Developed Countries

Highlights Chart 1Contagion? Until last week, global growth weakness had been wholly confined to the manufacturing sector. But the drop to 52.6 in September’s Non-Manufacturing PMI (from 56.4 in August) raises the specter of contagion from manufacturing into the broader U.S. economy. A further drop would be consistent with an economy headed toward recession, and run contrary to the 2015/16 roadmap that has been our base case (Chart 1). We think it is still premature to abandon the 2015/16 episode as an appropriate comparable for the current period. For one thing, the hard economic data paint a rosier picture than the PMI surveys. Industrial production and core durable goods new orders are up 2.5% and 2.3% (annualized), respectively, during the past 3 months. These data have helped drive the economic surprise index above zero, an event that usually coincides with rising yields (bottom panel). The divergence between soft and hard data makes it clear that trade uncertainties are so far having a greater impact on business sentiment than on actual production, but history tells us that these divergences don’t last long. Some positive news on the trade front will be required during the next few months to raise business sentiment and push bond yields higher. Stay tuned. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 42 basis points in September, before giving back 37 bps in the first week of October. We consider three main factors in our credit cycle analysis: (i) corporate balance sheet health, (ii) monetary conditions, and (iii) valuation. At present, the chief conundrum for investors is that while corporate balance sheet health is weak, the monetary environment is extraordinarily accommodative.1 On balance sheets, our top-down measure of gross leverage is elevated and rising (Chart 2). In contrast, interest coverage ratios remain solid, propped up by the Fed’s accommodative stance. With inflation expectations still very low, the Fed can maintain its “easy money” policy for some time yet. This will ensure that interest coverage stays solid and that bank lending standards continue to ease (bottom panel). This is an environment where corporate bond spreads should tighten. How low can spreads go? Our assessment of reasonable spread targets for the current environment suggests that Aaa, Aa and A-rated spreads are already fully valued, while Baa-rated spreads are 13 bps cheap (panels 2 & 3).2 We recommend focusing investment grade corporate bond exposure on the Baa credit tier, and subbing some Agency MBS into your portfolio in place of corporate bonds rated A or higher. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 66 basis points in September, before giving back 117 bps in the first week of October. The junk index’s option-adjusted spread (OAS) has been fairly stable for most of the year, but the sector has become increasingly attractive from a risk/reward perspective.3 This is because the index’s negatively convex nature has caused its average duration to fall alongside declining Treasury yields. Chart 3 shows that while the index OAS has been rangebound, the 12-month breakeven spread has widened considerably.4 In other words, while junk expected returns have been stable, those expected returns now come with considerably less risk. As a result, the junk index OAS looks increasingly attractive relative to our spread target.5 Specifically, we now view the junk index OAS as 171 bps cheap (panel 3). Falling index duration also explains the divergence between quality spreads and the index OAS. Many have observed that the spread differential between Caa and Ba-rated junk bonds has widened in recent months, while the overall index OAS has been stable (panel 4). However, the divergence evaporates when we look at 12-month breakeven spreads instead of OAS (bottom panel). MBS: Neutral Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 24 basis points in September, before giving back 25 bps in the first week of October. MBS have underperformed Treasuries by 31 bps, year-to-date. The conventional 30-year zero volatility spread held flat at 82 bps in September, as a 3 bps increase in expected prepayment losses (option cost) was offset by a 3 bps tightening in the option-adjusted spread (OAS). In last week’s report, we recommended favoring Agency MBS over Aaa, Aa and A-rated corporate bonds.6 We have three main reasons for this recommendation. First, expected compensation is competitive. The conventional 30-year MBS OAS is now 57 bps. This is above the pre-crisis average (Chart 4), and only 4 bps below the spread offered by a Aa-rated corporate bond. Aaa, Aa and A-rated corporate bond spreads also all look expensive relative to our targets. Second, risk-adjusted compensation heavily favors MBS. The 12-month breakeven spread for a conventional 30-year MBS is 21 bps. This compares to 6 bps, 8 bps and 12 bps for Aaa, Aa and A-rated corporates, respectively. Finally, the macro environment for MBS remains supportive. Mortgage lending standards have barely eased since the financial crisis (bottom panel), and most people have already had at least one opportunity to refinance their mortgage. This burnout will keep refi activity low, and MBS spreads tight (panel 2), going forward. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 10 basis points in September, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +163 bps. September returns were concentrated in the Foreign Agency sub-sector. These securities outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 55 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +197 bps. Sovereign bonds underperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 6 bps in September, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +436 bps. Local Authority and Domestic Agency debt underperformed by 1 bp and 2 bps on the month, respectively. Meanwhile, Supranationals bested the Treasury benchmark by a single basis point. Sovereign debt remains very expensive relative to equivalently-rated U.S. corporate credit (Chart 5). While the sector would benefit if the Fed’s dovish pivot eventually results in a weaker dollar, U.S. corporate bonds would also perform well in such an environment. Given the much more attractive starting point for U.S. corporate bond spreads, we find it difficult to recommend sovereign debt as an alternative. While sovereign debt in general looks expensive. USD-denominated Mexican sovereign bonds continue to look attractive relative to U.S. corporates (bottom panel). Investors should favor Mexican sovereigns within an otherwise underweight allocation to the sector as a whole. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 10 basis points in September, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -57 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). We recommended upgrading municipal bonds from neutral to overweight in last week’s report.7  We based the decision on the increasing attractiveness of yield ratios, despite an underlying credit environment that remains supportive for munis. Municipal bond yields failed to keep pace with falling Treasury yields in recent months, and now look quite attractive as a result (Chart 6). The average Aaa-rated Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio rose 4% in September and is now back above 90%. This is well above the 81% average that prevailed in the late stages of the previous cycle, between mid-2006 and mid-2007. In fact, Aaa M/T yield ratios for every maturity are now above average pre-crisis levels. Though yield ratios still look best at the long-end of the Aaa curve (panel 2), we now recommend owning munis in place of Treasuries across the entire maturity spectrum. Fundamentally, state & local government balance sheets remain solid. We showed in last week’s report that our Municipal Health Monitor is in “improving health” territory, and noted that state & local government interest coverage is positive (bottom panel). Both of those trends are consistent with muni ratings upgrades continuing to outnumber downgrades going forward. Treasury Curve: Maintain A Barbell Curve Positioning Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bear-steepened in September, and then bull-steepened sharply last week. All in all, the 2/10 Treasury slope is +12 bps, 12 bps steeper than it was at the end of August. The 5/30 slope is +67 bps, 10 bps steeper than at the end of August. Our fair value models (see Appendix B) continue to show that bullets are expensive relative to barbells across the entire Treasury curve. In particular, 5-year and 7-year maturities look very expensive compared to the short and long ends of the curve. Notice that the 2/5/10 butterfly spread, the spread between the 5-year bullet and a duration-matched 2/10 barbell, remains negative despite the recent 2/10 steepening (Chart 7). We have shown in prior research that the 5-year and 7-year maturities are the most highly correlated with our 12-month Fed Funds Discounter. Our discounter is currently at -74 bps, meaning that the market is priced for nearly three more Fed rate cuts during the next 12 months (top panel). We expect fewer cuts than that, and as such, think the Discounter is more likely to rise. 5-year and 7-year maturities would underperform the rest of the curve in that scenario. We also continue to hold our short position in the February 2020 fed funds futures contract. That contract is currently priced for 2 more rate cuts during the next 3 FOMC meetings. That outcome is possible, but our base case economic outlook is more consistent with 1 further cut, likely occurring this month. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8Inflation Compensation TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 38 basis points in September, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -142 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 3 bps in September, and then another 2 bps last week. It currently sits at 1.51%, well below levels consistent with the Fed’s target. The divergence between the actual inflation data and inflation expectations is becoming increasingly stark. Trimmed mean PCE inflation has been fluctuating around the Fed’s target for most of the year (Chart 8). However, long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates remain stubbornly low, nowhere near the 2.3% - 2.5% range that is consistent with the Fed’s target. As we have pointed out in prior research, it can take time for expectations to adapt to a changing macro environment.8 That being said, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is currently 43 bps too low according to our Adaptive Expectations Model, a model whose primary input is 10-year trailing core inflation (panel 4). It is highly likely that the Fed will have to tolerate some overshoot of its 2% inflation target in order to re-anchor inflation expectations near desired levels. We anticipate that the committee will do so, and we maintain our view that long-dated TIPS breakevens will move above 2.3% before the end of the cycle. ABS: Underweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 2 basis points in September, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +72 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened 2 bps on the month. It currently sits at 36 bps, very close to its minimum pre-crisis level (Chart 9). ABS also appear unattractive on a risk/reward basis, as both Aaa-rated auto loans and credit cards have moved into the “Avoid” quadrant of our Excess Return Bond Map (Appendix C). The Map uses each bond sector’s spread, duration and volatility to calculate the likelihood of earning or losing 100 bps of excess return versus Treasuries on a 12-month horizon. At present, the Map shows that ABS offer poor expected return for their level of risk. In addition to poor valuation, the ABS sector’s credit fundamentals are shifting in a negative direction. Household interest payments continue to trend up, suggesting a higher delinquency rate in the future (panel 3). Meanwhile, senior loan officers continue to tighten lending standards for both credit cards and auto loans. Tighter lending standards usually coincide with rising delinquencies (bottom panel). All in all, the combination of poor value and deteriorating credit quality leads us to recommend an underweight allocation to consumer ABS. Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 9 basis points in September, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +227 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS held flat on the month, before widening 4 bps last week. It currently sits at 75 bps, below average pre-crisis levels but above levels seen in 2018 (Chart 10). The macro outlook for commercial real estate is somewhat unfavorable, with lenders tightening loan standards (panel 4) amidst falling demand (bottom panel). Commercial real estate prices have accelerated of late, but are still not keeping pace with CMBS spreads (panel 3). Despite the poor fundamental picture, our Excess Return Bond Map shows that CMBS offer a reasonably attractive risk/reward trade-off compared to other bond sectors (see Appendix C). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 2 basis points in September, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +90 bps. The index option-adjusted spread held flat on the month, before widening by 5 bps last week. It currently sits at 61 bps. The Excess Return Bond Map in Appendix C shows that Agency CMBS offer high potential return compared to other low-risk spread products. Appendix A - The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing We follow a two-step process to formulate recommendations for bond portfolio duration. First, we determine the change in the federal funds rate that is priced into the yield curve for the next 12 months. Second, we decide – based on our assessments of the economy and Fed policy – whether the change in the fed funds rate will exceed or fall short of what is priced into the curve. Most of the time, a correct answer to this question leads to the appropriate duration call. We call this framework the Golden Rule Of Bond Investing, and we demonstrated its effectiveness in the U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Chart 11 illustrates the Golden Rule’s track record by showing that the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Master Index tends to outperform cash when rate hikes fall short of 12-month expectations, and vice-versa. Chart 11The Golden Rule's Track Record At present, the market is priced for 74 basis points of cuts during the next 12 months. We anticipate fewer rate cuts over that time horizon, and therefore anticipate that below-benchmark portfolio duration positions will profit. We can also use our Golden Rule framework to make 12-month total return and excess return forecasts for the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index under different scenarios for the fed funds rate. Excess returns are relative to the Bloomberg Barclays Cash index. To forecast total returns we first calculate the 12-month fed funds rate surprise in each scenario by comparing the assumed change in the fed funds rate to the current value of our 12-month discounter. This rate hike surprise is then mapped to an expected change in the Treasury index yield using a regression based on the historical relationship between those two variables. Finally, we apply the expected change in index yield to the current characteristics (yield, duration and convexity) of the Treasury index to estimate total returns on a 12-month horizon. The below tables present those results, along with 95% confidence intervals. Excess returns are calculated by subtracting assumed cash returns in each scenario from our total return projections. Appendix B - Butterfly Strategy Valuation The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of +48 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 48 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As of October 4, 2019) Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As of October 4, 2019) Table 6 Appendix C - Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the U.S. fixed income market. The Map employs volatility-adjusted breakeven spread analysis to show how likely it is that a given sector will earn/lose money during the subsequent 12 months. The Map does not incorporate any macroeconomic view. The horizontal axis of the Map shows the number of days of average spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps versus a position in duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of average spread widening and are therefore less likely to see losses. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average spread tightening required for each sector to earn 100 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of spread tightening and are therefore more likely to earn 100 bps of excess return. Chart 12Excess Return Bond Map (As Of October 4, 2019) Ryan Swift, U.S. Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Corporate Bond Investors Should Not Fight The Fed”, dated September 17, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 For more details on how we arrive at our spread targets please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Value In Corporate Bonds”, dated February 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Corporate Bond Investors Should Not Fight The Fed”, dated September 17, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 The 12-month breakeven spread is the spread widening required to break even with a duration-matched position in Treasuries on a 12-month horizon. It can be approximated by OAS divided by duration. 5 For more details on how we arrive at our spread targets please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Value In Corporate Bonds”, dated February 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Two Themes And Two Trades”, dated October 1, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Two Themes And Two Trades”, dated October 1, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation

Special Report

Brief Market Overview The S&P 500 convulsed last week, as a slew of weaker-than-expected data shattered investors’ confidence in the longevity of the business and profit cycles. Importantly, both ISM surveys declined month-over-month, arguing that the manufacturing sector’s ails are infecting services industries (second panel, Chart 1). Chart 1The U.S. Dollar Is The Key Indicator To Monitor The “In Fed We Trust” doctrine will get severely tested in upcoming weeks. The Federal Reserve’s reaction function to the poor data took center stage with bond investors pricing a 75% probability of a rate cut in late October. However, our four factor EPS growth model continues to predict that earnings will remain weak for the rest of 2019 (not shown). Thus, next year’s 10% EPS growth is wishful thinking and profit growth will begin to bottom in Q1/2020 at the earliest. Absent profit growth, stocks will have to face reality and continue to drift lower. Importantly, the U.S. dollar – the great reflator – is the key determinant of both profit and global economic growth in coming quarters. The third panel of Chart 1 shows that currently that are no advanced economy central banks that have a policy rate higher than the Fed. Historically, this has been U.S. dollar bullish and has weighed on SPX momentum (trade-weighted U.S. dollar shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 1). It remains to be seen if aggressive Fed easing can change this relationship, stave off recession and engineer a soft landing. U.S. Equity Strategy’s view remains intact that things will get worse before they get better and therefore a cautious overall U.S. equity market stance is still warranted on a cyclical 9-12 month time horizon. NIPA VS. SPX Profit Margins On the eve of earnings season, we decided to delve deeper into corporate profits and margins, and tally where we are in the cycle, specifically with regard to profit margin drivers. To start off, we compare overall economy profits, as measured by the NIPA accounts, with SPX earnings (Chart 2). While a lot of ink has been spent on this topic and the differences between these two profit measures are more or less well recognized and understood, Kenneth A. Petrick’s commentary on the issue is worth re-reading. Without going into much detail, according to Petrick four key reasons explain the differences between NIPA and S&P 500 profits: “coverage, changing shares, industry representation and accounting principles”.1 What interests us is the leading property of NIPA profits. Importantly, NIPA profits have peaked in advance of SPX earnings in the previous three cycles. Economy-wide profits may have already peaked this cycle, warning that the SPX earnings juggernaut is long in the tooth (top panel, Chart 2). Chart 2Earnings Fatigue Given that NIPA profits include a broader universe of firms, small and medium enterprise (SME) profits are weighing on the overall NIPA number. The recent drubbing in economically hypersensitive S&P 400 (mid-caps) and S&P 600 (small-caps) profit estimates confirms this SME profit deterioration and forewarns that SPX profits are likely running out of fuel. While the SPX has not cracked yet courtesy of the heavyweight S&P software index, the Value Line Arithmetic (VLA, gauging the average stock) and Value Line Geometric (VLG, gauging the median stock) indexes appear to have peaked and correspond better to the NIPA profits as these indexes are broad-based are not market capitalization weighted (bottom panel, Chart 3). Chart 3Top Chart Of The Year Worryingly for the S&P 500, the VLG index is an excellent leading indicator of the SPX. Based on empirical evidence, it has led the SPX tops in the past three cycles, making it a serious contender for our “Chart Of The Year” award (top panel, Chart 3). Not only have NIPA profits likely crested, but NIPA profit margins are in steep retreat and have definitively peaked. Similar to earnings, NIPA margins lead SPX profit margins (top panel, Chart 4). Importantly, the delta between the two margin gauges is surprisingly wide. This margin gap now sits nearly three standard deviations above the historical mean and has only been wider during the dotcom bubble (bottom panel, Chart 4). Our sense is that such an acute divergence is unsustainable and will likely narrow via a mean reversion in SPX margins. Chart 4Mind The Gap Primary Margin Drivers Taking a deeper dive into traditional margin drivers is instructive. We use SPX margins since 1960 and prior to that we have used reconstructed SPX earnings divided by U.S. GDP (gauging SPX sales) to recreate a longer-term equity market profit margin proxy. The primary net-profit margin drivers are: Interest rates, Tax rates, Labor costs / Globalization, And corporate pricing power. Globalization has been another significant profit margin booster in the U.S. As countries are more outward looking, trade flourishes and openness to trade allows the free flow of capital to take advantage of profit maximizing projects. The bond bull market since the early 1980s has been a clear contributor to the secular advance in profits margins. Interest rates cut both ways and the big rise in long-term bond yields post World War II ate into margins. If the bond bull market is ending, then interest rates will start eating into margins anew (interest rates shown inverted, top panel, Chart 5). Intuitively, taxes and margins are also inversely correlated (tax rate shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 5). Following the 2018 fiscal easing package, the effective corporate tax rate is now hovering in the mid-teens and explains the jump to all-time highs in SPX margins. We doubt corporate tax rates will drop further. At best, taxes will be margin-neutral in the coming years. Rising labor input costs squeeze margins and declining wages boost corporate profit margins. While labor’s share of income tentatively peaked in 1980, the late-1990s is this series’ ultimate peak and since then, it has been in a steady decline (employee compensation shown inverted, second panel, Chart 5). This labor input cost suppression has likely run its course and given that the U.S. economy is at full employment, wage inflation should also start denting margins. Globalization has been another significant profit margin booster in the U.S. As countries are more outward looking, trade flourishes and openness to trade allows the free flow of capital to take advantage of profit maximizing projects. Following the end of the Great Recession and similar to the Great Depression, de-globalization has commenced (third panel, Chart 5). Chart 5Primary... Clearly, the Sino-U.S. war has accentuated and accelerated the inward movement of countries including Korea and Japan, and has had negative knock on effects on trade as evidenced by the now nearly two-year old global growth deceleration. The longer the U.S./China trade war remains unresolved, the deeper the cracks in the foundations of global trade. Such a backdrop is negative for profit margins, as inward looking countries prevent capital from being allocated most efficiently. Moreover, the uprooting of supply chains due to the trade war hurts margins and the redeployment of equipment in different jurisdictions will weigh on margins at a time when final demand suffers a setback. Corporate pricing power is deteriorating, which will negatively impact profit margins, given that they are joined at the hip. The current global manufacturing recession is wreaking havoc on selling prices around the world as a number of countries are experiencing outright producer price deflation. To compete, the U.S. corporate sector is doomed to suffer the same fate, which is depressing our Corporate Pricing Power proxy, an indicator composed of 60 top-down sector price series (bottom panel, Chart 6). Chart 6...And Secondary Profit Margin Drivers Secondary Margin Drivers The ability of the overall corporate sector to lift prices is largely a function of firming final demand (i.e. volumes) and a falling greenback for the 40% of SPX sales that are international. This leads us to two secondary profit margin drivers: The trade-weighted U.S. dollar, And the yield curve. The ability of the overall corporate sector to lift prices is largely a function of firming final demand (i.e. volumes) and a falling greenback for the 40% of SPX sales that are international. Thus, not only is S&P 500 revenue growth and the trade-weighted U.S. dollar tightly inversely correlated, but also the same holds true for the greenback and profit margins (U.S. dollar shown inverted, top panel, Chart 6). Given that the U.S. dollar refuses to fall and is breaking out according to some Federal Reserve trade-weighted indexes, the path of least resistance for profit margins points south. The yield curve is related to the primary “interest rate” driver discussed above, but its most important signal concerns the business cycle. Empirically, profit margins mean revert at the onset of recession (yield curve shown advanced, middle panel, Chart 6). As a reminder, parts of the yield curve inverted last December, signaling that a corporate profit margin squeeze is looming. Income Inequality And Margins Finally, we make an interesting geopolitical observation. Rising profit margins are synonymous with wealth accruing to the top 1% of U.S. families and vice versa. This relationship dates back to the late-1920s, as far back as our dataset goes. Using Piketty and Saez data excluding capital gains it is clear that profit margin expansion accentuates income inequality (Chart 7).2 Chart 7Income Inequality And Margins Rising profit margins lead to rising profits. Because families at the top of the income distribution are more often than not business owners, income disparities are the widest when margins are in overshoot territory. Eventually this income chasm comes to a head and potentially explains the rise of populism. Income re-distribution is therefore a rising probability event in the coming decades.3 Bottom Line: Unequivocally, all six key drivers we have identified (interest rates, tax rates, labor costs / globalization, corporate pricing power, yield curve and the U.S. dollar) are firing warning shots that profit margins have peaked and a “catch down” phase of SPX margins to NIPA margins is in store in the coming quarters.   Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      https://apps.bea.gov/scb/pdf/national/niparel/2001/0401cpm.pdf 2      https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/TabFig2017.xls 3      Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy?” dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights We still don’t see a recession occurring in the next twelve months, … : Recessions only occur when monetary policy is restrictive. It’s easy now, and it will be a while before conditions push the Fed to execute the requisite series of rate hikes to make it tight. … but that doesn’t mean that we don’t worry anyway, … : Although the inverted yield curve looks more like a reflection of the Fed’s asset purchases than a telltale sign of trouble, leading indicators have been moving in the wrong direction all year. … as survey data clearly indicate that household and business confidence is fragile: Consumer confidence indexes and the latest ISM surveys testify to a worsening mood. Hard data are faring better than soft data, but there is a danger that anxiety could become self-fulfilling. We remain constructive, but alert for risks to the growth outlook: The labor market remains vibrant enough to exert downward pressure on the unemployment rate, and services continue to expand despite the contraction in manufacturing, both here and abroad. The expansion has slowed, but it’s not finished yet. Feature Although the oil market quickly shrugged off last month’s attack on Saudi energy infrastructure (Chart 1), investors don’t lack for other concerns. It’s not easy for a business to commit to longer-term investment spending when U.S.-China negotiations yo-yo between thawing and frigid depending on the day, Brexit remains a pratfall wrapped in a farce inside an absurdity, and trenches are being dug for a bitter impeachment battle in Washington. Global export volumes have contracted on a year-over-year basis in six of eight months through July (Chart 2), casting a chill over multinationals’ profit outlooks. Workers know that companies cut headcount when profits fall, so consumer confidence is also subject to the ebb and flow of the trade negotiations. Chart 1Middle East Tensions Are So Last Month The worries are well known, but they could spark a recession themselves if they persist long enough. Chart 2If You Want Less Of Something, Tax It It would be hard to see the glass as half-full if markets hadn’t long since priced in the China and Brexit pressures. The impeachment spectacle is new, but we’re not sure what investors and businesses would have to fear from a Pence administration. It would be hard to see the glass as half-empty if survey data weren’t flagging a steady deterioration in sentiment that could sow the seeds of a recession. The bottom line is that it’s late in the cycle, and the combination of softening data and geopolitical tensions is chipping away at what’s left of investor optimism. Our Recession/Bear Market Indicator Tight monetary policy is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for a recession. Over the 60-year period that we maintain estimates of an equilibrium fed funds rate, expansions have not stopped in their tracks when the fed funds rate crossed above our equilibrium estimate, but no recession has occurred unless it did (Chart 3). We currently estimate that the equilibrium rate is well above the 2% target rate, which appears to be headed for 1.75% at the FOMC meeting at the end of the month. Given the benign pace of current inflation, monetary policy should remain accommodative for all of 2020, provided our equilibrium estimate is in the ballpark. Chart 3Monetary Policy Is Easy And Getting Easier: Green Though we are confident that the Fed isn’t about to kill the expansion, the other components of our simple recession indicator are sending worrisome signals. The yield curve has been inverted for five straight months. An inverted curve has historically been a reliable indicator that monetary policy is too tight, and has therefore compiled an enviable track record for calling recessions (Chart 4). Today’s unprecedentedly negative term premium may well be scrambling the yield curve’s message, however, distorting comparisons with past periods.1 Chart 4The Curve Has Inverted, But ... : Yellow The year-over-year change in the Conference Board’s Leading Economic Index (LEI) is the other component of our recession indicator. The LEI has been just as reliable as the yield curve, and it is rapidly decelerating (Chart 5). We note, however, that the LEI has previously pulled out of two similar dives in this expansion, and it has not yet contracted. Given its heavy manufacturing focus, the LEI won’t likely begin to accelerate without a material easing of trade tensions, but a limited deal between the U.S. and China is not out of the realm of possibility. Chart 5LEI Growth Is Rapidly Decelerating: Yellow Bottom Line: One green light and two yellow lights are less than a resounding endorsement of the business cycle’s prospects, but the mix nonetheless argues for staying the risk-friendly course that has amply rewarded investors throughout the expansion. A Dismal Manufacturing ISM … The U.S. is impacted by global conditions with a lag, but September’s manufacturing ISM report confirmed that it is eventually impacted by them. Last Tuesday’s dreary manufacturing ISM report sparked a two-day sell-off in the S&P 500 that financial TV networks were quick to highlight as the worst start to a fourth quarter since the crisis. The composite index came in far below the 50 consensus, falling to its lowest level since June 2009, and spent a second consecutive month below the 50 boom/bust line for the first time since the 2015-16 global manufacturing recession (Chart 6, top panel). Crumbling exports (Chart 6, second panel) and stalled new orders (Chart 6, third panel) weighed on the composite reading. The only slight glimmer of hope was that a good-sized inventory contraction (Chart 6, fourth panel) allowed the New-Orders-to-Inventories ratio to rise (Chart 6, bottom panel). Chart 6The Global Manufacturing Slowdown Reaches The U.S. Chart 7Consumers Didn't Sweat The ISM ... The surprisingly bad report stoked another round of recession hand-wringing in the media, though not, apparently, among the broader public (Chart 7). The potential economic threat stems from the possibility that the release will discourage hiring and investment. The NFIB monthly jobs report released Thursday afternoon suggests that smaller businesses are still actively seeking to fill positions, though the pool of qualified applicants continues to shrink. The Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow model trimmed its projection of nonresidential fixed investment’s contribution to 3Q GDP from +10 to -10 basis points following the manufacturing ISM release, but it sees overall growth of 1.8%. … And Eroding Consumer Confidence … The leading consumer sentiment surveys have also been slipping, though they remain at high levels relative to their history (Chart 8). That dichotomy sustains the bull-versus-bear debate, as bulls point to the lofty level while bears cite the flagging direction. We will not resolve the level-versus-direction question here, but note that real consumption growth has exhibited a robust correlation with the expectations components of the surveys. Declining expectations point to a decline in consumption, but as long as the expectations index remains at or above the mid-90s, it appears that consumption will keep economic growth around its trend level (Chart 9). Chart 8... And They Remain Fairly Optimistic Chart 9Consumption Still Looks Fine … Square Off With Still-Solid Hard Data While the survey data have been steadily disappointing expectations (including, last week, the formerly redoubtable non-manufacturing ISM), hard data have been a source of positive surprises. Since the beginning of July, when the economic surprise index finally bottomed and went about the business of mean-reverting, measures of real activity have been encouraging (Chart 10). Though the September employment situation report showed that the pace of hiring is also slowing, and wage growth puzzlingly hit a wall, the broader definition of the unemployment rate broke below 7% for the first time since the peak of the dot-com boom and is only one tick above its all-time low (Chart 11). Robust year-to-date equity gains have pushed the multiple of household net worth to disposable personal income right back to its all-time highs, suggesting that there is little need for households in the aggregate to increase their savings rate (Chart 12). Chart 10Hard Data Have Cleared A Low Bar Chart 11The Labor Market Is Still Absorbing Slack Chart 12There's Room For The Savings Rate To Come Down Putting It All Together The U.S. is a comparatively closed economy that customarily reacts to global developments with a longer lag than its major-economy peers. It was due to slow this year from a declining domestic fiscal impulse, but global weakness has now begun to wash up on its shores. The question for investors is how far will the deceleration go? Is it simply a mid-cycle slowdown that will dent growth for a quarter or two, or is it the end of the expansion? The Fed has promised to act appropriately to sustain the expansion so many times this year that it’s become a mantra. Markets are taking it to heart, just as they did last Thursday, when the S&P 500 turned a 1% decline immediately after the release of the non-manufacturing ISM into a 1% gain, and Friday, when a mixed employment situation report gave rise to another 1% bump. Bad news is still good news for equities as long as investors believe the Fed is willing and able to ease monetary policy to mitigate risks to the growth outlook. In a world where monetary accommodation is currently the rule among central banks large and small, and the Fed has dry powder to ease, we think stocks are getting it right. There’s no lack of things for investors to worry about, but they shouldn’t forget that worry fuels bull markets. Our sanguine take is also supported by a useful trading maxim. When a stock doesn’t go down on bad news (or up on good news), it’s telling you something. In this case, we think the S&P 500’s repeated failure to capsize in the face of wave after wave of bad news reveals that it has already discounted a considerable amount of pessimism. If some significantly good news were to come out of U.S.-China trade negotiations, for example, stocks could resume their march higher in line with the historical bull market pattern of sprinting to the finish line. Investment Implications Fears that weak surveys could morph into weak activity are well-founded. There is clear potential for poor corporate and consumer sentiment to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. If corporate managers sit on their hands amidst uncertainty over trade rules, corporate investment and hiring could dry up. One person’s spending is another person’s income, and vice versa, and if households divert spending to saving, income will fall. If households turn tail at a time when skittish businesses have little appetite for investment, their savings will lie fallow, doing nothing but lowering interest rates, which could stoke additional anxiety about the growth outlook. We may not have much more to fear than fear itself, but that’s enough, given fear’s viral, self-reinforcing nature. The good news from our perspective is that we do not believe that businesses or households have reached the point of no return. Real final domestic demand (GDP ex-inventory adjustments and net exports) is holding up well despite the sharp market sell-offs in last year’s fourth quarter, the month-long federal government shutdown and the ongoing tariff follies. The labor market remains tight, which should help wage gains accelerate at a time when there’s little chance that the Fed will intervene to counter budding inflation pressures, opening the door to a virtuous circle. No cycle lasts forever, and this one is surely in its latter stages, though we remain positive over the three-to-twelve-month cyclical timeframe. We are more cautious in the near term, and it may well be appropriate to position portfolios more conservatively than normal over the zero-to-three-month tactical timeframe while keeping positions on a shorter leash. Though investors will have to live with an elevated sense of worry over the coming months, they shouldn’t lose sight of the fact that bull markets climb a wall of it. Doug Peta, CFA Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA’s U.S. Investment Research Weekly Report titled “Everybody Into The Pool!,” published June 24, 2019. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com.

Special Report

Highlights The Cold War is a limited analogy for the U.S.-China conflict; In a multipolar world, complete bifurcation of trade is difficult if not impossible; History suggests that trade between rivals will continue, with minimal impediments; On a secular horizon, buy defense stocks, Europe, capex, and non-aligned countries. Feature There is a growing consensus that China and the U.S. are hurtling towards a Cold War. BCA Research played some part in this consensus – at least as far as the investment community is concerned – by publishing “Power and Politics in East Asia: Cold War 2.0?” in September 2012.1 For much of this decade, Geopolitical Strategy focused on the thesis that geopolitical risk was rotating out of the Middle East, where it was increasingly irrelevant, to East Asia, where it would become increasingly relevant. This thesis remains cogent, but it does not mean that a “Silicon Curtain” will necessarily divide the world into two bifurcated zones of capitalism. Trade, capital flows, and human exchanges between China and the U.S. will continue and may even grow. But the risk of conflict, including a military one, will not decline. In this report, we first review the geopolitical logic that underpins Sino-American tensions. We then survey the academic literature for clues on how that relationship will develop vis-à-vis trade and economic relations. The evidence from political theory is surprising and highly investment relevant. We then look back at history for clues as to what this means for investors. Our conclusion is that it is highly likely that the U.S. and China will continue to be geopolitical rivals. However, due to the geopolitical context of multipolarity, it is unlikely that the result will be “Bifurcated Capitalism.” Rather, we expect an exciting and volatile environment for investors where geopolitics takes its historical place alongside valuation, momentum, fundamentals, and macroeconomics in the pantheon of factors that determine investment opportunities and risks. The Thucydides Trap Is Real … Speaking in the Reichstag in 1897, German Foreign Secretary Bernhard von Bülow proclaimed that it was time for Germany to demand “its own place in the sun.”2 The occasion was a debate on Germany’s policy towards East Asia. Bülow soon ascended to the Chancellorship under Kaiser Wilhelm II and oversaw the evolution of German foreign policy from Realpolitik to Weltpolitik. While Realpolitik was characterized by Germany’s cautious balancing of global powers under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, Weltpolitik saw Bülow and Wilhelm II seek to redraw the status quo through aggressive foreign and trade policy. Imperial Germany joined a long list of antagonists, from Athens to today’s People’s Republic of China, in the tragic play of human history dubbed the “Thucydides Trap.”3 Chart 1Imperial Overstretch The underlying concept is well known to all students of world history. It takes its name from the Greek historian Thucydides and his seminal History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides explains why Sparta and Athens went to war but, unlike his contemporaries, he does not moralize or blame the gods. Instead, he dispassionately describes how the conflict between a revisionist Athens and established Sparta became inevitable due to a cycle of mistrust. Graham Allison, one of America’s preeminent scholars of international relations, has argued that the interplay between a status quo power and a challenger has almost always led to conflict. In 12 out of the 16 cases he surveyed, actual military conflict broke out. Of the four cases where war did not develop, three involved transitions between countries that shared a deep cultural affinity and a respect for the prevailing institutions.4 In those cases, the transition was a case of new management running largely the same organizational structure. And one of the four non-war outcomes was nothing less than the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the U.S. The fundamental problem for a status quo power is that its empire or “sphere of influence” remains the same size as when it stood at the zenith of power. However, its decline in a relative sense leads to a classic problem of “imperial overstretch.” The hegemonic or imperial power erroneously doubles down on maintaining a status quo that it can no longer afford (Chart 1). The challenger power is not blameless. It senses weakness in the hegemon and begins to develop a regional sphere of influence. The problem is that regional hegemony is a perfect jumping off point towards global hegemony. And while the challenger’s intentions may be limited and restrained (though they often are ambitious and overweening), the status quo power must react to capabilities, not intentions. The former are material and real, whereas the latter are perceived and ephemeral. The challenging power always has an internal logic justifying its ambitions. In China’s case today, there is a sense among the elite that the country is merely mean-reverting to the way things were for many centuries in China’s and Asia’s long history (Chart 2). In other words, China is a “challenger” power only if one describes the status quo as the past three hundred years. It is the “established” power if one goes back to an earlier state of affairs. As such, the consensus in China is that it should not have to pay deference to the prevailing status quo given that the contemporary context is merely the result of western imperialist “challenges” to the established Chinese and regional order. Chart 2China’s Mean Reverting Narrative In addition, China has a legitimate claim that it is at least as relevant to the global economy as the U.S. and therefore deserves a greater say in global governance. While the U.S. still takes a larger share of the global economy, China has contributed 23% to incremental global GDP over the past two decades, compared to 13% for the U.S. (Chart 3). Chart 3The Beijing Consensus Bottom Line: The emerging tensions between China and the U.S. fit neatly into the theoretical and empirical outlines of the Thucydides Trap. We do not see any way for the two countries to avoid struggle and conflict on a secular or forecastable horizon. What does this mean for investors? For one, the secular tailwinds behind defense stocks will persist. But what beyond that? Is the global economy destined to witness complete bifurcation into two armed camps separated by a Silicon Curtain? Will the Alibaba and Amazon Pacts suspiciously glare at each other the way that NATO and Warsaw Pacts did amidst the Cold War? The answer, tentatively, is no. … But It Will Not Lead to Economic Bifurcation President Trump’s aggressive trade policy also fits neatly into political theory, to a point. Realism in political science focuses on relative gains over absolute gains in all relationships, including trade. This is because trade leads to economic prosperity, prosperity to the accumulation of economic surplus, and economic surplus to military spending, research, and development. Two states that care only about relative gains due to rivalry produce a zero-sum game with no room for cooperation. It is a “Prisoner’s Dilemma” that can lead to sub-optimal economic outcomes in which both actors chose not to cooperate. The U.S.-China conflict will not lead to complete bifurcation of the global economy. Diagram 1 illustrates the effects of relative gain calculations on the trade behavior of states. In the absence of geopolitics, demand (Q3) is satisfied via trade (Q3-Q0) due to the inability of domestic production (Q0) to meet it. Diagram 1Trade War In A Bipolar World However, geopolitical externality – a rivalry with another state – raises the marginal social cost of imports – i.e. trade allows the rival to gain more out of trade and “catch up” in terms of geopolitical capabilities. The trading state therefore eliminates such externalities with a tariff (t), raising domestic output to Q1, while shrinking demand to Q2, thus reducing imports to merely Q2-Q1, a fraction of where they would be in a world where geopolitics do not matter. The dynamic of relative gains can also have a powerful pull on the hegemon as it begins to weaken and rethink its originally magnanimous trade relations. As political scientist Duncan Snidal argued in a 1991 paper, When the global system is first set up, the hegemon makes deals with smaller states. The hegemon is concerned more with absolute gains, smaller states are more concerned with relative, so they are tougher negotiators. Cooperative arrangements favoring smaller states contribute to relative hegemonic decline. As the unequal distribution of benefits in favor of smaller states helps them catch up to the hegemonic actor, it also lowers the relative gains weight they place on the hegemonic actor. At the same time, declining relative preponderance increases the hegemonic state’s concern for relative gains with other states, especially any rising challengers. The net result is increasing pressure from the largest actor to change the prevailing system to gain a greater share of cooperative benefits.5 The reason small states are initially more concerned with relative gains is because they are far more concerned with national security than the hegemon. The hegemon has a preponderance of power and is therefore more relaxed about its security needs. This explains why Presidents George Bush Sr., Bill Clinton, and George Bush Jr. all made “bad deals” with China. Writing nearly thirty years ago, Snidal cogently described the current U.S.-China trade war. Snidal thought he was describing a coming decade of anarchy. But he and fellow political scientists writing in the early 1990s underestimated American power. The “unipolar moment” of American supremacy was not over, it was just beginning! As such, the dynamic Snidal described took thirty years to come to fruition. When thinking about the transition away from U.S. hegemony, most investors anchor themselves to the Cold War as it is the only world they have known that was not unipolar. Moreover the Cold War provides a simple, bipolar distribution of power that is easy to model through game theory. If this is the world we are about to inhabit, with the U.S. and China dividing the whole planet into spheres like the U.S. and Soviet Union, then the paragraph we lifted from Snidal’s paper would be the end of it. America would abandon globalization in totality, impose a draconian Silicon Curtain around China, and coerce its allies to follow suit. But most of recent human history has been defined by a multipolar distribution of power between states, not a bipolar one. The term “cold war” is applicable to the U.S. and China in the sense that comparable military power may prevent them from fighting a full-blown “hot war.” But ultimately the U.S.-Soviet Cold War is a poor analogy for today’s world. In a multipolar world, Snidal concludes, “states that do not cooperate fall behind other relative gains maximizers that cooperate among themselves. This makes cooperation the best defense (as well as the best offense) when your rivals are cooperating in a multilateral relative gains world.” Snidal shows via formal modeling that as the number of players increases from two, relative-gains sensitivity drops sharply.6 The U.S.-China relationship does not occur in a vacuum — it is moderated by the global context. Today’s global context is one of multipolarity. Multipolarity refers to the distribution of geopolitical power, which is no longer dominated by one or two great powers (Chart 4). Europe and Japan, for instance, have formidable economies and military capabilities. Russia remains a potent military power, even as India surpasses it in terms of overall geopolitical power. Chart 4The World Is No Longer Bipolar A multipolar world is the least “ordered” and the most unstable of world systems (Chart 5). This is for three reasons: Chart 5Multipolarity Is Messy Math: Multipolarity engenders more potential “conflict dyads” that can lead to conflict. In a unipolar world, there is only one country that determines norms and rules of behavior. Conflict is possible, but only if the hegemon wishes it. In a bipolar world, conflict is possible, but it must align along the axis of the two dominant powers. In a multipolar world, alliances are constantly shifting and producing novel conflict dyads. Lack of coordination: Global coordination suffers in periods of multipolarity as there are more “veto players.” This is particularly problematic during times of stress, such as when an aggressive revisionist power uses force or when the world is faced with an economic crisis. Charles Kindleberger has argued that it was exactly such hegemonic instability that caused the Great Depression to descend into the Second World War in his seminal The World In Depression.7 Mistakes: In a unipolar and bipolar world, there are a very limited number of dice being rolled at once. As such, the odds of tragic mistakes are low and can be mitigated with complex formal relationships (such as U.S.-Soviet Mutually Assured Destruction, grounded in formal modeling of game theory). But in a multipolar world, something as random as an assassination of a dignitary can set in motion a global war. The multipolar system is far more dynamic and thus unpredictable. In a multipolar world, the U.S. will not be able to exclude China from the global system. Diagram 2 is modified for a multipolar world. Everything is the same, except that we highlight the trade lost to other great powers. The state considering using tariffs to lower the marginal social cost of trading with a rival must account for this “lost trade.” In the context of today’s trade war with China, this would be the sum of all European Airbuses and Brazilian soybeans sold to China in the place of American exports. For China, it would be the sum of all the machinery, electronics, and capital goods produced in the rest of Asia and shipped to the United States. Diagram 2Trade War In A Multipolar World Could Washington ask its allies – Europe, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, etc. – not to take advantage of the lucrative trade (Q3-Q0)-(Q2-Q1) lost due to its trade tiff with China? Sure, but empirical research shows that they would likely ignore such pleas for unity. Alliances produced by a bipolar system produce a statistically significant and large impact on bilateral trade flows, a relationship that weakens in a multipolar context. This is the conclusion of a 1993 paper by Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield.8 The authors draw their conclusion from an 80-year period beginning in 1905, which captures several decades of global multipolarity. Unless the U.S. produces a wholehearted diplomatic effort to tighten up its alliances and enforce trade sanctions – something hardly foreseeable under the current administration – the self-interest of U.S. allies will drive them to continue trading with China. The U.S. will not be able to exclude China from the global system; nor will China be able to achieve Xi Jinping’s vaunted “self-sufficiency.” A risk to our view is that we have misjudged the global system, just as political scientists writing in the early 1990s did. To that effect, we accept that Charts 1 and 4 do not really support a view that the world is in a balanced multipolar state. The U.S. clearly remains the most powerful country in the world. The problem is that it is also clearly in a relative decline and that its sphere of influence is global – and thus very expensive – whereas its rivals have merely regional ambitions (for the time being). As such, we concede that American hegemony could be reasserted relatively quickly, but it would require a significant calamity in one of the other poles of power. For instance, a breakdown in China’s internal stability alongside the recovery of U.S. political stability. Bottom Line: The trade war between the U.S. and China is geopolitically unsustainable. The only way it could continue is if the two states existed in a bipolar world where the rest of the states closely aligned themselves behind the two superpowers. We have a high conviction view that today’s world is – for the time being – multipolar. American allies will cheat and skirt around Washington’s demands that China be isolated. This is because the U.S. no longer has the preponderance of power that it enjoyed in the last decade of the twentieth and the first decade of the twenty-first century. Insights presented thus far come from formal theory in political science. What does history teach us? Trading With The Enemy In 1896, a bestselling pamphlet in the U.K., “Made in Germany,” painted an ominous picture: “A gigantic commercial State is arising to menace our prosperity, and contend with us for the trade of the world.”9 Look around your own houses, author E.E. Williams urged his readers. “The toys, and the dolls, and the fairy books which your children maltreat in the nursery are made in Germany: nay, the material of your favorite (patriotic) newspaper had the same birthplace as like as not.” Williams later wrote that tariffs were the answer and that they “would bring Germany to her knees, pleading for our clemency.”10 By the late 1890s, it was clear to the U.K. that Germany was its greatest national security threat. The Germany Navy Laws of 1898 and 1900 launched a massive naval buildup with the singular objective of liberating the German Empire from the geographic constraints of the Jutland Peninsula. By 1902, the First Lord of the Royal Navy pointed out that “the great new German navy is being carefully built up from the point of view of a war with us.”11 There is absolutely no doubt that Germany was the U.K.’s gravest national security threat. As a result, London signed in April 1904 a set of agreements with France that came to be known as Entente Cordiale. The entente was immediately tested by Germany in the 1905 First Moroccan Crisis, which only served to strengthen the alliance. Russia was brought into the pact in 1907, creating the Triple Entente. In hindsight, the alliance structure was obvious given Germany’s meteoric rise from unification in 1871. However, one should not underestimate the magnitude of these geopolitical events. For the U.K. and France to resolve centuries of differences and formalize an alliance in 1904 was a tectonic shift — one that they undertook against the grain of history, entrenched enmity, and ideology.12 History teaches us that trade occurs even amongst rivals and during wartime. Political scientists and historians have noted that geopolitical enmity rarely produces bifurcated economic relations exhibited during the Cold War. Both empirical research and formal modeling shows that trade occurs even amongst rivals and during wartime.13 This was certainly the case between the U.K. and Germany, whose trade steadily increased right up until the outbreak of World War One (Chart 6). Could this be written off due to the U.K.’s ideological commitment to laissez-faire economics? Or perhaps London feared a move against its lightly defended colonies in case it became protectionist? These are fair arguments. However, they do not explain why Russia and France both saw ever-rising total trade with the German Empire during the same period (Chart 7). Either all three states were led by incompetent policymakers who somehow did not see the war coming – unlikely given the empirical record – or they simply could not afford to lose out on the gains of trade with Germany to each other. Chart 6The Allies Traded With Germany… Chart 7… Right Up To WWI Chart 8Japan And U.S. Never Downshifted Trade A similar dynamic was afoot ahead of World War Two. Relations between the U.S. and Japan soured in the 1930s, with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. In 1935, Japan withdrew from the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty – the bedrock of the Pacific balance of power – and began a massive naval buildup. In 1937, Japan invaded China. Despite a clear and present danger, the U.S. continued to trade with Japan right up until July 26, 1941, few days after Japan invaded southern Indochina (Chart 8). On December 7, Japan attacked the U.S. A skeptic may argue that precisely because policymakers sleepwalked into war in the First and Second World Wars, they will not (or should not) make the same mistake this time around. First, we do not make policy prescriptions and therefore care not what should happen. Second, we are highly skeptical of the view that policymakers in the early and mid-twentieth century were somehow defective (as opposed to today’s enlightened leaders). Our constraints-based framework urges us to seek systemic reasons for the behavior of leaders. Political science provides a clear theoretical explanation for why London and Washington continued to trade with the enemy despite the clarity of the threat. The answer lies in the systemic nature of the constraint: a multipolar world reduces the sensitivity of policymakers to relative gains by introducing a collective action problem thanks to changing alliances and the difficulty of disciplining allies’ behavior. In the case of U.S. and China, this is further accentuated by President Trump’s strategy of skirting multilateral diplomacy and intense focus on mercantilist measures of power (i.e. obsession with the trade deficit). An anti-China trade policy that was accompanied by a magnanimous approach to trade relations with allies could have produced a “coalition of the willing” against Beijing. But after two years of tariffs and threats against the EU, Japan, and Canada, the Trump administration has already signaled to the rest of the world that old alliances and coordination avenues are up for revision. There are two outcomes that we can see emerging over the course of the next decade. First, U.S. leadership will become aware of the systemic constraints under which they operate, and trade with China will continue – albeit with limitations and variations. However, such trade will not reduce the geopolitical tensions, nor will it prevent a military conflict. In facts, the probability of military conflict may increase even as trade between China and the U.S. remains steady. Second, U.S. leadership will fail to correctly assess that they operate in a multipolar world and will give up the highlighted trade gains from Diagram 2 to economic rivals such as Europe and Japan. Given our methodological adherence to constraint-based forecasting, we highly doubt that the latter scenario is likely. Bottom Line: The China-U.S. conflict is not a replay of the Cold War. Systemic pressures from global multipolarity will force the U.S. to continue to trade with China, with limitations on exchanges in emergent, dual-use technologies that China will nonetheless source from other technologically advanced countries. This will create a complicated but exciting world where geopolitics will cease to be seen as exogenous to investing. A risk to the sanguine conclusion is that the historical record is applicable to today, but that the hour is late, not early. It is already July 26, 1941 – when U.S. abrogated all trade with Japan – not 1930. As such, we do not have another decade of trade between U.S. and China remaining, we are at the end of the cycle. While this is a risk, it is unlikely. American policymakers would essentially have to be willing to risk a military conflict with China in order to take the trade war to the same level they did with Japan. It is an objective fact that China has meaningfully stepped up aggressive foreign policy in the region. But unlike Japan in 1941, China has not outright invaded any countries over the past decade. As such, the willingness of the public to support such a conflict is unclear, with only 21% of Americans considering China a top threat to the U.S. Investment Implications This analysis is not meant to be optimistic. First, the U.S. and China will continue to be rivals even if the economic relationship between them does not lead to global bifurcation. For one, China continues to be – much like Germany in the early twentieth century – concerned with access to external markets on which 19.5% of its economy still depend. China is therefore developing a modern navy and military not because it wants to dominate the rest of the world but because it wants to dominate its near abroad, much as the U.S. wanted to, beginning with the Monroe Doctrine. This will continue to lead to Chinese aggression in the South and East China Seas, raising the odds of a conflict with the U.S. Navy. Given that the Thucydides Trap narrative remains cogent, investors should look to overweight S&P 500 aerospace and defense stocks relative to global equity markets. An alternative way that one could play this thesis is by developing a basket of global defense stocks. Multipolarity may create constraints to trade protectionism, but it engenders geopolitical volatility and thus buoys defense spending. Second, we would not expect another uptick in globalization. Multipolarity may make it difficult for countries to completely close off trade with a rival, but globalization is built on more than just trade between rivals. Globalization requires a high level of coordination among great powers that is only possible under hegemonic conditions. Chart 9 shows that the hegemony of the British and later American empires created a powerful tailwind for trade over the past two hundred years. Chart 9The Apex Of Globalization Is Behind Us The Apex of Globalization has come and gone – it is all downhill from here. But this is not a binary view. Foreign trade will not go to zero. The U.S. and China will not completely seal each other’s sphere of influence behind a Silicon Curtain. Instead, we focus on five investment themes that flow from a world that is characterized by the three trends of multipolarity, Sino-U.S. geopolitical rivalry, and apex of globalization: Europe will profit: As the U.S. and China deepen their enmity, we expect some European companies to profit. There is some evidence that the investment community has already caught wind of this trend, with European equities modestly outperforming their U.S. counterparts whenever trade tensions flared up in 2019 (Chart 10). Given our thesis, however, it is unlikely that the U.S. would completely lose market share in China to Europe. As such, we specifically focus on tech, where we expect the U.S. and China to ramp up non-tariff barriers to trade regardless of systemic pressures to continue to trade. A strategic long in the secularly beleaguered European tech companies relative to their U.S. counterparts may therefore make sense (Chart 11). Chart 10Europe: A Trade War Safe Haven Chart 11Is Europe Really This Incompetent? USD bull market will end: A trade war is a very disruptive way to adjust one’s trade relationship. It opens one to retaliation and thus the kind of relative losses described in this analysis. As such, we expect that U.S. to eventually depreciate the USD, either by aggressively reversing 2018 tightening or by coercing its trade rivals to strengthen their currencies. Such a move will be yet another tailwind behind the diversification away from the USD as a reserve currency, a move that should benefit the euro. Bull market in capex: The re-wiring of global manufacturing chains will still take place. The bad news is that multinational corporations will have to dip into their profit margins to move their supply chains to adjust to the new geopolitical reality. The good news is that they will have to invest in manufacturing capex to accomplish the task. One way to articulate this theme is to buy an index of semiconductor capital companies (AMAT, LRCX, KLAC, MKSI, AEIS, BRIKS, and TER). Given the highly cyclical nature of capital companies, we would recommend an entry point once trade tensions subside and green shoots of global growth appear. “Non-aligned” markets will benefit: The last time the world was multipolar, great powers competed through imperialism. This time around, a same dynamic will develop as countries seek to replicate China’s “Belt and Road Initiative.” This is positive for frontier markets. A rush to provide them with exports and services will increase supply and thus lower costs, providing otherwise forgotten markets with a boon of investments. India, and Asia-ex-China more broadly, stand as intriguing alternatives to China, especially with the current administration aggressively reforming to take advantage of the rewiring of global manufacturing chains. Capital markets will remain globalized: With interest rates near zero in much of the developed world and the demographic burden putting an ever-greater pressure on pension plans to generate returns, the search for yield will continue to be a powerful drive that keeps capital markets globalized. Limitations are likely to grow, especially when it comes to cross-border private investments in dual-use technologies. But a completely bifurcation of capital markets is unlikely. The world we are describing is one where geopolitics will play an increasingly prominent role for global investors. It would be convenient if the world simply divided into two warring camps, leaving investors with neatly separated compartments that enabled them to go back to ignoring geopolitics. This is unlikely. Rather, the world will resemble the dynamic years at the end of the nineteenth century, a rough-and-tumble era that required a multi-disciplinary approach to investing.   Marko Papic, Consulting Editor, BCA Research Chief Strategist, Clocktower Group Marko@clocktowergroup.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy, “Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?,” September 25, 2012, “Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think,” October 4, 2013, “The Great Risk Rotation,” December 11, 2013, and “Strategic Outlook 2014 – Stay The Course: EM Risk – DM Reward,” January 23, 2014, “Underestimating Sino-American Tensions,” November 6, 2015, “The Geopolitics Of Trump,” December 2, 2016, “How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia,” March 1, 2017, and others available at gps.bcaresearch.com or upon request. 2 Please see German Historical Institute, “Bernhard von Bulow on Germany’s ‘Place in the Sun’” (1897), available at http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/ 3 See Graham Allison, Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York: Houghton Miffin Harcourt, 2017). 4 The three cases are Spain taking over from Portugal in the sixteenth century, the U.S. taking over from the U.K. in the twentieth century, and Germany rising to regional hegemony in Europe in the twenty-first century. 5 Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,” The American Political Science Review, 85:3 (September 1991), pp. 701-726. 6 We do not review Snidal’s excellent game theory formal modeling in this paper as it is complex and detailed. However, we highly encourage the intrigued reader to pursue the study on their own. 7 See Charles P. Kindleberger, The World In Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013). 8 Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, “Power Politics and International Trade,” The American Political Science Review, 87:2 (June 1993), pp. 408-420. 9 See Ernest Edwin Williams, Made in Germany (reprint, Ithaca: Cornell University Press), available at https://archive.org/details/cu31924031247830. 10 Quoted in Margaret MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2014). 11 Peter Liberman, “Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains,” international Security, 21:1 (Summer 1996), pp. 147-175. 12 Although France and Russia overcame even greater bitterness due to the ideological differences between a republic founded on a violent uprising against its aristocracy – France – and an aristocratic authoritarian regime – Russia. 13 See James Morrow, “When Do ‘Relative Gains’ Impede Trade?” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41:1 (February 1997), pp. 12-37; and Jack S. Levy and Katherine Barbieri, “Trading With the Enemy During Wartime,” Security Studies, 13:3 (December 2004), pp. 1-47.