Developed Countries

Overweight In our most recent Special Report we outline why we believe the S&P industrials index is set to outperform the market. Among other reasons, industrials forward earnings breadth – defined as the net number of sub-sectors with higher forward earnings revisions – has bounced off extreme lows signaling that the sell-off in relative share prices is reaching exhaustion. Historically, similar sharp bounces have marked previous price reversals (second panel). With regard to fundamentals, expanding profit margins since mid-2018 also reflect positive sector dynamics, despite the industry having borne the brunt of the US/China trade war. In fact, CEOs managed to compensate for the falling selling prices at the expense of labor (third & bottom panels). Bottom Line: Remain overweight the S&P industrials index. For more details please refer to the most recent Special Report.

Highlights The recently signed Phase One deal is positive for China and global equity markets as it brings a temporary truce to the trade war. However, China is unlikely to change its current policy trajectory to create additional domestic demand to consume $200 billion in new imports from the US. China is likely to meet the commitment only half way in the next two years, and meet the 2020 import target from the US by a redistribution of its purchases overseas. The RMB will modestly appreciate in the next three to six months. On the monetary policy front, there is no sign of further monetary easing from the PBoC. We continue to recommend an overweight stance towards Chinese stocks in the next six months, relative to the global benchmark. Feature Economic data released last week, including Q4 GDP growth, December industrial production, fixed-asset investment and trade data, all suggest that the Chinese economy bottomed before the end of 2019. The Phase One trade deal between China and the US marks a significant de-escalation in a two-year trade war. The RMB appreciated by 1.4% against the greenback since the beginning of the year, pushing USD-CNY firmly below the key psychological 7 mark. The performance of equities in China’s onshore and offshore markets confirms that the economy has bottomed. Since December 11, 2019, Chinese cyclical sectors have outperformed defensives and both the investable and domestic markets have broken above their respective 200-day moving averages versus global stocks (Chart 1A and 1B). Chart 1ABoth Onshore And Offshore Equities Signal A Bottoming In China's Economy Chart 1BCyclicals Have Significantly Outperformed Defensives Lately We continue to recommend a cyclical long stance on Chinese stocks. We expect pro-growth policy support to accelerate in the first quarter, economic recovery to further solidify, and the Phase One trade deal to reduce economic and financial market volatility until the November 2020 US presidential election. All of these factors should support an outperformance in Chinese stocks relative to their global peers. Some Inconvenient Truth To The Truce China’s commitment to purchase an additional $200 billion in goods from the US was more than market participants anticipated. We do not think China will honor this commitment to its full extent. Moreover, we also do not think this will change China’s domestic economic policy trajectory for 2020. Details in Chapter 6 of the Phase One trade agreement titled “Expanding Trade”1 include: In the next 2 years, China is committed to purchase an additional $200 billion worth of goods and services from the US, from the 2017 baseline. The additional $200 billion amount is split over the next two years: China will need to add no less than $77 billion of imports from the US in 2020, and $123 billion in 2021. This amounts to a 41% increase in 2020 and a 66% increase in 2021, from the 2017 baseline of $186 billion (Chart 2). The text from Chapter 6 of the Phase One deal also specifies that, between January 2020 and December 2021, China will add a total of $77.7 billion in purchases of manufactured goods (including aircraft components), $32 billion in agricultural products, $52.4 billion in energy and $37.9 billion in services from the US (Chart 3). Chart 2Phase One Trade Deal Sets An Ambitious Import Target For The Next Two Years Chart 3Chinese Imports Of Agro And Energy Goods From The US Likely To See The Biggest Increase In 2020 From 2019   China’s annual import growth from the US in 2017 was the highest one in the past ten years.  If we assume that China will simply add $200 billion of new imports in the next two years from the US to this high starting point, it will need to boost domestic demand to accommodate at least a 4-6% increase in total imports in the next two years from 2019.2 In contrast, growth in China’s total imports in 2019 contracted by 3% from 2018, and averaged at only 2% in the last five years. In other words, in 2020 and 2021, even if China does not increase imports from other countries, just the commitment from purchases of US goods alone would require a sizable boost in China’s domestic demand. However, the assumption above is overly simplified and optimistic. Even though Chinese leadership may have shifted their policy priority from financial deleveraging to supporting economic growth this year, we do not think they will fully abandon the battle against systemic risks in the financial sector. Therefore, China is unlikely to significantly deviate from its current policy trajectory and stimulate aggressively to create additional domestic demand to consume the agreed $200 billion in new imports from the US. It is equally unlikely that China will absorb the $200 billion additional imports from the US, at the expense of its domestic production. A more plausible approach, which is our base case scenario, is that China will meet a large portion of the 2020 import target before November, to show good faith. After the US presidential election, China will face the challenge of either a re-escalation from the Phase Two trade talk with a re-elected President Trump, or a new US president with his/her own political agenda. In either case, at this point China is unlikely to have the intention to meet the import target for 2021. Chart 4China Likely To Shift Agro And Energy Import Suppliers To The US In 2020, to absorb a $77 billion additional imports from the US, China will likely shift some of its imports, such as agriculture and energy products, from other countries to suppliers in the US. China currently imports $150 billion of agriculture goods and $298 billion of energy related products on an annual basis, so the pie is large enough to absorb some of increased import commitments by shifting the sources of imports (Chart 4). The same logic goes for the manufactured goods category in the trade agreement, which includes cars, airplanes, steel, industrial machinery, and so on.3 China is likely to choose to shift its import suppliers of these goods to the US, while increasing its own share of intermediate goods supplies to the US manufacturers. Almost all of the eight subcategories under the manufactured goods category in the Phase One trade agreement are deeply integrated in the global supply chain. For example, foreign value-added share accounts for 23% of the total output value of the US automobile industry.4 In other words, if a “Made in America” car is worth $20,000, $4,600 is produced by foreign suppliers of intermediate goods. Since China has been the leading source of this foreign value-added in the US automobile industry, a sizeable slice of these additional imports will likely benefit Chinese manufacturers. In this scenario, we expect an increase in bilateral trade between China and the US in 2020, at the expense of other players in the global supply chain. Lastly, while this is not our base case scenario, it is possible the Phase One trade agreement was set up for failure, if China is simply hoping to delay the imposition of additional tariffs as part of a gamble that President Trump will not be re-elected. In this scenario, China might not make any meaningful additional purchases from the US even in 2020 (while claiming that they will be made closer to the election), implying that bilateral trade between China and the US will only revert to its historical average this year, at best. Bottom Line: Chinese policymakers are unlikely willing to alter their existing policy trajectory when accommodating more imports of US goods. China will, at best, reshuffle its supply chain to absorb a portion of the commitment before November 2020. The RMB And Monetary Policy: A Refocus On The Economic Fundamentals As tensions from the US-China trade war abate, investors are starting to refocus on economic fundamentals. The RMB has appreciated by 1.4% against the USD since the beginning of this year (Chart 5). The recent appreciation in the currency is a reversal to its fair value, which reflects an ongoing economic recovery (Chart 6). In the next three to six months, the improvement in China’s economic fundamentals and market sentiment should support a continuation in the RMB’s reversal to its structural trend. Chart 5USD/CNY Has Durably Fallen Below 7 Chart 6The Recent Appreciation In RMB Is A Reversal To Its Fair Value   But Chinese leadership’s cautious approach to boosting domestic demand will also cap the upside potential in the RMB appreciation. We think Chinese policymakers will maintain their tight grip this year on local government spending and bank lending, and will continue to fine-tune policies based on economic conditions. This will limit the magnitude in both the stimulus and economic recovery. Baring a major re-escalation in the trade war, the RMB should oscillate within a relatively narrow band through the third quarter of this year. For that reason, the PBoC is unlikely to intervene in the RMB exchange rate by significantly altering its monetary stance (Chart 7). The 3-month interbank lending rate, China’s de facto policy rate, remains low compared with the 2015-16 easing cycle. There is no sign that the PBoC will allow the rate to fall much more. The recent bank reserve requirement ratio (RRR) rate cut provides additional liquidity to the interbank system, but on a net basis liquidity does not seem excessive (Chart 8). Chart 7PBoC Unlikely To Alter Monetary Policy To Intervene RMB Exchange Rate This Year Chart 8No Sign Of Meaningful Monetary Easing From PBoC   Historically, the 3-month interbank lending rate only falls significantly and durably when the PBoC places consecutive RRR rate cuts (in both 2015 and mid-2018) and/or keeps net fund injections positive through the open market for a prolonged period (such as in the 2015/16 easing cycle). Chart 8 suggests the current monetary environment does not indicate that such an extremely easy stance is in place, as PBoC net fund injections through the open market remain negative. Furthermore, neither the 3-month interbank lending rate nor the 10-year government bond yield has fallen below its most recent lows in the third quarter of last year. Bottom Line: While the current environment supports a stronger RMB, the upside potential in RMB appreciation is capped by a modest scale of economic recovery. There is no sign that the PBoC is easing its monetary stance by lowering the policy rate. Investment Conclusions We have been cyclically overweight Chinese stocks on the basis of a bottoming in the economy in the first quarter of 2020, and the likelihood of an eventual trade deal. These two factors were confirmed in the past two weeks. Last week’s small selloffs in both onshore and offshore Chinese equity markets were likely technical corrections and pre-Chinese New Year profit taking, rather than a fundamental shift in investors’ sentiment towards Chinese stocks (Chart 9). We expect Chinese stocks to resume an upward trajectory after the Chinese New Year. Chart 9Small Corrections Following A 14% Gain Since Dec 2019 Chart 10Offshore Stocks Still Showing More Upside Potential Than Onshore China’s economic conditions and corporate earnings should continue to improve, with investable stocks showing more upside potential than their domestic counterparts (Chart 10). As growth supporting measures continue to work their way through the economy and solidify an economic recovery, China’s leadership may pull back the scale of the stimulus in the second half of the year. Therefore, the relative outperformance in both markets may be front loaded and subsequently subside in the second half of 2020. Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1    https://assets.bwbx.io/documents/users/iqjWHBFdfxIU/rVaHxDBUtdew/v0  2   China’s total imports of goods and services in 2019 was $2604 billion, including $168 billion imports from the US. If China was to fully meet the $200 billion target of additional imports from the US, assuming no change to imports from other countries in 2020 from 2019, China’s total imports would jump to $2699 billion in 2020 and $2745 billion in 2021. 3   The eight subcategories of Manufacturing Goods listed in the Annex 6.1 of the Phase One Trade agreement include: Industrial Machinery, Electrical Equipment and Machinery, Pharmaceutical Products, Aircraft, Vehicles, Optical and Medical Instruments, Iron and Steel, Other Manufactured Goods including solar-grade polysilicon and other organic and inorganic chemicals, hardwood lumber, integrated circuits (manufactured in US), and chemical products. 4   WIOD Data, 2016 release and OECD Input-Output Tables (IOTs), 2015 release. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Special Report

Highlights Global Corporates: The cyclical backdrop – accommodative monetary policies, improving global growth momentum, moderate inflation and subdued volatility – is supportive for the continued outperformance of global corporate bonds over sovereign debt in 2020. Corporate Bond Valuation: Extending a valuation framework we’ve introduced for US corporates to non-US credit – looking at volatility-adjusted spreads relative to both their own history and the “phase” of the monetary policy cycle - we calculate spread targets for non-US corporates in the euro area, UK and Canada. 2020 Opportunities: Current corporate spread levels are furthest above our targets (i.e. cheap) for US high-yield (most notably for Ba- and Caa-rated credit), UK high-yield and UK investment grade. Spreads are furthest below our targets (i.e. expensive) for euro area high-yield (mostly Ba-rated), US investment grade (all credit tiers) and Canadian investment grade. Feature Chart 1Deviations From Corporate Spread Targets One of our main investment themes for 2020 is that accommodative monetary policies and faster economic growth will delay the peak in the aging global credit cycle, giving investors another year of corporate bond outperformance versus sovereign debt in the developed economies. Returns this year will be nowhere near as robust as in 2019, however, given rich valuation starting points for much of the global corporate universe. Against this backdrop, fixed income investors will have to be more selective in allocations by country, sector and credit quality in order to outperform. To that end, in this Special Report we extend a valuation framework for corporate bond spreads first introduced for US corporates by our sister service, US Bond Strategy, to non-US credit. This methodology looks at spreads on a volatility-adjusted basis, allowing comparison of valuations versus their own history and relative to similar stages of past monetary policy cycles. Chart 1 shows the deviations of current benchmark index option-adjusted spreads (OAS) from spread targets derived from our methodology for different countries (the US, euro area, the UK and Canada) and credit quality tiers (investment grade vs. high-yield). Positive deviations imply current spreads are above the targets derived from our framework – in other words, relatively undervalued - and vice-versa. Returns this year will be nowhere near as robust as in 2019, however, given rich valuation starting points for much of the global corporate universe. Against this backdrop, fixed income investors will have to be more selective in allocations by country, sector and credit quality in order to outperform. The conclusions are that there are still opportunities for additional spread tightening from current levels for lower-rated US high-yield and both UK investment grade and high-yield corporates. At the same time, valuations are looking most stretched for euro area high-yield, US investment grade (all credit tiers) and Canadian investment grade. A Brief Word On The Outlook For Global Corporate Credit In 2020 Chart 2Positive Backdrop For Corporate Bonds The backdrop for global corporate bond markets will remain positive in 2020 for three main reasons: Global monetary policies will remain accommodative. Central bankers are now focusing more on boosting soft growth and low inflation expectations. Real policy interest rates in the US, euro area, UK and Canada are already below estimates of neutral like r-star (Chart 2, top panel), and will likely remain so throughout 2020. In the past, periods of credit market underperformance have occurred when monetary policy was restrictive, with real rates above neutral or government bond yield curves that were very flat or inverted (more on that later). Global growth momentum will improve. Recent data releases (global manufacturing PMIs, sentiment surveys like the global ZEW and German IFO) have shown that the 2019 global industrial downturn was in the process of bottoming out during the 4th quarter of the year. Additional improvement is likely in the coming months, based on the steady gains of the BCA Global Leading Economic Indicator (LEI). The elevated level of our global LEI diffusion index – measuring the share of individual country LEIs that are rising and which is itself a leading indicator of both the global LEI and corporate bond returns - suggests that additional outperformance of global corporates versus sovereign bonds is likely within the next 12 months (Chart 2, middle panel). Financial conditions are stimulative. Global equities and credit are off to a strong start in 2020, while market volatility is subdued across a variety of asset classes. For example, the US VIX index is now just above its 2019 low, which is consistent with narrow global corporate bond spreads (Chart 2, bottom panel). That low volatility backdrop – supported by market-friendly central bank policies - is helping keep financial conditions easy enough to lift economic growth, while also boosting investor risk appetite for corporate credit. The overall outlook for global corporate credit is still positive and investors should expect another year of corporate bond outperformance versus sovereign debt in the developed economies. Nonetheless, returns will be lower in 2020 than in 2019 due to expensive valuation starting points. As can be seen from Chart 3, global corporate bond spreads are already fairly tight relative to their long-term historical range. Also, outright index yields in many asset classes, like US high-yield, are now at new all-time lows. We interpret this as a sign that the “easy money” has already been made in being generally long corporate credit versus government bonds. Having the right tools to assess the relative values among differing credit markets will be critical to finding the best investment opportunities in this environment. Chart 3Rich Valuation Starting Points In Corporate Credit We can use the breakeven spread as a valuation tool by looking at the percentile rank relative to its own history, effectively showing the percentage of time that the breakeven spread has been lower in the past. Bottom Line: The cyclical backdrop – accommodative monetary policies, improving global growth momentum, moderate inflation and subdued volatility – is supportive for the continued outperformance of global corporate bonds over sovereign debt in 2020. Valuations are likely to be more of a headwind for corporate bond returns, though. Using Breakeven Spreads As A Credit Valuation Tool As a reminder to existing readers (and to new clients), one of our main valuation tools for credit instruments is the 12-month breakeven spread. That is, the amount of spread widening required for corporate bond returns to break even with a duration-matched position in government bond securities over a 12-month horizon. It can be approximated by dividing the OAS of a bond (or a benchmark bond index) by its duration. More specifically, we can use the breakeven spread as a valuation tool by looking at the percentile rank relative to its own history, effectively showing the percentage of time that the breakeven spread has been lower in the past. We find this valuation tool to be superior to others for two main reasons: (i) using the breakeven spread rather than the average index OAS allows us to control for the changing average duration of the benchmark bond indices; and (ii) the percentile rank is often a better representation of credit spreads than the spread itself.1 BCA Research US Bond Strategy and Global Fixed Income Strategy have both regularly shown the percentile rankings of US investment grade and high-yield breakeven spreads as part of our discussion of US corporate bond markets. We have never produced such rankings for non-US credit, until now. InCharts 4- 7, we show those percentile ranks relative to history for credit in the US and, for the first time, the euro area, UK, Canada, Japan, Australia and Emerging Markets US dollar denominated corporates. We also provide the breakeven spread historical percentile ranks for each individual credit tier in the Appendix charts on pages 13-16. Chart 4US: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads Chart 5Euro Area: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads Chart 6UK: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads Using these charts, we can gauge which markets offer the best (or worst) level of spread, adjusted by its own volatility and compared to its own history. The most attractive corporate credit spreads on a volatility-adjusted basis are: US high-yield (mostly Caa-rated and B-rated) Japan investment grade (mostly Baa-rated and A-rated) Canada Aaa-rated UK high-yield (excluding financials) Chart 7Other Countries: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads The least attractive corporate credit spreads on a volatility-adjusted basis are: US investment grade (all credit tiers) UK Aaa-rated Canada Baa-rated Euro Area high-yield Using this metric, US Caa-rated junk bonds look most “undervalued”, with a volatility-adjusted spread in the upper 20% of all observations. Chart 8 displays the current breakeven spread historical percentile ranks across countries and credit quality, with high-yield markets shown in red. Using this metric, US Caa-rated junk bonds look most “undervalued”, with a volatility-adjusted spread in the upper 20% of all observations. While this chart provides a quick overview of which corporate bond markets are cheap/expensive with respect to their own history, it does not allow for comparisons of the relative cheapness between markets. To do this, we need to find a way to convert the percentile rankings into some measure of a “fair value” credit spread. Chart 8Global Corporate Bond 12-Month Breakeven Spreads By Percentile Rank (%) Using Monetary Policy Cycles To Determine Corporate Spread Targets Our colleagues at BCA Research US Bond Strategy have come up with a novel approach for determining spread targets for US corporate credit, based on the breakeven spread percentile rankings.2 Essentially, the stance of US monetary policy, as measured by the slope of the US Treasury curve, is used to predict changes in the US credit cycle, helping to determine “cyclical” spread targets relative to the stance of monetary policy. The first step of this process is to group corporate bond excess returns (vs government debt) into buckets defined by the following “phases” of the US monetary policy cycle, measured by the yield differential between 10-year and 3-year Treasuries: Phase 1: from the end of the previous recession until the slope goes below 50 bps. Phase 2: from the time that the slope crosses below 50 bps until it inverts. Phase 3: from the time that the yield curve first inverts to the start of the next recession. Recessionary periods are not included in these phases, as all corporate credit exhibits the worst returns during those episodes. That is because economic growth and downgrade/default risks, and not the state of monetary policy, are the driving factor behind credit spread moves during recessions. Chart 9 shows the history of the US corporate bond markets broken down into “curve-defined” cycles.3 Dating back to 1974, the earliest date for investment grade bond index data, there have been five such cycles. Chart 9US Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve In Charts 10-12, we show the same phases for the euro area, the UK and Canada, using their own government bond yield curves to determine the phase of the monetary policy cycle in the same fashion as was done for the US.4 Once the phases of the monetary policy cycle are defined, we can then calculate corporate bond excess returns during each phase. Chart 10Euro Area: Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve Chart 11UK: Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve Chart 12Canada: Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve Table 1 shows the average corporate bond annualized excess returns under each phase across every cycle that can be defined with available data. Excess returns tend to be highest in Phase 1, quite low but still positive in Phase 2, and usually turn negative during Phase 3, once the yield curve has inverted. Table 1Corporate Bond Annualized Excess Returns* (%) Under Each Phase Of The Cycle Currently, we are in Phase 2 in the US, euro area and UK, with yield curves that are relatively flat but still positively sloped. Historically, such periods have generated positive excess returns for corporate debt versus duration-matched government bonds, although of far smaller magnitudes compared to Phase 1 periods. Given our expectation that the Fed, ECB and Bank of England will maintain a dovish bias throughout 2020, we expect the no shift from Phase 2 for the US, euro area and the UK that would hurt corporate bond excess returns in those countries. With the Canadian yield curve now slightly inverted, however, Canada is now in Phase 3. This raises the risk that the recent strong outperformance of Canadian investment grade corporate bonds could end if the Bank of Canada does not deliver the monetary easing currently discounted in the Canadian yield curve. How We Determine Corporate Spread Targets Having defined the three phases of the monetary policy cycle, we then re-calculate our corporate bond breakeven spread percentile ranks within each phase. We then back-out a spread target for each credit tier by taking the median 12-month breakeven spread seen in similar monetary policy environments, as determined by the slope of the yield curve.5 Finally, we convert those “median” breakeven spreads into OAS targets using the current benchmark index duration and credit rating distribution. We are assuming that a reasonable spread target for any corporate bond market is determined by adjusting for both spread volatility AND the monetary policy cycle. So, essentially, we are assuming that a reasonable spread target for any corporate bond market is determined by adjusting for both spread volatility AND the monetary policy cycle. Charts 13-16 show the index OAS and their respective targets for the US (both investment grade and high-yield), euro area (both investment grade and high-yield), the UK (both investment grade and high-yield excluding financials), and Canada (only investment grade). Further, the spread targets for each individual credit tier are provided in the Appendix on pages 17-19. Chart 13US: Corporate Bond Spread Targets Chart 14Euro Area: Corporate Bond Spread Targets Chart 15UK: Corporate Bond Spread Targets Chart 16Canada: Corporate Bond Spread Targets For example, our spread target for US B-rated high-yield is 227bps, which is 80bps below the current index OAS. From the charts, we can make the following conclusions about the relative attractiveness of current spread levels: The largest deviations from our spread target (i.e. potentially most undervalued) are: US high-yield (mostly Caa-rated and B-rated) UK high-yield (excluding financials) The lowest deviations from our spread target (i.e. potentially most overvalued) are: Euro Area high-yield (mostly Ba-rated) Canada investment grade US investment grade (all credit tiers) This framework is an interesting way to derive corporate bond value, by adjusting for both the volatility and monetary policy backdrop. Of course, there are other factors that are more difficult to quantify that can keep spreads too tight or too wide versus these fair value levels, like investor risk tolerance or risk premia for political uncertainty. In terms of factors that are quantifiable, however, this spread target methodology is a useful way to get a sense of the richness or cheapness of global corporate debt. In terms of factors that are quantifiable, however, this spread target methodology is a useful way to get a sense of the richness or cheapness of global corporate debt. We will regularly update these targets in future BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy reports. Bottom Line: Current corporate spread levels are furthest above our targets (i.e. cheap) for US high-yield (most notably for Ba- and Caa-rated credit), UK high-yield and UK investment grade. Spreads are furthest below our targets (i.e. expensive) for euro area high-yield (mostly Ba-rated), US investment grade (all credit tiers) and Canadian investment grade.   Jeremie Peloso Research Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 This is because credit spreads often tighten to very low levels and then remain tight for an extended period. Thus, by showing the percentage of time that a given spread has been tighter than its current level, the percentile rank gives a better sense of this pattern than the actual spread. 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For US Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 3 Note that the Treasury curve used for this analysis is the spread between the 10-year Treasury and the 3-year Treasury yield. The more widely-followed 2-year Treasury was not used as there was more historical data available for the 3-year maturity. 4 Note that there are fewer cycles to analyze for these countries due to the shorter available history of corporate bond market data outside the US. 5 For more details on the spread targets please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Paid To Wait”, dated February 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Appendix Chart 1AUS: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Chart 1BUS: High-Yield Breakeven Spreads Chart 1CEuro Area: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads By Credit Tiers Chart 1DEuro Area: High-Yield Breakeven Spreads By Credit Tiers Chart 1EUK: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Chart 1FCanada: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Chart 1GJapan: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Chart 2AUS: Investment Grade Spread Targets Chart 2BUS: High-Yield Spread Targets Chart 2CEuro Area: Investment Grade Spread Targets By Credit Tiers Chart 2DEuro Area: High-Yield Spread Targets By Credit Tiers Chart 2EUK: Investment Grade Spread Targets By Credit Tiers Chart 2FCanada: Investment Grade Spread Targets By Credit Tiers

Special Report

Highlights Macro winds are slowly changing, compelling investors to take a second look at highly cyclical sectors such as industrials. In this Special Report we highlight that the S&P industrials index is trading at a nearly 10% discount to the market on a forward P/E basis, meanwhile a list of welcoming omens has appeared on the horizon which will serve as a foundation for the relative share price outperformance. Increasing odds of a modest rebound in the US manufacturing PMI Stabilization in EM in general and Chinese economy in particular BCA’s House View of a weaker dollar Healthy industry operating metrics Table 1 Feature While US manufacturing remains in recession, investors have already positioned for a V-shaped recovery according to the spectacular run-up in the S&P 500. However, drilling beneath the surface is revealing. Instead of hypersensitive industrials equities sniffing out a recovery in the manufacturing sector, the SPX’s advance has been solely driven by tech mega caps, and thus leaving in the dust all their deep cyclical peers. Why? Because the industrials complex has borne the brunt of the trade war (Chart 1). However, our expectation remains for a natural healing of the economy sometime in the first half of the year, and a rotation out of tech equities into capital goods stocks. Industrials equities will be among the first beneficiaries of this improving macro backdrop. Specifically, four key themes underpin our bullish stance on the S&P industrials index: Increasing odds of a modest rebound in the US manufacturing PMI Stabilization in EM in general and Chinese economy in particular BCA’s House View of a weaker dollar Healthy industry operating metrics Chart 1Trade War Echoes The ISM Will Soon Turn The Corner ISM’s manufacturing PMI survey is still below the 50 boom/bust line, but much of the macro pessimism is likely already reflected in the data, as it is set to bottom by the end of Q1 2020 and rebound into Q2 2020. To be clear, we are not expecting a jump into the high 50s, but rather look for a more balanced recovery into the low 50s. Nevertheless, it is a 5-point rise from the current recessionary level, and the S&P industrials index will cheer a relief in macro data. Charts 2 & 3 clearly depict that the ISM manufacturing PMI is set to improve in the coming months. First, our demand/supply proxy for the overall US economy (comprising of retail and industrial production data) is signaling that industrial production will likely bottom by mid-2020, despite Boeing’s ails (Chart 2, bottom panel). Industrial production is also known to lag PMI by roughly three months, which translates into PMI bottoming in Q1 2020, if history at least rhymes. Moreover, the bond market is also sending a similar message (Chart 2, third panel). As a reminder, BCA’s House View calls for a sell-off in the bond market to a range of 2.25-2.5% for this year. Chart 2Long Term And … Chart 3… Short Term Drivers Are Positive Both coincident and short-term leading economic variables also emit a positive signal. Lumber prices have recovered sharply over the past year (Chart 3, second panel), and given their close correlation with the ISM manufacturing PMI, the move underscores that the bottoming process in the latter has already begun. Moreover, survey internals have made a modest turn on a three-month moving average basis, suggesting that the path of least resistance is to the upside (Chart 3, bottom panel). On the political front, our sister Geopolitical Strategy service has been right on Trump having to retreat and to agree on a “ceasefire” deal as the 2020 elections are looming. Following the October and December tariff “postponement/cancelation” coupled with lower chances of any tariff hikes at all until the 2020 election will likely provide a further boost to the “soft” survey data. As a reminder, the increase in trade policy uncertainty over 2018-2019 has been a large contributor to data deterioration (Chart 1). EM And Chinese Green Shoots A rising share of international sales for the S&P industrials index originates from the EM, as those countries are responsible for a large percent of world total commodity consumption and construction activity. The EM manufacturing PMI has done a good job at tracing the S&P industrials relative share price performance, and the current divergence between the two can serve as yet another catalyst for a rally (Chart 4, top panel). Most importantly, China is also enjoying green shoots. BCA’s Chinese credit & fiscal impulse has been grinding higher over the past year foreshadowing a further rebound in EM data, and consequently benefiting US industrials. Finally, Chinese infrastructure spending that managed to climb out of negative territory will, at the margin, further boost industrials end-demand (Chart 4, middle & bottom panels). Chart 4International Arena Improving The Dollar Is Petering Out Switching gears to the greenback, more good news is in store for the S&P industrials index. Forty-four percent of sales are international for the S&P industrials sector, making it sensitive to FX fluctuations. BCA’s House View for 2020 calls for a weaker USD and should it be proven correct, industrials P&Ls will enjoy positive currency translation tailwinds. Chart 5 shows a newly created dollar model first published by our sister The Bank Credit Analyst service, heralding a softer greenback in the coming months. The real trade-weighted US dollar has been a key driver for the S&P industrials’ sales ever since 1975 as they remained in positive territory even during the recent manufacturing recession. A turn in the US dollar will reignite sales growth and underpin the relative share price ratio (Chart 6, bottom panel). Chart 5The Softening US Dollar … In addition, a depreciating US dollar has been synonymous with a relative multiple expansion phase, and a definitive fall in the dollar will likely serve as a catalyst to unlock excellent value in bombed out relative valuations (Chart 6, third panel). Looking at sales from a different angle, our industrials sector exports proxy has a tight inverse correlation with the USD, and is likely to hook higher given that the US dollar is flat on a year-over-year basis (Chart 6, second panel). Chart 6… Holds The Key … Chart 7… And So Do Our EPS Models Finally, our relative earnings growth model does an excellent job at encapsulating all the profit drivers and is signaling that an earnings-led outperformance period looms (Chart 7). Enticing Operating Metrics Drilling down and away from macro and toward industry-level data is instructive. First, industrials forward earnings breadth – defined as the net number of sub-sectors with higher forward earnings revisions – has bounced off extreme lows signaling that the sell-off in relative share prices is reaching exhaustion. Historically, similar sharp bounces have marked previous price reversals (Chart 8, second panel). Chart 8Selling Climax? Chart 9More Welcoming News Expanding profit margins since mid-2018 also reflect positive sector dynamics as the industry managed to shrug off falling selling prices at the expense of labor (Chart 8, third & fourth panels). Importantly, the CRB raw industrials index is tracing a bottom and a depreciating US dollar will assist in orchestrating a recovery in industrials PPI (Chart 9). With regard to balance sheet health, interest coverage and net debt-to-EBITDA ratios are not sounding alarm bells as they are comparable to the broad market. Industrials are also steadily pumping out healthy free cash flow numbers, which should be a welcoming sign for investors (Chart 10). Despite all these tailwinds, sell-side analysts are still overly pessimistic on relative long-term profit prospects (Chart 11, fourth panel). Chart 10Good B/S All Around Chart 11No Red Flags Neither BCA composite Valuations nor Technical Indicators caution against overweighting the S&P industrials index (Chart 11, second and third panels). In fact, on a forward P/E basis, the sector is trading at a nearly 10% discount to the broad market making it an historically “cheap” addition to one’s portfolio (Chart 11, bottom panel). Risks To Monitor There are a few key risks to our view. First, we treat the current de-escalation in the trade war as temporary. Should Trump get reelected in 2020 for another term, all of the pre-election constraints will be lifted, likely allowing him to get back to his tariff hawkishness. Second, the US economy has already suffered too much damage making it vulnerable to an external shock. Were a black swan to materialize, the dollar would skyrocket putting our industrials view offside. Finally, should the Chinese government miscalculate the amount of stimulus required to reignite their economy, US industrials will again be among the first ones to suffer the consequences via the final-demand link. Put simply, any combination of these risks would slay animal spirits and postpone capex-led US industrials sector recovery. Bottom Line: Increasing chances of a rebound in the ISM manufacturing PMI coupled with green shoots in the EM, expectations for a weaker US dollar and sound industry level data, argue for an above benchmark allocation in the S&P industrials index. Please stay tuned for an upcoming Special Report on how to position within the industrials complex.     Arseniy Urazov Research Associate ArseniyU@bcaresearch.com