Emerging Markets

Highlights Unsurprisingly, OPEC 2.0's leadership agreed on the need to extend the coalition's 1.8mm b/d production-cutting agreement to end-March 2018. Leaders of the coalition - the energy ministers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia - will recommend as much when the coalition meets next week in Vienna. Meanwhile, sequential production in U.S. shales during the first four months of the year is up just under 100k b/d, based on the EIA's latest estimates. This was led by surging Permian production. We expect shale-oil production growth to continue, and are revising our year-end 2017 light-tight-oil (LTO) production estimate for the four main shale-oil plays to 5.66mm b/d, up from our earlier assessment of 5.39mm b/d. We also are lifting our year-end 2018 estimate of shale production to 6.64mm b/d. This means December-to-December LTO production will increase ~ 1mm b/d by Dec/17 and by another ~1mm b/d by Dec/18. Energy: Overweight. As of last Thursday's close, we are long Dec/17 Brent $65/bbl calls vs. $45/bbl puts at -$1.16/bbl, and long Dec/17 vs. Dec/18 Brent at -$0.21/bbl. These positions were up 16.4% and 242.9%, respectively. Base Metals: Neutral. The physical deficit in zinc appears to be widening slightly, based on supply-demand estimates from the International Zinc Study Group. Usage totaled 2.282mm MT in Jan-Feb 2017 vs. refined production of 2.28mm MT. For 2016, usage was 13.89mm MT vs. supply of 12.67mm MT. Precious Metals: Neutral. Metal refiner Johnson Matthey expects a 790k oz. palladium deficit this year, up from a little over 160k oz. last year. Separately, the World Platinum Investment Council expects platinum supply to fall 2% this year to 7.33mm oz. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA reported corn planting stood at 71% for the week ended May 14, vs. an average of 70% over the 2012 - 16 period. We remain bearish. Feature The determination of the leaders of OPEC 2.0 to clear the storage overhang could not have been made more clear, following comments earlier this week from KSA's and Russia's energy ministers the coalition's 1.8mm b/d production-cutting agreement would be extended to end-March 2018. This is three months beyond earlier speculation the deal would be extended to year-end 2017. Chart of the WeekBalances Chart Still, when dealing with a political organization of any sort - and OPEC 2.0 is nothing if not a political entity - our bias is to assume less-than-complete compliance with production cuts, and an earlier return to pre-agreement production levels than proffered by the leadership of the coalition. Hence, in our updated balances model (Chart of the Week), in addition to assuming higher U.S. production out of the shales, we have Russian production returning to a level just below 11.30mm b/d by October 2017, up roughly 150k b/d from the 11.15mm b/d we assume they'll be producing until the end of September. We also assume Iraq's production will move up to 4.45mm b/d (up 50k b/d) beginning in January, and that Iran will be steadily, yet slowly, increasing production by 5-10k b/d per month beginning this month. The only assumption we're making for staunch compliance to the OPEC 2.0 accord after our assumed extension to year-end 2017 at next week's Vienna meeting is that KSA and its GCC allies - Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE - will continue to abide by their voluntary production cuts. This group has maintained solidarity on past production-management deals, we expect them to do so again in this round. Of course, the other members of the coalition could vote against this proposal next week, and instead decide to end the production deal in June under its original conditions. Or, they could agree to extend the deal, but only until year-end 2017. Regardless of whichever policy decisions are agreed to during next week's meeting, come November, when OPEC meets again, they might tweak/change those agreements to reflect their updated outlook at that time. Given this uncertainty, we believe the assumptions we've made are realistic, but we will be monitoring conditions closely so that we can modify our view quickly. Shale Coming On Strong Part of OPEC 2.0's desire to extend its deal likely is the improvement in the performance of shale-oil producers in the U.S. In its latest Drilling Productivity Report (DPR), the EIA noted that sequential production in the first four months of the year has risen ~ 100k b/d per month in the U.S. shales. This surge was led by higher Permian production, which accounted for ~ three-quarters of the increased output (Chart 2). Interestingly, rig-weighted production per rig dropped for the first time in April 2017, but it still is high at 732 b/d, down from 735 b/d in March. We will be watching this closely to see if it is the beginning of a trend of stagnating productivity amid a rapid expansion of industry activity. The resurgence in the shales can be seen in the year-on-year (yoy) growth in total production in the seven basins the EIA tracks, which broke back above 5.0mm b/d in February and crossed into positive yoy growth in March (Chart 3). Net, we expect 2017 global supply to average 97.65mm b/d, for an increase 610k b/d this year, and for demand to average 98.3mm b/d, for an increase of 1.5mm b/d. EM demand, which we proxy using non-OECD consumption, accounts for 1.27mm b/d of this year's global demand growth, and continues to lead overall growth in oil demand (Chart 4, panel 2). Of this, China and India account for 350k and 210k b/d, respectively, of the growth in EM demand. Chart 2Permian Basin Leads##br##U.S. Shale's Resurgence Chart 3Year-On-Year LTO Production##br##Breaks Out In 1Q17 Chart 4EM Growth Continues##br##To Lead Global Demand China, India Lead EM Oil Consumption Non-OECD countries represent more than 50% of global oil consumption. Indeed, within the ~1.6mm b/d global oil demand growth we expect for 2017 and again in 2018, slightly more than 87% of it comes from EM economies. Table 1 below shows the average yoy growth by year for different regions - DM and EM - and countries from 2011 to 2018. Over this period, almost all of the world's oil-demand growth comes from non-OECD countries. From 2011-2018, the average p.a. demand growth for non-OECD countries is 2.79%, while for OECD countries it is only 0.12%. Table 1EM Leads Oil-Demand Growth Looking more closely at the composition of the EM economies, we see that, on average, between 2010 and 2018 Chinese oil consumption accounts for 24% of non-OECD demand, while the Indian oil consumption represents 8.3%, for a combined total of 32.37% of non-OECD average consumption. These two countries alone contributed on average to around 50% of the world oil consumption growth from 2010 to 2018. China has been the fastest-growing oil market in the world since the early 2000s. However, since 2015, when it emerged as an important growth market on the world stage, India's consumption has been increasing at a faster pace than China's. One of the reasons for this likely is the desire of the Chinese government to resume its pivot to a more service-oriented economy, which is less commodity-intensive than the export-oriented economy dominated by heavy industry. India, meanwhile, is looking to increase its manufacturing output, lifting it from the low-teens to 25% of GDP by 2022 under Prime Minister Narendra Modi's "Make in India" campaign. This change in the composition of global oil-demand growth is reducing demand for residual fuel oil and distillates. Indeed, IEA data continues to show a steady decline in yoy consumption for these two types of fuel in China, with residual fuel oil consumption down 26.5% yoy in 2016, and gasoil and diesel (distillates) consumption down close to 3% yoy. By contrast, gasoline consumption, is up more than 8% yoy along with jet fuel and kerosene. LPG demand (propane and butane, along with other light ends) and ethane demand (a petrochemical feedstock) is surging, up 24% in 2016, according to the IEA. In relative terms, China will remain the main driver of global oil consumption. At ~ 12.5mm b/d, China's oil demand is close to three times as high than India's. However, India likely will surpass China in terms of its contribution to global oil demand growth in coming years. A combination of structural and policy-driven factors points toward a possible sustainable growth path for Indian oil consumption for the coming years (oil consumption per capita is increasing, as is vehicle usage, particularly motorcycles (Chart 5); and, the government's desire to increase the share of the manufacturing to 25% of GDP by 2022 will boost oil demand growth as well). Chart 5India Passenger Car Sales Are Soaring Recent studies assessing the "take-off" of an economy look at its per capita oil consumption in transportation, in particular, given that this sector accounts for more than half of the world's oil consumption (63% according to IEA Energy Statistics 2014). The theory boils down to the following: As income grows, a larger share of the population becomes vehicle owners. This is referred to as the "motorization" of an economy. In India, the transportation sector represents around 40% of total oil consumption.1 According to Sen and Sen (2016), the level of vehicle-ownership per capita is still low in India compared to other economies that have experienced similar take-offs. The government's targeted increase in manufacturing as a share of GDP to 25% under the "Make In India" program (from a current level of ~ 15%) would, according to the Sen and Sen (2016) formulation, lead to an increase in oil consumption. The "Make in India" campaign was launched in 2014 by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and aims to transform the country's manufacturing sector into a powerhouse for growth and employment. Other key objectives of this campaign include a target of 12-14% annual growth in the manufacturing sector, and the creation of 100 million new jobs by 2020 in the sector.2 In 2017Q1, India's liquid fuels consumption declined by 3% yoy. This decline was, for the most part, caused by the government's "demonetization" program, which was designed to streamline the economy and reduce rampant black-market transactions. The government chose to invalidate the 500- and the 1,000-rupee banknotes, the most-used currency denominations in the economy (around 86% of the total value of currency in circulation). This represented a huge shock to the average citizen, since it limited the purchasing power of a large part of the consumer economy for an extended period of time and impacted India's overall economic activity. Recent data show Indian oil and liquids consumption up 3% in April (yoy), and its money supply is almost back to its pre-demonetization levels, according to the EIA. This suggests economic activity and liquid-fuel consumption will get back to their previous levels. Bottom Line: We believe OPEC 2.0's deal will be extended at next week's Vienna meeting to March 2018. However, after September, we are expecting compliance to fall off meaningfully, leaving KSA and its allies as the only producers adhering to their voluntary cuts past year-end 2017. Even so, we expect the storage overhang to be worked off - mostly this year - but also into next. Even though U.S. shale production is surprising on the upside, the commitment of a majority of OPEC 2.0 to production cutbacks at least through September of this year will force the storage overhang to draw down by year end. KSA and its core allies will maintain production discipline to March 2018, which will keep storage from refilling too quickly during the seasonally weak consumption period in the first quarter next year. We continue to expect oil forward curves to backwardate by December 2017, and remain long Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent. In addition, we remain long Dec/17 Brent $65/bbl calls vs. short Dec/17 Brent $45/bbl puts, expecting prices to rally toward $60/bbl by the time Brent delivers in December. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Assistant Commodity & Energy Strategy hugob@bcaresearch.com 1 Sen, Amrita; Anupama Sen (2016), "India's Oil Demand: On the Verge of 'Take-Off'?". Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. 2 Some of the recent policies to enhance the manufacturing growth include: Government subsidies of up to 25% for specific manufacturing sub-sectors; area-based incentives to increase the manufacturing development in key regions; allowances for companies that invest a predetermined amount in new plant and machinery; deductions for additional wages paid to new regular employees; deductions for R&D expenditures; and other incentives aimed at promoting the manufacturing sector and improving the India's ease of doing business to attract foreign direct investments. Please see http://www.makeinindia.com/article/-/v/direct-foreign-investment-towards-india-s-growth. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

Special Report

Highlights Venezuela's economic implosion accelerated with the oil price crash. The petrodollar collapse is suffocating consumption as well as oilfield investment, creating a "death spiral" of falling production. The military has already begun assuming more powers as Maduro becomes increasingly vulnerable, and will likely take over before long. OPEC's cuts may help Maduro delay, but not avoid, deposition. Civil unrest/revolution could cause a disruption in oil production, profoundly impacting oil markets. Feature The wheels on the bus go round and round, Round and round, Round and round ... The story of Venezuela's decline under the revolutionary socialist government of deceased dictator Hugo Chavez is well known. The country went from being one of the richest South American states to one of the poorest and from being reliant on oil exports to being entirely dependent on them (Chart 1). The straw that broke the back of Chavismo was the end of the global commodity bull market in 2014 (Chart 2). Widespread shortages of essential goods, mass protests, opposition political victories, and a slide into overt military dictatorship have ensued.1 Chart 1Venezuela Suffers Under Chavismo Chart 2Commodity Bull Market Ended The acute social unrest at the end of 2016 and beginning of 2017 raises the question of whether Venezuela will cause global oil-supply disruptions that boost prices this year.2 One of the reasons we have been bullish oil prices is the fact that the world has little spare production capacity (Chart 3). This means that political turmoil in Venezuela, Libya, Nigeria, or other oil-producing countries could take enough supply out of the market to accelerate the global rebalancing process and drawdown of inventories, pushing up prices. The longer oil prices stay below the budget break-even levels of the politically unstable petro-states (mostly $80/bbl and above), the more likely some of them will be to fail. Venezuela, with a break-even of $350/bbl, has long been one of our prime candidates (Chart 4).3 Venezuela is on the verge of total regime collapse and a massive oil production shutdown. This is not a low-probability outcome. However, the fact that the military is already taking control of the situation, combined with our belief that OPEC and Russia will continue cutting oil production to shore up prices, suggest that the regime may be able to limp along. Therefore a continuation of the gradual decline in oil output is more likely than a sharp cutoff this year. Investors should stay short Venezuelan 10-year sovereign bonds and be aware of the upside risks to global oil prices. A Brief History Of PDVSA State-owned oil company PDVSA is the lifeblood of Venezuela. It once was a well-run company that allowed foreign investment with a reasonable government take, but now it is shut off from direct foreign investment. In 1996-1997, prior to Chavez being elected in late 1998, Venezuela was a rampant cheater on its OPEC quota, producing 3.1-3.3 MMB/d versus a quota of ~2.4 MMB/d in 1996 and ~2.8 in 1997. The oil-price crash that started in late 1997 and bottomed in early 1999 (remember the Economist's "Drowning In Oil" cover story on March 4, 1999 predicting $5 per barrel crude prices?) was a critical event propelling the rise of Chavez (Chart 5). One of the planks in Chavez's platform was that Venezuela had to stop cheating on OPEC quotas because that strategy had helped cause the oil-price decline and subsequent economic misery. Without the oil-price crash, Chavez would not have had such strong public support in the run-up to the 1998 elections, which he won. Chavez did in fact rein in Venezuela's production to 2.8 MMB/d in 1999, which had a positive impact on oil prices and reinforced OPEC. In 2002 and 2003, there were two labor strikes at PDVSA and a two-day coup that displaced Chavez. When Chavez returned to power, he fired 18,000 experienced workers at PDVSA and replaced them with political loyalists. Since then, the total number of employees at PDVSA has swelled from about 46,000 people in 2002, when PDVSA was producing 3.2 MMB/d, to about 140,000 people today, when it is producing slightly below 2 MMB/d. Average oil revenue per employee was over $500,000/person in 2002 at $20 oil, versus about $100,000/person today at $50 oil. Suffice it to say, PDVSA is stuffed to the gills with political patronage, and a strike or a revolution inside PDVSA against President Nicolas Maduro is unlikely. However, if opposition forces manage to seize control of government, the Chavistas in control of PDVSA may attempt to shut down operations to deprive them of oil revenues and blackmail them into a better deal going forward. Chart 5Oil Bust Catapulted Chavez Venezuela is estimated to have the world's largest proved oil reserves at about 300 billion barrels (Chart 6). In addition, there are 1.2-1.4 trillion barrels estimated to rest in heavy-oil deposits in the Orinoco Petroleum Belt (at the mouth of the Orinoco river) that is difficult to extract and has barely been touched. Chart 7Venezuela Cuts Forced By Economic Disaster These reserves are somewhat similar to Canada's oil sands. It is estimated that 300-500 billion barrels are technically recoverable. In the early 2000s, there were four international consortiums involved in developing these reserves: Petrozuata (COP-50%), Cerro Negro (XOM), Sincor (TOT, STO) and Hamaca (COP-40%). However, Chavez nationalized the Orinoco projects in 2007, paying the international oil companies (IOCs) a pittance. XOM and COP contested the taking and "sued" Venezuela at the World Bank. XOM sought $14.7 billion and won an arbitrated decision for a $1.6 billion settlement in 2014. Venezuela continues to litigate the case and the amount awarded to investors has apparently been reduced by a recent ruling. Over the past decade, as Venezuelan industry declined due to dramatic anti-free market laws, including aggressive fixed exchange rates absurdly out of keeping with black market rates, the government nationalized more and more private assets in order to get the wealth they needed to maintain profligate spending policies. The underlying point of these policies is to garner support from low-income Venezuelans, the Chavista political base. In addition to the Orinoco nationalization, the government appropriated equipment and drilling rigs from several oilfield service companies that had stopped working on account of not being properly paid. In 2009, Petrosucre (a subsidiary of PDVSA) appropriated the ENSCO 69 jackup rig, although the rig was returned in 2010. In 2010, the Venezuelan government seized 11 high-quality land rigs from Helmerich & Payne, resulting in nearly $200MM of losses for the company. These rigs were "easy" for Venezuela to appropriate because they did not require much private-sector expertise to operate. As payment failures continued, relationships with the country's remaining contractors continued to be strained. In 2013, Schlumberger (SLB), the largest energy service company in the world, threatened to stop working for PDVSA due to lack of payment in hard currency. PDVSA paid them in depreciating Venezuelan bolivares, but tightened controls over conversion into U.S. dollars. Some accounts receivables were partially converted into interest-bearing government notes. Promises for payment were made and broken. SLB has taken over $600MM of write-downs for the collapse of the bolivar (Haliburton, HAL, has taken ~$150MM in losses). With accounts receivable balances now stratospherically high at approximately $1.2 billion for SLB, $636 million for HAL (plus $200 million face amount in other notes), and $225 million for Weatherford International, the service companies have already taken write-offs on what they are owed and have refused to extend Venezuela additional credit. Unlike the "dumb iron" of drilling rigs, the service companies provide highly technical proprietary goods and services, from drill bits and fluids to measuring services. The lack of these proprietary technical services diminishes PDVSA's ability to drill new wells and properly maintain its legacy production infrastructure. Venezuela's production started falling in late 2015 - well before OPEC and Russia coordinated their January 2017 production cuts (Chart 7). Drought contributed to the problem in 2016 by causing electricity shortages and forced rationing of electricity (60-70% of Venezuela's electricity generation is hydro); water levels at key dams are still very low, but the condition has eased a bit in 2017. After watching crude oil production fall from 2.4 MMB/d in 2015 to 2.05 MMB/d in 2016, OPEC gave Venezuela a production quota of 1.97 MMB/d for the first half of 2017, which is about what they were expected to be capable of producing. In essence, Venezuela was exempt from production cuts, like other compromised OPEC producers Libya, Nigeria and Iran. So far, Venezuela has produced 1.99 MMB/d in the first quarter, according to EIA. Venezuela's falling production is not cartel behavior but indicative of broader economic and political instability. Venezuela is losing control of oil output, the pillar of regime stability. Bottom Line: The double-edged sword for energy companies is that if the regime utterly fails, the country's 2MM b/d of production may be disrupted. However, if government policy shifts - whether through the political opposition finally gaining de facto power or through the military imposing reforms - Venezuela could ramp up its production, perhaps by 1MMB/d within five years, and more after that if Orinoco is developed. How Long Can Maduro Last? Chavez's model worked like that of Louis XIV, who famously said, "après nous, le déluge." Chavez benefited from high oil prices throughout his reign and died in 2013 just before the country's descent into depression began (Chart 8). He won his last election in 2012 by a margin of 10.8%, while Maduro, his hand-picked successor, won a special election only half a year later by a 1.5% margin, which was contested for all kinds of fraud (Chart 9). Chart 8A Hyperflationary Depression Thus Maduro has suffered from "inept successor" syndrome from the beginning, compounding the fears of the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) that the succession would be rocky. Maduro lacked both the political capital and the originality to launch orthodox economic reforms to address the country's mounting inflation and weak productivity, but instead doubled down on Chavez's rapid expansion of money and credit to lift domestic consumption (Chart 10).4 Chart 10Excessive Monetary And Credit Expansion Chart 11Exports Recovered, Reserves Did Not The economic collapse was well under way even before commodities pulled the rug out from under the government.5 Remarkably, the recovery in export revenue since 2010 did not occasion a recovery in foreign exchange reserves - these two decoupled, as Venezuela chewed through its reserves to finance its growing domestic costs (Chart 11). This means Venezuela's ability to recover even in the most optimistic oil scenarios is limited. Another sign that the economic break is irreversible is the fact that, since 2013, private consumption has fallen faster than oil output - a reversal of the populist model that boosted consumption (Chart 12). Chart 12Consumption Falls Faster Than Oil Output Chart 13Oil-Price Crash Hobbles Maduro Critically, the external environment turned against Maduro and PSUV as oil prices declined after June 2014. In November 2014 Saudi Arabia launched its market-share war against Iran and U.S. shale producers, expanding production into a looming global supply overbalance. Brent crude prices collapsed to $29/bbl by early 2016 (Chart 13). This pushed Venezuela over the brink.6 First, hyperinflation: Currency in circulation - already expanding excessively - has exploded upward since 2014. The 100 bolivar note has exploded in usage while notes of lower denominations have dropped out of usage. Total deposits in the banking system are growing at a pace of over 200%, narrow money (M1) at 140%, and consumer price index at 150% (see Chart 10 above). Real interest rates have plunged into an abyss, with devastating results for the financial system. The real effective exchange rate illustrates the annihilation of the currency's value. Monetary authorities have repeatedly devalued the official exchange rate of the bolivar against the dollar (Chart 14). However, the currency remains overvalued, which creates a huge gap between the official rate and the black market rate, which currently stands at about 5,400 bolivares to the dollar. Regime allies have access to hard USD, for which they charge high rents, and the rest suffer. Chart 14Official Forex Devaluations Chart 15Domestic Demand Collapses Second, the real economy has gone from depression to worse: Exports peaked in October 2008, nearly recovered in March 2012, and plummeted thereafter. Imports have fallen faster as domestic demand contracted (Chart 15). Venezuela must import almost everything and the currency collapse means staples are either unavailable or exorbitantly expensive. Venezuelan exports to China reached 20% of total exports in 2012 but have declined to about 14% (Chart 16). This means that Venezuela has lost a precious $10 billion per year. The state has also been trading oil output for loans from China, resulting in an ever higher share of shrinking oil output devoted to paying back the loans, leaving less and less exported production to bring in hard currency needed to pay for production, imports, and debt servicing. Both private and government consumption are shrinking, according to official statistics (Chart 17). Again, the consumption slump removes a key regime support. Chart 16Chinese Demand Is Limited Chart 17Public And Private Consumption Shrink Third, Venezuela is rapidly becoming insolvent: Venezuela's total public debt is high. It stood at 102% of GDP as of August 2014, and GDP has declined by 25%-plus since then. Total external debt, which becomes costlier to service as the currency depreciates, was about $139 billion, or 71% of GDP, in Q3 2015 (Chart 18). It has risen sharply ever since the fall in export revenues post-2011. The destruction of the currency by definition makes the foreign debt burden grow. Chart 18External Debt Soars... Chart 19...While Forex Reserves Dwindle The regime's hard currency reserves are rapidly drying up - they have fallen from nearly $30 billion in 2013 to just $10 billion today (Chart 19). Without hard cash, Venezuela will be unable to meet import costs and external debt payments. In Table 1, we assess the country's ability to make these payments at different oil-price and output levels. Assuming the YTD average Venezuelan crude price of $44/bbl, export revenue should hit about $32 billion this year, while imports should hover around $21 billion, leaving $11 billion for debt servicing costs of roughly $10 billion (combining the state's $8 billion with PDVSA's $2 billion). Thus if global oil prices hold up - as we think they will - the regime may be able to squeak by another year. In short, the regime could have about $11 billion in revenues left at the end of the year if the Venezuela oil basket hovers around $44/bbl and production remains at about 2 MMB/d. That is a "minimum cash" scenario for the regime this year, though it by no means guarantees regime survival amid the widespread economic distress of the population. Chart 20Foreign Asset Sales Will Continue If production drops to 1.25 MMb/d or lower as a result of the economic crisis - or if Venezuelan oil prices settle at $28/bbl or below - the regime will be unable to meet its import costs and debt payments. It will have to sell off more of its international assets as rapidly as it can (Chart 20), restrict imports further, and eventually default. Moreover, the calculation becomes much more negative for Venezuela if we assume, conservatively, $10 billion in capital outflows, which is far from unreasonable. Outflows could easily wipe out any small remainder of foreign reserves. So far, the government has chosen to deprive the populace of imports rather than default on external debt, wagering that the military and other state security forces can suppress domestic opposition for longer than the regime can survive under an international financial embargo. This strategy is fueling mass protests, riots, and clashes with the National Guard and Bolivarian colectivos (militias). An extension of the OPEC-Russia production cuts in late May, which we expect, will bring much-needed relief for Venezuela's budget. Thus, there is a clear path for regime survival through 2017 on a purely fiscal basis, though it is a highly precarious one - the reality is that the state is bound to default sooner or later. Moreover, the socio-political crisis has already spiraled far enough that a modest boost to oil prices this year will probably be too little, too late to save Maduro and the PSUV in its current form. As we discuss below, the question is only whether the military takes greater control to perpetuate the current regime, or the opposition is gradually allowed to take power and renovate the constitutional order. Bottom Line: Even if oil production holds up, and oil prices average above $44/bbl as we expect, the country's leaders will have to take extreme measures to avoid default. Domestic shortages and military-enforced rationing will compound. As economic contraction persists, social unrest will intensify. Will The Military Throw A Coup? Explosive popular discontent this year shows no sign of abating. It is a continuation of the mass protests and sporadic violence since the economic crisis fully erupted in 2014. However, as recession deepens - and food, fuel, and medicine shortages become even more widespread - unrest will spread to a broader geographic and demographic base. Protests since September 2016 have drawn numbers in the upper hundreds of thousands, possibly over a million on two occasions. Security forces have increasingly cracked down on civilians, raising the death toll and provoking a nasty feedback loop with protesters. Reports suggest that the poorest people - the Chavista base - are increasingly joining the protests, which is a new trend and bodes ill for the ruling party's survival. Already the public has turned against the United Socialist Party, as evinced by the December 2015 legislative election results and a range of public opinion polls, which show Maduro's support in the low-20% range. In the 2015 vote, the opposition defeated the Chavistas for the first time since 1998. The Democratic Unity Roundtable won a majority of the popular vote and a supermajority of the seats in the National Assembly. Since then, however, Maduro has used party-controlled civilian institutions like the Supreme Court and National Electoral Council - backed by the military and state security - to prevent the opposition's exercise of its newfound legislative power. Key signposts to watch will be whether Maduro is pressured into restoring the electoral calendar. The opposition has so far been denied local elections (supposedly rescheduled for later this year) and a popular referendum on recalling Maduro. So it has little reason to expect that the government will hold the October 2018 elections on time. The government is likely to keep delaying these votes because it knows it will lose them. In the meantime, the opposition has few choices other than protests and street tactics to try to pressure the government into allowing elections after all. Further, oil prices are low, so the regime is vulnerable, which means that the opposition has every incentive to step up the pressure now. If it waits, higher prices could give Maduro a new infusion of revenues and the ability to prolong his time in power. The question at this point is: will the military defect from the government? The military is the historical arbiter of power in the country. Maduro - who unlike Chavez does not hail from a military background - has only managed to make it this far by granting his top brass more power. Crucially, in July 2016, Maduro handed army chief Vladimir Padrino Lopez control over the country's critical transportation and distribution networks, including for food supplies. He has also carved out large tracts of land for a vast new mining venture, supposed to focus on gold, which the military will oversee and profit from.7 What this means is that the government and military are becoming more, not less, integrated at the moment. The army has a vested interest in the current regime. It is also internally coherent, as recent political science research shows, in the sense that the upper-most and lower-most ranks are devoted to Chavismo.8 Economic sanctions and human rights allegations from the U.S. and international community reinforce this point, making it so that officials have no future outside of the regime and therefore fight harder for the regime to survive.9 Still, there are fractures within the military that could get worse over time. Divisions within the ranks: An analysis of the Arab Spring shows that militaries that defected from the government (Egypt, Tunisia), or split up and made war on each other (Syria, Libya, Yemen), exhibited certain key divisions within their ranks.10 Looking at these variables, Venezuela's military lacks critical ethno-sectarian divisions, but does suffer from important differences between the military branches, between the army and the other state security forces, and between the ideological and socio-economic factions that are entirely devoted to Chavismo versus the rest. Thus, for example, it is possible that Bolivarian militias committing atrocities against unarmed civilians could eventually force the military to change its position to preserve its reputation.11 Popular opinion: Massive protests have approached 1 million people by some counts (of a population of 31 million) and have combined a range of elements within the society - not only young men or violent rebels/anarchists. Also, public opinion surveys suggest that supporters of Maduro have a more favorable view of the army, and opponents have a less favorable view.12 This implies that Maduro's extreme lack of popular support is a liability that will weigh on the military over time. Military funds shrinking: Because of the economic crisis, Maduro has been forced to slash military spending by a roughly estimated 56% over the past year (Chart 21). The military may eventually decide it needs to fix the economy in order to fix its budget. Autonomous military leader: That General Lopez has considerable autonomy is another variable that increases the risk of military defection or fracture. As the country slides out of control Lopez will likely intervene more often. He already did so recently when the Chavista-aligned Supreme Court tried to usurp the National Assembly's legislative function. The attorney general, Luisa Ortega Diaz, broke with party norms by criticizing the court's ruling. Maduro was forced to order the court to reverse it, at least nominally restoring the National Assembly's authority. Lopez supposedly had encouraged Maduro to backtrack in this way, contrary to the advice of two notable Chavistas, Diosdado Cabello and Vice President Tareck El Aissami. Ultimately, military rule for extended periods is common in Venezuelan history. Chavez always deeply integrated the party and military leadership, so the regime could persist through greater military assertion within it, or the military could take over and initiate topical political changes. Finally, if Lopez is ready to stage a coup, he may still wait for oil prices to recover. It makes more sense to let the already discredited ruling party suffer the public consequences of the recession than to seize power when the country is in shambles. Previous coup attempts have occurred not only when oil prices were bottoming but also when they bounded back after bottoming (Chart 22). It would appear that the Venezuelan military is as good at forecasting oil prices as any Wall Street analyst! For oil markets, the military's strong grip over the country suggests that even if Maduro and the PSUV collapse, the party loyalists at PDVSA may not have the option of going on strike. The military will still need the petro dollars to stay in power, and it will have the guns to insist that production keeps up, as long as economic destitution does not force operations to a halt. Bottom Line: There is a high probability that the military will expand its overt control over the country. As long as the leaders avoid fundamental economic reforms, the result of any full-out military coup against Maduro may just mean more of the same, which would be politically and economically unsustainable. Chart 22Coups Can Come After Oil Price Recovers Chart 23Stay Short Venezuelan Sovereign Bonds Investment Implications Any rebound in oil prices as a result of an extension of OPEC's and Russia's production cuts at the OPEC meeting on May 25 will be "too little, too late" in terms of saving Maduro and the PSUV. They may be able to play for time, but their legitimacy has been destroyed - they will only survive as long as the military sustains them. To a great extent, the ruling party has already handed the keys over to the military, and military rule can persist for some time. Hence oil production is more likely to continue its slow decline than experience a sudden shutdown, at least this year. This is because it is likely that military control will tighten, not diminish, when Maduro falls. Incidentally, the military is also more capable than the current weak civilian government of forcing through wrenching policy adjustments that are necessary to begin the process of normalizing economic policy - such as floating the currency and cutting public spending. But any such process would bring even more economic pain and unrest in the short term, and it has not begun yet. Even if the ruling party avoids defaulting on government debts this year - which is possible given our budget calculations - it is on the path to default before long. We remain short Venezuelan 10-year sovereign bonds versus emerging market peers. This trade is down 330 basis points since initiation in June 2015, but Venezuelan bonds have rolled over and the outlook is dim (Chart 23). Within the oil markets, our base case is that global oil producers have benefitted and will benefit from the marginally higher prices derived from Venezuela's slow production deterioration. Should a more sudden and severe production collapse occur, the upward price response would be much more acute. A sustained outage of Venezuelan production would send oil prices quickly towards $80-$100/bbl as a necessary price signal to curb demand growth, creating a meaningful recessionary force around the globe. Oil producers, specifically U.S. shale producers that can react quickly to these price signals, would stand to benefit temporarily from the higher prices, but would again suffer from falling oil prices in the inevitable post-crisis denouement. Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Matt Conlan, Senior Vice President Energy Sector Strategy mattconlan@bcaresearchny.com 1 For the military takeover, please see "Venezuelan Debt: The Rally Is Late," in BCA Emerging Markets Strategy, "EM: From Liquidity To Growth?" dated August 24, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Energy Spring," dated December 10, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com; BCA Commodity and Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Tactical Focus Again Required In 2017," dated January 5, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com; and Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "The Other Guys In The Oil Market," dated April 5, 2017, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Venezuelan Chavismo: Life After Death," dated April 2, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Strategic Outlook 2013," dated January 16, 2013, and Monthly Report, "The Reflation Era," dated December 10, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Assessing Political And Financial Landscapes In Argentina, Venezuela And Brazil," dated January 6, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 7 For Lopez's taking control, please see "Venezuelan Debt: The Rally Is Late" in BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "EM: From Liquidity To Growth?" dated August 24, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. For the gold mine, please see Edgardo Lander, "The Implosion of Venezuela's Rentier State," Transnational Institute, New Politics Papers 1, September 2016, available at www.tni.org. 8 The junior officers have advanced through special military schools set up by Chavez, while the senior officials have been carefully selected over the years for their loyalty and ideological purity. Please see Brian Fonseca, John Polga-Hecimovich, and Harold A. Trinkunas, "Venezuelan Military Culture," FIU-USSOUTHCOM Military Culture Series, May 2016, available at www.johnpolga.com. 9 Please see David Smilde, "Venezuela: Options for U.S. Policy," Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 2, 2017, available at www.foreign.senate.gov. 10 Please see Timothy Hazen, "Defect Or Defend? Explaining Military Responses During The Arab Uprisings," doctoral dissertation, Loyola University Chicago, December 2016, available at ecommons.luc.edu. 11 Civilian deaths caused by the National Guard and Chavez's loyalist militias triggered the aborted 2002 military coup. Please see Steven Barracca, "Military coups in the post-cold war era: Pakistan, Ecuador and Venezuela," Third World Quarterly 28: 1 (2007), pp. 137-54. 12 See footnote 8 above.

Highlights The structural theme of overweighting technology stocks within the overall equity benchmark, and relative to other cyclical sectors such as commodities and machinery stocks, remains intact. However, in absolute terms, EM tech/semi share prices have become overbought and have already priced in a lot of good news. They will likely sell off soon due to the potential slowdown in the pace of semiconductor demand. Continue overweighting EM tech stocks, Taiwanese and Korean bourses within EM equity portfolios. We also reiterate our long-standing long tech / short materials strategy. Feature EM technology stocks have surged to all-time highs (Chart I-1, top panel), contributing significantly to the ongoing EM rally. In fact, excluding tech stocks, EM share prices have not yet surpassed a major technical hurdle, as shown in the bottom panel of Chart I-1. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy (EMS) team has been recommending that investors overweight tech stocks since June 8, 2010. In our report titled, How To Play EM Growth In The Coming Decade,1 we contended that the structural bull market in commodities was over, and that in the coming decade (2010-2019) the winners would be health care and technology (Chart I-2). We also identified a potential mania candidate - i.e., a segment that was poised for exponential price gains. We reasoned that the fusion between technology and health care - health care equipment stocks - could experience exponential price moves. This strategy has paid off exceptionally well. Consistently, within the EM equity benchmark, we have been overweighting Taiwanese and Korean tech stocks since 2007 and 2010, respectively (Chart I-3). Chart I-1EM Tech Stocks Have ##br##Surged To All Time Highs Chart I-2EMS Strategy Since 2010: ##br##Long Tech / Short Materials Chart I-3Taiwanese & Korean Tech ##br##Stocks Relative To Overall EM After such enormous gains, a relevant question is whether technology share prices will continue to rally in absolute terms, boosting the EM equity benchmark, or whether their absolute performance and/or relative performance will roll over. Chart I-4EM Tech Stocks Are Overbought Before we proceed in laying out our analysis, a caveat is in order: we can offer thematic long-term views on various sectors, but investors should realize the investment calls on many technology, internet and social media companies are driven by bottom-up - not macro - views. From a top-down perspective, we can offer little insight on whether EM internet and social media stocks such as Alibaba, Tencent and Baidu are cheap or expensive, whether their business models are or are not proficient, or what their profit outlooks might be. The reason is that these and other global internet/social media companies' revenues are not driven by business cycle dynamics and top-down analysis is less imperative in forecasting their performance. In this report we will shed some light on the business cycle in the global/Asian semiconductor industry. The latter is subject to both business cycle swings as well as sector-specific factors. Again, sector-unique factors for the semi industry are also beyond our top-down approach. The five largest constituents of the EM MSCI tech sector are Samsung (4.3% of EM MSCI market cap), Tencent (4.0%), Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (3.5%), Alibaba (3.0%), and Baidu (1.0%). Chart I-4 shows their share prices. In short, they have become a large part of the EM benchmark and are also extremely overbought, increasing the risk of correction. Technology's Structural Bull Market Is Intact... Even though EM tech prices have skyrocketed in both absolute and relative terms, odds are that the structural bull market has further to run. There are no structural excesses in the technology sector that would warrant a bust for now. Even in China, credit/leverage excesses are concentrated in the old industries, not among the tech and new economy segments. Demand for tech products in general and semiconductors in particular is not very dependent on the credit cycle in EM. In both developed market (DM) and EM economies, spending on many tech gadgets is contingent on income gains rather than credit growth. Our bearish view on EM/China growth is primarily due to our expectations of a credit downturn that will affect spending that is financed by credit. Investment expenditures driven by credit are much more important for commodities and industrial goods than technology products. While the share prices of technology and new economy companies are overbought and may be expensive, global/EM economic demand growth will be skewed toward new industries and technologies rather than commodities. In brief, the outlook for global tech spending remains positive, both cyclically and structurally. Having outperformed all other sectors by a large margin, the EM technology sector presently accounts for 26% of the EM MSCI benchmark, while at its previous structural peak in 2000 its market share stood at 22% (Chart I-5, top panel). During the 1999-2000 tech bubble, the U.S. and DM tech sector’s share of market cap reached 34% and 24% of the U.S. MSCI and DM MSCI benchmark market caps, respectively (Chart I-5, middle and bottom panels). Despite being stretched, it is possible that the technology sector's market cap will rise further before another structural top transpires. Hence, we are not yet ready to call the top in the tech's share of the overall market cap either in EM or DM. From a very long-term perspective (since 1960), the relative performance of the U.S. technology sector against the S&P 500 has not yet reached two standard deviations above its time trend, as it did in the year 2000 during the tech bubble. Conversely, the same measure for energy, materials and machinery stocks is not yet depressed enough to warrant a mean reversion bet (Chart I-6). Chart I-5Tech Stocks Market Cap Share ##br##Of Overall Equity Benchmarks Chart I-6Relative Performance Of ##br##U.S. Sectors Vs. S&P 500 Finally, secular leadership rotations within global equities typically occur during market downturns. Chart I-7 shows that commodities stocks and tech leadership changed in 2001 and 2008. It is possible that new sectoral leadership will emerge in global equities during the next bear market/severe selloff. However, it is too early to bet on it now. The current character of equity markets - which favors technology over commodities - will persist. Bottom Line: The structural theme of overweighting technology stocks within the overall equity benchmark and relative to other cyclical sectors such as resources/commodities and machinery stocks remains intact. ...But The Semi Cycle Upswing Is Advanced The semiconductors industry is cyclical, and as such business cycle analysis is pertinent here. The rest of the technology sector, however, is not correlated with overall business cycles. Therefore, there is little value that macro analysis can deliver on the outlook for non-semi tech areas. This is why this section is focused on semiconductors rather than the overall tech sector. There is no basis as to why semiconductor/tech cycles should correlate with commodities cycles. However, when they do, the amplitude of global business cycle fluctuations rises. Indeed, Asian exports and global trade tumbled in 2015 and have subsequently improved over the past 12 months for the following reason: the 2015 downturn and the ensuing recovery in the semiconductor cycle overlapped with similar swings in commodities and Chinese capital goods demand (Chart I-8). This has increased the amplitude of the global business cycle's swings in the past two years. Chart I-7Secular Leadership ##br##Rotation: Tech Vs. Energy Chart I-8Chinese Capital Goods Imports & ##br##Global Semiconductor Cycle We remain bearish on Chinese capital spending in general and construction in particular. This entails weaker demand for commodities and industrial goods. Yet we are not bearish on Chinese demand for semiconductors and tech devices. The semiconductor cycle has experienced a mini boom in the past 12-18 months. Demand for electronic products in the U.S. has been exceptionally strong (Chart I-9, top panel). Moreover, European production and sale of overall high-tech products as well as computer and electronic products have been robust (Chart I-9, bottom panel). In China, retail sales of communication appliances have also been extremely healthy (Chart I-10, top panel). By extension, the mainland's production of electronics has also boomed (Chart I-10, bottom panel). Chart I-9DM Demand For Tech Is Strong... Chart I-10...And So Is China's One soft spot for semi demand, however, could emanate from the global auto sector. U.S. auto sales have begun to contract, and auto production will likely shrink as well (Chart I-11, top panel). In addition, the growth rate of auto sales in both China and Europe may have reached a peak (Chart I-11, middle and bottom panels). Annual vehicle sales have reached 25 million units in China, and 17 million vehicles in both the U.S. and euro area. Overall global auto production is set to decelerate and this will weigh on semiconductor demand given that autos consume a lot of electronics. In addition, there are several other indications that suggest a mini-slowdown will likely transpire in the global semiconductor sector later this year: Taiwan's narrow money (M1) growth impulse has historically been correlated with the tech-heavy TSE index and has led export cycles (Chart I-12). This money impulse currently heralds a major top and relapse in both share prices and exports. Chart I-11Global Auto Production Chart I-12Taiwanese M1 Money Impulse Is Signaling A ##br##Growth Slowdown And Risk To Stocks The semiconductor shipments-to-inventory ratio has peaked in Korea and Taiwan (Chart I-13). This indicates that the best of the semi upswing may be behind us. Consistently, both global semiconductor producers' and semiconductor equipment stocks' forward EPS net revisions have already surged, and are elevated. This implies that a lot of earnings optimism has been priced in. Historically, when forward earning net revisions have reached these levels, global semi share prices have rolled over or entered a consolidation period (Chart I-14). Chart I-13Korea's & Taiwan's Semi ##br##Cycle Is Topping Out Chart I-14Semiconductors' Forward EPS ##br##Revisions Are Elevated Bottom Line: We expect a moderation in semi demand, but not recession. Semi share prices may react negatively to slower demand growth as the former have become extremely overbought and have already priced in a lot of good news. Investment Conclusions Semiconductor stocks have become overbought and a marginal slowdown in demand might be enough to cause a shake-out. The same is true for the overall tech sector. That said, we continue to recommend that investors overweight EM tech stocks, Taiwanese and Korean bourses within the EM equity portfolios. We also reiterate our long-standing long tech / short materials strategy. Remarkably, the KOSPI and Taiwanese TSE indexes - highly leveraged to semiconductors - have rallied to their previous highs (Chart I-15). In the past, they failed to break above these levels and we expect them to struggle again. If these equity indexes pull back and tech stocks correct, the overall EM stock index will roll over too. The rest of EM equity universe has much poorer fundamentals than tech companies. Financials and commodities sectors make 25% and 7% of the EM MSCI benchmark's market cap, respectively. The former is at risk from credit slowdown in EM and the latter is at a risk from lower commodities prices (Chart I-16). Chart I-15KOSPI & TSE Have Reached ##br##Major Resistances Chart I-16Industrial Metals ##br##Prices To Head Lower On the whole, we believe the recent divergence of EM risk assets from commodities prices and the EM/China credit cycles does not represent a structural regime shift in EM fundamentals, it rather reflects complacency in the marketplace. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor aymank@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled, "How The Play Emerging Market Growth In The Coming Decade", dated June 8, 2010, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlight Once-ebullient oil markets are overwrought. Fears that an economic slowdown in China will spill over into EM - the engine of global commodity demand growth - along with a very weak 1Q17 U.S. GDP performance, will keep oil markets focused on downside risks to prices. On the supply side, high-frequency inventory data from the U.S. suggests visible OECD stocks remain high, seemingly impervious to OPEC 2.0's best efforts to drain them. Steadily rising U.S. shale output also weighs on prices. Markets appear to be looking right through the choreographed comments on production cuts from leaders of OPEC 2.0, which suggest these cuts will definitely be extended to year-end 2017, and possibly into 2018. We doubt the demand picture is anywhere close to a fundamental downshift, expecting, instead, continued robust demand. We also expect the extension of OPEC 2.0's production cutbacks to year-end 2017 to significantly drain storage, even as shale output continues to grow. If anything, recent market action has presented an opportunity re-establish length, and to position for backwardation toward year-end. Energy: Overweight. The stop-loss on our Dec/17 Brent $45/bbl puts vs. $65/bbl calls was elected May 4/17, leaving us with a loss of $1.54/bbl (-327.7%). We are reinstating the position as of tonight's close, anticipating Brent will reach $60/bbl by year-end. We also stopped out of our Dec/17 Brent long vs. Dec/18 Brent short on May 4/17, with a $0.50/bbl loss (-263.2%). We will re-establish this position as well basis tonight's close. Base Metals: Neutral. LME and COMEX stock builds are keeping copper under pressure, offsetting possible renewed labor unrest. This is keeping us neutral. Precious Metals: Neutral. We were made long spot gold at $1230.25/oz basis last Thursday's close as a hedge against inflation risk, and a possible equities correction. Ags/Softs: Underweight. USDA data indicate a favorable start to the grain planting season. We remain bearish. Feature Softer Chinese PMIs spooked commodity markets, coming as they did on the heels of a very visible and much-reported weakening of base metals and iron ore prices emanating from Chinese markets (Chart of the Week).1 Financial markets fear weaker Chinese growth could presage weaker EM growth, which is the engine of commodity growth generally.2 With U.S. GDP coming in weak as well - registering a paltry growth of 0.7% in 1Q17 - markets started re-calibrating oil demand estimates for this year in light of still-high inventory levels. Adding to the market's agita, visible oil inventories in the OECD remain stubbornly high, thwarting OPEC 2.0's best efforts to drain them via their closely followed production cuts. By Wednesday of this week, this potent combination shaved some 9.6% off 1Q17 average prices, taking international benchmarks Brent and WTI below $50/bbl. Dubai prices have largely been spared similar carnage, as Gulf OPEC states continue to reduce supplies of heavier sour crude availabilities (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekChina PMIs Weaken As Monetary##BR##Conditions Tighten Slightly Chart 2Oil Prices##BR##In Retreat OPEC 2.0 Responds To Weaker Prices OPEC 2.0 - our moniker for the producer group comprised of OPEC, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and non-OPEC, led by Russia - was not oblivious to these concerns. Indeed, earlier this week KSA Oil Minister Khalid al-Falih said the group would "do whatever it takes" to drain stocks and normalize global inventories (Chart 3). The OPEC 2.0 leadership is well aware that failure to do so would again expose these petro-states to the risk of a price collapse, as, absent production discipline, oil inventories once again would fill. This would force prices through producers' cash costs until enough production was knocked off-line to drain the storage overhang.3 Comments by leaders of OPEC 2.0 regarding the extension of its 1.8mm b/d production cuts this year and into next year are consistent with a strategy we laid out earlier, part of which includes the use of forward guidance to convince markets the supply side will tighten in the future.4 The other critical part of the strategy is for OPEC 2.0 to keep the front of the Brent curve at or below $60/bbl, using their own production, spare capacity and storage, and guiding to higher supply in the future, which would keep markets backwardated in 2018 once visible storage returns to five-year average levels. A persistent and deep backwardation - on the order of 10% p.a. - would, based on our modelling, slow the return of rigs to U.S. shale fields. In addition, the combination of a front-end forward curve capped at $60/bbl and persistent backwardation would keep depletion rates elevated, as cash-strapped producers - e.g., non-Gulf OPEC producers with high fiscal breakeven oil prices - are forced to forego maintenance capex. Taken together, this would give OPEC 2.0 a stronger hand in guiding prices - provided the coalition can hold together and maintain production discipline. We continue to expect an extension of the 1.8mm b/d OPEC 2.0 cuts will backwardate markets once inventories normalize later this year, even with strong growth from U.S. shales.5 Indeed, we expect this combination of fundamentals will clear the storage overhang by end-2017, and produce draws of more than 1mm b/d on average from April - December (Chart 4). Chart 3OPEC 2.0 Leaders KSA,##BR##Russia: "Whatever It Takes" Chart 4Steady Demand,##BR##Extended Cuts Will Drain Inventories Wobbly Oil Demand Is Transitory The 1Q17 demand-side scares emanating from China and the U.S. are transitory. Chart 5Fiscal And Infrastructure Spending##BR##Picked Up This Year In China Following their return from the mainland, our colleagues on BCA's China Investment Strategy desk note that monetary conditions still are fairly stimulative, and are unlikely to cause the economy to roll over.6 Most of the deterioration in economic growth results from a slowing in the depreciation of China's trade-weighted RMB, following a years-long appreciation from 2012 to 2015, which did dampen growth. In addition, while fiscal stimulus was reduced at the end of 2016, the government "quickly reversed course" as direct spending and investment in infrastructure picked up substantially (Chart 5). Our China Investment Strategy colleagues note China's fiscal spending is pro-cyclical - it increases as the economy improves and tax revenues increase. The government shows no sign of wanting to wind this down: "China's policy setting remains expansionary, a major departure from previous years when the Chinese economy was under the heavy weight of policy tightening while external demand also weakened. Looking forward, there is little chance that the Chinese authorities will commit similar policy mistakes that could lead to a major growth downturn. Barring a major policy mistake of aggressive tightening, Chinese growth should remain buoyant." The impact of Chinese demand on global oil demand is increasing, based on econometric work we've recently completed. From 2000 to end-April 2017, a 1% increase in Chinese oil demand has translated into a 0.64% ncrease in Brent prompt prices. During this period, the impact of non-OECD demand ex China was more than two times that of China's - a 1% increase there could be expected to lead to a 1.3% increase in Brent prices. China's impact on Brent prices in the post-GFC world more than doubled, while the impact of non-OECD demand ex-China increased marginally. Since the Global Financial Crisis, a 1% increase in China's oil consumption has produced a 1.4% increase in Brent prices, while a similar increase in EM ex-China has translated into a 1.8% increase in Brent prices.7 Turning to the U.S., we believe, along with the Fed, the weak patch in GDP in 1Q17 is transitory. Following the report on the quarter's weak 0.7% GDP growth, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics surprised markets with a reading of 4.4% unemployment (U3 measure), and an equally impressive U6 measure of 8.6%, which takes it almost to pre-GFC levels. We expect robust U.S. labor-market conditions will keep demand for refined products in the U.S. robust, which will support oil prices there going forward. Globally, the U.S. EIA expects oil consumption will grow 1.6mm b/d this year - unchanged from last year. This is above our 1.4mm b/d estimate for the year. If the EIA's demand estimate is accurate, we can expect a sharper draw (+200k b/d) in global inventories than the average 860k b/d we currently are projecting, all else equal (Chart 4). This would lead to a sharper and earlier backwardation in prices that we currently expect. We will be re-estimating our balances model next week. Investment Implications We continue to expect the global storage overhang to clear by year-end, given the extension of OPEC 2.0's production cuts to at least year-end 2017. Wobbly demand is a transitory phenomenon, and we expect a recovery in the balance of the year. Given our expectation, we are re-establishing our long year-end Brent exposure, and are going short a $45/bbl Dec/17 Brent put vs. long a $65/bbl Dec/17 Brent call at tonight's close. We had a -$1.00/bbl stop-loss on this position, which was elected May 4/17 and resulted in a 1.54/bbl loss (-327.7%). We stopped out of our long Brent front-to-back position - long Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent - in anticipation of backwardation. We also will be looking to re-establishing this position at tonight's closing levels, and for a good entry point to re-establish the same position in WTI. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Iron-ore (62% Fe) prices are down 33.5% after peaking this year at close to $91/MT in March. The LMEX base metals index is down 7.7% from its 2017 peak in February. Regular readers of Commodity & Energy Strategy will recall we've been bearish iron ore and steel for months, and have remained neutral base metals. Please see "China Commodity Focus: Supply Cuts, Environmental Restrictions Will Hit Metals," and "Copper's Price Supports Are Fading," in the January 19, and March 23, 2017, issues of Commodity & Energy Strategy. They are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 In the May 5, 2017, issue of BCA Research's Foreign Exchange Strategy, our colleague Mathieu Savary notes, "The impulse to EM growth tends to emerge from China as Chinese imports have been the key fuel to boost exports, investments, and incomes across a wide swath of EM nations. Chinese developments suggest that Chinese growth, while not about to crater, may be slowing." Please see "The Achilles Heel of Commodity Currencies" in the May 5 FES, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see "OPEC 2.0 Cuts Will Be Extended Into 2017H2; Fade The Skew And Get Long Calls Vs. Short Puts," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy April 20, 2017, for a further discussion of the logic behind these cuts. 4 This aligns with a strategy we laid out last month, which uses forward guidance to convince markets to anticipate tighter supply further out the curve. By leading markets to anticipate lower crude oil availabilities in the future - while storage is drawing - OPEC 2.0 is setting the stage for forward curves to remain backwardated. Please see "The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One?" published April 6, 2017, in BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 "Backwardation" refers to a futures forward-price curve in which contracts for prompt delivery are higher than prices for deferred delivery. This indicates merchants and refiners are willing to pay more for a commodity delivered close in time versus in the future. It is the opposite of a "contango" curve, in which deferred prices exceed prompt prices. 6 Please see "Has China's Cyclical Recovery Peaked?" in BCA Research's China Investment Strategy Weekly Report published May 5, 2017. It is available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 7 These coefficients are all significant at less than 0.01. R2 coefficients of determination for these cointegrating regressions, which include the USD broad trade-weighted index (TWIB) all exceed 0.90, indicating that the USD TWIB and Brent prices share a common long-term trend, and that FX effects remain important in assessing oil prices. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

Highlights Shorting the RMB against the dollar is no longer a one-way bet. Investors should look to reduce bearish positions on the RMB going forward. The RMB is no longer overvalued. Therefore, any further decline will push the RMB deeper into undershoot territory, which is ultimately subject to mean reversion. The recent focus on China's low and falling reserve-to-M2 ratio largely reflects lopsided expectations on continued capital outflows and further RMB declines. The PBoC should have no difficulties maintaining control over the exchange rate with the country's massive current account surplus, low foreign currency debt and pervasive capital account control measures. Feature With widespread consensus among investors and market-watchers for the RMB to continue depreciating against the U.S. dollar, a key question is whether the seemingly unloved RMB could once again become appreciated. Indeed, the widely shared consensus a mere three years ago - that the RMB had nowhere to go but up - has now become a highly controversial rhetorical question. The current prevailing view is that the RMB is under intense downward pressure against the dollar, and the People's Bank of China (PBoC) is fighting an uphill battle in maintaining exchange rate stability. Some have gone even further, relating the RMB's ongoing weakness to "money printing" and "credit largess." According to these pundits, the country's mighty official foreign reserves pale in comparison to domestic capital flight, and the end game will have to be a substantial currency depreciation before a new equilibrium is re-established. Chart 1The RMB's Rollercoaster Ride In June 2013, amid the comfortable consensus that the RMB would perpetually rise against the dollar and the RMB "carry trade" was running amok, we published a Special Report titled "Is The RMB Still Undervalued?"1 We argued at the time that "the large valuation buffer for the RMB has mostly been eliminated," and that "there is a strengthening case for the RMB to fall against the greenback." Fast forward four years, the CNY/USD peaked in January 2014 and has since depreciated by about 15% (Chart 1). As the consensus on the RMB has now completely swung to the other extreme, it is time for a new reality check and some provocative rethinking. What Has Changed? With the benefits of hindsight, it is easy to spot what went wrong for the RMB as well as for the Chinese economy. In our 2013 Special Report, we concluded that "the dollar appears to be bottoming out from its structural bear market" and that "the Chinese central bank should guide the RMB lower versus the greenback in order to maintain a relatively stable exchange rate against a currency basket." In reality, the sharp dollar rally of 2014-'15 pushed up the trade-weighted RMB by another 10% and led to draconian tightening in China's monetary conditions - a major policy mistake that caused relentless deflationary pressure and growth woes. By the same token, the depreciation of the RMB since early 2016 has turned out to be a key reflationary force that has helped stabilize the Chinese economy. As far as the RMB is concerned, there have been a few important changes in the macro environment. Chart 2The Dollar: A Long Term Perspective First, the dollar's multi-year bull market has pushed the greenback up by 25% since 2014. The U.S. economy is currently a bright spot in the world, and the Federal Reserve appears to be the most determined to tighten among the major monetary authorities - two factors that are likely to maintain dollar bullishness. However, it is important to note that the sharp rally has already pushed the dollar close to two sigma above its long-term trend (Chart 2). The dollar may remain well bid in the near term, but another major up leg similar to the one in 2014-'15 is highly unlikely. Second, the valuation froth in the RMB accumulated in previous years has been squeezed out (Chart 3). The trade-weighted RMB has fallen back to its long-term trend line after a two-sigma overshoot. Its spot rate against the dollar has now dropped below our PPP model fair value estimate. In real effective terms, the RMB has also quickly swung back from overvalued territory. The increase in Chinese producer prices since September 2016 also suggests the RMB may have become cheap again. Third, the massive RMB "carry trade" has been largely unwound. Before 2014, the RMB's one-way ascendance attracted speculative "hot money" inflows to China in anticipation of both higher yields and further currency upside. Chinese companies also sharply ramped up borrowing in foreign currencies, mostly U.S. dollars, for lower rates and potential exchange rate gains. Both trends abruptly reversed as the RMB began to fall, with hot money fleeing and domestic borrowers rushing to pay back foreign currency obligations. Chart 4 shows the abnormal surge of the RMB "carry trade" before 2014 has essentially vanished. Chart 3The RMB Is No Longer Overvalued Chart 4The Unwinding Of The RMB "Carry Trade" Finally, the reflationary benefit of a weaker exchange rate on the Chinese economy has been proven since 2016, which in of itself rules out the possibility of an endless RMB decline. As the largest manufacturer and exporter in the world, a weaker RMB is good news for the Chinese industrial sector's pricing power, profit margins and overall business activity - unless broad protectionist backlash blocks the positive feedback loop.2 The bearish argument on the RMB fixating on Chinese credit, even if true, ignores the reflationary impact on a major part of the Chinese economy, which in turn puts a floor under its exchange rate. What's Intact? Meanwhile, some factors that were widely viewed in previous years as supportive for an ever-rising RMB have remained largely intact. China still runs by far the largest trade surplus in the world, amounting to an annualized US$ 500 billion. Chinese foreign reserves, although having fallen by US$ 1 trillion since their all-time peak, still accounts for almost 30% of the global total (Chart 5). In comparison, China's official hoarding of foreign assets accounted for about 15% of the world in 2005, when the RMB was de-pegged from the greenback and began a decade-long ascent. In addition, Chinese exporters have continued to gain global market share, currently accounting for about 14% of world exports, more than double 2005 levels. Meanwhile, it is fairly likely that China's recent export numbers have been under-reported, as exporters have hidden part of their overseas proceeds offshore in anticipation of further RMB declines. Overall, there is no evidence that the value of the RMB has hindered Chinese exporters' competitiveness. From a long-term perspective, a country's productivity growth relative to the rest of the world fundamentally determines its relative competitiveness in global trade, which in turn is the ultimate driving force behind its exchange rate (Chart 6). On all these fronts, China still compares favorably to other major countries. Chart 5China's Foreign Official ##br##Reserves Remain Massive Chart 6Relative Productivity Determines ##br##Export Sector Competitiveness Are China's Foreign Reserves Enough? Chart 7 shows that the ebbs and flows of China's foreign exchange reserves are tightly linked with the USD/CNY "risk reversal" indicator, defined as the implied volatility for call options minus the implied volatility for put options on the cross rate. Chinese foreign reserves have increased for three consecutive months, a sign of slower capital outflows and easing concerns surrounding the RMB. It remains to be seen whether this is a permanent shift or a temporary pause. A more important question is whether China's foreign reserves are large enough for the PBoC to maintain control over its exchange rate. Chart 7The RMB Risk Aversion And Capital Flows Central banks' precautionary holdings of foreign reserves are mainly to reduce the likelihood of balance-of-payments pressures. From this perspective, for a country running chronic and massive trade surpluses with minimal foreign currency debt, China should not hold large foreign reserves at all. This is also why its massive foreign reserve holdings were long regarded as wasteful before 2014 by both market participants and Chinese policymakers - and since 2014 as the RMB has weakened the exact opposite: as not enough. Based on traditional yardsticks for reserve adequacy such as coverage ratios for imports or short-term foreign currency debt, China's reserves are far more than adequate. The more recent focus has been on additional metrics proposed by the IMF, particularly the ratio of reserves relative to a country's broad money supply (M2). This ratio captures potential residents' capital flight through the liquidation of their highly liquid domestic assets, which reflects potential drains on the balance of payments. Chart 8 shows a sharp decline in China's reserves-to-M2 ratio in recent years. However, this does not mean that Chinese foreign reserves are insufficient for the following reasons. Historically China's reserve-to-M2 ratio has had no direct correlation with the broad RMB trend. China's reserve-to-M2 ratio peaked at 28% in 2008, long before the RMB peaked. At 13% currently, the ratio is comparable to 2005 when the RMB began to rise against the dollar. Globally speaking, there is no empirical evidence that a higher reserve-to-M2 ratio helps alleviate downward pressure on a country's exchange rate. Other major emerging countries such as Brazil, Russia and India have much higher reserve-to-M2 ratios than China, but their currencies have suffered brutal declines in recent years (Chart 9). In contrast, Japan's reserve-to-M2 ratio is comparable to China, but the Bank of Japan has been trying desperately to weaken the yen. Germany's ratio is even lower. Finally, China's pervasive capital account control measures and its largely state-controlled financial institutions are powerful tools to hinder capital outflows, and can be adjusted to accommodate changes in the marketplace. This further diminishes the usefulness of this ratio. Chart 8China's Reserves-To-M2 Ratio Has Been Falling... Chart 9...But Does It Matter? Overall, the recent focus on China's low and falling reserve-to-M2 ratio largely reflects lopsided expectations on continued capital outflows and further RMB declines. This has all but ignored the prospect for capital inflows. True, Chinese households and companies will likely continue to diversify into foreign assets. However, there is an equally compelling case that foreign demand for RMB-denominated assets will also increase going forward. For example, Chinese local bond yields, both sovereign and credit, are substantially higher than other major economies. Meanwhile, foreign ownership in Chinese bonds is practically non-existent compared with other bourses (Chart 10). It is almost a sure bet that foreign demand for RMB bonds will increase significantly, especially if market expectations on the RMB stabilize. Given how dramatic market expectations on the RMB have shifted in the past several years, this could come much sooner than many expect. Chart 10The Case For Increasing Foreign Demand##br## For RMB Bonds Investment Conclusions We are not making the case for an immediate resumption of a rising RMB. In the near term, the USD/CNY cross rate will continue to be dominated by the broad dollar trend, the upside of which may not yet be exhausted. However, the prevailing bearish consensus means that shorting the RMB against the dollar has become a very crowded trade. Meanwhile, our valuation models suggest the RMB is currently no longer overvalued. Therefore, any further decline will push the RMB deeper into undershoot territory, which is ultimately subject to mean reversion. Overall, we caution against being overly negative at the moment, and investors should begin to reduce bearish bets on the RMB going forward. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Is The RMB Still Undervalued?," dated June 12, 2013, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Reflecting On The Trump-Xi Summit," dated April 13, 2017 available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Special Report

Highlights The risk to EM currencies is to the downside over the next 12 months - i.e., they will depreciate more than their carry. In this context, investors in local currency bonds should consider hedging against currency depreciation. The cross-currency basis spread can be used to calculate exchange rate-hedged yield on local currency bonds for U.S. dollar and euro-based investors. On a currency-hedged basis, Korean, Russian and Mexican local bonds offer the highest yield, while Turkish, South African and Chinese fixed-income securities stand at the opposite end of the spectrum. Feature The Big Picture: A Stampede Into EM Bonds There has been a stampede into EM risk assets since early this year. Fixed-income investors' search for yield is understandable, given DM bond yields are very low. However, we believe investors are underappreciating currency and other risks embedded in EM that are likely to manifest in the next 6-12 months. In other words, the fact that DM bond yields are low in of itself does not justify chasing EM bonds and currencies. Investment in EM should primarily be based on the merits of EM fundamentals. With respect to EM local bonds, total returns for international investors are greatly influenced by exchange rate moves. Not only does currency depreciation undermine returns for foreign investors, but in many high-yielding fixed income markets, bond yields also rise when their respective country's currency depreciates, and vice versa (Chart I-1). Furthermore, Chart I-2 demonstrates that high or rising interest rates historically have not precluded bear markets in EM currencies. On the contrary, historically, it was exchange rate that determined the direction and level of local interest rates: a strong currency led to lower interest rates and a weak currency warranted rising interest rates. This was especially true with the recent darlings of investors, the Brazilian real and South African rand. Chart I-1EM Local Bond Yields And ##br##Currencies: Negative Correlation Chart I-2In EM, Currencies Drive ##br##Interest Rates Not Vice Versa In our weekly reports, we have argued at length why EM currencies are set to depreciate considerably, and we will not repeat the rationale in this report. Instead, our focus this week is on hedging mechanisms and the concept of cross-currency basis swap. Specifically, we calculate what yields would be on offer to U.S. dollar- and euro-based investors in EM local currency bonds after hedging the EM exchange rate risk. This can be done via cross-currency basis swaps. We also demonstrate the mechanism behind the hedge, and present the relative attractiveness of local yields across the EM universe after hedging. EM local currency bonds are only comparable to each other as well as to U.S. Treasurys and German bunds after hedging exchange rate risk. We conclude that Korea, Russia and Mexico local bond markets offer the highest hedged yields, while Turkey, South Africa and China provide the lowest hedged yield. Bottom Line: The risk to EM currencies is to the downside in the next 12 months - i.e., they will depreciate more than their carry. In this context, investors in local currency bonds should consider hedging against currency depreciation. Cross-Currency Basis Swap The cross-currency basis spread is the price of a cross-currency basis swap. This spread is directly quoted in the marketplace. The swap allows two parties involved to temporarily access each other's currencies without having to take on foreign currency exposure. Chart I-3 demonstrates an equal-weighted average basis spread for nine EM currencies (Mexico, Russia, Korea, Malaysia, Turkey, South Africa, China, Hungary, Poland) and the aggregate EM exchange rate versus the greenback. Chart I-4 does the same but against the euro - i.e., EM cross-currency basis spread versus the euro, and the EM aggregate exchange rate against the euro. Chart I-3EM Versus U.S. Dollar And Cross-Currency Basis Swap With Dollar Chart I-4EM Versus Euro And Cross-Currency Basis Swap With Euro A few considerations are in order: A negative basis spread means that U.S. dollar investors are paid to hedge their EM currency exposure - i.e., they can enhance their U.S. dollar yield by forgoing their EM local yield and hedging their EM exchange rate risk. The aggregate EM basis spread was very wide in 2011 before the EM bear market began. This meant that not many investors hedged their EM currency exposure before the second half of 2011. From 2011 through to mid-2016, various EM cross-currency basis spreads narrowed. The narrowing occurred at an uneven pace, at times in sync with EM rallies and at other times with EM selloffs. This suggests that fixed-income investors were periodically hedging their EM currency exposure via basis swaps until the middle of 2016. Since the middle 2016 - the point when confidence in EM fixed-income rally was cemented - the basis swap spread has widened. This entails that EM fixed-income investors have been reluctant to hedge their currency risk via basis swaps. This corroborates the lingering complacency among the investment community with respect to EM risk. Chart I-5EM Domestic Bond Yields ##br##Over U.S. Treasurys Are Low There is no strong and stable correlation between the EM basis swap spread and EM exchange rate moves (appreciation/depreciation). However, the persisting negative sign of the basis spread implies stronger secular demand for hedged U.S. dollar funding from EM companies and banks than demand for hedged EM currency exposure among foreign investors and companies. Remarkably, the spread of EM local bond yields over 5-year U.S. Treasurys is at the bottom of the trading range that has prevailed over the past seven years (Chart I-5). Provided that EM exchange rate risk is currently considerable, the current level of EM local yields does not warrant blind yield chasing. Hedging Mechanism While obtaining funds in the spot foreign exchange market and hedging via forwards is possible, liquidity in forwards becomes very poor beyond 12 months. Cross-currency basis swaps allow hedging up to multiple years, effectively locking in yields until the maturity of the bond. The following illustrates the transactions involved in the hedging process. A fixed-income portfolio manager (PM) starts with $1 U.S. dollar. This investor enters into a cross-currency basis swap with Counterparty A who, let's say, owns Malaysian ringgits. The PM gives $1 and receives 4.3 MYR, where 4.3 is the spot exchange rate. The PM also agrees to swap back 4.3 MYR for $1 at maturity. The PM then takes the 4.3 MYR and purchases a Malaysian 5-year local currency government bond yielding 3.7% (Chart I-6). During the lifetime of the swap, the PM receives U.S. LIBOR from Counterparty A. In return, she/he must pay Counterparty A KLIBOR (the Kuala-Lumpur interbank offered rate, presently 3.9%) plus the basis spread, which is currently -50 basis points. The PM collects 3.7% yield from the ownership of Malaysian government bonds (Chart I-7). Thus, a negative basis spread of 50 basis points implies that the PM would be paying less than KLIBOR, which is the ordinary rate for borrowing ringgits. At the maturity of the swap contract, the PM redeems the bond and pays 4.3 MYR back to Counterparty A. In exchange, Counterparty A returns $1 U.S. dollar (Chart I-8). Chart I-6Hedging Mechanism: Step 1 Chart I-7Hedging Mechanism: Step 2 Chart I-8Hedging Mechanism: Step 3 The transaction allowed the international fixed-income investor to gain exposure to local currency Malaysian government bonds with almost no currency risk, as the PM received all of the payments in U.S. dollars. On a net basis, the investor receives the following yield: U.S. LIBOR + local yield - (KLIBOR + BASIS), or 2.3% = 2.0% + 3.7% - (3.9%-0.5%). Importantly, this yield is in U.S. dollars, meaning the PM has secured the principal investment and the yield on it in U.S. dollars while gaining exposure to Malaysian local currency sovereign bonds. The latter entails that the portfolio will gain/lose from changes in prices of Malaysian government bonds. Besides, the investor still has some currency exposure on the quarterly flows of interest payments. However, this is miniscule in comparison to the notional. Currency-Hedged Local Bond Yields Using the method described above to calculate hedged returns for individual countries, we ranked the resulting yields for EM countries with available data. Unfortunately, some markets like Brazil do not have a cross-currency basis swap market. Chart I-9 ranks currency-hedged yield for U.S. dollar investors for investments in 5-year local currency fixed-income bonds. Chart I-9EM Local Bonds: Currency-Hedged Yields For U.S. Dollar Investors We also did the same calculation for the euro using German bunds as a proxy. For pairs that do not have direct cross-currency basis swaps with the euro or U.S. dollar, we use the euro/U.S. dollar cross-currency basis to do the conversion. Chart I-10 classifies EM countries according to their hedged euro yield for euro-based international fixed-income investors. Chart I-10EM Local Bonds: Currency-Hedged Yields For Euro-Based Investors For 5-year local bonds, the highest hedged yields are offered by Korea, Russia and Mexico. In contrast, the lowest hedged yields for 5-year domestic local bonds are offered by Turkey, South Africa and China. These hedged yields are calculated on our best estimate of transactions happening at the mid-point of the bid-ask spread. The EM cross-currency swap market is often illiquid. Coupled with the fact that the hedging process requires multiple transactions, the hedged return can be quite lower. To conclude, the highest-yielding local bond markets do not always offer the highest yield when taking currency hedging into account. A caveat is in order: Applying hedging via basis swaps eliminates exchange rate risk, but it does not eliminate risk from fluctuations in bond prices (capital gains/losses). Therefore, in the event that EM local bond yields rise as their currencies depreciate, hedging via basis swaps will not protect against capital losses. Therefore, basis swap hedging should be used by long-term fixed-income investors who have deployed a lot of capital in EM local bond markets and share our concerns on EM exchange rates. These investors typically have a higher tolerance for asset price swings compared with traders who have little tolerance for short-term losses. The latter should sell out of EM domestic bonds altogether. Investment Implications This exercise reinforces our existing overweights in Korean, Russian and Mexican bonds within the EM local currency bond universe. Similarly, it also corroborates our underweights in Turkish and South African domestic bond markets. Although we expect most EM currencies will depreciate versus both the U.S. dollar and the euro in the next 12 months, the Korean won (as well as other low-yielding Asian currencies such as the TWD and the SGD), the Russian ruble and the Mexican peso are less vulnerable, and will outperform other EM currencies. By contrast, the TRY and the ZAR are among the most vulnerable, even after adjusting for their high carry. A plunge in these currencies will also force their local bond yields higher. Hence, capital losses on local bonds even after hedging exchange rate risk could be substantial in these countries. Furthermore, we also continue to recommend overweight positions in local currency bonds in Poland, Hungary, India and Chile within the EM universe. Henry Wu, Research Analyst henryw@bcaresearch.com

Please note that we are publishing a Special Report today titled "EM Local Bonds: Looking At Hedged Yields". Feature Commodities prices have plunged lately, even though the U.S. dollar, up until this past week, has been weak versus European currencies. Hence, the recent selloff in the commodities complex cannot be attributable to U.S. dollar strength. Something else has been at work. Furthermore, EM share prices and currencies have decoupled from both commodities prices and DM commodities currencies such as the AUD, NZD and the CAD (Chart I-1). Chart I-1Unsustainable Divergence Is this time different, and are we entering a new era in EM investing? We do not think so. This divergence is unsustainable and reflects irrational exuberance and fund flows into EM. The decoupling is already overstretched - although it could last another several weeks, it will not continue for much longer. We have the following observations: The commodities selloff has been very broad-based, and has been especially intense in commodities that are trading in China as well as those that are leveraged to Chinese growth (Chart I-2A & Chart I-2B). Such a simultaneous gap down in various commodities prices can be explained either by a decline in speculative long positions in commodities or weakness in real demand. It cannot be attributed to supply because the selloff has transpired at the same time across various commodities. Commodities' supply dynamics are idiosyncratic. China's central bank has been tightening liquidity, forcing deleveraging in the financial system. It is very plausible that this has led to an unwinding of long positions in commodities trading in China. Chart I-2AWidespread Carnage In Commodities Chart I-2BWidespread Carnage In Commodities China bulls would correctly argue that the selloff in commodities is indicative of a reduction in speculative trading activities - not in final demand. However, to be consistent, we should also accept that that the commodities rally in 2016 was not entirely due to demand improvement in China. Instead, it was at least partially due to speculative investment demand. It is impossible to quantify the magnitude of speculative activity in China's commodities markets, yet it has probably been a non-trivial force supercharging both last year's rally as well as the latest selloff. In regard to commodities demand from the real economy, China's growth has not yet turned decisively down. That said, the growth outlook is downbeat as credit growth downshifts in response to the ongoing policy tightening. Chart I-3 illustrates that the annual growth in the number and value of newly started projects has recently contracted. This heralds weaker demand for commodities, materials and capital goods in the months ahead. The surge in new projects launched last year marked the beginning of an upturn in industrial activity, and could well be indicative of a budding downtrend now. Besides, Chinese imports of industrial metals (excluding iron ore) has by and large been flat since 2010 (Chart I-4). The mainland's iron ore imports have been strong because inefficient/expensive domestic production has been shut down, leading to an increase in imports. Chart I-3China: Capital Spending To Slump Again Chart I-4China: No Growth In Industrial Metals' Imports Although China's oil imports have been strong (Chart I-5, top panel), underlying final demand has been weaker as there is evidence that the country has used imports of crude to increase inventories (Chart I-5, bottom panel). Provided that inventories are mean-reverting, such a large build-up in crude inventories poses a risk to China's oil demand and oil prices in the months ahead. Remarkably, the Brazilian real and South African rand have recently decoupled from the overall commodities price index and platinum prices, respectively (Chart I-6). These divergences represent a substantial departure from historical correlations. We cannot find any explanation other than the ongoing irrational exuberance in EM financial markets. Finally, signposts of potential growth deceleration are not only limited to the commodities complex. For example, Taiwanese narrow money (M1) impulse has decisively rolled over; it typically leads Taiwanese exports and correlates well with the equity market (Chart I-7). Chart I-5China's Oil Imports And An Inventories Proxy Chart I-6EM Commodity Currencies And Commodities Prices Chart I-7Taiwanese Export Growth And Equities Are At Risk Too Bottom Line: The recent decoupling between commodities prices and EM risk assets is unsustainable. This divergence reflects irrational exuberance that typically transpires around a major market top. While not chasing this rally has been painful, there is no point in doing so at current levels. We recommend investors maintain a negative stance on EM risk assets. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights Duration: U.S. growth expectations have become overly pessimistic. A Q2 rebound will lead to higher global bond yields and a steeper U.S. Treasury curve. UST / Bund Spread: The extreme divergence between the European and U.S. economic surprise indexes is not sustainable, especially in the face of weakening Chinese economic data. The Treasury / Bund spread is biased wider in the near term, though could tighten in the second half of this year as the ECB shifts to a less accommodative policy. USD Hedging Costs: Declining hedging costs driven by interest rate differentials and negative basis swap spreads make international bond investment very attractive for U.S. investors. Feature Chart 1Global Recovery Will Persist The synchronized global recovery that took hold in the second half of 2016 has stalled so far this year. Measures of economic sentiment, such as the Global ZEW survey and our own Boom/Bust Indicator, have rolled over from high levels and global bonds have clawed back some of last year's lost returns (Chart 1). Year-to-date, the Bloomberg Barclays Global Government Bond index has returned +3%, after having lost more than 9% between the July trough in the Global ZEW index and the end of last year. In our view, a repeat of early 2016's global growth slowdown and bond market rally, which saw the Global ZEW index fall below zero and the Global Government Bond index return 11.6% in 2016H1, is not in the cards. The global economy is on much firmer footing than at this time last year. U.S. Growth: Past Peak Pessimism First quarter U.S. GDP growth was a disappointing 0.7%, but is poised to bounce back strongly in Q2. The volatile inventories component subtracted 0.9% from overall Q1 growth, harsh weather wreaked havoc on the March employment report and there continue to be problems with residual seasonality depressing first quarter GDP data.1 The outlook is much brighter moving forward. The latest employment report showed that the U.S. economy added a healthy 211k jobs in April and our model is pointing toward a further acceleration (Chart 2). Economic growth can be thought of as a combination of aggregate hours worked and labor productivity (Chart 3). With aggregate hours worked growing at 1.7% year-over-year and labor productivity growth having averaged 0.6% (annualized) per quarter since 2012, real U.S. GDP growth of around 2.3% seems like a reasonable forecast. Chart 2Labor Market Still Strong Chart 3Look For Above 2% Growth There is even some reason to suspect that labor productivity could strengthen during the next few quarters. A recent IMF paper2 attributed weak post-crisis productivity growth to a combination of structural and cyclical factors, but also noted that weak investment in physical capital may be responsible for lowering total factor productivity growth by nearly 0.2 percentage points per year in advanced economies during the post-crisis period. With leading indicators pointing to still further gains in fixed investment (Chart 3, bottom panel), we would not be shocked to see productivity growth enjoy a modest late-cycle rebound. Chart 4Stronger Productivity = Steeper Curve All else equal, a late-cycle rebound in productivity growth would slow the increase in unit labor costs. Unit labor costs are a combination of wages (compensation-per-hour) and productivity (output-per-hour), and have historically tracked changes in the slope of the U.S. yield curve (Chart 4). Faster wage growth tends to coincide with Fed tightening, and slower wage growth with Fed easing. For this reason, all wage measures perform reasonably well tracking changes in the yield curve. But unit labor costs perform best because they also incorporate productivity growth, and low productivity growth can flatten the yield curve by pulling down long-dated yields. Rapid increases in compensation-per-hour and muted productivity growth have combined to give the yield curve a strong flattening bias during the past several years. Any increase in productivity growth would slow the uptrend in unit labor costs relative to other wage measures, allowing the yield curve to steepen. In fact, we continue to recommend that investors position for a steeper U.S. yield curve by going long the 5-year Treasury note and shorting a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes. This trade produces positive returns when the 2/10 slope steepens (Chart 4, panel 3), but has also returned +19 bps since we initiated the position last December, even though the curve has flattened since then. The reason for the trade's strong performance in an unfavorable curve environment is that the 5-year yield had been unusually elevated compared to the rest of the curve. Our model of the 2/5/10 butterfly spread versus the 2/10 slope showed that the 5-year note was one standard deviation cheap on the curve as recently as mid-March (Chart 4, bottom panel). This undervaluation has mostly dissipated and the 5-year note now appears only slightly cheap. For our curve trade to outperform from here, it will likely require the 2/10 slope to steepen.3 Bottom Line: With weak Q1 GDP now in the rearview mirror, we are likely past the point of peak pessimism on U.S. growth. Expect global bond yields to rise and the U.S. yield curve to steepen as the economic data start to reflect an environment of above-trend growth, in the neighborhood of 2% - 2.5%. European Growth & The Risk From China While the U.S. data have disappointed in recent weeks, as evidenced by the U.S. Economic Surprise Index having dipped below zero (Chart 5), the European economy has consistently bested expectations (Chart 5, panel 2). As a result, the Treasury / Bund spread has narrowed from high levels during the past few months. In practice, economic surprise indexes tend to mean revert because positive data surprises beget increasingly optimistic expectations. Eventually, overly optimistic expectations become too high a hurdle and the data start to disappoint. In our view, U.S. expectations have become unduly pessimistic while the Eurozone surprise index appears overdue for a correction. Against this back-drop, we expect the Treasury / Bund spread to widen in the near term as the large divergence between the U.S. and European surprise indexes starts to narrow. Further making the case for a wider Treasury / Bund spread is the recent performance of the Chinese economy. Our Foreign Exchange Strategy service recently observed that growth differentials between the U.S. and Europe are highly correlated with indicators of Chinese growth.4 This should not be overly surprising since Europe trades more with China and other Emerging Markets than does the United States. Along those lines, the IMF has calculated that a 1% growth shock to Emerging Markets impacts European growth by nearly 40 basis points, while it impacts U.S. growth by only 10 basis points.5 The worry at the moment is that Chinese monetary conditions have started to tighten, and China's Manufacturing PMI is rolling over alongside weaker commodity prices. These trends usually coincide with the underperformance of Europe relative to the U.S. (Chart 6). Chart 5Surprise Indexes Will Converge Chart 6Look To China To Trade UST / Bund Spread Our China Investment Strategy service highlights the importance of the trade-weighted RMB as a driver of Chinese growth.6 The RMB's 30% appreciation between 2012 and 2015 applied a massive deflationary force to China's economy, while its more recent depreciation helped boost producer prices, enhance profit margins and reduce the real cost of funding (Chart 7). Chart 7Monetary Conditions ##br##Still Fairly Stimulative More recently, the pace of the RMB's depreciation has slowed and this likely explains the weakness in China's Manufacturing PMI and commodity prices. Our China strategists are quick to note that while the pace of RMB depreciation has slowed, it is still not appreciating, and real interest rates deflated by the producer price index remain negative. In other words, monetary conditions have become somewhat less stimulative, but they should still be supportive of further economic growth. Although the Chinese economic data are likely to moderate in the coming months, barring the major policy mistake of aggressive tightening, Chinese growth will avoid a collapse and remain reasonably buoyant. Similarly, we would also expect European growth expectations to soften in the coming months, but growth is very likely to remain above trend and the ECB is still on track to adopt a less accommodative policy stance over the next year. In the most likely scenario, a few hints will be given at the June ECB meeting, and then an announcement that asset purchases will be tapered in 2018 will be made at the September meeting. The market will correctly assume that rate hikes will follow the taper, and this re-pricing of rate expectations will open up a window in the second half of this year when the Treasury / Bund spread can tighten. However, it is still too soon to adopt this position. Bottom Line: The extreme divergence between the European and U.S. economic surprise indexes is not sustainable, especially in the face of weakening Chinese economic data. The Treasury / Bund spread is biased wider in the near term, though could tighten in the second half of this year as the ECB shifts to a less accommodative policy. U.S. Bond Investors Should Expand Their Borders Divergences that have opened up between U.S. short-term interest rates and short-term rates in other developed countries mean that U.S. bond investors now face much lower currency hedging costs. In addition, increasingly negative cross-currency basis swap spreads have become a permanent feature of the post-crisis investment landscape, and unless significant regulatory changes occur, we expect they are here to stay. Combined, both of these factors make it incredibly attractive for U.S. bond investors to swap their U.S. dollars for foreign currencies and invest in foreign government bonds. In this week's report we explain why this is an attractive trade for U.S. investors and why it will likely remain so for quite some time. What Is The Basis Swap Spread? An excellent definition of the cross-currency basis comes from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) who define it as "the difference between the direct dollar interest rate in the cash market and the implied dollar interest rate in the [currency] swap market".7 In essence, the existence of a negative basis swap spread should mean that there is an opportunity to arbitrage the difference between interest rates in the cash market and implied interest rates in the currency swap market. However, post-crisis regulatory constraints on bank balance sheets appear to have made this arbitrage prohibitive. Banks are either unable or unwilling to arbitrage the basis swap spread back to zero, and this increases the cost of U.S. dollars in FX swap markets. As a quick example, we can calculate the 10-year German Bund yield hedged into U.S. dollars using currency forwards. Hedged yield = Unhedged yield - Cost of hedging Where: Cost of hedging = forward exchange rate / spot exchange rate In this case, we define the exchange rates as euros per 1 U.S. dollar. By covered interest rate parity, we can also calculate the cost of hedging as: Cost of hedging = (1 + euro interest rate + basis swap spread) / (1 + USD interest rate) Using current 3-month interest rates, this means that the cost of hedging from euros into U.S. dollars is: Cost of hedging = (1 - 0.36% - 0.3%) / (1 + 1.18%) = -1.82% This means that the 10-year German Bund yield rises from 0.42% to 2.24%, from the perspective of a U.S. dollar investor, after hedging the currency on a 3-month horizon. In other words, U.S. investors can significantly increase the average yield of their portfolios by lending U.S. dollars over short time horizons and investing the proceeds into non-U.S. bonds. In Chart 8 we show the difference this currency hedging makes for German, Japanese and French 10-year government bonds. Current hedged 10-year yields for all the major bond markets are also shown on page 13 of this report. But for how long can this trade continue? In short, it can continue for as long as U.S. short-term interest rates increase relative to non-U.S. short-term interest rates and for as long as basis swap spreads move further into negative territory. At the moment there is no widespread agreement on what drives the day-to-day fluctuations in the basis swap spread. The BIS has posited a model where dollar strength weakens the capital positions of bank balance sheets, causing them to back away from providing liquidity to the FX swap market, and leading to increasingly negative basis swap spreads (Chart 9, top panel). Chart 8Higher Yields Via Currency Hedging Chart 9Basis Swaps, Reserves And The Dollar Meanwhile, Zoltan Pozsar from Credit Suisse has identified a link between basis swap spreads and reserves on the Fed's balance sheet (Chart 9, bottom panel).8 Specifically, as the Fed winds down its balance sheet it will be draining cash reserves from the banking system and replacing them with Treasury securities. This could cause money to leave the FX swap market and flow into Treasuries. The result is less liquidity in the FX swap market and increasingly negative basis swap spreads. Interestingly, the run-up to the debt ceiling in the U.S. has presented a test of this view. To stay under the debt ceiling the U.S. Treasury department has drawn down its cash account at the Fed and removed T-bill supply from the market. The result has been a temporary increase in reserve balances. As the theory would have predicted, basis swap spreads have moved closer to zero as reserves have increased. Going forward, the Fed is very likely to start winding down its balance sheet later this year. In all likelihood this will serve to pressure basis swap spreads even further below zero. Meanwhile, short-term interest rates in the U.S. will probably continue to rise more quickly than in most other developed markets. This means that the cost of hedging should become increasingly negative for U.S. investors. In Chart 10 we show that as the cost of hedging becomes more negative, total returns from a USD-hedged position in German bunds tend to outpace total returns from a position in U.S. Treasuries. Similarly, Chart 11 shows that USD-hedged Japanese government bonds (JGBs) also tend to outperform U.S. Treasuries when the cost of hedging falls. Chart 10Hedging Costs & Bond Returns: Germany Chart 11Hedging Costs & Bond Returns: Japan We should note that the relationships between hedging costs and relative total returns shown in Charts 10 & 11 are not perfect, and there will be instances when Treasuries can outperform even if hedging costs continue to decline. However, in the long run, as long as short-term U.S. interest rates continue to rise more quickly than short-term interest rates in the Eurozone or Japan, and especially if the Fed's upcoming balance sheet contraction leads to more deeply negative basis swap spreads, then U.S. investors should continue to boost their yields by lending dollars and investing in bunds and JGBs. Bottom Line: Declining hedging costs driven by interest rate differentials and negative basis swap spreads make international bond investment very attractive for U.S. investors. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Our U.S. Investment Strategy service took up the issue of residual seasonality in a recent report. Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Spring Snapback?", dated April 24, 207, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 2 IMF Staff Discussion Note, "Gone with the Headwinds: Global Productivity", https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Staff-Discussion-Notes/Issues/2017/04/03/Gone-with-the-Headwinds-Global-Productivity-44758 3 Our outlook for the U.S. yield curve was discussed in detail in a recent report. Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Yield Curve On A Cyclical Horizon", dated March 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "ECB: All About China?", dated April 7, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 5 IMF Multilateral Policy Issues Report: 2014 Spillover Report https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/062514.pdf 6 Please see China Investment Strategy Weeky Report, "Has China's Cyclical Recovery Peaked?", dated May 5, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 7 http://www.bis.org/publ/work592.pdf 8 https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2017/04/13/2187317/where-would-you-prefer-your-balance-sheet-banks-or-the-federal-reserve/ Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights China's recent growth moderation is due to marginally tighter monetary conditions. There is no case for severe policy tightening that could lead to a material growth relapse. There are plenty of signs the economy could continue to run hotter on almost all fronts. The downside risk in the economy remains fairly low, even if annual growth rates of various macro variables do not continue to accelerate. Feature Chart 1Tighter Monetary Conditions ##br##Led To Growth Moderation Our team was in China over the past two weeks, talking to investors and exchanging views with our local contacts for some on-the-ground reconnaissance. Investors appeared more upbeat on China's cyclical outlook than during our recent past trips, but generally speaking conviction remained low, and concern on some structural issues - particularly credit and the housing market - remained deeply rooted. Investors' more upbeat sentiment on growth reflected China's cyclical recovery since early last year, but the rapidly-emerging consensus appeared to be that the growth acceleration peaked in the first quarter, and the economy is facing growing downward pressure, even though few investors seem worried about a chaotic "hard landing" at the moment. Collectively, investors appeared largely preoccupied with downside risks and mindful of negative surprises, while the upside risks were not really discussed. China's latest PMI numbers released this week seemed to validate the consensus view of an imminent growth top. Most major components of the PMI surveys in both the manufacturing and service sectors had setbacks, which were also reflected in softer commodities prices (Chart 1).1 A key reason for the growth moderation is likely the performance of the RMB. We have long argued that the RMB's depreciation has been a key reflationary force for China, which boosted producer prices, enhanced profit margins and reduced the real cost of funding.2 By the same token, the pace of RMB depreciation has moderated in recent months, removing some reflationary impulses within the economy. However, it is important to note that China's worsening growth deterioration in previous years was in part attributable to sharp RMB appreciation, a replay of which is highly unlikely going forward (Chart 2). The RMB appreciated by almost 30% between 2012 and 2015, a massive deflationary shock to the economy. Currently, the trade-weighted RMB is still depreciating, albeit at a slower pace, and real interest rates deflated by PPI are still negative. In other words, although tighter on the margin, monetary conditions are still fairly stimulative, which should continue to help the economy improve. On the fiscal front, the government significantly reduced fiscal stimulus toward the end of last year, but quickly reversed course (Chart 3).3 Both direct fiscal spending and infrastructure investment have picked up notably, and its impact will continue to ripple through the broader economy. Moreover, China's fiscal spending tends to be pro-cyclical: growth recovery typically boosts fiscal revenues, which gives the government more financial resources for fiscal expenditures, and vice versa. Unless the government steps on the brakes, there is no case for a sudden retrenchment in fiscal stimulus soon. Chart 2China: But Monetary Conditions ##br##Remain Fairly Stimulative Chart 3... Meets Waning Fiscal Stimulus China: ##br##Fiscal Retrenchment Has Been Reversed In short, China's policy setting remains expansionary, a major departure from previous years when the Chinese economy was under the heavy weight of policy tightening while external demand also weakened. Looking forward, there is little chance that the Chinese authorities will commit similar policy mistakes that could lead to a major growth downturn. Chart 4China: More Upside In Exports? Barring a major policy mistake of aggressive tightening, Chinese growth should remain buoyant. In fact, there are plenty of signs the economy could continue to run hotter on almost all fronts: Exports are likely to continue to accelerate, according to our model, barring disruptions from major external shocks such as election surprises in Europe and /or broad protectionist measures from the Trump administration (Chart 4). America's latest anti-dumping measures on some Chinese steel products are irrelevant from a big picture point of view, as U.S. steel imports from China only account for a mere 1% of Chinese steel output.4 The upturn in the profit cycle will likely boost investment, particularly among private industrial enterprises (Chart 5). Rising profits and higher output prices indicate tighter capacity utilization, which would in turn encourage capital spending. The prolonged downturn in China's capital spending cycle has likely come to an end. Domestic consumption may further benefit from improvement in the labor market, which is lifting both income and confidence. This is particularly important for large-ticket consumer durable goods such as automobiles and household appliances. Housing construction will likely continue to improve, driven by strong demand. The most recent central bank survey showed that households' home-buying intentions jumped to an all-time high in the last quarter, underscoring a massive increase in pent-up demand (Chart 6). Developers are also warming to increasing supply - and land purchases have resumed positive growth in recent months after a prolonged slump. Tighter housing policies in major cities will prevent a massive boom, but will not short-circuit the recovery. Chart 5China: Private Capex Should Have Bottomed Chart 6China: A Sharp Recovery In Housing Demand All in all, we reiterate our view that the downside risk in the Chinese economy is low from a cyclical perspective, even if annual growth rates of various macro variables do not continue to accelerate. Growth figures to be released in the coming weeks will become noisy, but we lean against being overly bearish. Overall, business activity will remain fairly robust, and a major relapse in growth is unlikely. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Chinese Growth: Testing Time Ahead" dated April 6, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "2016: A Choppy Bottoming" dated January 6, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Be Aware Of China's Fiscal Tightening" dated February 16, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Reflecting On The Trump-Xi Summit" dated April 13, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights The headwinds against commodity currencies are still brewing, the selloff is not over. Global liquidity conditions are deteriorating and EM growth will disappoint. The valuation cushion in commodity currencies and EM plays is not large enough to compensate for the red flags emanating from financial markets. The euro is peaking. A capitulation by shorts is likely early next week. A move to 1.12 should be used to sell EUR/USD. Feature Commodity currencies have had a tough nine weeks, weakening by 5% in aggregate, helping boost our short commodity currency trade returns to 3.8%. At this juncture, the key questions on investors' minds is whether or not this trend will deepen and if this selloff will remain playable. We believe the answer to both questions is yes. A Less Friendly Global Backdrop When observed in aggregate, the past 12 months represented a fertile ground for commodity currencies to perform well as both global liquidity and growth conditions were on one of the most powerful upswings in the past two decades, lifting risk assets in the process (Chart I-1). Chart I-1The Zenith Is Passing Global Liquidity Is Drying When we look at the global liquidity picture, the improvement seems to be over, especially as the Fed, the key anchor to the global cost of money, is more confidently embracing its switch toward a tighter monetary policy. It is true that U.S. Q1 data has been punky at best; however, like the Fed, we think this phenomenon will prove to be temporary. Recently, much ink has been spilled over the weakness in the auto sector. However, when cyclical spending is looked at in aggregate, the picture is not as dire and even encourages moderate optimism. Driven by both corporate and housing investment, cyclical sectors have been growing as a share of GDP (Chart I-2). This highlights that poor auto sales may have been a sector specific development and do not necessarily provide an accurate read on the state of household finances. Chart I-2Autos Do Not Paint The Full Picture For The U.S. Cyclical Spending Is Firm... Moreover, the outlook for household income is still positive. Our indicator for aggregate household disposable income continues to point north (Chart I-3). As we have highlighted in recent publications, various employment surveys are suggesting that job growth should improve in the coming months.1 Also, this week's productivity and labor cost report showed that compensation is increasing at a nearly 4% annual pace. This healthy outlook for household income, combined with the consumer's healthy balance sheets - debt to disposable income stands near 14 year lows while debt-servicing ratios are still near 40 year lows - and elevated confidence suggests that house purchases can expand. With the inventory of vacant homes standing at 11 year lows, this positive backdrop, along with the improving household-formation rate, is likely to prompt additional housing starts, lifting residential investment (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Bright U.S. Household ##br##Income Prospects Chart I-4As Households Get Formed,##br## Housing Starts To Pick up For the corporate sector, the strength in survey data is also likely to result in growing capex (Chart I-5). Not only have "soft" data historically been a good leading indicator of "hard" data, but the outlook for profit growth has also improved substantially. Profit growth is the needed ingredient to realize the positive expectation of business leaders embedded in "soft" data. Profit itself is very often dictated by the trend in nominal revenue growth. The fall in profits in 2016 mostly reflected the fall in nominal GDP growth to 2.5%, which produced a level of revenue growth historically associated with recessions (Chart I-6). As such, the recent rebound in nominal GDP growth, suggests that through the power of operating leverage, profit should also continue to grow, supporting capex in the process. Chart I-5Business Confidence Points ##br##To Better Growth And Capex... Chart I-6...Especially As A Key Profit##br## Driver Is Improving With the most cyclical sector of the U.S. economy still on an upswing, the Fed will continue to increase rates, at least more aggressively than the 45 basis points of tightening priced into the OIS curve over the next 12 months. With liquidity being sucked into the U.S. economic machine, international dollar-based liquidity, which is already in a downtrend, is likely to deteriorate further (Chart I-7). Moreover, global yield curves, which were steepening until earlier this year, have begun flattening again, highlighting that the tightening in global liquidity conditions is biting (Chart I-8). This will represent a continuation of the expanding handicap against global growth, and EM growth in particular. Chart I-7Global Dollar Liquidity Is Already Poor Chart I-8A Symptom Of The Tightening In Liquidity Global Growth Conditions Are Also Past Their Best, Especially In EM Global growth conditions are already showing a few troubling signs, potentially exerted by the tightening in global liquidity. To begin with, while our global leading economic indicator is still pointing north, its own diffusion index - the number of nations with improving LEIs versus those with deteriorating ones - has already rolled over. Normally, this represents a reliable signal that growth will soon peak (Chart I-9). For commodity currencies, the key growth consideration is EM growth. Here too, the outlook looks precarious. The impulse to EM growth tends to emerge from China as Chinese imports have been the key fuel to boost exports, investments, and incomes across a wide swath of EM nations. Chinese developments suggest that Chinese growth, while not about to crater, may be slowing. Chinese monetary conditions have been tightening abruptly (Chart I-10, top panel). Moreover, this tightening seems to be already yielding some results. The issuance of bonds by smaller financial firms has been plunging, which tends to lead the growth in aggregate total social financing (Chart I-10, bottom panel). This is because the grease in the shadow banking system becomes scarcer as the cost of financing rises. Chart I-9Deteriorating Growth##br## Outlook Chart I-10Chinese Monetary Conditions ##br##Are Tightening This situation could continue. Some of the rise in Chinese interbank rates to two-year highs reflects the fact that easing capital outflows have meant that the PBoC can tighten monetary policy through other means. However, the recent focus by the Beijing and president Xi Jinping on financial stability and bubble prevention, suggests that there is a real will to see tighter policy implemented. This means that the decline in total credit growth in China should become more pronounced. As a result, this will weigh on the country's industrial activity, a risk already highlighted by the decline in Manufacturing PMIs (Chart I-11). Additionally, this decline in credit growth tends to be a harbinger of lower nominal GDP growth, and most importantly for EM and commodity producers, a foreboding warning for Chinese imports (Chart I-12). Chart I-11China Industrial ##br##Growth Worry Chart I-12Slowing Chinese Credit Impulse ##br##Will Weigh On EM Growth Financial markets are already flashing red signals. The Canadian Venture exchange and various coal plays have historically displayed a tight correlation with Chinese GDP growth.2 Today, they are breaking below key trend lines that have defined their bull markets since the February 2016 troughs (Chart I-13). This message is corroborated by the recent weakness in copper, iron ore, and oil prices. Additionally, the price of platinum relative to that of gold is also breaking down. While the VW scandal has a role to play, this breakdown is also a symptom of the pain on growth created by the tightening in global liquidity conditions. In the past, the message from this ratio have ultimately been heeded by EM stock prices, suggesting that the recent divergence is likely to be resolved with weaker EM asset prices (Chart I-14). Confirming this risk, the sectoral breadth of EM equities has also deteriorated, and is already at levels that in the past have marked the end of stock advances (Chart I-15). At the very least, the narrowing of the EM bull market should prompt investors in EM-related plays to pause and reflect. Chart I-13Two Worrisome Breakdowns##br## On Chinese Plays Chart I-14Platinum's Dark##br## Omen For EM Chart I-15The Falling Participation ##br##In The EM Rally This moment of reflection seems especially warranted as EM assets do not have much cushion for unanticipated growth disappointment. The implied volatility on EM stocks is near cycle lows, so are EM sovereign CDS and corporate spreads (Chart I-16). This picture is mimicked by commodity currencies. Even after the recent bout of weakness, the aggregate risk-reversal in options points to a limited amount of concern, and therefore, a growing risk of negative surprises (Chart I-17). Chart I-16Little Cushion##br## In EM Assets Chart I-17Commodity Currency Options##br## Turn Optimistic As Well If commodity currencies have already depreciated in the face of a slightly soft dollar and perky EM asset prices, we worry that further weaknesses will emerge if the dollar strengthens again and EM assets self-off on the back of less liquidity and more EM growth disappointment. If the price of platinum relative to that of gold was a signal for EM assets, it is also a good indicator of additional stress in the commodity-currency space (Chart I-18). Chart I-18Platinum Raises Concerns ##br##For Commodity Currencies As Well We remain committed to our trade of shorting a basket of commodity currencies. AUD is the most expensive and most exposed to the Chinese tightening of the group, but that doesn't mean much. The Canadian housing market seems to be under increased scrutiny thanks to the combined assault of rising taxes on non-residents and growing worries about mortgage fraud, which is deepening the underperformance of Canadian banks relative to their U.S. counterparts. If this two-front attack continues, the housing market, the engine of the domestic economy, may also prove to weaken faster than we anticipated. Finally, the New Zealand dollar too is expensive even if domestic economic developments suggest that its fair value may be understated by most PPP metrics. Bottom Line: The outlook for the U.S. economy remains good, but this will deepen the tightening in global liquidity. When combined with the tightening of monetary conditions in China, this suggests that global industrial activity and EM growth in particular could disappoint, especially as cracks in the financial system are beginning to appear. Moreover, EM assets and commodity currencies do not yet offer enough of a valuation cushion to fade this risk. Stay short commodity currencies. Macron In = Buy The Euro? The euro has rallied a 3.6% since early April, mostly on the back of Emmanuel Macron's electoral victories. Obviously, the last big hurdle is arriving this weekend with the second round. The En Marche! candidate still leads Marine Le Pen by a 20% margin. Wednesday's bellicose debate is unlikely to overturn this significant lead. The Front National candidate's lack of substance seems to have weighed against her in flash polls. If anything, her performance might have prompted some undecided Mélanchon voters to abstain or cast a "vote blanc" this weekend instead of picking her. This was her loss, not Macron's win. Does this mean that the euro has much upside? A quick rally toward 1.12 early next week still seems reasonable. New polls are beginning to show that En March! might perform much better than anticipated in the legislative election. Also, the center-right Les Républicains should also perform very well, resulting in the most right wing, pro-market Assemblée Nationale in nearly 50 years. While these polls are much too early to have any reliability, they may influence the interpretation by traders of Sunday's presidential election. However, we would remain inclined to fade any such rally. As we highlighted last week in a Special Report, our EUR/USD intermediate-term timing model shows that the euro is becoming expensive tactically, and that much good news is now in the euro's prices (Chart I-19).3 Additionally, investors have been excited by the rebound in core CPI in the euro area, a development interpreted as giving a carte-blanche to the ECB to hike rates sooner than was anticipated a few months ago. Indeed, currently, the first hike by the ECB is estimated to materialize in 27 months, versus the more than 60 months anticipated in July 2016. We doubt that market participants will bring the first rate hike closer to the present, a necessary development to prompt the euro to rally given our view on the Fed's tightening stance. We expect the rebound in the European core CPI to prove transient. Not only does European wage dynamics remain very poor outside of Germany, our country-based core CPI diffusion index has rolled over and points to a decelerating euro area core CPI (Chart I-20). Chart I-19EUR/USD: ##br##Good News In The Price Chart I-20European Core CPI Rebound ##br##Should Prove Transient Additionally, as we argued four weeks ago, tightening Chinese monetary conditions and EM growth shocks weigh more heavily on European growth than they do on the U.S.4 As such, our EM view implies that the euro area's positive economic surprises might soon deteriorate. Therefore, the favorable growth differential between Europe and the U.S. could be at its zenith. Shorting the euro today may prove dangerous, as a violent pop next week is very possible if the last euro shorts capitulate on a positive electoral outcome. Instead, we recommend investors sell EUR/USD if this pair hits 1.12 next week. Moreover, for risk management reasons, despite our view on the AUD, we are closing our long EUR/AUD position at a 6.9% gain this week. Bottom Line: Emmanuel Macron's likely victory this weekend could prompt a last wave of euro purchases. However, we are inclined to sell the euro as economic differentials between the common currency area and the U.S. are at their apex. Moreover, European core CPI is likely to weaken in the coming quarters, removing another excuse for investors to bid up the euro. Close long EUR/AUD. A Few Words On The Yen The yen has sold-off furiously in recent weeks. The tension with North Korea and the rise in the probability of a Fed hike in June to more than 90% have been poisons for the JPY. We are reluctant to close our yen longs just yet. Our anticipation that EM stresses will become particularly acute in the coming months should help the yen across the board. That being said, going forward, we recommend investors be more aggressive on shorting NZD/JPY than USD/JPY. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled “The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction”, dated April 21, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled "Healthcare Or Not, Risks Remain", dated March 24, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report titled "Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models", dated April 28, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled "ECB: All About China?", dated April 7, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 The Fed decided to keep the federal funds rate unchanged at the 0.75% - 1% range. The Committee highlighted the Q1 GDP weakness as transitory, as the labor market has tightened more since their last meeting, inflation is reaching its 2% target, and business investment is firming. Continuing and initial jobless claims both beat expectations; However, ISM Manufacturing PMI came in less than expected at 54.8; PCE continues to fluctuate around the 2% target, coming in at 1.8% from 2.1%; ISM Prices Paid came in at 68.5, beating expectations. Furthermore, the Committee expects that "near-term risks to the economic outlook appear roughly balanced", and that "economic activity will expand at a moderate pace". The market is now pricing in a 93.8% probability of a hike. We therefore expect the dollar to continue its appreciation after the French elections. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Macron's lead over Le Pen has risen after the heated debate between the two rival candidates. We believe these dynamics were a key bullish support for the euro in the run up to elections as the possibility of a Le Pen victory is being completely priced out. Adding to this optimism is a plethora of positive data from Europe. Business and consumer confidences have both pick up. German HICP came in at 2% yoy; Overall euro area headline CPI came in at 1.9%, and core at 1.2%. Nevertheless, labor market data in the peripheries, as well as the overall euro area, was disappointing. We believe this highlights substantial slack in the economy, and will keep the ECB from increasing rates any time soon. We expect the euro to climb in the short run, but the longer-run outlook remains bleak. Look to short EUR/USD at 1.12. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Economic data in Japan has been positive this past week: The unemployment rate went down to 2.8%, outperforming expectations. Retail trade annual growth came in 2.1%, also outperforming expectations. The jobs offer-to-applicants ratio came in at 1.45. This last number is significant, as this ratio has reached it 1990 peak, and it provides strong evidence that the Japanese labor market is very tight. Eventually, this tight labor market will exert pressures on wage inflation. In an environment like Japan, where nominal rates are capped, rising inflation would mean a collapse in real rates and consequently a collapse on the yen. Thus, we are maintaining our bearish view on the yen on a cyclical basis. On a tactical basis, we continue to be positive on the yen, given that a risk-off period in EM seems imminent. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 In spite of the tougher rhetoric coming from Brussels recently, the pound has maintained resilient and has even gain against the U.S. dollar. Indeed, recent data from the U.K. has been positive: Markit Services PMI came in at 55.8, outperforming expectations. Meanwhile, Markit Manufacturing PMI came in at 57.3, crushing expectations. Additionally, both consumer credit and M4 money supply growth also outperformed. Overall we continue to be positive on the pound, particularly against the euro, as we believe that expectations on Britain are too pessimistic, while the ability for the ECB to turn hawkish limited given that peripheral economies are still too weak to sustain tighter monetary conditions. Against the U.S. dollar the pound will have limited upside from now, given that it has already appreciated substantially. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 The RBA left its cash rate unchanged at 1.5%. The Bank also stated that its "forecasts for the Australian economy are little changed." It remains of the opinion that the low interest rate environment continues to support the outlook. This will also be a crucial ingredient to generate a positive outcome in the labor market in the foreseeable future. This past month has been very negative for the antipodean currency, with copper and iron ore prices displaying a similar behavior, losing almost 10% and 25% of their values since February, respectively. With China tightening monetary policy, and dissipating government spending soon to impact the Chinese economy, we remain bearish on AUD. In brighter news, the Bank's trimmed mean CPI measure increased by 1.9% on an annual basis, beating expectations of 1.8%. This is definitely a positive, but economic slack elsewhere could limit this development. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Data for New Zealand was very positive this week: The participation rate came in at 70.6%, outperforming expectations. Employment growth outperformed expectations substantially in the first quarter of 2017, coming in at 1.2%. The unemployment rate also outperformed coming in at 4.9% This recent data confirms our belief that inflationary pressures in New Zealand are stronger than what the RBNZ would lead you to believe. Indeed, non-tradable inflation, which measures domestically produced inflation is at its highest since 2014. Eventually, this will lead the RBNZ to abandon its neutral bias and embrace a more hawkish one, lifting the NZD in the process, particularly against the AUD. Against the U.S. dollar the kiwi dollar will likely have further downside, as the tightening in monetary conditions in China should weigh on commodity prices. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 The oil-based currency has once again succumbed to fleeting oil prices, depreciating to a 1-year low. U.S. crude inventories have recently been declining by less than expected and production in Libya has been increasing. Moreover, headline inflation dropped 0.5% from its January high of 2.1%. The Bank of Canada acknowledged the weak core CPI data in its last monetary policy meeting, but instead chose to focus on stronger economic data to change their stance to neutral. As the weakness in oil prices proves temporary due to another likely OPEC cut, headline inflation should pick up again. However, labor market conditions and economic activity remain questionable based on the weakness of recent data: retail sales are contracting 0.6% on a monthly basis, and the raw materials price index dropped 1.6%. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland has been mixed: Real retail sales growth came in at 2.1%, crushing expectations. However, Aprils PMI underperformed coming in at 57.4 against expectations of 58.3. Additionally, the KOF leading indicator came in at 106, al coming below expectations. EUR/CHF now stands at its highest level since late 2017 and while data has not been beating expectations it still very upbeat. We believe that conditions are slowly being put into place for the SNB to abandon its implied floor, given that core inflation is approaching its long term average. Therefore, once the French elections are over, EUR/CHF will become an attractive short, given that the euro will once again trade on economic fundamentals rather than political risks. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 The krone continues to depreciate sharply. This comes as no surprise given that oil is now down 13% in 2017. Overall we expect that oil currencies will outperform metal currencies given that oil prices will have less sensitivity to EM liquidity and economic conditions. That being said, it is hard to be too bullish on oil if China slows anew, even if one believe that the OPEC deal will stay in place . This means that USD/NOK could have additional upside. On a longer term basis, there has been a slight improvement in Norwegian data, as nominal retail sales are growing at a staggering 10% pace, while real retail sales are growing at more than 2%, which are a 5-year and a 2-year high respectively. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 The April Monetary Policy meeting delivered an unexpected decision, with members deciding to extend asset purchases till the end of the year, while delaying the forecast for a rate hike to mid-2018. Recent inflationary fluctuations and weak commodity prices support the Riksbank's actions. Forecasts for both inflation and the repo rate were lowered for 2018 and 2019. The Riksbank highlighted that "to support the upturn in inflation, monetary policy needs to be somewhat more expansionary", and is prepared to be more aggressive if need be. This increasingly dovish rhetoric by the Riksbank contrasts markedly with the FOMC's hawkish tilt, a dichotomy that will prove bearish for the krona relative to the greenback. Implications for EUR/SEK are a little more blurred, as the ECB will also remain dovish for the foreseeable future. However, Sweden's attentive and cautious stance on its currency's strength will cap any downside in EUR/SEK. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades