Developed Countries

Highlights Why is the gap between the stock market and the economy so wide?: It is well established that stocks can diverge considerably from fundamentals in the near term, but lately it is as if the stock tables and the front-page headlines are from entirely different newspapers. It may be because the virus poses much less of a threat to the owners of equities than the general populace: More affluent households are more readily able to work from home and to practice social distancing. They also have access to better medical care. With the S&P 500 having hit technical resistance, however, the gap may be nearing its upper limit: Large-caps have run in place since retracing half of their peak-to-trough losses, and the next Fibonacci resistance level is only another 5% higher. Where are the shoddy loans?: During the expansion, corporations were able to borrow on prodigally easy terms. If banks aren't holding the loans, who is? Feature That’s New York’s future, not mine – “Hold On” (Reed) For someone who entered the business as a sell-side trader, it is a matter of course that prices can diverge from fundamentals. The trading desk had a one-day horizon, and the traders necessarily made their way on price signals while barely considering fundamentals. Though the junior traders had been exposed to dividend discount models at their fancy colleges, the ones who lasted recognized they weren’t relevant to the desk’s mission. Trading the daily flow required accepting that new news can have a dramatically larger effect on stocks in the here and now than it would on the lifetime stream of earnings available to common shareholders. Long-run fair value might solely turn on the fundamentals, but animal spirits hold sway over any given tick. The sudden stop imposed by stay-at-home orders has made backward-looking economic data nearly irrelevant, but the sizable upward surprises in unemployment claims should not be ignored. Our Global Investment Strategy colleagues showed last week just how difficult it is for even severe near-term shocks to materially alter the present value of aggregate future earnings.1 Furthermore, the market effects of negative earnings shocks are inherently self-limiting at the margin because they tend to be accompanied by lower interest rates, driving up the equity risk premium and making stocks more attractive relative to “safe” fixed income alternatives. Bear markets coincide with recessions, though, as near-term earnings expectations are revised lower and animal spirits droop (Chart 1). Given that the recession just begun is expected to be the worst since the Great Depression, one would expect that equities would be stumbling in search of a bottom as investors remained fearful of taking on risk. Chart 1Joined At The Hip They have instead been acting like the S&P 500 found that bottom on March 23rd, when the index completed a 35% peak-to-trough decline in just 23 sessions. It then proceeded to gain 28.5% over the next eighteen sessions. Some retracement is to be expected after a sudden, sharp move, and the S&P 500 has only recovered half of the ground that it lost. It certainly priced in a great deal of bad news on the way down, but the data have been worsening, and investors have been forced to give up on the notion of a swift economic recovery. Why are stocks rising when economic projections are being downwardly revised and good virus news has been few and far between? We ourselves have been barely glancing at backward-looking economic data releases that merely confirm the well-understood fact that draconian social distancing measures have wrung much of the life out of the economy. The degree to which job losses have outrun consensus forecasts stands out nonetheless. Aggregate initial unemployment claims over the last five weeks have exceeded consensus expectations by 5.5 million (Table 1). Even though the forecasts have caught up to the situation on the ground, the claims data suggest that unemployment is now pushing 20%, a worst-case-scenario level that is far above the first forecasts that incorporated the effects of stay-at-home orders. Claims may well have peaked, but they’re still an order of magnitude higher than normal, and they are not finished exerting upward pressure on the unemployment rate. Table 1Job Losses Have Been Worse Than Expected Meanwhile, COVID-19 data have yet to provoke much optimism. The rate of US infections has yet to come down to Italy’s level (Chart 2), and hopes that remdesivir might prove to be a wonder drug were dashed late last week. Clients are increasingly asking us why the stock market is traveling such a dramatically different path than the economy and the virus. How could stocks have plunged at a record rate as the coronavirus drew a bead on the United States, but surged after crippling social distancing measures were put in place? Chart 2The US Has Fallen Behind Italy's Pace A Tale Of Two Boroughs The simplest answer is that the Fed’s response was swifter and more far-reaching than expected. Ditto Congressional actions, and we expect that DC will continue to deploy its fiscal firepower to try to shield households and businesses from the worst of the effects of the anti-virus measures. We believe the monetary and fiscal efforts will make a difference, and do not think it’s a coincidence that equities turned around the week of March 23rd, which began with the Fed’s rollout of a formidable new arsenal and ended with the passage of the CARES Act. But the market action has not accounted for the shift from expectations of a V-bottom to talk of Us, Ls and Ws. Two articles published a week apart in The New Yorker vividly illustrated a demographic virus gap. The first looked at COVID-19 from the perspective of financial professionals at hedge funds and other sophisticated investment aeries.2 Although the views of the investors in the profile shifted with the tide of the incoming data, they were generally of the mind that the health threat was being dramatically overhyped. One retired hedge fund manager boasted about his and his family’s non-stop early March air travel between New York, London and a Wyoming ski resort. The second article followed an emergency room resident at Elmhurst, a publicly funded hospital in a working-class Queens neighborhood, which has been described as the epicenter of the outbreak in several local media reports.3 “‘It’s become very clear to me what a socioeconomic disease this is,’” he said. “‘Short-order cooks, doormen, cleaners, deli workers – that is the patient population here. Other people were at home, but my patients were still working. A few weeks ago, when they were told to socially isolate, they still had to go back to an apartment with ten other people. Now they are in our cardiac room dying.’” Stock ownership is largely reserved to the affluent, with the top percentile of households owning 53% of equities as of the end of 2019, and the rest of the top decile owning another 35% (Chart 3). For households in the top decile, maintaining a healthy distance from the virus isn’t that difficult. Knowledge workers equipped with a laptop and a reliable internet connection can work from anywhere, unlike the Elmhurst patients in low-skilled service positions who have to work onsite. The tonier precincts of Manhattan feel nearly deserted, with their residents having decamped for second homes in lower-density areas. Perhaps it's because the Fed's attempts to shore up the economy have far more personal relevance for investors than the spread of the virus. There are no comprehensive data series on virus infections and outcomes by zip code, which would facilitate analysis of the link between household wealth and COVID-19, but New York state reports age-adjusted fatality rates in four racial/ethnic categories. In New York state ex-New York city, which has lesser extremes of wealth than the city itself, the cross-category disparities are striking (Chart 4). Race/ethnicity is far from an ideal proxy for inequality, but it is fair to conclude that financial market participants have a sound basis for being more sanguine about the virus than the overall population. Assuming that more affluent households will be able to remain out of the virus’ reach, the dichotomy can persist for as long as the economic impacts do not become so bad that investors cannot reasonably look through them. Chart 3Demographics Drive Stock Ownership ... Chart 4... And COVID-19 Fatalities Technical Resistance Back on the trading desk, technical analysis was the go-to tool for traders pricing large blocks of stock in real time. Following sizable moves, the Fibonacci sequence provided a popular method for assessing how far a stock might retrace its steps before resuming its course. The most widely used Fibonacci retracement levels are 38% and 62%, and 50%, a round number exactly between the two, has also become an anticipated stopping point. From the February 19 closing high of 3,386.15 to the March 23 closing low of 2,237.40, the S&P 500 lost 1,148.75 points. The 38%, 50% and 62% retracement levels are 2,673.93, 2,811.78 and 2,949.63, respectively. The S&P paused at the 38% level for just two days before breaking through it decisively, but it’s had more trouble making its way through 2,812, failing to hold above it for more than a day or two at a time (Chart 5). Should it escape 2,812, the 2,950 level waits just 5% higher. Chart 5Fibonacci Retracement Levels For The S&P 500 We are fundamental investors who do not get hung up on technical levels, though they can become self-fulfilling prophecies if enough participants are following them. Given the popularity of Fibonacci retracement, it is possible that a critical mass of short-term investors may view 2,812 and 2,950 as preferred levels for exiting long positions in the S&P. Our bigger near-term concern is that it is hard to see US equities making much more headway while the virus and ongoing distancing measures have the potential to cause investors to revise their fundamental expectations lower and/or lose a little bit of their policy-fueled nerve. Who's Left Holding The Bag? Multiple commentators have expressed alarm at the post-2008 increase in corporate debt, especially given anecdotal reports that lending covenants had been loosened dramatically. If the banks don’t hold the debt, as we’ve argued, who does, and could a wave of virus-inspired defaults cause larger problems in the financial system? The Fed’s fourth quarter Flow of Funds report, published last month, provides some clues, but does not answer the question definitively. As we saw in higher frequency data on aggregate banking system exposures, bank loans to nonfinancial corporations grew modestly (3.2% annualized) since December 31, 2008. Nonfinancial corporations borrowed in the bond market at double that rate (6.2% annualized). Foreign loans, powered by near doubling in 2017 and 2018, grew at an annualized 13.4% pace, and are four times as large as they were at the end of 2008. Finance company loans have shrunk, and trade payables grew at a modest 2% rate. (Chart 6). Chart 6Debt Risks Are Pretty Well Diffused Publicly available data from Preqin on the capital raised by direct lending funds suggests that their impact has been modest, accounting for only about a quarter of outstanding bank loans if every dollar they’ve raised is currently deployed. Demand for leveraged loans, senior floating-rate debt issued to high-yield borrowers, was occasionally intense as investors sought protection from rising rates. The desire for duration protection has faded as rates have plunged to new lows, but ETFs and CLOs were eager buyers at points during the last expansion. In a Special Report published last summer, our US Bond Strategy and Global Fixed Income Strategy services concluded that the ownership of leveraged loans is diffuse enough that credit strains are unlikely to pose a systemic threat. They were also encouraged that leveraged loans and high yield corporate bonds act as substitutes, keeping one another in check as investor preferences for fixed and floating instruments wax and wane. They also noted that leveraged loan lending standards had tightened last year, with a reduced share of covenant-lite loans being issued, though standards have eased again since they published their report (Chart 7). Chart 7Covenant Protections Have Eroded Chart 8Diverse Corporate Bond Ownership Will Help Mitigate The Effect Of Defaults There is no way around the fact that high yield corporate bondholders (Chart 8), owners of CLO tranches rated below AAA and leveraged loan holders face elevated credit losses as the broad economic shutdown provokes a wave of defaults in instruments without Fed support. We expect that the default losses will be spread out across enough constituents that they will not become worryingly concentrated, but they may contribute to a further erosion of risk appetites.       Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the April 23, 2020 Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Could The Pandemic Actually Raise Stock Prices?" available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Paumgarten, Nick. "The Price of a Pandemic." The New Yorker, April 20, 2020, pp. 20-24. The article, relaying traders’ conversations, contains some profanity. 3 Galchen, Rivka. "The Longest Shift." The New Yorker, April 27, 2020, pp. 20-26. The article, relaying ER conversations, contains some profanity.

Neutral Following up from last week’s report, we heed the message from our research to be wary of staples stocks at the depth of the recession and downgrade the S&P packaged foods index to neutral. Food & beverage store retail sales now garner 17% of total retail sales - a percentage last hit in the early 1990s. As a result, relative share price momentum came close to accelerating by triple digits on a short-term rate of change basis (middle panel). While such euphoria is warranted, we reckon that most if not all the good news is already reflected in prices, especially given the early signs of a possible reopening of the US economy some time next month. Importantly, sell side analyst optimism has climbed above the previous peak observed in late-2015/early-2016 when industry 12-month forward EPS were slated to outshine the broad market by over 10% (bottom panel). Bottom Line: Trim the S&P packaged foods index to neutral. This downgrade also pushes the S&P consumer staples sector to neutral. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5PACK – MDLZ, SJM, KHC, CPB, MKC, CAG, TSN, GIS, HSY, HRL, K, LW. For additional details please refer to our most recent Weekly Report.  

Special Report

Highlights A simple three-factor model has outperformed the DXY index since 1980. The main variables have been relative changes in interest rates, valuation and sentiment. The dominant factor varies from one currency to the next. The model recommends a barbell strategy over the next month – long SEK along with some safe havens. Commodity currencies remain a short. Feature Over the past few months, we have been trying to see if a rules-based approach in trading foreign exchange would have provided some sort of anchor amid the market chaos. In our February 7 report, we suggested that a currency investor could construct a long-term portfolio based on three criteria:1  A macroeconomic variable that captures the most important relative price between any two currencies: the real interest rate. A valuation measure that captures dislocation in a currency pair relative to its own history. A key assumption is stationarity, meaning the currency cross should mean-revert back to fair value over time. For this exercise, we use our adjusted purchasing power parity (PPP) models. More on this later. A sentiment indicator. We use a combination of the bullish consensus indicator published by martketvane.net and momentum measures that worked best. Other measures such as net speculative positioning from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) also provide relatively reliable results. This is a very simplistic approach, since foreign exchange markets discount a lot more macroeconomic information, and valuation measures span the spectrum of PPP, effective exchange rates, and behavioral and fundamental models. We intend to build upon the work laid out in this paper, but the goal is to see whether a simple trading rule has provided alpha for G10 currencies versus the US dollar. The good news is that it has. Since the 1980s, our three-factor model has outperformed the DXY index by 280%.  Since the 1980s, our three-factor model has outperformed the DXY index by 280% (Chart 1). There are three important considerations. First, the trading rules are generated monthly, which might be too frequent for hedging managers but make sense in the foreign exchange-trading world. This also made carry less important for excess returns. Second, the model has experienced some significant drawdowns. For example, the model started shorting the US dollar in 2014 (Chart 2) as it was making fresh highs. Since 2015, however, the DXY index has been broadly flat (EUR/USD is still above its 2015 lows). Otherwise, the USD has sold off massively against commodity FX and petrocurrencies. Finally, the model does now account for size in positioning. Chart 1Model Relative Return Chart 2DXY Trading Signal: > 0 = Buy; < 0 = Sell Part of the reason for the model’s volatility is its inherent design. The model is very aggressive in establishing long and short positions. This has paid off handsomely over time but can be quite painful in the short to medium term. In a nutshell, it provides a mechanical tool to anchor our ever-shifting fundamental biases towards currencies.  The Macro Factor Chart 3The Dollar And Interest Rates Diverge If a currency exchange rate is simply a measure of relative prices between two countries, then the most important price is the cost of money, or the interest rate. Over time, rising interest rates have usually been associated with an appreciating currency, and vice versa (Chart 3). Our trading rule for the macro model is as follows: First, only currencies with a positive real rate are eligible for long positions (negative real rate currencies are shorted). And second, this positive real rate should be rising relative to the US. We do not account for trading or hedging costs in this exercise, which are important considerations. The model has worked well most of the time, but less so for the commodity currencies and safe-haven currencies. The lack of terms-of-trade considerations is an important factor for commodity currencies. A buy-and-hold strategy for safe-haven currencies has also performed in line with the model, due to the significant upside safe-haven currencies command during market selloffs. A review of the results for each currency is available starting on page 7. The Value Factor Chart 4The USD Is Expensive According To PPP Valuation has proved to be a powerful catalyst for buying currencies over the longer term. In our previous work, we showed that value strategies in FX, especially based on PPP, needed an adjustment to be effective due to shortfalls in the measure.2 But once an adjustment was made, it was profitable to buy cheap currencies while selling expensive ones over the long term. While we look at a wide swath of currency valuation models, we only tested our adjusted PPP model for the purposes of this paper. Our in-house PPP models have undergone two crucial adjustments. In order to get closer to an “apples-to-apples” comparison across countries, we divide the consumer price index (CPI) baskets into five major groups: food, restaurants and hotels, shelter, health care, culture and recreation, and energy and transportation. We then take a weighted average combination of the five groups to form a synthetic relative price ratio. If, for example, shelter is 33% of the US CPI basket but 19% of the Swedish CPI basket, relative shelter prices will represent 26% of the combined price ratio. This allows for a uniform cross-sectional comparison, compared to using the national CPI weights. In most cases, this breakdown captures 90% of the national CPI basket. Buy currencies that are 5% or more cheaper than their PPP-implied fair value, and short currencies that are 5% or more overvalued.  The trading rule is simple. Buy currencies that are 5% or more cheaper than their PPP-implied fair value, and short currencies that are 5% or more overvalued. The outperformance versus a buy-and-hold strategy for the dollar was significant, but came with much volatility. The results also show that the cheapest currencies today are the Swedish krona and the Norwegian krone (Chart 4). The results for individual currencies are available on page 7. The Sentiment Factor We use a combination of the bullish consensus data published by martketvane.net and momentum measures for the sentiment component of the model. Speculative positioning tends to be our favorite contrarian indicator, but it has data limitations and is less effective as a monthly timing tool. The rules for the sentiment indicator encompass both the momentum and mean-reversion factor to exchange rates: If bullish sentiment (range is 0 – 100) is > 70, buy the currency. If it is < 30, sell the currency. If the one-month change in bullish sentiment is positive, buy. If it is negative, sell. If the 2-month return on a currency is > 10-month return, buy. If it is less, sell. The overarching theme from this exercise is that the US dollar is a momentum currency.3 Meanwhile, sentiment has proven to be quite agile in catching shifts in the FX market over the shorter term. We intend to explore this part of the paper in forthcoming iterations for more tactical trade ideas. Portfolio Calibration A composite model aggregates the signal from the three main factors. A buy signal is generated for values > =1 and a sell signal is generated for values < =1. The results are presented in Charts 5A and 5B. The model currently suggests a barbell strategy consisting off being long SEK, as well as the safe-haven currencies (CHF and JPY). The model is neutral on EUR, GBP, CAD, and NOK, while bearish on AUD and NZD. This fits with our near-term view that there could still be short-term upside to the US dollar, warranting holding a basket of the cheapest currencies as well as some safe havens. Chart 5ATrading Signal: >0 = Buy, <0 = Sell Chart 5BTrading Signal: >0 = Buy, <0 = Sell Kelly Zhong Research Analyst kellyz@bcaresearch.com   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Appendix Chart 6US Dollar Chart 7FX Model: The Euro Chart 8FX Model: British Pound Chart 9FX Model: Japanese Yen Chart 10FX Model: Australian Dollar Chart 11FX Model: New Zealand Dollar Chart 12FX Model: Canadian Dollar Chart 13FX Model: Swiss Franc Chart 14FX Model: Norwegian Krone Chart 15FX Model: Swedish Krona   Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled “Building A Protector Currency Portfolio”, dated February 7, 2020, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled “Value Strategies In FX Markets, Putting PPP To The Test”, dated May 11, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled, “Riding The Wave: Momentum Strategies In Foreign Exchange Markets”, dated December 8, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights The collapse in oil prices supercharges the geopolitical risks stemming from the global pandemic and recession. Low oil prices should discourage petro-states from waging war, but Iran may be an important exception. Russian instability is one of the most important secular geopolitical consequences of this year’s crisis. President Trump’s precarious status this election year raises the possibility of provocations or reactions on his part. Europe faces instability on its eastern and southern borders in coming years, but integration rather than breakup is the response. Over a strategic time frame, go long AAA-rated municipal bonds, cyber security stocks, infrastructure stocks, and China reflation plays. Feature Chart 1Someone Took Physical Delivery! Oil markets melted this week. Oil volatility measured by the Crude Oil ETF Volatility Index surpassed 300% as WTI futures for May 2020 delivery fell into a black hole, bottoming at -$40.40 per barrel (Chart 1). Our own long Brent trade, initiated on 27 March 2020 at $24.92 per barrel, is down 17.9% as we go to press. Strategically we are putting cash to work acquiring risk assets and we remain long Brent. The forward curve implies that prices will rise to $35 and $31 per barrel for Brent and WTI by April 2021. We initiated this trade because we assessed that: The US and EU would gradually reopen their economies (they are doing so). Oil production would be destroyed (more on this below). Russia and Saudi Arabia would agree to production cuts (they did). Monetary and fiscal stimulus would take effect (the tsunami of stimulus is still growing). Global demand would start the long process of recovery (no turn yet, unknown timing). On a shorter time horizon, we are defensively positioned but things are starting to look up on COVID-19 – New York Governor Andrew Cuomo has released results of a study showing that 15% of New Yorkers have antibodies, implying a death rate of only 0.5%. The US dollar and global policy uncertainty may be peaking as we go to press (Chart 2). However, second-order effects still pose risks that keep us wary. Chart 2Dollar And Policy Uncertainty Roaring Geopolitics is the “next shoe to drop” – and it is already dropping. A host of risks are flying under the radar as the world focuses on the virus. Taken alone, not every risk warrants a risk-off positioning. But combined, these risks reveal extreme global uncertainty which does warrant a risk-off position in the near term. This week’s threats between the US and Iran, in particular, show that the political and geopolitical fallout from COVID-19 begins now, it will not “wait” until the pandemic crisis subsides. In this report we focus on the risks from oil-producing economies, but we first we update our fiscal stimulus tally. Stimulus Tsunami Chart 3Stimulus Tsunami Still Building Policymakers responded to COVID-19 by doing “whatever it takes” to prop up demand (Chart 3). Please see the Appendix for our latest update of our global fiscal stimulus table. The latest fiscal and monetary measures show that countries are still adding stimulus – i.e. there is not yet a substantial shift away from providing stimulus: China has increased its measures to a total of 10% of GDP for the year so far, according to BCA Research China Investment Strategy. This includes a general increase in credit growth, a big increase in government spending (2% of GDP), a bank re-lending scheme (1.5% of GDP), an increase in general purpose local government bonds (2% of GDP), plus special purpose bonds (4% of GDP) and other measures. On the political front, the government has rolled out a new slogan, “the Six Stabilities and the Six Guarantees,” and President Xi Jinping said on an inspection tour to Shaanxi that the state will increase investments to ensure that employment is stabilized. This is the maximum reflationary signal from China that we have long expected. The US agreed to a $484 billion “fourth phase” stimulus package, bringing its total to 13% of GDP. President Trump is already pushing for a fifth phase involving bailouts of state and local governments and infrastructure, which we fully expect to take place even if it takes a bit longer than packages that have been passed so far this year. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has opened the way for the EU to issue Eurobonds, in keeping with our expectations. Germany is spending 12% of GDP in total – which can go much higher depending on how many corporate loans are tapped – while Italy is increasing its stimulus to 3% of GDP. As deficits rise to astronomical sums, and economies gradually reopen, will legislatures balk at passing new stimulus? Yes, eventually. Financial markets will have to put more pressure on policymakers to get them to pass more stimulus. This can lead to volatility. In the US the pandemic is coinciding with “peak polarization” over the 2020 election. Lack of coordination between federal and state governments is increasing uncertainty. Currently disputes center on the timing of economic reopening and the provisioning bailout funds for state and local governments. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell is threatening to deny bailouts for American states with large, unfunded public pension benefits (Chart 4A). He is insisting that the Senate “push the pause button” on coronavirus relief measures; specifically that nothing new be passed until the Senate convenes in Washington on May 4. He may then lead a charge in the Republican Senate to try to require structural reforms from states in exchange for bailouts. Estimates of the total state budget shortfall due to the crisis stand at $500 billion over the next three years, which is almost certainly an understatement (Chart 4B). Chart 4AUS States Have Unfunded Liabilities Chart 4BUS States Face Funding Shortfalls Could a local government or state declare bankruptcy? Not anytime soon. Technically there is no provision for states to declare bankruptcy. A constitutional challenge to such a declaration would go to the Supreme Court. One commonly cited precedent, Arkansas in 1933, ended up with a federal bailout.1 A unilateral declaration could conceivably become a kind of “Lehman moment” in the public sector, but state governors will ask their legislatures to provide more fiscal flexibility and will seek bailouts from the federal government first. The Federal Reserve is already committed to buying state and local bonds and can expand these purchases to keep interest rates low. Washington would be forced to provide at least short-term funding if state workers started getting fired in the midst of the crisis because of straightened state finances – another $500 billion for the states is entirely feasible in today’s climate. Constraints will prevail on the GOP Senate to provide state bailout funds. This conflict over state finances could have a negative impact on US equities in the near term, but it is largely a bluff – McConnell will lose this battle. The fundamental dynamic in Washington is that of populism combined with a pandemic that neutralizes arguments about moral hazard. Big-spending Democrats in the House of Representatives control the purse strings while big-spending President Trump faces an election. Senate Republicans are cornered on all sides – and their fate is tied to the President’s – so they will eventually capitulate. Bottom Line: The global fiscal and monetary policy tsunami is still building. But there are plenty of chances for near-term debacles. Over the long run the gargantuan stimulus is the signal while the rest is noise. Over the long run we expect the reflationary efforts to prevail and therefore we are long Treasury inflation-protected securities and US investment grade corporate bonds. We recommend going strategically long AAA-rated US municipal bonds relative to 10-year Treasuries. Petro-State Meltdown Since March we have highlighted that the collapse in oil prices will destabilize oil producers above and beyond the pandemic and recession. This leaves Iran in danger, but even threatens the stability of great powers like Russia. Normally there is something of a correlation between the global oil price and the willingness of petro-states to engage in war (Chart 5). Chart 5Petro-States Cease Fire When Oil Drops When prices fall, revenues dry up and governments have to prioritize domestic stability. This tends to defer inter-state conflict. We can loosely corroborate this evidence by showing that global defense stocks tend to be correlated with oil prices (Chart 6). Global growth is the obvious driver of both of these indicators. But states whose budgets are closely tied to the commodity cycle are the most likely to cut defense spending. Chart 6Global Growth Drives Oil And Guns Russia is case in point. Revenues from Rostec, one of Russia’s largest arms firms, rise and fall with the Urals crude oil price (Chart 7). The Russians launch into foreign adventures during oil bull markets, when state coffers are flush with cash. They have an uncanny way of calling the top of the cycle by invading countries (Chart 8). Chart 7Oil Correlates With Russian Arms Sales Chart 8Russian Invasions Call Peak In Oil Bull Markets Chart 9Turkish Political Risk On The Rise In the current oil rout, there is already some evidence of hostilities dying down in this way. For instance, after years of dogged fighting in Yemen, Saudi Arabia is finally declaring a ceasefire there. Turkey, which benefits from low oil prices, has temporarily gotten the upper hand in Libya vis-à-vis Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army, which depends on oil revenues and backing from petro-states like Russia and the GCC. Of course, Turkey’s deepening involvement in foreign conflicts is evidence of populism at home so it does not bode well for the lira or Turkish assets (Chart 9). But it does highlight the impact of weak oil on petro-players such as Haftar. However, the tendency of petro-states to cease fire amid low prices is merely a rule of thumb, not a law of physics. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Already we are seeing that Iran is defying this dynamic by engaging in provocative saber-rattling with the United States. Iran And Iraq The US and Iran are rattling sabers again. One would think that Iran, deep in the throes of recession and COVID-19, would eschew a conflict with the US at a time when a vulnerable and anti-Iranian US president is only seven months away from an election. Chart 10US Maximum Pressure On Iran Iran has survived nearly two years of “maximum pressure” from President Trump (Chart 10), and previous US sanction regimes, and has a fair chance of seeing the Democrats retake Washington. The Democrats would restart negotiations to restore the 2015 nuclear deal, which was favorable to Iran. Therefore risking air strikes from President Trump is counterproductive and potentially disastrous. Yet this logic only holds if the Iranian regime is capable of sustaining the pain of a pandemic and global recession on top of its already collapsing economy. Iran’s ability to circumvent sanctions to acquire funds depended on the economy outside of Iran doing fine. Now Iran’s illicit funds are drying up. This could lead to a pullback in funding for militant proxies across the region as Iran cuts costs. But it also removes the constraint on Iran taking bolder actions. If the economy is collapsing anyway then Iran can take bigger risks. Furthermore if Iran is teetering, there may be an incentive to initiate foreign conflicts to refocus domestic angst. This could be done without crossing Trump’s red lines by attacking Iraq or Saudi Arabia. With weak oil demand, Iran’s leverage declines. But a major attack would reduce oil production and accelerate the global supply-demand rebalance. Iran’s attack on the Saudi Abqaiq refinery last September took six million barrels per day offline briefly, but it was clearly not intended to shut down that production permanently. Threats against shipping in the Persian Gulf bring about 14 million barrels per day into jeopardy (Chart 11). Chart 11Closing Hormuz Would Be The Biggest Oil Shock Ever Iran-backed militias in Iraq have continued to attack American assets and have provoked American air strikes over the past month, despite the near-war scenario that erupted just before COVID. Iranian ships have harassed US naval ships in recent days. President Trump has ordered the navy to destroy ships that threaten it; Iranian commander has warned that Iran will sink US warships that threaten its ships in the Gulf. There is a 20% chance of armed hostilities between the US and Iran. Why would Iran be willing to confront the United States? First, Iran rightly believes that the US is war-weary and that Trump is committed to withdrawing from the Middle East. But this could prompt a fateful mistake. The equation changes if the US public is incensed and Trump’s election campaign could benefit from conflict. Chart 12Youth Pose Stability Risk To Iran Second, the US is never going to engage in a ground invasion of Iran. Airstrikes would not easily dislodge the regime. They could have the opposite effect and convert an entire generation of young, modernizing Iranians into battle-hardened supporters of the Islamic revolution (Chart 12). This is a dire calculation that the Iranian leaders would only make if they believed their regime was about to collapse. But they are quite possibly the closest to collapse that they have been since the 1980s and nobody knows where their pain threshold lies. They are especially vulnerable as the regime approaches the uncharted succession of Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei. Since early 2018 we have argued that there is a 20% chance of armed hostilities between the US and Iran. We upgraded this to 40% in June 2019 and downgraded it back to 20% after the Iranians shied from direct conflict this January. Our position remains the same 20%. This is still a major understated risk at a time when the global focus is entirely elsewhere. It will persist into 2021 if Trump is reelected. If the Democrats win the US election, this war risk will abate. The Iranians will play hard to get but they are politically prohibited from pursuing confrontation with the US when a 2015-type deal is available. This would open up the possibility for greater oil supply to be unlocked in the future, but sanctions are not likely to be lifted till 2022 at earliest. Russia Russia may not be on the verge of invading anyone, but it is internally vulnerable and fully capable of striking out against foreign opponents. Cyberattacks, election interference, or disinformation campaigns would sow confusion or heighten tensions among the great powers. The Russian state is suffering a triple whammy of pandemic, recession, and oil collapse. President Vladimir Putin’s approval rating has fallen this year so far, whereas other leaders in the western world have all seen polling bounces (even President Trump, slightly) (Chart 13). Putin postponed a referendum designed to keep him in office through 2036 due to the COVID crisis. In other words, the pandemic has already disrupted his carefully laid succession plans. While Putin can bypass a referendum, he would have been better off in the long run with the public mandate. Generally it is Putin’s administration, not his personal popularity, that is at risk, but the looming impact on Russian health and livelihoods puts both in jeopardy (Chart 14) and requires larger fiscal outlays to try to stabilize approval (Chart 15). Chart 13Putin Saw No COVID Popularity Bump Chart 14Russian Regime Faces Political Discontent Moreover, regardless of popular opinion, Putin is likely to settle scores with the oligarchs. The fateful decision to clash with the Saudis in March, which led to the oil collapse, will fall on Igor Sechin, Chief Executive of Rosneft, and his faction. An extensive political purge may well ensue that would jeopardize domestic stability (Chart 16). Chart 15Russia To Focus On Domestic Stability Chart 16Russian Political Risk Will Rise Russian tensions with the US will rise over the US election in November. The Democrats would seek to make Russia pay for interfering in US politics to help President Trump win in 2016. But even President Trump may no longer be a reliable “ally” of Putin given that Putin’s oil tactics have bankrupted the US shale industry during Trump’s reelection campaign. The American and Russian air forces are currently sparring in the air space over Syria and the Mediterranean. The US has also warned against a malign actor threatening to hack the health care system of the Czech Republic, which could be Russia or another actor like North Korea or Iran. These issues have taken place off the radar due to the coronavirus but they are no less real for that. Venezuela We have predicted Venezuela’s regime change for several years but the oil meltdown, pandemic, and insufficient Russian and Chinese support should put the final nail in the regime’s coffin. Hugo Chavez’s rise to power, the last “regime change,” occurred as oil prices bottomed in 1998. Historically the Venezuelan armed forces have frequently overthrown civilian authorities, but in several cases not until oil prices recovered (Chart 17). Chart 17Venezuelan Coups Follow Oil Rebounds The US decision to designate Nicolas Maduro as a “narco-terrorist,” to deploy greater naval and coast guard assets around Venezuela, to reassert the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary, and to pull Chevron from the country all suggest that Washington is preparing for regime change. Such a change may or may not involve any American orchestration. Venezuela is an easy punching-bag for President Trump if he seeks to “wag the dog” ahead of the election. Venezuela would be a strategic prize and yet it cannot hurt the US economy or financial markets substantially, giving limited downside to President Trump if he pursues such a strategy. Obviously any conflict with Venezuela this year is far less relevant to global investors than one with Iran, North Korea, China, or Russia. Regime change would be positive for oil supply and negative for prices over the long run. But that is a story for the next cycle of energy development, as it would take years for government and oil industry change in Venezuela to increase production. The US election cycle is a critical aggravating factor for all of these petro-state risks. Shale producers are going bankrupt, putting pressure on the economy and some swing states. The risk of a conflict arises not only from Trump playing “wag the dog” after the crisis abates, but also from other states provoking the president, causing him to react or overreact. The “Other Guys” Oil producers outside the US, Canada, gulf OPEC, and Russia – the “other guys” – are extremely vulnerable to this year’s global crisis and price collapse. Comprising half of global production, they were already seeing production declines and a falling global market share over the past decade when they should have benefited from a global economic expansion. They never recovered from the 2014-15 oil plunge and market share war (Chart 18). Angola (1.4 million barrels per day), Algeria (one million barrels per day), and Nigeria (1.8 million barrels per day) are relatively sizable producers whose domestic stability is in question in the coming years as they cut budgets and deplete limited forex reserves to adjust to the lower oil price. This means fewer fiscal resources to keep political and regional factions cooperating and provide basic services. Algeria is particularly vulnerable. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who ruled as a strongman from 1999, was forced out last year, leaving a power vacuum that persists under Prime Minister Abdelaziz Djerad, in the wake of the low-participation elections in December. An active popular protest movement, Hirak, already exists and is under police suppression. Unemployment is high, especially among the youth. Neighboring Libya is in the midst of a war and extremist militants within Libya and North Africa would like to expand their range of operations in a destabilized Algeria. Instability would send immigrants north to Europe. Oil production will be reduced involuntarily as well as voluntarily this year due to regime failures. Brazil is not facing the risk of state failure like Algeria, but it is facing a deteriorating domestic political outlook (Chart 19). President Jair Bolsonaro’s popularity was already low relative to most previous presidents before COVID. His narrow base in the Chamber of Deputies got narrower when he abandoned his political party. He has defied the pandemic, refused to endorse social distancing or lockdown orders by local governments, and fired his Health Minister Luiz Henrique Mandetta. Chart 18Petro-States: 'Other Guys' Face Instability Chart 19Brazilian Political Risk Rising Again Brazil has a high number of coronavirus deaths per million people relative to other emerging markets with similar health capacity and susceptibility to the disease. This, combined with sharply rising unemployment, could prove toxic for Bolsonaro, who has not received a bounce in popular opinion from the crisis like most other world leaders. Thus on balance we expect the October local elections to mark a comeback for the Worker’s Party. The limited fiscal gains of Bolsonaro’s pension reform are already wiped out by the global recession, which will set back the country’s frail recovery from its biggest recession in a century. The country is still on an unsustainable fiscal path. Bolsonaro does not have a strong personal commitment to neoliberal structural reform, which has been put aside anyway due to the need for government fiscal spending amid the crisis. Unless Bolsonaro’s popularity increases in the wake of the crisis – due to backlash against the state-level lockdowns – the economic shock is negative for Brazil’s political stability and economic policy orthodoxy. Bottom Line: Our rule of thumb about petro-states suggests that they will generally act less aggressive amid a historic oil price collapse, but Iran may prove a critical exception. Investors should not underestimate the risk of a US-Iran conflict this year. Beyond that, the US election will have a decisive impact as the Democrats will seek to resume the Iranian nuclear deal and Iran would eventually play ball. Venezuela is less globally relevant this year – although a “wag the dog” scenario is a distinct possibility – but it may well be a major oil supply surprise in the 2020s. More broadly the takeaway is that oil production will be reduced involuntarily as well as voluntarily this year due to regime failures. Investment Takeaways Obviously any conflict with Iran could affect the range of Middle Eastern OPEC supply, not just the portion already shuttered due to sanctions on Iran itself. Any Iran war risk is entirely separate from the risk of supply destruction from more routine state failures in Africa. These shortages have been far less consequential lately and have plenty of room to grow in significance (Chart 20). The extreme lows in oil prices today will create the conditions for higher oil prices later when demand recovers, via supply destruction. Chart 20More Unplanned Outages To Come Chart 21European Political Risk No Longer Underrated An important implication – to be explored in future reports – is that Europe’s neighborhood is about to get a lot more dangerous in the coming years, as the Middle East and Russia will become less stable. Middle East instability will result in new waves of immigration and terrorism after a lull since 2015-16. These waves would fuel right-wing political sentiment in parts of Europe that are the most vulnerable in today’ crisis: Italy, Spain, and France (Chart 21). This should not be equated with the EU breaking apart, however, as the populist parties in these countries are pursuing soft rather than hard Euroskepticism. Unless that changes the risk is to the Euro Area’s policy coherence rather than its existence. Finally Russian domestic instability is one of the major secular consequences of the pandemic and recession and its consequences could be far-reaching, particularly in its great power struggle with the United States. We are reinitiating a strategic long in cyber security stocks, the ISE Cyber Security Index, relative to the S&P500 Info Tech sector. Cyberattacks are a form of asymmetrical warfare that we expect to ramp up with the general increase in global geopolitical tensions. The US’s recent official warning against an unknown actor that apparently intended to attack the health system of the Czech Republic highlights the way in which malign actors could attempt to capitalize on the chaos of the pandemic. We also recommend strategic investors reinitiate our “China Play Index” – commodities and equities sensitive to China’s reflation – and our BCA Infrastructure Basket, which will benefit from Chinese reflation as well as US deficit spending. China’s reflation will help industrial metals more so than oil, but it is positive for the latter as well. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 John Mauldin, "Don't Be So Sure That States Can't Go Bankrupt," Forbes, July 28, 2016, forbes.com.   Section II: Appendix : GeoRisk Indicator China Russia UK Germany France Italy Canada Spain Taiwan Korea Turkey Brazil Appendix Table 1 The Global Fiscal Stimulus Response To COVID-19 Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights Uncertainty over the duration of lockdowns globally will continue to hamper the estimation of the global demand recovery for commodities. This uncertainty will continue to fuel safe-haven demand for USD for the balance of 2Q20. In addition, markets continue to experience a shortage of USD, which can become acute for EM debtors servicing dollar-denominated debt. The combination of safe-haven demand and a continued dollar shortage will keep the USD well bid, which will, at the margin, suppress commodity demand, compounding the effects of COVID-19-induced demand destruction. The Fed will continue to accommodate USD demand, in an ongoing attempt to reverse a tightening of global financial conditions, which also reduces the level of economic activity and commodity demand. Commodity demand will recover in 2H20. Given the expected earlier recovery of China from the COVID-19-induced commodity-demand destruction – and the fiscal and monetary stimulus being deployed by the Communist Party of China (CCP) – base metals and grain prices should recover earlier than other commodities.  Oil likely recovers in 3Q20, as the COVID-19 pandemic is contained and supply cuts – voluntary and involuntary – take hold. We remain long gold as a portfolio hedge against continued global policy uncertainty. Feature The short-term path forward for commodity prices will be a function of uncertainty regarding the global economic recovery and its impact on the US dollar, which, at present, remains well bid and is keeping global financial conditions tight. The sharp USD appreciation – mostly vs. EM currencies – is a response to the COVID-19 economic shock, which intensified in March. This significantly tightened global financial conditions (Chart of the Week). EM economies’ capacity to withstand the hit to aggregate demand locally – caused by widespread lockdown measures meant to contain the spread of the virus – has led to capital outflows. EM economies, therefore, are forced to combat a combination of plunging currencies, crumpling domestic and export demand, and increasing financing costs. Low risk appetite globally and diminished liquidity in money and credit markets add to USD demand, and will keep it elevated over the next few months. Chart of the WeekEM Currencies Plunged Vs. The USD Chart 2Commodity-Intensive Industries Are Vulnerable To USD Shocks After that, we expect the dollar will reverse – mostly on the back of massive Fed accommodation to redress these factors – in 2H20. As COVID-19-induced demand destruction abates, this weakening in the USD will propel EM economic growth higher and bolster commodity demand (Chart 2). USD Well Bid On Safe-Haven Demand, Dollar Shortage The dollar could retest its recent highs in the short term. Heightened volatility over the past two months powered a surge in demand for safe havens and highly liquid risk assets globally. We expect this to persist as stringent lockdowns remain in place to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. This will keep economic policy uncertainty elevated. Over the short term, the USD will benefit in this environment. Demand for USD and dollar-denominated assets will remain strong. Indeed, our FX strategists believe the dollar could retest its recent highs (Chart 3).1 Chart 3Global Uncertainty Lifts The US Dollar And Rates Since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), US dollar movements have been a prime driver of cross-currency basis swaps and can be indicative of risk-taking capacity in capital markets.2 Also, a rising dollar limits the cross-border supply of dollar-denominated loans and increases funding costs. The Fed is monitoring domestic and global liquidity conditions closely, and is fulfilling the role of global USD lender of last resort. Its rapid extension of swap lines to foreign central banks, as well as a temporary repo facility for foreign and international monetary authorities (FIMA), temporarily eased liquidity concerns in some regions (Chart 4). Chart 4Fed Actions Have Eased Global Liquidity Constraints   It is too early to presume the dollar liquidity constraints have been wholly contained. However, it is too early to presume the dollar liquidity constraints have been wholly contained. The Fed cannot force foreign central banks to direct these dollars to the sectors in which they are needed in their domestic economies. Besides, not all EMs have access to these swap lines. This means much-needed swap lines are inaccessible to a significant portion of the global financial system. In addition, close to 60% of outstanding foreign exchange swaps/forwards involve non-bank financial and other institutions.3 It is highly likely, therefore, the Fed will have to provide additional liquidity to struggling foreign entities. We believe the Fed is well aware of these constraints on global growth and is addressing the need for additional global USD liquidity. However, as has been the case throughout the post-GFC period, policy action will continue to be uncertain as to its duration and its effectiveness. Combined with expanding fiscal deficits in the US, we believe this extraordinary accommodation by the Fed will considerably increase USD supply this year. Following a volatile 2Q20, we expect the US dollar will face severe downward pressures – assuming lockdown measures are successful in containing the pandemic and are gradually lifted. With interest rates now close to zero in most DM economies, relative balance-sheet dynamics will become important drivers of exchange rates (Chart 5). Ample liquidity globally will propel pro-cyclical currencies up and the combination of fiscal and monetary easing could lead to a debasing of the dollar next year as inflationary pressures intensify. Momentum will start working against the dollar in 2H20. Chart 5Massive QE In The US Will Pressure The USD Downward USD Strength Hinders Global Growth The dollar’s importance as a driver of EM – and global – industrial production cycles has increased and, because EM economies account for a larger share of aggregate commodity demand, its link with commodity prices also has strengthened. The strong dollar remains a headwind to global growth – particularly in EM economies – as it pushes up funding costs and tightens financial conditions. This negative dollar shock adds to the devastating effects of lockdowns, record portfolio outflows, and collapsing commodity prices on EM economies (Chart 6). Since the GFC, the dollar’s importance as a driver of EM – and global – industrial production cycles has increased and, because EM economies account for a larger share of aggregate commodity demand, its link with commodity prices also has strengthened (Chart 7). EM economies’ rising responsiveness to dollar movements is in part explained by their growing share of foreign USD-denominated debt, a larger foreign ownership of their sovereign debt, and increasing integration into global supply chains, in which transactions typically are invoiced in dollars (Chart 8). Chart 6Record Portfolio Outflows From EM   Chart 7Brent Prices Are Closely Correlated With EM Currencies Post-GFC Chart 8EM Vulnerability To The USD Increased Since The GFC Elevated economic uncertainty – which drives up the dollar convenience yield and reduces cross-border dollar lending – pushes up the dollar and tightens financial conditions globally, and ultimately spills over to the real economy. Thus, elevated economic uncertainty – which drives up the dollar convenience yield and reduces cross-border dollar lending – pushes up the dollar and tightens financial conditions globally, and ultimately spills over to the real economy. Interestingly, this relationship is non-linear and asymmetric – i.e. the dollar’s impact on commodity prices is higher in dollar bull markets, and positive dollar changes have a greater impact. For instance, its impact on oil prices is 30% stronger in dollar-appreciation cycles. Large increases in the relative value of the USD – on a monthly, weekly, or daily basis – have a disproportionate negative impact on oil prices compared to large decreases (Chart 9). Hence, sudden rushes to safe and liquid assets in periods of rising global economic uncertainty have a magnified negative effect on commodity prices. This means the recovery in commodity prices will be more gradual. Chart 9Asymmetric Impact Of USD Changes On Commodity Prices Base Metals Could Recover In 2Q20 Gold will benefit from the continued uncertainty and system-wide risk aversion over the coming months. The USD strength is keeping commodity demand growth in check. Until uncertainty re the speed of economic recovery dissipates – mainly vis-à-vis EM economies – commodity prices will remain under pressure (Chart 10). Base metals and grain prices could recover earlier than other commodities given the expected earlier recovery of China from the COVID-19-induced commodity-demand destruction – and the fiscal and monetary stimulus being deployed by the CCP. Specifically, copper prices could decouple from the USD, following China’s economic growth as it contributes close to 50% of both supply and demand of refined copper (Chart 11). Chart 10USD Strength Will Weigh Down Commodity Prices In 2Q20 Chart 11Metals' Prices Will React To China's Economic Recovery Oil will rebound in 3Q20 as the COVID-19 pandemic is contained and supply cuts – voluntary and involuntary – take hold. China consumes a smaller 14% of world oil demand, which is not sufficient to support a sustainable rally in prices on its own. For 2Q20, the correlation with the USD will intensify and weigh down its price (Chart 12). Lastly, gold will benefit from the continued uncertainty and system-wide risk aversion over the coming months. Bottom Line: As the global economy recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic and things get back to normal in 2H20, the USD will weaken and commodity prices will rebound. These two factors will halt the deflationary impulse from the COVID-19 demand shock. On the back of this improvement, we expect inflation expectations to recover throughout 2021 (Chart 13). Chart 12Oil Prices' Correlation With The USD Increases In Contango Chart 13Weaker USD, Rising Commodity Prices Will Revive Inflation Expectations   Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com     Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight Oil price volatility as measured by the Crude Oil ETF Volatility Index (OVX) surged to above 300% earlier this week as WTI futures for May 2020 delivery fell to a low of -$40.40/bbl (Chart 14). Unprecedented negative pricing for the North American benchmark crude oil will accelerate supply destruction and bankruptcies among highly levered, unprofitable E+P companies operating in the principal shale basins, particularly the Permian. We will be looking at the supply-side implications of the massive price volatility, coupled with the first-ever negative pricing for the benchmark crude oil in next week’s publication. We currently expect US production to fall 1.5mm b/d this year. Base Metals: Neutral Front month Singapore Iron Ore Futures continue to perform relatively well, with the 62% Fines contracts hovering around $83/MT. This contract is down 5.3% ytd, after having peaked in January at $92/MT. Chinese steel inventories while elevated, have started to turn the corner since Mid-March when they reached a record 26 Mn MT (Chart 15). Resilience in iron ore and steel reflects favorable fundamentals, as Chinese manufactures starting to get back to business are reviving demand in China, and as supply concerns stemming from reduced mine activity among major mining groups around the world persist. Precious Metals: Neutral We are going long palladium at tonight’s close, following its break below $2,000/oz. We expect the global economy to recover in 2H20 on the back of massive fiscal and monetary stimulus. We expect this will be supportive of consumer spending, particularly automobiles. Palladium is essential to pollution-abatement technology in gasoline-powered cars. While work is being undertaken to rehabilitate South Africa’s derelict power grid, this is at least a five-year effort. In the meantime, rolling backouts will continue to threaten the 73% of global palladium supply produced in South Africa. Ags/Softs:  Underweight CBOT corn May futures fell 1.55% on Tuesday, closing at $3.09/bu, the lowest level since 2009. Corn has been under pressure in recent weeks as the COVID-19 pandemic caused large demand destruction for this grain. Initially, this stemmed from a lower ethanol demand. However, concerns over a slowdown in demand for cattle feed has impacted corn demand as meat plants close in North America. Chart 14Crude Oil ETF Volatility Index Surged Over 300% Chart 15Chinese Steel Inventories Have Turned The Corner     Footnotes 1     Please see QE And Currencies, published by BCA Research’s Foreign Exchange Strategy April 17, 2020. It is available at fes.bcareserach.com. 2     Please see Avdjiev, Stefan, Wenxin Du, Cathérine Koch, and Hyun Song Shin. 2019. "The Dollar, Bank Leverage, and Deviations from Covered Interest Parity." American Economic Review: Insights, 1 (2): 193-208. 3     Please see Capitulation?, published by BCA Research’s Foreign Exchange Strategy April 3, 2020. It is available at fes.bcareserach.com.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2019 Q4 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2020 Summary of Closed Trades