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Working from home has become much more common following the COVID-19 pandemic. This trend may remain in place for years to come, even if life regains a semblance of normality. Professors Jonathan Dingel and Brent Neiman from the University of Chicago…
On Friday, the US unemployment rate fell from 11.1% to 10.2%, beating expectations of 10.5%. While this is a positive number, optimism must be tempered. The survey was conducted in the second week of July, before live-trackers began to decline in response to…
The S&P health care equipment (HCE) index is our only overweight within the health care universe, and over the past several weeks the index has been ripping higher. One of the likely catalysts behind the recent rally in US health care equipment manufacturers is the dollar. With exports accounting for a large portion of overall sales, a depreciating US dollar boosts international competitiveness of US manufacturers (middle panel). In turn, HCE stocks enjoy top line growth. On the domestic front the news is also welcoming. Our operating margin proxy, which gauges the difference between the industry’s PPI and wage bill, has made a clear U-turn (bottom panel). The upshot is that earnings will get a boost from this looming margin expansion. Bottom Line: We remain overweight the S&P HCE index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the index are: BLBG: S5HCEP – ABT, MDT, DHR, BDX, SYK, ISRG, BSX, BAX, EW, ZBH, IDXX, RMD, TFX, HOLX, ABMD, VAR, STE, DXCM.  
Special Report Highlights Even after the COVID-19 pandemic is over, likely within 18 months, many behavioral changes that were forced on society by social distancing will remain. Individuals who have gotten used to working from home, shopping online, and using the internet for socializing and entertainment will continue to do so. Amid any large structural shift, it is easier to spot losers than winners. The biggest losers are likely to be: (1) Parts of the real estate industry, as companies shed expensive city-center office space and office workers move away from big cities; and (2) the travel industry, since business travel will decline. The winners will include: Health care (as governments spend to strengthen medical services); capital-goods producers (with US manufacturers increasingly reshoring production but automating more); and the broadly-defined IT sector which, while expensively valued, is nowhere near its 2000 level and has several years of strong growth ahead.   “We always overestimate the change that will occur in the next two years and underestimate the change that will occur in the next ten.” –  Bill Gates “There are decades where nothing happens, and there are weeks where decades happen.” –  Lenin Introduction The world has been turned upside down since February by the coronavirus pandemic. Households all around the globe have been forced to stay indoors; companies have been forced to drastically change working practices; some industries, such as online shopping or videoconferencing software, have seen a surge in demand. But once the pandemic is over, how many of these changes will stick? What will be the long-term impact on society, the workplace, consumer attitudes, and companies’ strategic planning? How should investors position themselves to take advantage of secular changes in the sectors that will be most affected, ranging from health care and technology, to real estate, retailing, and travel? In this Special Report (which should be read in conjunction with two other recent BCA Research Special Reports on the macro-economic and geopolitical consequences, respectively, of COVID-191), we look at the social and industry implications of the coronavirus pandemic. We assume that, within the next 12-to-18 months, the pandemic will be a thing of the past, either because a vaccine has been developed, or because enough people have caught it for herd immunity to develop. This does not mean that people will be unconcerned about a reoccurrence, or about a new virus triggering another epidemic. Pandemics are not rare, even in modern history (Table 1). And COVID-19 may return as an annual mild seasonal flu (as the 1968 Asian flu did), but which is not serious enough to alter behavior. But the assumption in this report is that, within a couple of years, people will feel comfortable again about being in crowded spaces and traveling, without a need for social distancing or periodic lockdowns. Table 1Estimated Mortality And Infection Rates Of Pandemics During The Past Century But that doesn’t mean that everything will return to the status quo ante. At least some individuals who have gotten used to working from home, video conferencing, and shopping online will continue these practices. Companies will, therefore, need to rethink their employment policies, as well as how they manage their office space, global supply chains, and just-in-time inventories. Government policies towards health care and education will need to be rethought. None of these changes are new. Indeed, the result of an exogenous shock is often simply to accelerate trends that were already in place. E-commerce, telecommuting, and “reshoring” have already been growing steadily for years. COVID-19 is, however, likely to accelerate these shifts. Not every individual or company will change their behavior, but even small changes at the margin can have a significant impact. Ultimately, what these changes amount to is a liberalization of space and time. Employees do not need to be in the same physical space to work together. Students can choose when to listen to a lecture. Music lovers based in a small city can have the same access to a live (streamed) concert as those in London or New York. This Special Report is divided into two sections. In the first section, we examine the meta-changes in consumer and corporate behavior that could result from the pandemic. How widely will the shift from office-based work to “working from home” stick? How much will shopping, entertainment, and education stay online? Will companies really bring back a large chunk of manufacturing from overseas? In the second section, we analyze the impact on specific industries, such as real estate, health care, technology, and retailing, and make some suggestions as to how investors should tilt their portfolios over the longer term to take advantage of these trends. In summary, we identify the winners as health care, technology, and capital-goods producers. The clear losers are in real estate and travel. Retailing and consumer goods will see a significant shakeout, with both winners and losers, but the overall impact on these industries will be neutral. Social Impacts Working From Home Teleworking, or working from home, is hardly new. Craftsmen before the industrial revolution did so as a matter of course. But the development of computers and telecommunications in the 1980s made it feasible for white-collar workers to work from home too. As Peter Drucker wrote as long ago as 1993: "...commuting to office work is obsolete. It is now infinitely easier, cheaper and faster to do what the nineteenth century could not do: move information, and with it office work, to where the people are."2  Until now, however, teleworking has been rare. But the requirements imposed by the pandemic could cause that to change. Technically, it is possible for workers in many job categories to telework effectively. A recent study by Jonathan Dingel and Brent Neiman3 estimated, based on job characteristics, that it is feasible for 37% of all jobs in the US to be done entirely from home (46% if weighted by wages). The vast majority of jobs in sectors such as education, professional services, and company management could be done from home (Table 2). Extending the analysis to other countries, they find that more than 35% of jobs in most developing countries can be done from home, but less than 25% in manufacturing-heavy emerging economies such as Turkey and Mexico (Chart 1). Table 2Share Of Jobs That Can Be Done At Home, By Industry Chart 1Share Of Jobs That Can Be Done At Home, By Country But, in practice, before the coronavirus pandemic, many fewer people than this worked from home. Partly this was simply because many companies did not allow it. A survey by OWL Labs in 2018 found that 44% of companies around the world required employees to work from an office, with no option to work remotely.4 The percentage was even higher, 53%, in both Asia and Latin America. By contrast, OWL did find that 52% of employees globally worked from home at least occasionally, and that as many as 18% of respondents reported working from home always. The pandemic forced many white-collar workers to telework for the first time. The Pew Research Center found that 40% of US adults – and as many as 62% of those with at least a bachelor’s degree – worked from home during the crisis.5  How white-collar workers found the experience, and whether they plan to continue to work from home some of the time even if not required to do so, vary widely. Employers are generally positive about the idea. A survey of hiring managers by Upwork found that 56% believed that remote working functioned better than expected during the crisis (Chart 2). They cited reduced meetings, fewer distractions, increased productivity, and greater autonomy as reasons for this. The major drawbacks were technological issues, reduced team cohesion, and communication difficulties. Another survey, by realtor Redfin, found that 76% of US office workers had worked from home during the crisis (compared to only 36% who worked from home at least some of the time beforehand) and that 33% of respondents who had not worked remotely pre-shutdown expect to work remotely after shutdowns end (with another 39% unsure) (Chart 3). Chart 2Employers Found That Teleworking Worked Well Chart 3Many Employees Expect To Continue Working Remotely After The Pandemic Ends But there are problems too. Research published in the Journal of Applied Psychology found that, while teleworking has some clear advantages, such as improved work-family interface, greater job satisfaction, and enhanced autonomy, it also has drawbacks. Most notably, if workers aren’t in the office at least half the week, relationships with fellow workers suffer, as does collaboration.6 There are also developed countries where backward technology has made the experience of working from home difficult. This is particularly the case in Japan. A survey by the Japan Productivity Center found that 66% of office workers said their productivity fell when working from home; 43% were dissatisfied with the experience. The reasons cited for the dissatisfaction were “lack of access to documents when not in the office” (49%), “a poor telecommunications environment” (44%), and a difficult working environment, such as lack of desk space (44%). Japanese companies remain rather paper-based, and household living space tends to be small. Research carried out on employees at Chinese online travel company Ctrip before the pandemic concluded that home working led to a 13% performance increase but, crucially, there were four requirements for working from home to succeed: Children must be in school or daycare; employees must have a home office that is not a bedroom; complete privacy in that room is essential; and employees must have a choice of whether to work from home.7  After the pandemic, a significant shift in the pattern of office work is likely. Many workers will work remotely part or most of the time. But they will also benefit from coming to an office a certain number of days a month to work together, bond with co-workers, exchange ideas, etc. Online Shopping E-commerce has been growing steadily for years. In the US, it increased by 15% year-on-year in 2019, to reach $602 bn, or 16% of total retail sales (Charts 4 and 5). The share is even higher in some other countries: For example, 25% in China and 22% in the UK. The pandemic caused a big acceleration in e-commerce the first few months of this year, as consumers in most countries around the world were either not allowed to go outside, or felt unsafe doing so. Chart 4The Share Of E-commerce Has Been Steadily Expanding For Years… Data from Mastercard show that, in the worst period of lockdowns in April, e-commerce grew by 63% in the US, and 64% in the UK year-on-year, compared to a decline of 15% and 8%, respectively, in overall retail sales (Chart 6). The growth was particularly apparent in products such as home improvement, footwear, and apparel (Chart 7). Chart 5…With Growth Of Around 15% A Year Chart 6In April, Online Sales Soared…   Chart 7…Especially In Certain Categories Moreover, many consumers in advanced economies bought goods such as clothing, medicine, and books online for the first time, and used services such as online grocery delivery, and apps to order food from restaurants (Chart 8). Note, however, that few consumers bought financial services, magazines, music, and videos online for the first time. Presumably these are products that the vast majority of households had already been consuming online. Chart 8Consumers Shifted Purchases Of Many Items Online It is hard to know how sticky these trends will be. Once shops permanently reopen without restrictions, will consumers simply return to their old habits of going to supermarkets, restaurants, and clothing stores? Perhaps many enjoy the experience of browsing. It seems likely, however, that the newly acquired habit of shopping online will at least accelerate the trend towards e-commerce. Many of those who ordered, for example, supermarket deliveries online for the first time will continue to do so at least occasionally in the future. Other changes are likely too: Many smaller retailers were forced to close their physical stores during the pandemic and so had no choice but to set up an online delivery service. Some struggled with this, but others were aided by companies such as Shopify, which simplify the process of setting up a website, processing payments, and arranging delivery. Shopify now works with over a million merchants. These smaller retailers are now better able to compete with giants such as Amazon. During the lockdown, US consumers notably diversified their online product searches away from Amazon and Google to smaller retailers (Chart 9). Chart 9Search Diversified Away From Amazon And Google We might see a trend towards smaller-scale, local shops benefiting as consumers stick to shopping in smaller stores closer to their homes. Many stores during the pandemic refused to accept cash; this might accelerate the shift towards contactless payments. Consumers may be less focused in future on conspicuous consumption. The trend towards wellness, home-cooking, gardening, crafts, and self-investment might continue. Other Uses Of Technology It is not only work and shopping habits that changed during lockdowns. Individuals also got used to a range of technologies for socializing, entertainment, education, and medical consultation. Consumer surveys by the Pew Research Center show that a third of American adults have socialized online using services such as Zoom, and a quarter have used online systems for work or conferences (Chart 10). But these percentages are much higher for certain demographics. For example, 48% of 18-to-29 year-olds have socialized online, and 30% of this age group have taken online fitness classes. The percentage using video systems for work is as high as 48% for people with a college degree. And, unsurprisingly, with many university courses moving online since the spring, 38% of 18-to-29 year-olds say they have taken an online class. Chart 10Individuals Have Been Socializing And Communicating More Online How sticky these trends will be once the pandemic is over is not easy to forecast. But further research by Pew showed that 27% of US adults believed that online and telephone contacts are “just as good as in-person contact,” and only 8% thought of them as not much help at all, although a rather larger 64% answered that online socializing is “useful but will not be a replacement for in-person contact.” The responses differed little between gender, race, and political views, although fewer people under the age of 30 thought online contacts were as good as in-person ones (Table 3). Table 3How Do Online Interactions Compare To In-Person Ones? Another survey in Japan by Ipsos suggests that people’s values have changed as a result of the pandemic and quarantines, with a greater focus on wellbeing, home-based activities such as cooking, and self-improvement. When questioned, a large percentage of people believe they will persist with these habits even when lockdowns end. For example, 51% of Japanese respondents believe they will continue to enjoy themselves as much as possible at home in their spare time, compared to only 20% who favored entertainment at home before the pandemic (Chart 11).  Chart 11Pandemic Brought A Greater Focus On Wellbeing And Home-Based Activities Other areas that have moved online en masse include education, health care, the judiciary, concerts, and sports (e-sports, and popular sports such as soccer and baseball that are now being played in empty venues). Education at the tertiary level in advanced economies was already partly online before the pandemic. In the US, out of 19.7 million tertiary students in 2017, 2.2 million (13.3%) were enrolled in exclusively online/distance learning courses, and another 3.2 million (19.5%) took at least one course online.8 Of course, everything changed during the pandemic, with 98% of US institutions moving the majority of in-person courses online, and many planning to continue this through the Fall 2020 semester. At the elementary and secondary school level, online education was much more limited pre-pandemic. According to the National Center for Educational Statistics, 21% of US schools offered some courses entirely online in 2016 but, of this 21%, only 6% offered all their courses online and only another 6% the majority of courses. Many of these schools were forced to shift entirely online during lockdowns: According to UNESCO data, at the peak of the pandemic 1.6 billion children (90% of the total in school) in 191 countries attended schools that had closed physically. It seems likely that, while in-person teaching will remain the central method of education, distance and online learning solutions, even at the high school level, will become more prevalent in the future. The health care sector has lagged in technology, in terms of using AI for diagnosis, digitalizing patient records, and offering online doctor-patient consultation. But the use of digital tools had started to increase in recent years, particularly in the number of practices using telemedicine and virtual visits (Chart 12). At the peak of the pandemic in April, the number of telehealth visits in the US rose by 14% year-on-year, compared to a 69% decline in in-person visits to a doctor.9 It seems likely that this trend will continue, as medical practitioners find viritual consultations more efficient and effective for many simple initial diagnoses, and as sick or elderly patients prefer to avoid a physical visit to a surgery.10 Chart 12The Transition To A Digital-Driven Health Care Model Travel Travelers have been very reluctant to get back on airplanes and stay in hotels again, even in countries and regions where the pandemic has eased over the past couple of months (Chart 13). Based on our assumption that the pandemic will be completely over within 18 months, it seems likely that people will eventually resume travelling, at least for leisure and to see family and friends. After previous disruptions to global travel, such as 9/11 and SARS, it took only two-to-three years for air travel to resumed its pre-crisis trend (Chart 14). Chart 13Travelers Remained Reluctant Even When Pandemic Eased Business travel might be very different, however. Salespeople who have become used to making sales calls over Zoom may not feel the need to travel to see clients so much. Conferences, exhibitions, and other events will be increasingly (at least partly) online. Travel budgets are a large expense for many companies. According to estimates by Certify, a travel software provider, spending on business trips in 2019 totalled $1.5 trillion (including $315 billion by US businesses). The availability of a technological alternative to at least some business trips will provide a good excuse for many companies to meaningfully reduce the number of trips and their travel budget. In the future, business travel may become more of a privilege than a necessity. It is easy to imagine a significant decline in overall business travel. Manufacturing Supply Chains Corporate behavior could also change as a result of the disruptions caused by the coronavirus. Companies in the US and Europe realized how vulnerable their complex supply chains are. Popular and political pressure is pushing firms to reshore at least some of their overseas production. Firms will need to build in more “operational resilience,” with higher levels of inventory, less debt, and greater redundancy in their systems. Developed economies such as the US have been deindustrializing for 40 years – since reforms in China in the late 1970s, followed by Mexico and central Europe in the 1990s,  made these countries appealing locations for cheap manufacturing. US manufacturing employment has almost halved since 1980, falling to only 27% of the workforce (Chart 15). Manufacturing output, especially outside of the computer sector, has substantially lagged that of the overall private sector (Chart 16). The US has also fallen behind in automation, with a much lower number of robots per manufacturing worker than in countries such as Germany and Japan (Chart 17). Chart 15US Manufacturing Employment Has Halved Since 1980   Chart 16Manufacturing Output Outside The Computer Sector Has Lagged Chart 17The US Has Relatively Few Robots The pandemic highlighted how vulnerable widely distributed supply chains are. This was clearest in the health care sector. The US is far away the biggest spender on health care research and development (Chart 18). And yet it was unable to provide critical medical equipment such as face masks, testing kits, and ventilators to its population at an adequate rate, mainly because almost 70% of the facilities which manufacture essential medicines are based abroad (Chart 19). During the pandemic, countries such as China and India prioritized their own citizens, forcing the US government to strike emergency deals to avoid drug shortages. Chart 18The US Spends A Lot On R&D In Health Care… Chart 19…But Drug Production Is Mostly Done Overseas Once the crisis subsides, CEOs of American companies (as well as the US government) will have to decide if they are comfortable with the fact that, while they possess a vast store of intellectual capital, the manufacturing of their products happens halfway around the world. What happens if there is another pandemic? What about a global disaster caused by climate change? Finally, and perhaps more worryingly, what happens if tensions between the US and China escalate seriously? This shift will not happen overnight: China still has much cheaper labor, an enormous manufacturing base of factories and parts suppliers, and formidable transportation infrastructure. Many aspects of supply chains are too deep-rooted and the economics too compelling for them to be unwound quickly. Some production will shift from China to other emerging economies. A Biden administration might be less confrontational with China, and could lower some of the Trump tariffs. But, at the margin, companies will choose to build new factories in the US (and in western Europe and Japan), with highly automated systems. Government policy (via both subsidies and tariffs) will encourage these trends. Manufacturers which have lived “on the edge” in recent years, with dispersed supply chains, just-in-time processes, minimal inventories, the fewest possible workers, and the maximum amount of debt compatible with their targeted credit rating (often BBB) now understand the need to build redundancy into their systems. Corporate debt levels are high by historical standards in many countries (Chart 20). Companies may want to build up a buffer of net cash in the future, as Japanese companies did for decades after the bubble there burst in 1990. Inventories have risen a little relative to sales since the Global Financial Crisis but will probably rise further (Chart 21). These trends are likely to be negative for profit margins. Chart 20In The Future, Will Companies Be Happy With This Much Debt... Chart 21...And Such Low Level Of Inventories? Implications For Industries In light of the social changes described above, how will various industries be reshaped over the coming years? Which sectors should investors tilt towards because they are likely to emerge as winners from post-COVID structural shifts? And which are the sectors that investors should avoid since they will suffer from the creative destruction? In the midst of major social and technological change, it is often easier to spot losers than winners. Think of the arrival of the internet in the 1990s. How many investors would have correctly picked Google, Amazon, Apple, and only a handful of others as the winners? It would have been easier to correctly identify industries that were likely to lose out to disruption, such as book retailers, travel agents, newspaper publishers, and TV broadcasters. We start, therefore, with the industries likely to lose out from post-COVID changes. The Losers Real Estate Over the next few years, prime real estate seems the most likely loser. It is not clear how many white-collar workers will choose to work from home in the future, or how many days a month they will want to come into an office to meet with fellow workers. But it seems likely there will be a strong continued trend in the direction of remote working. As a result, demand for prime central-business-district property will fall, given that it is very expensive. In Manhattan, for example, the average workspace for each of the 1.5 million office workers is around 310 square feet. At pre-COVID rental costs, that amounts to an average of $20,000 per employee – and more than $30,000 for A+ grade buildings. And rent is only part of what a company pays: There are also costs for cleaning, utilities, technology, security, coffee machines, and cafeterias on top of that. Employees working at home pay for their own space, utilities, food (and often even computer equipment). The size, location, and layout of offices will need to be rethought. Maybe companies will choose to build a campus in the suburbs, with a range of different working spaces (for meetings, quiet work, or collaboration). They may prefer to rent shared co-working spaces by the day or week. Some real estate developers and builders would be beneficiaries of this. Companies would save money in real estate costs. But they may need to pay a stipend to employees who work at home to cover the extra space they will require, and to upgrade their technology (computer equipment, internet speed, and so on). On the other hand, companies may pay lower salaries for workers who move out of high-cost locations such as Manhattan or London to places where it is cheaper to live. Many office spaces are leased on a long-term basis, so some companies will not be able to move out of big cities immediately. But residential property is more liquid. The trends in work practices might accelerate a shift to the suburbs which has already been emerging over the past few years (Chart 22). Workers will not need to live so close to the company’s office if they will visit it for only a few days a month. Small towns with a lively community and pleasant environment (and decent transportation links to a big city) could grow in popularity. This would be bad news for developers which are specialized in developing residential property in cities such as London, Sydney, Toronto, and Vancouver, and for the owners of those properties. But it might be positive for builders who will develop the new houses and out-of-town office campuses. Chart 22The Shift To The Suburbs Was Already Taking Place This does not mean that cities will wither away. After previous epidemics and crises in history (think the Great Plague of London in the 17th century, or 9/11), they have always bounced back. “Casual collisions” – chance meetings with interesting people which lead to collaborative relationships – are crucial in creative industries, and happen online only with difficulty. Buildings will be repurposed: Retail space will be turned into warehouses or apartments, for example. A fall in rents would allow cities to “degentrify” and attract back young people, making the city more dynamic again. But the period of transition could be painful for some segments of the real estate industry. Travel A permanent decline in business travel would be a significant blow to airlines and hotel chains. Business travelers account for only about 12% of the number of air tickets purchased, but they generate 70%-75% of airlines’ profits. Even discount leisure airlines such as Southwest have in recent years started to target business travelers. And it will not just be airlines that are affected. Data from the US Travel Association show that 26% of the $2.5 trillion in travel-related revenues in the US in 2018 came from business travelers. Of that, 17% goes to air travel, 13% to accommodation, and 5% to car rental. An even larger portion goes to food (21%). Around 40% of hotel rooms are occupied by business travelers. Conference organizers and venues could also suffer: 62% of US business trips are to attend conferences. “Sharing economy” companies would be affected too. In 2018, 700,000 business travelers booked accommodation through AirBnB, and 78% of business travelers use Uber and other ride-sharing services. Furthermore, a slowdown in business travel would have knock-on effects on the leisure travel sector. Surveys suggest that almost 40% of business trips in the US are extended to include leisure activities (“bleisure” in the travel industry parlance). The Winners Health Care A recent report by BCA Research’s Global Asset Allocation service argued in detail that the macro environment for global health care equities will remain very positive in the coming years.11 An aging population in the world, and a growing middle class in emerging countries will steadily raise demand for health care services (Charts 23 and 24). China, in particular, has underinvested in health care: It spends only 5% of GDP, barely higher than it did 20 years ago, and well behind other emerging economies such as Brazil and South Africa (Chart 25). Chart 23Positives For Health Care Include An Aging Population… Chart 24…And A Growing Emerging Market Middle Class As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, governments everywhere will need to spend more money on health care (or, in the case of the US, perhaps spend it more effectively). In the US, before the pandemic, intensive-care beds were sufficient to cope only with the peak of a normal seasonal influenza breakout. The World Health Organization warns that, while pandemics are rare, highly disruptive regional and local outbreaks of infectious diseases are becoming more common (Chart 26). More money will need to be spent, in particular, on developing health care technology (online consultations, digitalized patient records, track-and-trace systems), on improving senior care homes (80% of COVID-19 deaths in the Canadian province of Quebec were in such facilities), and on biotech (such as gene-related therapies). Chart 25Expenditures On Health Care Will Have To Grow Chart 26Number Of Countries Experiencing Serious Outbreak Of Infectious Disease   The health care equity sector is not expensive, trading in line with its long-run average valuation (Chart 27). Within the sector, biotech and health care technology look more attractive than pharmaceuticals, which are expensive and vulnerable to the price caps proposed by Joe Biden if he is elected US president this November. Chart 27Health Care Stocks Are Not Expensive Technology In a plethora of ways, the pandemic has propelled the use of technology: For working at home, communication, online shopping, entertainment, etc. Companies such as Zoom have moved from niche players to mainstream business providers: Zoom’s peak daily users rose from 10 million in December 2019 to 300 million in April. Chart 28Tech Stocks Are Nowhere Close To Previous Peaks Assuming that at least some of these developments remain in place once the pandemic is over, it is easy to see how technology stocks (broadly defined to include any company that uses information technology as a central part of its business) will continue to prosper. These stocks will not be just in the IT sector, but also in communications and consumer discretionary. Picking the individual winners will be hard: Will Microsoft overtake Amazon in cloud computing? Will Zoom’s much-discussed privacy issues undermine it? Will competitors emerge to Shopify in merchant services? Can Spotify compete with Apple in online music streaming? But the broadly-defined sector seems likely to have improving fundamentals for some years to come. The only question is whether the good news is already priced in, after the huge run-up in stock prices over the past few years. We do not believe it is fully. The valuations of these sectors are still nowhere close to the level they reached at the peak of the TMT Bubble in 1999-2000 (Chart 28), they have strong balance-sheets, and considerable earnings power. For their outperformance to end, it will take one of two things. The first trigger could be a significant shift down in growth. Over the past three years, Amazon has grown EPS at a compound rate of 47%, and Netflix at 76% (Chart 29). Over the next three years (2020-2023), analysts forecast compound EPS growth of 32% for Netflix, 30% for Amazon, 15% for Facebook (compared to 24% in 2016-2019), and 12% for Microsoft (compared to 16%). Those are still impressive growth numbers, and should be achievable as long as these companies can continue to grow market share. Chart 29Can The Big Tech Stocks Keep Growing Earnings At This Rate? The second set of risks would be regulatory: A move to break up companies such as Google and Amazon, the US introducing data privacy legislation similar to that in the European Union, or a move to a digital tax or minimum global taxation. None of these seems likely in the immediate future. Automation/Robotics/Capital Goods The return, at the margin, of some manufacturing to the United States (and other developed economies) will bring about economic changes. Unable to tap into the pool of cheap international labor as easily as before, companies will have to invest significantly in this sector. This will result in the following: A resurgence of manufacturing productivity, thanks to increased investment. An intensification of automation. The US will need to boost the number of robots per capita to compete with Korea, Germany, and Japan. This will further improve productivity. The development of a high-tech manufacturing sector. Analogous to the FAANG stocks during the 2010s, a new group of innovative manufacturing companies could emerge. New infrastructure, roads, factories, and machinery will be needed to replace what is now an outdated capital stock in the US (Chart 30). These trends should all be positive for the capital-goods sector. Such a project would also need large amounts of raw materials. This might push up the prices of commodities such as industrial metals, and benefit materials producers. As mentioned above, it could boost the price of real estate outside of the major cities, where the new manufacturers would be likely to set up. Chart 30The US Capital Stock Is Becoming Outdated Mixed Retailing / Consumer Goods Retailing is likely to see a significant shakeout over the next few years. The cracks have been apparent for some years: Decreasing footfall, and empty units on many high streets and shopping malls, amid the shift to online shopping. A shift to the suburbs and further growth in online shopping will change retailing further. Rents in the highest end Manhattan shopping districts have already fallen noticeably since the start of the year, especially Lower Fifth Avenue (between 42nd and 49th Streets) which is dominated by large chain stores (Chart 31). Shopping malls, particularly undistinguished ones in poorer areas, will continue to suffer. Overall, the US in particular has an excess of retailing space, almost five times as much per capita as the major European economies (Chart 32). Chart 31Manhattan Retail Store Rents Already Falling Sharply Chart 32The US Has Far Too Much Retail Space But it is hard to predict the winners from this shake-out. Overall spending by consumers is unlikely to be significantly affected, so it is a matter of forecasting which companies and formats will emerge victorious. Will Walmart and Target and other large retail chains improve their online offering to fight back against Amazon? Facebook, Shopify, and others have set up new services to compete with Amazon on price – will they be successful? Will small stores start to win back market share? Will supermarkets figure out how to make profits from their order-online-and-deliver services (which are now very costly because most often a human has to run around the store picking out the items ordered), or will new, fully automated competitors emerge? Will new technologies materialize to make it easier to buy clothes online (for example, digitized body measuring systems)? These changes will also affect producers of consumer products. They will have to understand the new channels, and adapt their offerings and positioning strategies accordingly. These changes will make the sector a tricky one. A skilled fund manager might be able to predict which companies’ strategies will be successful. But it could be a problematic area for investors owning individual stocks within the sector who do not have detailed expertise. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Beyond The Virus," dated May 22, 2020 and Geopolitical Strategy, "Nationalism And Globalization After COVID-19," dated June 26, 2020. 2 Peter E. Drucker, "The Ecological Vision: Reflections on the American Condition," 1993, p.340. 3 Jonathan I. Dingel and Brent Neiman, "How Many Jobs Can Be Done At Home?" NBER Working Paper No. 26948, April 2020. 4 OWL Labs, “The State of Remote Work Report,” available at www.owllabs.com. 5 Pew Research Center survey conducted March 19-24 2020. Please see https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2020/03/30/most-americans-say-coronavirus-outbreak-has-impacted-their-lives/psdt_03-30-20_covid-impact-00-4/ 6 Gajendran, R.S., & Harrison, D.A., “The Good, the Bad, and the Unknown about Telecommuting”,  Journal of Applied Psychology 92(6), 2007. 7 Nicholas Bloom, James Liang, John Roberts & Zhichun Jenny Ying, “Does Working from Home Work? Evidence From a Chinese Experiment,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2015), 165-218. 8 Please see educationdata.org. 9 Ateev Mehrotra, Michael Chernew, David Linetsky, Hilary Hatch, and David Cutler, "The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Outpatient Visits: A Rebound Emerges," The Commonwealth Fund, dated May 19, 2020.  10For more on the long-term outlook for the health care sector, Global Asset Allocation Special Report, "The Healthcare Revolution: The Case For Staying Overweight," dated July 24, 2020, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 11Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, "The Healthcare Revolution: The Case For Staying Overweight,"dated July 24, 2020, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com.
Special Report Highlights We remain bullish on France over the long run. Its industrial economy should revive on global stimulus over the coming years and its government will likely remain reformist in orientation. Macron has enough of a popular consensus and enough time on the political clock to oversee recovery in 2021 and get reelected in 2022. It would take a massive new economic crisis, on top of COVID-19, to generate a successful anti-establishment challenge. Macron is not likely to enjoy the strong legislative majorities of his first term. Much depends on how he handles the economic recovery and the international challenges facing Europe. The likely leadership change in the US will assist on the latter point, although US policy uncertainty will weigh on France’s prospects in the near term. Investors with a long-term horizon should go long French defense and energy stocks relative to American peers, which face policy headwinds. Underweight French government bonds in a diversified portfolio over the long run. Feature France celebrated Bastille Day this year with a toned down military parade on the Champs Elysee. The COVID-19 pandemic has hit the country hard – it has the eighth highest death toll in the world with 452 deaths per million people. By comparison, the US is ranked seventh, with 472 deaths per million (Chart 1). Chart 1France Has Been Badly Hit By COVID-19 Ironically, the crisis provided President Emmanuel Macron an opportunity to postpone his controversial pension reform and put a stop to massive labor strikes. These strikes were surprisingly large and effective – much more significant than the Yellow Vest protests that erupted in 2018. Aggregate demand will benefit but France’s economic structure will not, until reforms get back on track. With less than two years before the presidential election, we take a moment to reassess our view on Macron’s re-election prospects and our bullish view of the country’s equity market. We view Macron as a favorite for re-election and hence remain optimistic about the prospects for structural reforms that improve France’s economic competitiveness over the long run. French Markets Have Underperformed Amid COVID-19 But Will Outperform Later Chart 2French Equities Amid Covid-19 French equities have underperformed developed market equities by 12% this year. The post-February equity rally, fueled as elsewhere by massive monetary and fiscal stimulus, has been disappointing compared to US and German equities but still better than that of southern European bourses Italy, Spain and Greece (Chart 2). France has also outperformed the UK, which is heavily reliant on energy and financials and faces a high degree of economic policy uncertainty due to Brexit. Our European Strategist, Dhaval Joshi, has described equity performance this year as a case of the “good stock market” versus the “bad stock market.” The key lies in the relationship between equity sectors and bond yields. For the good sectors, lower bond yields entail a valuation boom and higher prices – as with information technology and health care. For the bad market, lower bond yields entail a profits recession and lower prices – case in point being the banking sector. To better illustrate his point, Table 1 provides the sector composition for core European equities and other developed market bourses (US and UK) as well as the year-to-date performance of each sector. Banks have underperformed massively while information technology and health care have delivered positive returns across different bourses thus far. Table 1The "Good" And The "Bad" Stock Markets French equities are the most exposed to global growth, with 17% allotted to industrials and 4% to energy. Year to date, these sectors have underperformed by -24% and -34% respectively. The upside is that global economic recovery will benefit France more than other bourses and enable it to retrace its massive underperformance during the virus lockdowns. Global economic recovery will benefit France more than other bourses and enable it to retrace its massive underperformance. Extremely accommodative monetary policy around the world will keep bond yields low as long as unemployment stays high and inflation stays low. Central bankers will remain ultra-dovish. This will drive a search for yield from investors and bid up risk assets’ prices in the process. Core European government bond yields may fall further in the short run, in the face of a resurgent virus and acute geopolitical risk surrounding the US election, but not the long run (Chart 3). Reliable cyclical indicators such as the German ZEW and IFO surveys are already showing signs that Euro Area growth is starting to recover from the lockdowns. Chart 3The Threat Of Second Waves Will Keep A Lid On Bond Yields Chart 4French Bonds Will Underperform As Growth Recovers In relative terms, economies with high “yield betas” tend to have the greatest sensitivity to global growth indicators (Chart 4). We anticipate a revival in global growth sometime in 2021, as policymakers will be forced to apply more stimulus when needed. Bond yields will eventually rise, though there is a long journey before the output gap will be closed. French bonds will underperform their peripheral peers, which have more to gain from the global search for yield combined with the implementation of the Macron-Merkel agreement to mutualize Euro Area debt. Bottom Line: Fundamentals suggest that investors should go long French equities, and favor French over other developed market equities over a long-term investment horizon. Investors should remain underweight French government bonds in a diversified portfolio over the long run as the global recovery advances. The Bloated State Saves The Supply-Side Reformer Most lockdown restrictions ended at the beginning of June in France and most measures of economic activity have rebounded sharply. The French manufacturing PMI came in at 52.4 in July, a 22-month high, from 40.6 in May. The services PMI jumped well above the 50 boom/bust line to 57.8 from 31.1 in May (Chart 5). Firms are finally resuming business as usual alongside a marked improvement in sentiment regarding the next 12 months. The underlying data from the Markit PMI survey revealed that domestic demand drove the expansion. Chart 5Sharp Rebound In Soft Data Chart 6Don’t Judge The Recovery Based On The Fiscal Stimulus Package France’s rebound was sharp even relative to other developed markets that had deployed much larger fiscal stimulus packages (Chart 6, with details in Appendix). First, the French economy was surprisingly resilient during the 2019 manufacturing downturn and the slowdown in global activity – note that the French manufacturing PMI only flirted with the 50 boom/bust line in 2019 while German, Italian and Spanish manufacturing PMIs remained well below 50. Importantly, France is after Germany the European country that stands to benefit the most from the recovery in Chinese economic activity. Second, while France’s new fiscal spending was restrained overall, the composition of its stimulus and its existing automatic stabilizers proved to be effective. France rolled out one of the most generous state-subsidized furlough schemes in Europe, with the state shouldering more than two-thirds of wages and leaving the rest to the employers. By end of June, more than 13 million workers were on state-subsidized furloughs, almost half the French workforce (Chart 7). That compares with around one-third of workers in Italy, and around one-fifth in the UK and Germany. Going forward, the sectors most badly hurt by the COVID-19 crisis, such as aerospace and tourism, will be able to keep benefitting from state-subsidized furlough schemes for the next 24 months if necessary. For other companies, the coverage will be slightly reduced and extended into the first quarter of 2021. Reducing unemployment is essential for any world leader, but Macron faces an election around the corner, and he had promised specifically to bring unemployment to 7% by the end of his mandate. Before the crisis the unemployment rate was 7.6% but is now expected to reach 10% by the end of 2020 (Chart 8). Normally it takes eight years after a recession for French unemployment to return to pre-recession levels. Chart 7The French Furlough Scheme Is Impressive Chart 8French Unemployment Rate Expected To Jump Back To Post-GFC Peak In other words, Macron will do more stimulus if necessary. So far France’s coronavirus response measures amount to nearly 4% of GDP, excluding loan guarantees. An unprecedented public sector budget deficit of 11.4% is now expected by the government this year, compared to 3% in 2019. The government is supporting car manufacturer Renault and airline company Air France – two jewels of the French economy – as well as other industries. Given the V-shaped recovery, we would not expect banks to shut the credit tap (Chart 9). Indeed, the French economy will be able to rely on stronger bank lending activity than its European peers (Chart 9, panels 2 and 3). Importantly, Chart 10 shows that French companies rated by Moody’s are less extremely exposed to the pandemic-induced recession than the firms of neighboring Germany, Italy, and Spain. Further, once economic conditions improve enough to restore consumer confidence, then consumer spending will pick up, bolstered by accumulated savings (Chart 11). Chart 9Supportive Bank Lending Chart 10A Lower Exposure To The Pandemic-Induced Recession Tourism is a weak spot, but France’s reliance on tourism is overstated (Table 2). The sector accounts for 9.5% of GDP and 7.3% of non-financial business employment. France made supporting this industry a national priority.   Chart 11A V-Shaped Recovery In Consumer Spending Incoming? Table 2The French Reliance On Tourism Is Overstated Ironically, President Macron’s greatest asset right now is the large French state that he campaigned on cutting down to size. The French state helped sustain the economy better than others during this year’s historic shock. Bottom Line: France’s economic rebound has surpassed that of other countries that deployed larger stimulus packages. Gener­ous furloughing, large automatic stabilizers, ample bank credit, and Macron’s looming election ensure that government support will persist. This is a solid backdrop for an economic recovery led by domestic demand. Macron Still Favored In 2022 Chart 12France Gets A “C-“ For Handling The Pandemic & A “B+” For Handling The Economy The French people naturally question the ability of government authorities to handle the pandemic efficiently (Chart 12). By mid-May, about 60% of the public doubted the government’s effectiveness. Public opinion has not been so bad when it comes to the handling of the economy by the government (Chart 12, bottom panel). Moreover Macron has received a notable boost to his popular support during the crisis. The number of people who intend to vote for him has gone up, the first time that has happened for an incumbent president since 2002 (Chart 13). Compared to other world leaders, Macron fares pretty well. His personal support and his party’s support have increased more than their peers in Spain, the US, the UK, and Japan, albeit less than in Germany and the Netherlands (Chart 14). But while those two governments only have to sustain this support until next year’s elections, Macron needs to sustain support for two years to get re-elected. Chart 13The Crisis Ended Up Boosting Macron’s Popular Support... Chart 14…Which Is Not The Case For All Political Leaders The good news for Macron is that the public does not believe that any other parties or candidates would have handled the pandemic any better (Chart 15). There is a lack of credible opposition from traditional political parties. Macron and the anti-establishment Marine Le Pen, who leads the National Rally, are expected to face each other once again in the second round of the 2022 election. If the election were held today, polls suggest Macron would win this rematch with 55% of votes instead of the 66% he won in 2017. Chart 15French Public Does Not Blame Macron For Coronavirus Handling As long as voters are forced to choose between Macron and Le Pen, Macron has the advantage. As in 2017, he will be able to appeal to voters from other parties in the second round of the election, notably the green party EELV (see Box 1). Left-wing voters will join with center-right voters to elect him. The risk to Macron is if a viable challenger manages to edge out Le Pen. Or, an economic collapse could discredit his centrist and reformist movement and drive more voters into the anti-establishment camp. But that risk merely underscores the necessity that will drive his administration to play an accommodative and reflationary economic role. As long as voters are forced to choose between Macron and Le Pen in 2022, Macron has the advantage.  Box 1: Macron Suffers A Setback In Local Elections French local elections have historically been a way for voters to sanction the incumbent power, as was the case for Nicolas Sarkozy in 2008 and his successor Francois Hollande in 2014. True to the historical pattern, Macron and his party La Republique En Marche (LREM) performed poorly in the polls this year. Amid the virus, voter turnout was historically low: 41% compared to 62.1% in 2014. Macron has seen some splintering in his party and has been forced to reshuffle his cabinet. This stumble should not come as a surprise for a party that is akin to an infant in the French political landscape and therefore preferred to play it safe by endorsing candidates in only half of France’s cities of 10,000 people, often choosing to support right-wing candidates (Les Republicains) everywhere else. Fortunately for Macron, Marine Le Pen’s party did not fare any better. The main surprise from the 2020 local elections came from the green party Europe Ecologie-Les Verts (EELV) which even managed to win a number of major victories in large cities. A surge for the Greens is actually quite positive for Macron as he will have no trouble rallying the Greens in 2022 if he is opposed by Le Pen (Chart 16, bottom panel). This outcome also calls for an environmental spending push as part of stimulus efforts in the second half of his term. Chart 16Polls See Macron Win In 2022 Macron is still popular among Millennials, white collar workers, and the elderly (Chart 16). He also has a strong base in Paris (and the suburbs) as opposed to Le Pen, yet he still outperforms Le Pen among rural voters in today’s polls. Bottom Line: Macron is still favored to win the 2022 election. The two-round voting system makes it very difficult for a populist or anti-establishment politician to win the election, given that other factions will align against extreme players. While another massive economic shock could change things, the Macron administration will pursue economic reflation all the more aggressively to prevent this outcome. Macron Keeps France On Reformist Path Crises often accelerate the changes that were taking shape beforehand. This is positive for Macron’s centrist vision of France rather than the anti-establishment alternative that he faced down in 2017. What will be Macron’s roadmap for the remaining two years of his presidency? Public opinion wants him to focus on the labor market and the economic recovery in the months to come and he will be happy to oblige (Chart 17). Macron reshuffled his government before announcing a recovery plan of 100 billion euros, of which 40% will be funded by the European recovery fund. For now, we know the private sector will receive a large share of the pie in order to boost productivity and help French companies stay afloat. Twenty billion euros will go toward the environmental push. A detailed blueprint will be unveiled at the end of August. Chart 17Roadmap To 2022: Focusing On The Labor Market & Economic Recovery Structural reforms may not resume until after 2022. Yes, Macron intends to finish his pension reform prior to the election. And yes, he is capable of passing it through the legislature on paper. Technically he lost his single-party absolute majority in the National Assembly in May. Defections have cost him 26 party members since the 2017 election. But LREM can still count on the unconditional support of two other coalitions in the Assembly giving him 355 seats out of 577 (61.5%). However, Macron would take a huge gamble in reviving the pension reform when the country’s output gap is large. Former President Nicolas Sarkozy attempted to pass a less ambitious pension reform in the midst of the Euro debt crisis, 12 months before facing re-election in 2012 – and he lost the election. We doubt Macron will share the fate of his predecessor, but that most likely means punting on reforms for now and returning to them after securing re-election. If Macron proves us wrong, then that will be a positive surprise for French equity markets confirming our thesis that Macron is favored and France is on a reformist trajectory. The pace and breadth of the reforms have been substantial so far, but obviously Macron has halted plans to pare back the size of the state. Cutting back inefficiencies will still be a theme of Macron’s re-election campaign, but with modifications for the new political environment (such as green spending, mentioned above). Meantime, the COVID-19 crisis revealed that more state decentralization is desperately needed. We should also expect measures to push French companies to relocate production activities back into France, which will be more feasible thanks to labor reforms passed into law earlier in Macron’s presidency. The crisis revealed France might find ways to strengthen supply chains, starting with medical masks, of which France is a net importer. Excessive foreign dependency is an economic reality that the French president cannot envision for France and the EU. As Macron said, “The only answer is to build a new, stronger economic model, to work and produce more, so as not to rely on others.” The objective is to build a European Union that is less dependent on China and the US. The EU is first and foremost a geopolitical project, and the impetus for integration has increased, not decreased, since the 2008 financial crisis. A divided Europe is no match for Russia, the US, or China, especially if the US takes a step back from its post-World War II role of guaranteeing free trade and global security. While a Democratic Party government in Washington would ease trans-Atlantic tensions, there will still be an American need to limit foreign commitments and a European need to look after itself. The outstanding question, then, is the makeup of the National Assembly in 2022. This is too far away to predict. What is clear is that Macron is unlikely to regain the golden single-party majority with which he entered office in 2017, or to gain control of the Senate. So he will necessarily be more constrained in a second term in the legislature. Nevertheless he will still benefit from the underlying trend in France: the demand for a better economy and jobs market. This requires pro-productivity reforms, which is known by the public, and Macron has made reform his banner. Bottom Line: Overseeing the economic recovery and bringing down unemployment will be the two key factors to monitor. At present, Macron’s chances of re-election are good. He does not face a major challenger other than the anti-establishment Marine Le Pen, who will provoke a coalition of parties against her. He even stands to benefit from the rise of the Greens, although the future makeup of the legislature will then become the key challenge. Although the focus of the remaining two years of his mandate will be on economic recovery, there is a chance that Macron could pass a watered-down pension reform. This political setup is positive for French growth but not entirely at the expense of long-term productivity. After 2022, Macron will face a higher legislative constraint, but he will have a new mandate to pursue structural reforms. Investment Takeaways Governments and their populations do not have much appetite for additional social lockdowns as COVID-19 cases reaccelerate, but lockdowns are clearly a near-term risk to the recovery. As such, risky assets face volatility in the near term. Europe’s political cooperation and stability combined with global reflation provide a stable launching pad for EUR-USD. The EUR-USD is reaching a critical testing ground (Chart 18). European integration has taken another leap forward during this crisis, thanks in part to Macron’s diplomatic success in smoothing the way for Germany’s Merkel to take prompt steps toward joint debt issuance and more proactive fiscal support for the periphery. Europe’s political cooperation and stability combined with global reflation provide a stable launching pad for EUR-USD. Chart 18The Case For A Higher EUR/USD However, the dollar could bounce in the near term. A chaotic US election is looming in three months and European earnings revisions underperforming the US will weigh on the euro. While global growth is recovering, and a massive new round of US fiscal stimulus is likely to further enlarge US twin deficits, the 35% chance of a surprise Trump victory would raise the prospect of trade war against Europe as well as China in 2021 and beyond. The dollar could revive if the market seeks safe havens on the anticipation of new crises in a second term in which President Trump is “unleashed.” This would also hurt industrial-oriented economies like France. The risk scenario of Trump’s re-election would also increase the tail-risk of a major conflict with Iran over the subsequent four years – and Middle Eastern instability is negative for European risk assets and political stability. Therefore the long EUR-USD call could be jeopardized by a surprise as November approaches. Otherwise, assuming that the Democratic Party wins the US election, the risk of a trade war against Europe will collapse. So too will the risk of a real war with Iran. Meanwhile the US’s strategic pivot to Asia will be handled in a less disruptive way. Therefore EUR-USD would stand to benefit. To the extent that European equities tend to outperform other regions only when global growth is accelerating, bond yields are heading higher, and the growth defensives like tech are underperforming, we are inclined to underweight European bourses relative to US equities in the short run, but not the long run. On a cyclical or 12-month-plus time frame, governments are likely to succeed in rebooting economic growth through massive stimulus. This is positive for French equities, particularly relative to US equities. We recommend going long French aerospace and defense equities in particular. This sector has been beaten down, like its global and American peers. Yet geopolitical power struggle will fuel defense expenditures and global stimulus will revive the aerospace sector once the coronavirus becomes more manageable (Chart 19). Tactically, the shift to a Democratic administration in the US presents near-term risk for US defense stocks, making them the fitting short end of a pair trade favoring French defense stocks. Two French sectors equities are particularly attractive: Aerospace & defense and Energy. Tactically we would play these against American counterparts due to US election policy headwinds for defense and energy. We also recommend going long French energy equities, relative to US peers. The French energy sector has been outperforming its US and developed market counterparts in recent years and will benefit from a global growth revival (Chart 20). The sector will also benefit on the margin if Trump loses the vote and cannot pursue “maximum pressure” on Iran, but instead gives way for former Vice President Joe Biden to tighten regulation on US energy companies and restore the 2015 nuclear deal and strategic détente with Iran. Chart 19Go Long French Aerospace & Defense... Chart 20…And Long French Energy Relative To US We remain bullish French equities on a secular basis as long as Macron’s reelection remains the base case, European integration is supported and France has the prospect to return to incremental structural reforms over time. Meanwhile it is an economy that is structurally protected from the world’s retreat from globalization. De-globalization abroad requires Europe to break down internal barriers and France is well-positioned to succeed in such an environment.   Jeremie Peloso Senior Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com Appendix
Special Report Dear clients, This week we are sending you a Research Note on balance of payments across the G10, authored by my colleague Kelly Zhong. With unprecedented monetary and fiscal stimulus, balance-of-payment dynamics will become an even more important driver of currencies over the next few years. That said, while the US current account is in deficit, the short dollar narrative is beginning to capture investor imagination, suggesting the call is rapidly becoming consensus. We are in the consensus camp, but are going short GBP today, as a bet on a short-term reversal. As for cable, the recent rally has gotten ahead of potential volatility in the coming months, even though it is cheap. Finally, we are lowering our target on the short gold/silver trade to 65, but tightening the stop-loss to 75. I hope you find the report insightful. Chester Ntonifor, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy Highlights COVID-19 has turned the world upside down this year, and severely impaired global trade. Global trade values plunged by 5% quarter-on-quarter in the first quarter, and are forecasted to have slumped by 27% in the second quarter. Most countries have also seen negative foreign direct investment (FDI) growth in the first few months of 2020. Global FDI inflows are forecasted to fall by 40% this year and drop by an additional 5-10% next. While all countries have been hit by COVID-19, the economic damage appears particularly pronounced in countries heavily reliant on foreign funding. Feature COVID-19 has turned the world upside down in 2020. The global economy headed into recession following a decade-long expansion. While many economies are starting to ease restriction measures, the possibility of a second wave remains a big downside risk to the global economy. If history is any guide, the Spanish flu during the early 1900s came in three waves, the second of which brought the most severe damage. Undoubtedly, international trade has been under severe pressure this year. Global trade volumes plunged by 5% in the first quarter, and are expected to be down 27% in the second quarter from their levels in the final three months of 2019. Moreover, the path of recovery remains uncertain as the pandemic continues to disrupt global supply chains and weaken consumer confidence. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), it may take until late 2021/early 2022 for global trade to recover to pre-pandemic levels (Chart 1). As reinvested earnings make up more than half of total FDI, squeezed earnings this year will have a direct impact on FDI in the aftermath of COVID-19.  Global FDI inflows rebounded in 2019, reaching a total of $1.5 trillion, as the effect of the 2017 US tax reforms waned and US repatriation declined. This year, however, most countries have seen negative FDI growth rates in the first few months in 2020. According to UNCTAD, global FDI inflows are forecast to plunge by 40%, bringing total FDI inflows below the US$1 trillion level for the first time since 2005 (Chart 2). Unfortunately, as reinvested earnings make up more than half of total FDI, squeezed earnings this year will have a direct impact on FDI in the aftermath of COVID-19. Typically, FDI flows bottom only six to 18 months after the end of a recession. FDI inflows are forecast to decline further by another 5-10% in 2021. Chart 1Steep Decline In Trade Volumes In 1H'20 Chart 2Global FDI Projected To Fall Through 2021 While all economies have been hit by COVID-19, the impact varies by region. Emerging market countries, particularly those linked to commodities and manufacturing-intensive industries, appear to be have been hit harder by the crisis. This makes sense, given trade is much more volatile than services or consumption. Chart 3 shows that while exports make up less than 30% of GDP in the US, they amount to over 130% of GDP in Thailand and Malaysia, and over 300% of GDP in Singapore and Hong Kong. Chart 3Reliance On Trade Differ Across Countries Going forward, the recoveries might be uneven as well. Prior to COVID-19, global trade flows were already facing many challenges, including trade disputes, geopolitical tensions and rising protectionism. COVID-19 may have just supercharged two megatrends: Technology and Innovation: The pool of investments concentrated on exploiting raw materials and cheap labor is shrinking, while those promoting technology and ESG are becoming crucial. De-globalization: Policymakers in many countries are promoting more regulation and intervention, especially in key industries related to national security and health care. This suggests COVID-19 might represent a tipping point, making balance of payments all the more important for currencies, as investors become more discerning between countries and sectors with a high return on capital and those without. The euro area, Switzerland, Australia and Sweden sport the best basic balance surpluses.  In this report, we look at the balance-of-payment dynamics in the G10. The most important measure for us is the basic balance, which takes the sum of the current account and net long-term capital inflows. Our rationale is that these tend to measure the underlying competitiveness of a currency more accurately than other balance of payment measures. On this basis, the euro area, Switzerland, Australia and Sweden sport the best basic balance surpluses. The US is the worst (Chart 4). Below, we visit some of key drivers behind these trends. Chart 4Basic Balances Across G10 United States Chart 5US Balance Of Payments The US basic balance is deteriorating again (Chart 5). The key driver has been a decline in foreign direct investment. If this trend continues, this could further undermine the US currency. The US remains the world’s largest FDI recipient, attracting US$261 billion in 2019, which is almost double the size of FDI inflows into the second largest FDI recipient – China – with US$141 billion of inflows last year. However, cross-border flows have since fallen off a cliff after the waning effect of the one-time tax dividend introduced at the end of 2017. The lack of mega-M&A deals has also been a contributing factor. The trends in the trade balance have been flat, despite a push by the Trump Administration to reduce the US trade deficit and rejuvenate the US economy. The most recent second-quarter data show a deterioration from -2.3% of GDP to -2.8%. The trade deficit with China did drop by 21% to $345 billion in 2019, however, US companies quickly found alternatives from countries that are not affected by newly imposed tariffs, particularly from Southeast Asia: The US trade deficit with Vietnam jumped by 30%, or $16.3 billion, in 2019. More recently, exports have plunged much faster than imports, further widening the US trade deficit. On portfolio flows, the most recent TIC data show that US Treasurys continued to be shunned by foreigners in May. In short, the US balance-of-payment dynamics are consistent with our bearish dollar view. Euro Area Chart 6Euro Area Balance Of Payments A rising basic balance surplus has been one of the key pillars underpinning a bullish euro thesis. Of course, an apex in globalization will hurt this thesis, but the starting point for the euro area is much better than many of its trading partners. The trade surplus in the euro area was not spared from COVID-19 – it plunged to €9.4 billion in May from €20.7 billion the same month last year, as the pandemic hit global demand and disrupted supply chains. Exports tumbled by 29.5% year-on-year to €143.3 billion while imports declined by 26.7% to €133.9 billion. Even in this dire scenario, the trade surplus still remains a “healthy” 1.8% of GDP, buffeting the current account (Chart 6). Foreign direct investment inflows have regained some ground in recent years, with the improvement accelerating in recent months. FDI inflows surged by 18% in 2019, reaching US$429 billion. Outflows also rose by 13% in 2019, led by a large increase in investment by multinationals based in the Netherlands and Germany. Going forward, FDI is sure to drop, but this will not be a European-centric problem. Portfolio flows have started to reverse, but have not been the key driver of the basic balance. This is because ever since the European Central Bank introduced negative interest rates in 2014, portfolio outflows have been persisted. This also makes sense since Europeans need to recycle their excess savings abroad. In sum, despite the headwinds to global trade and investment, the basic balance remains at a healthy 2.9% of GDP, which bodes well for the euro. Japan Chart 7Japan Balance Of Payments A key pillar for the basic balance in Japan has been the current account balance, which has been buffeted over the years by income receipts from Japan’s large investment positions abroad. Going forward, this could make the yen very attractive in a world less reliant on global trade. Japanese exports tumbled by 26.2% year-on-year in June, led by lower sales in transport equipment, motor vehicles and manufactured goods. However, the slowing export trend was well in place before the pandemic. Exports had been declining for 18 consecutive months before COVID-19 dealt the final blow. Imports also fell by 14% year-on-year in June, led by lower energy prices. On the service side of the income equation, foreign visitors to Japan dropped by 99.9% from over 2.5 million in January to less than 2,000 in May. That equates to about 2% of the Japanese population. Despite all this, Japan still sports a healthy current account surplus, at 4% of GDP (Chart 7). In 2019, Japan remained the largest investor in the world, heavily recycling its current account surplus. FDI outflows from Japanese multinationals surged by 58% to a record US$227 billion, including US$104 billion in cross-border M&A deals. Notable mentions include Takeda acquiring Shire (Ireland) for US$60 billion, and SoftBank Group acquiring a stake in WeWork (the US) for US$6 billion. In terms of portfolio investments, foreign bond purchases have eased of late as global interest rates approach zero. Higher real rates are now being found in safe-haven currencies like the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen, which is supportive for the yen. Overall, the basic balance in Japan is at nil, in perfect balance between domestic savings and external investments. United Kingdom Chart 8UK Balance Of Payments The key development in the UK’s balance-of-payment dynamics is that a cheap pound combined with the pandemic appear to have stemmed the decline in the trade balance. The UK has run a current account deficit each year since 1983. This has kept the basic balance mostly negative (Chart 8). That could change if the marginal improvement in trade is durable and meaningful. The current account deficit further widened to £21.1 billion, or 3.8% of GDP, in the first quarter, of which the goods trade balance was more volatile than usual. Since May, the goods trade balance has been slowly recovering to £2.8 billion, but has been offset by the services trade deficit. The primary income deficit also widened in the first quarter as offshore businesses rushed to preserve cash buffers. Foreign direct investment in the UK has been improving of late, currently sitting at 3.7% of GDP. This is encouraging, given the steep post-Brexit drop. Going forward, we continue to favor the British pound over the long term due to its cheap valuation. However, we are going short today, as a play on a tactical dollar bounce. More on this next week.       Canada Chart 9Canada Balance Of Payments The Canadian basic balance has been flat for over a decade, as the persistent current account deficit has continuously been financed by FDI inflows and portfolio investment (Chart 9). This is a vote of confidence by investors over longer-term returns on Canadian assets. Canada is one of the largest exporters of crude oil, meaning the fall in resource prices generated a big dent in export incomes. However, the country is slowly on a recovery path. Exports increased 6.7% month-on-month in May, helping narrow the trade deficit to C$0.7 billion. More importantly, a positive net international investment position means that positive income flows into Canada are buffeting the current account balance. In 2019, Canada was the 10th largest FDI recipient in the world, with FDI inflows increasing to US$50 billion. Today, the basic balance stands at a surplus of 1% of GDP.               Australia Chart 10Australia Balance Of Payments Australia’s trade balance has been rapidly improving since the 2016 bottom, and has been the primary driver of an improving basic balance. While exports fell as the pandemic hit a nadir, imports fell more deeply. This allowed the trade surplus to widen in the first six months of the year compared to last year. Australia has long had a current account deficit, as import requirements to help drive investment opportunities were not met by domestic savings. With those projects now bearing fruit, the funding requirement has greatly eased. This has buffeted the current account balance, which turned positive for the first time last year following a 35-year-long deficit, and continues to rocket higher (Chart 10). Going forward, Australia’s trade balance and current account balance are likely to continue increasing as Australia has a comparative advantage in exports of resources, especially LNG, which is consistent with the ESG megatrend. Australia is also introducing major reforms to its foreign investment framework to protect national interests and local assets from acquisitions. Meanwhile, net portfolio investment remains negative, suggesting the current account surplus is being recycled abroad. In short, we believe the Aussie dollar has a large amount of running room, based on its healthy basic balance surplus of 4% of GDP. New Zealand Chart 11New Zealand Balance Of Payments Compared to its antipodean neighbour, the New Zealand basic balance has been flat for many years, but has seen recent improvement (Chart 11). The trade balance was boosted by goods exports, which were up NZ$261 million, while imports were down NZ$352 million in the first quarter of this year. The rise in goods exports was led by an increase in fruit (mainly kiwifruit), milk, powder, butter and cheese. More recently, due to the ease of lockdown measures, exports increased by 2.2% year-on-year in June while imports marginally rose by 0.2%, further enhancing New Zealand’s trade balance. The primary income deficit widened to NZ$2.2 billion in the first quarter due to less earnings on foreign investment. Moreover, the secondary income deficit also widened, driven by a smaller inflow of non-resident withholding tax. Despite this, the current account deficit narrowed to NZ$1.6 billion in the first quarter, or 2% of GDP, the smallest deficit since 2016.  New Zealand received $5.4 billion in FDI flows in 2019, rising from only $2 billion in 2018. Most FDI inflows arrived from Canada, Australia, Hong Kong and Japan. Impressively, according to the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report, New Zealand ranked first out of 190 countries due to its openness and business-friendly economy, low levels of corruption, good protection of property rights, political stability and favorable tax policies. Portfolio investment inflows also increased by NZ$11.8 billion.  The improvement in the backdrop of New Zealand’s basic balance will allow it to outperform the US dollar. As a tactical trade, however, we are short the kiwi versus the CAD. The basis is that relative terms of trade favor the CAD for now. Switzerland Chart 12Switzerland Balance Of Payments Switzerland’s basic balance is almost always in surplus, driven by a structural uptrend in the trade balance (Chart 12). This has allowed the trade-weighted Swiss franc to outperform on a structural basis. We expect this trend to continue. As a country consistently running high surpluses, Switzerland also tends to invest more in foreign assets. Over the years, these smart investments have helped buffet the current account. Overall, in the first three months of this year, the current account balance stood at CHF 17.4 billion, or 11.2% of GDP. In terms of the net international investment position, both stocks of assets and liabilities fell by CHF 110 billion and CHF 42 billion, respectively in the first quarter, due to falling equity prices globally. The net international investment position fell by CHF 67 billion to CHF 745 billion in the January-March period. That said, Switzerland continued to deploy capital abroad in the first quarter, which should help buffet the current account going forward. The positive balance-of-payment backdrop has created a headache for the Swiss National Bank. As such, the SNB will likely continue to intervene in the foreign exchange markets to calm appreciation in the franc. We believe the franc will continue to outperform the USD in the near term, but underperform the euro.  Norway Chart 13Norway Balance Of Payments Norway has a very open economy, with trade representing over 70% of GDP, and it has been hit quite hard by COVID-19 this year. The trade surplus started to plunge sharply due to falling energy prices at the beginning of the lockdown (Chart 13). More recently, Norway posted its first trade deficit in May since last September, which carried over to June, as exports fell more than imports. Thanks to increases in income receipts from abroad, the current account balance remained flat at NOK 66.1 billion in the first quarter. With persistent current account surpluses, Norway has long been a capital exporter. However, the FDI outflow and inflow gap is gradually closing. In 2019, net FDI was -3.5% of GDP. In the first quarter of this year, it was -3.3%. Portfolio outflows have also softened over the years, as the current account balance has narrowed. There was, however, a trend change in the first three months of this year - Norway’s purchases of foreign bonds, surged as investors switched to safer assets. Ultimately, we remain NOK bulls due to its cheap valuation. As economies gradually reopen and ease lockdown measures, the recovery in energy prices will push the Norwegian krone back toward its fair value.     Sweden Chart 14Sweden Balance Of Payments Sweden maintained its trade surplus with the rest of the world throughout the first few months of 2020 (Chart 14). Imports fell more than exports amid the pandemic. The goods trade balance almost doubled from the fourth quarter of 2019 to SEK 68.8 billion in the first quarter of 2020. The primary income surplus also increased by SEK 10 billion to SEK 42.2, further strengthening the current account and bringing the total current account surplus to SEK 80.6 billion, or 4% of GDP. Both FDI inflows and outflows have been increasing in Sweden, but the net number was slightly negative. In the first quarter of 2020, FDI inflows rose by SEK 51.6 billion while FDI outflows increased by SEK 100.6 billion. In terms of portfolio investment, Swedish investors reduced their portfolio investment abroad by SEK 141 billion in the first quarter, while foreigners decreased their portfolio investment in Sweden by SEK 45.8 billion. In conclusion, the Swedish krona remains one of our favorite longs due to its increasing basic balance surplus (4% of GDP) and its cheap valuation. We are long the Nordic basket (NOK and SEK) against both the euro and the US dollar. Kelly Zhong Research Analyst kellyz@bcaresearch.com Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes   Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades
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Today we continue to highlight another reason we outlined in this Monday’s Special Report on why investors should favor cyclical over defensive equities on a 12-18 month time horizon.  The latest GDP report made for grim reading. US capex collapsed 27% last quarter in line with the fall it suffered in Q1/2009. Not even bulletproof software investment escaped unscathed and contracted for the first time in seven years, albeit modestly. However, if the looming recovery resembles the GFC episode when real non-residential investment soared 40 percentage points from that nadir in the subsequent five quarters, then a slingshot rebound will ensue by the end of 2021. Importantly, our US capex indicator has an excellent track record in leading the relative share price ratio and confirms that a capex trough is already in store, tracing out the bottom hit during the Great Recession (top panel). Regional Fed surveys and CEOs also signal that a capex boom looms in the coming quarters (middle and bottom panels). Bottom Line: The conditions are ripe for a cyclicals outperformance phase at the expense of defensives, especially after the election uncertainty lifts toward the end of the year.