Equities
Highlights The ongoing selloff in EM risk assets and commodities resembles a domino effect. Given that domino effects transpire in bear markets - not corrections - we believe that EM risk assets and commodities are indeed in a bear market. We continue to recommend short positions in EM risk assets and underweighting EM versus DM. Finally, we rank individual developing countries in terms of their vulnerability to foreign portfolio capital outflows based on their share of foreign equity and domestic bond holdings. Feature The fundamental case for our negative stance on EM risk assets continues to rest on the following: A deepening slowdown in global trade due to weakening demand in Chinese and EM economies alongside the Federal Reserve's determination to tighten policy are creating a toxic mix for EM risk assets, a stronger U.S. dollar and negative spillovers into DM markets. With the exception of China's latest trade data, which were inexplicably strong,1 recent trade data out of Asia indicate the region's exports are faltering, as evidenced by slumping outward shipments of Taiwan and Korea (Chart I-1). Chart I-1No Improvement In Asian Exports Importantly, not only has capital spending decelerated in China but household spending growth has also slowed considerably. Chart I-2 illustrates that the marginal propensity to spend among mainland households has diminished, passenger car sales are contracting and the nominal growth rate of retail sales of consumer goods has plummeted from 10% last year to 4%. Chart I-2Chinese Consumer Is Decelerating That said, observing past and current economic data alone does not offer enough information to gauge whether a selloff is a correction or a bear market. To assess the potential for further downside in risk assets, one needs to exercise judgement on the growth outlook. The latter is often contingent on the presence of imbalances and excesses as well as potential policy responses and their effectiveness. We have elaborated on these topics - in particular why lingering excesses and imbalances in China/EM could make the present global cyclical downturn extensive - at great length in past reports2 and we will not repeat our arguments today. Instead, this week we focus on the nature and character of the equity selloff to understand whether this is a correction or a bear market. In addition, we estimate the degree of foreign investors' positioning in individual EM equity and local bond markets, with the aim of gauging risks of potential portfolio outflows. Domino Effects Occur During Bear Markets Bear markets evolve in phases resembling domino effect-like patterns, where some markets lead while others lag. In contrast, corrections are abrupt and the majority of markets drop concurrently. For example, the EM crises in 1997-'98 did not occur simultaneously across all EM countries. It began in July 1997 with Thailand, then spread to Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia and finally to the rest of Asia. By August 1998, Russian financial markets had collapsed, triggering the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) debacle. The last leg of the crisis appeared in Brazil and culminated in the real's devaluation in January 1999. Similarly, the U.S. financial/credit crisis commenced with the selloff in sub-prime securities in March 2007. Corporate spreads began widening, and bank share prices rolled over in June 2007. Next, the S&P 500 and EM stocks peaked in October 2007 (Chart I-3). Despite these developments, commodities prices and EM currencies continued to rally until the summer of 2008, finally collapsing in the second half of that year (Chart I-3, bottom panel). Chart I-3Domino Effect In 2007-08 We discussed the nature of the current EM selloff in our June 14 report titled, "EM: Sustained Decoupling, Or Domino Effect?" In that report,3 we argued that the selloff in EM risk assets fits the pattern of a bear market - not a correction. We also noted that the odds of U.S. stocks and corporate bonds remaining resilient in the face of a deepening EM selloff were low. In the past month, U.S. equities and corporate bonds have sold off, validating our thesis. In terms of market dynamics, the following observations are noteworthy: The selloff in global risk assets that commenced early this year resembles that of a domino effect, and therefore fits the pattern of a bear market. Following the initial selloff in early February, U.S. stocks recovered and made new highs, but EM risk assets and DM ex-U.S. share prices continued to riot. Since early October, the selloff has snared U.S. stocks and more recently U.S. corporate bonds. Within the EM universe, it began with Turkey and Argentina, then spread to Indonesia, South Africa and Brazil. Chinese, Korean and Taiwanese equities held up until the middle of June. By the second half of June, the selloff spread to these markets as well, causing severe damage. A similar rotational selloff developed in the commodities space. Precious metals prices were the first to drop; followed by industrial metals. While oil made new highs in October, crude oil prices have lately recoupled to the downside. Interestingly, crude oil prices have rolled over at their very long-term moving averages - a phenomenon that often marks a major top and is followed by a large decline (Chart I-4). Chart I-4A Major Top In Oil In terms of market indicators, some of our favorites are signaling more downside in share prices. First, China's narrow money (M1) growth has been a good marker for EM share prices; currently, it is extremely weak and has not yet turned up (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Chinese Money Supply & EM Stocks Second, both U.S. and EM share prices always deflate in tandem with a rise in their corporate bond yields, as illustrated in Chart I-6. Chart I-6Corporate Bond Yields Point To Lower Share Prices Importantly, yields on Chinese property companies' offshore bonds have surged and spreads have widened dramatically (Chart I-7). Such high cost of capital entails a dismal outlook for construction activity and industries that are exposed to it. These include global industrials and materials. Chart I-7A Stress In Chinese Real Estate Credit Table I-1 segregates the EM equity selloffs of the past 35 years into corrections (Table I-1A) and bear markets (Table I-1B). The duration of the corrections range from one to three months, while for bear markets it is three to 19 months. The current EM equity selloff is already 9.5 months old and its drawdown is 25%. As such, it qualifies as a bear market, not a correction. Table I-1 Interestingly, this year the global equity index has exhibited a very similar profile to its 2000 top - Chart I-8 overlays the MSCI global stocks index in U.S. dollars with its profile in 1997-2002. Global share prices peaked in January 2000, attempted a failed breakout in March, and after several months of moving sideways, began plunging in September 2000. The behavior of the equity market this year is very similar to what happened in 2000. Chart I-82018 Top = 2000 Peak? This does not mean the current global equity selloff will last as long as or will be as severe as it was in 2000-2002, but the similarities between these episodes are noteworthy. Some investors have hypothesized that a blow-off phase in global stocks will likely occur when the Fed halts its tightening. Although this is a plausible argument, it is important to note that the rally in global stocks from the early 2016 lows to the tops reached this year was of similar magnitude to the surge that occurred in global equities from their 1998 lows to their peak in 2000. Is a widely expected blow-off phase in global share prices behind us? Only time will tell. Finally, the U.S. equal-weighted stock index as well as share prices of Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan - the two financial behemoths leveraged to financial markets - have exhibited negative technical chart patterns (Chart I-9). These are also warnings signals for U.S. share prices and risk assets worldwide. Chart I-9Bearish Technicals In U.S. Stocks How far will this selloff go? Table I-2 compares the current selloff with the one in 2015, when global manufacturing and trade growth flirted with contraction and global cyclical sectors plunged due to a slowdown in China and EM. Table I-2Drawdown In Various Equity Indexes In 2015 And 2018 The current selloff is likely to be at least as bad, if not worse. This is because EM risk assets have entered this selloff more overbought than they were in 2015. We discuss the topic in the following section. Bottom Line: The selloff in EM risk assets and currencies has further to run. Stay short / underweight. EM Portfolio Outflows: Vulnerability Ranking The U.S. dollar is attempting to break out to new cyclical highs, and the odds are in its favor. Both the Fed's tightening and the ongoing global trade slowdown will foster the U.S. dollar rally. As EM currencies depreciate further, there will be considerable pressure on foreign investors to sell their EM assets. To gauge how vulnerable various developing countries are to foreign capital outflows, we have determined how individual countries rank with respect to their share of foreign equity and domestic bond holdings. Table I-3 ranks individual bourses by the share of foreign equity ownership in their largest companies accounting for at least two-thirds of market cap.4 Table I-3What Is The Share Of Foreign Ownership In Local Bourses? This ranking illustrates that South Africa, the Czech Republic, Taiwan, Russia and Hungary have the highest share of foreign holdings, while Colombia, Malaysia, Chile, Thailand and Indonesia have the lowest. China is not a part of this list because its investable stocks are traded in various jurisdictions, making it difficult to define foreign investor ownership. To put the current penetration of foreign ownership into historical perspective, Table I-4 juxtaposes the current share of foreign stock ownership for select bourses with the one from March 2015 - just before the freefall in EM share prices. The share of foreign ownership is larger now than back in March 2015 for Brazil, Turkey and India, while it is lower for Indonesia and unchanged for Russia. Table I-4Share Of Foreign Ownership In Stocks: March 2015 Vs. Today Foreign purchases of local currency bonds have been a major source of capital flows for developing countries as well. Critically, exchange rates substantially influence foreign investors' returns in EM local bonds, as illustrated in Chart I-10. Therefore, EM currency depreciation will lead to further outflows from their local bonds. Chart I-10Return On EM Domestic Bonds: In USD & Local Currency Table I-5 demonstrates that foreigners hold the largest share of domestic bonds in Peru, the Czech Republic, South Africa, Indonesia and Mexico. Meanwhile, India, Brazil, Korea, Thailand and Hungary have the lowest share of foreign investors in their local currency bonds. Table I-5Share Of Domestic Bonds Held By Foreigners The scatter plot in Chart I-11 brings together the share of foreign ownership of equities on the X axis with the share of foreign ownership of local currency bonds on the Y axis. Chart I-11EM Portfolio Outflow Vulnerability Assessment Based on this diagram, South Africa, the Czech Republic, Peru, Mexico and Russia seem to be the most at risk of foreign portfolio outflows, while Colombia, Malaysia, Thailand and India seem to be the least vulnerable. These rankings are only one of the indicators we look at when forming our asset allocation across EM countries. We are currently overweight equity markets in Korea, Thailand, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Russia and central Europe. Our equity underweights are Indonesia, India, the Philippines, Hong Kong, South Africa and Peru. In the local-currency bond space, we favor Korea, Thailand, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Russia and central Europe. The markets to underweight or avoid are Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, South Africa and India. A complete list of our overweights and underweights across EM equities, fixed-income, credit and currencies as well as specific trade recommendations can be found each week at the end of our reports (please see pages 11-12). Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 Most likely they reflect the frontrunning of U.S. import tariffs. 2 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report "Is The EM Pendulum About To Swing Back?" dated November 8, 2018, the link is available on page 13. 3 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report "EM: Sustained Decoupling, Or Domino Effect?" dated June 14, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 4 We weighted each company's share of foreign stock ownership by their respective market cap weight. The result is an equity market cap-weighted proxy for the share of foreign stock ownership by country. All of these data are from Bloomberg Finance L.P. and dates as of November 12, 2018. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights Bond yields have trapped equities, and equities have trapped bond yields. The double-digit investment opportunities are within asset-classes. From a tactical perspective: Banks will outperform the broad market. EM will outperform DM. The Eurostoxx50 will briefly outperform the S&P500. Raw industrial commodities will outperform crude oil. Feature What has been the biggest driver of financial markets this year? Trade wars and the emerging market slowdown? The budget spat between Italy and the EU Commission? The U.S. mid-term elections? Or perhaps, central bank policy normalization? These are all sensible answers, and each one has generated endless output of commentary and analysis. But none of these tells the biggest story of 2018. Chart of the WeekIn 2018, Bond Yields Have Trapped Equities, And Equities Have Trapped Bond Yields The Biggest Story Is Not Economics Or Politics... It Is Mathematics This year, the two largest five-day plunges in the global stock market - 6 percent in February and 7 percent in mid-October - resulted directly from the two largest five-day spikes in the global bond yield (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). This simple observation reveals the biggest story in the financial markets this year: the hypersensitivity of the stock market to rising bond yields, and especially when the global 10-year yield approaches 2 percent - or equivalently 'the rule of 4': when the sum of the 10-year U.S. T-bond, German bund and Japanese government bond approaches 4 percent (Chart of the Week).1 Chart I-2Equities Plunged In February After A Spike In Bond Yields Chart I-3Equities Plunged In October After A Spike In Bond Yields With the global stock market now flat year-to-date, it follows that excluding these two five-day plunges, global equities would be comfortably higher even with the emerging market slowdown, trade war quarrels, and political spats. Meaning that this year's market action is not explained by economics or by politics. It is explained by mathematics, and specifically the great misunderstanding of investment risk. Previous reports have focused on this great misunderstanding, most recently Risk: The Great Misunderstanding Of Finance, to which we refer our readers. Here, we will just summarize:2 An investment's risk depends on the negative asymmetry of its short-term returns. At very low bond yields, bond returns develop the same negative asymmetry as equity returns. This means that equities lose their excess riskiness versus bonds, requiring equity valuations to experience a phase transition sharply higher. But when bond yields normalize, equities regain their excess riskiness versus bonds - and their valuations must suffer a phase transition sharply lower. This phase transition to sharply lower equity valuations is most pronounced when the global 10-year bond yield rises to 2 percent. This dynamic has proved to be the biggest driver of financial markets in 2018, and is likely to be the biggest driver in 2019 too. Essentially, higher bond yields can suddenly and viciously undermine the valuation support of equities, limiting the upside in the stock market (Chart I-4). In turn, a plunge in the stock market and other risk-assets threatens a disinflationary impulse, limiting the sustainable upside in bond yields. Chart I-4Equities Remain Richly Valued In effect, bond yields have trapped equities, and equities have trapped bond yields (Chart I-5). The result is that in 2018 the global asset-classes: equities, bonds, commodities, and cash have all ended up going nowhere. Indeed, the global 30-year bond yield has been trapped since early 2017!3 Chart I-5The Global 30-Year Bond Yield Has Been Trapped For Two Years The Double-Digit Investment Opportunities Are Within Asset-Classes Although the global asset-classes have ended up going nowhere this year (Chart I-6), 2018 has still provided double-digit investment opportunities. But to find these double-digit opportunities, you have to look below the main asset allocation decision to within the asset-classes, in sector, region and country allocation. Chart I-6In 2018, Global Asset-Classes Have Ended Up Going Nowhere For example, until very recently: banks had underperformed the broad equity market by 10 percent globally and 25 percent in Europe; emerging market equities had underperformed developed market equities by 15 percent; the Eurostoxx50 had underperformed the S&P500 by 13 percent; and raw industrial commodities had underperformed crude oil by 30 percent. But in the last month or so, these strong trends have exhausted and even started to reverse: banks have started to outperform the market; the Eurostoxx50 has eked ahead of the S&P500; emerging market equities have retraced versus developed market equities; and raw industrial commodities have made up much lost ground on crude oil (Charts I-7 - Chart I-10). One important reason is that the sharp down-oscillation in global credit growth which was responsible for many of this year's intra asset-class trends has now clearly rebounded into an up-oscillation. Chart I-7Banks Have Started To Outperform Chart I-8The Eurostoxx50 Is Starting To Outperform The S&P500 Chart I-9EM Has Started To Outperform DM Chart I-10Industrial Commodities Are Starting To Outperform Crude Oil Hence, we expect these trend reversals to continue in the coming months. From a tactical perspective only, this means: 1. Banks will outperform the broad market. 2. EM will outperform DM. 3. The Eurostoxx50 will briefly outperform the S&P500. 4. Raw industrial commodities will outperform crude oil. Such an inflection point can leave investors scratching their heads in confusion, because sector performances seem to conflict with the economic data releases. But the conflict is easily resolved. Though we are now in mid-November, the economic data releases - for example, German exports - are a lagging indicator, referring to a time in the past, September, when global credit growth might still have been in a down-oscillation. Whereas the financial markets - for example, bank equities' relative performance - are a contemporaneous indicator, sensing credit growth's switch to an up-oscillation in real-time. Always remember that market prices move on the marginal change in information and expectations. To be absolutely clear, we are not referring to the business cycle. We are referring to predictable oscillations in credit growth that occur within the business cycle, but which nevertheless create double-digit investment opportunities - such as bank equities' relative performance. The Importance Of 6-Month Credit Growth Still, several clients have asked about our choice of 6-month credit growth, as it appears to be an arbitrary period plucked out of thin air or, more cynically, 'data-mined'. In fact, our choice of 6-month growth has a rock-solid foundation in economic theory.4 For any item, if supply lags demand by a period t, then economic theory proves that both the quantity of the item and its price will experience oscillations with half-cycle length t. Clearly, bank credit is such an item whose supply does lag demand. For example, a mortgage is only allocated and released after a time-consuming process of checking collateral and creditworthiness. For bank credit in aggregate, the lag between demand and supply, and specifically final spending of the funds, averages six to eight months. Once you accept this fundamental truth, it follows that credit growth must also experience oscillations whose half-cycles last six to eight months. So we end with a very important investment lesson. If you only look at the conventionally examined year-on-year credit growth data, you will not see the predictable oscillations in 6-month credit growth. And if you do not look at 6-month credit growth, you will miss the double-digit investment opportunities that are always on offer (Chart I-11). Chart I-11A Sharp Down-Oscillation In Global Credit Growth Has Rebounded Into An Up-Oscillation The choice is yours. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 We use the MSCI All Country World Index in local currency terms to capture the global stock market. 2 Negative asymmetry of returns means the possibility of larger short-term losses than short-term gains. Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk: The Great Misunderstanding Of Finance", October 25, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Trapped: Have Equities Trapped Bonds?", September 13, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Cobweb Theory And Market Cycles", January 11, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model* Palladium has outperformed nickel by 50% in the past three months, but this strong trend is nearing exhaustion according to its 65-day fractal dimension. Hence, this week's trade recommendation is long nickel/short palladium setting a profit target of 14% with a symmetrical stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-12 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Neutral When we downgraded the S&P home improvement retail index (HIR) to neutral in September, the core of our thesis was that fixed residential investment as a percentage of GDP appeared to have peaked, up 50% from trough to the recent highs, whereas relative HIR performance is up 170% in the same time frame (top and second panels).1 Such euphoria, both among investors and the sell side community (bottom panel), leaves the index prone to fall, should a disappointment occur. Yesterday's results from index giant Home Depot reinforce this point. The company exceeded earnings expectations and raised their guidance (albeit for only one quarter) and the stock still underperformed the market. Considering the cautious guidance from management on the housing market, cost pressures from tariffs and a much-reduced price of lumber, it is of little wonder the company failed to live up to expectations. Net, while we remain constructive on the overall housing market, we continue to think the positivity is fully baked in to the S&P HIR index; stay neutral. Clients seeking housing exposure should consider the compellingly valued S&P homebuilding index that we are overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOMI - HD, LOW. 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Indurated," dated September 24, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights So What? The Trump administration is focusing on re-election in 2020, which could push the recession call into 2021. Why? The midterms were investment-relevant, just not in the way most of our clients thought. We are downgrading our alarmism on Iran; Trump is aware of his constraints. But investor optimism regarding the trade war may be overdone. China has contained its capital outflows, which suggests Beijing will be comfortable with more CNY/USD downside. A new GPS mega-theme: Bifurcated Capitalism! Watch carefully for any upcoming trade action on semiconductors. Feature There is no better feeling than hearing from our clients that we got a call wrong because we misjudged the constraints of the Trump administration by focusing too much on its preferences. Why? Because it means that clients are keeping us honest by employing our most important method: constraints over preferences. This is one of the takeaways from a quarter filled with meetings with our clients in the Midwest, Toronto, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Frankfurt, Berlin, Auckland, Melbourne, Sydney, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and sunny Marbella, Spain! In this report, we discuss several pieces of insight from our clients. Midterms Are Investment Relevant Generally speaking, few of our clients agreed with our assessment that the midterm elections were not investment-relevant. The further away from the U.S. we traveled, the greater the sense among investors that equity markets influence U.S. politics: both the upcoming takeover of the House of Representatives by the Democratic Party and the odds of trade war intensification. We strongly disagree with this assessment. Both periods of equity market turbulence this year were preceded by a rising U.S. 10-year yield, not any particularly damning trade war chatter (Chart 1). In fact, the intensification of the trade war this summer occurred amidst a fairly buoyant S&P 500! Meanwhile, the odds of a Democratic takeover of the House were priced in well before the October equity decline began. Chart 1Yields, Not Trade, Matter For Stocks Generally speaking, even midterms that produce gridlock have led to a relief rally (Chart 2). This time could be the same, especially because the likely next Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, has signalled that the main policy goal for 2019 would be infrastructure spending. In her "victory" speech following the election, Pelosi mentioned infrastructure numerous times (impeachment, zero times). Chart 2Stocks Are Indifferent To Midterm Results Democratic Representative Peter DeFazio, likely head of the House of Representatives committee overseeing transportation, has already signalled that he will ask for "real money, real investment."1 DeFazio has previously proposed a $500bn infrastructure plan, backed by issuance of 30-year Treasuries and raising fuel taxes. He has rejected the February 2017 Trump proposal, which largely relied on raising private money for the job. Would President Trump go with such a plan? Maybe. In early 2018, he stunned lawmakers by saying that he supported hiking the federal gasoline tax by 25 cents a gallon (the federal 18.4 cent-a-gallon gasoline tax has not been hiked since 1993). He has since confirmed that "everything is on the table" to achieve an infrastructure deal. Several clients from around the world pointed out that both Democrats and President Trump have an incentive to make a deal. President Trump wants to avoid the deeply negative fiscal thrust awaiting him in 2020 (Chart 3). Given the House takeover by the Democrats, it is tough to imagine that new tax cuts are the means for Trump to avoid the "stimulus cliff." As such, another round of stimulative fiscal spending may be the only way for him to avoid a late-2020 recession (although the latter is currently the BCA House View). Chart 3Can Trump And Pelosi Reverse... Democrats, on the other hand, have an incentive to ditch "Resistance" and embrace policy-making. Yes, hastening the recession in 2020 would be the Machiavellian play, but President Trump would be able to blame Democrats for the downturn - since they will necessarily have had to participate in planning an infrastructure bill only to sink it. They also learned the lesson from the January 2018 government shutdown, which backfired at the polls and forced Senate Democrats to come to an agreement quickly on a two-year stimulative budget deal. What about the GOP fiscal conservatives? They don't necessarily need to come on board. The House is held by Democrats. And the Democrats in the Senate would only need 15-18 GOP Senators to support a profligate infrastructure plan. Given that infrastructure is popular, that the president will be pushing it, and that the GOP-controlled Senate agreed with the budget bill in January, we think that even more Republican Senators can go along with an infrastructure plan. Another big takeaway from the midterms is that the GOP suffered deep losses in the Midwest. President Trump's party lost ten out of twelve races in the region (Table 1). The two most representative contests were the loss of Republican Wisconsin Governor and one-time rising presidential star Scott Walker, and the victory of the left-wing and über-protectionist Democratic Senator Sherrod Brown of Ohio. Table 1Massive Republican Losses Across The Midwest Senator Brown won his contest comfortably by 6.4% in a state that Trump carried by 8.13%. The appeal of Brown to the very blue-collar voters that Trump himself won is obvious. On trade, there is no daylight between the left-wing Brown and President Trump. Meanwhile, Walker, an establishment Republican who built his reputation on busting public-sector unions, could not replicate Trump's success in Wisconsin. Several of our clients suggested that the GOP performance in the Midwest was poor because of the aggressive trade rhetoric. But that makes little sense. Republicans did not run Trump-style populists in the Midwest, to their obvious detriment. Democrats have always claimed to be for "fair trade" rather than "free trade." And we know, empirically, that Trump saw a key swing of turnout in 2016 in these states, largely thanks to his protectionist rhetoric (Chart 4). Chart 4Trump Owes The Midwest The Presidency President Trump cannot take Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin lightly. His performance in 2016 was extraordinary, but also tight. The Democrats will win these states if Trump does not grow voter turnout and support, according to demographic projections - and they lost them by less than a percentage point of white voters (Map 1). As such, we think that Democrats will talk tough on trade and try to reclaim their union and blue-collar voters, while President Trump has to double down on an aggressive trade posture towards China. Map 1Can 'White Hype' Work In 2020? Trump's Margins Are Small The midterms are investment relevant after all, but not in the way some might think. The Democratic takeover of the House, and the resultant gridlock, will potentially avert the "stimulus cliff" in 2020. This ought to support short-term inflation expectations and thus allow the Fed to stay-the-course. For markets, this could be unsettling given the correlation between yields and downturns in 2018. For the dollar, this should be supportive. The odds of an infrastructure deal are good, above 50%, with the key risk being a Democratic House focused on impeaching Trump. Such a bill would augur even higher levels of fiscal spending through 2020, possibly prolonging the business cycle, and setting up an even wider budget deficit when the next recession hits (Chart 5). Chart 5Pro-Cyclical Policy Has To Continue Meanwhile, the shellacking in the Midwest ought to embolden the president to go even harder against China on trade. Rather than the upcoming Xi-Trump meeting in Buenos Aires, the key bellwether of this thesis is whether Trump signals afterwards that he will implement the tariff rate hike on January 1, 2019 (and whether he announces a third round of tariffs). Bottom Line: Go long building products and construction material stocks. Stay short China-exposed S&P 500 companies. The 10-year yield may end the year even closer to 3.5% when the market realizes that the odds of an infrastructure deal are higher than previously thought. The political path of least resistance in the U.S. continues to point towards greater profligacy. Trump Is Aware Of His Constraints In The Middle East Throughout 2018, we have flagged U.S.-Iran tensions as the risk for 2019. In early October, we went long Brent / short S&P 500 as a hedge against this risk, a trade that we closed for a 6% gain last week. During our meetings with clients this quarter, however, several astute observers pointed out that in our own analyses we have stressed the geopolitical and political constraints to President Trump. First, we have argued that the original 2015 nuclear deal signed by President Obama had a deep geopolitical logic, allowing the U.S. to pivot to Asia and stare down China by geopolitically deleveraging the U.S. from the Middle East. If President Trump undermined the détente with Iran, he would be opening up a two-front conflict with both China and Iran, diluting his administration's focus and capabilities. Second, we noted that a rise in oil prices could precipitate an early recession and push up gasoline prices in 2019, a probable death knell for any president's re-election prospects. Our clients were right to ask: Why would President Trump face down these constraints, given the high cost that he would incur? We did not have a very good answer to this question. It is difficult to understand President Trump's preferences for raising tensions against Iran beyond the fact that he promised to do so in his campaign, appears to want to undermine all of President Obama's policies, and turned to Iran hawks to head his foreign policy. Are these preferences worth the risk of a recession in 2019? Or worth the risk of triggering yet another military conflict in the Middle East over a country that only 7% of Americans consider is the 'greatest enemy' (Chart 6)? Chart 6Americans Don't Perceive Iran As 'The Greatest Enemy' Given that the administration has offered exemptions to the oil embargo to eight key importers, it now appears that President Trump is well aware of his geopolitical and domestic constraints. The combined imports of Iranian oil by these eight states is ~1.4mm b/d. While we do not have the detail of the volumes that will be allowed under the waivers, it is likely that these Iranian sales will recover some of the ~1mm b/d of exports lost already (Chart 7). Chart 7Waivers Will Restore Iranian Exports For 180 Days What does this mean for investors? On one hand, it means that the risk of oil prices spiking north of $100 per barrel have substantively decreased. On the other hand, however, it also means that the Trump administration agrees with BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy view that oil markets remain tight and that OPEC 2.0's spare capacity may be a constraint to future production increases. Bottom Line: The risks of an oil-price-shock-induced 2019 recession have fallen. However, oil prices may yet surge in 2019 to the $85-95 level (Brent) on the back of supply risks in Venezuela and Iran, especially if Saudi Arabia and Russia prove unable to expand production much beyond their current levels. Most of our clients in the Middle East shared the skepticism of our commodity strategists that Saudi Arabia would be able to increase production much higher than current levels in 2019. However, the view was not unanimous. Risks Of Saudi Arabia Going Rogue Have Declined Clients in the Middle East were convinced that the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi would have no impact on Saudi oil production decisions. However, the insight from the region is that the incident has probably ended the "blank cheque" that the Trump administration initially gave Riyadh on foreign policy. For global investors, this may not have a major impact. But it may have been at least part of the administration's reasoning behind giving embargo exemptions to such a large number of economies. The incident has likely forced Saudi Arabia to adjust its calculus on three issues: Qatar: The Saudi-Qatari split never made much sense in the first place. It was initially endorsed by President Trump, who may not have understood the strategic value of Qatar to the United States. Defense Secretary James Mattis almost immediately responded by reaffirming the U.S. commitment to the Persian Gulf country which hosts one of the most strategic U.S. air bases in the world. Yemen: The U.S. has now openly called on Saudi Arabia to end its military operations in Yemen. We would expect Riyadh to acquiesce to the request. Iran: With the U.S. giving major importers of Iranian oil exemptions, the message is twofold. First, the U.S. cares about its domestic economic stability. Second, the U.S. does not care about Saudi domestic economic stability. Our commodity strategists believe that Saudi fiscal breakeven oil price is around $85. As such, the U.S. decision to slow-roll the sanctions against Iran will be received with chagrin in Riyadh, especially as the latter will now have to shoulder both lower oil prices and the American request for higher output. Could Saudi Arabia break with the U.S.? Not a chance. The U.S. is the Saudis' security guarantor. As such, it is up to Saudi Arabia to acquiesce to American foreign policy goals, not the other way around. While we think that President Trump ultimately succumbed to geopolitical and political constraints when he decided to take the "phoney war" approach to Iran, he may have been nudged in that direction by Khashoggi's tragic murder. Bottom Line: A major risk for investors in 2019 was that the Trump administration would treat Saudi preferences for a major confrontation with Iran as its own interests. Such a strategy would have destabilized the global oil markets and potentially have unwound the 2015 U.S.-Iran détente that has allowed the U.S. to focus on China. However, the death of Khashoggi has marginally hurt President Trump domestically - given that it makes him look soft on Saudi Arabia, an unpopular stance in the U.S. Moreover, the administration has come to grips with the risks of a dire oil shock should Iran retaliate. The shift in U.S. policy vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia will therefore refocus the Trump administration on its own priorities, not that of its ally in the Middle East. Trade War Is All About CNY/USD In The Short Term... Clients in Australia and New Zealand are the most sophisticated Western investors when it comes to China. The level of macro understanding of the Chinese economy and the markets in these two countries is unparalleled (outside of China itself, of course). We therefore always appreciate the insights we pick up from our clients Down Under. And they are convinced that the massive capital outflow from China has clearly ceased. The flow of Chinese capital into Auckland, Melbourne, and Sydney real estate has definitely slowed, and anecdotal evidence appears to be showing up in the price data (Chart 8). Separately, this intel has been confirmed by clients from British Columbia and California. Chart 8Pacific Rim Home Prices Rolling Over The reality is that China has successfully closed its capital account. How else can we explain that a 4.7% CNY/USD depreciation in 2015 precipitated a $483 billion outflow of forex reserves, whereas a 10.1% depreciation this year has not had a major impact (Chart 9)? Chart 9On Balance, China Is Experiencing Modest Outflows To be fair, forex reserves declined by $34bn in October, but that is still a far cry from the panic in 2015. Our other indicators suggest that the impact on capital seepage is muted this time around, largely due to the official crackdown on various forms of capital outflows: Quarterly data (Chart 10) reflecting the change in foreign exchange reserves minus the sum of the current account balance and FDI, indicate that while net inflows have remained negative, they are still a far cry from 2015 levels. Chart 10Far Cry From 2016 Crisis Import data (Chart 11) no longer show the massive deviation between Chinese national statistics and IMF figures. Imports from Hong Kong (Chart 12), specifically, are now down to normal levels, with the fake invoicing problem having quieted down for now. Chart 11No More Confusion Regarding Imports Chart 12Fake Invoicing Has Been Curbed Growth rate of foreign reserves (Chart 13) is not clearly contracting yet, and has been positive this year. Chart 13Severe FX Reserve Drawdown Has Ended Chinese foreign borrowing (Chart 14) is down from stratospheric levels, which limits the volume of potential outflows. Chart 14China's Foreign Lending Has Eased And the orgy of M&A and investment deals in the U.S. (Chart 15) has ended. Chart 15M&A Deals Have Eased Bottom Line: Anecdotal and official data suggest that capital outflows are in check despite their recent uptick. This could embolden Chinese leaders to continue using CNY/USD depreciation as their primary weapon against President Trump's tariffs, especially if the global backdrop is not collapsing. An increase of the 10% tariff rate to 25% on January 1 could, therefore, precipitate further weakness in the CNY/USD. The announcement of a third round of tariffs covering the remainder of Chinese imports could do the same. This would be negative for global risk assets, particularly EM equities and currencies. ... In the Long Term, Bifurcated Capitalism Our annual pilgrimage to Oceania included our traditional meeting with The Smartest Man In Oceania The Bloke From Down Under.2 He shares our belief that the long-term result of the broader Sino-American geopolitical conflict will be a form of Bifurcated Capitalism. His exact words were that "countries may soon have to choose between being in the Amazon or Alibaba camp," a great real-world implication of our mega-theme. Australian and New Zealand clients are particularly sensitive to the idea that the world may soon be split into spheres of influence because both countries are so high-beta to China, while obviously retaining their membership card in the West. Our suspicion is that both will be fine as they export mainly a high-grade and diversified range of commodities to China. Short of war, it is unlikely that the U.S. will one day demand that New Zealand stop its dairy exports to China, or that Australia stop iron ore and LNG exports. Countries exporting semiconductors to China, on the other hand, could face a choice between enforcing a future embargo or incurring the wrath of their closest military ally. The Bloke From Down Under has pointed out that, given China's dependency on semiconductor technology, a U.S. embargo of this critical tech could be comparable to the U.S. oil embargo against Japan that precipitated the latter's attack on Pearl Harbor. Chart 16China Accounts For 60% Of Global Semiconductor Demand The global semiconductor market reached $354 billion in 2016, with China accounting for 60% of total consumption (Chart 16). Despite the country's insatiable appetite for semiconductors, no Chinese firm is among the world's top 20 makers. This is why Beijing's "Made in China 2025" plan has focused so much on semiconductor capability (Chart 17). The goal is for China to become self-sufficient in semiconductors, gaining 35% share of the global design market. Chart 17China's High-Tech Protectionism A key feature of Bifurcated Capitalism will be impairment of investment in high-tech that has dual-use applications in military. Semiconductors obviously make that list. Another key feature would be investment restrictions in such high-tech sectors, particularly the kind of investments and M&A deals that China has been looking for in the U.S. this decade. Further, clients in California are very concerned about the U.S.'s proposed export controls, which would cut off access to China and wreak havoc on the industry. The Trump administration has already signalled that it will restrict Chinese inbound investment. Congress passed, with a large bipartisan majority, an expanded review system, the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA). The law has expanded the purview of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), a secretive interagency panel nominally under control of the Treasury Department that can block inbound investment on national security grounds. CFIUS, at its core, has always been an entity focused on China. While the Treasury Department initially signalled it would take as much as 18 months to adopt the new FIRRMA rules, Secretary Mnuchin has accelerated the process. The procedure now will expand review from only large-stake takeovers to joint ventures and smaller investments by foreigners, particularly in technology deemed critical for national security reasons. This oversight began on November 10 and will allow CFIUS to block foreigners from taking a stake in a business making sensitive technology even if it gives the foreign investors merely a board seat. Countries of "special concern" will inherently receive heightened scrutiny, and a country's history of compliance with U.S. law, as well as cybersecurity and American citizens' privacy, will be considerations. A new interagency process led by the Commerce Department will focus on refurbishing export controls so as to protect "emerging and foundational technologies." Such impediments to capital flows are likely to become endemic and expand beyond the U.S. We may be seeing the first steps in the Bifurcated Capitalism concept that one day comes to dominate the global economy. Entire countries and sectors may become off-limits to Western investors and vice-versa for Chinese market participants. At the very least, companies whose revenue growth is currently slated to come from expansion in overseas markets may see those expectations falter. At its most pessimistic, however, Bifurcated Capitalism may precipitate geopolitical conflict if it denies China or the U.S. critical technology or commodities. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see David Shepardson, "Democrats to push for big infrastructure bill with 'real money' in 2019," Reuters, dated November 7, 2018, available at reuters.com. 2 At the time of publication, the said investor was unable to secure the permission of his wife for the "The Smartest Man" moniker. Geopolitical Calendar
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