwise objectionable.” But once tech companies prevent the emergence of competitors and alternatives, and cooperate in doing so, they enter much more dangerous legal territory. And yet the response from the House Democrats on the oversight committee was to ask the FBI to investigate Parler for hosting far-right extremists. Conservatives are therefore up in arms. The courts have not yet weighed in but the case represents a larger risk to the tech firms than the usual challenges under Section 230. 4    Representative Ken Buck, “The Third Way,” House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law 5    See Will Duffield, “Circumventing Section 230: Product Liability Lawsuits Threaten Internet Speech,” Cato Institute, January 26, 2021, cato.org. 6    See Ryan Grim and David Dayen, “Merrick Garland Wants Former Facebook Lawyer To Top Antitrust Division,” The Intercept, January 28, 2021, theintercept.com. 

Highlights The enormous size of US stimulus and overflow of liquidity is creating a thrill akin to riding a tiger. Remarkably, this kind of jubilation is very similar to what EM experienced in 2009-10. That was followed by a lost decade for EM. The US equity and bond markets as well as the economy have grown accustomed to constant stimulus – an addiction that will be very hard to wean off. Due to recurring stimulus, the US will experience asset bubbles and inflation in the real economy. The Fed will fall behind the inflation curve. The resulting downward pressure on the US dollar in the coming years favors EM stocks and fixed-income markets over their US counterparts. Feature Policymakers worldwide and in the US in particular “are riding a tiger”. Congress is authorizing unlimited spending and the government is on a borrowing and spending spree. So far there are no constraints on the ballooning budget deficit. Government bond yields are well behaved. In turn, the Fed is printing limitless money to finance the Treasury and there have been no market or economic constrictions. Share prices are at a record high and credit spreads are very tight. The US dollar is depreciating but it is a benign adjustment for the US because the greenback had been too strong for too long. Chart 1EM's Soft-Budget Constraints In 2009-10 Were Followed By A Decade-Long Hangover In brief, the enormous size of US stimulus and overflow of liquidity is creating a thrill akin to riding a tiger. Remarkably, this kind of jubilation is very similar to what EM experienced in 2009-10. At the BCA annual conference in New York in 2016, one of the invited speakers – a hedge fund manager – recounted that in 2010, in a private conversation with an investor, Brazilian President Lula da Silva likened ruling Brazil to driving a sports car at high speed in the city with no police around. These were prescient words to describe the situation in Brazil’s economy and financial markets in 2009-10. In 2009-10, Brazil – like many other developing countries – benefited from both the impact of China’s enormous stimulus on commodities prices as well as from foreign capital inflows in part triggered by the Fed’s QE program. In addition, its own government provided sizeable monetary and fiscal stimulus. This stimulus trifecta – emanating from China, the US and local authorities – produced a one-off economic boom and a cyclical bull market in Brazil and other EM countries. Yet, the exuberance was followed by a stagflationary period in Brazil, and later a depression and associated rolling bear markets. Brazil was a poster child for that EM era. The experience of other EM economies was similar and the performance of their financial markets was equally underwhelming. These economies, their leaders, and financial markets wholly enjoyed the stimulus of that period. What followed, however, was a drawn-out hangover that lasted many years: EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan share prices have been flat for the past 10 years and their currencies were depreciating till last spring (Chart 1). China, the epicenter of epic stimulus in 2009-10, had a similar experience. Its investable ex-TMT stocks, i.e., excluding Alibaba, Tencent and Meituan, are presently at the same level as they were in 2010 (Chart 2). The underlying cause has been a collapse in listed companies’ return on assets (Chart 2, bottom panel). It is essential to emphasize that such poor Chinese equity market performance occurred despite recurring fiscal and credit stimulus from Chinese authorities since 2009 (Chart 2, top panel). As we discussed in detail in a previous report, soft-budget constraints – unlimited stimulus and liquidity overflow – led to complacency, inefficiencies and falling return on capital in EM/China. Chart 3 demonstrates that EM EPS (including China, Korea and Taiwan and their TMT companies) has been flat for 10 years and non-financial companies’ return on assets plunged during the past decade. Chart 2China: "Free Money" Undermined Corporate Efficiency And Profitability Chart 3EM EPS And Return On Assets: The Lost Decade   Can The US Dismount The Tiger? The US is currently experiencing no budget constraints. US broad money (M2) growth is at a record high both in nominal and real terms (Chart 4). In turn, the fiscal thrust was 11.4% of GDP last year and will remain substantial this year as most of Biden’s stimulus plan is likely to gain approval from Congress.  Chart 4Helicopter Money In The US Chart 5China Has Not Been Able To Wean Off Stimulus Such an explosive boom in US money supply and fiscal largess will continue. Even after the pandemic is under control, it will be hard for policymakers to withdraw stimulus. China is a case in point. In the past 10 years, any time Beijing attempted to reduce the stimulus, China’s economic growth downshifted considerably and financial markets sold off (Chart 5, top panel). This forced Chinese policymakers to continuously enact new rounds of stimulus measures. As a result, they have not been able to achieve their goal of stabilizing the credit-to-GDP ratio (Chart 5, bottom panel). Similar dynamics will likely transpire in the US. Having been inflated enormously, US equity and corporate credit markets will be exceptionally sensitive to any policy shifts. US financial markets will riot at any attempt to withdraw monetary or fiscal stimulus. Given how sensitive US policymakers are to selloffs in financial markets, authorities will be extremely reluctant to exit these stimulative policies. Overall, the US equity and bond markets as well as the economy have grown accustomed to constant stimulus – an addiction that will be very hard to wean off. Bottom Line: Riding a tiger is fun. The hitch is that no one can safely get off a tiger. Similarly, US authorities are currently enjoying the exuberance from stimulus, but they will not be able to safely and smoothly dismount. Inflation, Asset Bubbles Or Capital Misallocation? In any system where an explosive money/credit boom persists, the outcome will be one or a combination of the following: inflation, asset bubbles or capital misallocation. Charts 6 and 7 illustrate that rampant money/credit growth in Japan and Korea in the second half of the 1980s produced property and equity market bubbles. Chart 6Japan: Money And Asset Prices Chart 7Korea: Money And Asset Prices   Chart 8Deploying Credit To Capital Spending Could Lead To Deflation In China’s case, the 2009-10 stimulus resulted in a property bubble as well as capital misallocation. Over the years, we have discussed these outcomes in China in detail and will not elaborate on them in this report. The pertinent question is why inflation has remained depressed in China. In fact, bouts of deflation occurred in various industries in China in the past 10 years. One usually associates a money/credit boom with demand exceeding supply resulting in higher inflation. That is correct if money/credit origination finances consumption with little capital expenditures taking place. However, the credit outburst in China enabled a capital spending boom. This led to a greater supply of goods and services, which in many cases exceeded underlying demand. The upshot has been deflation in various goods prices (Chart 8). History does not repeat but it rhymes. Open-ended stimulus in the US will eventually lead to years of economic and financial malaise. The nature of the challenges that the US will face matters not only to US financial markets but also to EM. Odds are that the US will experience asset bubbles and inflation in the real economy. We will not debate whether the US equity market is already in a bubble or not. Suffice it to say that in our opinion, parts of the market are already in a bubble. The main observation we will make in that regard is as follows: the sole way to justify the current broad US equity valuations is to assume that US Treasurys yields will not rise from the current levels. If US bond yields do not rise much, equity prices could hover at a high altitude. However, any mean reversion in US bond yields will deflate American share prices considerably. In turn, the outlook for US bond yields is contingent on the Fed’s willingness to continue with QE. We do not doubt the Fed will continue buying government securities until it faces a significant inflationary threat. Hence, the primary threat to US and global equity prices is inflation. Fertile Grounds For Inflation In The US Odds of inflation rising meaningfully above 2% in the US economy in the next 12-24 months have increased substantially:1 1. A combination of surging money supply and a potential revival in the velocity of money herald higher nominal GDP growth and inflation. It is critical to realize that in contrast to the last decade when the Fed was also undertaking QE programs, US money supply is now skyrocketing, as shown in Chart 4.  In the Special Report from October 22 we discussed in depth why US money growth is currently substantially stronger than the post-GFC period. With household income and deposits (money supply) booming due to fiscal transfers funded by the Fed, the only missing ingredient for inflation to transpire is a pickup in the velocity of money. Lets’ recall: Nominal GDP = Price Level x Output Volume = Velocity of Money x Money Supply Solving the above equation for inflation, we get: Price Level = (Velocity of Money x Money Supply) / (Output Volume) Going forward, the velocity of US money will likely recover, for it is closely associated with consumer and businesses’ willingness to spend. At that point, a rising velocity of money and greater money supply will work together to exert upward pressure on nominal GDP and inflation (Chart 9). Chart 9The US: The Velocity Of Money Correlates With Inflation Momentum 2. Government policies targeting faster growth in employee compensation are conducive to higher inflation. One of the Biden administration’s key priorities is to boost wages and reduce income inequality. Unless productivity growth accelerates considerably in the coming years, odds are that labor’s share in national income will rise and companies’ profit margins will shrink (Chart 10).  Businesses will attempt to raise prices to restore their profit margins. Provided income and spending will be strong, companies could succeed in raising their prices. In the US, a modest wage-inflation spiral is probable in the coming years. Chart 10The US: Faster Wage Growth Will Likely Undermine Corporate Profit Margins Chart 11US Core Goods Price Inflation Is Accelerating 3. Demand-supply distortions and shortages will lead to higher prices. The pandemic has distorted supply chains while the overwhelming demand for manufacturing goods has produced shortages of manufacturing goods. US household spending on goods is booming and US core goods prices as well as import prices from emerging Asia and China are rising (Chart 11). In the service sector, lockdowns will permanently curtail capacity in some sectors. Meanwhile, the reopening of the economy will likely release pent-up demand for services, leading to shortages in certain segments. 4. De-globalization – the ongoing shift away from the lowest price producer – entails higher costs of production and, ultimately, higher prices. 5. Higher industry concentration and less competition create fertile grounds for inflation. Over the past two decades, the competitive structure of many US industries has changed – it has become oligopolistic. Due to cheap financing and weak enforcement of anti-trust regulation, large companies have acquired smaller competitors. In many industries, several dominant players now have a substantial market share. Such a high concentration across many industries raises odds of collusion and price increases when the macro backdrop permits. In sum, US inflation will rise well above 2% in the coming years. Inflationary pressures will become evident later this year when the economy opens up. The main and overarching risk to this view is that technology and automation will boost productivity and allow companies to cut or maintain prices despite cost pressures. Conclusions And Investment Strategy As America’s economy normalizes in the second half of this year, US inflationary pressures will begin rising. However, the Fed will fall behind the inflation curve – it will be late to acknowledge the potency of the inflationary pressures and act on it. It is typical for policymakers to downplay a budding new economic or financial tendency when they have long been pre-occupied with the opposite. Policymakers often fight past wars and are slow to calibrate their policy when the setting changes. The Fed falling behind the inflation curve is bearish for the US dollar in the medium and long-term. Share prices will be caught between rising inflationary pressures and the Fed’s continuous dovishness. This could create large swings in share prices: the market will sell off in response to evidence of rising inflation but will rebound after being calmed by the Fed. Eventually, fundamentals will prevail and the next US equity bear market will be due to higher inflation and rising bond yields. Over the coming several years, US share prices and bond yields will be negatively correlated as they were in the second half of the 1960s (Chart 12). Chart 12The 1960-70s: US Treasury Yields And The S&P 500 Were Negatively Correlated Chart 13Will Gold Outperform Global Equities? This is not imminent, but it is not several years away either. Inflation could become the market’s focus later this year. Such a backdrop of heightening inflation risks and the Fed falling behind the curve will favor gold over equities – this ratio might be making a major bottom (Chart 13). In this context, we reiterate our trade of being long gold/short EM stocks. For now, global risk assets are extremely overbought and many of them are expensive. In short, they are overdue for a correction. During this setback, EM equities and credit markets will suffer and in the near term could even underperform their respective global benchmarks. In anticipation of such a setback, we have not upgraded EM to overweight. We continue to recommend maintaining a neutral allocation to EM in global equity and credit portfolios. Consistently, the US dollar will rebound because it is very oversold. We continue shorting a basket of EM currencies versus the euro, CHF and JPY. High-risk currencies will underperform low-beta currencies. The EM/China backdrop remains disinflationary. Therefore, fixed-income investors should continue receiving 10-year swap rates in the following EM countries: Mexico, Colombia, Russia, China, Korea, India, and Malaysia. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1  This is the view of BCA’s Emerging Markets team and is different from BCA’s house view. The latter is more benign on the US inflation outlook in the coming years.   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Special Report

Generally-speaking, an increase in bank deposits occurs due to either Fed asset purchases, bank asset purchases, or bank loan creation. Deposits have grown massively over the past year because the Treasury has issued an enormous amount of bonds, and these bonds have been purchased both by the Fed and US banks. Relative to the 2008-2009 period, the comparatively better health of US bank balance sheets last year has been an even more important factor than Fed asset purchases in accounting for the difference in money growth between the two periods. Money growth used to be a good predictor of economic activity, but today it makes more sense to focus on interest rates rather than monetary aggregates as a leading economic indicator. Over the past 20 years, only the collapse in velocity that occurred after 2008 is meaningful for investors, and it appears to reflect already “known” information: the persistent household deleveraging that occurred following the global financial crisis, and the effect of Fed asset purchases on the stock of money at several points over the past decade. Our base case view is that a portion of the significant amount of household savings that have accumulated will not be spent, and that the US output gap will close but not move deeply into positive territory this year. But the enormous growth in money over the past year reflects unprecedented fiscal and monetary support, which could eventually change investor expectations about long-term interest rates (even absent rapid overheating). Rising long-term rate expectations could threaten the equity bull market, given the impact the secular stagnation narrative has had in keeping long-term rate expectations low and the extent to which easy money has boosted equity valuation multiples over the past year. Broad money growth has exploded higher over the past year, to a pace that has not been seen since WWII (Chart II-1). This growth in the money supply has vastly exceeded what investors witnessed during and immediately following the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, raising concerns among many investors of the potential cyclical and structural consequences. Chart II-1A Nearly Unprecedented Surge In Money Growth In this report we revisit the deposit creation process, and explain the specific factors that have led to surging money growth over the past year. We also review the usefulness of money growth as an economic indicator, and provide some perspective on the 20-year decline in money velocity. We conclude by noting that the surge in money growth is potentially concerning for investors for two reasons. First, if US households ignore likely future tax increases and decide to fully spend the vast amount of savings that have accumulated over the past year, then the US economy is likely to overheat rather quickly. The second, more likely, threat to investors is if the sharp increase in the money supply ends up changing market expectations about the neutral rate of interest. It remains too early to conclude whether investors will significantly revise up their long-term rate expectations, in large part because the scale of permanent damage in the wake of the pandemic is still unknown. But investors should remain vigilant, given the impact the secular stagnation narrative has had on keeping long-term rate expectations low and the extent to which easy money has boosted equity valuation multiples over the past year. Reviewing The Money And Bank Deposit Creation Process In order to fully understand the spectacular growth of the money supply over the past year and its potential implications for the economy and financial markets, it is important to revisit how money is created in a modern economy. My colleague Ryan Swift, BCA’s US Bond Strategist, reviewed this question in detail in a June 2020 Strategy Report and we summarize the report’s key points below.1 In the US, most of the stock of broad money aggregates is composed of bank deposits. Following the global financial crisis, the textbook view of how banks act purely as intermediaries, taking in deposits from the public and lending them out, was revealed to be a mostly inaccurate description of the financial system in the aggregate. Rather, while individual banks often compete for deposits as a source of funding, bank deposits in the aggregate are typically created by making loans. Central banks can also create money, by purchasing financial assets and crediting the banking system with reserve assets (central bank money). Table II-1 highlights the link between the Fed’s balance sheet and that of US banks in the aggregate, and highlights how changes in deposits – a liability of the banking system – must be offset by increases in bank assets or decreases in other bank liabilities. Table II-1The Link Between The Fed’s Balance Sheet And The Aggregate US Banking System The typical mechanics of three money-creating operations are described below, alongside the corresponding change in balance sheet items: Fed Asset Purchases: When the Federal Reserve purchases financial assets in the secondary market, it increases securities held (Fed asset) and typically increases reserves (Fed liability). In the increase in reserves (banking system asset) matches the increase in deposits (banking system liability), as the previous holders of the assets purchased by the Fed deposit the proceeds of the sale. Bank Asset Purchases: When banks purchase government securities from non-bank holders they credit the sellers with bank deposits.2 This increases bank holdings of securities or other assets (banking system asset) and increases deposits (banking system liability). Bank Loan Creation: When banks create a loan, they increase their holdings of loans & leases (banking system asset) and deposit the loan amount into the borrowers’ account (banking system liability). At the individual bank level, if Bank A creates a loan and the borrower withdraws the funds to pay someone with an account at Bank B, there will be an asset-liability mismatch relating to that loan transaction between those two banks if no other actions are taken. The result will be that Bank A experiences an increase in equity capital and Bank B experiences a decline. But for the banking system as a whole, the increase in bank assets exactly matched the increase in bank liabilities, and Bank A created the deposits that ended up as a liability of Bank B. The issuance or retirement of long-term bank debt and equity instruments can also create or destroy deposits but, for the purpose of understanding the difference in money growth during the pandemic compared with the 2008-2009 experience, it is sufficient to focus on the three money-creating operations described above. Explaining The Recent Surge In Money Growth The prevalent view among many financial market participants is that the money supply has surged in the US due to the fiscal stimulus provided by the CARES act. But an increase in the government’s budget deficit does not in and of itself create money, because the Treasury issues bonds to finance the difference between revenue and expenditures. If those bonds are purchased entirely by the nonfinancial sector, then an increase in deposits of stimulus recipients is offset by a decrease in deposits of those who purchased the bonds. A more precise answer is that deposits have grown massively over the past year because the Treasury has issued an enormous amount of bonds and these bonds have been purchased both by the Fed and US banks. Charts II-2A and II-2B highlight this by showing the change in the main items on the aggregate banking system balance sheet since the end of 2019. The charts show that the increase in deposits on the liability side of bank balance sheets have been matched by large increases in reserves and other cash (caused by the Fed’s asset purchases) and banks’ securities holdings (caused by bank asset purchases). Chart II-2AOver The Past Year, Fed And Bank Asset Purchases… Chart II-2B…Account For Most Of The Surge In Deposits   But this does not explain why money growth has been so much larger over the past year than it was in 2008-2009, when total Federal Reserve assets increased from $920 billion to $2.2 trillion. Chart II-1 on page 15 highlighted that growth in M2 has risen to a whopping 25% year-over-year growth rate, a full 15 percentage points above the strongest rate that prevailed following the global financial crisis. Charts II-3A and II-3B explain the discrepancy, by showing the change in the main items on the aggregate banking system balance sheet as a percent of the money supply during each of the two periods, as well as the difference. The charts show that while changes in bank reserves and cash assets – caused by Fed asset purchases – were significantly larger in 2020 than they were on average from 2008 to 2009, changes in loans & leases and securities in bank credit, as well as other assets were also quite significant and account for two-thirds of the difference when added together. Chart II-3ARelative To 2008/2009, The Health Of The Banking System… Chart II-3B…Helped Facilitate More Money Creation Last Year   Thus, while it is true that the Fed’s accommodation of extraordinary fiscal easing has helped create a sizeable amount of money over the past year, relative to the 2008-2009 period the comparatively better health of US bank balance sheets has been an even more important factor – in the sense that balance sheet restrictions did not prevent US banks from facilitating the creation of money as appears to have been the case in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Money And Growth We noted above that fiscal easing does not create money in and of itself unless the bonds issued to finance an increase in the deficit are purchased either by banks or the Fed. Yet most investors would not disagree that significant increases in budget deficits boost short-term economic growth, particularly during recessions. This implies that the link between money and economic growth may not be particularly strong over a cyclical time horizon, which is in fact what the data shows – at least over the past 30 years. Charts II-4A and II-4B illustrate the historical relationship between real GDP and real M2 growth, pre- and post-1990. The chart makes it clear that the relationship between real money and GDP growth used to be strong, with real money growth somewhat leading economic activity. This relationship completely broke down after the 1980s, and is now mostly coincident and negative. There are three reasons behind the breakdown: 1. The money supply used to be the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy target, meaning that money growth directly reflected monetary policy shifts. Today, the Fed targets interest rates, and the portion of money created through loans simply mirrors the change in interest rates as loan demand rises (falls) and interest rates fall (rise). Specifically, Chart II-4A shows that the ability of money growth to lead economic activity seems to have ended in the late 1980s, when the Fed stopped providing targets for monetary aggregates. Chart II-4AMoney Growth Used To Predict Economic Activity… Chart II-4B…But Ceased To Do So Once The Fed Stopped Targeting The Money Supply Chart II-5US Banks Provide Meaningfully Less Private Sector Credit Than In The Past 2. The share of total US credit provided by US banks has fallen significantly over time – especially during the early 1990s – as corporate bond issuance, securitized loans, and mortgages backed by agency bonds issued to the private sector rose as a proportion of total credit (Chart II-5). 3. Since 2000, a Chart II-4B shows that a clearly negative correlation has emerged between money growth and economic activity during recessions. In 2008-2009 and again last year, money growth reflected emergency Fed asset purchases in the face of a sharp decline in economic activity. In 2000, the Fed did not expand its balance sheet, but the economy diverged from money growth due to the lingering impact of management excesses, governance failures, and elevated debt in the corporate sector in the 1990s. The conclusion for investors is straightforward: while money growth used to be a good predictor of economic activity, today it makes more sense to use interest rates than monetary aggregates as a leading indicator for growth. Money Velocity And Its Implications When discussing the impact of money on the economy, one point often raised by investors is the fact that money velocity has declined significantly over the past two decades. This observation is frequently followed by the question of whether the absence of this decline would have caused real growth, inflation, or both to have been higher over the past 20 years than they otherwise were. It is difficult to prove or refute the point, as monetary velocity is not a well-understood concept – investors do not have a good, reliable theory upon which to predict changes in velocity or understand their economic significance. Velocity is calculated from the equation of exchange as a ratio of nominal GDP to some measure of the money supply (typically a broad measure such as M2) and theoretically represents the turnover rate of money. But long-term changes in velocity do not seem to correlate well with measures of growth or inflation. Short-term changes in velocity correlate extremely well with inflation, but this simply reflects the fact that velocity tends to be driven by the numerator (nominal GDP) over short periods of time (see Box II-1). BOX II-1 Money Velocity Over The Short-Term Some investors have pointed to the relationship shown in Chart II-B1 to argue that M2 money velocity is a significant cyclical predictor of inflation. But Chart II-B2 illustrates that nearly two-thirds of annual changes in velocity since 1990 have been accounted for by changes in the numerator – nominal GDP – rather than the denominator. This underscores that the apparent explanatory power of short-term changes in money velocity at predicting inflation is simply capturing the normal relationship between real growth and inflation, as well as the naturally positive correlation between the implicit GDP price deflator and core consumer prices. Chart Box II-1Velocity Seemingly Predicts Inflation Over The Short-Term… Chart Box II-2…Because Short-Term Changes In Velocity Are Driven By Nominal Output   The bigger question is why velocity has declined so significantly over the past 20 years, and what this means for investors. Chart II-6Large Declines In Velocity Are Linked To Prolonged Periods Of Deleveraging Panel 1 of Chart II-6 shows a long-dated history of M2 velocity, and highlights that the average or “normal” level of M2 velocity has historically been just under 1.8. Over the past century, there have been just four major deviations from this level: A major decline that began at the start of the Great Depression and prevailed until the Second World War (WWII) Significant volatility during and in the years immediately following WWII A sharp rise in velocity during the 1990s to a record level A downtrend beginning in the late 1990s that remains intact today Abstracting from the war period in which the economy was heavily distorted by government intervention, Chart II-6 also highlights that persistent declines in velocity appear to be explainable by major deleveraging events. The second panel of the chart shows a measure of the duration of private sector deleveraging, and highlights that the two periods of low velocity have been strongly (negatively) correlated with the prevalence of deleveraging. This explanation is simple but intuitive: excessive leveraging eventually causes households and firms to redirect a larger portion of their income to servicing or paying down debt, which weighs on real growth and, by extension, prices. While it is true that the recent 20-year downtrend in velocity began in the late 1990s and thus well before household deleveraging began in 2008, this seems to mostly reflect the reversal of an anomalous rise in velocity in the late 1990s. We largely view the decline in velocity from the late 1990s to 2008 as a “reversion to the mean.” It remains an option question why velocity rose so sharply in the 1990s. Some evidence seems to point to financial innovation and technological change: Chart II-7 highlights that the number of automated bank teller and point-of-sale payment terminals rose massively in the 1990s, alongside a significant acceleration in real cash in circulation. This is theoretically consistent with an increased “turnover” rate of money. But Chart II-8 highlights that a substantial portion of the rise in velocity during this period was attributable to denominator effects (persistently weak money growth), rather than numerator effects. Chart II-7Some Evidence Of Increased Money Turnover In The 1990s Chart II-8The Rise In Velocity In The 1990s Was Driven By Slow Money Growth   Regardless of the cause, velocity was clearly anomalous on the upside in the 1990s, suggesting that it is not the downtrend in velocity over the past 20 years that is significant to investors. Rather, it is the collapse in velocity that has occurred since 2008 that is meaningful, and from the perspective of investors it appears to reflect already “known” information: the persistent household deleveraging that occurred following the global financial crisis, and the effect of Fed asset purchases on the stock of money at several points over the past decade. In the future, any meaningful increases in velocity are only likely to occur due to a significant reduction in the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, which is two to three years away at the earliest. The Fed could decide to taper its asset purchases sometime later this year or in early 2022, but tapering would merely slow the pace at which the Fed’s assets are increasing (and would thus not cause velocity to rise via a meaningful slowdown in money growth). Money And Future Inflation The final question to address is the issue of whether the enormous rise in money growth over the past year is likely to lead to higher, potentially much higher, inflation over the coming 6-12 months. This has been the main question from investors who have been unnerved by the surge in money growth and the collapse in the US government budget balance. Any link between money and inflation has to come through spending, so the question of whether a surge in money will lead to higher inflation is akin to asking whether the massive amount of savings that have been accumulated over the past year are likely to be spent, and over what period. We discussed this question in Section 1 of this month’s report, and noted that expectations of future tax increases and a permanent decline in some services spending will likely prevent all of these savings from being deployed once the practice of social distancing durably ends later this year. This implies that a substantial closure of the output gap is likely to occur in the second half of the year, but that major economic overheating will be avoided. Moreover, even if the output gap does rise into positive territory over the coming 6-12 months, this does not necessarily suggest that inflation will rise quickly back above the Fed’s target. In last month’s Special Report, we highlighted two important points about inflation that are often overlooked by investors. First, inflation’s long-term trend is determined by inflation expectations. Second, if inflation expectations are largely formed based on the experience of past inflation, then inflation is ultimately determined by three dimensions of the output gap: whether it is rising or falling, whether it is above or below zero, and how long it has been above or below zero. While market-based expectations of long-term inflation have risen well above the Fed’s target, both our adaptive expectations model for inflation as well as a simple five-year moving average are between 30-60 basis points below the 2% mark (Chart II-9). This may suggest that a persistent period of output above potential may be required in order to raise inflation relative to expectations and to raise expectations themselves above the Fed’s target unless the Fed’s efforts at “jawboning” them higher prove to be highly successful. Measured as a year-over-year growth rate of core prices, inflation is set to spike higher in April and May in the order of 50-60 basis points simply due to base effects (Chart II-10). However, inflation will only sustainably rise to an above-target rate over the coming 6-12 months if demand is even stronger than implied by consensus expectations, which is not our base case view. Chart II-9Adaptive Inflation Expectations Measures Are Still Well Below The Fed's Target Chart II-10The Fed Will Look Through Base Effects On Consumer Prices   Investment Conclusions Investors can draw two conclusions from our analysis above. First, there is reason to be concerned about the enormous rise in the money supply if we are wrong in our assessment that some portion of the savings accumulated over the past year will not ultimately be spent. If US households ignore likely future tax increases and decide to fully spend their savings windfall, then the US economy is likely to overheat rather quickly. The second, more likely, threat to investors is if the sharp increase in the money supply, reflecting monetized fiscal stimulus and a meaningfully healthier financial system compared with the global financial crisis, ends up changing market expectations about the neutral rate of interest. Chart II-11The Pandemic Response May Raise Long-Term Rate Expectations Chart II-11 that while 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yields are not much lower than they were pre-pandemic, that is an artificially low bar. Long-dated bond yields fell over 100 basis points in 2018 and 2019, in response to a global growth slowdown precipitated by the Trump administration’s trade war. While President Biden will pursue some protectionist policies, they are likely to be meaningfully less damaging to global growth than under President Trump and are extremely unlikely to act as the primary driver of macroeconomic activity over the course of Biden’s term (as they were during the period that long-dated bond yields fell). As such, if the pandemic ends this year with seemingly minimal lasting damage to the US economy, long-dated bond yields could re-approach their late 2018 levels or higher towards the end of the year. This would cause a meaningful rise in 10-year Treasury yields, even with the Fed on hold until the middle of 2022 or later. A significant rise in bond yields would be quite unwelcome to stock investors given how stretched equity multiples have become. Table II-2 presents a set of year-end scenarios to gauge the potential impact of an eventual rise in 10-year yields. We assume that forward earnings grow at 5% this year, and we allow the spread between the 12-month forward earnings yield and the 10-year yield (a proxy for the equity risk premium) to return to its 2003-2007 average as part of an assumed “normalization” trade. Table II-2Current Multiples Are Justified Only If The 10-Year Treasury Yield Does Not Rise Above 2.5% The table suggests that a 10-year Treasury yield of 2.5% will be the most that the interest rates could rise before the fair value of the S&P 500 falls below current levels. That roughly equates to a return to the late-2018 levels that prevailed for 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yields, given that the short-end of the curve will remain pinned close to the zero lower bound for some time. For now, it remains too early to conclude whether investors will significantly revise their long-term rate expectations, in large part because the scale of permanent damage in the wake of the pandemic is still unknown. But investors should remain vigilant and attentive to the fact that interest rates may pose a threat to financial markets later this year even in a scenario where the US economy is not immediately overheating, given the impact the secular stagnation narrative has had in keeping long-term rate expectations low and the extent to which easy money has boosted equity valuation multiples over the past year. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1 Please see USBS Strategy Report "The Case Against The Money Supply," dated June 30, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see “Money creation in the modern economy,” Bank of England, Q1 2014 Quarterly Bulletin.

Highlights Biden’s initial political capital is moderate-to-strong according to our Political Capital Matrix. He will pass his American Rescue Plan and one or two budget reconciliation bills over the next 18 months. Investors will need to discount the impact of tax hikes eventually.  The Democrats’ second impeachment of President Trump is a distraction but the party will not let it derail their legislative agenda. The bipartisan power-sharing agreement in the Senate will keep the filibuster in place for now (though not permanently). This does not affect the most market-relevant aspects of Biden’s policies, at least not in 2021, but beyond that it is an open question.  The stock rally is stretched, so prepare for volatility in the near term. But over the long run continue to prefer stocks over bonds, cyclicals over defensives, and value over growth stocks. Feature The US equity rally is getting frothy even as President Joe Biden kicks off his administration with a flurry of executive orders. Financial exuberance stems from combined monetary and fiscal stimulus that will provide a positive backdrop for risk assets for most of this year. Still, most of the good news is priced so we expect volatility to revive in the short run. The BCA Equity Capitulation Indicator is nearing the highest points of its historic range, which is typically a signal for a 10% equity correction or more (Chart 1). Not all indicators point decisively to a bubble that will pop imminently but several suggest that a bubble is being formed.1 The policy backdrop of fiscal largesse combined with an ultra-dovish Fed makes it easy to see why some parts of the market are getting manic. In this context, the Biden administration’s regulatory and tax agenda will become a negative catalyst in the short run even though its big spending will secure the economic recovery, which is positive in the long run. Chart 1Mania Unfolding Biden’s First Executive Orders Biden’s initial decrees brought zero surprises so far. He rejoined the Paris climate agreement, canceled the Keystone XL pipeline, suspended new oil and gas leasing on federal land, reversed President Trump’s border emergency and immigration curbs, ordered federal workers to wear masks, and directed the federal government to “Buy American.” The energy sector suffered the brunt of Biden’s initial regulatory salvo but the relative performance of energy stocks did not drop as much as financials, where Biden’s regulatory risks are less immediate. Biden’s policies are negative for health care stocks but they suffered least from what was a general setback for value plays in the context of a small bounce in the dollar and fears about global growth weakness stemming from the pandemic which has not yet been quelled. Large caps in all three of these sectors are underperforming small caps, suggesting that Biden’s new regulations and looming tax hikes are not driving the markets – at least not yet (Chart 2). Rather these cyclical small caps stand to benefit from the administration’s large spending plans, which include the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan currently being negotiated (Table 1). These plans are highly likely to pass as explained below.    Chart 2Biden's Executive Orders: No Surprises So Far Table 1Biden’s American Rescue Plan (With Previous COVID Relief) Going forward, Biden’s regulatory onslaught will bring negative surprises eventually as it expands and deepens but these will not counteract the stronger tailwinds of the vaccine and fiscal spending. Democrats have yet to invoke the Congressional Review Act, which enables them rapidly to reverse the regulations that the Trump administration ordered just before leaving office.2 The regulatory risk is greater for health care and energy than it is for financials and tech, though the latter two are not void of risk. Health care is the Democrats’ top priority outside of pandemic relief and economic recovery. (See Appendix for our updated political risk matrix by sector.) While the market can look through Biden’s regulatory threat, at least for now, it cannot look through the impact of higher taxes on corporate earnings forever. Over the next two months House Democrats will start revealing details of their budget proposals, which could serve as a negative catalyst for the overstretched equity rally. Other negative catalysts from an ambitious new administration are also possible with a market at such dizzy heights. Secretary of Treasury Janet Yellen has discouraged raising taxes initially but investors know that taxes will go up sooner or later. Moreover the specific legislative vehicle for Biden to push his agenda – “budget reconciliation” – requires tax hikes to offset spending increases. Thus if Democrats initiate a reconciliation bill in February or March then it will imply at least some revenue offsets, even if the biggest tax increases are saved for the second reconciliation bill for FY2022. Bottom Line: Value stocks have taken a breather but will continue to outperform over the cyclical 12-month time horizon. Looming Democratic tax proposals are more likely to serve as a near-term negative catalyst for the overstretched equity rally than Biden’s regulatory onslaught, which will take time to be felt. We are sticking with value over growth stocks due to the extremely accommodative fiscal and monetary policy setting. The Filibuster Preserved (For Now) A critical check on lawmaking in the Senate, the filibuster, has been preserved – at least for the moment. This is positive news for markets as it lowers the odds of major legislative surprises this year. The filibuster enables senators to block normal legislation through endless debate. Sixty senators are needed to invoke “cloture” and bring debate to a close. Otherwise the bill goes nowhere. With the Senate divided evenly at 50-50 seats between the two parties, Biden’s agenda will now depend on any bills that can garner 10 Republican senators, plus two “budget reconciliation” bills for fiscal 2021-22. Reconciliation bills only require a simple 51-seat majority in the Senate. Eliminating the filibuster will remain a risk over the long run. It was only preserved because two centrist Democratic senators, Joe Manchin of West Virginia and Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona, declared that they would not vote to abolish it. This prompted Republican Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell to drop his chief demand, that the filibuster be kept, in his negotiations with Democratic Majority Leader Chuck Schumer toward an agreement for the two evenly divided parties in the Senate to share power. Now a power-sharing agreement is in place so the legislative process can begin, albeit within the filibuster’s guardrails. Notice that Schumer never conceded to McConnell that the filibuster would be preserved. And two Democrats is not very many. Later these centrists may succumb to party pressure, say amid Republican obstructionism of a voting rights bill, to eliminate the filibuster. The last time the Senate was evenly divided, after the 2000 election, the power-sharing agreement only lasted six months, from January to June 2001. A single retirement or death could turn the balance. Moreover since Democrats have the option of two reconciliation bills first, the filibuster is not a substantial check on them until 2022 or beyond, at which point the centrists could fall under sustained pressure.3 Bottom Line: Preserving the filibuster provides a source of stability – it reduces policy uncertainty and polarization. It restricts Biden’s agenda largely to his major initiatives: entrenching the Affordable Care Act, expanding infrastructure spending, partially repealing Trump tax cuts, and various other tax-and-spend measures known to investors. It lowers the chance that financial markets will be blindsided in 2021 by a sweeping new legislative initiative – for example, the Green New Deal – or radical redistributive schemes. While markets will need to discount the tax hikes they will be able to recover more quickly than if they also expected a stream of unpredictable legislation from a Senate unshackled from the filibuster. Stimulus And The Tax Hike Timeline The American Rescue Plan could pass in February at the earliest or April at the latest. If at least 10 Republican senators cooperate then it will fly through Congress. The advantage of this bipartisan route is that it would achieve an early Biden objective while still leaving Democrats with two full chances to pass reconciliation bills covering fiscal 2021-22. The economic recovery would be on sure footing thereafter, giving Biden more room to maneuver (Charts 3 and 4). Chart 3Is More Stimulus Necessary? Bipartisan talks are under way. Senator Joe Manchin of West Virginia set up talks with about 15 other senators and three White House aides, including National Economic Council director Brian Deese, toward revising and passing the rescue plan.4 Winning over ten Republicans is a tall order but GOP senators are aware that the pandemic is still going and even Republican voter opinion favors more relief. So far Democrats have not allowed any compromise in the size of the deal but that could change to get 60 votes, since they can always make up the difference through reconciliation later. The rescue plan is unlikely to be passed before Trump’s second impeachment trial begins on February 8, however. If 10 Republicans cannot be found, the Senate will be slowed down by juggling reconciliation and impeachment. Trump’s first impeachment took 49 days, leaving the average at 65 days (Table 2). It will keep the Senate busy at least through mid-March. Chart 4More Checks Coming For Households? Table 2Impeachment Takes At Least A Month Since Democrats are highly unlikely to win over 17 Republicans to convict Trump of inciting insurrection, the impeachment could be a policy mistake. Democrats are determined not to let slide the opportunity to position themselves as the arch defenders of democracy. Acquitting Trump would put several prominent Republicans on record endorsing him even after his alleged interference with the peaceful transition of power. However, impeachment will not be allowed to derail Biden’s agenda. The Democratic Party controls both processes. The Senate can wrap up the trial if it becomes an obstacle. Diagram 1 presents the timeline for these events to occur. The implication is that March 14, when the latest expansion of unemployment benefits starts to expire, will serve as a deadline for Biden’s rescue plan. Diagram 1Timeline Of Impeachment, Budget Reconciliation, And Regular Legislation Budget reconciliation takes seven months on average but it only took three months in 2017, which is the proper analogy for today. Even if tax hikes are passed in Q2 there is an open question as to when they would take effect (Diagram 2). Prudent investors should be prepared for a retroactive January 1, 2021 effective date, even if it is more likely that they will kick in on January 1, 2022 to give the economy more time to recover. Again, taxes pose a risk to the rally. Diagram 2How Long Does It Take To Pass A Budget Reconciliation Bill? If Republicans do not cooperate on Biden’s rescue plan then Democrats will cite it as obstructionism from the beginning, despite Biden’s call to unity, and it will play into any future efforts to eliminate the filibuster. But those will likely center on the period after the two reconciliation bills. Bottom Line: As the House Democrats begin to draft their first budget resolution, to initiate the reconciliation process, tax hikes will come more into focus. The near-term upside risk is that Democrats skip taxes in the first bill and save it for later. But there will have to be at least some revenue raisers in any reconciliation bill. So a near-term pullback is entirely reasonable to expect. We would be buyers on the dip given the extremely accommodative fiscal and monetary backdrop. Introducing Our Political Capital Index To assess any government’s capability – namely its ability to alter the policy setting that affects the economy and financial markets – we need to measure its political capital or grounds of support. To this end we have constructed a Political Capital Index to measure the strength and capability of US ruling parties and presidencies (Table 3). Table 3Political Capital Index The Political Capital Index shows a series of political and economic indicators, as of the latest available data (December or January), as well as the change since Biden’s election in November.5 Below we describe the political and economic categories of political capital that we chose and the data we use to represent them: Political Strength: The most basic measure of political capital is President Biden’s margin of victory in the popular vote (4.4%) and Electoral College vote (306/538), the number of days he has been in power, his party’s Congressional majorities, and the Supreme Court’s ideological leaning. These components will last for two-to-four years and can only be changed by new elections or deaths (Table 4). Even a president elected in a landslide would see his political capital decay over time. The sooner the next election, the less political capital the ruling party has. The president and Congress will have more trouble passing legislation just before the election and will be more careful about what they do pass to avoid punishment at the ballot box. Any difficult economic policies or reforms will tend to be done at the beginning of the term, as political capital is still abundant and the next election is not a clear and present danger. President Biden has moderate political capital. His popular victory was solid, his electoral victory was the same as President Trump’s, but his congressional majorities are weak. His initial legislative efforts should be assumed to pass but aside from his rescue plan and one or two reconciliation bills he will not be able to get much else done. Table 4Political Capital: White House And Congress Household Sentiment: Household sentiment is the origin of political capital since households are voters. We measure it through presidential net approval ratings, both in general and in handling the economy, as well as through consumer confidence (Chart 5). Household sentiment changes easily – it can drive policies and react to them. Even if the economy is objectively improving, sentiment can remain downbeat if politicians fail to communicate their policies, which could cost them the election. Measures that improve household pocketbooks or welfare are more popular than those that impose structural changes like taxes and regulation. But reforms are possible when a politician has sufficient political capital, or when a worse outcome would follow from doing nothing. Biden will start with a higher approval rating than President Trump but his average approval is not much higher at present and consumer confidence has ticked down as a result of the pandemic. His economic stimulus should create an improvement in household sentiment in the coming year. Chart 5US Households: Still Downbeat Business Sentiment: Business sentiment is another important element of political capital. Businesses that are confident about the economy’s prospects will spend on capex, new orders, and new hires, and they will also deplete their inventories (Table 5). Animal spirits respond to spending, taxation, regulation, and trade – all areas where politicians have some control. Table 5Political Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Policymakers can run down business sentiment by enacting painful policies for business, in favor of government or households or personal whim – or they can pass business-friendly policies to boost animal spirits. Businesses cannot vote like households but they have a powerful influence over politicians through lobbyists and political donations and a powerful influence on voters through employment. Higher animal spirits encourage new employment, which improves household welfare, thus boosting political capital. Biden is starting out fairly strong with respect to business sentiment, with the exception of the service sector, which is still beaten down by the pandemic. This is an area where his political capital could decay over time. Big business was happy to get rid of Trump’s trade war but now it faces larger government encroachment. This risk is flagged by small businesses, which are already highly distrustful of new taxes and regulation (Chart 6). Chart 6US Business Sentiment Chart 7Measures Of Polarization Political Polarization: Starkly divided populations and governments are often gridlocked or obstructionist, preventing policies from getting approved or implemented (Chart 7). Our polarization proxy measures the difference in approval of the sitting president according to party, while our economic polarization measure does the same for economic sentiment. Structural polarization is a low-frequency data series from political science literature that measures whether House members and senators tend to vote with the “party line” or “reach across the aisle.”6 The Philly Fed Partisan Index also measures the degree of political disagreement among politicians at the federal level. A highly polarized environment ensures that there will be strong opposition to any policy put forward by lawmakers and a higher likelihood of reversal by the next governing party. This leads to erratic policymaking and policy uncertainty among households and businesses. Lower polarization increases the durability of policies. Fiscal Policy: The government sector contributes to political capital through fiscal policy, especially fiscal thrust (the change in the cyclically adjusted primary budget deficit) (Table 6). An expansionary fiscal policy affords policymakers greater latitude – especially in times and places where inflation is not a public concern. It can also be an effort by the ruling party to boost its political capital when it is low, or when an election looms. The Biden administration is lucky to start off with a new business cycle, as Obama did in 2009, but the large dose of fiscal support today will become a fiscal drag by 2024 so the long-term effectiveness of today’s “pump priming” will be essential. Table 6Political Capital: The Economy And Markets Economic Conditions: Economic conditions are arguably the most important component of political capital. We included several objective measures of household wellbeing such as unemployment, inflation, gasoline prices at the pump, and wage growth. If voters have seen their quality of life improve under the current set of leaders then they are more likely to vote to continue their windfall. To judge whether a party will be re-elected, it is critical to know whether household wellbeing has changed since the last election. High unemployment, high inflation, high economic uncertainty, and high bankruptcy levels point to struggling voters who are more likely to take their grievances to the ballot box. By the same token, leaders will struggle to get anything done if voters are beset with these ills. Asset Markets: Asset markets play at least some role in determining political capital. Most voters are not highly exposed to the stock market, though they care about their pension fund. Most voters are highly exposed to the property market. A euphoric stock market will not necessarily buoy the political capital of a president or ruling party, as demonstrated by the recent election: President Trump’s approval was closely linked to the stock market, which also restrained his actions, yet a rallying market did not get him re-elected. A market crash will always hurt policymakers, especially if it happens just before an election. We watch the stock market primarily as a downside risk to the ruling party’s political capital rather than upside. Bottom Line: Our Political Capital Index is how we will monitor President Biden’s and the Democratic Party’s capability in the coming months and years. The administration begins with moderate political capital but it is likely to improve on economic recovery, which will be secured through control of Congress and the purse strings. Our confidence that Biden’s American Rescue Plan and one or two reconciliation bills will pass stems from this assessment. This means a large spending program and tax hikes are highly probable and investors should prepare for them. Investment Takeaways Signs of mania – from Bitcoin to TESLA to GameStop – have gripped the market as the combined effect of ultra-dovish monetary and fiscal policy is priced. This process can continue beyond reasonable expectations. Nevertheless we are prepared for near-term volatility and a correction at any time. The rollout of the COVID-19 vaccine faces inevitable bumps and the pandemic is still triggering government lockdown measures and consumer caution – though these will improve over time. Biden’s regulatory agenda and especially looming tax hikes will also spur some risk aversion in the near term as the House Democrats begin preparing a reconciliation bill. Overcoming the hurdle of Trump’s impeachment will free up the Senate to move forward on reconciliation as well, which means tax hikes will fall under the market’s radar sooner or later. A regular bill could be passed in February without new taxes but otherwise a reconciliation bill will pass as early as April and include at least some new taxes, even if they take effect next year. We would still use the opportunity to buy into any further weakness in value plays relative to growth plays (Chart 8). Fundamentally the economy is set to improve this year, the pandemic is set to subside, and the policy support will be reinforced and expanded as necessary. Chart 8A Setback For Growth Versus Value Chart 9Equity Correction Looms The reflation trade is technically over-extended, investors are complacent, and some profit-taking is due. The extremely depressed put-to-call ratio tracks well with the US dollar index, both of which are showing signs of life (Chart 9). We would fade a rebound in the dollar, however, as the Democratic Party’s policies will ensure widening twin deficits (budget and trade deficits) even as the Fed demonstrates its commitment to its new goal of allowing an inflation overshoot to make up for past undershoots.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor jesse.Kuri@bcaresearch.com   Appendix Table A1Political Risk Matrix Table A2Biden’s Cabinet Position Appointments   Footnotes 1     See BCA Research US Equity Strategy, “Overdose?” January 25, 2021, bcaresearch.com. 2     The Congressional Review Act of 1996 enables Congress to speed up the removal of regulations that were adopted recently, in this case since August 21, 2020. The process requires both houses of Congress to repeal a regulation but the Senate cannot prevent repeal via filibuster. The Trump administration used the law aggressively to remove several of President Barack Obama’s outgoing regulations. See Jonathan H. Adler, “Will Democrats Learn To Love The Congressional Review Act?” Reason, January 23, 2021, reason.com.  3    Democrats are explicitly interested in repealing the filibuster, as Biden and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer have indicated (not to mention former President Obama who characterized it as a relic of the racist Jim Crowe era). 4    See Ed O’Keefe et al, “16 senators from both parties meet with White House on COVID-19 relief plan,” CBS News, January 25, 2021, cbsnews.com; Aamer Madhani and Lisa Mascaro, “White House Begins Talks With Lawmakers On COVID-19 Relief,” Associated Press, January 25, 2021, apnews.com.  5    Biden’s term technically began on January 20 but voters in 2024 will judge the president and ruling party based on whether they are better off than they were four years ago, i.e. when they last made a major judgment. 6    See Jeffrey Lewis, Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, et al, at voteview.org.  

Highlights A positive backdrop still supports a cyclical bull market in Chinese stocks, but the upside in prices could be quickly exhausted. Investors may be overlooking emerging negative signs in China’s onshore equity market.  The breadth of the A-share price rally has sharply declined since the beginning of this year; historically, a rapid narrowing in breadth has been a reliable indicator for pullbacks in the onshore market. Recent stock price rallies in some high-flying sectors of the onshore market are due to earnings multiples rather than earnings growth. Overstretched stock prices relative to earnings risk a snapback. We remain cautious on short-term prospects for China’s onshore equity markets.  Feature Market commentators remain sharply divided about whether Chinese stocks will continue on their cyclical bull run or are in a speculative frenzy ready to capitulate. Stock prices picked up further in the first three weeks of 2021, extending their rallies in 2020. The positives that support a bull market, such as China’s economic recovery and improving profit growth, are at odds with the negatives. The downside is that the intensity of post-pandemic stimulus in China has likely peaked and monetary conditions have tightened. In addition, China’s stock markets may be showing signs of fatigue. While aggregate indexes have recorded new highs, the breadth of the rally—the percentage of stocks for which prices are rising versus falling—has been rapidly deteriorating. In the past, a sharp narrowing in breadth led to corrections and major setbacks in Chinese stock prices. Timing the eventual correction in stock prices will be tricky in an environment where plentiful cash on the sidelines from stimulus invites risk-taking. For now, there is little near-term benefit for investors to chase the rally in Chinese stocks. While we are not yet negative on Chinese stocks on a cyclical basis, the risks for a near-term price correction are significant. Investors looking to allocate more cash to Chinese stocks should wait until a correction occurs. Positive Backdrop On a cyclical basis, there are still some aspects that could push Chinese stocks even higher. The question is the speed of the rally. The more earnings multiples expand in the near term, the more earnings will have to do the heavy lifting in the rest of the year to pull Chinese stocks higher. The following factors have provided tailwinds to Chinese stocks, but may have already been discounted by investors: Chart 1Chinas Economic Recovery Continues China’s economic recovery continues. China was the only major world economy to record growth in 2020. The massive stimulus rolled out last year should continue to work its way through the economy and support the ongoing uptrend in the business cycle (Chart 1). China’s relative success containing domestic COVID-19 outbreaks also provides confidence for the country’s consumers, businesses and investors. Chinese consumers have saved money—a lot of it. Although the household sector has been a laggard in China’s aggregate economy, much of the consumption weakness has been due to a slower recovery in service activities, such as tourism and catering (Chart 2). More importantly, Chinese households have accumulated substantial savings in the past two years. Unlike investors in the US, Chinese households have limited investment choices. Historically, sharp increases in household savings growth led to property booms (Chart 3, top panel). Given that Chinese authorities have become more vigilant in preventing further price inflation in the property market, Chinese households have been increasingly investing in the domestic equity market (Chart 3, middle and bottom panels). Reportedly, there has been a sharp jump in demand for investment products from households; mutual funds in China have raised money at a record pace, bringing in over 2 trillion yuan ($308 billion) in 2020, which is more than the total amount for the previous four years. The equity investment penetration remains low in China compared with developed nations such as the US.1 Thus, there is still room for Chinese households to deploy their savings into domestic stock markets. Chart 2Consumption Has Been A Laggard In Chinas Economic Recovery Chart 3But Chinese Households Have Saved A Lot Of Dry Powder   Global growth and the liquidity backdrop remain positive. The combination of extremely easy monetary policy worldwide and a new round of fiscal support in the US will provide a supportive backdrop for both global economic growth and liquidity conditions. Foreign investment has flocked into China’s financial markets since last year and has picked up speed since the New Year (Chart 4). On a monthly basis, portfolio inflows account for less than 1% of the onshore equity market trading volume, but in recent years foreign portfolio inflows have increasingly influenced China’s onshore equity market sentiment and prices (Chart 5). Chart 4Foreign Investors Are Piling Into The Chinese Equity Market Chart 5And Have Become A More Influential Player In The Chinese Onshore Market Geopolitical risks are abating somewhat. We do not expect that the Biden administration will be quick to unwind Trump’s existing trade policies on China. However, in the near term, the two nations will likely embark on a less confrontational track than in the past two and a half years. Slightly eased Sino-US tensions will provide global investors with more confidence for buying Chinese risk assets. Lastly, localized COVID-19 outbreaks have flared up in several Chinese cities, prompting local authorities to take aggressive measures, including community lockdowns and stepping up travel restrictions. A deterioration in the situation could delay the recovery of household consumption; however, any negative impact on China’s aggregate economy will more than likely be offset by market expectations that policymakers will delay monetary policy normalization. Domestic liquidity conditions could improve, possibly providing a short-term boost to the rally in Chinese stocks. Bottom Line: Much of the positive news may already be priced into Chinese stocks. Non-Negligible Downside Risks There is a consensus that Chinese authorities will dial back their stimulus efforts this year and continue to tighten regulations in sectors such as real estate. Investors may disagree on the pace and magnitude of policy tightening, but the policy direction has been explicit from recent government announcements. However, the market may have ignored the following factors and their implications on stock performance: Deteriorating equity market breadth. In the past three weeks, the rally in Chinese stocks has been supported by a handful of blue-chip companies. The CSI 300 Index, which aggregates the largest 300 companies listed on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges (i.e. the A-share market) outperformed the broader A-share market by a large margin (Chart 6). Crucially, stock market breadth has declined rapidly (Chart 7). In short, the majority of Chinese stocks have relapsed. Chart 6Large Cap Stocks Outperform The Rest By A Sizable Margin Chart 7The Breadth Of Onshore Stock Price Rally Has Narrowed Sharply   Chart 8Narrowing Market Breadth Has Historically Led To Price Pullbacks Previously, Chinese stocks experienced either price corrections or a major setback as the breadth of the rally narrowed (Chart 8). However, the relationship has broken down since October last year; the number of stocks with ascending prices has fallen, while the aggregate A-share prices have risen. In other words, breadth has narrowed and the rally in the benchmark has been due to a handful of large-cap stocks.   Top performers do not have enough weight to support the broad market. An overconcentration of returns in itself may not necessarily lead to an imminent price pullback in the aggregate equity index. The five tech titans in the S&P 500 index have been dominating returns since 2015, whereas the rest of the 495 stocks in the index barely made any gains. Yet the overconcentration in just a few stocks has not stopped the S&P 500 from reaching new highs in the past five years. Unlike the tech titans which represent more than 20% of the S&P index, the overconcentration in the Chinese onshore market has been more on the sector leaders rather than on a particular sector. China’s own tech giants such as Alibaba, Tencent, and Meituan, represent 35% of China’s offshore market, but most of the sector leaders in China’s onshore market account for only two to three percent of the total equity market cap (Table 1). Given their relatively small weight in the Shanghai and Shenzhen composite indexes, it is difficult for these stocks to lift the entire A-share market if prices in all the other stocks decline sharply.  The CSI 300 Index, which aggregates some of China’s largest blue-chip companies and industry leaders, including Kweichow Moutai, Midea Group, and Ping An Insurance, is not insulated from gyrations in the aggregate A-share market. Historically, when investors crowded into those top performers, the weight from underperforming companies in the broader onshore market would create a domino effect and drag down the CSI 300 Index. In other words, the magnitude of returns on the CSI 300 Index can deviate from the broader onshore market, but not the direction of returns.  Table 1Top 10 Constituents And Their Weights In The CSI 300, Shanghai Composite, And Shenzhen Composite Indexes Chinese “groupthinkers” are pushing the overconcentration. With the explosive growth in mutual fund sales, Chinese institutional investors and asset managers have started to play important roles in the bull market. Unlike their Western counterparts, Chinese fund managers’ performances are ranked on a quarterly or even monthly basis by asset owners, including retail investors. As such, they face intense and constant pressure to outperform the benchmarks and their peers, and have great incentive to chase rallies in well-known companies. In a late-state bull market when uncertainties emerge and assets with higher returns are sparse, fund managers tend to group up in chasing fewer “sector winners,” driving up their share prices. Chart 9Forward Earnings Growth Has Stalled Earnings outlook fails to keep up with multiple expansions. Despite the massive stimulus last year and improving industrial profits, forward earnings growth in both the onshore and offshore equity markets rolled over by the end of last year (Chart 9). Earnings from some of China’s high-flying sectors have been mediocre (Chart 10). Even though the ROEs in the food & beverage, healthcare and aerospace sectors remain above the domestic industry benchmarks, the sharp upticks in their share prices are largely due to an expansion of forward earnings multiples rather than earnings growth (Chart 11). The stretched valuation measures suggest that investors have priced in significant earnings growth, which may be more than these industries can deliver in 2021. Chart 10Other Than Healthcare, High-Flying Sectors Have Seen Mediocre Earnings Chart 11Too Much Growth Priced In Cyclical stocks may be sniffing out a peak in the market. The performance in cyclical stocks relative to defensives in both the onshore and offshore equity markets has started to falter, after outperforming throughout 2020 (Chart 12). Historically, the strength in cyclical stocks relative to defensives corresponds with improving economic activity (and vice versa). Therefore, the recent rollover in the outperformance of cyclical stocks versus defensives indicates that China’s economic recovery and the equity rally could soon peak.   An IPO mania. New IPOs in China reached a record high last year, jumping by more than 100% from 2019. IPOs on the Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hong Kong stock exchanges together were more than half of all global IPOs in 2020. The previous rounds of explosive IPOs in China occurred in 2007, 2010/11, and 2014/15, most followed by stock market riots (Chart 13). Chart 12Cyclical Stocks May Be Sniffing Out A Peak In The Market Chart 13IPO Manias In The Past Have Led To Market Riots Bottom Line: Investors may be neglecting some risks and pitfalls in the Chinese equity markets, which could lead to near-term price corrections. Investment Conclusions We still hold a constructive view on Chinese stocks in the next 6 to 12 months. Yet the equity market rally has been on overdrive for the past several weeks. The higher Chinese stock prices climb in the near term, the more it will eat into upside potentials and thus push down expected returns. The divergence between forward earnings and PE expansions in Chinese stocks is reminiscent of the massive stock market boom-bust cycle in 2014/15 (Chart 14A and 14B). This is in stark contrast with the picture at the beginning of the last policy tightening cycle, which started in late 2016 (Chart 15A and 15B). Valuation is a poor timing indicator and investor sentiment is hard to pin down. Nevertheless, the wide divergence between the earnings outlook and multiples indicates that Chinese stock prices are overstretched and at risk of price setbacks. Chart 14AA Picture Looking Too Familiar Chart 14BA Picture Looking Too Familiar Chart 15AAnd A Sharp Contrast From The Last Policy Tightening Cycle Chart 15BAnd A Sharp Contrast From The Last Policy Tightening Cycle We remain cautious on the short-term prospects for the broad equity market. Investors looking to allocate more cash to Chinese stocks should wait until a price correction occurs. Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1Only 20.4% of Chinese households’ total net worth is in financial assets versus the US, where the share is 42.5%. PBoC, “2019 Chinese Urban Households Assets And Liabilities Survey.” Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations