Developed Countries

The market has rallied roughly 10% this month, and while we remain cyclically and structurally bullish, a short-term consolidation period is likely in the cards. As Chart 1 highlights below, extremely easy financial conditions along with a near halving in implied volatility – which have been key rally drivers since the March lows as we pointed out numerous times in our research – are nearly perfectly priced in the SPX. The implication is that if a meaningful rally is to resume, further easing is required.  Another factor underpinning the market’s recent advance is the drop in the CBOE’s implied correlation index (pair wise correlation of S&P500 constituents, shown inverted, Chart 2). However, correlations have collapsed and are near levels that have marked prior temporary peaks in the SPX. Bottom Line: A short-term consolidation phase is likely in the cards  

Highlights The DXY is still overvalued by 13%, despite the 10% drop since March. The Scandinavian currencies remain very cheap. The Japanese yen should be a core holding in every currency portfolio. It is cheap relative to the US dollar, and a great hedge against market volatility. Outside the US dollar, the New Zealand dollar is also expensive. Our positioning is largely in line with PPP fundamentals. Stay short EUR/GBP, CAD/NOK, NZD/CAD and USD/JPY. We are also long a basket of petrocurrencies (NOK, CAD, RUB, MXN and COP) against the euro. Feature Inflation dynamics are a very powerful determinant for the trajectory of a currency. If inflation is high and rising in one country relative to another, then the currency should depreciate to equalize prices across borders. Otherwise, the high-inflation currency becomes incrementally expensive. Over time, by gauging relative shifts in prices, one can ascertain where a currency rests relative to its long-term fair value. This is the basic theory behind purchasing power parity (PPP).   In practice, PPP can be a very poor timing tool for managing currencies. Inflation tends to be a lagging indicator, making timely decisions based on PPP modeling futile. Meanwhile, there are also measurement issues, given the difference in consumer price baskets across countries. For example, shelter is 33% of the US CPI basket but only 17% in the euro area. The rising share of services in many economies also renders the PPP exercise less relevant, given the difficulty is arbitraging those prices away. It is rather difficult to import a haircut from Manila into Canada, though there could be a huge price differential. US inflation has been blasting downwards since the start of the year and by most indicators will remain very tepid in the near term.  That said, there are two crucial benefits that come from the PPP exercise. First, most currencies tend to be mean reverting around their PPP fair value. This is especially true if the deviations from fair value are especially large. For developed market currencies, 20-30% deviations from fair value are extremely rare, making such occurrences very potent bets for a reversal. Second, by creating a synthetic CPI basket for each country that equalizes the weights of various items across countries, one gets much closer to an apples-to-apples comparison.1 The Adjustment Chart I-1The Dollar Move This Week Was Unusual We make two adjustments. First, we divide the CPI baskets into five major groups. Second, we run two regressions with the exchange rate as the dependent variable. The first regression (REG1) uses the relative price ratios of the five groups2 as independent variables. This allows us to observe the most influential prices that help explain variations in the exchange rate. The second regression (REG2) uses a weighted average combination of the five groups to form a synthetic relative price ratio. If, for example, household goods are 3% in the US CPI basket, but 9% in the Australian CPI basket, a new synthetic price basket will have a 6% weight for household goods. Given the big move in currencies since the March 19 peak in the DXY index, we are updating these models to see where value lies within the G10 and to provide a more grounded anchor to our relative value trades. The results show the US dollar as still overvalued, especially versus the Swedish krona and Norwegian krone (Chart I-1). Within the safe haven complex, the Japanese yen remains very attractive. The rally in the euro has eroded the valuation cushion that was much evident at the start of the year. Our positioning is largely in line with PPP fundamentals. We are short EUR/GBP, CAD/NOK, NZD/CAD and USD/JPY. We are also long a basket of petrocurrencies (NOK, CAD, RUB, MXN and COP) against the euro. This is a play on both relative fundamentals and valuation. The US Dollar Chart I-2Downside Risks To US Inflation US inflation has been blasting downwards since the start of the year and by most indicators will remain very tepid in the near term (Chart I-2). This could force the hand of the Federal Reserve into injecting more stimulus into the economy. Services remain a very important component of US CPI, especially shelter. The shelter CPI (33% of the consumption basket) component has dramatically softened from about 3.3% at the start of the year to about 2% today. That said, prices have been disinflationary globally and not just in the US. This means that despite the drop in US CPI, the fair value of the currency continues to fall given weaker prices outside the US (Chart I-3). According to REG2, the US dollar is still overvalued by 13%. REG1 has a higher fair-value for the currency, since household good and transportation prices have been drifting lower in the US and are captured more fervently in this regression. Our long-term view on the US dollar remains bearish. The Fed now has an asymmetrical inflation target. This means willingness to allow for an inflation overshoot, as the Fed will not fight upside surprises in inflation with tighter monetary policy anytime soon. This will dampen the long-term fair value of the US dollar, compared to its G10 peers. Chart I-3The Dollar Is Expensive The Euro Chart I-4The Euro Is Cheap The euro area has stepped back into deflation, at a time when the European Central Bank is running out of monetary policy bullets. Annual CPI in September came in at -0.3%, which explains why the fair value of the euro has been rising relative to the USD (Chart I-4). Most components of the CPI basket in the euro area are declining, including household goods, medicare and shelter. With the pandemic hitting the euro area very hard, food, restaurants and hotels (food and non-alcoholic beverages account for 29% of the consumption basket) have fallen. This has buffeted the fair value of the euro. Shelter's weight in the euro area CPI basket currently stands at 17%. This is a small share compared to the US. This means that more subdued house and rental price increases in the euro area have been beneficial for the fair value of the common currency. Rampant rent controls, especially in places like Germany, have subdued housing CPI. These trends should continue. It is well known that the euro area is relatively open; as such, tradable goods prices are important for the fair value of the euro. On this front, there has been a generalized downtrend in euro area tradeable goods prices. Compared to the Fed, the ECB can do little about this. This is relatively euro bullish, since it will boost real rates and lift the fair value of the currency. The Japanese Yen Chart I-5The Yen Is Quite Cheap The yen remains cheap and is undervalued by both measures around 15% (Chart I-5). Falling relative prices in Japan is the norm, which makes the yen relatively attractive on a recurring basis. Shelter prices have been the big component in the relative decline of Japanese prices. Other prices have been decreasing, especially in culture and recreation where the boom in the tourism industry was crushed by the pandemic. The new Prime Minister, Yoshihide Suga, continues to encourage deflation by targeting lower telecom prices. This is reinforced by the aging population. Encouragingly, BoJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda remains committed to achieving a 2% inflation target, even though inflation expectations have not been trending in his favor. That means inflation in Japan will likely lag that of other developed countries, lifting the fair value of the yen. The British Pound Chart I-6The Pound Is Cheap While the pound might be driven near-term by political gyrations on the conclusion of Brexit, it is fundamentally undervalued. REG2 suggests the pound is undervalued by 17%. (Chart I-6). The consumption baskets in both the UK and the US are roughly similar, which means traditional PPP models do a good job at capturing the true underlying picture of price differentials. Relative food and restaurant prices have gone up as the UK economy reopened, but energy and transportation costs are down since the oil crisis took hold. Brexit will continue to dictate the ebb and flow of sterling gyrations over the next few weeks, but the reality is that the pound should be higher on a fundamental basis. We are long cable versus the euro on this basis. The Australian Dollar Chart I-7The Aussie Is Slightly Cheap The AUD is undervalued by about 3% as the discount has fallen with the bounce in the Aussie (Chart I-7). As a commodity currency, PPP models are less useful for the AUD than terms of trade, which have been moving in favor of the Australian dollar. Most prices in the Australian consumption basket are up relative to the US. This is especially the case for health, culture and recreation, as well as household goods. Shelter accounts for almost a quarter of the consumption basket. Relative shelter prices in Australia have been improving of late, on the back of waning macro-prudential measures. In the 1980s, inflation in Australia averaged around 8.3% year-on-year. This made the Aussie incrementally expensive, creating grounds for a subsequent 50% devaluation from 1980 to 1986. Inflation targeting was finally introduced and has realigned Aussie prices with the rest of the world. Our bias is that the Aussie will be less driven by price differentials going forward, and more by RBA policy and terms of trade. The New Zealand Dollar Chart I-8The Kiwi Is Slightly Expensive The New Zealand dollar is overvalued by about 5% relative to the US dollar, according to our PPP models (Chart I-8). Like the Aussie, the kiwi is less driven by price differentials and more by terms of trade. Food and shelter account for the largest share of the consumption basket, and relative prices have been moving against the kiwi. Relative shelter prices in New Zealand, which were flat for most of this decade, are reaccelerating anew on low rates and government support. Inflation has moderated considerably in New Zealand since the pandemic hit the global economy. This should keep the fair value of the kiwi stable. Our bias is that going forward, the kiwi will underperform other commodity currencies on valuation grounds. The Canadian Dollar Chart I-9The Loonie Is Cheap The loonie is currently undervalued by about 10% against the US dollar (Chart I-9).  Shelter remains the largest budget item for Canadian households, and relative prices have been rising. Interestingly, shelter CPI does not fully capture skyrocketing house prices in Canada over the last decade, due to measurement differences in owner’s equivalent rent. Since 2005, Canadian house prices relative to the US have doubled but, on the contrary, the relative shelter CPI has trended downwards. These crosscurrents have dampened the CPI explanatory power of the exchange rate. Due to heavy taxation, Canadian consumers are not benefitting from the steep drop in energy costs compared to their US neighbors. Relative energy and transportation costs are up in Canada. That said, terms of trade have been more important for the loonie. As such, rising energy prices will be positive for Canadian incomes and the fair value of the loonie. The Swiss Franc Chart I-10The Swiss Franc Is Cheap USD/CHF is expensive according to our PPP models, despite a structural appreciation of the franc in recent years (Chart I-10). This has been driven by a relative price decline in all categories of the Swiss consumption basket. A large item in the Swiss CPI basket is the food, restaurants and hotels category, and this has been in structural relative price decline. But even more volatile items, such as energy and transportation, have declined of late as well. Headline consumer prices in Switzerland are down -0.6% year-on-year, one of the worst in the developed world. This has significantly boosted the fair value of the franc. As a small open economy, tradable goods prices are important for Switzerland. Given high levels of specialization, terms-of-trade in Switzerland are doing well as imported goods prices continue to deflate. This suggests that Swiss innovation will continue to drive the value of the franc higher. The Norwegian Krone Chart I-11The Norwegian Krone Is Very Undervalued The Norwegian krone is one of the most undervalued currencies, according to our PPP models (Chart I-11). A big swing factor for the krone has been falling energy prices. As a large energy producer, Norwegians pay less for electricity, gas and other fuels. Norway is also a heavy producer of renewable energy, notably hydropower. This makes the domestic energy basket less susceptible to the ebbs and flows of energy prices, even though it is extremely beneficial for terms of trade. As such, the drop in energy prices has eroded the valuation cushion for the NOK, but not by enough to significantly dent deep undervaluation. The Swedish Krona Chart I-12The Swedish Krona Is Very Cheap The krona is the cheapest currency in our universe by a wide margin (Chart I-12). Relative prices in Sweden have been rising, but not by enough to dent the undervaluation in the currency.  Sweden kept its economy mostly open during the entire duration of the pandemic. As such, relative prices, especially those for services such as restaurants and hotels, have held up relatively well. Energy prices have also been a big swing factor in the CPI basket, with the cheap krona boosting domestic fuel costs. Negative rates have also been a boon for the housing market, with prices for both shelter and homes picking up relative to the US. The bottom line is that modest inflationary pressures are to be expected given the steep undervaluation of the krona. But it will require a lot more of a rise in domestic prices to dent the fair value of the SEK.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Special Report, titled “A Fresh Look At Purchasing Power Parity,” dated August 23, 2019, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Group A: Food, restaurants and hotels; Group B: Shelter; Group C: Health, culture and recreation; Group D: Energy and transportation; Group E: Household goods Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data from the US have been mostly positive: Nonfarm payrolls increased by 638K in October, higher than the expected 600K. The unemployment rate declined from 7.9% to 6.9% in October. The NFIB Business Optimism Index was unchanged at 104 in October. Headline inflation fell from 1.4% to 1.2% year-on-year in October. Core inflation also slipped from 1.7% to 1.6%. Initial jobless claims increased by 709K for the week ending on November 6, better than expected. The DXY index fell by 0.4% this week. Risk appetite made a tentative come back earlier this week while downside risks persist. A confirmed Biden presidential victory, together with positive vaccine news from Pfizer make a stronger case for our long-term dollar bearish view. Report Links: The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 The Dollar In A Market Reset - October 30, 2020 A Few Market Observations - October 23, 2020 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data from the euro area have been negative: The Sentix Investor Confidence Index declined from -8.3 to -10 in November, while still above the expectations of -15.  The ZEW Economic Sentiment Index declined from 52.3 to 32.8 in November. Industrial production fell by 6.8% year-on-year in September. The euro increased by 0.4% against the US dollar this week. We expect the euro to outperform the US dollar should global growth recover in the coming months. Many economic indicators are consistent with this view: the trade balance in the euro area remains very positive; relative bond yields are quite attractive; lastly, the gap between the economic surprise index with the US is also closing. Report Links: The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 Addressing Client Questions - September 4, 2020 On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 The Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data from Japan have been positive: The Coincident Index slightly increased from 79.4 to 80.8 in September. The Leading Economic Index also ticked up from 88.5 to 92.9. Preliminary machine tool orders declined by 5.9% year-on-year in October. This is a considerable improvement compared to the 15% drop in the previous month. The Eco Watchers Survey Outlook Index increased from 48.3 to 49.1 in October. The Current Index also climbed from 49.3 to 54.5. The Japanese yen declined by 0.8% this week against the US dollar with a more optimistic backdrop for global growth. That said, we continue to favor the Japanese yen as a safe-haven hedge as the yen could still outperform the US dollar in a pro-cyclical environment. The Summary of Opinions released by the BoJ this week highlighted that Japan’s economy is likely to follow an improving trend at a moderate pace. Report Links: The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data from the UK have been positive: GDP increased by 15.5% quarter-on-quarter in Q3, following the 19.8% plunge in the previous quarter. Halifax house prices increased by 7.5% year-on-year over the past three months to October. Retail sales increased by 5.2% year-on-year in October. The British pound appreciated by 1.1% against the US dollar this week. The UK is one of the countries hit hardest by COVID-19 as its services sector is a large component of GDP. The UK is also well prepared for the vaccine this time and is likely to benefit most from the vaccine distribution. We remain bullish on the British pound and are playing the GBP upside via the euro. Report Links: The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data from Australia have been positive: The NAB Business Confidence Index increased from -4 to 5 in October. The NAB Business Conditions Index also ticked up from 0 to 1. The Australian dollar appreciated by 1.2% against the US dollar this week. As the NAB November 2020 Global Forward View pointed out, incoming GDP data confirms a substantial but incomplete rebound in the third quarter globally. Besides, stronger manufacturing conditions in the EM space firmly support the Australian economy and the Aussie dollar. Moreover, the RBA’s policy remains highly accommodative, which should support domestic economic activity. Report Links: An Update On The Australian Dollar - September 18, 2020 On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data from New Zealand have been mixed: REINZ house prices increased by 3.5% month-on-month in October. Visitor arrivals continued to fall by 96.7% year-on-year in September. Two-year inflation expectations edged up from 1.43% to 1.59% in Q4. The New Zealand dollar surged by 2.4% against the US dollar this week. On Wednesday, the RBNZ held the official cash rate unchanged at 0.25% and sounded more optimistic about the economic outlook. This was a marked difference from market expectations of negative rates. The bank did reaffirm a funding for lending program, which will allow banks to obtain cheap funds for lending. This was esteemed more potent than a negative OCR. That said, the Bank is ready to deploy negative rates by year end if needed. Report Links: Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data from Canada have been positive: The unemployment rate declined from 9% to 8.9% in October. The participation rate ticked up from 65% to 65.2%. Average hourly wages increased by 5.3% year-on-year in October. Employment increased by 84,000 in October. Bloomberg Nanos Confidence was unchanged at 52.5 for the week ending on November 6th. The Canadian dollar appreciated by 0.6% against the US dollar this week. Higher hopes for a vaccine provide a positive backdrop for the transportation sector, supporting energy prices and petrocurrencies including the Canadian dollar. We remain positive on the CAD against the USD while negative on the CAD against higher beta petrocurrencies such as the NOK. Report Links: Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data from Switzerland have been positive: The unemployment rate fell from 3.4% to 3.3% in October. FX reserves declined from CHF 873.5 billion to CHF 871.5 billion in October. Total sight deposits were unchanged at CHF 707.6 billion for the week ending on November 6. The Swiss franc remained flat against the US dollar this week. While we are positive on the Swiss franc against the US dollar, we do think that the Japanese yen is a better hedge than the franc. Moreover, as we argued in last week’s report, an interesting gap has been opened between EUR/CHF and USD/CHF. Our bias is that the euro will outperform the Swiss franc in coming months. Stay long EUR/CHF. Report Links: The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data from Norway have been mostly positive: Manufacturing output fell by 0.5% month-on-month in September. Headline inflation increased from 1.6% to 1.7% year-on-year in September. The Norwegian krone appreciated by 2.3% against the US dollar this week. The Norges Bank decided to keep the policy rate accommodative at low levels last week to support economic recovery. Our Commodity and Energy strategists now forecast Brent prices to reach $65 - $70 /bbl by 2025. We believe that the Norwegian krone will follow the energy price higher as travel restrictions are being lifted in the post-vaccine world. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data from Sweden have been mostly negative: The budget deficit widened from SEK 13 billion to SEK 36 billion in October. Household consumption fell by 3.8% year-on-year in September. Headline inflation declined from 0.4% to 0.3% year-on-year in October. The Swedish krona appreciated by 1.7% against the US dollar this week. Scandinavian central banks, including the central banks of Norway, Sweden and Denmark, have entered into a new agreement for currency swap facilities to strengthen contingency. This will help cushion further damages from a prolonged health crisis. We continue to favor the Nordic currencies and will buy the Nordic basket again on 2% drop. Kelly Zhong Research Analyst Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights The vaccine promises an eventual return to “normal” life – just as Americans voted to “return to normalcy.” Markets are cheering and hinting at an eventual rotation into value stocks. The contested US election can still cause volatility even though Trump is highly unlikely to change the result. The fiscal stimulus cliff is still a risk to the normalcy rally in the short run. But gridlock is the best political outcome over the coming 12-24 months. Stay strategically long global stocks over bonds. Tactically maintain safe-haven positions, add risk gradually, and stay short China/Taiwan. Feature The news of Pfizer’s success in developing a COVID-19 vaccine galvanized financial markets this week. America’s leading public health official Anthony Fauci also predicted that Moderna’s vaccine candidate would be similarly effective. It will take time to distribute these vaccines but the world can look toward economic recovery next year. Stocks rallied, bonds sold off, and value outperformed growth on the back of the news (Charts 1A and 1B). Chart 1ABiden: Return To Normalcy Chart 1BVaccine: Return To Normalcy The vaccine announcement super-charged the “return to normalcy” rally that followed the US election. The election’s likeliest policy outcome is that President Elect Joe Biden will not raise sweeping tariffs while Republican senators will not raise taxes next year, the best-case scenario for markets. This is genuinely positive news. The benefits are very clear over the next 12 months. But the risks are also very clear over the next three months: the virus will remain a problem until the vaccine is widely distributed, the US is in the midst of a contested election that could still cause negative surprises, the Republican senators are less likely to agree to fiscal relief, and President Trump will take aggressive actions to cement his legacy during the “lame duck” period of his last 68 days in office. The takeaway is that the US dollar will see a near-term, counter-trend rally and developed markets will outperform emerging markets for a while longer. We are only gradually adding risk to our strategic portfolio as we keep dry powder and maintain tactical safe-haven trades. Is The Election Over Or Not? Yes, most likely the election is over. But our definitive guide to contested US elections will teach any reader to be sensitive to the tail risks. The counting of ballots is not finished and the Electoral College does not vote until December 14. First, it is still possible that President Trump could pull off a victory in Georgia, which will now recount ballots by hand. Biden’s margin of victory of 14,045 votes is not so large there as to make it impossible that Trump would come back with a win (though history suggests recounts only change hundreds, not thousands, of votes). Trump is also narrowing the gap in Arizona, where counting continues, though the latest reports suggest he is still falling short of the roughly 60% share of late ballots that he needs to close the 11,635 vote gap and win the state. Second, there is a 50/50 chance that the Supreme Court will rule that Pennsylvania must stick to the statutory November 3 deadline, i.e. not accept mail-in ballots that arrived in the three days after that date. While the high court would prefer to let Pennsylvania settle its own affairs, this case is of the sort that the court could feel compelled to weigh in. The constitution is crystal clear that legislatures, not courts, decide how a state’s electors are chosen. Such a ruling probably would not reverse Biden’s projected victory in Pennsylvania. Trump is currently trailing Biden by 53,980 votes in this state. State officials say that the ballots that arrived late amount to only 7,800 and would not be able to change the outcome.1 This may be understating the risk but it is probably accurate in the main. Table 1 shows the share of mail-in votes that arrived late in this year’s primary elections. The share was 1.07% in Pennsylvania and up to 3% in other states. Applying the high water mark of 3% to the November 3 general election mail-in ballots, it is possible that 77,187 votes arrived late and would be excluded by a Supreme Court ruling. However, 85% of those ballots would have to have gone to Biden in order for Trump to come out the winner. This is far-fetched. Table 1Share Of Ballots Arriving Late In Primary Election Extrapolated To General Election It is also unlikely that Republican legislatures will take matters into their own hands and defy the election boards of their state by nominating their own slate of Republican electors – a scenario we entertained in our definitive guide. If Biden leads the statewide vote, then a state legislature would be politically suicidal to appoint the state’s electors to vote for Trump. It would invite a popular backlash. In the case of Pennsylvania, Republican leaders of the lower and upper chambers have explicitly denied any willingness or ability to choose electors other than those entailed by the popular vote. Thus the 1876 “Stolen Election” scenario is extremely unlikely in this critical state. It is just as unlikely in Arizona, Nevada, or Georgia.2 Nevertheless, if President Trump wins in Georgia or gets a favorable Supreme Court verdict, investors will have to increase the probability that the election result will be overturned, which currently stands at 16% (Chart 2). This will cause a bout of volatility even if it changes nothing in the end. If somehow Trump pulls off a Rutherford B. Hayes and overturn the result, markets should sell off. Yes, Trump is an exclusively commercial and reflationary president, but his election on a constitutional technicality would create nearly unprecedented social and political instability in the United States and it would presage major instability globally. Chinese, European, and Canadian assets would be hardest hit (Chart 3). Chart 2Trump’s Tiny Chance Of Reversing Election Otherwise Trump and the Republicans are trying to do four things with their litigation: (1) probing for weaknesses that can delay or change the Electoral College math (2) conducting due diligence in case fraud really did tip over one of the states (3) saving face for President Trump and his allies, who otherwise would be exposed as failures (4) keeping their base motivated for the showdown in Georgia on January 5, which will determine control of the Senate. Chart 3Trump's Loss Favors Euro, Renminbi, Loonie In Georgia, opinion polls show Republican David Perdue slightly leading Democrat Jon Ossoff, in keeping with his superior showing on November 3. However, Republican Kelly Loeffler is trailing Democrat Raphael Warnock (Charts 4A and 4B). Last week we argued that the odds of Democrats winning both races stood around 20%. If anything this view is generous – given that Perdue already beat Ossoff, and Warnock will continue to suffer attacks for associating with Fidel Castro – but it is in line with online betting markets (Chart 5). Chart 4AVoters Split On Georgia Senate Runoffs Chart 4BVoters Split On Georgia Senate Runoffs Chart 5Democrats Have ~20% Chance To Win Senate Investors should plan on the US government being gridlocked unless something occurs that fundamentally changes the Georgia race. Gridlock is positive, so if Trump’s election disputes keep the Republican political base spirited for the Georgia runoffs, then Trump’s activities have an ironic upside for markets. That is, as long as he doesn’t succeed in overturning the election result and the flames of discontent do not break out into a significant violent incident. Other fears about the transition period are less concerning. Several clients have asked us what should happen if President Elect Biden came down with COVID-19 or were otherwise incapacitated. The answer is that Vice President Elect Kamala Harris would take his place, as she now has popular consent to do exactly that. Prior to the Electoral College voting on December 14, the Democratic National Committee would have to nominate a candidate to replace Biden, almost certainly Harris. After December 14, the regular succession would apply under the twentieth amendment and Harris would automatically fill Biden’s shoes. Harris is only slightly more negative for equities than Biden: her regulatory pen would be more anti-business, but like Biden her main policies depend entirely on control of the senate. Bottom Line: It ain’t over till it’s over. The big picture is positive for risk assets but a surprise from ongoing election disputes or the unusually rocky transition of power would trigger a new bout of volatility. Stay long Japanese yen and health stocks on a tactical time frame. Trump’s Lame Duck Risk An investor in the Wild West has often criticized us for arguing that Trump would become a “war president” as he became a political lame duck at home. This war president view did pay off with Iran in January 2020, but otherwise the criticism is valid (see Trump’s Abraham Accords). Now Trump is almost certainly a lame duck so we will find out what he intends to do when unshackled from election concerns. Stay long Japanese yen and health stocks on a tactical time frame.  Since losing the election, Trump has fired Defense Secretary Mark Esper, several defense officials have resigned, and CIA Director Gina Haspel is rumored to be next on the chopping block. Most of the officials to depart had broken with the president over the course of the election year, so he may just be dishing out punishment now that the campaign is over. But it is possible that Trump is planning a series of final actions to cement his legacy and that these officials were removed because they got in the way. Chart 6Trump's Lame Duck Risk To China And Taiwan Strait First, there is no doubt that Trump is already tightening sanctions on China and Iran. China was the origin of the coronavirus pandemic and Trump has called for reparations, which could mean more tariff hikes. His outstanding legacy in US history will be his insistence that the US confront China. We are fully prepared for this outcome and remain short the renminbi and Taiwanese equities, despite their strong performance year-to-date (Chart 6). Trump could also raise tariffs on Europe. However, investors should be used to tariffs and sanctions by now. The impact would be fleeting and the next administration could reverse it. In the case of the renminbi, or any tariffs that weigh on the euro, investors should buy on the dips. By contrast, there are some conceivable actions – we are speculating – that would be extremely destabilizing and possibly irreversible. These would include: Extending diplomatic recognition to Taiwan, potentially provoking a war with China. Sending aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Strait, like Bill Clinton did during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, to shore up US deterrence. Launching surgical strikes against Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear facilities or critical infrastructure. A prominent official has already denied that Trump intends anything of the sort. Launching surgical strikes against North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear facilities. No sign of this, but Kim Jong Un did enhance his capabilities after his meetings with Trump, thus embarrassing the president on a major foreign policy initiative ahead of the election. Providing intelligence and assistance to US allies like Israel who may seek to sabotage or attack Iran now or in future to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons. Withdrawing US troops from Germany or South Korea – which is much more consequential than hasty withdrawals from Afghanistan or Syria, which Trump clearly intends. War actions are largely infeasible. The bureaucracy would refuse to implement them. Assuming the Department of Defense would slow-walk any attempts to reduce troops in important regions like Germany or Korea, it would almost certainly avoid instigating a war. Withdrawing troops from Afghanistan or Syria is manageable, and fitting with Trump’s legacy, but it would not be disruptive for financial markets. A diplomatic upgrade or a show of force to demonstrate the American commitment to defend Taiwan is possible and highly disruptive for global financial markets. The critical risk may come from US allies or partners that are threatened by the impending Biden administration and have a window of opportunity to act with full American support while Trump still inhabits the Oval Office. The likeliest candidate would be Israel and Saudi Arabia on the Iranian nuclear program. Trump’s onetime national security advisor, H. R. McMaster, has already warned that Israel could act on the “Begin Doctrine,” which calls for targeted preventive strikes against hostile nuclear capabilities.3 Even here, Israel is unlikely to jeopardize its critical security relationship with the United States, so any actions would be limited, but they could still bring a major increase in regional tensions. Saudi Arabia can do little on its own but President Trump could willingly or unwilling encourage provocative actions. Chart 7Big Tech Is Not Priced For Surprises Any number of incidents or provocations could occur in this risky interregnum between Trump and Biden. Some suggest Trump will release a treasure trove of documents to discredit Washington and the Deep State. If that is all that occurs, then investors will be able to give a sigh of relief, as revelations of government intrigue would have to be truly consequential for future events in order to cause a notable market impact. Last-minute executive orders on regulating domestic industries are just as likely to shock markets as any international moves. We speculate that Big Tech is in Trump’s sights for censoring his comments during the election. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Homeland Security versus Regents of the University of California, the Trump administration is positively incentivized to issue a flurry of executive orders and write them in a way that makes them hard for the Biden administration to rescind them.4 Tech is priced for perfection, despite ruffles due to the vaccine this week, and investors expect Biden-Harris to maintain Obama’s alliance with Silicon Valley, not least because Biden has named executives from Facebook and Apple to his transition team and is considering putting former Google chief Eric Schmidt in charge of a Big Tech task force (Chart 7).5 Ultimately we have no idea what the Trump administration will do in its final two months. A lot of Trump’s attention will be focused on contesting the election. Drastic or reckless decisions will likely be obstructed by the bureaucracy. But the president still retains immense powers and there are executive orders that are legitimate and would benefit the US’s long-term interests even if disruptive for financial markets – and these would be harder for officials to disobey. Trump is an anti-establishment player who intends to shake up Washington, stay involved in politics, and cement his legacy. There is a reason for investors to take political risk seriously rather than to assume that the transition to a more market-friendly administration will be smooth. Bottom Line: Stay long gold on geopolitical risk, despite the potential for a counter-trend rise in the US dollar. We are neutral tech: polarization and fiscal risks are positive for tech shares but reopening and Trump lame duck risks are negative. Biden’s Cabinet Picks This “lame duck Trump” risk explains why we are not overly concerned about Biden’s cabinet picks. Insofar as Biden’s choices affect the market at all, they will confirm the “return to normalcy” theme and hence will be market-friendly. Take for example Biden’s just-announced chief of staff, Ronald Klain, who was chief of staff when Biden served as vice president from 2009- 16. The current transition is obstructed by election disputes, as occurred in November-December of 2000, but the cabinet picks are not likely to bring negative surprises. Already Biden has announced a coronavirus advisory board, a bipartisan transition team, and is pondering other picks, some of which will be known by Thanksgiving. None of the choices are in the least disruptive or radical – and most are acceptable to Wall Street. Biden will pick experts and technocrats who are known from his political career, the Obama administration, the Clinton administration, the Democratic Party, and academia. The market will invariably approve of establishment nominations after four years of anti-establishment picks and spontaneous firings. Since the Senate will remain in Republican hands, the cabinet members will have to be centrist enough to be confirmed. While Biden will inevitably nominate a few progressives, they will either fail in the Senate or take up marginal posts. Stay long gold on Trump “lame duck” geopolitical risks. Biden may have the opportunity to appoint three or even four members to the Federal Reserve’s board of governors. The Trump administration failed to fill two seats, while Fed Chair Jerome Powell’s term will expire in February 2022 (Diagram 1). If Biden appoints Lael Brainard to another post, such as Treasury Secretary, he will have a fourth space to fill. Diagram 1Biden Could Have Three-To-Four Fed Picks Chart 8Facing Gridlock, Biden Will Re-Regulate The implication will be a further entrenchment of dovish policy, with greater attention to new concerns that fall outside of traditional monetary policy such as climate change and racial inequality. The Fed has already committed to pursuing “maximum employment,” refraining from rate hikes till the end of 2023, and targeting average inflation – all a major boon to the Biden administration as it attempts to revive the economy. What is negative for markets is that Biden will re-regulate the economy – after Trump’s deregulatory shock – and that this will bring about political risks for small business and key industries like health, financials, and energy (Chart 8). Biden has little other option given that his legislative agenda will be largely stymied. Nevertheless, the sectors most likely to be heavily impacted are attractively valued and stand to benefit from economic normalization if not from Biden’s version of normalcy. Bottom Line: Stay long health and energy. Yes, Gridlock Is Best For Markets Some clients have asked us about our view that gridlocked government is truly the best for financial markets. Wouldn’t Democrats winning control of the Senate in Georgia be better, as it would usher in greater political certainty and larger fiscal spending? We have addressed this issue in previous reports so we will be brief. First, yes, gridlock has higher returns than single-party sweep governments on average over the past 120 years (Chart 9). Clearly the normalcy rally can go higher, but it is equally clear that it will get caught by surprise when the political reality hits home.  Second, however, the stock market’s annual returns are roughly average under single-party sweeps during this period (Chart 10). Chart 9Gridlock Best For Markets Chart 10Single-Party Sweeps Generate Average Annual Returns So while investors can cheer gridlock, it is not as if they should sell everything if Democrats do win control of the Senate on January 5. Chart 11Sweeps As Good As Gridlock Over 70 Years Indeed, looking at the period after World War II, sweep governments have witnessed average annual returns that are the same or slightly better than under gridlock (Chart 11). Whereas limiting the study to the post-Reagan era, gridlocks are clearly favored. If greater fiscal resources are needed then gridlock will quickly become a market risk rather than an opportunity. It is notable that over the past 120 years, there is not an example of a Democratic president presiding over a Republican senate and a Democratic House. There was only one case of the inverse – a Republican President, a Democratic senate, and a Republican House – which occurred in 2001-02 and coincided with a bear market. In fact, this episode should be classified as a Republican sweep, as in Table 2, since a sweep was the result of the 2000 election and the context of the key market-relevant legislation in 2001.6 Table 2Average Annual Equity Returns And Gridlock Government Chart 12Market Predicted Gridlock In 2020 In 2020 the stock market clearly anticipated a gridlocked outcome – the market’s performance matches with the historical profile of divided government (Chart 12). We argued that this was the best case for the market because it meant neither right-wing populism nor left-wing socialism. But we also highlighted that any relief rally on election results (reduced uncertainty) would be cut short by the major near-term implication of gridlock: a delay of fiscal support for the economy in the near term. This was the only deflationary scenario on offer in this election. Hence bad news in winter 2020-21 would precede the good news over the entire 2020-22 period. This is still largely our view, but we admit that the vaccine announcement erodes near-term risk aversion even further. There is little substance to the discussion of whether Americans will take the vaccine or not. Evidence shows that Americans are no less likely to take vaccines than other developed country citizens – assuming they are demonstrated to be safe and effective (Chart 13). Chart 13Yes, Americans Take Vaccines So gridlock looks even better now than it did previously. Yet we still think the near-term fiscal risks will hit markets sometime soon. Senate Republicans have been emboldened by the fact that their relative hawkishness paid off in the election on November 3. If they would not capitulate to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi prior to the election, they are even less likely to do so after gaining seats in the House, retaining the Senate, and crying foul over the presidential election. McConnell could agree to a $500 billion deal before Christmas – or not. There is no clear basis for optimism. A government shutdown is even possible if the continuing resolution expires on December 12. If the economic data turns sour and/or markets sell off dramatically then the Republicans will be forced to agree to a bigger deal, but as things stand they are not forced to do anything. And that presents a downside risk to the normalcy rally. Investment Takeaways Today’s post-election environment is comparable to the period after 2010, when a new business cycle was beginning and a new President Barack Obama had to face down Republican fiscal hawks in the House of Representatives. Today’s GOP senators may prove somewhat more cooperative with President Elect Biden, but that remains to be seen. Given how tight the election was, Republicans have an incentive to obstruct, slow down the economic recovery, and contest the 2022 midterms and 2024 election on the back of another slow-burn recovery. It worked last time. The debt ceiling crises of 2011 and 2012-13 were different than the fiscal stimulus cliff that Washington faces today but the market implications are similar. At the climax of brinkmanship between the president and the senate, treasuries will rally, the dollar will rally, stocks will fall, and emerging markets will underperform (Charts 14A and 14B). Today there is a greater limit on how far the dollar will rise and how far treasury yields will fall, but a fiscal impasse will still drive flows into these assets. Chart 14AObama’s Debt Ceiling Crises… Chart 14B… Presage Biden’s Fiscal Cliffs ​​​​​​​This is what we expect over the next three months. The fact that President Trump could bring negative surprises only enhances this expectation. Therefore we are only gradually adding risk to our strategic portfolio and maintaining tactically defensive positions. Clearly the normalcy rally can go higher, but it is equally clear to us that it will get caught by surprise when the political reality hits home. Since this could be anytime over the next two months, we are only gradually adding new risk. We would not deny that the outlook is brighter over the 12-24-month periods due to the vaccine and election results.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 See Chris Matthews, "Alleging fraud, GOP seeks to overturn election results in Michigan, Pennsylvania," MarketWatch, November 10, 2020, marketwatch.com. 2 See Senator Jake Corman and Representative Kerry Benninghoff, "Pennsylvania lawmakers have no role to play in deciding the presidential election," Centre Daily, October 19, 2020, centredailly.com. As for the 1876 “Stolen Election,” the initial election results suggested that Democrat Samuel Tilden had won 184 electoral votes while Republican Rutherford B. Hayes had won 165. The amount needed for a majority in the Electoral College at the time was 185, so Tilden fell one vote short while Hayes fell 20 votes short. After partisan litigation, actions by state legislatures, an intervention by the US House of Representatives, and a grand political compromise, Hayes won with 185 votes. 3 See Charles Creitz, "McMaster warns Biden on Iran deal: Don't resurrect 'political disaster masquerading as a diplomatic triumph,’" Fox News, November 12, 2020, foxnews.com. 4 In this ruling, which was decided on a 5-4 split with Chief Justice John Roberts siding with liberal justices, the Supreme Court denied the Trump administration’s effort to overturn the Obama administration’s policy known as Deferred Action on Childhood Arrivals (DACA), which stopped the US from deporting illegal immigrants who came to the US as children. The majority opinion argued that the Trump administration had merely asserted, not demonstrated, that the Obama administration’s executive orders were unconstitutional. In doing so, it established a precedent by which the court can determine whether one president’s executive orders should overrule another’s. While future administrations may follow better procedures in attempting to revoke their predecessors’ orders, this decision likely incentivizes the Trump administration to try to issue decrees that will be difficult to revoke. See John Yoo, "How the Supreme Court’s DACA decision harms the Constitution, the presidency, Congress, and the country," American Enterprise Institute, June 22, 2020, aei.org. 5 See Kiran Stacey, “What can Silicon Valley expect from Joe Biden?” Financial Times, November 8, 2020, ft.com. 6 The election produced a Republican sweep, with a 50-50 balance in the Senate, that led to the Bush tax cuts in May 2001. The business cycle was ending, however. In June, Democrats took the senate majority when Republican Senator Jim Jeffords of Vermont became an independent and began caucusing with Democrats. In September terrorists attacked the World Trade Center causing a market collapse.

The vaccine announcement this week accelerated the unwinding of the long tech short everything else pandemic trade. While such a rotation is augmenting our portfolio via an explicit long “Back To Work”/short “COVID-19 Winners” trade, as we highlighted in yesterday’s Daily US Sector Insight, our small cap size bias is another prime beneficiary. Specifically, small caps outshined large caps by nearly 4% this week. One of the key drivers behind such a quick move is the delta in sector composition between the small and large cap indexes. The relative gap in deep cyclicals alone is 13% as we highlighted in recent research. The implication is that as manufacturing rebounds, so will the relative performance of small caps (top panel). Moreover, easy fiscal policy is a tonic to the small/large share price ratio. As a flood of money enters the economy with a slight lag, small caps will continue to make up ground lost during the early stages of the pandemic (fiscal balance shown inverted, bottom panel). Bottom Line: We reiterate our recent small cap bias.

Highlights US inflation expectations will moderate, and US real yields will rise. This will support the US dollar. The potential rebound in the US dollar will cap any upside in EM ex-TMT stocks. Rising US real yields are a risk to high-multiple global growth stocks. Maintain a neutral allocation to EM in global equity and credit portfolios. Feature In this week’s report we identify market-relevant issues and topics and then present the investment implications of these potential developments. Current key investment-relevant topics and issues are as follows: 1. Implications of the US elections Fiscal Stimulus: In the context of Biden’s victory and the Senate remaining Republican, the odds of a meaningful fiscal package in the next several months are quite low. The Republican Senate did not support a fiscal package going into the elections. Odds are low that it will now agree to a fiscal package larger than $750 billion. Chart 1Rising US Real Yields Are Positive For The US Dollar According to the US Congressional Budget Office’s calculations, without a new fiscal package, the fiscal thrust in 2021 will be -7.5% of GDP or $1.5 trillion. Hence, fiscal stimulus should be more than $1 trillion to avoid a slump in growth. Granted that the recovery in US consumer income and spending that has been underway since April has to a large extent been supported by US fiscal transfers, the lack of current government income support to households poses a risk to the economy.  Of course, if US economic activity tanks again and the stock market plunges, Republicans will support a much larger package. However, as things stand now, the probability of a substantial (more than $1 trillion) fiscal package is low. The lack of fiscal stimulus implies that US growth and inflation expectations will moderate. Chart 1 shows that US inflation expectations have probably reached an apex and will downshift for now. US nominal bond yields are capped on the upside (by the Fed’s purchases and its commitment not to raise interest rates for several years) and on the downside (by the Fed’s reluctance to reach negative interest rates). Consequently, swings in inflation expectations will drive fluctuations in real yields, as has been occurring in recent months. As inflation expectations decline, real yields will rise. Impact of rising US real yields on financial markets: A stronger US dollar and lower prices for Nasdaq stocks. Rising real rates will support the US dollar (Chart 1, bottom panel). Chart 5 on page 5 reveals that the real rates differential between the US and the euro area has recently been moving in favor of the greenback.  Chart 2Rising US Real Yields Are Negative For Growth Stocks Budding investor realization that the US might not pursue an aggressively expansionary fiscal policy, as has been expected since spring, could also support the greenback. Less issuance of Treasury securities might be interpreted as less public debt monetization and less money creation by the Federal Reserve. Such a viewpoint will also be marginally positive for the US dollar. As to the equity market, US real (TIPS) yields have been negatively correlated with the Nasdaq index (Chart 2). As US real yields continue to rise, odds are that global growth stocks will come under selling pressure. Geopolitical ramifications: The impact of the forthcoming change in the White House on US foreign policy has been widely anticipated and has already been priced in by financial markets. A Biden administration will have a positive impact on the euro area, Canada, Mexico and Asia Pacific countries with the exception of China – as was not the case under the Trump administration. On the other end, Russia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia will be under heat from Biden’s White House. In our view, the impact on China will be neutral, not better than during Trump’s administration. It might be mildly positive in the near term but negative in the long run. In the short run, the new US administration will be less likely to use global trade as a weapon. In the long run, however, Biden will likely mobilize Europe to join its geopolitical confrontation with China. This will be negative for the Middle Kingdom.   One country where the impact of Biden’s administration has not been fully priced in is Brazil. The US executive branch will take a tougher stance in its dealings with Brazil’s right-wing government because their social values are not aligned and policy priorities differ. We remain short the BRL and underweight Brazilian equity and fixed-income markets within their respective EM portfolios. 2. Vaccines We have no better expertise than the market’s judgement on the timing of vaccine availability and its effectiveness in containing the pandemic in EM ex-China countries. It is clear, however, that the process of vaccine acquisition and distribution might be slower in EM ex-China than in advanced countries. On all three fronts – the spread of the pandemic, policy stimulus and vaccine distribution – EM excluding China, Korea and Taiwan will continue lagging DM. Therefore, EM ex-China domestic demand will continue to underperform relative to expectations and versus those in DM. This argues for continuous underweight, or at best a neutral allocation, in EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan equities versus their DM peers. Chart 3Chinese Onshore Equities Have Been In A Trading Range Since Early July 3. China: the business cycle and regulatory clampdown China’s business cycle recovery has further to go. The stimulus injected into the economy has been considerable and will continue to work its way into the economy. Even though we believe that China has reached peak stimulus, the latter works with a time lag of 6-12 months and economic growth will top only around mid-2021. That said, Chinese onshore share prices have been in a consolidation phase since early July and this is likely not over yet (Chart 3).  In turn, Chinese investable stocks have been surging in absolute terms and outperforming the global equity index (Chart 4, top panel). However, the entire Chinese equity outperformance has been due to growth stocks (TMT/new economy). Excluding these, the absolute and relative performance of Chinese investable stocks has been lackluster (Chart 4, top and bottom panels). Chart 4Chinese Investable Stocks: Surging TMT And Lackluster Performance By Ex-TMT Stocks In short, the spectacular performance of Chinese investable stocks this year has been attributed to three new economy stocks: Alibaba, Tencent and Meituan. These three stocks presently account for 40.5% of China’s MSCI Investable Index and 17.5% of the aggregate EM MSCI equity index. Concerns about regulatory clampdowns on new economy stocks have been, and remain, a major risk, not only in China but also in advanced economies. It is impossible to time regulatory actions. Nevertheless, investors should take into account the possibility that regulation may curb the profitability of new economy companies, especially if they are de-facto monopolies or oligopolies. Chinese authorities will not back down from imposing new regulation and scrutiny over the activities of giant new economy companies. Hence, risks of further de-rating remain elevated. In short, even though the mainland business cycle recovery is on a track, Chinese share prices remain at risk of correction due to overbought conditions and re-pricing of regulatory risks for new economy stocks. Will The US Dollar Capture Some Of Its Luster? US real yields are rising not only in absolute terms, but also relative to real yields in the euro area (Chart 5). Rising real yields in the US versus the euro area generally lead to a dollar rally against the euro.  Apart from rising US real bond yields, there are a number of other factors that will likely support the greenback: Investor sentiment on the US dollar is very low (Chart 6). From a contrarian perspective, this is positive. Chart 5The US Versus Euro Area: Real Yield Differentials And Exchange Rate Chart 6Investors Are Downbeat On The US Dollar   Consistently, investors are very short the US dollar, especially versus DM currencies (Charts 7and 8). Positioning is less short in the US dollar versus cyclical DM and high-beta EM currencies (Chart 8). That said, the fundamentals of EM high-beta currencies such as BRL, TRY, ZAR and IDR are poor. Chart 7Investors Are Very Long Safe-Haven Currencies… Chart 8...And Modestly Long Cyclical Currencies   The Republican Senate will block corporate tax increases and limit any regulatory initiatives by Democrats in Congress. Such business-friendly policies are currency bullish. In short, a Republican Senate is broadly positive for the US dollar, and markets have not priced it in. The fact that broad US equity averages – such as small caps and equal-weighted equity indexes – continue outperforming the rest of the world in local currency terms is also dollar bullish (Chart 9). The reasoning is that US equity outperformance versus the rest of the world suggests better profitability and return on capital in the US versus its peers. That favors a firmer US dollar. Finally, the broad-trade weighted US dollar is oversold and is sitting on a long-term technical resistance level (Chart 10). Chart 9US Relative Equity Outperformance Heralds A Stronger US Dollar Chart 10The US Dollar Is Very Oversold   Bottom Line: We have been highlighting downside risks to the US dollar since July 9. However, the conclusion of the US election raises the odds of a playable US dollar rebound. EM Strategy EM Equities We have been advocating for a neutral allocation toward EM in a global equity portfolio since July 30. If the US dollar rebounds, as we expect, EM stocks will not outperform the global equity index (Chart 11). Notably, excluding Chinese investable stocks, EM share prices have not outperformed the global benchmark (Chart 12). Besides, as shown in the top panel of Chart 4 on page 4, China’s outperformance against the global equity benchmark has been driven exclusively by new economy stocks. Chart 11EM Stocks Do Not Outperform When The Dollar Rallies Chart 12EM Versus Global Equity Performance: With And Without China   All in all, Charts 4 and 12 reveal that excluding three large Chinese new economy stocks – Alibaba, Tencent and Meituan – EM share prices have underperformed the global equity benchmark. Going forward, the potential rebound in the US dollar will cap any upside in EM ex-TMT stocks. Meanwhile, the correction in the NASDAQ and the increased scrutiny on the part of Chinese authorities over new economy stocks poses a risk to Chinese mega-cap TMT share prices. In absolute terms, we have been waiting for a pullback to buy EM equities, but they have surged following the US elections and the news on Pfizer’s vaccine. Chart 13EM Equity Index: No Breakout Yet The EM equity index could still advance and reach its 2011 or 2018 highs before rolling over (Chart 13). However, given our view on the US currency and risks to EM stemming from a rising US dollar, we refrain from playing such limited upside. EM currencies EM currencies will be at a risk if the US dollar stages a rebound. Since July 9, we have been shorting a basket of BRL, CLP, TRY, KRW, ZAR and IDR versus an equally-weighted basket of the euro, CHF and JPY. We are sticking with this strategy. Even if the US dollar rebounds, downsides in the euro, CHF and JPY against the greenback will be relatively limited. However, investors might consider adding the US dollar to the long side of this strategy. EM local bonds and EM credit markets We continue recommending long duration in EM local rates. However, we remain reluctant to take on currency risk. We maintain our recommendations from April 23 about receiving 10-year swap rates in Mexico, Colombia, Russia, India, China and Korea. We are also receiving 2-year rates in Malaysia and South Africa as a bet on rate cuts in these economies. In the EM credit space, we are also neutral. Our sovereign credit overweights are Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Russia, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. Our underweights are South Africa, Turkey, Indonesia, Argentina and Brazil. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights US Election & COVID-19: Joe Biden’s apparent victory in the US presidential race, as well as the announcement of a potential successful COVID-19 vaccine trial, are both bond-bearish outcomes. This is especially so for US Treasuries given the more resilient growth momentum in the US. Fixed Income Strategy: The big news announcements do not motivate us to change our fixed income investment recommendations. Stay below-benchmark on overall duration, and underweight the US in global bond portfolios. Stay overweight global inflation-linked bonds versus nominal government debt, particularly in the US and Italy. Maintain an overweight stance on global spread product, focused on US corporates (investment grade and Ba-rated high-yield) and emerging market US dollar denominated corporates. Feature Chart of the WeekUS Yields Leading The Way Higher Investors have digested two major pieces of news over the past few days – the projected election of Joe Biden as the 46th US President and the positive results of Pfizer’s COVID-19 vaccine trial. Both outcomes are bond-bearish, but the bigger response came after the news of a potential vaccine, with the 10-year US Treasury yield hitting an 8-month high of 0.96% yesterday. Yields in other countries rose by a lesser amount, continuing the recent trend of US Treasury underperformance (Chart of the Week). After the US election result, however, we remain comfortable with our recommended below-benchmark overall duration stance and underweight allocation to US Treasuries in global bond portfolios.  The introduction of a successful vaccine would obviously be a game-changer for all financial markets, not just fixed income, as it would allow investors to see an end to the pandemic and a return to more normal economic activity. While we are heartened by the vaccine trial announcement, there are still many hurdles that need to be cleared before any vaccine is approved and distributed around the world. It is still too soon to adjust our bond investment strategy in anticipation of a post-COVID world. After the US election result, however, we remain comfortable with our recommended below-benchmark overall duration stance and underweight allocation to US Treasuries in global bond portfolios. While a Biden victory combined with the Republicans likely keeping control of the US Senate was the least bond-bearish outcome - thus avoiding the big surge in government spending likely after a Democratic “blue wave” - there is clear upward momentum in US economic growth that suggests more upside for Treasury yields on both an absolute basis and relative to other countries. Cross-Country Divergences Are Starting To Appear Our recent decision to cut our recommended overall global duration stance to below-benchmark was motivated by our more bearish view on US Treasuries. However, a more defensive duration posture was justified by the rapid rebound in global growth seen since the depths of the COVID-19 recession. Our Global Duration Indicator, comprised of leading economic data, has been calling for a bottom in global bond yields toward the end of 2020 (Chart 2). The rise in global yields we are witnessing now appears to be right on cue. There are now more relative growth, inflation and policy divergences opening up that will allow country allocation to become a bigger source of outperformance for fixed income investors. Chart 2Global Yields Are Bottoming Importantly, inflation expectations across the developed world have yet not risen by enough to force central banks to become less dovish. This suggests that global yield curves will have a steepening bias over at least the next six months, with longer-term yields rising more on the back of faster growth (and additional increases in inflation expectations) than shorter-maturity yields which are more sensitive to monetary policy shifts. Those trends will not be seen equally across all countries, though. There are now more relative growth, inflation and policy divergences opening up that will allow country allocation to become a bigger source of outperformance for fixed income investors. For example, the October US manufacturing ISM and Payrolls data released last week showed robust strength, even in a month where new US COVID-19 cases rose sharply. Europe, on the other hand, has seen an even bigger surge in new cases, resulting in a wave of national lockdowns that has already begun to weigh on domestic economic activity. Thus, core European bond yields have remained stable, even with the euro area manufacturing PMI remaining elevated (Chart 3). We see similar divergences in other developed economies, with generally strong manufacturing PMIs and mixed responses from bond yields. When looking at the breakdown of nominal bond yields into the real yield and inflation expectations components, even more divergences are evident (Chart 4).1 Chart 3Mixed Responses To Rebounding Growth Chart 4Real Yield Trends Are Starting To Diverge Chart 5Discounting An Extended Period Of Negative Real Rates The real yields on benchmark 10-year inflation-linked bonds are slowly rising in the US and Canada, but remain stable in Germany, the UK and Australia. Market expectations for central bank policy rates, extracted from overnight index swap (OIS) curves, are currently priced for an extended period of low policy rates over the next few years. This is no surprise, as central banks have told the markets this would be the case via dovish forward guidance. Yet central banks are also projecting inflation rates to move higher between 2021 and 2023, even as they are signaling unchanged interest rates over that same period (Chart 5). Central banks are effectively telling markets that they want an extended period of negative real policy rates - a major reason why real bond yields are negative across the developed world. At some point, however, markets will begin to challenge the need for deeply negative real policy rates as economies recover from the COVID-19 shock to growth. Unemployment in the US and Canada has already declined sharply since spiking during the first wave of COVID-19 lockdowns. In the US, the unemployment rate has fallen from a peak of 14.7% to 6.9%; in Canada, the decline has been from 13.7% to 8.9% (Chart 6). This contrasts sharply to trends in Europe and Australia, where unemployment rates remain elevated. Chart 6Diverging Trends In Unemployment At some point, however, markets will begin to challenge the need for deeply negative real policy rates as economies recover from the COVID-19 shock to growth. With the Fed and Bank of Canada (BoC) projecting additional declines in unemployment over the next few years, markets are starting to discount a less dovish stance from both central banks. The US and Canadian OIS curves are now discounting one full 25bp policy rate hike by Aug 2023 and May 2023, respectively. This is a bit sooner than signaled by the forward guidance of the Fed and BoC. Thus, markets are now pricing in a less negative path for real policy rates – and, by association, real bond yields. Chart 7Markets Still Discounting Low Yields For Longer This contrasts to the euro area, Australia and the UK, where unemployment rates remain elevated. The recent surge in coronavirus cases across Europe means that the ECB and Bank of England will be under no pressure by markets to reconsider their current easy money policies. While in Australia, persistently weak inflation and, more recently, worries about an appreciating Australian dollar are keeping expectations for Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) policy ultra-dovish. Given the likely hit to longer-term potential growth from the COVID-19 pandemic, coming at a time of elevated debt levels (both government and private), markets are justified in pricing in a structurally lower level of policy rates for longer (Chart 7). Yet even in such a world, there will be cyclical upswings in growth and inflation that will upward pressure on bond yields. At the moment, those pressures seem greatest in the developed world in the US and Canada. This suggests that global bond investors should underweight both the US and Canada. However, the Fed seems more willing to accept a period of rising bond yields than the BoC, which has been very aggressive in the expansion of its quantitative easing (QE) program, which leaves us to only consider the US as a recommended underweight. Bottom Line: Joe Biden’s apparent victory in the US presidential race, as well as the announcement of a potential successful COVID-19 vaccine trial, are both bond-bearish outcomes. This is especially so for US Treasuries given the more resilient growth momentum in the US. Recommended Fixed Income Strategy After A Busy Few Days Joe Biden’s election victory and the potential COVID-19 vaccine do not lead us to make any changes to our main fixed income investment recommendations, which generally have a pro-growth, pro-risk bias that would benefit from the reduction in US political uncertainty and, potentially, the beginning of the end of the pandemic. On duration, we continue to recommend a moderate below-benchmark overall exposure. Our main fixed income investment recommendations, which generally have a pro-growth, pro-risk bias that would benefit from the reduction in US political uncertainty and, potentially, the beginning of the end of the pandemic. On country allocation, we remain underweight the US, neutral Canada and Australia, and overweight the UK, core Europe, Italy, Spain and Japan. The country allocations are determined by each country’s sensitivity to changes in US Treasury yields, particularly during periods of rising yields. We are overweight the countries with a lower “yield beta” to changes in US yields. We view Italy and Spain as credit instruments, supported by large-scale ECB purchases and more fiscal cooperation within Europe. We are not recommending underweights to higher-beta Canada and Australia, however, with both the BoC and RBA being very aggressive with bond purchases (Chart 8). On credit, the backdrop remains very conducive to spread product outperformance versus government bonds, particularly with the monetary policy backdrop remaining highly accommodative (Chart 9). Chart 8Global QE Has Been Aggressive We expect some additional spread tightening for developed market corporate debt as well also emerging market US dollar denominated corporates. In terms of regions and credit tiers, we prefer US investment grade and Ba-rated high-yield to euro area credit. Chart 9Central Bank Liquidity Still Supportive For Global Credit Chart 10More Global QE Is Good For Inflation-Linked Bonds Finally, we continue to recommend overweight allocations to inflation-linked bods versus nominal government debt in the US, Italy and Canada. Central banks will continue to err on the side of maintaining stimulative monetary policy settings to keep financial conditions easy to support economic growth. That means no hawkish surprises on the interest rate front, while also continuing to buy bonds via quantitative easing (Chart 10) – reflationary policies that should help boost inflation expectations.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 We have deliberately left Japan out of this analysis, as the Bank of Japan’s Yield Curve Control policy has effectively short-circuited the link between Japanese economic growth, inflation and bond yields. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns